Wittgenstein's Critique of the Tractatus View of Rules

8/12/2019 Wittgenstein's Critique of the Tractatus View of Rules

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D I A N E F . G O T T L I E B

W I T T G E N S T E I N ' S C R I T I Q U E O F T H ET R A C T A T U S V I EW O F R U LES*

1 . I N T R O D U C T I O NOf the three main doctrines of the Tractatus namely, the picture theoryof meaning, the truth-functional thesis, and the theory that all logicaltruths are tautologies, at least the truth-functional thesis was un-equivocally repudiated by Wittgenstein by 1930 1 Motivated by thedesire to provide an accoun t of the definiteness of Sense contained in theseemingly vague sentences of ordinary language, the truth-functionalthesis held that on any occasion when a sentence of ordinary languagewas meant and understood, the sentence was analyzable into theelementary propositions of which it was a logical product. Implicit in itwas a view of rules which, when made explicit, can be seen to be thetarget of several of the themes about rules propounded in the Philoso-phical Investigations. The purpose of this paper is to relate Wittgenstein'sdissatisfaction with the truth- funct ional thesis (early statements of whichappear in 1930 when he returned to philosophy) to the critique of theTractatus view of rules which can be discerned in the PhilosophicalInvestigations.The topic of rules is not so prominent in the text of the Tractatus as it isin Wittgenstein's published works from the Philosophical Grammar tothe Philosophical Investigations. During the period in which the Trac-tatas was conceived and written, Wittgenstein was aware of no specialphilosophical problem attaching to the concept of rule . He used theterm in an unselfconscious and unreflective way. It achieved importancefor him as a problematic concept2 only after he had made some attemptsin the early thirties to correct what he had come to believe werefundamental errors in the Tractatas philosophy. In the PhilosophicalG r a m m a r the Blu e a n d Bro wn Bo o ks and in the seven parts of theRem arks on the Foundation o f M athemat ics written form 1937 through1945, can be seen the trail of the development of his thought on rules upuntil the version that is found in various clusters of remarks in the text ofthe Philosophical Investigations Part One. My paper focuses on a fewpoints on this long and winding trail: a brief sketch of the role of rulesSynthese 5 6 ( 19 8 3 ) 2 3 9 - 2 5 1 . 0 0 3 9 - 7 8 5 7 / 8 3 / 0 5 6 2 - 0 2 3 9 0 1 .3 0Copyright 0 1 9 8 3 by D. Reidel Publishing Co. Dordrecht Holland and Boston U.S.A.


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240 D I A N E F G O T T L I E B

in the Tractatus, the presenta t ion and explana t ion of Wi t tgens te in ' srepudiat ion of the t ruth-funct ional thesis from 1930 to 1934, and final lyin te rpre ta t ion of a few themes of the P I t rea tment of ru les tha t a rei l lumina ted by the unders tanding of the i r h is torical back gro und wi th inthe Wit tgens te in corpus .The l i t e ra ture on Wit tgens te in ' s Philosophical Investigations untilrecent ly conta ined re la t ive ly l i t t l e comment on the passages in the P Idea l ing wi th the topic of ru les . Some com men ta tors take for granted tha tWit tgens te in be l ieved tha t meaning i s ru le governed in the PI, 3 andothers , no tably S tanley Cave l l and Jam es B ogen , 4 a rgue tha t in the P Iphi losophy of language ru les a re not important to meaning. In a paperconta ined in a recent ly publ i shed anthology of essays ent i t l ed Witt-genste in: To F ollow a Ru le , 5 G or don Ba ke r p re se n t s a n ove rv i e w of t hecomp lex of phi losophica l i ssues involved in the Investigations passageson rules, and makes the fol lowing two cla ims. First , Wit tgenste in 'spurpose in the rules discussion in the P I is not to deny that language isru le gov erne d or , I would add, to asse r t it ; but ra ther to mak e c lea r wha t i tmean s to say tha t the use of language i s ru le governed . 6 Second, thecr i t ica l examina t ion of phi losophers ' myths about ru les and rule -fol lowing in the Invest igat ions i s a d i rec t deve lopment f rom Wit t -genste in 's earl iest cri t ic ism o f logical a tom ism . 7 I t is this la t ter p oint thatI a im to develop in this paper. I wil l emphasize centra l features of thecri t ique of logical a tomis m n ot so far found in the l i tera ture , in part icular,an e laborat ion of the role of thinking in the t ruth-funct ional thesis , andan in te rpre ta tion of the machine ana logies conta ined in P (193 , 194)in the co ntex t of the cri t ique of logical a tomism. 8

2. R U L E S I N T H E TR CT TU STh ere a re a num ber of passages form the per iod 1930 through 1934, inthe Phi losophical Gram ma r and in Waismann ' s repor t s of Wi t tgens te in ' sconversa t ions wi th the Vienna Ci rc le which make pla in Wit tgens te in ' sdissat isfact ion with the doctrine of logical analysis contained in theTractatus. 9 The main e lements of the doc t r ine of logica l ana lys is towhich Wit tgens te in re fe rs in these passages can be paraphrased roughlyas fol lows: All proposi t ions with sense, including the proposi t ions ofeveryday language , have an ana lys is in to e lementa ry proposi t ionsconsist ing of comb inat ion s of s imple signs, names in com binat io n. This isbecause a l l sentences wi th sense , inc luding the sentences of everyday


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T H T R C T T U S V I W O F R U L S 241

language , a re in perfec t logica l order . 1 By ord er , Wi t tgens te in m eanstha t they have a de te rmina te or de f in i te sense in cont ras t to a vagueone.1 ~ If a propo si t ion has a defini te sense, then i t mu st b e pos sible that i thave an ana lys i s in to e lementa ry propos i t ions cons is t ing of names incom bin a t ion J 2 Th e mot iva t ion for th i s doc t r ine is i llumina ted byWit tgens te in ' s re t rospec t ive v iew of i t in Philosophical Investigations,98 through 103. P I 98 echoes Tractatus 5.5563: Al l the pro-pos i t ions of our everyday language , jus t a s they s tand, a re in perfec tlogica l ord er , and po ints out tha t thi s thes i s comb ined w i th theobserv a t ion tha t the sentences of our ever yday language a re app arent lyva gue p rodu c e s t he re su lt tha t t he re mus t be pe r fe c t o rde r e ve n in t heva gue s t s e n t e nc e . P I 101 emphas izes tha t the n ot ion of the re be ing alogical analysis of every proposi t ion with sense was the resul t of apreconcept ion , a preconcept ion tha t exis ted despi te the fac t tha t theauthor of the Tracatus did not see how the e lem enta ry propos i t ions werehidd en in the visible s ign, did not see ho w the simp le signs with defini tesense were conta ined wi th in the apparen t ly vag ue sense of the phys ica lsigns.

What is the role of rules in this account? The handful of expl ic i tremarks on the topic of ru les in the Tractatus can be c lassified in asuperfic ia l way into two groups: (1) those which me ntio n rules of logicalsyntax ; and (2) those which speak of t rans la t ion ru les for thet rans la t ion of one languag e in to an other . 13 No ne of them bear anexplic i t re la t ion to the do ctrine of the logical analysis of prop osi t ions w ithsense in to a logica l produc t of e lementa ry propos i t ions . Once aga in ,Wit tgens te in ' s re t rospec t ive v iew of the doc t r ine in the PhilosophicalInvestigations proves to be he lpful . From the perspec t ive of the P Ilooking ba ck on h is Tractatus view, Wit tgens te in sees i t as fo l lows: Theidea l of a language wi th def in i te sense i s reconc i led wi th the apparentva gue ne ss o f e ve ry da y l a ngua ge b y me a ns o f a hypo the t i c al p roc e ss o fanalysis that takes place wh en la ngu age is used. 14 Th e unan alyzedpropos i t ion may appear to be vague and indef in i te ; and f rom theTractatus view poin t an indefini te sense is not a sense a t a ll . How ev er, i f a

. IS *person means o t U nders tands a sentence , i t must h ave a sense ; and i f i t hasa sense, i t 1 ~ hav e a defini te sense. Ru les for the t ransla t ion of thepropos i t iona l s igns of the sentences of everyday l i fe in to e lementa rypropos i t ions wi l l p lay a ro le in the menta l processes of meaning andunders tanding. When I unders tand, the ru les must be ava i lable to me ,a lbe i t d imly , in order to regula te the t rans la t ion procedure PI, 102).


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We will see that by 1930 Wittgenstein will repudiate the doctrine onthe grounds that at the root of [it] there was a false and idealized pictureof the use of language PG, p. 211).

3 T I l E B A S I C C R I T I C I S M O F L O G I C A L A T O M I S MA repeated theme of passages from Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circleand passages from the posthumous ly published Philosophical Gram marcan be paraphrased as follows: the mistake in the notion of analysis wasthat if it were true that every sentence with sense were a truth funct ion ofelementary propositions, then the logical product of these elementarypropositions would in some way be contained or hid den in thesentence itself. But what could this mean? It might mean that theanalyzed form of the sentence was hidden in the unanalyzed form,as a quotient is hidden in the sign 753/3. In the arithmetical case, wehave a method for determining the quotient, and when we carry outthe calculation the heretofore hidden quotient is brought out into theopen.

In the Tractatus, when Wittgenstein spoke of a comple te analysis ofa sentence with sense, he spoke as if there were a calculus according towhich the analysis could be carried out. But he had only the vaguestnotion of such a calculus, a not ion suggested by the analysis that Russellhad given of the definite article. Lacking such a calculus, what sensecould be given to the notion of a complet e analysis or a logicalproduct.., hidden in a sentence ? Just as a division in arithmetic iscarried out in accordance with calculation rules, an analysis wouldrequire a method of carrying it out. But there was no method. Blackquotes Wittgenstein: the false concept that Russell, Ramsey and I had.So that one awaits a logical analysis of facts, as if for a chemical analysisof compounds. 15

4. A N O V E R V E W O F T H E PI C R I T I Q U E O FT H E TR CT TU S V I E W O F R U L E S

At about the same time as the origin of the passages stating the basiccriticism of logical atomism, there appear three themes which are to haveimportant consequences for the development of his conception of a rulein the Philosophical Investigations. In the first place, he draws adistinction between a connection set up by means of a mechanism and a


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connection set up in a calculus. In a mechanism, the effect canunexpectedly be determined by some unforeseen occurrence such as themalfunctioning of the mechanism for various reasons. In a calculus, theresult is not dependent upon, nor vulnerable to, the accidents of fortune.In the second place, he expresses a determination to avoid in hisphilosophy explanatory appeals to the occult appearance of the processof thi nk in g. ., a n d . . , to replace in these processes any working of theimagination by acts of looking at real objects Blue Book , p. 4). In thethird place, he changed his attitude towards the relation of rules andlanguage. The preconceived notion of an analysis that must be takingplace according to strict rules was replaced by a metaphor which lay atthe bottom of a new method of investigation. 16 This feature ofWittgenstein's technique has two aspects: the construction of specificlanguage-games, and the comparison of specific characteristics oflanguage to characteristics of games played according to definite rules,where the comparison is made not in relation to a specific language-gameas such. 17

By the time of the PI, the distinction between a mechanism and acalculus has developed into a decisive objection against one inter-pretation of the Tractarian notion of the role of rules in meaningmeinen) and understanding. The objec tion consists of two main points:the uncovering of a logical inconsistency in the conception of a rule as a

part of a mechanism of any sort; and the arguments specifically directedat the conception of a rule as a part of a mental process, event ormechanism. There is some effort in the P I to lay out a model of the role ofa rule of language, alternative to the rule in the menta l-medium picture,and to describe the grammar or use of the expression to follow a rule ;but much of the discussion of rules in the P I makes use of the gamemetaphor to support points made about rules of language in lieu of amore direct approach.Two fundamental criticisms of the Tractatus view of rules can bediscerned in the P I discussion. First, where the Tractatus had claimedthat what could be said could be said clearly, implying that the rules forthe use of language were definite and exact, the P I argues tha t rules oflanguage ought not be presumed to have strict application. Witt-genstein's views about the vagueness of applications of rules are by nowfairly well digested, and in any case are thoroughly explained in Volume1 of Baker and Hacker's commentary on the P I. ~8Second, it is logicallyinconsistent to think of a rule of language as something functioning in a


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men tal m edium . It is this seco nd poin t that I wil l e lab ora te in this pap er inwhat fol lows.5 R U L E S A N D T H I N K I N G I N T H E P

Early in the PI (PI , 53, 54) , Wi t tgens te in ske tches a concept ion ofus ing language according to a ru le tha t avoids any ment ion of menta lprocesses , and cons t ruc ts the conc ept ion out of desc r ip tions of mate ria l sthat are public objects and act ions. I t should be noted that this effort isnot in tended to provide a genera l account of the ro le of a ru le ofl a ngua ge . The P I conta ins no such genera l account . The par t icula rpu rpo se o f these rem arks is to show that a rule for the defini tion of colors ,connec ted to a par t icula r language-game des igned to conform to theTractatus accou nt of language , involves nothing occul t . The i r t a rge t i st he v i e w tha t t he c o r re sponde nc e b e tw e e n na me a nd ob je c t is a que e rc onne c t ion o f a w ord w i th a n ob j e c t (PI, 38), e f fec ted by som eremarkable ac t of mind, as i t were a bapt i sm of an objec t (PI, 38).

This ske tch of the ro le Of a ru le of language appears in connec t ion wi ththe language -gam e des igned to conform to the concep t ion of the sense ofa se n t e nc e a s be ing c ompose d o f na me s tha t c o r re spond to p r ima ryelemen ts, a featu re o f his logical a tom ism in the Tractatus. The w ords ofthe language a re names of pr imary or s imple e lements , and the sequ encesof words a re a complex of names to which correspond a complex ofe lements . Th e remarks on the ro le of ru les in thi s concept ion of languageoc cu r in the midst of a long discussion of logical a tomism w hich cri t ic izesi t from a varie ty of angles. P 51 through 54, the remarks on ru les ,a l though occurr ing in the mids t of th i s c r i t ique , may be a t tached tolanguage-game 48 for only compara t ive ly inc identa l reasons . Theapplicat ion of the language in 48 is exact ( the not ion of familyrese mb lanc e or f luctuat ing d efinit ions has no role in the applicat ion o f i tse lementa ry s igns) ; each word corresponds to an objec t ; the d is t inc t ionbe tw een word and se ntence i s c lea r and unproblemat ica l , and the use ofthe s igns i s not re la ted to any purpose or form of l i fe . These con-s iderat ions toge th er m ake the mat te r of the re la t ion of s ign and what i sdes igna ted much s imple r than i t i s in the o ther language-games .The concept of the ro le of a ru le func t ioning outs ide of a menta lmedium as opposed to the concept of a ru le func t ioning h idden in amenta l m edium is supp or ted b y no a rgu menta t ion in these passages o therthan a re inforc ing com parison wi th the k inds of case where we say tha t a


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ga m e i s p l a ye d a c c or d in g to a de f in i te r u l e . Ne ve r the le s s , i t isa ppr opr i a t e tha t t he s ke tc h o f a c onc e p t o f a r u l e f unc t ion ing in a pub l i cm e d i u m b e a t t a c h e d t o a l a n g u a g e - g a m e c o n s t r u c t e d s o as to c o n f o r m t othe Tractatus s og ic a l a tom ism ; a n d i t is p l a us ib le th a t t h i s c onne c t ion i sno t m e r e ly a c c ide n ta l . Th ink ing th r ough Wi t tge ns te in ' s ba s i c c r i t i c i smof log ic a l a tom ism shows tha t t he doc t r in e ' s r e l i a nc e on the c onc e p t o f ar u le f unc t ion ing in a m e n ta l m e d iu m wa s e s se n t ia l t o it s a ppe a r a nc e o fc o h e r e n c e .

Th e m is t a ke in the d oc t r ine o f log ic a l a na lys i s, the c l a im tha t t he r e w a sa n a na lys i s o f a p r opos i t ion a l though no m e thod f o r c a r r y ing ou t thea na lys i s e x i s t e d , wa s obsc ur e d by wha t Wi t tge ns te in l a t e r c a l l e d i t sdo gm a t i c '19 c ha r a c te r . Th a t t he r e m u s t be suc h a n a na lys is wa s a

p r e c o n c e i v e d n o t i o n , a r e q u i r e m e n t (PI, 107, 108) ra the r than ar e s u l t o f i n v e s t i g a t io n . F o r w i th r e s p e c t t o a p r e c o n c e i v e d n o t i o n ,

t he l a c k o f ru l e s to a c h ie ve the a na lys i s ne e d no t c o un t a s a sho r t c o m ingof the the o r y . A l l i e d wi th the no t ion tha t t he a na lys i s m u s t be t a k ing p la c ein the m ind , i t c a n be a s sum e d th a t t he r u l es m us t be p r e se n t so m e h ow inthe m ind , a lbe i t h id de n . G iv e n the l a c k o f a c a l c u lus , the p r oc e ss o fa na lys i s ha d to be a s sum e d to be t a k ing p la c e in a h idde n loc a le ; f o r i f one

op e n to v i e w we r e invo lve d , t he l a c k o f a m e tho d o f a na lys i s a nd thec onse que n t im poss ib il i ty o f ana lys is i n so f a r a s the r e wa s no t a m e tho d f o rc a r r y ing i t ou t , wo u ld h a ve be e n a ll t oo obv ious . I t is f o r th i s r e a son tha tthe mental medium as the locale of the process of analysis of the sentencec a n no t f a i r ly be r e ga r d e d a s inc ide n ta l t o the v i e w tha t p r opos i t ions w i thse nse a r e t r u th - f un c t ions o f e l e m e n ta r y p r opos i t ions . I n a f a m ous pa s -sa ge f r om the Blue Book, Wit tg e ns te in sa ys tha t we ha ve a f a i th tha t t hem e c h a n i s m o f th e m i n d . . , c a n b r in g a b o u t e f f e c ts w h i c h n o m a t er i a lm e c h a n i s m c o u l d .20 F o r o n e w h o b e l ie v e s t h a t w h e n w e m e a n a n d u n -de r s t a nd l a ngua ge , suc h a n a na lys is m us t be t a k ing p la c e , t he l a c k o f am e tho d o f a na lys is w i ll no t t r oub le one . F or suc h a one a l so ha s f a i th tha tt h e m i n d c a n d o w o n d e r f u l th i n g s t h a t w e d o n o t b e g i n t o u n d e r s t a n d .

I n a pa ssa ge f r om the Philosophical Grammar, W i t t g e n s t e i n s a ys t h a tf o r h i s pu r pose s , i t c a n ne ve r be e s se n t i a l t ha t a sym bol i c ph e no m e no n

oc c ur s in the m in d a nd no t on pa pe r so tha t o the r s c a n se e i t (PG, p. 59).I t is p l a us ib le tha t t he r e i s a c onne c t ion b e tw e e n the r o l e o f th ink ing inthe m is t a ke n no t io n o f log ic a l a nalys is in the Tractatus a n d t h e a v o i d a n c ein the l a t e r ph i losophy o f a ppe a l s to m e n ta l m e c ha n i sm s , p r oc e sse s o re ve n t s a s e xp la na t ions o f m e a n ing (meinen) a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a tc ha r a c te r i z e d Wi t tge ns te in ' s ph i losoph ic a l m e thod . I t i s p l a us ib le to


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2 4 6 D I A N E F G O T T L I E B

t h i n k t h a t h is d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o r id h is p h i l o s o p h y o f a n o c c u l tc h a r a c t e r w a s b o r n o f a d e s i re t o p r o t e c t h i m s e lf f r o m r e p e a t i n g t h e s a m emi s t a ke , i . e . , o f p r ov i d i ng a n e xp l a na t i on w h i c h r e l i e d on t he mys -t e r i ous ne s s o f t he p r o c e s s e s o f t he m i nd a s a w a y o f obs c u r i n g i ts ba s i cunin te l l ig ib i l i ty .

C ons i s t e n t w i t h t he PI 's m e t h o d o f c o n d u c t i n g g r a m m a t i c a l in -ve s t i ga t i ons , 21 a ma i n a ve nu e o f a pp r oa c h t o t he t op i c o f r u le s i n t he P I isb y m e a n s o f th e g r a m m a r o r u s e o f t h e e x p r e s si o n f o l lo w s a r u l e . I ta p p e a r s t h a t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e P i mp l i c it l y o r e xp l i c i tl y a r e a n um be r o fa r g u m e n t s s p e ci fi c al ly d i r e c t e d t o o r r e l a t e d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t n ove r s i on o f a me n t a l i s t i c a c c oun t i s c a pa b l e o f p r ov i d i ng c r i t e r i a f o r t hea pp l i c a t i on o f t he e xp r e s s i on f o l l ow s a r u l e . 22 T h e a r gu me n t s c ov e r as p e c t r u m o f t y p e s o f a c c o u n t s o f m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a t h a t c o u l d b ei n d i c a t e d a s a w a y o f m o d e l i n g w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n a n i n d i v id u a l p e r s o nf o ll o w s a r u le . E a c h a c c o u n t c o n t a i n s w i th i n it a n e l e m e n t t h a t c o u l d b ed e s i g n a t e d p l a us i bl y a s t h a t w h i c h h a p p e n s i n t h e m i n d w h i c hc o n s t i t u t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g o f a r u l e . A m o n g t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e s o m ew hi c h , i f va l i d , a r e va l i d a ga i n s t a n y t he o r y ho l d i ng t ha t i t is a n i n t e n t i ont o f o l l ow a r u l e i n pe r f o r mi ng a c e r t a i n a c t i on t ha t ma ke s t he a c t i onr u l e - f o l l ow i n g ; t he r e a r e s om e w h i c h , i f va l i d , a re va l i d a ga i n s t a nyt he o r y t ha t ho l ds t ha t a r u l e is a c t ua l i z e d a s a dyn a m i c e l e m e n t w i t h i n ac a u s al m e c h a n i s m o f an y so r t. T h e p a s s ag e s c o n t a i n i n g t h e s e a r g u m e n t sa r e d i f f i c u l t t o i n t e r p r e t , a nd t he va l i d i t y o f t he a r gume n t s d i f f i c u l t t oa ss es s. I n t he t i me r e ma i n i n g , I w a n t t o de ve l op a n i n t e r p r e t a t i on o f j u stone o f t he s e a r gume n t s w h i c h I be l i e ve i s de c i s i ve a ga i n s t a pa r t i c u l a rv i e w o f r u l e - f o l l ow i ng , v i z ., t ha t w ha t go i ng - by - a - r u l e is , is t hef unc t i on i ng o f a r u l e i n a me n t a l me c ha n i s m.

6. R U L E S A N D M A C H I N E ST h e p a s s a g e f r o m t h e Philosophical Grammar c i t e d a b o v e c o n t i n u e s :

w e a r e m i s le d b y t h e i d e a o f a m e c h a n i s m t h a t w o r k s i n s p e c ia l m e d i a(PG, p . 59 ) . I n a c l o s e l y r e l a t e d pa s s a ge a r e t he s e e ds o f a f u t he r c r i t i c i smof t he Tractatus c o n c e p t i o n o f ru l e s th a t f o c u s n o t o n t h e m e n t a l a s p e c to f a m e n t a l m e c h a n i s m , b u t r a t h e r h a v e a s th e i r t a r g e t t h e n o t i o n o f a r u l ef u n c t i o n i n g a s p a r t o f a m e c h a n i s m o f a n y s o rt . A m e c h a n i c a l ,e l e c tr i c a l, p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n n e c t i o n is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h m a y o r m a y n o tf u n c t i o n . . . . I t g i v e s t h e w r o n g i d e a i f y o u s a y t h a t t h e c o n n e c t i o nb e t w e e n n a m e a n d o b j e c t i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l o n e (PG, p. 56).


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T I l TR CT TU S V I W O F R U L S 247

This passage from the Philosophical G ram mar is the first of a series ofattempts to bring out the distinction between being causally deter-mined and being logically determined that constitutes the in-coherence of the notion of a rule functioning as an element in a causalmechanism. It finds expression in the P I in 193,194 and 218 through221. P I 193 and 194 are a more sophisticated version of similarpassages found in the Re ma rks on the Foundations of Mathem atics I andIII. In the PI, the passages are presented in relation to the problem ofhow a use extended in time could be present as the meaning of anexpression, when we say of the meaning that it can be grasped in a flash.P I 193 and 194 discuss an analogous problem: how is it that theaction of a mach ine , the possible movement s of a machine , arealready there in it in some mysterious way , seem to be in it from thestart PI, 193, 194). The action of a machine would normally bethought to be something that is extended in time. How then could theaction, which is extended in time, be in the machine at the start, i.e., at amoment before it has unfolded in time?For our purposes, what is important in these remarks is Wittgenstein'sconception of the relation between an actual machine and an idealmachine, or machine-as-symbol, as he also calls it. There are two ways ofregarding the future movements of a machine. We can look at a machine(or a drawing of it) as a symbol, from which its movements can be derivedas if the parts of the machine cou ld do nothing other . This is analogousto the way the twenty-fifth member of the series 1, 4, 9, 1 6 ,. . . can bederived PI, 193). In both cases, what will be derived seems as definitelydete rmined as objects which are already lying in a drawer and which wethen take out PI, 193). In both cases, certain movements and cer tainbestimmt) numbers are derived or determined, in contrast to other waysin which the machine could have moved, and other numbers that couldhave been written down. It is with respect to the machine-as-symbol thatwe think that the action of the machine seems to be there in it from thestart.Second, we can regard a given actual machine and predict its futuremovements. In this case, we do not forget the possibility of parts breakingand bending. The predetermination vorausbestimmten) of the actualmovement s of an actual machine is not the same as the case of deriving aseries of movements from a symbol. In the case of the actual machine,empirical conditions that hold for the given machine play a role indeterming future movements. For example, a pin's fitting too tightly in a


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soc ke t , o r t he p in ' s m a te r i a l be ing too b r i t tl e , a r e pa r t o f t he c ond i t ionst h a t e m p i ri c a ll y d e t e r m i n e t h e m o v e m e n t s o f t h e a c t u al m a c h i n e . B u tsuc h c ons ide r a t ions p l a y no r o l e in de te r m in ing the m ove m e n t s o f them a c h i n e - a s - s y m b o l .

Wha t i s t he po in t o f t he c om pa r i son o f the a c tua l m a c h ine wi th them a c h ine - a s - sym bol? Th i s be c om e s c l e a r e r a s we look a t two p r e de c e s -sors of these p assages in RFMI and II I . 23 A rule , as i t is actuall y me an t, isin t e ll i g ib l e a s a d r iv ing po we r in a m a c h in e , on ly i f t he m a c h ine i s t heidea l or symb ol ic sor t, no t the ac tua l sor t . T he reason for th is i s a s fo l lows.Th e resu l t of the appl ica t io n of a ru le of a ca lculus is r ig id ly de te rmi ned .F r o m the d r a wing o f the pa rt s o f a m a c h ine w hose pa r ts a r e a s su m e d to bepe r f e c t ly r ig id , we c a n c a l c u la t e w i th pe r f e c t c e r t a in ty the f u tu r em o v e m e n t s o f t h e m a c h i n e . T h e w o r k i n g o f t h e id e a l o r m a t h e m a t i c a lm a c h i n e i s o n l y t h e picture o f t h e w o r k i n g of a m a c h i n e ( R F M , I I I -4 8 ) .C a l l ing i t a p i c tu r e b r ings ou t t he f ixe d c ha r a c te r o f t he a c t ion o f them a c h ine wh ic h c a n be p r e d ic t e d , d e r ive d o r c a l c u la t e d f r om the d r a wing .T h e c o n s t r u c t io n o f a m a c h i n e o n p a p e r d o e s n o t b r e a k w h e n t h e m a c h i n e i t se lf s u c c u m b st o e x t e rna l fo rc e s . - Or a ga i n , I shou l d l i ke to s a y t ha t t he y a re no t sub j e c t t o w i nd a ndwe a t h e r l ike phys i c al th i ngs ; r a t he r t he y a re una s sa i la b l e , l i ke sha dows . R F M , 1 -102)A r u le c onc e ive d o f a s a d r iv in g pow e r in a n a c tua l m a c h ine isun in te ll i g ib l e . A r u le c a n no t re a l ly do wo r k RFM, I I I - 48 ) , f o r ther e su l t o f it s a pp l i c a t ion i s de t e r m ine d in a wa y tha t no f o r c e f unc t ion ingon a n a c tua l oc c a s ion c a n be . The po in t o f d i s t inc t ion be twe e n thein te l l ig ib i li ty of a ru le as a dr iv in g pow er in a ma chin e-as -p ic t ure or anidea l ma chin e , an d the unin te l l ig ib i l i ty of a ru le as a dr iv ing po wer in ana c tua l m a c h ine , i s t o e m pha s iz e tha t t he r e su l t o f t he a pp l i c a t ion o f a r u l e ,in c on t r a s t t o the e f f e c t o f a n a c tua l m e c ha n i sm , i s i nva r i a n t . Am e c ha n ic a l p r oc e ss whe the r in the m ind o r in a n e x t r a m e n ta l m a te r i a lm e c h a n i s m c a n causally de te r m ine the r e su l t o f a c a l c u la t ion , bu t i tc a n n o t logically de te r m ine the r e su l t o f a c a l c u la t ion .

Thus , t he im pl i c it a r gum e n t goe s , t o c onc e ive o f a r u l e a s a pa r t o f am e c ha n i s m i s t o m a ke a c onc e p tua l b lund e r . F o r , i f a r u l e f unc t ion e d a spa r t o f a m e c ha n i sm , i t wou ld h a ve to ha ve t r ue o f i t two c on t r a d ic to r yf e a tu r e s : i t wou ld ha ve a n a pp l i c a t ion th a t bo th ha d the poss ib i l it y o fva r y ing a nd d id n o t ha ve the poss ib i l it y o f va r y ing .

This i s one poin t of PI 218 th r oug h 221 . The a na log y o f theappl ica t ion s of a ru le be ing a v is ib le sec t ion o f ra il s invis ib ly la id toin f in i ty PI, 218) sym bol iz e s a d i f f e r e nc e be tw e e n be ing c a usa l ly


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T H E T R A C T A T U S V I E W O F R U L E S 249

de te rmined and be ing logica l ly de te rmined (PI, 220). It is amytho logica l desc r ip t ion of the use of a ru le (PI 221). The logical isprede te rm ined in a way tha t the causa l is not .

For ou r purposes , the point of the a rgum ent conta ined in the machinemetaphors i s as fo l lows. The de te rmina t ion of the meaning of s igns ,insofa r as the meaning is regula ted by ru les , could not be co nta ined inand e f fec ted by individua ls ' ac t s of meaning (meinen) and und ers tandinglanguage , i f these ac ts a re suppo sed to be e ffec ted by means of menta lmech anism s. I t is imp ortant to note that this argum ent is a cri t ic ism of theTractatus only i f thinking in the Tractatus, as it is engaged in the m eaningand unders tanding of language , inc ludes the ac t ion of menta lme c ha n i sms . Though t (der Gedanke) and th inking in the Tractatusare not , so far as I can find, terms that get deta i led interpreta t ion, in thisrespec t , e i the r in the text or the se conda ry com men ta ry . I t is p laus ible tothink th at in the Tractatus, the ro le of th inking, the wo rk i t accompl ishesand how i t does so, is left unspecified. In contrast , the t reatment of thec onc e p t o f t hou gh t a nd th ink ing in t he P I is r ich and complex.Wit tgens te in caut ions the reader in an important passage on ru les in P I81 tha t the orig ins of the mis taken not ion tha t he once he ld tha t i fanyone ut te rs a sentence and means or understands i t he is operat ing aca lculus according to def in ite ru les , can only appe ar in the r ight l ightwhen o ne has a tta ined g rea te r c la r i ty about the concep ts of unders tand -ing, meaning (meinen) and thinking (denken) . Muc h o f t he book i sdevoted to th i s under taking. Before comple t ing the task of com-prehending the re la t ion of rules and thinking implic i t in the Tractatusand explic i t in the PI, one needs to grasp Wit tgens te in ' s v iews onintent ion, d i spos i t ions , and consc ious and unconsc ious exper iencescharacterist ic of rule-fol lowing, as well as mental mechanisms.

N O T E S* I am indebted to Stephen Barker and Kingsley Price for s t imula t ing cr i t ic i sms of aprevious vers ion of th i s paper . The paper i s par t o f a la rger work in progress , en t i t ledWit tgens te in s Con cept of a Rule of Langu age in the Philosophical Investigations .1 F. Waismann, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, in Brian McG uinness (ed .) , 1979, pp .129-30 , pp . 182-83; and L. Wit tgenste in , Philosophical Grammar, in R. Rhees (ed.),Univers i ty of Cal i forn ia Press , Berkeley , Appendix 4A and 4B, pp . 211-12 .2 L. Wit tgenste in , Philosophical Grammar, 72-4 .3 F or example , R. Rhees , Discussions of Wittgens-tein~Schocken Books, New York , 1970,pp. 44, 55.


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4 S. Cavel l , 'Avai lab i l i ty of W it tgenste in 's la ter ph i losophy ' , Must We Mean What WeSay?, Scribners , New York , 1969, pp . 48 , 50 ; see a l so James Bogen, Wingenstein sPhilosophy of Lang uage , Human i t ies Press , New York , 1970, pp . 169- 220; and R. Mi l le r,'Wi t tgenste in in Transi t ion ' , Philosophical Review, October , 1977, pp . 527-29 .5 Gor don Baker , 'Fo l lowing Wit tgenste in : Some Signposts for Philosophical lnvestigations143-242 ' , Wittgenstein: To Follow a Ru le, S. Hol tzm an and C. Leich (eds. ) , Rout ledgeand K egan Paul , London, 1981. I do not d iscuss Saul Kripke 's book, Wittgenstein on Rulesand Private Language: A n Elementary Exposition, H arva rd U n iv . Pre ss, Cambr idge , M A ,1982, which was publ i shed af ter th i s paper was comple ted .6 Gordon Baker , 'Fo l lowing Wit tgenste in ' , pp . 39-40 , 42-43 .7 Ibid., p. 45.8 I be l ieve tha t c lear un ders tandin g of Wit tgen ste in 's grounds for repudia t ing thet ru th -fun ct ion al thesis of the Tractatas will pave the way for insight into a new conc ept of aru le found in the PI; and th at progres s in explicat ing what the new con cep t of a rule is willhave a ro le in c lari fy ing aspects of the pr iva te language d iscussion and in unders tanding theappeal to ord inary langu age as a way of te l ling wheth er an express ion of language makessense . I ment ion th is to ind ica te the p lace of my topic in a la rger context of in terpre t iveissues on the phi losophy of language of the PI. In th is paper , how ever , m y goal i s on ly toout l ine the main fea tures of the P I cri t ique of the Tractatus view of rules.9 See note 1 above.10 L. Wittgens tein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. Pears a nd B. McGu inness ( t rans .) ,Rout ledge a nd Keg an Paul , London, 1961, # 5 .5563.11 Max Black, A Com panion to Wittgenstein s Tractatus, Cornel l Univ . Press , I thaca ,N.Y., 1964, p. 305.12 Tractatus, 3.23 and 4.221.13 E.g., Tractatas, 3.334; 3.343, 3.344, and 4.0141.14 An antipsychologist ic reading of the Tractatus that confl icted with the claim that ahypothet ica l process of analysis takes p lace whe n languag e i s used i s no t ru led out in anyobvious way by the tex t of the Tractatus. There i s ev idence , however , for in terpre t ingthe t ru th-funct ional thesis in the way tha t I have suggested . For example , Baker andHacke r qu ote from a pre l iminary manu scrip t of the PhilosophicalInvestigations: H o w c a nI unders tand a proposi t ion now, i f it is for analysis to show what I real ly unders ta nd? H erethere sneaks in the idea of unders tanding as a specia l menta l process . Wingenstein,Understanding and Me anin g, Vol . I , pp . 507-508. Baker and Hacker put the poin t asfo llows: Giv en the appa rent necessi ty of an idea lly sharp and determin ate log ica l s t ruc tureof language , and g ive n tha t the appearance of language i s so far rem oved from th is idea l,how ca n we unders tand langu age a l a l l? Analysis wi ll , must, reveal the shar pness of theunderly ing s t ruc ture , bu t i t has not ye t been carr ied out . Consequent ly , in TLP,unders tanding , grasp ing the h idden , idea l s t ruc ture of the proposi t ion must be som eth ingcarr ied out by the myster ious opera t ion of a hypothet ica l menta l me chan ism (p, 508) .Malcolm has a s imi lar v iew: Wh ere does th is comple te ar t icu la t ion occur th a t tu rns asentence in to an un ambiguo us depic t ion of uniquely one s i tua t ion? Where i s i t ach ieved ?App aren t ly not in an ord inary physica l sen tence , such as 'Th e window is to the lef t o f thef i rep lace ' . For th is sen tence cer ta in ly does not hav e a u nique sense on a l l occasions ofu t te rance . T he co mple te ar t icu la t ion does not occur in the physica l pa t te rn of sounds ormarks . W here does i t occur? The only possib le answer, f rom the v iewpoin t of the Tractatus,


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is that i t takes place in our thinking or meaning ... . Acco rd ing to th is concep t ion thoughtsare c lear and perfec t ly ordered , jus t as they are . Thei r c lar i ty i s no t impai red by thevagueness and ambigui ty of the i r physica l embodiment , the i r ' c lo th ing ' . (N. Malcolm,Memory and Mind Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1977, p. 138.)15 M. Black, A Companion p. 208.16 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar 36.17 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 29-31 , 53-54 , 79-83 , 100 , and562-68 .18 G.P . B aker and P. M. S. Hacke r , Wittgenstein Understanding and Meanin g Vol . I , TheUnivers i ty of Chicago Press , Chacago , 1980 , pp . 351-44 7 . A l thou gh I agree in the mainwi th the genera l th rust o f the i r in terpre ta t ion on th is top ic , I d i sagree wi th the i rin terpre ta t ion of some specif ic passages , which have a bearing on the i ssue of whether ther eis a correspondence be tween meaning and ru les in the PI.19 See Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle pp. 182-83 .20 L. Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books Basil Blackwell , Oxford, 1958, p. 3.21 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 90.22 These are sca t te red tho ugho ut the tex t of the fi rst ha l f o f Part One. See G ord on Bake r ,'Fo l lowing Wit tgenste in ' , p . 43 .23 L. Wittgenstein, Rem arks on the Foundations o f Mathematics Macmillan, New York,1956.Dept. of PhilosophyThe Johns Hopkins UniversityBaltimore MD 21218U.S .A .

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Wittgenstein's Critique of the Tractatus View of Rules