2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION Letters Patent issued 16 February 2009

WITNESS STATEMENT OF CRAIG ANDREW BRITTAIN

Date of Document: Filed on behalf of: The State of Victoria Prepared by: Victorian Government Solicitor's Office Level 25 121 Exhibition Street Melbourne VIC 3000

Solicitor’s Code: 7977 Telephone: +61 3 8884 0444 Facsimile: +61 3 8684 0449

DX 3000077 Melbourne Ref: PAC 944884

Attention: John Cain

I, CRAIG ANDREW BRITTAIN of 48 Raglan Street, White Hills Victoria 3550, Operations

Officer, with the Country Fire Authority (CFA) can say as follows:

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

1. My full name is Craig Andrew Brittain and my date of birth is 8 February 1963.

2. I am an Operations Officer with the CFA in Region 2 which is in the North West

area. I am stationed at Bendigo fire station and am also Officer in Charge of

Bendigo Fire Station, which is located at Hargreaves Street, Bendigo.

3. On 7 February 2009, I was on duty at Region 2 headquarters at the Regional

Emergency Control Centre (RECC) in Bendigo. This statement will address the

Redesdale fire.

4. I made a statement to Victoria Police Phoenix Taskforce on 4 March 2009. I attach a

copy of that statement as Annexure 1 .

5. This statement is set out as follows:

Part 2 – Career and Qualifications;

Part 3 – Lead up to 7 February 2009; and

Part 4 – My role on 7 February 2009.

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PART 2 – CAREER AND QUALIFICATIONS

6. I have been a CFA member for 20 years. I have held the position of an Operations

Officer in Region 2 since July 2007.

7. I was an active volunteer member of the Bendigo Group from 1989 to 1990. In 1990,

I joined the CFA career staff. I have occupied various positions with the CFA,

including qualified firefighter from 1995 to 1998; leading firefighter from 1998 to

2003; and fire officer at Bendigo and Shepparton from 2003 to 2007. I have

performed higher duties as Operations Officer from 2007 to the present and have

occupied the position of Operations Manager during 2009. I attach a copy of my

Service History Details Report as Annexure 2.

8. I have some experience in Level 3 fires. In January 2003, I was Deputy Operations

Officer of the Cooryong fire over a four to five day period working under the

supervision of Les Vearing of Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE).

I also have experience in Level 2 fires, which have mainly been major grass land

fires. The Redesdale fire was the biggest fire I have been involved in.

9. My qualification and training competencies include:

(a) Certificate II in firefighting;

(b) Certificate III in firefighting;

(c) Certificate IV in firefighting;

(d) Wildfire Firefighter;

(e) Wildfire – Low structure firefighter;

(f) Wildfire structure firefighter;

(g) Structure – wildfire firefighter;

(h) Crew leader- wildfire;

(i) Crew leader – structure;

(j) Strike team leader – wildfire;

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(k) Sector commander – wildfire;

(l) Divisional Commander;

(m) Planning Officer;

(n) Logistics Officer;

(o) Operations Officer level 3; and

(p) Staging Area Manager.

10. I also have qualifications in Australasian Interservice Incident Management System

(AIIMS). I attach a copy of my Qualification Details Report as Annexure 3.

PART 3 – LEAD UP TO 7 FEBRUARY 2009

11. There was effective regional preparedness for the day, which commenced the week

prior to 7 February 2009. I kept a log during the week prior and on the 7 February. I

attach a copy of my brief log recordings that I kept from 4 February to 7 February

2009 as Annexure 4.

12. During the week prior to 7 February, I was Regional Duty Officer (RDO) for Region 2

at Bendigo fire station. I had been tasked with this role on 29 January 2009. Over

the summer period, Mark Gilmore, an Operations Officer in Region 2 at the time,

now the Operations Manager, prepared a Regional Duty Officer roster. I was

advised of my role as RDO some weeks prior. I was RDO over the Christmas

2008/2009 period.

13. I recall that in the week leading up to 7 February we had at least one or two total fire

ban days (TFB) and code red days, which are extensive fire danger days. Code red

days are days of 40 plus Fire Danger Index ( FDI) where the weather conditions are

not extreme enough to be coded as a TFB day There is the same level of

preparedness for code red days as TFB days. My role was comprised of ensuring

the regional preparedness for any fire or incident activity. As an Operations Officer, I

came under the supervision of John Deering, Operations Manager of Bendigo of

Region 2.

14. In the days leading up to the 7 February, there were two teleconferences that took

place with the Chief Officer of the CFA.

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15. I recall that I attended the teleconference on 5 February 2009, in which all RDOs

from around the State were briefed by the Chief Officer in relation to the seriousness

of the predicted weather on 7 February 2009, that it was the worst predicted weather

the state had ever seen.

16. Following that teleconference John Cutting, Operations Officer in Region 2 and I

prepared to have staff on recall duty. We also prepared to have the Incident Control

Centre (ICC) at Epsom ready with people in position to respond to the weather and

to fulfil incident management team positions. John Cutting notified all persons of

their roles for the 7 February 2009.

17. The weather for 7 February was predicted to be a very hot, plus 45 degrees, low

humidity around 6 or 7%, winds gusty to the 70 kilometre mark. In conjunction with

the predicted weather of the previous two weeks, the prediction was for very intense

fire weather.

18. On 6 February, all the working systems and back up systems of all RECC's in

Bendigo were tested according to the direction of the Chief of the CFA. The Chief

required all RECCs and all backup power supply systems to be checked. An

emergency shut down procedure was conducted, and the generators tested.

19. The ICC performed an exercise on the 6 February to make sure that they had all

their systems in place. The power was shut off for testing. Although I was not at the

ICC that day, I was aware that all systems were checked on that day.

20. At 1700 hours or thereabouts on 5 or 6 February 2009 I handed over my role as

RDO to John Cutting, Operations Officer.

21. I was due to have 6 February 2009 rostered off, but because the day was a TFB day

I came into work at around 0900 hours. I received a telephone call from John

Cutting asking me to come into work on 7 February because it was going to be a

bad day. I told him that there would be no problem in attending.

22. There were media warnings in the lead up to the day and on the day, including radio

warnings and on TV. I recall that the Bendigo Advertiser newspaper alerted the

public all week.

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PART 4 – MY ROLE ON 7 FEBRUARY 2009

23. I commenced my shift between 0800 and 0830 hours on 7 February 2009 and

commenced duty as an Operations Officer. Initially it was just a normal day. I was

involved in preparing the fire station because I am Officer in Charge. I performed

my own duties including station work and preparedness work, and John Cutting

carried out the duties of RDO. There was staff performing incident management

team roles, which were overseen by John Cutting.

24. Although I did not attend, I knew that the Incident Management Team (IMT) briefing

at Epsom on 7 February occurred at around 0830 or 0900 hours. The briefing was to

make sure that all Region 2 groups had their brigades and stations prepared. I sat

in on the group teleconference conducted by John Cutting, RDO. Everyone was on

high alert.

25. My role for the day was to 'go forward'. To 'go forward' is to perform our normal role

and to assist the Incident Controller (IC) so that the IMT structure is established.

26. I recall that the weather on the morning of the 7 February was hot and windy. At

about 1000 hours I noticed that the wind picked up slightly. I recall seeing dust in

the sky as the day got dirtier and hotter.

27. At the RECC, we had the Incident Management System (IMS) program running,

which is our main computer system which amongst other things provides details of

incidents that are taking place around the State. We monitored the weather station

report, which shows the temperature, wind and fire index on the day. The FDI

assists us to maintain and increase our fire response. There is a large screen

against the windows in the RECC and a projector which is connected via the main

computer. There was also a mini automatic weather stations report (RAWS) which

shows current temperature, wind and fire index . We were keeping an eye on this

and throughout the morning based on the weather conditions a decision was made

to implement a 'hot day' response. This involved requesting that VicFire send out

five brigades to a call, this is known as an 'E' response.

28. At about 1510 hours or 1515 hours we received a report of smoke from Victoria Fire

(VicFire) around the Redesdale, Coliban Park Road area. I recall that the call came

through the pager system to the RECC. The RECC was notified of the fire via the

pager as we have the same cap codes as all the brigades in the region. I think it was

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the Redesdale Brigade that got the page message. I recall John Cutting looking over

at me and saying that I had "better get on my bike" or something to that effect.

29. On the day, I was tasked with Andrew Gill who was my Deputy.

30. Andrew and I headed out to Redesdale, Coliban Park Road. My vehicle is a Falcon

CFA station wagon with lights and sirens. We were listening to the fire reports on

the CFA radio. We did not know a lot about the fire at that time, as we were getting

intermittent messages. I remember receiving a phone call from John Deering on my

mobile. John was Incident Controller (IC) at Epsom ICC. John said that he had just

sent 40 trucks. At that time I could not see any smoke. I recall the weather at that

time was very blowy, hot, dry, and very dirty.

31. I am not sure what time I arrived at the fire ground. However, I do recall it was

within 30 to 40 minutes of receiving the initial telephone call.

32. When we drove into Coliban Park Road we could see smoke. I remember thinking

that this was big.

33. We then drove towards Metcalfe, which was on the western side of the fire. To make

our way back around the fire we had to drive down along Metcalfe-Redesdale Road,

which brought us to the western flank of the fire. The fire had jumped the road and

crossed the grass paddocks. There was still a lot of fire activity on both sides of the

roads and in the paddocks. The grass had a very intense flame and was leaning

with the strong wind behind it. I remember seeing that in some spots the flames

were up to one to two metres high.

34. I came up behind a Taradale Tanker which was actually backing out of the fire. I

recognised the tanker and spoke with Max Robinson, Capitan of the Taradale

Brigade who was the driver. I told him to get his crew to start extinguishing some of

the fire on the road side, which they did.

35. We decided to drive around the eastern side of the fire to the Kyneton-Redesdale

Road. I knew that Andrew (Andy) Chapman was in control of the fire ground. We

wanted to find him to find out more about the fire. We drove through

Redesdale/Kyneton Road and met up with him.

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36. We discussed the fire and where it was heading. We spoke about units on the

scene and informed Andy there were 40 trucks on their way. We then commenced

discussions in relation to sectorising the fire.

37. At this stage of the fire, it was imperative to initiate some sectorisation. Based on the

teleconference the days prior and the need for early preparation, we made a

decision to sectorise early. The decision to coordinate and control appliances to put

them into strike teams was important.

38. I recall Andrew Gill taking a marker pen and together we quickly drew a map of the

sectors on the bonnet of my vehicle. This was to divide the fire into controllable

sectors for incident management. We allocated senior volunteer officers to those

sectors. We were then joined by some DSE staff.

39. I recall Roy Speechley from DSE arriving at the time. Andy Chapman, Andrew Gill

and Peter Dyer from VicPol joined our discussions regarding the fire.

40. I am not sure who made the decision that Redesdale was going to become a

Division, and I do not recall receiving a phone call or notification to advise me that I

was in a Division. But I know that when we got to Coliban Road we were a Division.

I cannot recall who made the decision, but it was likely to come from someone at the

ICC.

41. At that stage, as an Operations Officer I implemented the AIIMS system and shortly

after I assumed the role of Divisional Commander. Pat McCarthy of DSE and

Andrew Gill became Deputy Divisional Commanders. Even though I was Divisional

Commander we all had input into the management of the fire that day. We all

worked collectively, we discussed information that was received and made plans

together. We worked quickly and effectively. I was very comfortable having Andy

Chapman, Andrew Gill and Pat McCarthy there with me.

42. As Divisional Commander I was responsible for everybody on the fire ground. I

made sure that the plans developed by the ICC were in place and were carried out.

We also looked after the welfare of the troops.

43. Soon after the fire commenced, the relief centre was established at Redesdale Hall

and a Staging Area was established on the oval next to the Hall. We had a Incident

Control System (ICS) structure in place and a communication plan in place. We had

the fire sectorised and had allocated Sector Commanders. I recall that we went to

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the Redesdale Hall and saw that the mobile control vehicle (MCV) van was already

setting up. I think this was about 1600 to 1630 hours.

44. As Divisional Commander, my first priority was to get control and set up some

structure around the fire scene. We had briefings between DSE, CFA and Police

who were on the scene as well.

45. At some stage, we received information via the radio operators in the MCV from

Epsom that there was an impending wind change within an hour and a half or so. I

cannot recall the exact time I received this information.

46. We had another meeting with the Operations team at the Operations Point at

Redesdale Hall to work out our strategy prior to the wind change. That strategy was

to get as many resources as possible to the eastern flank of the fire. This is because

on a wind change, the eastern flank of the fire becomes the head of the fire. I recall

asking Pat McCarthy to arrange for a couple of graders, which were out on the fire

line, to try and put a fire break in front of Redesdale township.

47. I recall that the wind change came through early that evening. I cannot recall how

much earlier than expected the wind change came through. The fire started heading

towards Redesdale. At one point, I remember discussing pulling up stumps, and

relocating back to Heathcote because we were directly in line with the fire. I did not

consider issuing a red flag warning at that time. I was aware the wind change could

come in earlier after receiving information from the ICC that the wind change was

coming from Trentham. I do not recall what time I received that information from the

ICC.

48. There was a Red Flag Warning sent out. I do not recall who issued the Red Flag

Warning, what time it was sent out, or what was the content of the red flag warning.

49. We decided not to relocate because we had control lines in place and good work

was being done along the fire lines along Siddles Road and some work around

Burke and Wills Road near Mia Mia. The fire flank was reduced from about 20

kilometres down to about 3 kilometres. The hard work we did on the eastern flank,

and the control lines that we put in place, reduced the fire flank. In some paddocks

the fire could not be attacked due to the terrain and rocks.

50. When we were sectorising the fire we decided that there needed to be work done on

the north-eastern flank prior to the wind change coming in. We received notification

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that there was a wind change coming from Trentham, so we put a more

concentrated effort into the eastern flank. I believe that because the work was done

early on the north-eastern flank we were later able to safely move crews from our

western flank and allocate them to the north-eastern flank, down towards the head

of the fire.

51. As it started to get dark, I could see the fire was coming up a few kilometres

towards some forest on the Bendigo side of the fire. The fire was a lot more

subdued than it had been earlier. The wind was now cooler and there were a few

drops of rain at the Operations Point. It was still windy. The wind was coming from

the south westerly direction towards us. I cannot recall what time this occurred.

52. I remember that three Sector Commanders were Andy Chapman, Peter Farley and

Phil Anderson. There was the Redesdale Sector, Metcalfe Sector, and Siddonia

sectors.

53. The Staging Area Manager was Leading Fire Fighter Bryan Suckling from Bendigo

Fire Station. He took control of the Staging Area. His role was to log any appliances

coming in and deal with their needs. He also logs the trucks when they go out and

records all the vehicles and personal movements to the fire.

54. At around 1830 to 1900 hours, whilst I was still located at the Redesdale Hall, I

received information of the fires at Bracewell Street. I cannot remember who

provided the information. I was frustrated that I was not able to assist with the

Bracewell Street fire but knew that my primary concern and responsibility was

Redesdale.

55. At about midnight, I recall having a conversation with John Deering, and I suggested

I would like to come back to Bendigo.

56. Andrew Gill had some good assistance, namely Roy Speechley, from DSE. I

considered that because Andrew had a good team around him, I would be able to

come back into Bendigo. John approved me going to Bendigo.

57. At around 0300 hours, I had a conversation with Mike Wassing and Pat O'Brien, in

relation to going out into the field. Mike did not want me to go out in the field in

Bendigo. He said he wanted me to go home and be back at work first thing in the

morning.

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58. When I left to go back to Adam Street ICC in Bendigo, Andrew Gill stepped up as

Divisional Commander. I cannot recall what time Andrew became Divisional

Commander.

59. I got home on 8 February at about 0330 hours. I recall I got up at about 0730 hours.

I got a phone call from John Deering, IC and I was tasked to work at the ICC at

Epsom as the Deputy Incident Controller. I recall I was the only CFA person down

there on that day. It was also my 47th birthday.

COMMUNICATIONS

60. During the fire fight of 7 February, we were hampered by poor radio communications

and poor mobile phone coverage. Overall, we were affected by not having clear and

concise communications with Sector Commanders and our ground observer crew

who were out on the fire line gathering information about the fire.

61. During the course of the day, I had some contact with the IMT at the Epsom ICC. To

get in contact with the IMT I would use my mobile phone in the vehicle. Most of the

time my mobile phone wasn't working. The radios were also not working.

62. We did not have clear communication with the Sector Commanders of the fire.

Under normal conditions, the ground observers relay the information back to the

Operations Point electronically. This information could not be relayed electronically

on the day because of the poor communications. The lap tops use Next G cards

because of poor coverage.

63. There was also poor communication with the IMT. I recall we had spoken to people

at the MCV and they were communicating to the IMT for us. They were taking

messages and passing them on and we would take messages and pass them on to

the IMT. I do recall there were times when I phoned John Deering, IC but I cannot

remember the specific conversations that I had with him.

64. I recall that at around 2230 hours on 7 February, Russell Pollard from IMT arrived

from the ICC with some produced maps of the fire. These had to be delivered

where normally they would be printed out at the command post.

RELATIONSHIP WITH CFA AND OTHER AGENCIES

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65. There was no problem between CFA and DSE on the day. We were one unit, one

agency. We communicated very well together.

66. The problems that we had were with the geography of the Redesdale area. There

are a lot of rocks on the land. Once it started getting dark, it became nearly

impossible for tankers to be able to go into the fire ground into the fire's edge and

work, because it was unsafe for the crew; we pulled back and put some strategic

breaks in place with graders and dozers in areas that weren't rocky.

67. Once it was relatively dark, all the graders and dozers were pulled out of the area

because it wasn't worth risking the safety of the crews.

68. I do not remember having support from aircraft during the day. It was very windy

and dusty and it wasn't safe. Aircraft use would have been an integral part of

managing the fire because a lot of the areas we couldn’t get to could have been

water bombed. Without the aircraft, control of the fire was left to the crews on foot

and trucks. It was the old fashioned way.

69. I do not recall the exact time when the Redesdale fire was under control, but I think

it was around 2300 hours on 7 February 2009.

70. The Redesdale Hall and Staging Area was used for community meetings and they

took place in the Redesdale Hall. I recall there were about two or three community

meetings, in the evening, at the Redesdale Hall where the civilians gathered.

Andrew Gill, being Deputy Divisional Commander and a Community Educator, dealt

with the community and kept the community briefed about the fire. I recall he

provided several briefings to the community and gave up to date information on

what was happening and what the crews were doing.

71. The MCV and Divisional Command was parked right outside of the front of the

Redesdale Hall. The MCV were very professional on the day. A lot of people were

displaced from their homes and worried about what was going on and there were

some families who had family members who had stayed back to help fight the fire

and protect their assets. We didn't have any barriers up between the Hall and the

MCV.

ROAD BLOCKS

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72. I recall that John Deering, IC, VicPolice and the ICC were discussing which roads

needed to be closed. I did not have any involvement in allocating road blocks.

73. Sergeant John Olver from Bendigo Police was allocating the road blocks. There

were several other police officers, including Peter Dye from the Traffic Management

Unit (TMU). VicPolice also put some of their own maps together. They were

photocopying them and cutting out pages from their map book and taping them

together to allocate the road blocks.

74. Later on in the evening I had a conversation with John Deering, IC and discussed

whether we could start opening up some roads. I think, at that stage, the fire was

not contained, but well enough under control that the road blocks could be opened

up, near Kyneton. Those police officers were at Redesdale Hall.

RESOURCES AND RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT

75. There was quite a bit of work done on the north-eastern flank. I cannot recall there

being any shortfalls in resources. Once it got dark, we scaled down our operations

and returned some of the strike teams. It was dangerous for the crew to continued

working due to the topography.

76. Andrew Gill and I liaised with the ICC or the RECC in relation to the resources. A lot

of the resources were DSE resources. Pat McCarthy would tend to look after DSE

resources and most of the resources we allocated were from DSE. We looked after

the CFA matters. We liaised with DSE and kept each other in the loop.

77. I recall that the changeover of crews occurred at around 2200 hours on 7 February.

The slip on units, whether they were DSE or CFA units, had competent operational

people driving them. In the Redesdale area, the large tankers have difficulty on the

land. It was handy to have the smaller ones available.

78. The relationship between the DSE, Victoria Police and CFA on the day was very

professional. There was no difficulty between the agencies, we all worked together

to do what we had to do to manage and fight this fire. We have all known each

other for quite some time and those solid relationships certainly helped in being part

of the team on the day.

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