1

Mster en Democracia y Gobierno

Departamento de Ciencia Poltica y Relaciones Internacionales Universidad Autnoma de Madrid

Working Papers Online Series

http://www.uam.es/ss/Satellite/Derecho/es/1242658791834/listad

oCombo/Working_Papers.htm

Estudio/Working Paper 165/2014

Accountability as a determinant of Quality of Democracy (Impact of the economic crisis on accountability on the examples of Poland and Spain)

Anna Marta Sroka

University of Warsaw

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1. Introduction

A large number of scholars around the world are presently taking on the challenge of

conceptualization and operationalization of the concept of quality of democracy, in both its

quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Various means of conceptualizing research on quality

of democracy have been developed, as well as associated methods for its measurement. In

most operationalizations of quality of democracy, accountability may be identified as a

primary determinant. In this article an analysis of accountability will be conducted based on

the examples of two countries, Poland and Spain. It will explore the level to which the global

economic crisis that began in 2008 impacted accountability in both countries. The analysis of

Poland encompasses the period of 2007-2011, i.e. the 6th term of Parliament, while 2008-2011

is the frame of reference for Spain. Each country represents groups of nations that have

undergone the process of democratization in recent decades. Spain is among the countries of

southern Europe in which the process of democratization began in the mid-1970s, and in

reference to which we may speak of a consolidated democratic system. Poland is a member of

the group of countries at the most advanced stage of forming stable democratic structures

within the states of central and eastern Europe, and which set out along this path at the

beginning of the 1990s. Of significance is the fact that both of them are European countries

and members of the European Union. On the one hand, this is associated with the introduction

of general European standards for accountability (such as the 2001 White Paper on European

Governance). On the other hand, however, membership in a structure which has been assigned

a portion of the competencies typically reserved for a state leads to diffusion of responsibility.

Thus in the case of both Spain and Poland we may observe the influence of similar external

factors on mechanisms of accountability.

Something that doubtlessly serves to differentiate Poland and Spain, apart from

differences in their respective political systems, is the impact of the global crisis that began in

2008 on the economies of the two countries. Spain is one of the countries hit hardest by the

crisis, while Poland is referred to as a "green island" as one of the EU Member States that

went through it practically unscathed. This makes it interesting to compare these two

countries and to seek an answer to the following research questions: firstly, has the economic

crisis affected accountability in Poland and in Spain?Secondly, to what extent did the

economic crisis influence accountability in both countries, if we take into account that it

affected the Spanish economy more severely than it did the Polish economy?

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2. Theory, terms, definitions and preliminary analysis

One of the first to develop the concept of accountability was G. ODonnell, who, at the

end of the 1990s, introduced a distinction between two types of accountability: vertical and

horizontal (ODonnell, 1997: 143-167). His theoretical proposition inspired a number of

scholars who then undertook to operationalize accountability (Morlino, 2004; Roberts 2009;

Morlino: 2009; Levine, Molina, 2011; Bhlmann, Merkel, Mller, Wessels, 2011). In spite of

these efforts, accountability continues to be used as a conceptual umbrella under which

various terms and definitions can be found. This concept often becomes a general term

applied in the case of all institutions vested with authority and responsible to the public,

which in consequence leads to the loss of its analytical value. This occurs for such reasons as

the fact that accountability is understood as a synonym of many loosely-defined concepts.

This paper adopts the definition of accountability offered by M. Bovens, according to whom

accountability is the nexus between an actor and a forum, in which an actor is obliged to

explain and justify his/her behaviour while the forum may pose questions and pass judgments

whose consequences must be accepted by the actor (Bovens, 2007: 7). G. O'Donnell's division

of horizontal and vertical accountability is also applied. Horizontal accountability is

understood in categories of the existence of state entities and institutions imbued with both the

legal authority and operational capacity to initiate activities stretching from general

supervision to sanctions of a criminal nature, and even impeachment in relation to the

activities or omissions of other state authorities and institutions. The author differentiates two

types of institutions: balance institutions and mandated institutions. Vertical accountability,

otherwise referred to as electoral accountability, consists not only in the guarantee that

citizens may choose their representatives, but also that they have the possibility to observe, to

settle accounts and to sanction them (ODonnell, 2000)1.

In analyzing horizontal accountability in Poland and in Spain, it is difficult to observe

an influence of the global economic crisis on the institutional architecture of its mechanisms

or the dynamics of the use of instruments facilitating accountability (Sroka, 2014)2. In Poland,

this likely results on the one hand from the conviction that the country is managing quite well

in the face of the global economic crisis. Indeed, this image of Poland has been reinforced in

1 In later work G. O'Donnell also introduced a sort of social accountability, including it within vertical

accountability. For more, see: O'Donnell G. (2004) Accountability horizontal: la institucionalizacin legal de la

desconfianza poltica, Revista Espaola de Ciencia Poltica no 11, pp. 11-31. 2 A. Sroka, Rozliczalno w badaniach jakoci demokracji. Na przykadzie Polski i Hiszpanii, Wydawnictwo

Elipsa, (in print).

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the mass media. On the other hand, the Smolensk catastrophe of 10 April 2010 resulted in the

death of many of Poland's leading political figures, including President Lech Kaczyski. This

topic essentially dominated the public debate during the entire run-up to the elections of 9

October 2011. In Spain, however, the government initially poured water on the idea of a

global economic crisis, and it was not until 2010 that this issue took over political life in the

country. Nonetheless, the steps taken by the government, including the passage of legislation

intended to stimulate the Spanish economy and reform the labour market, failed to deliver the

expected effects (IDE, 2011: 29-49). In spite of this, the very poor economic situation did not

result in changes to the architecture of mechanisms of accountability. However, the mass

media saw an increasing number of calls for reconstruction of the political system in Spain.

As for the dynamics of the use of instruments of horizontal accountability, they also exhibited

no changes in comparison to previous parliamentary terms of office (Sroka, 2014). Even the

shortening of the Cortes Generales' term by four months did not result from a vote of no

confidence against PM Jos Luis Rodrguez Zapatero, but was rather the result of his own

decision. Undoubtedly, however, it was a consequence of the charge of inaction in the fight

against the economic crisis.

The results of elections in Poland and in Spain in 2011 may, however, demonstrate

that the economic crisis influenced vertical accountability in both the former and the latter

country. Indeed, analysis of election results in Poland beginning from 1997, thus from the

moment at which the Polish political system may be acknowledged as having achieved

consolidation, reveals that the 2011 elections were of an exceptional character for the first

time, the same party (Civic Platform - CP) succeeded in winning two elections in a row3. It

therefore may be supposed that this is associated with the crisis, or rather the lack thereof,

considering the previously-mentioned minor impact of the crisis compared to other countries.

In Spain, however, the governing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (SSWP) lost the 2011

elections. It should be kept in mind that, in contrast to Poland, since the moment of Spain's

democratic consolidation in 1982 the same party managed on several occasions to generate

enough of an advantage to form successive governments (SSWP in 1982-1996, the People's

Party (PP) in 1996-2004, SSWP in 2004-2011). This allows for the assumption that Spanish

voters decided not to elect SSWP again due to the poor economic situation.

3 Civic Platform (CP) was the only party that succeeded in receiving enough votes to form a government during

the entire period of 1989-2011. It is worth adding, however, that in 2007-2011 it did not receive enough votes to

govern independently, and entered into a governing coalition with the Polish People's Party (PPP).

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One of the potential means for examining the extent to which the global economic

crisis affected vertical accountability in Poland and in Spain in 2011 is to examine whether

voters made use of economic retrospective voting. In this manner it is possible to determine

whether voters were motivated by the desire to reward or to punish incumbent parties for

their actions in the first years of the crisis. In respect of the foregoing, the following

hypothesis is posited: the economic crisis exerted an influence on vertical accountability in

both Poland and in Spain; in Poland, economic voting was not used owing to positive

economic results, whereas the poor condition of the economy in Spain led voters there to

punish the government in power at the time.

3.The economic voting model applied

For determining the extent to which we may speak of economic voting in Poland and

Spain, and thus whether the punishment/reward mechanism functions in both countries, three

independent variables have been adopted: retrospective assessment of the countrys economic

situation, prospective assessment of the countrys economic situation and retrospective

assessment of the political situation. The application of these independent variables was

necessitated by the following conditions. Firstly, the decision to apply a sociotropic

retrospective assessment of the economy while excluding an egotropic assessment was

determined on the one hand by the high level of difficulty in capturing the effect of a

governments activities on the economic situation of individual citizens; indeed, improvement

or deterioration of their situations may result from personal experiences, and need not be

associated in any way with decisions taken by authorities (Kramer, 1983: 92-111). On the

other hand, results of research conducted by both P. Grzelak and M. Fraile demonstrate that

in both countries the practice of egotropic voting is practically non-existent (Fraile, 2002;

Fraile 2005; Grzelak, 2003).

However, by capturing within the model not only a retrospective assessment of the

country economic condition but also a prospective one, the common criticism raised against

economic voting associated with a lack of realism in interpreting voting behaviours is met

head-on. This criticism is associated with the fact that the presence in models of only

retrospective assessments concerning the economy would indicate a situation in which voters

did not give consideration to proposals for resolving particular issues in the future by political

parties (Kinder, Kieweit 1981; Rattinger, 1991: 49-62). For this reason as well, the most

recent literature concerning electoral accountability assumes that elections exhibit a

prospective element and do not only serve to punish or reward the party in power, but also

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serve the purpose of selecting the party offering the best political programme. This is also

why the model discussed herein additionally contains a prospective assessment of the

countrys economy, which serves to indicate the expectations of voters.

Expanding the analysis with a retrospective assessment of politics results from the fact

that the dependency between the condition of the economy and the popularity of the

governing party is not as clear-cut as some may assume. Analysis of previous research results

allows us to discern that periods of economic growth are not necessarily beneficial to

governing parties, nor do they contribute to their re-election; the reverse is also true, that

periods of recession are not inevitably linked with the infliction of punishment on the

government and election of the opposition. One potential explanation may be the dependency

empirically ascertained by M. Fraile using elections in Spain during the period 1979-1996.

She demonstrated that voters negative or positive assessment of the incumbent party during

times of crisis is dependent on whether that party offers compensation to voters in the form of

social policy. Thus we are dealing here with an assessment of the government based not only

on the condition of the economy, but also for the type of social policy it conducted (Fraile

2002: 129-151). This is also why, in analyzing the link between the state of the economy and

public opinion, the political and social context must be included in the equation, which has led

to the model also capturing retrospective assessment of the political situation.

Additionally, as argued by P.C. Magalhes, L. Aguiar-Conraria and M. Lewis-Beck, an

assessment of a countrys political situation may be used as a rough indicator of the popularity

of the government because, as the authors emphasize, the aggregate-level correlation between

opinions on the general political situation in the country and approval of the government is

high (Magalhes, Aguiar-Conraria, Lewis-Beck, 2012: 770).4 This enhanced model of

economic voting, something more than a mere punishment and reward hypothesis, allows for

the distinguishing of various types of links between public opinion and the economy.

The applied model of multinomial logistic regression is expressed in the following

equation5:

Formula 1: Y= (retro. econ. op. + prosp. econ. op. + retros. polit. op. + control variables)

4 P. C. Magalhes, L. Aguiar-Conraria and M. Lewis-Beck examined the level of correlation between opinions

on the general political situation in a country and approval of the government. In Spain during the period 1993-

2009 it was r=0.81. 5 Election decision = 0 + 1 retrospective assessment of economic situation + 2prospective assessment of

economic situation + 3retrospective assessment of political situation + 4 political self-identification + 5 age +

6 sex + 7 jobless + 8 housewife + 9 student + 10 pensioner + 11 vocational education + 12 secondary

education + 13 higher education +.

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The dependent variable Y signifies declared voting levels for parties presently in

government or opposition parties. It should be emphasized, however, that due to particular

clusters of respondents it was not possible to distinguish all of the opposition parties, which is

why some of them were placed in the "other" category6.

The primary independent variables, e.g. retrospective general economic opinion,

prospective general economic opinion and retrospective political opinion, are of a

dichotomous character. For those who felt that the economic/political situation had improved

over the preceding year the value of (1) was assigned; for those feeling that the situation had

deteriorated or remained unchanged, the value assigned was (0). Similarly, for those declaring

that the economic situation would improve in a year, the value of (1) was assigned, while the

value assigned for those declaring either that the situation would not improve or would remain

unchanged was (0). Also, ten control variables were introduced of those typically captured in

analyses regarding individual-level voting determinants.

It should be added that the model does not capture respondents who did not vote in

elections. Doubtlessly, it can not be excluded that electoral absence may constitute a sort of

punishment of incumbent governments as well, particularly when we consider that Poland is

home to one of Europes highest rates of electoral absence while Spain records high rates of

voter participation7. Nonetheless, interpretation of the motivations for electoral absence will

not be placed under analysis, as this would significantly exceed the scope of this work.

Variables applied in the model

Poland PGSW 2011

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Spain CiS no. 2920

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Independent variables

Retrospective assessment of the

economic situation

x x

Prospective assessment of the

economic situation

x x

Retrospective assessment of the

political situation

x x

Control variables

6 The basis for selection was the small number of individuals declaring they had voted for a given party, or the

occurrence of blank fields at the intersection of levels of dependent and independent variables making it

impossible to perform a proper multinomial regression analysis. 7 Average voting frequency in Poland during the period under review (1997-2011) was 47.52%, while in Spain it

was 73.46%. From data available at: http://pkw.gov.pl/ and

http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/generales/index.htm. 8 Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze: http://www.isppan.waw.pl/subpage/pgsw/index.html.

9 Centro de Investigaciones Sociolgicas, http//www.cis.es.

http://pkw.gov.pl/http://www.isppan.waw.pl/subpage/pgsw/index.html

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Political self-identification x x

Age x x

Sex x x

Jobless x x

Housewife - x

Student x x

Pensioner/Retiree x x

Vocational education x x

Secondary education x x

Higher education x x

4. The macro-political economic situation

The points of departure for interpretation of results generated by the applied model are

the economic and political situation from the parliaments previous term in Poland of 2007-

2011, and in Spain of 2008-2011. In analyzing Polands economic situation it should be

emphasized that in 2007-2011 a drop in GDP was noted of -2.5%, as well as a very slight

decline in unemployment of 0.01%, along with a drop in the level of inflation of 9%. In Spain,

however, the period of 2008-2011 saw the most serious crisis in the history of Spanish

democracy. This is demonstrated primarily by a drastic increase in the unemployment rate of

10.4%, as well as declines in GDP of 0.5% and inflation of 1.4%.

Table no.1: : Leading macroeconomic indicators in Poland 1997-2011

Poland Spain

Year GDP

Unemploymen

t Inflation GDP Unemployment Inflation

2007 6.8 9.6 4.0 - - -

2008 5.1 7.1 3.1 0.9 11.3 2.4

2009 1.6 8.2 3.7 -3.7 18 0.1

2010 3.9 9.6 1.4 -0.3 20.1 0.4

2011 4.3 9.7 3.1 0.4 21.7 1.0

Source: Statistical Annex of the European Economy: Autumn 2012, European Commission, 19

October 2012, pp. 35, 49, 77.

In summarizing the levels of macroeconomic indicators in Poland and their effects on

electoral behaviours, it should be added that a typical characteristic of the economy in the

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years immediately following the systemic transformation that took place in Poland was

dynamic economic growth. Nonetheless, such strong economic growth need not necessarily

lead to the perception by citizens that the economic situation was improving, as the initial

condition of the Polish economy was very poor. The same level of GDP growth in highly-

developed economies would be felt differently, as it would bring with it a significant increase

in the general welfare. GDP levels in 2007-2011 require additional comment. In analyzing the

slight growth in GDP, one might expect the government would be blamed for it during those

years. It must be kept in mind, however, that 2008 saw the beginning of a global economic

crisis, which is why that level of economic growth was recognized not as a failure, but rather

as a significant accomplishment. In summarizing the economic situation in Spain, the selected

macroeconomic indicators demonstrate that the economy worsened significantly. For this

reason as well, in accordance with the responsibility hypothesis the year 2011 should see the

use of the economic retrospective vote. All the more so considering that, as previously

mentioned, unemployment is correlated with economic voting, and in 2011 the level of

unemployment grew by 21.7%, which represented a rise in unemployment of 10.3%

compared to 2008.

Proceeding to an analysis of the political situation, it should be mentioned at the outset

that the parties attempting to win re-election in the two countries were facing diametrically

different situations. In the 2007 elections, CP received 41.51% of the votes, translating into

209 seats in parliament, while PPP received 8.91% of votes and 31 seats. Donald Tusk holds

the position of Prime Minister, i.e. head of the government. A characteristic aspect of D.

Tusks cabinet, differentiating it from all previous governments since the restoration of the

democratic Republic, is that it managed to maintain its parliamentary majority for its entire

term of office. In addition, the first coalition between a post-solidarity group and a post-

communist group was formed. The governments of the CP-PPP coalition were regarded as

stable ones, in spite of the Smolensk disaster, which is no mean feat in Polish conditions. In

addition, Poland continued to be portrayed in the media as an "economic miracle" against the

backdrop of a Europe mired in recession. In Spain, the 2008 elections were won by SSWP, as

they had been in 2004. Election results of 46.5% of votes allowed J. L. Rodrguez Zapatero to

form a minority government. In contrast to the previous term, none of the nationalist parties

offered support to the socialists. The new prime minister was selected in a second round of

voting by a simple majority. In the face of widespread criticism concerning the absence of a

government reaction to the Spanish economys descent into crisis, early elections were held.

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Thus in 2011 the parties in Poland battling for enough votes to constitute another

government were CP and PPP. Opposition parties included LDA (Left Democratic Alliance

and LJ (Law and Justice). The results of research for the main coalition party, CP, are given,

as they do not differ significantly in both the first and the second case, and this interpretation

of the results would seem to be more transparent. In Spain, the party attempting to receive yet

again the necessary number of votes for forming a government was SSWP. Opposition parties

were PP, UL (United Left)-ICV and UPD (Union for Progress and Democracy). For each

election a separate category of "other" has been created, applying to parties that received

votes from fewer than 50 respondents in a given survey study. The results given below allow

for a comparison of the degree to which the economy stepped into the ballot box in Poland

and in Spain during the first phase of the economic crisis, both in the retrospective and the

prospective dimension, and also the importance of the role played by assessments of the

political situation.

5. Results

During the elections of 2011 in Poland, the party vying for re-election was CP (which

constitutes a reference category in the model), which governed in 2007-2011 in a coalition

with PPP. Analyses also included LJ, LSA, PP and PM (Palikot Movement). In analyzing the

results of the study it should be stated that economic retrospective voting was not used during

the 2011 elections, and by the same token the responsibility hypothesis was not verified. The

situation was different in the case of economic prospective voting. The prospective

assessment of the economic situation turned out to be a statistically significant variable for

those casting their votes for LJ, PPP and PM; the only exceptions were the voters of LDA. A

positive assessment of the future condition of the economy increased the likelihood of voting

for CP. Only in the case of LDA was this a variable that did not differentiate that partys

voters from those of CP. A negative assessment of the political situation was only statistically

significant for LJ voters, as in their case a negative assessment of the current political

situation reduced the probability of voting for CP. Ideology was also of importance to voters

of all political parties except for PPP. In the case of LDA and PM, the greater the degree to

which voters described themselves as left-wing, the smaller the probability that they would

vote for CP. In respect of voters of LJ, this relationship was exactly the opposite; the more

they felt themselves as right-wing on the left/right spectrum, the smaller the chance that their

vote would go to CP.

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Table no. 2: Economic voting in Poland during the 2011 elections

Variables

Vote for CP

versus LJ

Vote for CP

versus PPP

Vote for CP

versus LDA

Vote for CP

versus PM

Retrospective assessment of economic

situation -0.48 (0.30) -0.69 (0.47) -0.56 (0.50) -0.37 (0.35)

Prospective assessment of economic

situation -1.38 (0.28)***

-1.21

(0.43)*** 0.03 (0.37)

-0.83

(0.32)***

Retrospective assessment of political -1.63 (0.35)*** -0.60 (0.44) -0.85 (0.49) 0.31 (0.32)

Ideological self-identification 0.35 (0.05)*** -0.11 (0.06)

-0.54

(0.07)***

-0.21

(0.06)***

N821

Log likelihood888.943 LR Chi(48) 989.63

Prob>Ch0.000

Pseudo- R...0.183

***p

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all voters offered a negative assessment of the economy, including those who again cast their

votes for SSWP. This is why another variable would seem important, that of the prospective

assessment of the economy, which turned out to be statistically significant in the case of those

voting for the most important opposition party PP. However, a retrospective assessment of the

political situation was not statistically significant for the voters of any party, which most

likely indicates that the political scene was dominated by the economy. In accordance with

tradition, political self-identification was statistically significant. The dependencies were the

same as those in previous years, meaning that the more strongly voters identified themselves

as right-leaning, the lesser the chances they would vote for SSWP; in respect of UL, the

circumstances were exactly the opposite.

Table no. 3: Economic voting in Spain during the 2011 elections

Variables

Vote for

SSWP

versus PP

Vote for

SSWP versus

UL

Vote for

SSWP versus

UPD

Vote for

SSWP

versus other

Retrospective assessment of economic

situation -0.62 (0.45) -1.17 (0.67) -0.44 (0.69) -1.02 (0.58)

Prospective assessment of economic

situation 0.48 (0.24)* -0.33 (0.33) 0.53 (0.38) -0.35 (0.28)

Retrospective assessment of political

situation 0.58 (0.34) -0.25 (0.50) -1.57 (1.05) 0.14 (0.38)

Ideological self-identification

1.52

(0.09)***

-0.35

(0.08)*** 0.80 (0.12)***

0.31

(0.07)***

N.1269

Log likelihood1189.970

LR Chi(52)1064.96

Prob>Ch0.000

Pseudo- R...0.309

***p

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6. Conclusions

On the basis of the research results presented above, it may be ascertained that the

hypothesis in both Poland and Spain the economic crisis exerted an influence on vertical

accountability; in Poland, economic voting was not applied due to positive economic results,

while in Spain the statement that the poor condition of the economy led voters to punish the

incumbent government is only partially accurate. In respect of Poland, the hypothesis is

accurate in that economic retrospective voting was not used, which is a landmark in the

history of democratic Poland. Indeed, by applying the same model of economic voting in

1997, 2001, 2005 and 2007, thus from the moment of Polish democracy's consolidation, it

turns out that this hypothesis was confirmed in the case of all elections (Sroka, 2014). By the

same token, economic retrospective voting was used. In each case the party seeking re-

election lost power. However, the use of economic retrospective voting was not always

associated with a real worsening of the condition of the economy, such as in 2005 and 2007.

In Spain, however, economic retrospective voting was not applied in 2011, which may be

surprising considering the economic situation in that country. All the more so when observing

that by applying the same model in studies of voting behaviours in 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993,

1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, it turns out that economic retrospective voting was primarily

made use of by voters of the leading opposition party (depending on the year this was either

PP or SSWP) in the years 1989, 2000 and 2004 (Sroka, 2014). That said, only in 2004 did the

incumbent party lose power. Similarly to the case of Poland, the use of economic

retrospective voting was not always associated with a real decline in the economy. This was

the case in the elections of 2000 and 2004, during which an objectively positive economic

situation was viewed negatively by voters. A contrary scenario occurred during elections in

1986, 1993.

However, in analyzing the results of the research in the context of the global economic

crisis' impact on vertical accountability, rather than merely the use of the reward/punish

mechanism, it turns out that this impact was profound. In Poland it may have contributed to

the re-election of the same political party, which represents a milestone in the context of the

entire democratic period. In Spain, however, while voting behaviours may not be interpreted

as punishment for bad governments, in the eyes of Spanish voters it was clear in 2011 that the

opposition PP was more equipped to deal with the crisis. In conclusion, the economic crisis

influenced electoral accountability in both cases. The aforementioned results do not, however,

allow for a determination as to the impact of the level of diffusion of responsibility existing as

14

a result of both countries' membership in the EU on the use of economic retrospective voting,

and by the same token on punishment directed towards incumbent governments.

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http://www.falternativas.org/la-fundacion/documentos/libros-e-informes/informe-

sobre-la-democracia-en-espana-2011-version-en-espanol

http://www.falternativas.org/la-fundacion/documentos/libros-e-informes/informe-sobre-la-democracia-en-espana-2011-version-en-espanolhttp://www.falternativas.org/la-fundacion/documentos/libros-e-informes/informe-sobre-la-democracia-en-espana-2011-version-en-espanol