W i t t g e n s t e i n , Rules, a n d Normativity

by

Frank M. Secky

A T h e s i s Submitted to the Faculty of Graduâte Studies in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Philosophy University of Manitoba

Winnipeg, Manitoba

O February, 2000

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Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normortivity

BY

A ThesWPracticom submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University

of Manitoba in partiai hilfillment of the requinments of the degree

of

Master of Arts

I;RANK M. SECKY O2000

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Wittgenstein, Rules. and Normativity

The aim of tb thais is to exmine the concept of "biiowing a d e " as it is

adai.csscd by Wiîtgcnsîein in his Phüapoplrial ~ ~ ~ & & I I I S §§143-242 and in certain

parts of the Raiiruficp on du FoundlttiO1~~ of MatAcntatjcS. The ccmcept of fOIIowbg a d e is essentiai 60r miderstanding certain key questions in the phrlowphy of m9id as w d

the philasaphy ab roQiI h a . Unfortmiately, there is little amsenms abord ho^ UR should mad Wittpnstein's trieatment of de-Mimukg, 1 vgoe that the claim thnt de s arise oat of a ~ g a i u d practice does not entul that the ccmmmity determines the

interpretation of des. The thinLers who daim that the community does &termine the

interpretaticm of des, the sa-calfed Conrm~ty Vim thcorists, an? nsoally mncemed to

put a stop to possible challenges by a rate *ceptic. Thc ComrnUmty Vxew theorists beiieve that the mie sceptic cpn challenge an indnndtd's de-fo1lOwing but not the

m~nm&ty's de-fbiiawing. I ciam, hawever, îhat the rule sceptic's w o y is incohemnt

and so is the solution to the sapticisn, the CommUmty View. Io discassing d e -

scepûcian and the Conrmunity View, I focus on Kripke's W- On R h Md

Ptiw& Lmgqp. Kriplre's appmch i s a sophistiated modification of the C o m m e

View. But even thou@ 1 aigrie, together with McGimi and Baker and Htcker, thpt the

Community View is fundament* incorrect, 1 think that it is interesthg to see why this Mew is so temptïng and why some Community View theoiists might want to attriiute it to Wittgenstein I bclieve that in interpreting Wiwnstein, one needs to appreciate the

. . deliute balance between the commPnNinui and the individualist aspects of his views an meaning and de-foiiowing. Although the commuuity is the most important source of

correctness, it does not mean that WC can equatc the right way of foiiowing a ruic with

the (nomative) attitude îhat the commulliify has towards that de. Tradition, eqlicït

rdes of various sorts and peopIe in a position of power or auîhority can be rlso a source of corriecbiess for determining the nght way of lonowing a de.

Detailed T a b l e of Contents

I N T R O D U C T I O N : R U L E S AND NORMS

1.2 INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE O F THE THESIS

Thesis statement.

My presuppositions.

1. B C L A S S I F Y I N G R U L E S

Different conceptions of r u l e s and norms.

1. C EXAMPL.ES OF R U L E S WITH DIFFERENT U S E S

Classifying rules according to their use (legal,

mathematical, grammatical, game-rules etc.).

I.D NORMATIVE COMPULSION

Classifying rules according to the kind and force of

their normative compulsion.

Secky 3

How is normative compulsion different from a natural

compulsion? (a preliminary treatment)

1. E FOLLOWING RULES VS. CONFORMING TO RULES

Classifying rules according to whether we can speak of

an agent (or the lack thereof : following rules vs.

conforming to rules or norms.

Why the norms encoded in the brain are not relevant to

an account of rule-following?

1. F THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY

Classifying rules and norrns according to their source

(verbal instruction, shared ways of life, "practice",

observation, conditioning, evolution, cybernetic

systems, etc. ) .

1. G EXPLICIT VS. IMPLICIT RULES

Rules as the logical condition acting.

Classifying rules according to the way in which the

agent obeys the rule (explicitly or implicitly) .

Secky 4

What does constitute the following of a r u l e i n a

genera l sense?

I. H RULES VS. RULE-FORMULATIONS

1.1 WITTGENSTEIN'S USE OF "RULE"

II. THEORIES OF RULE-FOLLOWING

II. A REDUCTIONISM VS. NON-REDUCTIONISM

Introduction to theories of rules.

Reductionism. Are norms u n d e r l a i n by something

non-normative?

II. B ACTUALISM AND DISPOSITIONALISM

Dispositionalism and actualism: an introduction and

some g e n e r a l difficulties with t h e s e concepts.

III. THE "PARADOX" OF PI S201

I1I.A KRIPKE'S "PARADOX"

Introduction to Kripke's interpretation of

Wittgenstein.

The "paradox" of Kripke's sceptic.

III . B KR IPKE ' S W I T T G E N S T E I N AND THE REAL W I T T G E N S T E I N

Secky 5

54

Kripke's "paradox" is not the paradox that Wittgenstein

addresses in PI S201 .

Why it is very u n l i k e l y that Wittgenstein would want to

offer a solution to the "sceptical paradox".

1II.C W I T T G E N S T E I N ' S PARADOX

The sceptic's "paradox" is a paradox for Wittgenstein's

interlocutor, rather than for Wittgenstein himself.

III. D REGULISM

The regress of interpretations argument revisited.

III. E THE FOLLOWING OF A RULE I S A PRAXIS

How is the role of the comrnunity in Wittgenstein's

account different £rom that of Kripke's?

IV. THE SCEPTICAL SOLUTIOl\i

1V.A THE COMMUNITY VIEW

Secky 6

68

Community View -- the scepticism about rules applies

only to the individualistic conception of

rule-following.

K r i p k e : For A to be in accord with a rule is for the

community to have no disposition to reject A. This is

incorrect because it is quite possible for the

comrnunity to be wrong about a particular thing

(czlculating rnidsurnrner' s day) .

IV. B PRIVATE RULE-FOLLOWING

Wt~at is the difference between saying that r u i e

following is necessârily public and saying that it is

necessarily social? Could there be just one occasion

of foliowing a rule? T h e w e could be just one occasion

S e c k y 7

of followinç a rule but that kind of rule-following needs to be

social.

V. SANCTIONS AND PKACTICES

V.A INTRODUCTION TO BRANDOM

An introduction to Brandomls account of normativity and

its connection to Wittgenstein's "rules".

V.B NORMZTIVITY AND CONDITIONING

Brandom's account of opewant conditioning and its

relation to Wittgenstein's "training".

V. C DIFFICULTIES WITH BRANDOM'S ACCOUNT

Possible difficulties with Brandom's xcount of reward

and punishment.

V. D INTZRNAL AND EXTERNAL SANCTIONS

V. E BRANDOM ON ANIMALS AND INTERNAL SANCTIONS

Secky 8

1 0 5

Animals do n o t ac t because t h e y do not have a

conception of what t h e y are do ing . However, this does

not entai1 t h a t a n i m a l behaviour cannot be a source of

normativity.

Animal behaviour can be interpreted as resulting £rom

the non-propositional attitudes that animals have.

Does this entai1 t h a t anirnals h a v e beliefs?

How is Brandom f a i t h f u l t o t h e s p i r i t of the

P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n ?

VI. CONCL U S I O N

B i b l i o g r a p h y

Wittgenstein, Rules, and Normativity

by Frank M. Secky

1. INTRODUCTION: RULES AND NORMS

1. A INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE T H E S I S

Although discussions of rules can be traced as far back in

the history of philosophy as Plato's Eutnyphro, and although

r u l e s and norms are also addressed by Kant in T h e C r i t i q u e o f

P u r e R e a s o n in the eighteenth century, the concept of "following

a rule" became prominent in philosophy mainly as a result of

Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic in the P h i l o s o p h i c a l

I n v e s t i g a t i o n s (PI) §§143-242 and in certein parts of the R e m a r k s

on the F o u n d a t i o n s o f M a t h e m a t i c s (RFM) .

In this thesis 1 shall address some of the main claims that

Wittgenstein makes regarding rules, though 1 shall conceive rny

discussion of rules and norms in somewhat broader terrns than

Wittgenstein. 1 shall share with Wittgenstein, and other

philosophers whose work 1 am going to discuss, the presupposition

Secky 10

that a l 1 intentionality and meaninq, whether human or otherwise,

is in some sense normative. That meaning is normative is quite

apparent when we consider the meaning of everyday words and

sentences, for example, when someone alters the meaning of a word

("Just among two of us") it cornes down to altering the r u l e that

governs the use of that word ("Among is used to refer to more

chan two entitiest'). 1 shall assume that the kind of normativity

that is relevant to specifically human acrivities, to language

and mind, is instituted largely by use and social practices.

In this first chapter 1 shall set the stage for the thesis

by distinguishing rules £rom other norms, as well as by examining

some of the central features of rules and norms. In the

subsequent chapters 1 shall argue that the claim that r u l e s arise

out of a regular social practice does not entai1 that the

comrnunity determiries the interpretation of rules. The thinkers

who claim that the comrnunity does determine the interpretation of

r u l e s , the so-called Community View theorists, are usually

concerned to put a stop to possible challenges by a rule

sceptic. As we shall see, according to the Community View

theorists the rule sceptic can challenge an individual's rule-

foilowing ("How can you know which rule you have followed?") but

not the community's rule-following. The rule sceptic is thus

someone who challenges the individual's conception of his own

action, for example, if someone

Secky

believes that he performs

addition the rule sceptic may challenge that person by suggest

that in fact he rnight be performing a different mathematical

ing

operation. I shall claim, however, that the rule sceptic's worry

is incoherent and so is the solution to the scepticism, the

Community View. In discussing rule-scepticism and the Community

View, I shaii focus on Kripke's W i t t g e n s t e i n : On R u l e s and

Priva t e Language. Kripke's approach is a sophisticated

modification of the Community View. But although 1 argue,

together with McGinn and Baker and ~acker', that the Community

View is fundarnentally incorrect, 1 think that it is interesting

to see why this view is so tempting and why someone might want to

attribute it to Wittgenstein. 1 believe that in interpreting

Wittgenstein one needs to appreciate the delicate balance between

the cornmunitarian and the individualist aspects of his views on

rneming and rule-following.

Given the broadly Wittgensteinian framework that an agent

can follow a rule only if he can, in p r i n c i p l e , provide reasons

for following the rule, 1 shall offer a defence of two important

Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Basil

Elackwell, 1 9 8 4 ) ; Gordon P. Baker and P.M. S. Hacker, Scepticism,

R u l e s and Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1 9 8 5 ) .

Secky 12

theses about rule-following, namely, that an agent follows a rule

only if

1. the rule that he follows is part of an established

social practice or its extension by an already

socialised individual and/or

2. the agent has individually followed the r u l e on a

number of occasions.

On a superficial reading, it might seem that (1) and (2)

contradict each other, or at least that (2) is susceptible to the

critique of Wittgenstein's private language argument, 1 shall

show why (1) and (2) are correct.

Lastly, I shall examine Robert Brandom's conception of

normativity in Making it Explicit. I shall agree closely with

Brandom's view that the community is central to an account of

rules (norms) and that only rational beings can follow rules.

Moreover, 1 shall agree with Brandom that it makes no sense to

rêduce normativity to something nonnormative, such as

dispositions to act, although I shall argue that Brandom's own

position cornes dangerously close to reductionism. Finally, 1

shall address Brandom's view of rewards ànd punishments. I shall

d a i m that even though rewards and punishrnents can be normative,

Secky 13

Brandom's emphasis on reward and punishment in the context of

social interaction cannot pxovide us with an account of the kind

of normativity thctt is necessary for language and mind.

I. B CLASSIFYING RULES

Let me start by looking at some of the many ways in which w e

may conceive of rules and norms. A brief discussion of the ways

in which we might want to classify rules will draw our attention

to the different layers of meaning of the expressions "rule" and

"norm". We c m classify rules and norms according to:

their use (discussed in section 1.C)

the kind and apparent force of their normative

compulsion (discussed in section 1. D)

whether we can speak of an agent ( o r the lack

thereof); whether we can speak of following rules or

merely conforming to them (discussed in section 1.E)

their source (shared ways of life, evolütion,

cybernetical systems) (aiscussed in section 1 . F )

the way in which the agent follows the rule (explicitly

or irnplicitly) (discussed in section 1 . G )

Secky 14

6. whether we speak of abstract entities ("the rules

thernselves") or concrete rule formulations (discussed

in section 1.H)

Some of these ways of classifying rules are philosophically

interesting while others are of marginal interest to philosophy.

Sone will be merely acknowledged in later sections of this

chapter, to close off blind alleys, so to speak, while others

will a l s o form the subject-matter of the subsequent chapters.

The ways in which 1 have classified rules are not, of course, the

only ones conceivable. For exarnple, Baker and Hacker note that

One might classify r u l e s according to their normative

function (viz. to prohibit, prescribe, permit, empower,

constitute or identify) or according to their social

functions (e.g. to discourage deviant behaviour, encourage

desireci conduct, create normative relationships at will, and

facilitate settlement of dispates). (WRGN 47)

Thus, my way of classifying rules and norms does not aspire to be

exhaustive. The aim of my rule taxonomy is rather to bring up

certain philosophical points, to sharpen our philosophical

perception and throw light on the discussion that is to follow.

Secky 15

1. C EXFMPLES OF RULES W I T H DIFFERENT USES

Perhaps the most obvious way to classify rules is according

to their use, that is, according to the purposes and functions

that they serve. Let me corne up with a few examples of rules, to

some of which I shall refer later in rny discussion:

1. Do not trespass.

2. The bishop moves along the diagonal.

3. Stcp at the traffic lights if they are red.

4. Do not eat with your fingers.

5. To open the window, push down the handle.

6. In English, pluralising of most singular substantives

is done by adding the suffix -S.

7. Let y = 2x."

"y initial example of a mathematical rule was Ca,= 2x.

Dr. Schroeder claimed, probably rightly, that this not a

mathematical rule at a l 1 so 1 changed the example to somethinq

that both of us could agree on. The reason why 1 came with this

list gf rules in the first place was to suggest that "rule" need

not be just what we ordinarily call a rule. According to my

understanding, a "rule" is anything nomative that is subject to

"incerpretation", that is, subject to misinterpretation in the

sense of the Investigations S201 -- be it what we ordinarily call

Secky 16

The above examples include a legal rule (l), a game rule (21,

part of a traffic code ( 3 ) , a rule of etiquette (4) , a guideline

or an instruction ( 5 ) , a rule of English grarnmar (6), a

mathematical instruction ( 7 ) , and a basic rule of logic (8).

1. D NORMATIVE COMPULSION

The fact that each of the rules frcm the list in section 1.C

has a different purpose or function is philosophically not that

interesting, but what is philosophically very interesting is the

fact that each of the rules in the list seems to have a different

k i r i d and force of normative compulsion.' However, 1 shali daim

a rule or an instruction, formula, guideline, etc. In other

words, a formula can be a kind of rule because its application

(the w a y the algorithm associated with the formula is meant) is

not determinate. (Note: Every formula has at lezst one

algorithm associated with it because otherwise the "formula"

would arnount to nothing more than some scribbles on paper. Thus,

it is the algorithrn that gives the formula a normative

dimension. As 1 have pointed out above, it makes no sense to

speak of a formula in the absence of an algorithm.)

' Given that some rules seem easier to break than others it

Secky 17

that to whatever extent certain "very rigid rules" might seem

impossible to break, Aristotle's Laws of Thought for instance,

their force is normative, that is, categorically different from

the force of natural compulsion.

As Brandom points out, the laws of nature do not bind us by

obligation, but only by compulsion (51). The distinction between

the compulsion of rules and natural compulsion can be made ciear

by noting that it is an essential characteristic of rules that

they can be violated. If someone does not obey a certain rule,

chen generally the fault is with the agent himself. On the other

hand, if you detect what appears to be a violation of a natural

law, then you almost certainly have an indication that the

natural law has been wrongiy stated. This distinction also plays

a key role in the Investigations when Wittgenstein attacks the

understanding of a rule as an "impersonal rnechanism":

initially appears that normative compulsion cornes in degrees. It

might seem, for example, that the traffic rule (3) is easier to

break than the r u l e of logic ( 8 ) . However, this way of speaking

is only netaphorical and normative compulsion does not come in

degrees: what does come in degrees is the likelihood and

severity of punishment for breaking a rule or the perceived

inportance of the rule, whether at the social or the individual

levels.

Secky 18

The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a

machine -- 1 might Say at first -- seems to be there in it

from the start. What does that mean? -- If we know the

machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be

already completely determined. We talk as if these parts

could only move in this way, as if they could not do

a n y t h i n g else. How is this -- do we forget the possibility

of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on?

[ . . . ] Fox instance, we give someone [a drawing of a machine] and assume that he will derive the movement of the

parts from it. (Just as we can give someone a number by

telling hirn that it is the twenty-fifth in the series 1, 4,

9, 6 . . . . (PI 5193)

When Wittgenstein talks here of the "machine-as-symbol" he is

war~ing us not to assimilate normative compulsior, to natural

cornpcilsion ("the action of a machine-as-syrnbol"). Moreover, this

metaphor concerning a machine shows that normative necessity is

quite close to "mechanical necessity" because, after ail,

"mechanical necessity" is just as non-compelling as normative

necessity (rules can be broken j u s t as machine parts can "bend,

break off, melt" and so on) . However, the machine-as-symbol, that is, a machine to which we do not attribute the possibility

S e c k y 1 9

of f a i l i n g , i s a me taphor f o r a r u l e t h a t c o u l d n o t be broken .

I n m a n u s c r i p t 123 ( t h e e n t r y o f June 5L'), W i t t g e n s t e i n w r i t e s :

Must 1 r e p r e s e n t t h e r u l e a s a n i m p e r s o n a l mechanism which

o n l y works on m e and t h r o u g h me? For t h e l a t t e r i s what

rna thema t i c i ans would l i k e t o Say. T h a t t h e r u l e i s a n

â b s t r a c t mechanism. ( q u o t e d by H a l l e t t 280 )

H a l l e t t p o i n t s o u t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n h e r e s u g g e s t s t h a t i t i s

h i g h l y m i s l e a d i n g t o r e p r e s e n t t h e r u l e as a n i m p e r s o n a i

mechanism t h a t c a n never f a i l ( 2 8 0 ) . The e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n

b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r u l e s o f l o g i c have a s p e c i a l status due t o

t h e i r h i g h " r i g i d i t y " , i n compar i son t o which a l 1 o t h e r r u l e s

l o o k l i k e f a i l e d r e p l i c a s :

F . P . Ramsey once emphas ized i n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h m e t h a t

l o g i c was a " n o r m a t i v e s c i e n c e " . 1 d o n o t know e x a c t l y what

he had i n rnind, b u t i t w a s d o u b t l e s s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o what

o n l y dawned on m e l a t e r : namely, t h a t i n p h i l o s o p h y w e

o f t e n compare t h e u s e o f words w i t h games and c a l c u l i which

have fixed r u l e s , b u t c a n n o t s a y t h a t someone who i s u s i n g

l anguage rnust b e p l a y i n g such a garne. [ . . . ] L o g i c does

n o t treat o f l a n g u a g e -- o r o f t h o u g h t -- i n t h e s e n s e i n

Secky 20

which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon

. . . . (PI 581, cf. BB 2 5 )

Thus, with some "very rigid" rules (such as the rules of

mathematics and of logic) we are sometimes tempted to assimilate

the normative compulsion of these rules to natural comp~lsion.~

However, this is a mistake because if something is to be a rule.

the failure to obey it must be possible (or at least well-

de£ inea) .

1. E FOLLOWING RULES VS. CONFORMING TO RULES

Turning now to the third distinction that 1 have made in

section I.B, we can Say that following a rule, whether expliciïly

or implicitly, is quite different from rnerely conforming with the

rule. When one follows a rule he always, at the same tirne,

conforms with it, but when someone conforms with a rule he rnay or

rnay not also follow it. Suppose that A and B live in a country

where martial law has been proclaimed. Further suppose that on

Monday evening B was arrested on charges of leaving his house

after 9 p . m . On Tuesday evening at 10 p.m. A is at home watching

' Or, as I have pointed out above, we mistakenly believe that the normative compulsion of the rules of logic is somehow

greater than the normative compulsion of the rules of the road.

Secky 21

the Comedy News Network (CNN) while B is in prison. We can Say

that on Tuesday both A and B conform with the enacted martial law

but only A is following what the law comrnands. As 1 have noted

above, someone can follow a r u l e only if he also has the

possibility of not following it -- which is not the case for B.

Let me explore another example (1 have adapted it from Kenny

152 ff.). Compare the way in which a pianist and a pianola can

be said to play a polonaise. While the pianist follows certain

rules of translation of musical notation (let us disregard the

more complicated scenario in which the pianist plays from memory)

the pianola cannot be said to follow any rules at all. The

pianola cannot follow any rules because it has no conception of

playing music, reading musical notation etc. The distinction

cornes up clearly when you consider whac happens when the pianist

and the pianola stop playing suddenly in the midale of a

polonsise. In the case of the pianola we start to enquire about

what went wrong with the causal mechanism. In the cose of the

pianist, however, we enquire about the reason why he stopped

playing. Although we can also say that the "reason" why the

pianola stopped playing was that the battery is too old, this

should not confuse us: the explanation that the battery is too

old is an explanation of a causal relation, not a rational

jüstification. Something very different applies in the case of

Secky 22

t h e p i a n i s t whom w e t r e a t as a n agent who h a s reasons f o r h i s

actions. The p i a n i s t c a n e x p l a i n , f o r example, t h a t he l i k e s

o n l y the f i r s r p a r t o f t h e p o l o n a i s e and s o he i s n o t g o i n g t o

p l a y t h e second p a r t . I n f a c t , it i s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e

p i a n i s t c a n ( a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e ) give r e a s o n s f o r h i s a c t i o n s

t h a t it makes s e n s e t o Say t h a t he f o l l o w s r u l e s .

However, someone might o b j e c t by a s k i n g , "But i s n o t t h e

p i a n o l a f o l l o w i n g t h e same r u i e s t h a t t h e p i a n i s t f o l l o w s ? A r e

n o t t h e y p l a y i n g t h e s a m e mus ic?" F i r s t 1 must emphas i se t h a t 1

do n o t deny t h a t t h e p i a n o l a has a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n ( t h a t i t c a n

p e r f o r m well o r m i s p e r f o r m ) , t h a t t h e m u s i c wnich i s e m i t t e d by

t h e p i a n o l a i s t h e ( c o r r e c t o r i n c o r r e c t ) r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e

same music t h a t t h e p i a n i s t p l a y s . 1 do n o t t h u s deny t h a t some

k i n d o f norm i s i n v o l v e d b o t h i n t h e case of t h e p i a n i s t a n d t h e

p i a n o l a . I f t h e p i a n o l a p e r f o r m s a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n t h e n t h e r e

must be a n o m which i t c a n con£orm w i t h o r n o t . For t h e p i a n o l a

n o t t o conform w i t h a s p e c i f i e d norm amounts t o f a i l i n g t o

p e r f o r m i t s f u n c t i o n . W e c a n t h u s Say t h a t t h e p i a n o l a i s mere ly

conforming w i t h a c e r t a i n norm w h i l e t h e p i a n i s t , b e s i d e s

conforming w i t h t h e same norm, i s a l s o f o l l o w i n g c e r t a i n r u l e s .

The p i a n o l a , n o t b e i n g a n a g e n t , t h a t i s , n o t b e i n g a b l e t o act,

i t c a n n o t f a i l t o obey r u l e s and hence it cannot f o l l o w a n y r u l e s

a t a l l . Only a g e n t s can f o l l o w r u l e s and o n l y agency , i n t u r n ,

Secky 23

entails the possibility of giving and asking for reasons. This

is an assumption that 1 share with the neo-Wittgensteinian

movenent, which Baker and Hacker express as follows:

That a personts action is normative, that he is following a

rule, that he is guided by a rule (or better, guides himself

'Dy reference to a rule) is manifest i n t h e rnanner i n which

h e uses rules, invokes rule-formulations, refers to rules in

explaininç what he did, justifying what he did in the face

of criticism, evaluating what he dia and correcting what he

did, criticizing his mistakes, and so forth. (WRGN 45)

Baker and Hacker emphasise the point that someone can be said tc

follow a rule only if the rule plays ar? organic role' in his

reason-giving. This means, of course, that only people, agents

who are capable of acting, can follow rules because machines do

not act and cannot give reasons. Hence we can generalise from

An oràinary computer can be

"give reasons". This is an example

programmed such that it can

of inorganic reason-giving

because a machine state, and hence also its reason-giving, is

meaningful only in virtue of its being designed by people for a

given purpose. This is a fact whether or not an imaginary

supercornputer can have machine States that do have intrinsic

meaning and as a result c m give organic reasons.

the above that people can

machines can only conform

both follow and conform

to rules. Although the

Secky 24

to rules but

working

assumption

Hacker are

misleading

of this essay will be that the point that Baker and

making is valid, the passage cited here is possibly

because their examples seem to involve only instances

in which the agent follows rules explicitly. Baker and Hacker

clarify their conception of rule in the following way:

[It is not]

rule merely

no rules) . rule -- for

his present

enough that the behaviour of someone following a

conforms with the rule (a chess computer follows

Nor is Ft sufficient that he once learned the

that is past history . . . and the issue here is possession of an ability, not its genesis. Nor

would it suffice that the rule might be encoded in his brain

(whatever that might mean); for being caused to act by the

encoding of a rule is precisely not to follow a rule.

(WRGN 45)

This passage is, of course, quite contentious: Fodor,

certain teleosemantic philosophersO (Dretske, Papineau,

and

and

' Teleosernantics, or teleosemanticism, is a theory of mind claiming that the brain is a collection of structures which are

stipposed to stand in correspondence relations to States

of affairs in the world. In other words, the brain is nothing

Secky 25

o t h e r s ) , would p r o b a b l y d i s a g r e e , p e r h a p s c l a i m i n g t h a t b e i n g

caused t o a c t by t h e encod ing o f a r u l e i n o n e ' s b r a i n amounts t o

f o l l o w i n g t h a t r u l e . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d such prima f a c i e

p u z z l i n g c l a i m s a s "a c h e s s cornputer f o l l o w s no r u l e s ' w e have t o

b e aware, f i r s t o f all, t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f " f o l l o w i n g " i s b e i n g

used by Baker and Hacker (as w e l l as by W i t t g e n s t e i n ) i n a v e r y

d i f f e r e n t way than contemporary n o n - W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s

t e n d t o u s e it. ' Thus, c h e s s cornputers do n o t , on t h e

b u t a c o l l e c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . W e c a n t a l k a b o u t

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s i n t h e b r a i n , o r

t h e b r a i n ' s s t r u c t u r e , c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e states of a f f a i r s i n t h e

wor ld . However, w e s h o u l d n o t t h i n k t h a t any k ind of

c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between s t a t e s of a f f a i r s c a n be c a l l e d a

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a k ind of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e i n

w h i c h t h e i s o m o r p h i c s t â tes of a f f a i r s a r e supposed Co s t a n d i n

that r e l a t i o n . Accord ing t o a t e l e o s e m a n t i c i s t , o n l y minds can

represent b e c a u s e o n l y i n t h e c a s e of minds t h e r e i s supposed t o

be a c e r t a i n k i n d o f r e l a t i o n be tween t h e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s i n

t h e world a n d t h e p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e s of t h e mind.

T e l e o s e m a n t i c i s t s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e b r a i n i n s t a n t i a t e s t h e mind

because a l 1 minds a r e n o t h i n g else b u t systems o f i n t e r a c t i n g

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s .

- A s w e s h a l l see l a t e r , W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n p h i l o s o p h e r s t e n d

t o c h a l l e n g e t h e r e l e v a n c e o f n o n - r a t i o n a l norms ( t h e t y p e o f

Secky 26

Wittgensteinian view, follow the rules of chess because they do

not literally act. However, chess cornputers conform to the rules

of chess whenever they "playwe chess with a human or another

computer.

If the following of a rule would amount to being merely

caused io act by the encoding of a rule then people would be

reduced to the kind of complicated physical mechanism that

pianolas are and this seems preposterous.' It might be a

necessary condition that conforming to a non-rational norm"

norms that cannot be involved in asking for and giving of

reosons) to the kind of intentionality that gives rise to

language and mind. As Dr. Schroeder pointed out to me, however,

in the present case the emphasis Fs not on the expression "rule"

but on "following". Thus, according to the Wittgensteinian view,

a cornputer can still accord with the rules of chess without

fcllowing those r u l e s .

' Chess cornputers cannot be said to play chess in a literal way since playing (in the literal sense) amounts to acting and

cornputers do not act because they do not have intentionality.

' Or 1 should perhaps Say would be preposterous. If reductionist philosophers are right then doing what an extremely

complicated pianola does might be sufficient for having a mind. - - - Many philosophers use the expression "norm" to refer to

Secky 27

involves the encoding of that norm in the brain; but even if

thot is the case, it has no relevance to the account of rule-

following that 1 offer here. As I have suggested above, the only

way that we can meaningfully tâlk of following rules is to

reserve rule-following for agents, because following a rule is an

activity and only agents can act.

Let me return to Baker and Hacker by quoting a passage that

is possibly even more controversial:

Current jargon of "neural representations" of rules is

manifest nonsense since only symbols with a use can function

as a representation (formulation) of a rule, and nerve cells

are not syrnbols. Being knocked sideways by a board on which

is written "Turn left!" is not to follow the rule to turn

left, but only to be caused unwittingly to conform to it.

(WRGN 45)

a class of entities that includes both rules and naturâl norms.

1 have no difficulty with this but 1 shall sometimes designate

norms that are not rules as "non-rational norms" (including both

natural norms and artifactual norms) to bring up the point that

nies are a kind of norm which is defined, at least in part, by

the possibility of rationai agency.

Secky 28

1 t a k e B a k e r a n d Hacker t o be c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e c a n b e no r u l e -

f o l l o w i n g a t t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l l e v e l . Baker a n d Hacker need n o t

deny, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e b r a i n i n v o l v e s n o r m a t i v i t y o f some k i n d

-- t h e y o n l y need t o c l a i m t h a t t h e k i n d o f n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t i s

i n v o l v e d i n t h e b r a i n , s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e e n c o d i n g o f norms a t t h e

n e u r o l o g i c a l l e v e l , i s i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c c o u n t o f

rule-following n e c e s s a r y f o r a s u c c e s s f u l t h e o r y o f mind. The

p o i n t t h a t Baker and Hacker are making, t h a t it makes no s e n s e t o

s p e a k o f r u l e s b e i n g encoded a t t h e n e u r o l o g i c a l l e v e l , is q u i t e

i m p o r t a n t and I t h i n k t h a t it can b e s u p p o r t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g

k i n d of a rgument . Suppose t h a t A is b o r n w i t h a n i n n a t e

d i s p o s i t i o n s u c h t h a t whenever someone g i v e s him a d i r e c t i o n t h e n

he would l o o k i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e l i n e t h a t e x t e n d s £rom t h a t

p e r s o n ' s w r i s t t o h i s f i n g e r t i p . As f a r a s 1 know t h e a b i l i t y t o

give and t a k e d i r e c t i o n by p o i n t i n g i s n o t i n b o r n i n p e o p l e and

hence A ' s case is r a t h e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y , W e c a n t h u s Say that A

h a s a n i n n a t e d i s p o s i t i o n a b o u t p o i n t i n g o r t h a t t h e norms

i n v o l v e d i n p o i n t i n g have been encoded i n A ' s b r a i n s i n c e h i s

b i r t h . But c a n w e a l s o Say t h a t whenevex A l o o k s i n t h e

d i r e c t i o n t h a t h e i s p o i n t e d t o t h e n h e i s f o l l o w i n g a r u l e ?

Suppose t h a t A is b o r n i n t o a c u l t u r e i n which d i r e c t i o n is given

by p o i n t i n g w i t h o n e ' s e lbow, t h a t i s , one i s supposed t o l o o k i n

t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e l i n e t h a t e x t e n d s £rom someone ' s w r i s t t o

his e lbow. If A would behave i n s u c h a c u l t u r e as he i s i n n a t e l y

Secky 29

disposed to, then clearly he would not act in accordance with the

rule about pointing that existed in that culture. This shows

that whatever norms might be encoded in one's brain, they do not

nave to enter into my account of rule-following at all. While my

example can be interpreted in such a way that it conflicts with

the claims of teleosemanticism, my aim was not to show that the

teleosemantic account of normativity is incorrect. Rather, 1

want to point out that the meaning of a rule, unlike the meaning

of a natural norrn, is inseparable from its use': or social

practice. In other words, in the absence of an established use

. . - - Wheri Wittgenstein talks about meaning he usually has in

mind conventional meaning and it is in this context that he

claims that "meaning is use":

The meaning of a word can be fixed by all the rules that

govern the word. These rules constitute the meaning and

they cannot be fixed by an ostensive definition, but only by

the use of the word. The meaning changes when one of its

rules changes. (WL 3-4, cf. PI 431 ff.)

In other woràs, it is the peculiawity of conventional meaning

that it is correlative with understanding: marks on a paper by

themselves mean nothing if no one understands them, if they do

not have a use.

Secky 30

or social practice we can speak of conforming to a rule but not

of rule-following. I believe that rule-following is both a

necessary and a sufficient condition for the kind of

intentionality that gives rise to human language and rnind,

because rule-following entails acting and acting is

intentional." The kind of intentionality that is involved in

acting is a necessary condition for rule-following because it is

inconceivable that someone would be following a rule without

acting, as opposed to merely conforming with a rule.

I . F THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY

The fourth distinction that 1 have made in section 1 . B is

concerned with the sources of normativity. Rules are established

solely by convention whereas non-rational norms (that is, al1

norms other than rules) can be establishea not only by convention

but also by evolution (which gives rise to natural norms) or, as

Dr. Schroeder would have it, by a cybernetic system (which can

. - * It is, of course, true that humans can behave in such a

way that they do not act and yet the behaviour in question can be

intenticnal. In this passage 1 was concerned only with the kind

of intentionality that is necessary for giving rise to language

and mind.

Secky 31

g i v e r ise t o n a t u r a l o r a r t i f a c t u a l " norms) (CST 9 ff.). The

s p l i t be tween r u l e s a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l norms ( o r f u n c t i o n s ) r o u g h l y

c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e two t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e

p h i l o s o p h y o f mind a s s o c i â t e d w i t h W i t t g e n s t e i n , S e l l a r s ,

~ randorn" and o t h e r s on t h e o n e hand, and D r e t s k e , P a p i n e a u and

o t h e r s on t h e o t h e r . Even i f p h i l o s o p h e r s o f d i f f e r e n t

traditions can a g r e e r o u g h l y how t o c o n c e i v e of r u l e s a n d norms,

and p e r h a p s e v e n açree on wnat are t h e v a r i o u s s o u r c e s o f

n o r m a t i v i t y , t h e r e i s n o t a n y c o n s e n s u s a b o u t t h e relevance of

t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of n o r m a t i v i t y f o r t h e k i n d o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y

t n a t i s i n v o l v e d i n l a n g u a g e and mind.

In Na t u r a l i z i n g the Mind, D r e t s k e d i s t i n g u i s h e s be tween

c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a s s i g n e d f u n c t i o n s and f u n c t i o n s t h a t a re

n a t u r a l l y a c q u i r e d . Peop le are t h e s o u r c e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l

f u n c t i o n s whereas n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n i s t h e main s o u r c e o f n a t u r a l

- - - B y " a r t i f o c t u a l norms" 1 mean t h e k i n d o f norms t h a t a r e

c r e a t e d b y t h e o p e r a t i o n o f rnanmade c y b e r n e t i c s y s t e m s

( a r t i f a c t s ) and whose f u n c t i o n o r meaning may o r may n o t depend

on t h e s o c i a l c o n t e x t .

- . - A s w e s h a l L see i n c h a p t e r V, Brandomian norms e l u d e a n

easy c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , b e c a u s e t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d l y g i v i n g r ise t o

language a n d rnind w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e b e i n g c r e a t e d a t t h e

unconsc ious level.

Secky 32

f u n c t i o n s . T h a t a t h i n g h a s a f u n c t i o n , w h e t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l o r

n a t u r a l , p r e s u p p o s e s t h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f r u l e s o r norms: it makes

s e n s e t o s p e a k o f a f u n c t i o n b e i n g p e r f o r m e d w e l l , o r of a t h i n g

m a I f u n c t i o n i n g , o n l y i f t h e r e i s a n o m t h a t s a y s ( o r

e s t a b l i s h e s ) what i s t h e g i v e n t h i n g ' s f u n c t i o n . The f u n c t i o n o f

a teacher i s t o t e a c h c h i l d r e n a n d t h e t e a c h e r c a n t h u s p e r f o r m

his f u n c t i o n w e l l o r n o t , S i r n i l a r l y , t h e f u n c t i o n of a t o a s t e r

is t o t o a s t b r e a d a n d a g a i n t h e t o a s t e r c a n p e r f o r m its f u n c t i o n

w e l l o r n o t . Each o f t h e s e manrnade f u n c t i o n s t h u s d e p e n d s on

. .. some kind of a s o u r c e o f c o r r e c t n e s s o r a norm.-= These s o u r c e s

of c o r r e c t n e s s may i n v o l v e t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e d e s i g n e r , t h e

p u r p o s e s o f t h e u s e r , t h e e s t a b l i s h e d way of d o i n g t h i n g s ,

c o n d i t i o n i n g , c y b e r n e t i c s y s t e m s ( b o t h n a t u r a l a n d a r t i f a c t u â l )

o r s imp ly w h a t e v e r f a c i l i t a t e s t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e s p e c i e s .

T h e r e cre, of c o u r s e , many o t n e r s o u r c e s o f c o r r e c t n e s s b u t o n l y

some s o u r c e s o f c o r r e c t n e s s a re r e l e v a n t t o s p e c i f i c a l l y human

a c t i v i t i e s , t o t h e k i n d o f n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n

language a n d mind.

" I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t natural f u n c t i o n s d o n o t depend on any norms a t a l 1 b u t a re a s p e c i e s o f norms t h e m s e l v e s . Non-

n a t u r a l f u n c t i o n s are n o r m a t i v e b u t a r e n o t norms o n l y by

t h e m s e l v e s ( t h e i r n o r m a t i v i t y d e p e n d s on , i n p a r t , t h e i n t e n t i o n s

of t h e d e s i g n e r , t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e u s e r , e t c . ) .

Secky 33

It is the peculiarity of some n o m s that they are, at least

in part, constituted by a physical mechanism, for example, the

existence of the right kind of a physical mechanism can be

sufficient for the existence of a biological norm. However, the

existence of a physical mechanismL6 is not sufficient for the

existence of rules, for example, the physical existence of a

chessboard and chessmen is not sufficient for h~ving the rules of

chess. In order to have chess we have to have chess players and,

for example, a tradition of playing chess from which the rules of

chess spring. Thus, the reason why the existence of a physical

mechanism is not sufficient for having rules is that the

existence of al1 rules depends on the existence of social beings

who use t h o s e rules. It is possible to object that there are

many rules that do not have any use at all, for example, the

rules of boring games that no one plays, but 1 shall suggest that

objections of this kind are incoherent, or at least misleading,

because (1) rules that do not Ssve a use are not rules in the

literal sense or, more importantly, (2) the existence of, for

example, the rules of boring games that no one plays still

aepends on an agent who formulated them.

- - - " Or, as Dr. Schroeder would like to specify, the

existence of a non-personal physical mechanism is insufficient

for having rules. (Whatever "personal physical mechanisms" mignt

be.)

Secky 3 4

R e t u r n i n g t o m y example i n v o l v i n g a p i a n o l a we c a n t h u s Say

t h a t t h e p i a n o l a conforms w i t h a g i v e n norm i n v i r t u e o f a

certain p h y s i c a l mechanism. U n l i k e t h e case of a b i o l o g i c a l

norm, however, t h e p h y s i c a l mechanism o f t h e p i a n o l a ( t h e

c y l i n d e r w i t h s p i k e s ) c o n s t i t u t e s t h e encod ing o f t h e norm o n l y

i n p a r t , b e c a u s e t h e norm is a l s o p a r t i a l l y d e f i n e d by o u r

e x p e c t a t i o n s , t h a t is t o say, by o u r g i v i n g t h e p i a n o l a a c e r t a i n

f ü n c t i o n a n d e x p e c t i n g t h a t it w i l l p e r f o r m t h a t f u n c t i o n i n a

s p e c i f i e d way. The norms t h a t t h e p i a n o l a i s c o n s t r a i n e d by a r e

of a quite d i f f e r e n t s o r t t h a n t h e r u l e s t h a t t h e p i a n i s t f o l l o w s

-- b u t there a l s o h a s t o be someth ing i n comrnon t o b o t h of t h e s e

c a s e s b e c a u s e t h e r e s u l t i s t h e " s a m e " k ind of music . 1 t h i n k

that w e c a n a v o i d t a l k i n g a b o u t " u n d e r l y i n g norms" by p o i n t i n g

o u t t h a t b o t n t h e p i a n i s t and t h e p i a n o l a can conform t o t h e same

r u l e , a l t h o u q h o n l y t h e p i a n i s t f o l l o w s that r u l e .

E X P L I C I T VS. IMPLICIT RULES

The p e n u l t i m a t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t I have made i n t h e l i s t

i n s e c t i o n 1 . B d i s t i n g u i s h e s between e x p l i c i t and i m p l i c i t r u l e s .

Although i t is t r u e t h a t any r u l e can, i n p r i n c i p l e , be s t a t e d

e x p l i c i t l y , i t must n o t be t h o u g h t t h a t whenever 1 f o l l o w a r u l e

1 am f o l l o w i n g it e x p l i c i t l y . T h e " i n p r i n c i p l e " c l a u s e i s t h u s

v e r y i m p o r t a n t , b e c a u s e p e o p l e c a n f o l l o w r u l e s i m p l i c i t l y even

Secky 35

though n o one has e v e r t h o u g h t o f f o r m u l a t i n g them e x p l i c i t l y ,

f o r example t h e r u l e s o f L a t i n b e f o r e a n y grammarians c a m e a l o n g

and f o r r n u l a t e d L a t i n gramrnar i n t h e form o f e x p l i c i t r u l e s .

Rules i n t h e sense i n which I a m g o i n g t o d i s c u s s them i n t h i s

t h e s i s a r e t h e l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n o f a c t i n g , a s opposed t o o t h e r

kinds of b e h a v i o u r o r a mere n a t u r a l o c c u r r e n c e , t h a t is t o Say,

ail a c t i o n s , o r a l 1 mean ingfu l b e h a v i o u r , i n v o l v e t h e f o l l o w i n g

of r u l e s , whether e x p l i c i t ( " c o n s c i o u s " ) o r i m p l i c i t

( "unconsc ious" )

A l 1 o f t h e e i g h t r u l e s t h a t 1 have l i s t e d i n s e c t i o n 1.B

e n a b l e m e t o engage myself i n some k i n d o f a c t i v i t y . Even t h e

f i r s t k i n d o f r u l e , t h e p r e c e p t " D o n o t t r e s p a s s " , a l t h o u g h i t

l i m i t s m y f reedom t o some e x t e n t , i t a l s o e n a b l e s m e t o ac t i n a

c e r t a i n way, namely a s a l aw-ab id ing t r a v e l l e r e tc . I f 1 would

ac t w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o any r u l e s a t a l1:- t h e n it would n o t rnake

. - - That is , i f t h i s w e r e c o n c e p t u a l l y p o s s i b l e . I f 1 w e r e

t o a c t i n s u c n a way t h a t 1 would, f o r example, v i o l a t e a l 1 r u l e s

t h a t 1 were t o e n c o u n t e r t h e n 1 c o u l d s t i l l be s a i d t o f o l l o w t h e

rule, "Break a l 1 t h e r u l e s t h a t you e n c o u n t e r " . 1 c a n a l s o

behave i n s u c h a way t h a t 1 d o n o t f o l l o w any r u l e s a t a l l , f o r

example, when 1 have a n e p i l e p t i c s e i z u r e , b u t s i n c e h a v i n g a n

e p i l e p t i c s e i z u r e i s n o t a c t i n g , t h i s k i n d o f b e h a v i o u r h a s no

r e l e v a n c e t o a n a c c o u n t of r u l e - f o l l o w i n g .

Secky 36

sense to say that I am really acting, because the very

possibility of acting is enabled by my following some kind of

rüle, by restricting my action in some way. What distinguishes

actions from other kinds of behaviour is the fact that in the

case of actions failure is well-defined. But this is only

another uay of saying that choosing between various actions cornes

d o m to choosinç between different rules that are to guide mÿ

action. When we Say that A has failed in performing a certain

action we really Say that A has violated a rule that governs the

performance of that action.

As 1 nave suggestea above, actions, as opposed to other

kinds of behaviour, are intelligible only in the context of

asking for and giving of reasons. That is to Say, the fact that

al1 rules have to be, at least potentially, explicit makes them

proposi t i o n a l in character. However, this statement is possibly

rn is leaaing because sDmeone might think that since a reference to

an explicit rule is needed, the explicit rule is more

fundamental. In fact, 1 shall argue in chapter II that the

implicit rule, the rule grounded in practice, is more fundamental

than the explicit one. It would be more precise to Say that

there is only one kind of rule that c a n be followed in two ways:

explicitly or implicitly. One can follow a rule such that he

Secky 37

g u i d e s h i m s e l f b y t h e r u l e ( h e obeys it explicitly) o r else h e i s

g u i d e d by t h e r u l e ( h e f o l l o w s it implicitly) .

1. H RULES VS. RULE-FORMULATIONS

The l a s t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t h a t 1 have made i n s e c t i o n 1 . B F s

n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h k inds of r u l e b u t r â t h e r w i t h t h e d i f f e r e n c e

between r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s and t h e " r u l e s t hemse lves" . I t i s

c l e a r t h a t rules canno t b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s

b e c a u s e one p a r t i c u l a r r u l e c a n be f o r m u l a t e d i n s e v e r a l

d i f f e r e n t l a n g u a g e s , it c a n be e x p r e s s e d i n v â r i o u s s t y l e s and s o

on . B u t d o e s t h i s mean t h a t r u l e s a r e a b s t r a c t e n t i t i e s , t h a t

they have some k i n d o f o n t o l o g i c a l status i n t h e way t h a t , f o r

example , P l a t o ' s Forms have a c e r t a i n o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s ? 1

t h i n k that t h e i n c o h e r e n c e o f what w e may cal1 " n o r m a t i v e

nominalisrn" ( r u l e s a r e t o b e i d e n t i f i e d w i t h r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s )

d o e s r ~ o t imp ly "normat ive r e a l i s m " (rules have a P l a t o n i c r e a l i t y

of s o m e sort). A s Baker and Hacker n o t e , one r e a s o n t o t h i n k

t h a t n e i t h e r o f t h e two e x t r e m e v i e w s i s c o r r e c t i s t h a t r u l e s

and r u l e f o r m u l a t i o n s a r e o f t e n i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e o r t h a t t h e

"grammar o f ' r u l e ' and ' r u l e - f o r m u l a t i o n ' r u n s , f o r a s t r e t c h ,

along p a r a l l e l t r a c k s " (WRGN 4 2 ) . This is an i m p o r t a n t p o i n t b u t

n o t a p o i n t t h a t can e a s i l y s a t i s f y u s because , a s w e s h a l l see

l a t e r , t h e "no rma t ive P l a t o n i s t " c a n e a s i l y r e s o l v e c e r t a i n

difficulties &out rule-following

Platonist" hâs to struggle with.

that

This

the

is,

"normative

of course,

that rules exist in some kind of Platonic reality but

Secky 38

non-

not to Say

that

"normative Platonism" can be persuasive when viewed in a certain

kind of light and hence we should not dismiss it too quickly.

Another way that we can frame this question is to ask

whether rules are a kind of n o m or whether they are an

expression of norms. Let us assume, for the purposes of this

thesis, that ruies are a kind of norm. We have to be aware,

however, that norm in this sense describes the class of normative

entities (rules, natural norms, functions) as opposed to itself

being, for example, a kind of artifactual norm. It is also worth

observing that any norm (that is, any rule, natural norm or

funccion) Fs distinct from a norm-formulation (that Is, rule-

formulation, natural norm-formulation or function-formulation).

What this clearly suggests is that nom-formulations are merely

epiphenomena (the function of an animal heart is to pump blood

whether or not there are any people around to formulate the

heart's function). But though it is possible to ask about the

ontological status of the various norms, as opposed to norm-

Secky 39

formulations, this question is too general to be directly

relevant to the present thesis." It is sufficient when we

define norms as distinct frorn norm-formulations and leave it at

tnat.

1. I WITTGENSTEIN'S USE OF "RULEf'

In order to prepare us for the discussion in the subsequent

chapters, 1 shall conclude chapter I with a brief description of

Wittgenstein's use of the expression "rule". According to

Wittgenstein' s Tracta tus Logico-Philosophicus, language is a

system of definite and hidden rules (TLP 4.023, 4.002). The

rules of the tractarian language are definite in the way that the

rules of calculus are definite. In the Investigations,

Wittgenstein compares language to garnes rather than to calculus.

. - -' As we shall see later, however, the distinction between

rules and rule-formulations is central to this thesis. Since my

present general account of norms and norm-formulations suggests

that rules in their propositional forrn, that is, rule

formulations, are merely epiphenomena we shall be able to

conclude that what is actually followed are not the rule-

formulations (as the regulists would have it) but rather the

"rules themselves", the rules grounded in practice (as the

Wittgensteinians would have it).

Secky 40

Throughout the Investigations we xead that speaking is like

playing chess and words are like chess pieces. The metaphor of

language-game captures the later Wittgenstein's conception of

language quite well because when one plays a game he often does

not think but only a c t s and r e a c t s . The later Wittgenstein is

concerned with deeds rather than with the tractarian systems of

hiaden rules and this is partly because at the bottom of the

language-game lies acting (OC 9 2 0 4 ) . Moreover, both language and

games are rule-guided activities and this strengthens the analogy

between language and games.

As Brandom notes, the later Wittgenstein uses "rule" ( R e g e l )

in three different senses (64 f f . ) :

whatever one consults while being engaged in a certain

activity: an explicit r u l e

whatever guides one's conduct, whether it be a n

e x p l i c i t or a n i m p l i c i t r u l e

whatever is subject to n o r m a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t , whether

one is "following a rule" and is aware of following it

(explicitly or implicitly) or not (also cf.

PI S54, 981)

Secky 41

1 have used and 1 shall continue to use the expression

" r u l e " in the first two senses. 1 find the third sense rather

problematic because it is in a danger of being mixed up with a

mere regularity, "a natural law". Moreover, the third sense of

Regel seems to conflate being a rule with being regulated. Let

me elucidate Wittgenstein's third sense of "rule" by considering

s u c h an activity as giving direction. If someone directs me to

St John's College by pointing 1 might be following an explicit

rule such as "When someone gives you a direction, look in the

direction of the line that exteads from that personfs wrist Co

his fingertip". It is also possible that I might follow this

r u l e implicitly. But in what sense could it be said that 1

looked in the direction of the fingertip w i t h o u t following any

rde, whetner explicit or implicit? Presmably, that would be

the case if looking in the direction of the fingertip was natural

for people, for example, if there had been encoded a certain k i ~ d

of norrn in every man's brain since his birth. This kind of cctse

involves "rule" in the third sense -- a case in which I would

prefer, as 1 have already indicated, to use the expression

"non-rational norm". In other words, the third sense of "rule"

that Brandorn identified is not a rule at all, at least not in my

terminology, even though Wittgenstein rnight have used the German

expression Regel in al1 three cases. The fact that an event can

be described in normative terms does not mean that it involves a

Secky 4 2

rule (in my sense) although, of course, the event has to involve

a norm of some kind.

II, THEORIES OF RULE-FOLLOWING

II. A REDUCTIONISM VS. NON-REDUCTIONISM

In chapter 1, 1 have outlined some of the various ways in

which we can conceive of rules. 1 would like to start this

chapter by briefly looking at how we can classify the competing

t h ê o r i e s of rules. We can identify two very broad categories of

theories, namely non-reductionist and reductionist.

Non-reductionists believe that our normative concepts cannot be

reduced to something non-normative, such as to dispositions to

act, and that r u l e s and their applications are internally

reloted. Hence I shall also cal1 non-reductionist philosophers

f 1 internalists" because the expression "internalism" captures the

central tenet of non-reductionism that 1 am interested in. There

are various aegrees in which a non-reductionist can be committed

to internalism about rules. The comrnon ground among internalists

seems Eo be that rules and their applications are internally

related in the sense of a particular rule being inseparable £rom

the way it is applied in practice while at the same time the

practice of the comrnunity does not determine the correctness of

S e c k y 43

t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f r u l e s i n p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e s . There i s an

i n t e r n a l r e l a t i on : ' between a g iven r u l e and i ts a p p l i c a t i o n and

it is i r r e l e v a n t , f o r example, how t h e majority of t h e rnembers of

a comrnunity i s disposed t o fo l l ow t h a t ru1e . l "

. - -' A n i n t e r n a 1 r e l a t i o n can be d e f i n e d such t h a t t h e

r e l a t i o n between two e n t i t i e s i s i n t e r n a l i f and o n l y i f it i s

i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e e n t i t i e s do n o t s t a n d i n t h a t r e l a t i o n

( c f . TLP 4 .123) . If a n o b j e c t is red , f o r i n s t a n c e , it i s i n t o r n a l l y r e l a t e d t o al1 green o b j e c t s such t h a t it is of a

d i f f e r e n t c o l o u r t h a n t h e s a i d g r een o b j e c t s . W e can thus s c y

t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between two o r more e n t i t i e s i s

analogous t o ~ h e a n a l y t i c i t y of two o r more p r o p o s i t i o n s .

A more r e l e v a n t s e n s e i n w h i c h w e can speak about " i n t e r n a l

relation" i s with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i n t e r n a l r e l o t i o n of t h e

central concep t s i nvo lved i n ru l e - fo l l owing . I n S225 of t h e

Investigations, f o r example, W i t t g e n s t e i n makes t h e impor tan t

p o i n t t h a t "The use of t h e word ' r u l e ' and t h e u se of t h e word

'same' a r e in terwoven. ( A s a r e t h e use of ' p r o p o s i t i o n ' and t h e

u s e of ‘truc'.)" - - - T h i s c l a i m is, of cou r se , q u i t e c o n t e n t i o u s , because, a s

we s h a i l see l a t e r , i t d i r e c t l y c o u n t e r s t h e d a i m s of t h e

Community V i e w .

Secky 44

Internalism about rules is, or appears to be, dangerously

close to the rules-as-rails view which is discussed by McDowell

(145 f f . ) . At its extreme this view is a kind of "Platonism"

proclaiming that the applications of rules are already determined

or "pre-interpreted", quite independently of human dispositions,

customs etc. Wittgenstein expresses this view as follows:

Wnence cornes the idea that the beginning of a series is a

visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity? Well,

we might imâgine rails instead of a rule. And infinitely

long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a

rule. (PI S 2 1 8 )

As I have pointed out above, the internalists believe that the

relation between a rule and its application is internal, that is

to Say, it does not depend on, for example, dispositions. But if

the correctness of the application of a rule is related only

the rule itself, is not the application of a rule somehow

determined or "pre-interpreted"?

rule were to 5e "pre-interpreted"

would be that of "rails invisibly

If al1 of the applications

then our picture of a rule

laid to infinity", that is

S a y , a picture of objective interpretati~ns of rules existing in

sorne kind of Platonic realm. But, of coLrse, al1 of the leading

internalists working on the philosophy of mind, namely Gordon

Baker, Peter

this accusat

M.S.

Secky 45

Hacker and Colin McGinn, would vehemently deny

ion that is sometimes raised against them (cf.

Malcolm 147 ff.). This accusation would not affect Robert

Brandom who also counts himself to be a normative

non-reductionist but, as we shall see in chapter V, if he is a

non-reductionist at all, it is in a different sense from the

internalist philosophers that 1 have just mentioned. 1 snall

further elaborate on internalism in chapter IV.

Reductionists believe that our normative practices are

underlain by something non-normative. We can subdivide

reductionist theories according to the non-normative foundation

of normativity that they rely on. With respect to philosophers

whose work is relevant to this thesis, we can distinguish

primarily between reductions of normative properties to

dispositions and to actual behaviour. It should be noted that in

al1 cases the norms to which the reductionist wants to reduce

benaviour (dispositions, actual behaviour) are those that make

language and mind possible, not non-rational norms of the kind

that make hearts possible. Some well-known normative

reductionists include2' Peter Winch (The Idea of Social Science),

- - - In Discussions of Wittgenstein, Rush Rhees sometirnes

tâlks like a normative reductionist, but I have not read enough

by him on this subject to be able to include him in this group

Secky 46

Norman Malcolm (Nothing is Hidden), Christopher Peacocke ("Rule-

Following"), Robert Fogelin (Wittgenstein), Crispin Wright

(Wittgenstein on the E'ooundation of Mathematics) , Saul A. Kripke

(Wittgenstein: On R u l e s and P r i v a t e Language) , and Hilary Putnam

(Realism and Reason). Al1 of the reductionists that 1 have just

mentioned espouse some f o m of the "Corrununity View", that is,

th2y believe that what gives substance to rules âre social

dispositions or the actual behaviour of an entire community as

opposed to the dispositions or actual behaviour of an individual

consiciered in isolation.'* In the next section 1 shall introduce

these two views in a little bit more detail.

II. B ACTUALISM AND DISPOSITIONALISM

Comrnunity actualism is the view that actual past behaviour

of the rnembers of a community determines the corxectness of the

application of r u l e s . The individual's âctual behaviour, when

t a k e n only by itself, is quite unimportant, for example, red is

of thinkers. - - " A reductionist philosopher who does not espouse the

Comunity View but believes in the foundational role of

individual dispositions is Gilbert Ryle. However, although Ryle

is a dispositionalist about the mind he is not a normative

theorist about the mind.

Secky 4 7

what m o s t p e o p l e a c t u a l l y c a l 1 " r e d " , t h a t is t o Say, r e d i s what

most p e o p l e h a v e c a l l e d " red" i n t h e p a s t . F o r example, i f a

s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l w e r e t o d e s c r i b e t h e map le l e a f i n t h e c e n t r e

o f t h e Canad ian f l a g a s "b lue" t h e n t h i s s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l ' s

a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r would have no i n f l u e n c e w h a t s o e v e r on t h e r u l e s

gove rn ing "red". I n o t h e r words, what i s a t t h e b a s i s o f

com.un i ty a c t u a l i s m i s a v a r i a t i o n on t h e a e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e 2 '

t h a t t h e m c j o r i t y is a l w a y s r i g h t .

- - '' But t h i s p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d b e p e r h a p s c a l l e d "mobocra t i c "

because i n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democrac i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e

m a j o r i t y i s a l w a y s " r i g h t " (wha teve r t h a t m i g h t mean) i s r e g a r d e d

o n l y a s a t n e o r e t i c a l g u i d e l i n e t h a t has l i t t l e c o n t a c t w i t h

s o c i a l r e a l i t y . T h a t i s t o say , in r e p r e s e n t a t i v e democrac i e s

t h e r e i s a gap between what is d e s i r e d by t h e p e o p l e and what i s

desirea by t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . T h i s g a p i s p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e

t h e " t r u t h t ' p o s s e s s e d by t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i s g e n e r o l l y

r e g a r d e d a s o f a g r e a t e r v a l u e t h a n t h e t r ü t h t h a t i s h e l d by t h e

m a j o r i t y of t h e p e o p l e b e c a u s e t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e ,

supposed ly , b e t t e r a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n s a t i s s u e , r e l y

on t h e a d v i c e o f v a r i o u s e x p e r t s and s o on . T h i s s i m p l e f a c t

suggests t h a t i t i s n o t t h e c a s e , a s t h e Community V i e w t h e o r i s t s

suppose , t h a t i t i s t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s o r a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r of t h e

m a j o r i t y t h a t d e f i n e s what i s c o r r e c t a n d what i s n o t . (See

below. )

Secky 48

One of the difficulties with this version of the Community

View is that there cannot be a correct application of rules if

there are no precedents to a given activity at the level of a

cornmuni~y.'' Taken to an extreme, this view would seem to entail

that if a new rule is formulated there cannot be a correct way of

following it for the first time. However, although this is a

seriotis difficulty 1 believe that in the context of this thesis

the £sr greater difficulty is the inability of community

actualism to distinguish between a clairn's being correct because

it accords with an objective standard, a rule, and a claim's

being correct because it accords with what most people actuzlly

do. It is this second difficulty, at the heart of which is the

assurnption that rule-following is necessarily social, that 1

shall focus on in my discussion of K r i p k e in the following two

chapters.

Dr. Schroeder suggested to me that in several sections

of the Investigations Wittgenstein seems to espouse a version of

normative actualism according to which actual future behaviour

determines, for instance, how 1 meânt tc go on (cf. PI 5S187,

190). It is true that Wittgenstein talks in this way but 1 think

that the main emphasis in passages such as PI SI87 is on the fact

that at present the interpretation of a rule is not determined,

that is, the steps that 1 am to take do not somehow exist prior

to my interpretation of those steps by actually taking them.

Secky 49

The community disposition thesis avoids the lesser

difficulty of community actualism that can result £rom the lack

of precedent behaviour by focusing solely on dispositions, that

is, potential future behaviour. According to comunity

dispositionalism, dispositions of members of a community

determine the correct application of rules, for example, red is

what most people are disposed to cal1 "red" whether or rrot

someone has actually used the predicate "red" in the past or not.

In other words, dispositions are actual "attitudes of tne minci1'

that determine the propriety of an action. However, as Kripke

points out, w e cannot ultimately distinguish between a correct

performance and an incorrect performance because the only thing

that counts are the individual's dispositions. When someone is

disposed to always make a particular mistake, for example, to

cali the maple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag "blue",

then there is no way to distinguish correct performance from

incorrect performance since both calling it "red" and calling it

"blue" are simply dispositions (29-30). When 1 follow Kripke in

claiming that dispositionalists cannot distinguish correct

performance £ r o m incorrect performance by referring to

dispositions 1 am claiming, in effect, that dispositionalists

conflate performances that are correct because they accord with

given dispositions and performances that are correct because they

accord with given rules. For example, there can be a rule

Secky 50

defining "red" by a reference to the maple leaf in the centre of

the Canadian flag but the dispositionalist view implies that when

someone calls the maple leaf "blue" then he is correct in virtue

of the fact that he is disposed to call the maple leaf blue. It

must be realised, of course, that the dispositionalist can object

that what really counts are the dispositions of the community

rzther than the dispositions of the individual. Even so, we can

raise the same objection regarding the dispositions of the

community as xe have raised regarding the dispositions of the

individual -- there is no reason why the comrnunity as a whole

could not make mistakes in following a particular rule. For

example, there can suddenly erupt a global chemical war and once

it is over al1 of the survivors can have their sensory apparata

damaged in s u c h a way that they are disposed to call the maple

leaf in the centre of the Canadion flag blue. Even if al1 people

on Earth were disposed to call the Canadian maple leaf "blue"

that does not mean that it is really blue. Of course, the reason

why al1 the survivors of the chemical war are wrong about calling

the naple leaf in the centre of the Canadian flag blue, even

though al1 of them are disposed to call it blue, is that they

violate the rule for using the expression "blue". 1 have defined

" ~ d " above as being the colour of the maple leaf in the centre

of the Canadian flag, and hence the maple leaf is red regardless

of anyone's dispositions, and we can make a rule for "blue" in a

Secky 51

similar way." Moreover, Kripke is quite right when he claims

that

The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of

the finiteness of my actual past performance by appealing

to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious

fâct: not only my actual performance, but also the

totality of my dispositions, is finite. It is not true,

for example, that if queried about the surn of any two

nurnbers, no matter how large, 1 will reply with their

actual sum, for some pairs of n.~mbers are simply too

large for my mind -- or my brain -- to grasp. (Kripke 26-7)

As we shall see later, since dispositions cover only a finite

segment of, for example, a given mathematical function, two

- - , - - - To avoid someone's objection that perhaps the chemical

warfare did not damage people's sensory apparata but changed the

chemical constitution of al1 objects in such a way that, for

example, the autumal maple leafs are now blue, we can define

"red" by specifying its wavelength. In this way we can show that

the rule for using "red" is quite objective and it is this

cbjective rule that defines Our use of "red", not people's

dispositions.

Secky 52

individuals may agree on their computations even though they are

actually computing different mathematical functions.

Thus, we can conclude that dispositions cannot be normative

because, as we have seen above, it makes no sense to speak of a

norm without the possibility of violating it. Dispositions

cannot be violated because it would not make any sense to say

that someone has acted in accordance with or against his

- - dispositions," A community dispositionalist can object, of

course, that a n o m is violated not when an individual acts

against his dispositions but when his action is in conflict with

the dispositions of a cornmunity. This conflict can come about in

various ways. It is possible to Say, for instance, that someone

has acted against his dispositions if we introduce the

- > '' Dr. Gerwin has made the interesting objection that when

I make a typing error 1 might possibly act against my disposi~ion

to spell the word correctly. However, 1 do not think that this

objection can endanger my general line of argument at all. The

reason is that there is nothing normative in my disposition to

spell a given word in a particular way, that is to Say, the

reason why 1 cal1 a particular typing error an error is not

because it conflicts with my disposition to spell the word in a

çiven way but because it conflicts with the rules of English

spelling.

Secky 53

distinction between "higher order dispositions" (those of the

experts, for example) and "lower order dispositions" (those of

the ccmmons, for instance) in the way that certain soft

determinists distinguish between "higher order desires" and

"lower order desires". But then the "higher order dispositions"

would be in some sense "right" regardless of how many people had

those dispositions and hence dispositions would cease to be the

kind of brute facts that are requirea for a truly

dispositionalist theory of normativity. At the same time, if we

were to Say that a norm is violated whenever an individual's

disposition conflicts with the dispositions of the m a j o r i t y of

the members of a community then we could also ask what it is

about the dispositions of the majority that it makes them in some

sense "right", or at any rate, a standard according to which

other dispositions can be wrneasured". 1 shall address this

difficulty in more detail in chapter IV because it does not

concern only dispositionalism but ail versicns of the Community

View, including Kripke's actualism. It is worch noting that

Kripke's actualist account has also dispositionalist elements,

althougn it is not necessarily the case that it is these

aispositionalist elements that make the present difficulty

relevant for him (cf. Kripke 90 ff., quoted below) . Kripke is

probably right when he notes that Wittgenstein's views have

dispositional elernents in it, although, of course, that does not

Secky 54

meân that Wittgenstein should be thought of as a dispositionalist

( 2 5 ) .

III. THE "PARADOX" OF PI §201

I I 1 . A KRIPKE'S "PARADOX"

One of the most debated interpretations of Wittgenstein's

Pni losophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s is Kripke' s W i t t g e n s t e i n : On R u l e s

and Priva te Language. Kripke thinks that the "paradox" of 5201

is "perhaps the centrnl problem" of the Phi losopnica l

Invsstigations and may be regarded as a "new form of

philcscphical scepticism" (Kripke 7 ) . According to Kripke's

interpretation of the rule-following considerations in the

Pnilosophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s , were it not for the "sceptical

solution", Wittgenstein would reach the paradoxical conclusion

that tnere are no facts about what a speaker means by a given

expression (Kripke 21 ff. ) Kripke' s "sceptical paradox"

culninates in the claim that rules cannot guide one's action and

as a result, were it not for the "sceptical solution", al1

language would be meaningless (Kripke 21) . '' *

- - .. .

Any interpretation of Kripke's W i t t g e n s t e i n has to be

problematic from the beginning because Kripke does not clearly

Secky 55

But although S201 is the focal point for Kripke's

interpretation of the Investigations, he sets up his sceptical

problem rather differently. The question of Kripke's sceptic is

this: "How do you know that you have always meant 'addition' by

+ not 'q~addition'?"~" For Kripke's sceptic, "quaddition" is

attribute the "sceptical paradox" to hirnself nor to Wittgenstein

but claims that it is "rather Wittgenstein's argument as it

struck Kripke" (Kripke 5) , I think that the "paradox" that

Kripke presents us with is quite different from the one that

Wittgenstein treats in the Investigations S201 and hence I shall

talk about "Kripke's paradox" although it would be perhaps more

precise to cal1 it "Kripkenstein's paradox".

- - , - - In Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Goodman provides us with

a sceptical technique that can be used to challenge any

predicates by means of their temporal definition, for example,

"green" csn be contrasted with "grue", where "grue" means "green

until time t and blue thereafter". Thus, we can predicate of a

grue object that it is green at t-1 and blue at t+ l . Kripke

essentially applies Goodman's sceptical technique about

predication to rules (Kripke 20 ff.). Wittgenstein himself used

a similâr example, the one involving the recalcitrant pupil

(PI §§143, 185). In S185, for instance, Wittgenstein considers

that someone might understand the order "add 2" as "add 2 up to

1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on". Nonetheless, since

Secky 5 6

an arithmetical operation like addition, but whose operator is

' i q ~ ~ ~ " ("8") rather than "plus" (Kripke 9) :

x e y = x + y, i f x , y < 57

x @ y = 5, if x, y 2 57

Kripke's sceptic asks, "How do you know that your response to '67

+ 58' was always supposed to be '125' and not ' S v ? " The sceptic

doubts whether anything that 1 have done in the past can justify

the