Wollheim - Hopkins 2003_What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual

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What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual?

Author(s): Richard Wollheim and Robert HopkinsSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 77 (2003), pp.131-147+149-167Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106996 .

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132 RICHARD WOLLHEIM AND ROBERT HOPKIN

of the experiences hat would undoubtedlytally witintentions could everbe had in front of the work as i

matter how sensitive,how well-informed the spectNow the fault lies with the work: it is too inept, tootoo over-worked.And, when either set of circumst

about, there are two things that can be said. Onartist's ntentionshave not beenfulfilled,either becations were unfulfillableor because the work failed t

The other is that the work lacks meaning,or is notstood. In real life both these things are thought

degree:an artist'sintentions are generally houghttoless unfulfilled,and works of art can be indicted foor that amount short of being fully comprehensible

In claiming hat therepresentational ropertiesof ato be explained n termsof the experienceappropriin effectcompressing wo claims:one structural,one

First, there is the broad structuralclaimthat the wstand pictorial representation s throughwhat we s

precisely,what we correctlysee,when we look at repthisholdingboth on a more general evel, and on alar level. It holds on a more generallevel in that wh

pictureto representsomethingis to be explainedbythe generalnature of the experience o be had in froit holds on a more particular evel in that what a gactually represents s to be explained by referencecontent of the experienceto which it gives rise. Thclaim

maybe

put by sayingthat

pictorial representtially experiential,hence, in standardcases, essentiaSecondly, there is the narrower substantiveclai

generalnatureof the experience o be had in fronto

tation, or what such an experienceis like. Is it fillusion, is it noticing a resemblancein some ressome partof the pictureand what it is therebyof, is

the imaginationin some specialway, is it using somode of

perceptionthat,

thoughalso called for in

contexts, is peculiarlyassociated with representatisubstantiveclaimthat I make is a version of thelast

a versionthat I have tried to identify throughuse of t



WHAT MAKESREPRESENTATIONALAINTINGTRULY

surface, and what is most distinctive of the phenosuch an experienceis what I call twofoldness, or t

single experience,but as separateaspectsof it, I amsurface and of a horse.For most philosophersof art, perhapsbecause th

concernedwithphilosophythantheyarewithart,mclaim, or the account that I have offeredof the motion involvedin looking at representationalpaintingto be the more interestingpartof my claim about th

pictorial representation.Furthermoremy account

widespead acceptance.But widespreadacceptanceofhas not equalledgeneralagreementon the topic. Qtrary:for the key notion in the account-that of secarrying,as indeed I recognizedat the time, its meface, philosophershave reinterpretedt so as to get t

representationthat they favour. They have smugappropriateexperiencemodes of perception,henceics theories of representation,that I had hoped t

seeing-inwould block.

Specifically want to consider two ways in whichbecome for philosophersof art a TrojanHorse to sfor their favouredtheoryof representation.One accefit in this way is that which grounds representatblance, and the other is an account that derives refrom a certain exerciseof the imaginationfor whicof make-believehas been used, and my argumentneitheradventure succeeds.

II

I start with Resemblancetheory, and shall take as tbest worked out, attempt to reformulate this theoleast the terminologyof seeing-inthat of my fellowin his book, Picture,Imageand Experience.'

1. RobertHopkins,Picture, mageandExperienceCambridge: asity Press, 1998). But see also ChristopherPeacocke,'DepictioReview,Vol. 6,no. 3 (July,1987),pp.383-410;CrispinSartwell,Naity and Imitation',BritishJournalof Aesthetics,Vol. 31, no. 1, (pp. 58-67, and 'Representation' in David Cooper (ed.), A Compani(Oxford:Blackwells,1992);and MalcolmBudd,'On Lookingat



134 RICHARDWOLLHEIMAND ROBERTHOPKI

At the outset, it must be noted that there are th

ways in whichit might be proposedthat resemblan

in the explanationof representation.All three can bwithin at least the terminologyof seeing-in.

The firstproposesthat a condition of seeingx in yis a resemblancebetweenx and y, hence betweeny

The second proposes that a condition of seeing xthere is a perceivedresemblancebetweeny and x.

(Note that, as we move from the first to the secoa fact, overlookedby many earlier resemblance-th

detrimentof their version of the theory, forces itsattention:that is that, whereasresemblance s symceived resemblance s non-symmetrical.)

The third proposes that there is an identitybetwin y and perceivingy as resemblingx.

So long as we hold to the view thatrepresentatioexperiential, t is only the thirdproposal that has aclaim on our attention.For it is only it that, tellinguabout what seeing-in is like, thereby tells us somwhat representations. The other two proposals,witsay about the phenomenology of the appropriathave nothing directlyto say about the nature of reI say 'directly': or, not only has the claim that seeseeing y as resemblingx (the third proposal) no aone also believesthat there is a perceivedresemblaand x (the secondproposal),but this secondproposbe a matter of continuing interesteven if the thir

abandoned,or it is no longer held that resemblanthe appropriateexperience.

I am awarethat, in regretting,as I do, the revivblancetheory,which only a few years ago had been

dead, I am personallyon shaky ground,and that is bhas motivated the revival is largely the sense th

experientialapproachto the natureof representatiobe said about what the appropriateexperience s li

be found in any accounts thus far offered of seeing-iso, it has been thought that an appeal to resembla

specificallyperceivedresemblance,can fill the gap,that accords with a e-old intuitions.2



WHAT MAKES REPRESENTATIONAL PAINTING TRULY

I too think that somethingmust be said about wto see something in a picture, and, the more that

said, the better.But to thinkthat enoughneedsto bsomeone who didn't believe that there are such econvinced of their existence is to succumb tostandards.

On the question where to begin, ProfessorHopkinominallyin agreement, orwe both seem to thinkth

beginwith the appropriateexperienceas a whole,or

twofoldness.3f we areluredinto beginningwithone f

or the other,so that we starteitherfromconsideringwhen we are a marked surface without seeing anytfrom what it is like whenwe see somethingface-to-f

try to work our way forwards towards the totalityby addingsomephenomenological eaturehere,subtfeaturethere, the attemptis doomed to failure.4

However, I concede that, in tryingto say what isthis flawedproject by callingits starting-pointand it

'incommensurate', hopedfor

too much fromwhatof the moment.

III

So on to the question:What, if anything, s wrong,owith understanding he appropriateexperience n frresentationalpictureas seeing one thing (the marke

looking like anotherthing (the represented hing, w

or event)?I shallpresenttwo objections, and I believethat

ficiently generalthat I am not required-as I would

3. I say 'nominally'n agreeement,ecause nfactHopkins's trateconsideringwhatit is likewhenwe see a marked urfacewithoutsein it, and then he moves forward o consideringwhatit is like whsurfaceas resembling omething lse;as faras I cansee,he nevercoexperience.

4. Compare rying o describewhatit is like to hear a tune in thefromhearinga tune in a concert-hall, nd thentaking awaycertaexperience, ndperhapsaddingothersfrom elsewhere.

5. A thirdobjection,which I developedn RichardWollheim,Art




arguing,not against, but in favour of, a perceivedaccount-to introducethe respector respectsin wh

ing to the account, we are supposed to see the resholding. Hopkins's own proposal on this score, thais 'outlineshape',or that we experience he solid angat our eye by the configurationon the surface as esubtendedby the represented hing, is interesting,bureservations.One is: Are solid anglessubtendedby oeye thingsthat can be the content of our perceptiois: Does not such a view of the respectin which sim

undulyfavour,in Wolfflin'sterminology, linear'ove'painterly' orms of representation?

So to my two objectionsto neo-Resemblance heBoth objectionsstemfromthe way in which such

or so I contend, to understand the appropriateexpfirstobjection s thatdoing so excludes a certainkindtational picture.The second objection is that doinceives the very nature of the appropriate expe

objectionsstart from the same broad featureof theof necessityit construes the appropriateexperienceseeing-as.And now let me point out that it is bec

starting-point,and the generalityof the argumenttthat I believethat, in criticizingthe Resemblancethnot need to take into account the respectin which

posed to perceiveresemblance o hold.The first objectionclaims that, if a picture repre

does because of the fact that we see it, or some presemblingwhat it represents,then it must be thateach and every case, a way of identifying theelement. To seey as resemblingx, we must be able t

y. And this unduly restrictsthe scope of representtherearerepresentationalpictureswhere we can ideof the surface in which somethingis represented, h

pictures-pictures that pre-theoreticallywe would

representational-where we can't. When TurnerdeShip labouring in the aftermath of a prolonged st

point to where the ship is represented,but we canwhere the aftermath of the prolongedstorm is rep



WHATMAKESREPRESENTATIONALAINTINGTRULY

face-to-face, the representedelementwould not beIn other words, the theory commits representation

wise unmotivatedrequirementof localization.6The second objectionis deeper,in that, instead o

one kind of representationalpicture that the theorit claims that, for every kind of representationalaccount of the appropriateexperiencethat the thdistorts the role played within that experienceby, fresentedobject, and then the representing urface.

cally, the accountplays down the role of the repres

andplays up the role of the representing urface.First, how is it that the theory that explains seeiterms of seeing y as looking like x plays down thethat experience?

It is surely a ground-levelobservation about tbetweenpictorialandlinguisticrepresentationhat, tare to understand a linguistic representationof x, ius to have a thought of x, we must, if we are to u

pictorial representationof

x,have an

experienceof

advantageof the account of the appropriateexperiof seeing-in is that it brings this out into the openthe required experienceof x with what is in effec

seeing x. However it is not necessaryto insist on sconstrual of how x enters into the pictorialexperienthe account of that experienceprovided by the rese

ory leaves somethingout. For, in order to have whaidentifiesas the appropriateexperience, t is not neceany kind of experienceof x. As Hopkins himselfcosuffices for someone to seey as looking like x is (1) aof y, (2) the thoughtof x, and (3) some kind of knoappearanceof x recruitedto the experienceof y. N

been found, let alone thought necessary,for an expthe representedobject goes unexperienced.7

What Hopkins concedes, Wittgenstein asserts.

opensthe famous SectionII xi of the Philosophical

6. Wollheim, p.cit., SupplementaryssayV.

7. Hopkins,op.cit.,pp.78--81,whereI take'being nvolved n an eshort of bein ex erienced.




with a contrast betweentwo differentkinds of situatwe mightbe struckby the resemblancebetween two

are two distinct kinds of case that we might think operceivedresemblance.One is when both faces arepand we are struckby the match betweenthem;the o

only one face is present,and it puts us in mind of thethe point that Wittgensteinwishes to make is thatthe first case that we have an experienceof the seconadd in the fact that, if we want to equatethe approence in front of a picturewith an experienceof perc

blance, then, since representations invariablyreprthe absent, it is only the second case of perceivedthat can be relevant.In other words,what might namost central to representation,or an experienceresentedobject, turns out, on the perceivedresembof representationwith, to be gratuitous.The role ox in y is seriouslyplayed down within any such the

Secondly,how is it that an account that explains

in terms of seeing y as looking like x plays up thethat experience?In the past, in arguing against illusionistic,or q

istic, accountsof the appropriateexperience,I have

that, when we see x in y, not only have we, as I ha

insisting,an experienceof x, but we are awareof y.of the markedsurface s foundational to my idea ofbut I believe it to be an exaggerationto identifythwith seeing the marked surface as somethingor oth

There is, it is true, a completelybland sense of 'swhich,when we reportourselves as seeing y as x, wethan registerthe fact, which is arguablyuniversal,trecruitedto our perceptiona thought, or that we pwe do under a certain description, where this tdescription,is something that we may be able tosome measure of success.9

However, it is not this bland sense of the term,b

sense, nowadays widely identifiedwith aspect-perceinvoked when seeing-asis looked to as providingth




way in which perceptionof the marked surface oftational picturecan deliverup its representational

it is this that I challenge.For, when I see y as x isense, I in effect use x as a kind of lens throughwhIn any such case, y is the focus of my awareness,a

capturingthe central cases is to say that I am carrie

my curiosityabouty, howeverinvoluntary t mightever fanciful a form it might take.

But none of this seems to match the true phenolooking at a representationwhen, out of my attentio

face y, there emerges an experienceof somethingthough my attention to the surface persists, it wou

deeply implausibleto say that the surface remains

my awareness,or that, in seeing somethingin it, I a

my curiosityabout it.This is not, of course, to deny that, once we have

x in y, we may very well develop curiosityabout juabout y, or about how it is marked,that inducesus

thing, specificallyo see

x,in it. But such

curiosityi

by, it follows upon, seeing x in y: it is not what

appropriateexperience.

IV

A quasi-positivisticstrand that runs through Hopkito the effect that we need to distinguishbetween thcal task of sayingwhat it is to see x in y, and the ptask of

discovering when,or in what

circumstanexpect to see x in y. Not merely am I disinclineddistinctionvery rigidly,but I believe that, at this stto Resemblancetheory requiresus to ignore it, anthe question, If it is true that perceivedresemblaenter into the appropriateexperience,might therenfor it as a condition, or concomitant,of representatwords,we should give resemblancea second chance

ing for Resemblance theory proper an account t

purely contingent connexion between resem

representation.However, this second option requiresus to ask (




As to the terms to the resemblance relation,observed that, if the relation is to be a condition

tation, neither term to the relation can presupptation: it must not be something that we can ithrough invokingrepresentation.

And what gives teeth to this observation is tha

pointed out elsewhere,one considerationwidely hethe connexion betweenrepresentationand resemblaas necessary or as contingent, very evidently tranprinciple,at least as far as the first term is concern

sideration I have in mind is groundedin the fact thsay in front of representationalpicturesthings like,like Napoleon,' or 'That resemblesa Deptford pink

However,if such remarksareto come out true,th

tive, the 'that', must be understoodin not the obvi'That looks like Napoleon,' 'That looks like a Depthe 'that' must be taken to refer, not, as we might ipose, and as a Resemblancetheorist would want, t

of the markedsurface,but to the historicalfigurehivery endangeredplant. And, if we take the 'that' in tare presupposing representation.For it is only rethat brings the reference of 'that', the man, theexistence.

(Incidentally,if we do take the 'that' in that wthing to note about 'That looks like Napoleon' andlike a Deptford pink' is that they turn out not to usof resemblanceat all. For, if both the first termantermnow referto what the picture represents, hereatwo terms between which resemblance could hol

quence 'That looks like ...' in 'That looks like Napol

something equivalentto 'Judging romappearancesthat what I am looking at is ...' It is, in other wor'looks like' that we use when Mary approachesus frand we say 'That looks like Mary.')

However, it might seem that, whatever difficultiebe with establishingthe first term to the resemblathe second term, the resembled term, is unproblsurelywhat the picture represents,or some part of i




seems reasonableto think that, at this stage,we ca

ourselves,and say that the respectin which we expe

blance to hold is whateverrespectin which it doesresemblancerelation were being used to explain rewhich it now is not, this would be intolerablycircul

laritydoesn't matter when we are only looking to ssion of resemblanceunderpinsrepresentation.

Nevertheless disappointmentawaits us. And thino matter how easy-goingwe are about the respectlook for the relationto hold, we shallnot find,for ev

tation, a resemblanceholding between its surfacerepresented.

To be convinced of this, let us momentarilyadoptview, not of the spectatorof a representation,but

Imagine an artist who is asked to depict, say NapDeptford pink. His basic task, though clearly no

expectedof him, is so to mark the surface that a stive, suitablyinformed,spectatorwill see in it the e

plant. What reason do we have for thinkingthat swill, in carrying out his basic task, be constrain

through getting the surface to resemble n some reswhat he wishes to represent?

At this point Hopkins re-entersthe argumentwination why we might fail to find the underlyingalthoughit is invariably here,and his explanation staken such trouble to get the resemblingterm to

right,we rushedinto errorabout the resembled er

y representsx, the perceivedresemblanceholds, nand x, or, as he puts it, x-as-it-is, as we have been abetweeny and (somethingnew) x-as-it-is-represent

If the suggestion appears to save the day, notResemblancetheory proper, which we may conclu

salvation,but for the contingentaccount, two quesThe first is: How are we to understand the phr

resented'?Is there a systematic way of picking ouwhere this is a representationof x, a correspondresented-in-y?

The secondis:What would the interest,or signific




Hopkinsseems to think that he has a systematicwa

ing the first question, which, startingfrom any rep

of x, will get him to an x-as-represented-in-y.Foentity he understandsas something(1) that exists e

and (2) whose every propertyis identical with some

the marked surface.Let us take as an exampleMatisse's famous port

ame Matisse, painted in 1905, and often called Th

because Matisse has run a line of green paint dow

of the face of the sitter. Now, of Madame M

resented-in-TheGreenLine, which contrasts with ato be called 'Madame Matisse-as-represented-iVert',which is to be arrivedat by startingfrom ano

of Madame Matisse of the same year, we can say (external to The GreenLine, and (2) she has a long

eyebrows,a puzzledexpression,and a greenline rher foreheadand nose and terminatingon her mou

I have to say that, if this is a promisingstart,how

less clear. For instance,out of what resourcessuppthe marked surface, do we endow Madame-Mresented-in-TheGreenLine with three-dimensiona

struggleswith this issue in what are surely the lea

pages of his book.'oBut suppose the task could be solved, I think t

question-What interestattaches to any perceivedbetween y, the representation, and x-as-repres

bringsus

upshort. For

surelyit is

onlyif

x-as-repis whaty represents hat a perceivedresemblancebe

this new entity should impressus. But it isn't. What

is x, and this is confirmedby the fact that the ar

representx as he did-or, as Hopkinswould put it,

jured into existence x-as-represented-in-y-becausthat that way of representingx did some specialjus

However that should not be the end of the matte

thatenough

has been said to establish that the no

represented-in-yraises some significant questions

passed over, about what may broadlybe called, th

the 'how' of re resentation.




There are three different contexts in which wethe how of representation.Two of these relate back

of representation,and how it is represented: he thithe representingsurface, and how it is marked.

respectivelythe Representationalhow, the Present

and the Material how. They call for elucidation.Of the Material how, nothing particularneeds t

this paper, except that it is through it that the othare realized,and these differ from one another in tresentationalhow correspondsto a propertyof the

resentation,possessedeitherpermanentlyor transiethe Presentationalhow does not qualify the what areflect a range of things from the expressivevision

through the artisticpressuresof the day, to the artilimitations.

Let me give examples: so (and this is the Rephow) when Titianpaintedthe EmperorCharlesV ohe represented omeone whose officerequiredhim t

man, which he was. When Degas paintedthe Duc ade Morbilli in an estranged pose, he representedcouple, which is what he probably thought all coupcontrast(andthis is the Presentationalhow), whenLand aboriginees painted stick figures, they we

resentinghumans who wereas thin as sticks. WhenPpainted the Madonna with a long neck, the Madon

represented s not, despite the title given to his picneckedMadonna. When Matisse

painteda stroke of

his wife'sface, he was not representinga womanwholine down her face. Sometimes it is an interesting swe are up against the Representationalor the Phow. When, in TheExecutionof theEmperorMaxi

paintedthe rebelfiringsquadin Frenchkepis,was hrumours he had heard that the Mexican rebels defor weapons and for uniforms on what they captuFrench,which would be the

Representationalhow,

the Presentationalhow-making the point that it wa

who, through putting Maximilian on the Mexican

ultimatelyhis executioners?



144 RICHARD WOLLHEIM AND ROBERT HOPKIN

that, though seeing-inis, in the first instance, a vis

open to all, it then, within the orbit of representati

is honed into a skill, upon which the sensibilityanedge of the right kind of spectator,who is attuned ttions of the artist, leave their mark. What this mea

spectator learns how to let certain parts of theaffect what he sees in the picture, and other parthow he sees it. What is to be seen in a picture e

Representationalhow, but the Presentational ho

excluded, and then let in only to modify how the

The long neck of Parmigianino'sMadonna can bepicture,but it cannot be correctlyseen in it, and so

allowed only to bringabout how the Madonna is p

V

My discussion of Resemblance theory concludesremarks on the

placeof

seeing-aswithin the

representation.In insistingthat seeing-in,as opposed to seeing-

to the appropriateexperience,I do not exclude sean overall account of representation.On the contraoccurs twiceover within any such account,but how

important.In the firstplace, seeing-as s a preconditionof the

experience.For me to be able to see anything in

tational painting,I must see it as a representationa

Secondly, seeing-ashas a role within the appropence,but a secondaryrole. For, whenI look at a rep

painting,and see somethingin it, I all but invariab

upon it a perceptualskill, and this is either a recogwhich is what allows me to see thingsof a particula

identificatory kill, which is what allows me to s

things. This means that, when I see somethingin

see it either as a thing merely of a particularkind

endangered plant), or as a particular thing (say,

Napoleon). Seeingx in y is standardlyseeingx asf




VI

In conclusion, I turnbriefly

to anotherattempt

tothe notion of seeing-inin support of a theory of rethat I believeto be in conflictwith what mightbe hointroducingthat notion. This time the attemptis inof the Make-Believetheory, as developedby Kendand whereasHopkins's theory, if I am right, distorof the visual experience appropriate before a reWalton's makes it hard for me to see how that expeual. Walton so little agreeswith me on this point th

that his theory establishes'the fundamentallyperceof pictorialrepresentation'.12

To settle this claim,we may start with Walton's bterization of the appropriateexperienceas (1) a comence, partly perceptual, partly imaginative, wi

componentslinkedinjust the way that I havecalledThe first thing to note is that if, for Walton, the

experienceis overall perceptual,this cannot be in

expressly perceptual component. For that is no m

spectator's looking at the marked surface in frontthat that can establish is that representations a visi

enon, or that as, say, with handwriting,we have to lwhat is there before we can understand t. It is a futo establish that representation s a visual phenomwe understanda representation hroughlooking at

So, secondly, can the imaginativecomponent in

whichWalton characterizesas the spectator's magiing at the markedsurface of the pictureto be his loothe representationrepresents,do the trick?An initiaWalton thinks it importantthat he talks of imaginto be anotherratherthan imagining hat one thingisI am sure it is. But its importance s not what we miWhat the preferred ocution securesis, not perceptwhole, but what I call twofoldness: it locks the two

11. KendallWalton,Mimesisas Make-BelieveHarvardUniverbridge,Mass., 1990),and most recently Depiction,Perception,a

to Richard ournal Aesthetics and Art




together. So we still need to know, Does someonehis looking at Matisse's canvas to be his looking

Matisse herselfprovidehim with a perceptualexperiame Matisse?One way in which this mightbe arguedfor would

be shown that this complex,or second-order,maginincluded,or otherwisenecessitated,what is a, perhaof imaginingthat is clearly perceptual: hat is, visuno reason to believethat it can be. Nor does Waltoit does, ratherthe contrary.And, as he was the firs

did,it looks as

thoughit would be at the cost of

How could looking at the marked surface and visuit representsbe locked together?

So, thirdly, is there some other form of imagicould be described,as Walton wants it to be, as iperceptual experience to be another, (2) could beensure overall perceptuality,and (3) could fill th

experience appropriate to pictorial representatithinks, Yes, and, in a recentarticle,offers some exa

Of these examples,there is one that I understanunfortunatelyit fails to satisfy the first or the thirdo not see how it has the structure that Walton c

and, not only does it relateto anotherart, but I doit can be adapted to the experience of lookingrepresentations.

The example goes thus:I attend a performanceof

fldte, sounds come to me from the flute in the orche

I imaginemy listeningto these sounds to be my listegeno's crude instrument.Now I believe that whatsuch a situation,which reconfigures t somewhatfr

description,is that (1) I imagine the sounds that Ilisten to the flautistto be sounds comingfromPapaon this basis, I hear the sounds coming from thsounds coming from Papageno. But, if this redescrrect, there is nothing here that is analogous to th

appropriateto

pictorial representation.For,as w

when we look at representations,we do not imaginbetween marked surface and representedobject,the

in -as that en o s centralit within the experience,




In other words, I believe that the experience t

brings before our attention is indeed one of make-

if it surpriseshim that I so readily think of seeinglisteningto the opera in this way, I see no compulsithis kind of experience o that whichwe have in fron

tational paintings.If a last-minuteconsiderationis neededto suppo

let me recall that, when I introduced the notion ofas characteristicof looking at pictures,I thought thmerits was that it could explain how we are able t

great masterpiecesof representationalart: for, by iwe are simultaneouslyaware of the marked surface

resented object, twofoldness allows us also to befineness of the match between the two that the geffected. But neither a great actress nor a greatstands to the charactershe plays like brush-strokcuro stand to what we see in them. They are not

how of their art, nor do we have need for a theory

them as such.



WHAT MAKES REPRESENTATI

PAINTING TRULY VISUAL

by RichardWollheimand RobertHo

II--Robert Hopkins

ABSTRACT I offer two, complementary,accounts of the vi

representationalpicturing.One, in terms of six features of deexplanatory ask. The other,in termsof the experience o which

rise, promisesto meet that need. ElsewhereI have offered an

experience hat allows thispromiseto be fulfilled.I sketchthat viit againstWollheim'sclaim that it cannot meet certaindemandsoaccount.I then turn to Wollheim'sown view, arguingthat it suffobscurities. These prevent it from meeting the explanatorydescribe,and are only exacerbatedby the demandsWollheim hi

I

n what does the visual nature of representationalindeedpicturing n general,consist?Some will rej

tion, denying that picturingis particularlyvisual.so on the groundsthat it is not speciallylinked toall. This reaction would be open to someone, such awho sought to definepicturingby reference o pureltures of the representationalsystem.' Or they maypicturing is perceptual,but claim that it is as tighother sense modalities as to vision. This is one reintriguing evidence concerning the ability of blinmake and understand 'tactilepictures'.2For currewill assume that our question is not undermined n

Assuming that picturingis visual, what renders ittwo answers,one too shallow, the other incomplete

1. N. Goodman,Languagesf Art(2ndedition,Oxford:OUP 1969

C. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciencesledge 1988).2. For theevidence, eeJ.M.Kennedy,Drawing nd theBlind LondsityPress1993).For discussion,ee D. Lopes, Art Mediaand theS



150 ROBERTHOPKINS

The shallowanswer ies in six featureswhich,I claiexhibits.Very roughlyput, the six are as follows. Fi

representationsalwayshave a relativelyrich contentdepictionof particularswithout the ascriptionof ceties to them, and, whether a particular is depidepictedpropertiesare relativelydeterminate.Secotion is from a point, perhapsseveralpoints, of view.what can be seen can be depicted, and any objecrepresentedas havinga visualappearance.Fourth,atorialmisrepresentations possible, it has limits. For

attempt to misrepresentan object's properties comfail to depict it at all. Fifth, to interpretpictorial reone must know the appearanceof the objects an

depicted.And sixth, interpretationdoes not requirePerhaps some basic competencewith picturingperwith particularsub-systemsof picturing,is also negiven such competence,it suffices,for one to under

picturedepictssome particular,kind or property,th

what those things look like.These statements are too crude and, even once rto challenge.3Nevertheless,I think the six can be dthat the featuresthey describeare important.Theyan answerto our question. They suggestthat pictuin being a form of representation hat works throuthe (visual) appearanceof things. That is why wha

representedmust have an appearance,and be represing one (featurethree);why its actual and represeance, although able to diverge, cannot do so w

(feature four); why, since something's appearancpoint of view, all depictionis from a point of view (why enough of the appearancemust be conveyed fto be captured (feature one); and why, if one know

thing looks, one has more or less all one needs to u

pictureof it (featuresfive and six).Although I endorse this account of picturing'svis

do not think we can rest content with it. It is, asshallow. At least many of the six featureswould hol

ally limitedlanguage,one in which speakersare fo




a party game from which there is no escape, to coto an audienceby describing heirappearance.Yet s

ing is visual as language, even in this speciallyrestis not. What is needed is a deeperaccount of pictotation, one explainingwhythe six features hold. Theeven when languagesharessome of these features odoes so for quite other reasons.Thus what is reallypicturing s pointedtowards,ratherthan captured,tures. Their true role is to frame an ambition everpictorialrepresentationshould have: to explain wh

features.Where are we to look for such an explanationbegin with the second answer to our question. ThWollheimoffers,and it is here above all thatmy debis both obvious and considerable.Picturingis visua

constituted,in key part, by the generationof a disti

experience.For a surfaceto depict, it must sustain aof this general type, and its pictorial content is de

the specific experiencesustained.Yet, as it stands, tincomplete.At the moment we know too little abou

ence, 'seeing-in', to be content with it as even theaccountof depiction.And we certainlyknow too littto explain the six features.

My disagreementwith Wollheimis over what morhow much more can reasonablybe said. (Perhapshnot accept my requirementthat a satisfactoryans

explanationsfor the six features.)I will turnto hispon these matters at the close (Section VI). I begi

hasty exposition of my own account,and a ratherted attemptto defend it from Wollheim'scriticisms

II

I claimthat seeing-inis an experienceof resemblanc

composingthe pictureare seen as resemblingsometdepicted scene, in a certain respect. I call that resshape',and in the past have defined it in terms of ththe marks on the one hand,and the depictedobjects



152 ROBERTHOPKINS

property, in his celebrated discussion of 'visible finotes that ordinary shape, be it two- or three-dim

matterof the differingrelationsin whichpartsof theto one another.Visiblefigure,in contrast,is a matt

feringrelationsof parts of the object to the eye. It

directionsof those partsfrom the eye. Their distanceVisible figure/outline shape is a genuine proper

Although Reid definesit by relationto 'the eye', it i

dent on any viewer.We can make perfectsenseof th

directionsof an object'sparts from a point in its s

without any claim about what occupiesthat point.is relative to such a point, and objects will in gen

many distinct outline shapes as there are points a

But this relativitydoes not undermine he objectiviterty. For it is a matter of mere geometrywhat out

given objecthas at a given point.Nevertheless,Reid was not mistaken to talk of 't

outline shape is something we see. Wollheim wor

experiencedoes not presentus with objectsas

subtangles. Perhapsthis claim will seemless problematiian version. We see, not only the 3-D shape of thidirections,from our point of view (loosely, 'the eytheirpartslie. We see, for instance,recedingrailwayallel (a matter of 3-D shape, the relations of their

another). But we also see opposing points on the lin evercloser directionsfrom our point of view, thethe section of track we consider. It is this, the perctracks'outline shape,whichprovidesthe converginof the lines.

Reid saw that since outline shape prescinds fro

dimension(distancefrom the eye), a flat surfacesuc

and a robustly three-dimensionalobject might mat

shape. And he saw that this fact might be central t

What he did not have available was Wollheim'sinsi

4. ThomasReid,InquiryntotheHumanMind1764,Ch.VI, SectihapsReid'snotionandminearenotquiteequivalent.Reidthoughtmanifested geometry istinct romthatrequiredo capture3-D shconceived. make no such claimfor outlineshape.At the least the

related and outline can be describedn Reidianter





154 ROBERTHOPKINS

Now, this difficulty with (2) stems from the claftermath of the storm is not localized when seen

That claim was not part of the original arguWollheim simply speculated that such cases w

depicted, provide the counter-examples n (3). Perhceding shows merelythat that speculationis false.

dropit, (2) remainsunchallenged,andthe aftermathserves to bringout the plausibilityof (3).

Although Wollheim has not offeredany argumeus suppose it true. Does the aftermathexample sh

correct?The obvious way to deny that it does is toaftermath s locatedin the Turner,thoughnot in anythan the whole. It is everywheren the painting.Noier presentationof the localization argument,Woll

pates and rejectsthis response.He does so on thethe 'everywhere' laim either(i) means that the depifills the picture as an object would fill a picture crcontours-a claim which would be false, in the

Turner;or (ii) that 'the replywouldjust be a way osay whereI see what I see,' and so would 'cohere withat there is no answerto the questionwhereit is se

This is unfair. Suppose that you are looking (facthe aftermath of a storm. You see as much of it a

shows, and no more. Where in your visual field,means simplythe rangeof 3-D spacerepresentednvisual experience, s the aftermath ocated?It is not

any partsmallerthan the whole, on this all can

anot somewherein particular.Yet nor does it seemthat it is nowhere. For one thing, if it is, the earli

against Wollheim's premise (2) goes through. Soshould rejectthis answer. And there areother, less

grounds for doubt. If your visual field expandedcby your changinglocation, or liftingsome blinkertoof the surroundings, hen the aftermathmight lie s

particularwithin the expandedvisual field. And sureason for thinkingthat it alreadyhad a locationthe field was narrower.Thus the only plausibledescoriginalcase seemsto be that the aftermath ay every




your originalfield of view. Precisely parallelpointspictorial case. There too, an expanded picture mig

aftermathas just part of a larger scene. Were it taftermathwould be depicted by, and seen in, some sthe surface. Once again, then, there is good reasontsmallerpicture,that the aftermath s seen somewhe

face,just nowhere less than everywhere.But what of the contrast with the picture cro

object'scontour?This phenomenontoo has its equiing face-to-face.As I approachan object,it fillsmor

of view. If it were the right shape, it might fill thprecisely, such that no part of its face is hidden frthere is no part of the visual field not occupiedby sit. The contrast betweenthis case and thatof seeingtis no less striking than that between the croppedthe Turner. But the former contrastcannot persuadaftermath is nowhere within the field of view, on

geringthe problemshighlighted n the last paragra

then, should it persuadeus of the parallelconclusiotorial case. In both cases, rather than retreatingtclaimthat the item is not seen,or seenin, anywhere,to make out the contrastin otherways. Either the crand the aftermathcases are not so different,afteralference lies in the contrast between items the locatiis a matter of continuous occupation of a spatialthose located more diffusely.

IV

Wollheim's other objection to my characterizatiocomes in two parts. That characterizationboth 'plrole of the representedobject, and plays up the rol

resentingsurface'.I take these in turn.The objectionfromplayingdown the role of the o

on the claim that what is sufficient for experiencedis insufficient or seeing-in.Wollheimreportsme as twhat suffices for the former is (i) seeing the mark

(ii) thinkingof the object0; and (iii) knowingthe a



156 ROBERT HOPKINS

resemblance.For the second and thirdmight simplyany difference o the first,one'sexperienceof the ma

One would then have just the experienceof the picwhen seeingit as a collection of marks,no more. Abe so even if one were aware(perhapsbecause one hthat the marks resembleO. Thereis no experienceof

until the look of P is transformed n the light of th

O.What more is requiredfor this last?I have no an

meansaddinga fourthconditionwhich is both non-

sufficient,with the other three, to securethe experirence.Thus,while I thinkseeing-incan be illuminatterized as experiencedresemblance,there are limi

think can illuminatinglybe said about experienceditself. Its ability to enlightenstems,not from the fa

be analysedwithout residue,but from its being a

with which we are all familiar, and not just in thform which is seeing-in.For seeing-inis the experie

blancein outlineshape,and there aremanyotherresvarious sense modalities, in which resemblancecaenced. Thus I agreewith Wollheim that (i) to (iii) dfor seeing-in.If Wollheimtakes me to be saying ot

haps that is because he thinksme more sanguineab

pects for an analysisof experiencedresemblance ham.

However, it is difficult to be confident that disa

readilyresolves into misunderstanding. concede th

do not suffice for a distinctiveexperienceof the ma

But Wollheim develops his objection around a paraboutwhattheyleave out:experienceof thedepictedI take it that Wollheimdoes not deny that, when

thing, 0, in a surfaceP, we experienceP differentlwe see nothingtherein. Thus he would acceptthat w

be tryingto do is capturea distinctiveexperienceof

he should acceptthat what is distinctive about that

preciselyits involving, in some centralway, the de

O. For together, these two claims simply capture t

depiction can be elucidatedby referenceto a disti



WHAT MAKESREPRESENTATIONALAINTINGTRULY

for the experienceof resemblance. But it looks asthinks that seeing-in involves more than this. It i

experienceof O (see his 'ground level observationwhat distinguishes pictorial representationfrom rein language).And nothing said above shows that theresemblanceview meets that demand.

But what is this demand? n what sense is it true thif we are to understanda pictorial representationof

experienceof [O]'?The last phrase cannot be readsince often there is no thing, such that P depictsit.

alternative s to readthe phraseas requiring hat weence as of O, experiencerepresentingO as beforeusnot that is so. The viewthat seeing-in nvolvesnothithis is illusionism. Wollheimrejects llusionism,butwhether he hopes to retain illusionisticelementsin

However, this suggestion introduces serious diffiexegeticaland philosophical.I thus postpone considI turn to Wollheim's own view (SectionVI). Settingonly alternative s to treattalk of

'experienceof

O'r

as meaning that seeing-in involves a distinctiveexpwhich needs characterizing n part by reference to

explained, so read, the demand is one the experiblanceview meets.

So to the objection's other part, that the experiblance view is fated to play up the role of the reprface. It is true that, at least often in seeing-in, althawareof the marks,one's attention is directed towa

visiblein them. It is also truethat, in certain clear caenced resemblance,one's attentionis focussedon th

object,rather than what it is experiencedas resemblcluster of rocks as resembling a bird in 3-D shintriguedby the way the head emergesfrom the concrags;perhaps by how only from this angle do theso that the 'bill' seems to belong with the 'head'.7

7. 1takethisexample o be a caseof experiencedesemblance hic

seeing-in. f one thinks hatseeing-indrives culpturalepresentatitorial,one may thinkseeing-ins involvedhere,after all. One defeview is its inability o distinguish culpturalrompictorialexperiencedresemblance ccount, n contrast,does so easily,by appeal



158 ROBERT HOPKINS

However, it is hard to see that the resemblerm

one's interest.Seeing the rock as the same shape as

might ask oneself what sort of bird the cluster looksansweringattend to the details of what it resemblein suchcases detailonly goes so far. One sees the roc

bling a bird, at a certainorientation,and of certai

portions, little more. But that will not be so in evethere are anywaydifferencesbetween these homelyexperiencedresemblanceand those with any claim tcentral instancesof seeing-in.Most obviously, the

experiencesof surfaceswhich have been carefullycisely to sustainthem, are ones in which the resemblterized in far more detail. This difference s one theresemblanceview must be in a position to acknowto be plausibleat all. The differenceWollheimpointa naturalconsequenceof it. The richer the resembl

naturallyit commandsone's attention.

VIn the rest of his discussion,Wollheim assumes th

objectionssuffice to finish off the experiencedreseas an account of the nature of seeing-in,and consitwo difficulties for resemblanceas a condition on imeans an account of why we see what we do in a gihow that surfacegeneratesthat experience.Now, awas nevermy intention to offer such an account. T

gest that Wollheim'sobjectionsto resemblanceas a

seeing-inmust, whateverforce they have, be passedever, it is at least possible that those objections c

experiencedresemblanceas an accountof seeing-in'Wollheim seems to think that they engage with asactual position. So I address them. I begin by explcome to distinguishthe question of what seeing-inquestion how, in any given case, it is generated.

Considerillusionism,the viewthat seeing-inpreciin phenomenology,the experienceone would have

depicted object face-to-face. Illusionismis wrong, a




of seeing-in.Illusionism is wrong,but informative,aof what seeing-inis. It makes a substantiveclaim a

in's nature, and would, if true, explain why seeing-of its features(includingall six with which I began).ism has nothingto say abouthow, in any givencase,surface sustains that specific experience of seeing-furtherobjection to the view?Surelyit is not. Thethese two questions are distinct. Certainly thisWollheim's view. For, despite his worry that the

'quasi-positivistic'his own account is no better pla

illusionistview to answer the second, 'how?'questiThose who have discussed resemblancetheoriesand critics alike, have found it far harder to keepapart. This is understandable,given that resemblaable to providean answer to the 'how?'question.B

does not show that it must. Since the questionsareresemblance heorist is free to choose which he inten

Moreover,if we distinguishsharply,as should be do

pasthas not

been,between resemblanceand

experiblance,we can see how the view bestsuitedto sayingin is may not even be able to say how, in any partioccurs. Just that, I suggest, is the position of my ac

One advantage of distinguishingthe two questiallows the experiencedresemblance view to offertreatment of misrepresentingpictures.As an accouure of seeing-in, the view claims that these pictureenced as resembling, n outline shape, whatever it iin them. Sinceex hypothesi hey misrepresent heirwe see in them is those objectswith propertiestheyally enjoy. The test of the view is then whether thseen as resembling hose objectswith the propertiesin the pictureas having. Supposewe see in the pictuenormous ears and wild staringeyes. Then the viethe marks are seen as resembling, n outlineshape, uwith enormous ears and wild staring eyes. In brief,is that resemblancebe experienced,not to the pictuit reallyis, but to that object as it is depictedas bei

This is whereWollheim'sremaining objectionse



160 ROBERT HOPKINS

any y, where this is a representationof x, a corresp

represented-in-y?'Wollheim goes on to suggest tha

is to take x-as-representedo be 'external'to y andpropertiesidenticalwith those of the marked surfa

prisingly,he then asks how I can account for the fa

pictures depict things of different 3-D shape fromthemselves.

I do not recognize my position in this descriptiosimple way to find out what the nature is of 'x-as-in-y'. It is to look at y and see what can be seen in i

and I are both committed to this procedure yieldinnate result, for any representationalpicture.For si

think that seeing-in holds the key to depiction, w

think that the facts about what can be seen in whaas determinateas the facts about what depictswhat.to say, of course, that what a given surfacedepicts,be seen in it, is always determinate.)Thus I appealto providethe putativeresembledobject.And the tes

is whether, for each picture, it is plausible thatth

seen as resemblingwhatever s seen in them. NoticeI have said rendersthis test trivial.

PerhapsWollheimwill replythat his objectionis, a

successfulif confined to its intendedrole, i.e. as dir

my view as providinga condition on seeing-in.For iview to explain whywe see one thing ratherthan a

surface, then it must indeed find some way of geobject from the marks,without appealto our indepof what can be seen there. This is reasonableenou

attempt to answer that question, and so am happthat the view cannot provide such an answer. H

responseon Wollheim's behalf does render some of

puzzling. How can he take me to offer a syste

answeringhis question,and how do I findmyselfstrthe problemof three-dimensionality p. 142), if eit

only arises as part of a projectI never undertake?

Wollheim's other question-cum-challengeies in habout the Presentational,Representationaland M

of representation. am very sympathetic o muchof




governs depiction, it need not govern it as a tyraspects of the (pictorial)content of a picture can

what is seen in it, although only in a particularwaaspectof what is seen in P need be depictedby it.8Tthen uses knowledge of the world, of our method

pictures,and perhapsspecific knowledgeof the artireconstructthe intentionbehind the surface,and hewhat it depicts. However, although some of Wollhtions echo those I used in makingthese claims, it mheart our views differ. I explicitly allow that wha

seen in a picture may divergefrom what the pictuPropertiesof the formermay fail to be propertiesThere are hints that Wollheim would deny this, insithat the spectator's 'sensibilityand knowledge' s fulin allowingher to excludeinappropriateexperienceleaving her with an experiencewhich captures perfture'scontent.This disagreementwould be interestisince Wollheimdoes not firmlynail his colours to tI shall not

pursuethis theme.

VI

I close by raisingsome questionsfor Wollheim's o

thought I understood his view. I took it to be t

Seeing-inis an experiencewith two aspects, or 'fol

configurational old, is 'capableof being describedto' seeingthe markswithoutseeing anythingin the

recognitional,fold is similarly analogous to seeingobject face-to-face. Nothing more can usefully b

quite how each fold is analogous to the independewith reference to which it has been described:'Wmuch into erroras into confusion if ... we ask how elike or unlike each aspect is to the analogous expetwo folds occur simultaneously,as part of an integ

My centralcomplaintagainstthis view is that it f

philosophicalwork which is the properduty of eve

8. See Hopkins, op. cit., Ch. 6.



162 ROBERT HOPKINS

depiction. It cannot explain any of the six featureI began. It starts in the right place. By insisting t

incorporatesa fold related to face-to-face visual ethe picture's object, the account at least promisestosix. But its refusal to say anythingabout how the rfold is analogous to seeing O face-to-face dooms

not to be fulfilled. For instance, all depictionis froview (my second feature).Wollheimmight hope to

by appealto the thought that depictioninvolvesseeiinvolves the recognitional fold, which is analogou

face experienceof the object, which is itself necesspoint of view. But whetherthe explanationgoes throon the details.After all, not everyfeatureof face-toence of O is preserved n seeing-in. Why should th

particularbe carriedover?Wollheimis entirelysilenmatter which could providean answer,the detail of

between the recognitionalfold and face-to-face exhe says is that the two are in some way analogou

that it would be a mistake to ask for more on hrelated experientially,and he tells us nothing abourelations.So, while Wollheim thinks I say more thaI think he says less than is required.

Thus the view, as I understandit, and my mai

againstit. However,my confidencethat I understan

position is weakenedby some of the claimsin his pwith a matter postponed above (Section IV), Wollence on the role, in seeing-in,of experienceof the deLet us call this the objectdemand. said that it wasthis is. It is now clear at least that, whatever it isnitional fold is what allows Wollheim's own accouBut this only deepens the mystery.As noted, therthree ways to interpretthe demand.We can read 'e0' relationally,readit as requiring hat room be maence as of O, or take the whole phraseas an ill-chosof the thought that the marked surface is experietively in light of the thought of O. Having set aside

third,we are left with the second. We need to makesecond reading of the demand in such a way that




Illusionismenters the framebecause the paradigas of O is an experiencepreciselymatchingthe phe

of actually seeing O. According to illusionism, seeisuch an experienceas of O. Confrontedwith this v

simplicityand explanatorypower,but also with its

ity, one might react in either of two ways. The radis to seek a completelyfresh start with the probleexperience.The resemblanceview is one way to deresponse.It takes seeing-into have a structurecompent from that of ordinaryseeing.In placeof havinga

as of O, it puts experiencingone thing,P, as resembO. The more conservativereactionis to attempt tothe illusionistview, until it becomesplausible.Perhdoes not have preciselythe phenomenology of seeiflesh, but are the two not at least akin, phenospeaking?Thus one might weaken the claim frommatch to phenomenal similarity,and/or suggestthais only part of the overall experienceof seeing-in.awareof the marks before

one,and

awareof themDoes Wollheimadopt the radicalor the conservatOf course,he does not imposethe structureof experiblanceon seeing-in.But his own account does introd

quite distinct from seeing face-to-face.Further,heit would be a mistake to attemptto build an accouin startingfrom the experienceof seeing things in

perhapshis reactionis the radicalone. However,heread as a conservative.After all, he is only explicitlto two differences between seeing-in and seeingFirst, seeing-in involves the configurational fold,somehow analogous to seeing the marks withoutof them. Second, even the recognitional fold does

phenomenalmatch with seeing O in the flesh. Inst

merelyto some degree,or in someway, analogoustoence. Moreover,this conservativeresponseseems tothe second readingof the object demand. Seeing-iinvolve experience as of O, in that one fold of t

experience s analogous to seeing O face-to-face.

Unfortunately,this way to resolvethe exegetical







166 ROBERTHOPKINS

same is true of any plausibleaccount of seeing-in.I

the phenomenologyof seeing-inwith that of seeing

we can explain how it enables us to engage withbeauty. For face-to-faceseeingis the paradigmof ebeauty, and it is very plausible that its being so dephenomenology.But by now the readerwill not neethat it is highly implausibleto identify the phenomseeing and seeing-in.And, as soon as we move torelation between the two, our ability to explain th

seeing-invanishes.For in generalour engagementw

dependenton the precise nature of our experience.ences in our experienceof an objectcan affect whethfind it beautiful.Thus this fourth and final readingdemandleaves Wollheimat a familiardialectical mhis own view meets the demand in virtue of beinillusionism,in which case it is false; or it avoids th

is no betteroff, with respectto the demand,than theresemblanceaccount.

It is possible that Wollheimwill considermy treaobject demand,and for that mattermy earliertrealocalizationobjection,to be vitiatedby neglectof aclaims.He emphasizes hat seeing-in s 'a particularception', or, as he sometimes puts it, 'a mode of

depictedobject.This last formulation threatensto dinto the mire of the object demand and its interpthere is a distinct point which Wollheim might bedevotes a

gooddeal of

effort,at least in his later

distinguishingseeing-infrom seeing-as.12He explici

experiencedresemblanceto be an example of the

force of the idea of a distinctperceptualmode is thuvisual experiencecomes in severalforms-ordinary

perceiving,visualizing,and seeingone thing as anotin cannot be subsumedunder any of these broad cforms a new item on the list. On this view, I mistacontours of the landscape here, so construingseeiends up in one of the other categories, seeing-as.A

may think that acknowledgingthis fact reinstates h




to my position. For perhapshe takes experiencedrebe subject to localization constraints, and to fail

object demand,only becauseit is a form of seeing-I rejectthis view of the intellectualspace.At root,

is that I am unsure that 'seeing-as'namesany unifie

category.There are cases traditionallytaken as centof seeing-as,such as those Wittgensteincompiled i

gations Part II, Section xi. But even between thoseences seem as salient as similarities,a point I takehimselfto make.Any levelat whicha commonfeatu

say in the idea that they all involve experience'spethought-is sufficientlyabstract that seeing-in alsthat feature.Why think, then, that there are any fmon to cases of seeing-asand distinguishingthemin? Of course, one of Wollheim'sgoals, here and elbeen preciselyto identify such generalfeatures(e.gation requirement,and inabilityto meet the object das the above indicates, I remain unconvinced eith

ported cases of seeing-as always exhibit these featseeing-infails to exhibit them. In short, while I accdifficult to describe the notion of experiencedreseout using such formulations as 'seeing (or experienciI doubt the significanceof this is more than graminsofar as I struggle to grasp the central categoryWollheim wishes to distinguishseeing-in,as a mod

tion, I do not find his appeal to this last notion mhis

position.'3

Documents

Wollheim - Hopkins 2003_What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual