7 Wittgenstein's Methodology

8/2/2019 7 Wittgenstein's Methodology ...

1/38

1

77

WittgensteinsWittgensteinsMethodology, theMethodology, the

Augustinian ConceptionAugustinian Conception

of Language, andof Language, and

LanguageLanguage quaquaInstitutionInstitution


2/38

2

People usually distinguish between twoPeople usually distinguish between twoWittgensteins:Wittgensteins:

the first (the first (TractatusTractatusLogioco Philosophicus)Logioco Philosophicus)andand

the second (the second (Philosophical InvestigationsPhilosophical Investigations))

The Philosophical InvestigationsThe Philosophical Investigations((PIPI) can be) can be

understood as a severe criticism of theunderstood as a severe criticism of theTractatus.Tractatus.

Wittgenstein planned to publish them in a singleWittgenstein planned to publish them in a single

volume.volume.


3/38

3

Philosophy as a therapyhilosophy as a therapyPhilosophy is a battle against thePhilosophy is a battle against the

bewitchment of our intelligence by means ofbewitchment of our intelligence by means of

language. (language. (PIPI: # 109): # 109)

Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fightPhilosophy, as we use the word, is a fight

against the fascination which forms ofagainst the fascination which forms ofexpression exert on us. (expression exert on us. (BBBB: 27): 27)


4/38

4

Philosophical problems differ from empiricalPhilosophical problems differ from empirical

problems.problems.

Philosophical problems unlike empirical ones arePhilosophical problems unlike empirical ones aresolved by looking at the way language works.solved by looking at the way language works.

Philosophy is a conceptual analysis.Philosophy is a conceptual analysis.


5/38

5

So, philosophy of language isSo, philosophy of language is the fil rougethe fil rougeofofphilosophical analysisphilosophical analysis quaquaconceptualconceptualclarification.clarification.

Hence, both Wittgensteins methodologyHence, both Wittgensteins methodology(philosophy(philosophy quaquaconceptual analysis) and hisconceptual analysis) and hisconception of philosophy differ from theconception of philosophy differ from themethodology and conception endorsed by logicalmethodology and conception endorsed by logicalpositivism, Quine, nowadays cognitive scientists,positivism, Quine, nowadays cognitive scientists,etc.etc.


6/38

6

Philosophers constantly see the method ofPhilosophers constantly see the method of

science before their eyes, and are irresistiblyscience before their eyes, and are irresistibly

tempted to ask and to answer questions in thetempted to ask and to answer questions in the

way science does. This tendency is the realway science does. This tendency is the realsource of metaphysics and leads philosopherssource of metaphysics and leads philosophers

into complete darkness. (into complete darkness. (BBBB: 18): 18)


7/387

M o r a lo r a lThe scientific method (in particular the way ofThe scientific method (in particular the way ofasking and answering questions in science) areasking and answering questions in science) aremisleading and inappropriate when applied tomisleading and inappropriate when applied toquestion like Whats meaning?, Whatsquestion like Whats meaning?, Whatsthought?, and the like.thought?, and the like.

The latter are typical philosophical (conceptual)The latter are typical philosophical (conceptual)questions which cannot be addressed andquestions which cannot be addressed andanswered using empirical analysis.answered using empirical analysis.


8/38

8

Philosophy is conceived as aPhilosophy is conceived as a t h e r apyhe r ap y enablingenablingus to get rid of the philosophical illness weus to get rid of the philosophical illness we

inherited.inherited.

Thus, philosophyThus, philosophy quaquaconceptual analysis shouldconceptual analysis should

allow us to reject some of the traditional (false)allow us to reject some of the traditional (false)

pictures, such as the Augustinian picture ofpictures, such as the Augustinian picture of

language, Cartesian dualism, etc.language, Cartesian dualism, etc.


9/38

9

Philosophical problems have (often) beenPhilosophical problems have (often) been

induced by a misconception on the wayinduced by a misconception on the way

language functions.language functions.

As such Wittgensteins methodology doesnt aimAs such Wittgensteins methodology doesnt aim

to propose solutions to classical problems.to propose solutions to classical problems.

It rather proposes aIt rather proposes a d i s so l u t i oni s so lu t i on of the allegedof the allegedproblem.problem.


10/38

10

What is your way in philosophy? To shew theWhat is your way in philosophy? To shew the

fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (PIPI: # 309): # 309)

These are among the main reasons why theThese are among the main reasons why the

Philosophical InvestigationsPhilosophical Investigationsdo not presentdo not present

themselves as an ordinary book but, rather, as athemselves as an ordinary book but, rather, as a

collection of thoughts or aphorisms.collection of thoughts or aphorisms.


11/38

11

Wittgensteins criticism of the AugustinianWittgensteins criticism of the Augustinian

picture of language is a good example of hispicture of language is a good example of his

methodology and his view of philosophymethodology and his view of philosophy quaqua

therapy.therapy.


12/38

12

The Augustinian conception ofhe Augustinian conception oflanguageanguage

Why Augustine?Why Augustine?

To stress the universality and force of theTo stress the universality and force of thetraditional picture.traditional picture.


13/38

13

The Augustinian picture endorses three mainThe Augustinian picture endorses three mainthesis:thesis:

1.1. every word has a meaningevery word has a meaning

2.2. this meaning is something correlated withthis meaning is something correlated withthe wordthe word

3.3. the meaning is the object for which the wordthe meaning is the object for which the wordstands.stands.


14/38

14

So,So, os ten s i ve de f i n i t i on ss t ens i ve d e f i n it ion s They are the fundamental form of explaining theThey are the fundamental form of explaining themeaning of a word, and, by the way, of learningmeaning of a word, and, by the way, of learninga language.a language.

Ba s i c p ic t u reas i c p i c t u reWords are names and sentences areWords are names and sentences arecombinations of names (cf.combinations of names (cf. TractatusTractatus: words: wordsname and sentences describe/picture, cf. Frege).name and sentences describe/picture, cf. Frege).


15/38

15

Name/object relationame/object relationIf a words meaning is the object it stands for,If a words meaning is the object it stands for,

then to assign the meaning to a word we oughtthen to assign the meaning to a word we oughtto correlate this word with the object/referent itto correlate this word with the object/referent itstands for.stands for.


16/38

16

Explanation of meaningxplanation of meaningEither verbal or by ostensive definition.Either verbal or by ostensive definition.

Since the former appeals to other expressions,Since the former appeals to other expressions,the basic explanation ought to be given bythe basic explanation ought to be given byostensive definitions.ostensive definitions.

For the latter furnish the relevant correlationFor the latter furnish the relevant correlationbetween words and their referents and, as such,between words and their referents and, as such,thethe foundation of languagefoundation of language..


17/38

17

Ostensive definitionsstensive definitionsIn order to provide the foundation of languageIn order to provide the foundation of languagethey ought to be complete and unambiguous.they ought to be complete and unambiguous.

Since there are two kinds of necessary truths,Since there are two kinds of necessary truths,analytic (truth by definition) and synthetic,analytic (truth by definition) and synthetic,ostensive definitions ought to provide the basisostensive definitions ought to provide the basis

for synthetic necessary truth.for synthetic necessary truth.

E.g.: nothing is red and blue all over.E.g.: nothing is red and blue all over.


18/38

18

UnderstandingnderstandingWithin the Augustinian tradition:Within the Augustinian tradition:

(i)(i) understanding consists in a mentalunderstanding consists in a mentalassociation of a word with an object.association of a word with an object.

This is a kind of mental pointing at an object.This is a kind of mental pointing at an object.


19/38

19

(ii)(ii) acquaintance with objects.acquaintance with objects.

if ostensive definitions are the foundation ofif ostensive definitions are the foundation of

language, then acquaintance is the foundation oflanguage, then acquaintance is the foundation of

understanding.understanding.

(cf. Russells knowledge by acquaintance/(cf. Russells knowledge by acquaintance/knowledge by description distinction).knowledge by description distinction).


20/38

20

TheThe Philosophical InvestigationsPhilosophical Investigationscan becan beunderstood as a criticism of the Augustinianunderstood as a criticism of the Augustinianpicture.picture.

In criticising the Augustinian paradigm,In criticising the Augustinian paradigm,Wittgenstein criticises most of the appealingWittgenstein criticises most of the appealingtheories of meaning: Freges, Russells and thetheories of meaning: Freges, Russells and theTractatusTractatus..


21/38

21

Such a criticism begins with a clear examinationSuch a criticism begins with a clear examination

on the way ostensive definitions work.on the way ostensive definitions work.

The general lesson of this examination will beThe general lesson of this examination will bethat ostensive definitions are not,that ostensive definitions are not, pacepacethethe

Augustinian conception, the foundation ofAugustinian conception, the foundation of

language.language.


22/38

22

The use ofThe use ofexamplesxamplesWittgensteins use of concrete examples (e.g.:Wittgensteins use of concrete examples (e.g.:the building block language game, colour andthe building block language game, colour andnumber words, etc.) stresses the inadequacy ofnumber words, etc.) stresses the inadequacy ofthe Augustinian temptation to think of languagethe Augustinian temptation to think of languagein abstraction from its use.in abstraction from its use.


23/38

23

Examples suggest that we cannot look for theExamples suggest that we cannot look for the

essence of meaning as something which can beessence of meaning as something which can be

detached from the way language is actually.detached from the way language is actually.

See Wittgenstein's motto:See Wittgenstein's motto: meaning is useeaning is use ..


24/38

24

In theIn the TractatusTractatusWittgenstein considers languageWittgenstein considers languageas a calculus, or system of sentences.as a calculus, or system of sentences.

In theIn the InvestigationsInvestigations language is considered aslanguage is considered asessentially connected with the notion ofessentially connected with the notion ofapplication.application.

Here the term language game is meant toHere the term language game is meant to

bring into prominence the fact thatbring into prominence the fact that speakingspeakinga language is part of an activity, or of a forma language is part of an activity, or of a formof life. (of life. (PIPI: # 23): # 23)


25/38

25

Learning a languageearning a language does not consist todoes not consist tomaster a calculus.master a calculus.

It means:It means:

Becoming acculturatedecoming acculturated ..


26/38

26

Being acculturates amounts to being able toBeing acculturates amounts to being able to

participate and interact in a variety of structuredparticipate and interact in a variety of structured

activities that essentially employ language.activities that essentially employ language.

It means to be able to master differentIt means to be able to master differentlanguage gamesanguage games ..


27/38

27

The Augustinian conception pictures a childThe Augustinian conception pictures a child

learning his mother tongue as a foreignerlearning his mother tongue as a foreigner

learning a foreign language.learning a foreign language.

Like a person who already masters her ownLike a person who already masters her own

language andlanguage and translatesranslates the new language intothe new language intothe former.the former.


28/38

28

If learning a language comes close toIf learning a language comes close to

translation, the child can already think: all shetranslation, the child can already think: all she

misses is how to label her mental concepts.misses is how to label her mental concepts.

This picture presupposes what it tries to explain.This picture presupposes what it tries to explain.

For it assumes that the child possesses aFor it assumes that the child possesses a

mastery of the techniques that provide themastery of the techniques that provide the

necessary background enabling the child tonecessary background enabling the child to

understand the language.understand the language.


29/38

29

Language as an institutionanguage as an institution Natural languages areNatural languages are system of socialystem of socialconventionsonventions

This conception is also defended by linguists:This conception is also defended by linguists:

Saussure, Sapir, Whorf, BloomfieldSaussure, Sapir, Whorf, Bloomfield

and by philosophers:and by philosophers:

Wittgenstein, Dummett, Kripke.Wittgenstein, Dummett, Kripke.


30/38

30

The view of language as a social institutionThe view of language as a social institutioncontrasts with:contrasts with:

1.1. The view of language as an ideal systemThe view of language as an ideal system(Frege, Montague, Church).(Frege, Montague, Church).

2.2. The view of language as innate, individual,The view of language as innate, individual,internal (Pinker, Chomsky, Fodor).internal (Pinker, Chomsky, Fodor).

3.3. The view of language as psychologicalThe view of language as psychological(Grice, Shiffer, Searle).(Grice, Shiffer, Searle).


31/38

31

Main questionsain questionsHow does languageHow does language quaquainstitution can enter theinstitution can enter the

physical world?physical world?

How canHow can naturalnaturallanguage be perceived as alanguage be perceived as a

naturalnaturalphenomenon?phenomenon?


32/38

32

Can social conventions be explained inCan social conventions be explained in

naturalistic terms?naturalistic terms?

A naturalist approach to language tends to focusA naturalist approach to language tends to focuson the speakers psychology. This seems toon the speakers psychology. This seems to

contrast with the social conception of language.contrast with the social conception of language.


33/38

33

Languageanguage ((vsvs. idiolect). idiolect)A praxis governed by syntactic and semanticA praxis governed by syntactic and semanticrules and pragmatic conventions. (cf. Saussuresrules and pragmatic conventions. (cf. Saussureslangue/parole distinction).langue/parole distinction).

But the syntactic/semantic rules need not beBut the syntactic/semantic rules need not besocial; they could be natural/psychological.social; they could be natural/psychological.

WittgensteinWittgenstein vs.vs. Frege, first Wittgenstein, andFrege, first Wittgenstein, andRussellRussell


34/38

34

Ideal language conceptiondeal language conceptionNatural language is imperfect, improper (e.g.:Natural language is imperfect, improper (e.g.:ambiguity, polysemy, etc.).ambiguity, polysemy, etc.).

Logic deals with an ideal language.Logic deals with an ideal language.

Natural languages aspire to be ideal languages,Natural languages aspire to be ideal languages,but theyre a mere copy of the latter (cf. Fregesbut theyre a mere copy of the latter (cf. Fregescomparison between natural language andcomparison between natural language andideography).ideography).


35/38

35

Main features of an ideal languageMain features of an ideal language

(i) context insensitive (no ambiguity, no(i) context insensitive (no ambiguity, no

indexicality)indexicality)

(ii) no polysemy (e.g. no terms such as value(ii) no polysemy (e.g. no terms such as valuemeaning either moral value, money value, )meaning either moral value, money value, )

(iii) no vague predicates (e.g. rich, small,(iii) no vague predicates (e.g. rich, small,bald, )bald, )


36/38

36

(iv) an ideal language expressions would have a(iv) an ideal language expressions would have a

fixed meaning (e.g. wouldnt change acrossfixed meaning (e.g. wouldnt change across

time). Cf. eternal sentencestime). Cf. eternal sentences

(v) no empty terms, i.e. each expression has a(v) no empty terms, i.e. each expression has a

meaning (thus no Robyn Hood).meaning (thus no Robyn Hood).


37/38

37

Fregean goalregean goalSentences of natural language should beSentences of natural language should be

translated into antranslated into an ideal language.deal language.


38/38

To this view the second Wittgenstein opposesTo this view the second Wittgenstein opposesConventionalismonventionalism ..

Language as a chess game, governed byLanguage as a chess game, governed byconventional rules. Whats the meaning of theconventional rules. Whats the meaning of thehorse, the tower, ?horse, the tower, ?

Can they have a meaning outside the game? Can they have a meaning outside the game?

Documents

7 Wittgenstein's Methodology