Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner Than China? · PDF fileWill India Be a Better Strategic Partner Than China? Presentation for Non-proliferation Education ... • Continued

Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner Than China?

Presentation for Non-proliferation Education Center

Dan Blumenthal

Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Dan Blumenthal NPEC Presentation

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Topics

• U.S. China partnership 1972 Strategic Justification

• Evolution

• Dissenting Arguments

• Take Aways

• U.S.-India Strategic Justification 2005

• Policy Implications


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U.S. China Partnership

• U.S. 1972 Strategic Justification

Vietnam War

Triangulating Against Soviets


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Vietnam

• What Did We Want?– Pressure North Vietnam to keep South

Vietnam in tact, join coalition government. • Unsuccessful

– Assurances that China would not intervene if we escalated in Vietnam. • Successful

– Bottom Line: Minimal assistance/Minimal influence in Vietnam


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Soviet Union

• Give America stronger hand in dealing with Moscow– Uneven success

• Intelligence Sharing: Make up for lost listening posts in Iran

• Impact on Soviet behavior?– Greatest tactical success: Afghanistan


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End Chinese Expansion

• Stop support of Communist Revolutions in Asia such as Malaysia and Indonesia.– Successful


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Integrating China

• Change and shape China into responsible global actor– Still open question


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What Did China Want?

• Taiwan issue– Mostly Successful. Taiwan loses recognition; mutual

defense treaty abrogated; assurances that Taiwan is part of China. Taiwan slowly marginalized

• International legitimacy for CCP. – Successful. UN Seat; Recognition from Japan,

Europe

• Pressure on Soviets who were considering attack on China– Successful. In 1978 ¼ of Soviet ground troops, 1/5 of

tactical air-force deployed against China


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What Did China Want?

• 1979 Support for attack on Vietnam– Successful

• Access to Western technology– Successful Opened spigot over time that is

difficult to close

– 1980 DoC authorized sale of dual use items

– DoC designates China a “friendly state” for tech-transfer licenses


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Evolution: China Card

• 1979 -1989 Triangulation becomes anti-Soviet partnership– Intelligence Sharing, technology transfer,

military cooperation dominate

– Open the door for China to acquire Western technology

– Detailed briefings on Soviet Military situation

– China gets MFN, other economic benefits, Soviets do not


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China Card cont…

• Turns into arms sales and high-tech transfer relationship– By 1985 China buying $5 billion dollars worth

– Eligible for FMS, bought radars, torpedoes, upgrades for jet fighters, “Peace Pearl”program


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Dissenters

• Shultz/Wolfowitz: China needed U.S. far more than reverse.

– Needless concessions on Taiwan when Chinese afraid of Soviet Invasion

– China defined “obstacles” that U.S. needed to overcome – Taiwan; tech transfer – in order to make relationship better

• Luttwak/Doak Barnett/Ambassador Toon/Perry:– Are we building up a power that will be hostile to us?


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China Take Aways• Strategic Competition punctuated by tactical cooperation

– China now only country with capabilities and intent to challenge U.S. primacy

– Taiwan more difficult/potential for armed conflict. U.S. negotiated away opportunities to clarify (e.g. 79 and 82 communiqués)

• Gave up too much (technology/Taiwan) as the “price of admission.”

• Justification/rational changed from “triangulation” to anti-Soviet to “engagement”

– Military and intelligence bureacracies took over/commercial interests grew in influence

• Despite U.S. give aways China did not become strategic parner.– Ideological differences = worldview differences– Clashing national interests


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U.S.-India Strategic PartnershipWhat Does U.S. Want?

Broad Goals in Asia• Prevent hegemon on Eurasian continent• Maintain pre-eminence/regain unipolarity

– Create Asian security architecture: Japan, Singapore, Australia and India

– Enduring strategy of military pre-dominance – U.S. strategy creates conditions for liberal

political and trading order.• Growth and democratization of Japan, Taiwan,

South Korea, Indonesia etc.


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U.S.-India Strategic PartnershipWhat Does U.S. Want?

• Support with War on Terror/Counter-proliferation

• Counterweight to China

• Preferential treatment for U.S defense industry

• More steps on nuclear nonproliferation

• Joint Action with U.S. Military outside UN

• Access and Basing

• Understanding on “Pakistan contingency”


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July 18 Joint StatementIndian Commitments

• “Combat Terrorism Relentlessly”

• Continued implementation of New Framework for Defense relationship

• Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.– Place civilian facilities under IAEA safeguard

• Continued moratorium on testing

• Working with U.S. on Fissile Cut-Off Treaty

• Strengthen Export Control in Line with MTCR, NSG

• Bottom Line: Not many new commitments


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India’s Aspirations

• Great power status– Recognition as nuclear power

• Maintain independent foreign policy– A “South Asian France”

• Triangulate China and United States

• Military technology for modernization

• Economic growth of 6-8%

• Power to stop Pakistan-supported incursions

• Primacy in South Asia


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Indian Aspirations

• Diverse energy supplies– Oil and pipeline from Iran

– Cooperative ventures with China and Russia in Central Asia

– Nuclear energy?

• Energy security– SLOC in Indian Ocean

– “Look East” Straits of Malacca


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U.S. Commitments

• U.S. will treat and urge others to treat India as a NWS– Not deny most civil nuclear technology.

– Military nuclear facilities will not be subject to IAEA safeguards

• Help India be “great power”

• Defense cooperation and technology

• Energy Security/cooperation


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Will India Be A Better Partner than China?

Positives• Democracy, rule of law.

– More transparency, shared values, ideological divergence not strong

• Shared Interest in minimizing Chinese influence in South Asia

• Shared interest in securing sea lanes

• Broader counter-terror goals/spread of Democracy?– Not supportive of Greater Middle East Initiative


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Will India Be Better Partner?

Positives

• Mitigate Indian suspicions of U.S.-Pakistan cooperation– Muted response to F-16 sale, but still “tit-for-

tat” mentality (e.g. will not buy P3s)


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Will India Be a Better Partner?

Negatives• Ideological

– Great power status in service of multi-polarity– Strategic Independence – legacy, political

culture

• Power gap: How much can India do?– $3.678 trillion GDP; $3,400 GDP per capita– Power shortages– 433 million living below poverty


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Power Gap cont…

• Military – Forces can defend against conventional war

with China

– Cannot attain quick decisive victory over Pakistan

– Limited power projection capabilities around Indian Ocean littoral


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Power Gap cont…

– Ambitious modernization goals • Navy: sea denial with submarine fleet, perhaps two carriers,

cruise missiles by 2015• Air Force has 40 Su 30s intends to buy 126 aircraft. Force

multipliers: Phalcon, air to air tankers• Army increasing firepower and mobility• Strategic forces: medium range missile program (~3000 km)

building Agni III (~3,500 km) plus missile defense; estimated 40-50 warheads

• Underfunded: defense budget has risen from 15.5 billion to 19.1 billion (around 2.75% of GDP) but for replacement and introduction of new systems not enough


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Negatives

• Strong interests in/with Iran– India imports 60% of oil needs and growing

– Pipeline project for natural gas worth $7 billion. Oil-field stake/development ~ $40 billion

– Large Indian Shia population

– Convergence on Afghanistan

– Routine defense/intelligence exchanges: 2003 joint naval exercises


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• India and rogue states energy cooperation (Burma, Sudan)

• Commitment to broader nonproliferation goals?– PSI

– Fissile moratorium

• Nuclear arms rivalry? – Watch carefully SLVs, ICBMs


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Will India Be a Better Partner?Take Aways

• Asymmetry in means: India needs maximum U.S. assistance

• In reality U.S. policy is to shape, engage, accommodate a rising power– Contrast with China first tried engagement,

now soft containment

• India will most likely not be strategic competitor; More likely an “Asian France”


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Will India Be a Better Partner?Take Aways

• Ideological similarities will help overcome some obstacles

• But similar to China deal in process: lack of consultation; giving up much up front without reciprocal commitments

• Inverted strategic priorities– Assistance with economic development/real energy

solutions should come first• American trade with India still less than 1% of total trade • FTA could force reforms in India, make U.S. and India more

interdependent


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Will India Be a Better Partner?Policy Implications/Suggestions

• Economic cooperation/assistance– FTA

• Energy cooperation– Diverse: clean coal, renewables – Nuclear energy – India plan of going from 2,700

megawatts to 10,000 by 2010 unrealistic. U.S. and others can provide low enriched uranium for existing reactors and possible LWRs

• Pressure China on adding to its arsenal– Strategic missiles are 120 and growing– Could have 75-100 warheads by 2015– No fissile moratorium


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Will India Be a Better Partner?Policy Implications/Suggestions

• Focus cooperation on maritime/sea lane• Negotiate for air access points in India in case of

conflict with China: Air to air exercises has “shaping affect” on Chinese military

• Defense Industrial – get India addicted• Monitor carefully SLV/ICBM program

– U.S. committed to assist with Polar SLV and Geo-synchronous SLV

• Don’t let India off the hook on Iran • Watch SCO statements/activities

– Work against anti-U.S. triangulation

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Will India Be a Better Strategic Partner Than China? · PDF fileWill India Be a Better Strategic Partner Than China? Presentation for Non-proliferation Education ... • Continued