WHS Logistics Paper · 2015-11-19 · Filename: \WHS Logistics Paper v0.3f (CLEAN).docx Page 6 of 69 Acknowledgements & Methodology The Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) considers

$Page 1: WHS Logistics Paper · 2015-11-19 · Filename: \WHS Logistics Paper v0.3f (CLEAN).docx Page 6 of 69 Acknowledgements & Methodology The Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) considers$
NOTETOLOGISTICSCLUSTERGLOBALMEETINGPARTICIPANTS

• ThisdocumentistobepublishedbytheOverseasDevelopmentInstituteasadiscussionpaper,tobepresentedatthe2016WorldHumanitarianSummitbytheHumanitarianLogisticsAssociation

• AlthoughthispaperdoesnottargettheLogisticsClusterspecifically,itdoes,however,makerecommendationsthatwillimpacttheworkandpositioningoftheLogisticsCluster.

• ThispaperisbeingpresentedattheLogisticsClusterGlobalMeetingConferenceinorderto:(1)keepyouinformedoffuturedirectionsbeingset;(2)toseekyourfeedbackonthecontent;and(3)toseehowitalignswiththeGLCstrategybeingdiscussed.

NOTE:

1. Thispaperistargetinganon-logisticsaudience.Theterminologyhasbeenadjustedtosuit.

2. Thispaperisstillaworkinprogress,andcontainssectionsthathavenotyetbeenvettedbythesteeringcommittee.Readersarerequestedtonotedowninconsistenciesormistakes,andfeedthesebacktothesessionmoderator.

3. Theappendices“B”through“I”willNOTbeincludedinthefinaldocument.

4. TheexecutivesummarywillbewrittenoncefeedbackfromtheGLCisreceived.

EMERGENCYSUPPLYCHAINS:WHATPRICEIS

RIGHT?Authors:GeorgeFenton,AaronHolmes,MirjanaKavelj,Jean-BaptisteLamarche,DanielLink,JohnMyraunet,PeterTatham,RebeccaTurner,NilsVanWassenhove,AlvaroVillanueva

STEERINGCOMMITTEECONTRIBUTIONS:GeorgeFenton(WorldVisionInternational);AlvaroVillanueva(ACF-Spain);Jean-Baptiste

Lamarche(ACF-France);WolfgangHerbinger(WFP);IsabelledeMuyser-Boucher(UN-OCHA);MaggieHeraty(IndependentHumanitarianConsultant);Juan-AlfonsoLozano-Basanta(ECHO);

RebeccaTurner(IndependentHumanitarianConsultant)

Version: 0.3(DRAFT)Printed: Thu,19-Nov-2015,19:02

EmergencySupplyChains:Whatpriceisright? Page2

Printed: Thu,19-Nov-1519:02 JumptoToCFilename: \WHSLogisticsPaperv0.3f(CLEAN).docx Page2of69

TableofContentsToCListofFigures............................................................................................................4

ListofAcronyms........................................................................................................5

Acknowledgements&Methodology..........................................................................6

ExecutiveSummary...................................................................................................7

1.Introduction..........................................................................................................81.1 Background......................................................................................................................81.2 Defining‘SupplyChain’Vs‘Logistics’...............................................................................81.3 Aimofthispaper.............................................................................................................9

2.TheDisaster-ResponseSupplyChain....................................................................102.1 TheDisaster-ResponseSupplyChainToday..................................................................102.2 Challengesforthehumanitariansector........................................................................122.3 IssuesfacingtheDisaster-ResponseSupplyChain........................................................132.4 WhatNext.....................................................................................................................18

3.Prerequisites.......................................................................................................193.1 FundingStructures........................................................................................................193.2 CloserDonor&SupplyChainrelationship....................................................................193.3 Tighterintegrationbetweensupply-chainfunctionswithinanorganisation...............19

4.ProposedActivities..............................................................................................214.1 Preparedness.................................................................................................................214.2 Renewal.........................................................................................................................244.3 Optimization..................................................................................................................29

5.WhatPriceisRight:Howdoesthisbenefittheaffectedpopulation?...................325.1 Dignity...........................................................................................................................325.2 Safety.............................................................................................................................335.3 Resilience.......................................................................................................................335.4 Partnerships..................................................................................................................335.5 Finance..........................................................................................................................33

AppendixA-Contributors.......................................................................................34A.1 SteeringCommitteeandContributingAuthors.............................................................34A.2 KeyContributors............................................................................................................34

AppendixB-CommonLogisticsServices.................................................................35B.1 Benefits&importancetoemergencies.........................................................................35B.2 Services&actors...........................................................................................................36B.3 RisksandchallengesforCLS..........................................................................................38B.4 Whatnextforcommonservices?..................................................................................38

AppendixC-SupplyChainCoordination..................................................................40C.1 Logisticsactorsandcoordination..................................................................................40C.2 Coordinationwithmilitary............................................................................................40

AppendixD-InstitutionalPreparedness..................................................................43D.1 Strengtheningthecapacityofnationalgovernment.....................................................43



D.2 Utilizingexistingin-countryNGOpartnerships.............................................................44D.3 Strengtheningin-countryprivatesectorpartnerships..................................................45D.4 RefiningAid-AgencyResponsethroughresearch..........................................................45

AppendixE-ProfessionalizationoftheSupplyChain...............................................47E.1 HumanResourcePreparedness....................................................................................47E.2 IndustryAccreditation...................................................................................................48E.3 StandardisedTraining....................................................................................................49

AppendixF-Agile,OptimisedSupply-chains...........................................................51F.1 SupplyChainOptimization............................................................................................51F.2 SupplyChainAgility.......................................................................................................52

AppendixG-ProvisionofCashVsIn-KindAssistance..............................................54G.1 Amixedapproach..........................................................................................................54G.2 Roleofthesupplychaininmarketanalysis..................................................................55G.3 Roleofthesupplychaininmarketsupport..................................................................56G.4 Monitoringusageofcashtransfers...............................................................................56

AppendixH-ImplementingIndustryStandards.......................................................59H.1 PerformanceMeasurement(KPI)Standards.................................................................59H.2 Commondata-exchangeStandards..............................................................................59

AppendixI-TechnologicalDevelopments...............................................................61I.1 LogisticsInformationTechnologies...............................................................................61I.2 DeliverybyDrone..........................................................................................................61I.3 EnterpriseResourcePlanningSystems..........................................................................61I.4 Traceabilitytechnology.................................................................................................61I.5 Accesstocommercialdata............................................................................................62I.6 RemoteOperations.......................................................................................................62



ListofFiguresFigure1–CLS(AirTransport)intheEbolaResponse................................................................37Figure2-AddressingCustomsBottlenecks...............................................................................44Figure3-ACFFilters...................................................................................................................57Figure4-E-cardsinLebanon.....................................................................................................58



ListofAcronymsACF ActionContrelaFaim

ECHO EuropeanCommission’sHumanitarianAidandCivilProtectionDepartment

ERCC EmergencyResponseCoordinationCentre

ERP EnterpriseResourcePlanning

HPC HumanitarianProcurementCentre

HPN HumanitarianPracticeNetwork

HRR HumanitarianResponseReview

IASC Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee

ICAO InternationalCivilAviationOrganisation

IFRC InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties

INGO InternationalNon-governmentalOrganisation

INSARAG InternationalSearchandRescueAdvisoryGroup

IRC InternationalRescueCommittee

KACHE KitforAutonomousCashTransferinHumanitarianEmergencies

KPI KeyPerformanceIndicator

LCA LogisticsCapacityAssessment

LET LogisticsEmergencyTeams

LRT LogisticsResponseTraining

MCDA MilitaryCivilDefenceAssets

MSF MédecinssansFrontières

NDMO NationalDisasterManagementOffice

NGO Non-governmentalOrganisation

PARCEL PartnerCapacityEnhancementinLogistics

RFI RadioFrequencyIdentification

SARP StandardsandRecommendedPractises

SCF SavetheChildrenFund

SOP StandardOperatingProcedures

UCPM UnionCivilProtectionMechanism

UNDAC UnitedNationsDisasterAssessmentandCoordination

UNHAS UnitedNationsHumanitarianAirServices

UNHRD UnitedNationsHumanitarianResponseDepot

UNJLC UnitedNationsJointLogisticsCentre

UNOCHA UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

WHS WorldHumanitarianSummit

WFP WorldFoodProgramme



Acknowledgements&MethodologyThe Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) considers it vital to engage with the widerhumanitariancommunityinordertoofimprovethequality,timelinessandappropriatenessofassistanceprovidedtobeneficiaries.

In January 2015, the HLA established a steering committee comprised of senior logisticspractitioners (see “Steering Committee and Contributing Authors”, page 34) to explore thefuturedirectionof,andchallengesfacing,thedisaster-responsesupplychain.Keyinformantsfromabroadrangeofdifferentstakeholdergroups(coveringpractitioners,donors,corporatesector,INGOs,NGOs,governmentsandtheUN)wereinterviewed(see“KeyContributors”,page34).

Todevelop this paper, theHLA requested the assistanceof the Logistics Cluster (LC), as theprinciplefacilitatoroflogisticssupportservicesduringanemergencyresponse,andcomprisedofrepresentativesfromawiderangeoforganisations,totaketheleadindevelopingthispaper.TheLogisticsCluster’sbi-annualmeetingsinMayandNovember2015wereusedasaforumtogatherfeedbackfromparticipatingorganisationsandexpertsinthefield.

TheSteeringCommitteeandcontributingauthorswishtothankthesponsorswhomadethisdocumentpossible.ThekindsupportandcontributionsfromACFInternational,WorldVision,WFP,Oxfam Intermon, Bioforce, Handicap International and FondationMerieuxwill help toimprove the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian logistics for affected populationsworld-wide.

Thispaperdoesnotpresumetospeakonbehalfofhumanitarianorganisationsorindividualsnotrepresented within the HLA or the LC, as they have not had the opportunity to review thisdocument. The opportunities, challenges and proposals discussed herein, nevertheless areapplicabletothewholehumanitarianlogistics&supplychainsector,andshouldbeconsideredbyallrelevantactors,inordertobetterservepopulationsaffectedbycrises.



ExecutiveSummary



1.Introduction1.1 BackgroundWith the faceofhumanitarianassistancerapidlychangingonmany fronts, thehumanitariancommunityingeneral–andthedisaster-responsesectorinparticular–areunderpressuretoadaptandevolve:Thegrowingfrequency,durationandcomplexityofnaturalandman-madedisasters is increasing demand for humanitarian assistance; competition for limited funds isintensifying; and advances in technology is generating unprecedented threats andopportunities.

Thedisaster-responsesupplychain(DRSC)isthepipelinedeliveringhumanitarianassistancetothoseinneedwhenanemergencyisdeclared.Itcoversallactivitiesfromtheinitialforecastingofbeneficiaryneedsthroughtotheprocurement, transportation,storageanddistributionofsupplies (water, food, medical goods, shelter). The DRSC is the foundation upon which thehumanitarian community deliversassistance to countriesandpopulationsaffectedby crises.Positionedattheheartofhumanitarianaidprovision,andenablingallsectors,fromhealthtowater and sanitation to deliver life-saving assistance to beneficiaries, the DRSC constitutesaround60%1ofthecostofatypicalemergencyresponseoperation.TheDRSC,likethewiderhumanitariancommunity,mustadaptandevolveifitistoaddressthechallengesfacingit,andinordertoexploitopportunitiesofferedbynewtechnologiesandnewdevelopmentparadigms.

1.2 Defining‘SupplyChain’Vs‘Logistics’Whiletheterms‘logistics’and‘supplychain’areoften(incorrectly)usedinterchangeably,thiscanleadtoconfusionaboutthespecificscopeofeachterm.Thispaperdefinesthetermsas:

• SupplyChainisthefocusofthisdocument,andcovers(1)allactivitiesinvolvedintheend-to-endprocessof forecasting (planning), sourcing (procurement)anddeliveryofhumanitarian aid products; and (2) the provision of market analysis and pipelineinformationtofacilitatedecisionmaking.

This paper is concernedwith supply chainswithin the specific context of adisaster-response,asseparatefromsupplychainssupportingdevelopmentassistance(suchasWFP’songoingoperationsinEthiopia).DRSCshaveuniquerequirements,astheyneedtofunctionatextremelyshortnotice,inachaotic,rapidlychangeableenvironment,andwheremultiplepartiesareinvolved.

• While the exact definition in the humanitarian context is open to interpretation,Logistics is defined here as the ‘delivery’ part of the supply chain, dealing with thephysicalhandling,storageandmovementofcommodities2.

Theterm“LogisticsUnit”isusedheretorefertotheorganisationalunitresponsibleforcarrying out the logistics functions (covering, incidentally, the management of theorganisation’svehiclefleetandinfrastructure).

Inmostorganisationstoday,thetotalsupplychain,asdefinedabove,isgenerallymanagedbythree separate organisational units –Programme (responsible for long-term planning baseduponanalysis of beneficiaryneeds);Procurement (responsible for purchasing commodities);and Logistics (responsible for the transporting, handling, storage and distribution ofcommodities).Alaterchapterdiscussesthelimitationsthiscreates,andofferssuggestionstoachievegreatersynergies.



1.3 AimofthispaperThis paper is sponsored by the Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA)3 as a first step insocialising the challenges facing theDRSC today, the impact this has upon the ability of thehumanitarian community to deliver to those in need, and to explore opportunities forimprovement.ItproposeswaystomaketheDRSCplannedratherthanreactive;robust,flexibleandcost-effective;andbetterabletomeettheneedsofthebeneficiarieswhilealsosupportingtheregenerationandstabilityoflocalmarkets.

Inthecomingyears,humanitarianassistancecaseloadisexpectedtogrowascrisesincreaseandextend.Inordertosupportthiscaseloadinthelightofincreasinglylimitedfundingpercrisis,theDSRCmustevolve,makingdeep-seatedchanges.ThispaperproposesactivitiestobeprioritisedbytheDRSCcommunity,andidentifiesthreecriticalareaswherestakeholdersupportisneededtoimplementtheseactivities.

Thispaper,then,aimsto:

(1) familiarise the humanitarian community with the DRSC, and upon this foundation,discuss the future of the DRSC in a rapidly changing humanitarian context andtechnologicalenvironment;

(2) Proposealistofactivitiestoaddressupcomingchallenges;and(3) Start a dialog with the key stakeholders able to support the evolutionary changes

needed

Thequestionposedinthetitleofthedocumentdoesnotrefertothemonetaryprice-tagincurredin improving the supply chain. It refers to thepricepaid in lives& livelihoodsof populationsaffectedbydisasters,shouldwenotdevelopadisaster-responsesupplychaincapableofmeetingthesechallenges.



2.TheDisaster-ResponseSupplyChainTheDRSC differs fromprivate sector andmilitary supply chains, aswell as its humanitariancousin,thedevelopment-assistancesupplychain,inseveralimportantrespects,impactingnotonlyhowitisimplemented,butalsohowitisplanned.TheDRSCmust:

• Operateinachaotic,rapidlychangingenvironment,wherecommunicationandphysicalinfrastructure are compromised. Government services critical to the supply chain’soperation(forexample,CustomsandtheCivilAviation/PortAuthorities)mayalsobereduced,withthedisasterhavingaffectedgovernmentstaffandoffices.

• Coordinate with diverse organisations spread across multiple categories (UN, INGO,NGO, government, military and private-sector) – each with their own mandates,prioritiesandtimeline;

• Provide life-saving commodities to a highly vulnerable population, traumatized anddisenfranchisedbynaturaldisasters,pandemicsorconflict.

AttheheartoftheDRSC,thenistheneedtocoordinate–acrossunitswithinanorganisation,betweendifferentorganisations,andbetweenorganisationsandthegovernment(s)involvedinthedisasterresponse.

2.1 TheDisaster-ResponseSupplyChainToday

2.1.1 Coordination&CooperationiskeyDisastersareseeinglargenumbersoforganisationsresponding,oftenwithinaveryshortperiod.The2004South-EastAsiaTsunami,forexample,sawover400INGOsand5,000staffpresentinBandaAceh,4and,inSriLanka,hundredsofINGOs,thousandsofnationalNGOsandmanyotherinformalgroupsofwell-wishers5.Duringthe2010Haitiresponse,theUNOCHAwebsiterecordedover900registeredNGOsinoperation.

The number, and experience, of responding organisations has serious implications on theefficiencyoftheDRSC:

• Severe competition for scarce resources, including transport, warehouses andaccommodation, both drives up prices and results in transport capacity beingunderutilizedasitbecomesfragmentedacrossorganisations.

• Uncoordinated(and,sometimes,ownerless)cargoarrivalsintoportsandairportscancongestlimitedhandlingareasandoverloadCustomsofficials–bothstoppingtheflowoflife-savingsupplies.

• Newlyestablished,smallerorganisationsattendingadisasterresponse,oftenwithlittlepractical experience of emergency operations, can inadvertently block criticalcommodityflows.

• Governmentofficialscanbeoverwhelmedandbecomefrustratedatthelackofasinglepointofrepresentation,hamperingtheirabilitytosetoperation-widepriorities.

• Duplicationsandgapsincoverageofreliefassistance,asmultipleorganisationattendonearea,whileotherareasareleftuntouched.

• No single point for the dissemination of trustworthy operational information (maps,roadandportstatus,cargo-spaceavailability).

Governments, the private sector and, to some extent, the military, are, fortunately, alsobecomingmore involvedwith response efforts. An active, centralised point of coordination,tasked with setting response-wide delivery priorities, resolving bottlenecks and distributing



trustworthy, timely information is critical to a functioning DRSC, and maintaining a solidrelationshipwiththehostgovernment.

Evenfollowingmanyyearsofexperience,issueswithcoordinationstillregularlyoccur:During2013PhilippinesTyphoon,liveswerelostduetothemassiveinfluxofinsufficientlycoordinatedhumanitariangoods;andotherrecentconflict(Syria)andpandemic(Ebola)responseshavealsohighlightedtheneedforcriticalimprovementsincoordinatingresponses.

TwomechanismscurrentlyusedtofacilitatesupplychaincoordinationaretheLogisticsClusterandtheorganisationsprovidingCommonLogisticsServices.

MoreinformationonCoordinationcanbefoundin“AppendixC-SupplyChainCoordination”,page40.

2.1.2 TheClusterapproachInter-agency coordination, especially in an emergency response, is overseen byOCHA. Thesheernumberof responders to the2004 tsunami,however, rendered thisunworkable.Asaremedy,in2005theInter-AgencyStandingCommitteedevisedtheClusterapproach6asawayofimprovingcoordination.EachClusteriscomprisedofhumanitarianorganisationsinvolvedinemergencyresponse.ParticipationinaCluster isentirelyvoluntary,anddoesnotrestrictthefreedomofitsmemberstooperateaccordingtotheirindividualmandates7.

EachClusterisassigneda‘leadorganisation’.InthecaseoftheLogisticsCluster,thisisWFP,duetoitsglobalpresenceandoperationalfocusonsupplychainandlogistics8.Theleadorganisationacts as a ‘provider of last resort’ (in the case of WFP, this means supplying commodityprocurementandhandlingservices),and is responsible forensuring theCluster’semergencyresponseiscoordinated.AstheClusterisnotalegalentityandcannotholdbankaccountsorsign legal documents, the lead organisation also acts as the Cluster’s financial and legalcustodian, and, as such, plays a vital role in seeking emergency funding during a disasterresponse.

TheLogisticsClusteractsasamechanismto:

(1) facilitate coordination, ensuring that in-country transport and storage resources aremanaged in a way that reduces inter-organisational competition andmaximises use ofcapacity);

(2) collateandshare informationwiththehumanitariancommunity (currentlydonevia theCluster’swebsitewww.logcluster.org/logistics-cluster).Thisisanessentialprerequisitetoavoidingduplicationof,andgapsinbeneficiarycoverage.

(3) augmentlogistics infrastructure, in itsroleof ‘providerof lastresort’,byofferingwhereneeded,transportandstorageresourcesasaCommonLogisticsService,availabletothewiderhumanitariancommunity.

2.1.3 CommonLogisticsServicesWhereastheLogisticsClusterrepresentsanaffiliationofmultipleorganisationswithacommonbackgroundofhumanitariansupplychainprovision,aCommonLogisticsServices(CLS)provider,by contrast, is usually a single organisation offering a specific expertise to the wholehumanitariancommunity–regardlessofLogisticsClustermembership.Thisallows:

• economies of scale to be achieved, through bulk purchasing of commodities ornegotiatingbetterratesontransportorstorageresources.



• maximiseduseoflimitedresources–multipleorganisationsconsolidatingcargoandairliftingitutilizingasingleplaneloadcanbeconsiderablymoreefficient–andmuchcheaper–thaneachorganisationorganizingitsowncargoshipmentonanad-hocbasis.

• access to expertise of the providing organisation – particularly valuable for smallerorganisationsthatdonothavethatcapacity.

CLSproviderscanchange fromemergency toemergency,dependingupon the requirementsdictated by the context of the disaster, the organisations responding and available funding.Someofthemainprovidersinclude:

• TheUN-managedHumanitarianResponseDepot(UNHRD)networkprocures,managesand organizes transport for emergency supplies. UNHRD currently has depots in sixlocationscoveringEurope,Asia,Africa,theMiddleEastandSouthAmerica,andsuppliesover65humanitarianorganisations.

• HumanitarianProcurementCentres(HPCs)provideaccesstostreamlinedprocurementservices,offeringcostandtimesavingsnotpossiblethroughcommercialoutsourcingoptions. HPCs are not-for-profit procurement-specialist organisations, accredited byECHOthroughtheDirectorateGeneralforHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection.

• The UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) manages air services for humanitarianorganisations, reducing the need to arrange their own costly air charters.With theestablishmentofUNHAS,donorresourceshavebeenbetteroptimizedandairoperationsafetyhassignificantlyimproved.In2014,UNHASprovidedairservicesin20countries,transporting almost241,000passengers andover3,930metric tonsofhumanitariancargoto258destinations.

• Some NGOs offer CLSs for smaller organisations, including, for example, HandicapInternational (covering transportation, storage, vehicle repair,mapping&workspaceservices),andmedicallogisticsbySavetheChildrenUK.

AdetailedexplanationofCommonLogisticsServicescanbefoundin“AppendixB-CommonLogisticsServices”,page35.

2.2 ChallengesforthehumanitariansectorThepastdecadehaswitnessedsomeofhistory’smajorcrisescausedeitherbynaturaldisasters,pandemicsorconflict.Thisislikelytocontinuewith“trendsinclimate-relateddisasters,intra-stateconflict,urbanizationanddisplacement[suggesting]thattheworldwillfaceanincreasingnumberofcomplexandprotractedcrisesinthecomingdecades.”9.Riskslikelytoincreasethedemandforhumanitarianaidinclude:

• Climatechangeandenvironmentaldegradationleadingtomorenaturaldisasters10bothdirectly impacting local populations and leading to conflicts over arable land, wateraccessandsettlementareas.

• Pandemicsexacerbatedbyunplannedurbangrowth;increasedexposureofpopulationsinvulnerableareas;higherpopulationdensities;massmigrations;andvolumeofcross-bordertravel.

Risksbeingfacedbyaidorganisationsthatreducetheirabilitytorespondinclude:

• Conflicts where accepted rules of engagement are not respected, placing staff andresourcesatextremerisk;



• Insufficientfundingforindividualcrises(whileoverallfundingisexpectedtoincrease,theavailablefundingpercrisismayreduce)

Withmoredemandthanever11andgrowingcompetitionforlimitedfunding12,riskmitigationstrategiesmustbefoundeduponworkingmoreeffectively–doingmorewithfewerresources.

2.3 IssuesfacingtheDisaster-ResponseSupplyChainResponsibleforprovidinglife-savingassistance,theDRSC’sfirstpriorityistoactasquicklyaspossibleonceactivated–normallywithverylittleadvancenotice.Thechaotic,unpredictableenvironmentthatdefinestheDRSC’scontextmeansthatonceitisoperational,allenergymustbefocusedondeliveringassistance,withlittleopportunitytoconsiderwaystoimproveit.Theonly possibility then, is to ensure the DRSC fits its context as closely as possiblebefore thedisasteroccurs.Onceimplemented,awell-designed,fit-for-contextsupplychaincanthenmoreeasilybeadjustedtosuitchangingconditions:thechangeswillbesmaller,andcanrelyonthesamesolidfoundationofdatathatinformedtheinitialdesign).

Aspartofitsprimarydirectivetosavethelivesofthoseinneed,efficiencyandcost-effectivenessof the DRSC is a top priority: accelerating the speed of response savesmore lives, sooner;ensuring the assistance is appropriate to beneficiary requirements reduces wastage andempowers recipients; and improving cost-efficiencymeans that dollars saved on the supplychain can be spent expanding beneficiary coverage. Based on 2014 UN-coordinatedrequirementsofUS$19.5bn,13around60%–US$7.5bn–wasspentonsupplychainactivities.A1%costsavinghereequatestoUS$117m.

Whenconsideringhowtoimproveitsefficiencyandcost-effectivenessaspartofpre-disasterplanning,itisimportanttokeepinmindthattheDRSCisacooperativeeffort,formedbymultipleorganisations.Whilethishastheadvantageofallowingorganisationstocontributeaccordingtoindividualstrengths,itdoeshowevercomewiththedisadvantageinthatthereisnosinglepointof authority responsible for instigating or directing strategic change. The first step towardaddressing this was taken in 2005, with the creation of the Logistics Cluster as a formalcoordinationmechanism(priortothis,coordinationwasundertakenbytheUNJointLogisticsCentre). Coordination alone, however, is not sufficient to bring about strategic change. TheLogisticsClusterismandatedtorespondtodisastersastheyoccur–andisfundedaccordingly.Itdoesnothave theability toaddress the increasingpressingquestionsaround (1)ensuringadequate preparation prior to a response; (2) fine-tuning the supply chain so it remainsappropriatetoitscontextduringtheresponse;or(3)developingtheskillsandtoolsnecessaryfortheDRSCtosupportthehumanitariancommunity.

Whether throughextending themandateof theLogisticsCluster,or through thecreationofsome other body, the long-term improvements needed to ensure effectiveness in today’schanginghumanitarianenvironmentcanonlybeaddressedthrough:

• Preparedness (before a disaster response):Assesses the likelihoodof anemergencyoccurring in a country or region, and then seek to pre-emptively put into placestructurestofacilitateanefficientandeffectiveDRSC,shouldthedisasteroccur.Criticalactivitiesincludetargetedinformationgathering,institutionalstrengthening,andthedevelopmentofcoordinationnetworks.

• Renewal (before, during and following a disaster response): Unlike preparedness,renewalisnotaresponsetoaspecificgeographicalrisk.Renewalseekstoanticipateandaddressbroaderchallengesfacingthehumanitariancommunity.Activitiesinclude



research, developing tools and ensuring the continuous replenishment of qualifiedhumanresources.

• Optimization (during a disaster response): Improve the speed, appropriateness andcost-efficiencyoftheDRSC,basedoninformationgatheredduringPreparedness.

To simplify discussion, the Logistics Cluster is referred to throughout the remainder of thischapter,ascurrentlyit(1)istheonlyentitywiththemandatetocarryoutcoordinationactivities;and (2) the only entity – at the moment – with sufficient breadth of scope to addresspreparednessand renewal. ‘LogisticsCluster’ can,however, be replacedwithanyentitywithsufficientmandateandrecognition.

2.3.1 NeedforResilienceAkeymeasureofanyintervention’seffectiveness,whenexaminedfromahumanitariansupply-chainperspective,shouldbeitseffectinthelocalmarketplace–fromthebuyersandsellersofproduce,throughtotheorganisationsinthelocalsupplychainthatsupportthem.TheDRSCisinauniquepositiontoeitheractasasupplychaincompetitor (throughtheprovisionof freecommoditiespeoplewouldotherwisebuyfromthemarketplace)or,ideally,asasupplychainfacilitator (providing humanitarian assistance in a way that increases market activity). ThisplacesastrongdutyofcareontheDRSC,toensurethatassistanceisnotonlyappropriatetotheneedsofthebeneficiaries,butitmustalsobeappropriatetothemarketcontext.

Enhancing the resilienceof the localmarketplacemustbea themeembedded intoallDRSCactivities–whetherpreparedness,renewaloroptimization–withtheintentionofleavingthemarketplacestrongerattheendofaninterventionthanatthestart.

Buildingmarketresiliencenotonlybenefitstheaffectedpopulation.Marketsabletocopewithshockswillhaveastrongercapacitytoremainfunctionalfollowingadisaster.Buildingmarketresilience,then,whetherthroughpreparednessactivities,orfollowingpreviousinterventions,has the potential to reduce the need for future humanitarian assistance, freeing up limitedhumanitarianfundstobespentelsewhere.

2.3.2 NeedforPreparednessPreparedness, seeking to assess and prepare for specific risks, is by definition a strategicexercise,requiringalong-termvision,supportedbylong-termfunding.Asthebodyresponsiblefor coordinating the DRSC, the Logistics Cluster is currently the best placed to undertakepreparednessactivities,butisunabletodosobecauseoflimitationsinfundingstructure.Atthemoment,theLogisticsClusterreceivesfundingonlyonceadisasterisdeclared,meaningthataresponsewillbereactive,ratherthanproactive.Thisalsomeansthatnofundingisavailableforstrategically-focused initiatives. In order for the Logistics Cluster – or any other suitablepositionedentity–toundertakethepreparednessactivitiesbelow,anecessaryprerequisiteisareviewofthewayfundingisstructured.

The table below lists issues identified as arising out of lack of preparedness, and suggestsactivitiestoaddressthem:



Preparednessgap ProposedActivityIdentify,systematicallyandfromasupply-chainperspective,countriesmostatrisk,andthecategory(s)ofriskmostlikelytooccur(pandemic,earthquake,flooding,conflict,cross-border,etc.).Developresponseplanstoaddressthese.

Conductcontinuousriskanalysisanddevelopappropriateemergencyresponseplans.

Allremainingactivitiesaredependentuponbytheresultsofthisriskanalysis.

WhileWFP’sLogisticsCapacityAssessments,(dlca.logcluster.org)provideinfrastructureinformation(capacityofportsandairports,navigabilityofinternalroutes,likelihoodoflandslides,rainyseasonimpact),agreaterlevelofdetail,andmorefrequentupdatesarenecessary.

Gather(andmaintain)detailedinformationonacountry’ssupply-chainrelatedinfrastructure.

Thisactivitycontributestoriskanalysis.

Under-capacitatedCustomsandCivilAviationAuthoritiescancreatebottlenecks,slowing(orstopping)goodsarrivingincountry.

StrengthenkeygovernmentdepartmentsandCivilProtectionbodiestoimprovethespeedofaresponse.

WhileIn-countryNGOsprovidevaluablelocalisedinformationandrelationshipswithlocalpopulations,theyoftenhavelimitedcapacity,andlimitedexperienceworkingwithINGOs.

Strengthenin-countryNGOsasacriticalresourceduringaresponseeffort.

Inadditiontounderstandingthecountry’sinfrastructure,understanding–andutilizing–itscommercialsupplychaincapacitycanbevaluableduringanemergencyresponse.

Understandthein-countrycommercialsupply-chainoperatorsandmarketplace.

Thisactivitycontributestoriskanalysis.

Ifairportorportinfrastructurehasbeendamaged,customsservicesarenotoperational,simultaneousemergencyresponsesaredrainingresourcesorroutesintothecountryareblocked,reliefgoodscantaketoolongtoarrive.

Build,maintain,stockandstaffprepositioningstagingareastoenablerapidresponse(WFP’sprepositioningstagingareainKathmandu,Nepalallowedemergencyresponsetocommencewithin24hoursofthethe2015earthquake)

Preparednessactivities,althoughundertakenbasedonthebestanalysisriskavailable,maybenever see a disaster eventuate. This should not be considered money lost, however, aspreparednessactivitiesthemselvescontributetotheresilienceofthecountriesidentified.

2.3.3 NeedforRenewalLike preparedness, renewal activities require funding with an eye to the future. Whilepreparedness,though,canhaveanimmediateimpactontheeffectivenessandefficiencyofaDRSC,thepaybackforrenewalactivitiesisoveralongertime-frameandislesseasilymeasured.Acontinuedlackofemphasisonrenewal,however,posesriskstothelong-termabilityoftheDRSCtomeetthechallengesaheadofit.Gapsidentifiedinrenewalinclude:

Renewalgap ProposedActivityContinuousresearchintorisksandopportunitiesisneededto1)investigatewaysofovercominginefficiencies;2)takeadvantageofnewtechnologies/assistanceparadigms;3)synthesise‘lessons-learned’tobecomebestpracticefortheDRSCsector.

Withoutadedicatedresearchbodytohousethem,theactivitieslistedbelow(standardisedKPIs,data-exchangestandards,etc.)areunlikelytomaterialise.

EstablisharesearchfacilitytoimprovetheDRSCinresponsetonewthreats,newtechnologiesandnewresponsecontexts.



Renewalgap ProposedActivityTheinabilitytoquicklyexchangekeystockdatabetweenorganisationsmeansthatinformationisreceivedlate(ifatall),andisoftenerroneous.Thiscausesaknock-oneffectwhereplannedcargomovementsaredelayed,ortransportassetsarenolonger.appropriateforthecargo.

Developcommondata-exchangestandardstofacilitatequick,accurateinformationtransferbetweenthecomputersystemsoforganisationsinvolvedintheDRSC.

NOTE:thisshouldnotbeconfusedwithinterconnectingcomputersystemsfromdifferentorganisationstogether.

Informationtechnologyandtoolsevolvecontinuously.AsthenumberofpartnersintheDRSCincrease,andresponsesbecomemoreprotracted,inabilityeffectivelyshareinformationwillimpactsupplychaineffectiveness.

Continuedevelopmentofinformationsharing&coordinationtools(asdistinctfromcommondata-exchangestandards).Existingsystems(includetheLogisticsCapacityAssessments,andtheLogisticsClusterwebsite)shouldbecontinuallyupgraded.

TheDRSCsectorhasnostandardindustry-wideKPIs,makingitdifficulttoconductempiricalpost-interventionevaluations,ortomeasurethecost-effectivenessofanoperation–botharekeystepsinlearningtorespondbetter.Well-definedKPIsallowanorganisation(oranindustry)toidentifyareasneedingattention,andareavitallearningtool.

Developindustry-widestandardKeyPerformanceIndicators(KPI)thatareagreedtopriortoanemergency;areconstantacrossevents,countriesandorganisations;andknowntoallstakeholdersaheadoftime.

Thenumberandrangeoforganisationsrespondingtoadisastermeanthattimeislostandmistakesaremadewhensupply-chainstaffareunabletocommunicateclearlyorareunusedtothedisaster-responsecontext.

Developnational&regionalpracticaltrainings(similartotheLogisticsCluster’stwice-yearlyLogisticsResponseTrainingcourseswhichofferpracticaldisaster-responsesimulationtostafffromallparticipatingorganisations),orthetrainingsprovidedbyBioForceandtheFritzInstitute.

WhileDRSCstaffmayreceivetrainingfromtheirindividualorganisations,thelackofastandardindustry-widetrainingcurriculumresultsin(1)inconsistentterminology-staffcomefromdifferentcultural,linguisticandprofessionalbackgrounds;(2)lackofunderstandingaroundalternativeprocesses;and(3)gapsinknowledge–especiallyforpeoplewhohavebeen‘trainedonthejob’inasinglespecialisation.

Asinterventionsbecomemorecomplex,theskillsetsneededbyDRSCprofessionalswillgrow,aswilltheneedtoquicklytrainnewstaff.Smallerorganisationsoftendonothavetheinternalresourcestoconductthenecessarytraining.

Withoutaformalcurriculum,lessonslearnedfrompastoperationsmaybeofvaluetoanorganisation,buthavenowaytoinformthewholeindustryorDRSCprofessionals.

DevelopstandardizedtrainingcurriculatoprofessionalizeDRSCstaff

Organisationscanfinditdifficulttoretainandreplacequalifiedstaff,andtoenticeexperiencedstafffromthecommercialsectortocrosstothehumanitariansector.Barrierstomovementbetweenorganisationsresultinstaffwhoseskillsetisrestrictedtoasingleorganisation’soperations,riskingbecomingstagnant.

Provideaccreditationofsupply-chaintrainingasasteptowardprovidingclearcareerpathoptionsandincreasingmobility



Renewalgap ProposedActivityGiventhepart-timenatureofemergencyresponsework,manyofthetrained,qualified,accreditedprofessionalsmaynotbeavailablewhentheemergencyoccursbytheorganisationsrespondingit.Withoutaroster,itisimpossiblefororganisationstoidentifyandcontactstaffwiththeskillstheyneed:Thestaffremainunemployed,andtheorganisationsremainunderstaffed.Asdisastersmultiplyandextend,thedemandforqualifiedstaffwillincrease.Asthiswillbeexacerbatedfurtherwithstafffatigue,havingarosterallowsorganisationstorotatestaffinawaythatprovidesemploymentwithoutriskingburn-out.

Developasupplychainrostertoenabletheidentificationofsuitablequalifiedsupply-chainprofessionalsacrossarangeoforganisations,locationsandspecialisations.

2.3.4 NeedforOptimizationSupply chain optimization involves continually seeking improvements in the efficiency,effectivenessandappropriatenessoftheDRSConceithasbeenactivated.Goodpreparednessis a prerequisite, as (1) the knowledge gathered during preparedness activities informsoptimization;and(2)preparednessleadstotheinitialDRSCmorecloselyalignedtothecontext(muchmoresothanaDRSCsetuponthebasisofnopreliminaryinformation),resultinginmuchsmallerchangesnecessarytooptimizethesupplychain.Inotherwords,betterinitialdesignandabetterknowledgebaseresultinfewer,andmoreeffective,changes.

GapsthathavebeenidentifiedinthecurrentDRSCoptimizationprocessinclude:

Optimizationgap ProposedActivityTheDRSCdoesnotmakethebestuseofavailableresourcesandisimpactedbyshocks.Itrunstheriskofinterferingwithlocalmarkets,andmaynotmeettheneedsofthebeneficiariesinthemostappropriatewaypossible

ContinuallyoptimizetheDRSC,ensuringitisbothfit-for-purposeandcontributestomarketplaceresilience

LackofvisibilityleadstoconfusionandconcernbythegovernmentandotherDRSCparticipants,erodingconfidenceintheoperationandtrustintheleadorganisation.Poorvisibilitymakesprioritizationofreliefitemsdifficulttoachieve.

Ensurethesupplychainactivitiesarevisibletoallpartners&thegovernmentthroughcommoditytracking

ThisiscloselylinkedtotheRenewalactivitiesof“Developmentofinformationsharing&coordinationtools”and“Developindustry-widestandardKPIs”.

In-countryNGOs,withaccesstopopulationsandlocalcontextknowledge,arenotbeingutilizedinresponseoperations.Theyremainincountryaftertheinternationalorganisationsleave,andhavethepotentialtosupporttherecoveryphase.NotusinglocalNGOsmakesthedisasterresponseless‘owned’bythepopulation,anddeniestheopportunitytobuildexperienceandresilienceinthoseorganisations

Coordinatewithin-countryNGOstoassistwithrequirement&marketassessments,andcommoditytracking

ThisisthecounterparttothePreparednessactivity“Strengtheningin-countryNGOs”

NottakingadvantageofCLScanleadtolossofeconomiesofscale,underutilizedtransportservices,increasedcompetitionforlocalresourcesandslowerprocurement.

EncouragewideruseofCommonLogisticsServices

EnsureCLSsareconstantlyreviewedtoensuretheyarefitforpurpose



Optimizationgap ProposedActivityIn-countrysupplychainpartnersarenotbeingfullyutilized,leadingtoresponseeffortsduplicatingexistingsystems,andinfact,interferingwithafunctioningmarketplace.

Prioritizeuseofin-countrycommercialsupplychainsandprivate-sectorpartners.

ThisisthecounterparttothePreparednessactivity“Understandthein-countrycommercialsupply-chainoperators”

Ifkeygovernmentdepartmentsarenotcentraltooptimizationplans,bottleneckscanoccur.Improvingthesupplychainupstreamanddownstreamofcustoms,forexample,willbeoflittlevalueifgoodscannotpassquicklythroughcustomsprocesses

WorkwithGovernmentdecisionmakersandtechnicalexperts(suchascustoms)toimplementemergencyresponseplan

ThisisthecounterparttothePreparednessactivity“Strengthenkeygovernmentdepartments”

WhatisthegapthattheMarketBasedResponsesactivityisaimingtoclose?

FacilitatemarketbasedresponsesMoreinformationneeded

Provisionofin-kindreliefcaninterferewithfunctioningmarketplace,anddeniesbeneficiariestheoptiontocontroltheirownpurchases.Whenbasedonasolidunderstandingofthelocalmarketplace,cashtransfersratherthancommodity-basedassistance(oranappropriatemixofthetwo)offermanyadvantages.

UseofCashTransfers(whereappropriate)

ThisiscloselylinkedtothePreparednessactivity“Understandthein-countrycommercialsupply-chainoperatorsandmarketplace”

2.4 WhatNextIn the face of the challenges facing the humanitarian sector – climate change, pandemics,increasinglystretchedfunding–theDRSCmusturgentlyaddressthegapslistedhere.WhiletheLogisticsclusterisinanidealpositiontoleadmanyoftheseinitiatives,itwillonlysucceedwiththe cooperation of the entire humanitarian sector. The following chapter examine threeprerequisites thatneed tobe satisfied,beforemanyof theaboveactivities, thatare furtherelaboratedinchapter4,canbeaddressed.

ThefinalchapterbringsthediscussionbacktotheaimoftheWorldHumanitarianSummit,andlooksathowtheactivitiescanhaveapositiveimpactonpopulationsaffectedbydisaster.



3.PrerequisitesBeforethegapsoutlinedinthepreviouschaptercanbeaddressed,threeprerequisitesfirstneedtobesatisfied:

3.1 FundingStructuresThedisaster-responsesupplychaincommunityrequiresdonorstoprovidefundingstructuredtowardpreparedness.

DETAILSOFFUNDINGSTRUCTURESNEEDED.

The LogisticsCluster, is not a legal entity, and canonly receiveanddisburse funds viaWFP.Currentfundingstructuresdonotprovideforpreparednessandcapacitydevelopmentactivities,as cluster is only granted funds in an emergency. For example, prior to the 2015 Nepalearthquake,aprepositioningsitehadbeenpreparedatKathmanduairport.TheDFIDfundingsupportingthisinitiativehadtobechannelledthroughWFP.

3.2 CloserDonor&SupplyChainrelationshipAs60%ofadisaster-responsebudgetisdirectedtowardthesupplychain,thereneedstobeastrongerrelationshipbetweentheDRSCcommunityanddonors–essentially,theDRSCisthedonors’biggestcustomer.

Strengthentherelationshipbetweendonorsandkeyhumanitariansupplychainsactors.Endingthe‘siloisation’betweenthosegrantingfundsandthoseusingthem,andmorecloselyworkingtogetherallowsbothsidestoexploreavenuesforadded-valueandsynergiesthatmayotherwisenotbevisible.

MOREINFORMATIONNEEDED

3.3 Tighterintegrationbetweensupply-chainfunctionswithinanorganisation

Transforming a donation into tangible beneficiary support involves planning, sourcing anddelivering goods (or cash transfers). Within many organisations, these activities are spreadacrossarangeofinternalfunctions:Programmelooksatplanning(andrequirementsanalysis);Procurementsourcesandpurchasesthecommodities;andLogisticsresponsibleforthephysicaltransport. Analysing beneficiary requirements lies with Programme, whereas analysing themarketsthatpotentiallysupportthosebeneficiarieslieswithLogistics.

This segregationof duties,while seemingly logical, in fact results in importantopportunitiesbeing missed. Planning activities, for example, suffer from not having clear visibility oninfrastructureandcustomsconstraintsthatmaybeimposedduringanemergency.

BringingProgramme,ProcurementandLogistics intocloseralignmentprovidesLogisticswithfullvisibilityofinitialassessmentandresponsedesign14,andallowsProgrammetoincorporatesupply chain-oriented risks, constraints (infrastructure, Customs) and opportunities (aroundsourcing, transportandcustoms)– creatinga supply chain that is robustness, cost-effective,effective and efficient. Considering Logistics as a programmatic function also allowsopportunities for a disaster-response supply chain to ‘piggy-back’ onto existing structures,minimisingdisruption&duplicationwithregularprogrammeactivities.

Whenconsideringfine-tuningasupplychaintoitscontext,tighterintegrationbetweenLogisticsandProgrammeisespeciallyimportant,aseveryaspectofasupplychainmayholdopportunities



foroptimisation.Forinstance,anorganisationmayreviewitsdeliverynetworks,recalibratingmoresuitablelocationsforwarehousesandoptimaltransportroutes.This,inturn,canreduceleadtimes,generatecostsavingsandleadtoamorereliablesupplychain.Itisonlybylookingend-to-endwithinthesupplychainthattruepotentialforoptimisationcanbeunlocked.

Aunified,coordinatedandcollaborativesupplychainrequiresallparticipantstohaveaclearandcompleteunderstandingofthebroaderpicture,withcoordinatedneedsassessmentsandmoreeffectiveplanning.

Involving experienced supply chain staff in formulating cash/in-kind assistance offers directbenefitstotheaffectedpopulation,facilitatinginterventionsthat:

• aresensitivetothelocalcontextandrisks• takeadvantageofthelocalmarket(optimized)andareabletorespondquicklytoshocks

(agile)• are better for the livelihoods of the affected population – during and following an

intervention.

Maintaining a monitoring presence by supply-chain staff can also provide early warning ofpotentialrisksthatmaynototherwisebecaptured



4.ProposedActivitiesChapter2exploredhowtheDRSCmustevolve if it is torespondtofuturecrisesandremaineffective,andChapter3hasexplainedthethreeprerequisitesthatneedtobemetinorderfortheDRSCtotakethenextsteps.

This chapter looks in detail at the activities necessary to address the gaps that have beenidentified,andlinkstheactivitiestoachievingfourmeasurabletargets:

• MarketResilience:Can theactivity identify the tippingpoint (thepointatwhich themarketwillcollapse),andwhatdoestheactivitytostopitreachingthatpoint?

• Effectiveness: Does the activity improve the DRSC’s ability to reach the targetedpopulation,withaidthatisappropriatetotheirneeds,onapredictableschedule,andwithoutinterferingwiththelocalmarketplace?Tobeeffective,thedeliveredaidmustalsoaddresstheprinciplesofsafetyanddignityfortheaffectedpopulation.

• Efficiency:Doestheactivitycontributetofasterdistributionofassistanceatthestartof,andthroughoutanemergencyresponse?

• Cost-Effectiveness:Doestheactivitycontributetoeffectiveandefficientaid-deliveryinawaythatsavesmoney?

Thefinalchapterlooksatthefiveprinciples(dignity,safety,resilience,partnershipsandfinance)thathavebeensetbytheWorldHumanitarianSummittoguidehumanitarianinterventionsinthefuture.ItexploreshowthesefiveprinciplesareaddressedbytheactivitiesandtargetsoftheDRSC.

4.1 PreparednessAdequatepreparednessisthekeytoimprovethetimelinessandappropriatenessofdeliveryoflife-saving aid to an affected population, and offers considerable cost-saving potential, withestimatesthateverydollarinvestedinpreparednessandriskreductiongeneratesbetweenUSD3andUSD5insavings.15Since2005,preparednesshasbeenthefocuswhenidentifyingwaystoimproveadisasterresponse:

• The2005HumanitarianResponseReviewconcludedthatashortageoflogisticsexpertsin the field, predominantly manual supply chain processes, inadequate logisticsassessmentsandplanningandlimitedcollaborationandcoordinationallcontributedtoaless-than-satisfactoryresponse.

• In2014,ValerieAmos,theUN’sformerUnder-Secretary-GeneralandEmergencyReliefCoordinator, noted that lessons yet to be implemented include “the importance ofimprovingemergencypreparedness,disastermitigationandearlywarningtosavelives;theneedforcommunitiestoparticipatefullyineverystageofaresponse;themeritofaligningemergencyhumanitarianassistancewith long-termrecoveryefforts;andthevalueofgettingcoordinationandpartnershipsright”16.The2014MSFreport,“WhereisEveryone?”17identifiedlogisticalissuesasoneofthetwo18 main factors inhibiting an efficient international response, concluding that“greater investment needs to be made in building better (… human resource andlogistical) systems for responding, in order to improve preparedness, reactivity andeffectiveness”.



4.1.1 PreparednessthroughInformationGatheringThe foundationofpreparedness is information.Theactivitiesheregatherandanalyse, tobeusedbothindevelopingresponseplans,tobeavailabletoinformoperationsshouldadisasterbedeclared:

P-1. Conductriskanalysisofwhereemergenciesarelikelytooccur,andwhatform(s) it islikelytotake(naturaldisaster,pandemic,conflict,etc.),anddeveloparangeofresponseplansbaseduponpossibledisasterscenarios.Asitisnotpossibletoinstantlyconductallpreparednessactivitiesinallcountries,thisactivity(1)identifiesat-riskcountriesorregions; and (2) allows thehigh-risk areas– andquick-interventionactivities – tobeprioritized. The priorities set out by the risk analysis drive all other preparednessactivities,allowingforamoreconsidereddistributionofresources.

P-2. Collect andmaintain information on in-country supply chain-related infrastructure,includingmapping supply sources, transport routes,warehousing sites and potentialdistributionpoints. This informationgathering feedsback into the risks analysis, andessentialforthedevelopmentrealisticresponseplans.

P-3. Map up-stream commercial supply chains and in-country marketplaces to providebetter visibility before, approaching and during a disaster.Mapping the suppliers ofessentialdisaster-responsecommodities,transportercapacity,portinfrastructureandkeyinternalrouteswithinacountryallowsbetterdecisionmakingaroundwhethertoimport commodities or source locally, whether to employ cash, in-kind or mixedassistance. Risk assessments around the possibility of corruption or market-placeprofiteering(inresponsetothe‘free’moneysuddenlyavailable)shouldbeconductedaspartofthisexercise.

Frameworkagreementswithkeyvendorscanbeputintoplaceatthispointtoensuresupplyavailabilityandlead-times.Thisthenfeedsbackintotheriskanalysis.

P-4. Ensureoptimizationwith theHealth supply chain. Supply chains transportinghealthitems,whilelargelysimilartothosetransportingfoodandnon-fooditems,havesomecriticaldifferences(theseincludedifficultiesintransportinghighlyfragileequipmentorvials;drugs requiringcold-chain support,witha short-shelf life,orwithahighblack-marketstreetvalue;andcomplexitiesobtainingthenecessaryimportpermits).Whenexaminingresponseplanswherebothsupplychainsmaybenecessary,itisimportanttounderstandtheoverlapsanddifferencesofthetwosystems,totakeadvantageofanysynergies,andtooptimizewhereverpossible.

4.1.2 PreparednessthroughCapacityDevelopmentDeveloping the capacityof keypartnerswithin the government, civil protectionbodies localNGOsandprivatesupplychainoperatorscanreducetheimpactofadisasteruponin-countrysystems,andisessentialtoensuringrecoverycancommencequickly:

P-5. DevelopregionalnetworksADDITIONALINPUTNEEDED

P-6. Strengthengovernmentcapacity,focusingonkeydepartmentslikelytobeinvolvedindisasterresponseactivities(Customs,CivilAviationAuthority,andtheNationalDisasterManagement Office). Assist these offices with developing of Disaster Risk Responseplans and Standard Operating Procedures, providing staff training and conductingdisaster simulations. The development of pre-approved customs plans is critical. An



important side-benefit from thisactivity isdevelopmentofprofessional relationshipsbetweensupplychainandgovernmentpersonnel,essentialinadisasterresponse.

P-7. Strengthencivilprotectionbodies,as theyare likely tobe the first responders inanemergency,throughtraininganddisastersimulations.

P-8. Workwithin-countryNGOs,strengtheningtheircapacitywherenecessary.WhereanINGOhasanexistingrelationshipwith the in-countryNGOs,otherorganisationsmayconsiderworkingthroughtheINGO.

P-9. Work with in-country commercial supply chain partners, to understand currentcapacity (both tonnage and staff), and the practical constraints they face – bothinfrastructure(tofeedbackintothecountryassessments),andgovernment(difficultieswithimportingcargo,forexample,tofeedbackintogovernmentstrengthening).Thisinformation is essential to planning disaster responses that facilitate marketplaceresilience.

MoreinformationonInstitutionalPreparednesscanbefoundin“AppendixD-InstitutionalPreparedness”,page43.

4.1.3 PreparednessthroughPrepositioningP-10. Build,maintain,stockandstaffprepositioningstagingareastoenablerapidresponse

immediatelyfollowingadisaster.Thesefacilities,eitherbuiltin-countryorataregionallocation,canbestockedwithequipmentandnon-perishablereliefitems.Asthisactivityincursconsiderableexpense,tobecost-effectivethelocationandtypeofprepositioningsite reliesheavilyuponaccurate riskanalysis results, and shouldbe in response toaspecificriskprofileratherthanageneralisedsolution.

Asprepositioningisundertakeninresponsetoariskprofile,thepossibilityremainsthattheriskwillnoteventuate,andtheprepositioningsiteandequipmentwillnotbeusedinanemergencyresponse.Forthisreason,isisimportanttoconsiderwaystomakeaprepositioningworthwhile,evenintheeventnodisasteriseverdeclared.Forexample,itofferstheopportunitytostrengthengovernmentandNGOsthroughon-sitetrainingandsimulationexercises.

4.1.4 AchievingtheDRSCTargetsthroughPreparedness

Theseactivities… …improvethesupplychainby… …benefitingaid-recipientsby…

MarketResilience P-1)RiskanalysisP-2)MapinfrastructureP-3)Mapcommercialsupplychains&markets

Responseplanscanbedevelopedbasedadeepunderstandingofthepotentialneedsofapopulationatrisk,theirlocalmarketplaceanditssupportingsupplychains.

Moreappropriateaid

P-9)Strengthencommercialsupplychain

reducestheimpactofshocksshouldadisasteroccurs.

Lessneedforanemergencyintervention,orlesswidespread

P-3)Mapcommercialsupplychains&markets

Anappropriatemixofin-kindandcashdonationsisprovided,andthatlocalsupplychainsareutilizedforresponseactivities.

AidmoresuitedtoneedsAidmoresuitedtomarketconditionsSupportjob&livelihoodcreation




Effectiveness

P-1)RiskanalysisP-2)MapinfrastructureP-10)Prepositioning

Understandriskprofileoftypeofdisasterlikelytooccurcanmeanthatmoreappropriateequipmentandreliefgoodsareprepositionedorarequicklyavailable

AidarrivesfasterAidischeaper(notpayingforunnecessaryairlift)

P-2)MapinfrastructureP-3)Mapcommercialsupplychains&markets

understandingofin-countryinfrastructureallowsappropriatetransportationmeansfordistributiontobedetermined

FasteraiddeliveryBetteruseofin-countryresources


Determineappropriateaidmodalitybasedonmarketcapacity Appropriateaid

P-7)Strengthencivilprotectionbodies,P-8)StrengthenNGOs

aidreachedthepopulationsmostinneed,regionaldifferencesareunderstood,assistanceisappropriate

FasteraiddeliveryLessersenseofforeignerstakingover

Efficiency P-6)Strengthengovernmentcapacity

removebottlenecks,allowingincomingcargotobeprocessedfarmorequickly. Fasteraiddelivery


understandingthecountry’sinfrastructure–airports,portsandroads–resultsingoodsarrivingincountryfaster,fromawiderrangeofports.Distributionroutespre-designed

Fasteraiddelivery

P-4)OptimizationwiththeHealthsupplychain Lessduplicationofresources Fasteraiddelivery

P-10)Prepositioning Stocksareonhand,evenifportinfrastructurehasbeencompromised

FasteraiddeliveryMorereliabledelivery

Cost-Effectiveness

P-1)RiskanalysisP-2)MapinfrastructureP-3)Mapcommercialsupplychains&markets

Thedevelopmentofresponseplanswellbeforeadisasterstrikesmeansthattheinitialresponsecanbehighlytargetedintheskillsandequipmentneeded,ratherthantakingan‘all-bases-covered’approach.

Savingscanbeallocatedelsewhere

P-10)Prepositioning Prepositionedgoodscanresultintransportsaving,avoidingtheneedforexpensiveairlifts

Savingscanbeallocatedelsewhere

4.2 RenewalWhilepreparednesstargetsspecificdisasterrisksbeforetheyhappen,renewaltakesalonger,broader viewpoint, aiming to prepares the DRSC for challenges facing the humanitariancommunityasawhole.Renewalcanbebrokenintotwosubcategories–InformationResourcesandHumanResources:

4.2.1 RenewalofInformationResourcesInformation is highly dependant upon technology. To keep pace with changes, continuousdevelopmentofstandardsandtoolsisneeded.

R-1. Establish aDRSC research facility: Increasingly complex disaster responses requiresincreasingly innovativeapproaches.AdedicatedDRSCresearchfacilitycanacceleratethe exploration of new practices, technologies and paradigms, with the aim of (1)seekingimprovementsinthefourDRSCcriteria,and(2)improvingwaysofmeasuringthese criteria (see KPIs below). To be effective, the research facility will need tomainstreamsuccessfulresearchresultsintothemainstreamDRSCthroughtrainingandthroughdirectinteractionwithrelevantstakeholders–whetheraidagencies,donors,governmentsorothers.

Many of the renewal activities listed below would benefit from being housed in aresearchfacility.Otherexamples,notlistedbelow,include:incorporatingbestpractices



from the private or military sectors; investigate “lessons learned” documents fromprevious operations; undertake operations research (a discipline dealing with theapplicationofadvancedanalyticalmethodstohelpmakebetterdecisions);harnessingnewtechnologies;assesstheimpactofnewhumanitarianparadigmsuponthesupplychain(i.e.,theadventofcashtransfers);developcontingencyplanstoaddresspotentialthreats(theriskofhackingattacksinterruptingcommunicationsystems,forexample);andexploreways tobetter forecastbeneficiarynumbers throughenhancingexistingtechniques (vulnerability assessment andmapping, historical data) and investigatingnewertechnologicaloptions(bigdataanalysis,mobiletelephonymetadata).

R-2. Define industry-wide standardised Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to facilitateconsistentperformancemeasurementsallowingquantitativeperformancecomparisons(betweenorganisations,betweeninterventions,andbetweengeographicalareas),andthrough this, identifying areas for improvement. To be of use, the KPIsmust be (1)agreedtopriortoanemergency(andcannotbechangedto‘hide’poorperformance)andknowntoallstakeholdersaheadoftime;and(2)constantacrossevents,countriesandorganisations.

TheKPIsshouldindicateprogress(orregression)inareaswheretheDRSCwishestoseekimprovements. For example, in the four criteria ofMarket Resilience, Effectiveness,EfficiencyandCost-Effectiveness.

Research into potential KPIs, and seeking consensus seeking around theirimplementationthroughanindependentresearchfacilityremovestheriskthattheKPIsfavourone stakeholderoverothers. Placing this taskwithin the LogisticsCluster, forexample,leavestheKPIsexposedtoaccusationsthattheyfavourtheleadagency.

R-3. Define and develop common data-exchange standards, to facilitate directcommunicationbetweentheelectroniccommoditymanagementsystemsofdifferentorganisations.Thisshouldnotthisshouldnotbeconfusedwithconnectingthecomputersystemsofdifferentorganisationstogether:commondata-exchangestandardsallowsthe exchange of discreet files (by email, for example), that can then be read andunderstood by the other organisation’s computers – they do not rely upon twocomputersystems‘talking’toeachother.

Atitsmostbasiclevel,commondata-exchangestandardsinvolves,forexample,clearlydefiningtheunitsofmeasuretobeused-ensuringallorganisationsreportvolumeincubiccentimetres,say,ratherthancubicmetresorcubicinches.

Housing the study and definition of common data-exchange standards in a researchfacility, and seeking expertise from the International Standards Organisation (ISO),ensures that standards are independent of individual organisations, and are notdependantuponasingleorganisationcontinually fundingtheactivity (data-exchangestandardswillevolveastechnologiesandtoolschange).

MoreinformationonstandardisedKPIsandcommondata-exchangestandardscanbefoundin“AppendixH-ImplementingIndustryStandards”,page59.

R-4. Develop and maintain Information Sharing & Coordination tools to simplify thecommunication of information between individuals. Informationmanagement is thelifebloodofanefficientemergencyresponse (theLogisticsCapacityAssessmentsandthe Logistics Cluster website are current examples). Coordination tools require



continuousdevelopmentiftheyaretoremaineffectiveinachangingtechnologicalanddisaster-responseenvironment.

InformationSharing&Coordinationtoolsshouldnotbeconfusedwithcommondata-exchange standards: the former facilitates people communicating, and the latterfacilitates computer communication. Defining and enforcing common data-exchangestandards, however, does strongly contribute to Information Sharing& Coordinationtoolspublishingclear,unambiguous,timelymaterial.

There are strong advantages to individual organisations developing andmaintainingtheirowntools–providedtheyarebasedonthestandardisedKPIsandcommondata-exchange standards outlined above. These tools usually require significant softwaredevelopment – an expensive and time-consuming process. As the primarymeans ofcommunicationwiththehumanitariancommunity,thesetoolsarehighlyvisibility,andcloselytiedtotheorganisationproducingthem(aspertheLogisticsClusterwebsite).

4.2.2 RenewalofHumanResourcesAsdisastersoccuratunpredictableintervals–therecouldbesixinayear,ornone–itisnotpossiblefororganisationstocontinuallymaintainthehighlevelsofstaffneededtorespondtoanemergency.DRSCstaffing,then,ischaracterisedbytherapidhiringoflargenumbersofstaffattheoutset,tobereleasedoncetheinterventioniscompleted.Largenumbersofpeoplemust(1)quicklycometogether;(2)havecompatibleskillsets;and(3)beabletocommunicateclearly–allwithinthemidstofchaosandconfusion.

Thiscreatesauniqueproblemfor theDRSC.Thecomplexityandbreadthof thetaskssupplychainprofessionalsneedtoundertakeduringadisasterresponse,combinedwiththelackofaclearcareer-pathcanmakeitdifficulttotrain,retain(acrossemergencies)andlocate(atthestart of an emergency) staff. The activities below target supply-chain staff in permanentemployment, thoseemployedonaper-emergencybasis,and thosecoming fromtheprivatesector.

R-5. Develop a standardised training curriculum, accepted and used industry-wide. Asinterventions become more complex, the demands upon DRSC professionals isextending beyond simple transportation of commodities. Market analysis skills, forexample,areneededtoensureaiddeliveryisappropriate,andtodesignsupplychainsthat facilitatemarket resilience.While practical training (see below) and on-the-jobexperiencewillalwaysbeessential,theseincreasinglyneedtobesupportedbyformaltraining.

While a number of institutions currently offer their own highly respected trainingprogrammes–includingtheFritzInstitute/CILT(UK),INSEAD(UK),GeorgiaTech(US),Lugano (Switzerland) and the Kuehne Foundation (Germany) – there is value indevelopingatrainingcurriculumthatisstandardisedacrosstheindustry.Reflectingthelargenumberanddiversityoforganisationsinvolvedinanemergencyresponse,supplychainstaffhailfrommanydifferentcultural,linguisticandprofessionalbackgrounds.Acommontrainingcurriculumensuressector-widecompetenciesandstandard[technical]language19areusedbystaff,ensuring that theyarebetterequippedassupplychainprofessionals20.Standardisedtrainingalsoprovidesawayfornewpracticesandtools–possiblydevelopedbytheresearchfacility–tobecomeembeddedindailypractice.

Expanduponthecommerciallybackedinitiatives liketheLogisticsEmergenciesTeam(LET)21 programme that enables commercial22 logisticians to gain disaster-response



experiencethroughcompany-backedsecondments.

R-6. Develop practical national & regional training to complement the theoreticalstandardisedtraining(above).TheLogisticsCluster’sLogisticsResponseTrainingofferspractical disaster-response simulations, bringing together participants from diverseorganisations.BioForceandtheFritzInstitutealsoprovidetraining.Inadditiontothetraining content, the professional networks developed by participants have provedinvaluable in later emergency-response operations, with greater cohesion acrossorganisations,andcompatibleSOPsandstandardizedframework.

R-7. Establish formal certification for supply-chain professionals (is this certification fortrainingcoursestake,orforon-the-jobexperiencesorboth?):Thelackofacareerpathcan be a disincentive for commercial supply-chain mangers wishing to join thehumanitariancommunity,andcanmakeretentionofexperiencedhumanitariansupplychain managers difficult. Formulating a standard accreditation system, acceptedindustrywidegivesstafftheabilitytomovebetweenthecommercialandhumanitariansectors, providing valuable ‘cross-pollination’, and simplifies employers’ search forsuitablequalifiedstaff.

R-8. Developandmaintainasupplychainroster:Thedevelopment,andmaintenance,ofarosterofqualifiedsupply-chainprofessionalsacrossarangeoforganisations,locationsandspecialisationsisanimportantsteptowardmaximisingthislimitedresource.Giventhe part-time nature of emergency response work, many of the trained, qualifiedprofessionalsmaynotbeemployedby respondingorganisationsat theoutsetof theemergency. Maintaining a roster allows staff with the desired specialisations to bequickly identified,contactedanddeployed.Arostercanalsocontributetoalleviatingstafffatigue,asnewhumanresources,beyondthoseknowntoanorganisation,canbedeployed.

More information on Human Resource Renewal can be found in “Appendix E -ProfessionalizationoftheSupplyChain”,page47.

4.2.3 AchievingtheDRSCTargetsthroughRenewalo TheadvantagestotheDRSCfromestablishingaresearchfacilityarenotlistedagainstthe

parametersbelow,asthebenefitaffordedandparametertargetedwilldependuponthespecificresearchbeingundertaken.

o Theindicatorsdevelopedinthe“industry-widestandardisedKPIs”activityshouldcontributethethemeasurementoftheparametersbelow.TheadvantagesshownbelowindicatehowthesupplychaincanbeimprovediftheKPIsareusedeffectively.


MarketResilience

R-2)KPIsMarketplaceactivityKPIscanhighlightareaswhereaninterventionisinterferingwithmarketactivity.

Lessriskofmarketinterference

R-5)StandardisedtrainingAstandardisedtrainingcurriculum,withastrongfocusonmarketresilienceensuresthatDRSCstaffprovidemarketplace-friendlyassistance

Bettermarketresilience




Effectiveness

R-2)KPIs

EffectivenessKPIscanindicateifatargetedpopulationisreceivingtoomuchortoolittleassistance,orifthemodeofassistanceisincorrect.

BettercoverageMoreappropriateaid

R-2)KPIsKnowingfromtheoutsetthatactionswillbemeasured(throughKPIs)canencouragebetterprocesses

Betterservice

R-2)KPIs Empiricalmeasurements(KPIs)canquicklyhighlightareasforimprovement

Fasterresolutionofproblems

R-2)KPIsEncouragesdonorstofocusfundingonthoseorganisationsthathaveabettertrack-record(basedontheKPIs)

Receiveaidfromprovenaidorganisations

R-4)InformationSharing&Coordinationtools

InformationSharing&Coordinationtoolsarekeytoensuringpopulationsdonotreceiveduplicatedsupport,andinensuringnogapsincoverageoccur

BettercoverageFasteridentificationofproblemareas

R-5)StandardisedtrainingR-6)PracticaltrainingR-7)Formalcertification

Bettertrainedstaff,boththroughtheoreticalandpracticalcoursework,willbebetterpositionedtoensureDRSCeffectiveness.

Betterservice

R-6)Practicaltraining

Stafffromdifferentorganisations(andfromgovernment)thathavereceivedpracticaltrainingtogethercanmakeuseoftrainingcontentandprofessionalnetworks

FasterresponseFasterresolutionofproblems

R-7)FormalcertificationStaffcertificationhelpsattractandretainqualifiedstaff,capableofrunningabetteroperation


Efficiency

R-2)KPIs

EfficiencyKPIscantrackthespeedwithwhichcommoditiesarereachingbeneficiaries.Examplesincludemeasuringthethroughputofaport,comparingvolumeenteringatawarehousetovolumeexiting

Fasteridentification&resolutionofproblems

R-2)KPIsR-3)Commondata-exchangestandardsR-4)InformationSharing&CoordinationtoolsR-5)Standardisedtraining

Commondata-exchangestandardscanspeedthemovementofcommoditiesbyreducingthetimelostinmissing,incorrectormisunderstooddata.Acommonoccurrenceinemergenciesisindividualssubmittingtransportrequestsincubicinchesratherthancubicmetres.Thesetaketimetotraceandresolve,impactingtransportqueues

FasteraiddeliveryFewermistakes

R-4)InformationSharing&Coordinationtools

InformationSharingcanhighlightareasthathavenotreceivedaid,enablingthistobeincreasedinpriority


R-5)StandardisedtrainingR-6)PracticaltrainingR-7)Formalcertification

Bettertrainedstaffmeanslessmistakesandfasterresponsetimes

FasteraiddeliveryFewermistakes

R-6)Practicaltraining

Thenetworksandcommontechnicallanguagedevelopedthroughjointpracticaltrainingcanensuremiscommunicationisminimisedandpersonalitiesdonotinterferewithserviceprovision

Fasterservice

R-7)FormalcertificationStaffcertificationhelpsattractandretainqualifiedstaff,capableofrunningamoreefficientoperation


R-8)Roster Maintainingasupplychainrosterhelpsidentifykeystaffandhavethemonthegroundsooner Fasterresponse

Cost-Effectiveness

R-2)KPIs KPIstomeasurecost-effectivenesswillneedtofirstdetermineanappropriate‘measuringpost’.





R-3)Commondata-exchangestandardsR-4)InformationSharing&Coordinationtools

InformationSharingassistscost-effectivenessbymakingsuretransportandstorageresourcesarebeingfullyutilised.Under-utilizedassetscanbemovedtolocationsmoreinneed

R-5)StandardisedtrainingR-6)Practicaltraining

Bettertrainedstaffmakinglessmistakesmeansamoreefficientuseofresources

4.3 OptimizationAplanned,ratherthanreactive,supplychainwillsavemoney&time,copebetterwithshocks,andbemoreappropriatetotheneedsofthepopulation.Planningitrequiresgatheringqualityinformation.Executingitinawaythatbuildsmarketresilienceandembedsrecoveryfromtheverystartrequireshavinginplacegovernment,civilprotection,NGOandcommercialactorsofsufficientcapacityandpreparation.

4.3.1 OptimizationActivitiesO-1. Implement DRSC that are fit-for-purpose by being fine-tuned to known market

conditions (optimised), able to respondquickly to shocks (agile); andadaptedof theneedsofthebeneficiariesandtheabilityofthelocalsupplychain(appropriate).

More informationonsupplychainoptimizationcanbe found in “AppendixF -Agile,OptimisedSupply-chains”,page51.

Thisactivity issupportedthroughactivitiesP-2 (informationgathering),P-3 (mappingup-streamsupplychains),P-4(optimizingwithhealthsupplychains)andP-9(workingwithin-countrysupplychainpartners).KPIs(activityR-2)canhelpidentifyshortcomingsinthesupplychain,tobeaddressedbysuitablequalifiedstaff(activitiesR-5andR-6).

O-2. Whereappropriate,implementingCashTransfersofferssignificantadvantagesoverin-kindassistancetobothbeneficiariesandthetheorganisationssupportingthem.Cashtransfersproviderecipientswithgreaterautonomyandcanbe‘delivered’quicklyandon-time. For aid organisations, cash transfers aremuch cheaper to handle, incurringminimal transaction costs and requiring no investment in transportinfrastructure/services. Cash transfers also play a vital role in fostering marketresilience,with recipients spending themoney in localmarkets, increasingeconomicactivity and employment, feeding into the local supply chain. This is known as themultipliereffect.23

Tobeuseful to recipientsandviable in themarkets,however, it isessential that themarket and supply chain’s ability to absorb24 the extra demand is continuouslymonitored both before and during the crisis. It may be necessary, for example, tocommencesupportwithcommodity-basedsupport,beforegraduallyshiftingtocash-basedsupportasmarketsheal.

Amoredetaileddiscussionaroundtheopportunitiesandrisksposedbycashtransfersisin“AppendixG-ProvisionofCashVsIn-KindAssistance”,page54.

ThisactivityissupportedthroughactivitiesP-3(mappingup-streamsupplychains)andP-9(workingwithin-countrysupplychainpartners).



O-3. Ensurethesupplychainactivitiesarevisibletoallpartners&thegovernmentthroughcommoditytrackingandreportinglocalvsglobalprocurement.Thisbuildstrustwiththegovernment,andbetweenorganisationsrespondingtoanorganisation.

This activity is supported through activity R-4 (information sharing & coordination),whichisassisted,inturnbyR-3(commondata-exchangestandards).

O-4. Improve coordination with those in-country NGOs to assist with downstreamrequirementandmarketassessments,andthetrackingofreliefcommodities.

This activity is supported through activities P-8 (strengthen in-country NGOs), P-3(mapping up-stream supply chains) and P-9 (working with in-country supply chainpartners).

O-5. Encourage the use of Common Logistics Services wherever appropriate, to achieveeconomiesofscale,expediteprocurement,andreducecompetitionforlocalresources.

Determining appropriateness is supported through activities P-2 (informationgathering),P-3 (mapping up-stream supply chains) andP-9 (workingwith in-countrysupplychainpartners).

O-6. Prioritize in-country commercial supply chains and private-sector partners, whereappropriate,topromotelocalmarketresilience.Appropriateuseoflocalresourcesisanessentialelementin(re)developinglocalsupplychainresilience,andwilldependheavilyuponaccurateresource-mappinginformation,gatheredbeforeandduringthedisasterresponse,aswellasthepartnershipsdevelopedaspartofinstitutionalstrengthening.

Determining appropriateness is supported through activities P-2 (informationgathering),P-3 (mapping up-stream supply chains) andP-9 (workingwith in-countrysupplychainpartners).

O-7. Buildinguponthepreparednessactivities,workwithCustomstoimplementtheagreed-toemergencyresponseplan,andtoenactstandardimport-exportanddutyagreements.

ThisactivityissupportedthroughactivityP-6(strengthengovernment).

4.3.2 AchievingtheDRSCTargetsthroughOptimization


MarketResilience

Useofappropriateinterventionscanavoidoverstressingdistressedmarketsthroughthedistributionofin-kindcommodities,orcanencourageeconomicactivityinmarketsthatcansupportitthroughcashassistance

‘Leadingbyexample’canbuildcapacityoflocalsupplychainactorstowithstandshocks

Effectiveness

Pre-disasterplanningandconstantattentiontochangesthatmayimpactthesupplychainallow

Efficiency

EfficiencyKPIscantrackthespeedwithwhichcommoditiesarereachingbeneficiaries.Examplesincludemeasuringthethroughputofaport,comparingvolumeenteringatawarehousetovolumeexiting




Cost-Effectiveness

Bettertrainedstaffmakinglessmistakesmeansamoreefficientuseofresources



5.WhatPriceisRight:Howdoesthisbenefittheaffectedpopulation?

TheWorldHumanitarianSummitdefinedprinciplestoguidehumanitarianintervention:Dignity,Safety, Resilience, Partnerships and Finance. This chapter takes the activities and the DRSCTargets, and links them to the WHS principles to explore they might benefit affectedpopulations.

Itisimportanttofirstunderstandhow,inthespecificcontextofsupplychainswithinadisaster–responsecontext, the linkagebetween theDRSCTargets (and theunderlyingactivities thatcontributethem)andthefiveprinciplesforhumanitariandevelopment:

• Ensuring thedignityandsafetyof theaffectedpopulation is theraisond'êtreof thehumanitariansector.DignityandsafetyareaddressedintheDRSCthroughtheprovisionofefficient(fastandtimely),effective(appropriateanduseful)andcost-effective(costsavingsallowgreaterbeneficiarycoverage).

• ResiliencehasbeensingledoutasaDRSCTarget,asitrequires(1)revisingthecurrentapproachtoDRSCimplementation;and(2)developingandapplyingdeliberateactionsandmethodologies.

• Partnerships–specificallylocalization–isaddressedbytheDRSCthroughactivitiesthatmakegreateruseoflocalsupply-chainpartners,andthroughprovisionofaidinawaythatencouragesmarketactivity.Unlikeresilience,partnerships,withinthecontextoftheDRSC,isameansthroughwhichresiliencecanbeachieved.

• The activities outlined in this paper address two aspects of the finance principle –transaction costs (through seeking out cost-efficiencies) and direct funding to localorganizations (through employing the use of local supply chain partners whereverpossible). As with partnerships, the final aim of the DRSC is not to finance localorganisations. It does, however, use finance as a preferred tool, to help achieveresilience.Note:Itispossible,however,thatthesetwoaspectsmaycomeintoconflict:Transactioncosts may be higher, for example, when using local partners rather, say, importingsuppliesthroughUNHRD.Inthisexample,adecisionwillhavetobemade,thenwhetherto foster resilience thorough theuseof local suppliers,or to save costs (andpossiblyincreasebeneficiarycoverage)andimportthroughUNHRD.

THISSECTIONISSTILLINPROGRESS,ANDISPENDINGLINKINGTOTHETABLESINCHAPTER4

5.1 DignityPeopleatthecentreofhumanitarianaction,increasedcash-basedassistance,andaccountabilitytoaffectedpeople

• Provisionofaidthatisappropriatetotherecipientneedsandmarketconditions§ Implementingcashpaymentswheresufficientandappropriate itemsareavailableat

reasonableprices,givestherecipientvolitionandautonomy§ Providing in-kindassistancewhenessentialcommoditiesnotavailableon themarket

ensuresrecipientsdonotneedtobarterhouseholditems§ Providing assistance on a regular schedule allows recipients to budget their

requirements,andnonotneedtosellhouseholdassetstobridgethegap



• Assistancereachingtherecipientsoonerafterfirstonsetavoidstheneedtosellhouseholdgoods(orworse)tosurvive

• Providingassistanceinmannerthatencouragesmarketactivityanduseslocalsupplychainpartnerscreatesjobsandlivelihoods

• AchievingDRSCcost-savingsallowsmorepeopletoreceiveassistance,orprovidesformorefrequentdeliveries,orfundsalargerbasketofreliefitems

5.2 SafetyProtectionandInternationalHumanitarianLaw

• Supply chains prepared ahead of time allow faster response after first onset, providingcriticalhealth,shelter,waterandfoodintheearlydaysofacrisis

• Knowledge of in-country provides for more appropriate relief items; distribution isorganisedinsuchawaythatpeople,esp.womenandchildrenneednotwalklongdistanceswithheavyweight;nofightingorattackspossibleduringdistributions;etc.

• ADDITIONALBENEFITS?• Safety isaddressed through rapid responseat theemergencyoutsetby suitably trained

supply-chainprofessionals,ensuringurgentprovisions,appropriatetocultureandcontextaresuppliedinamannerappropriatetocontext.

•

5.3 ResilienceProtractedcrises,bridgingthehumanitarian-developmentgap,DRR,socialprotection,refugeehostingdeal,durablesolutions;Responsemustfeedintoresilienceofthecountry

• Householdresiliencethroughnothavingtosellhouseholditems.• Economic resilience through (1) reducing impact upon local supply chain when

providingin-kind;and(2)buildinguplocalsupplychainthroughcash(&multipliereffect);(3)useoflocalassetswhenresponding

• Livelihoodsquicklyrestoredbyprovidingappropriateandtimelyitems• ADDITIONALBENEFITS?

5.4 PartnershipsHumanitarianprinciples,localization,subsidiarity,andinnovation

• ADDITIONALBENEFITS?

5.5 FinanceClosingthefundinggap,transactioncosts,directfundingtolocalorganizations

• ADDITIONALBENEFITS?



AppendixA- ContributorsA.1 SteeringCommitteeandContributingAuthors• GeorgeFenton*¸...................................WVI• MaggieHeraty*.....................................IndependentHumanitarianConsultant• WolfgangHerbinger*............................WFP• AaronHolmes¸......................................IndependentConsultant• MirjanaKavelj¸......................................WFP• Jean-BaptisteLamarche*¸.....................ACF-France• DanielLink¸............................................KuehneFoundation• Juan-AlfonsoLozano-Basanta*..............ECHO• IsabelledeMuyser-Boucher*................UN-OCHA• JohnMyraunet¸.....................................WFP• PeterTatham¸.......................................IndependentConsultant• RebeccaTurner*¸..................................IndependentConsultant• NilsVanWassenhove¸...........................WFP• AlvaroVillanueva*¸...............................ACF-Spain

*=SteeringCommitteemember¸=Contributingauthor

A.2 KeyContributors1. JéromeAubry2. BernardChomilier3. ErlandEgiziano4. MaxenceGiraud5. MikeGoodhand6. IonutHomeag7. MatsHultgren8. HeleneJuillard9. ChristopheLeHouedec10. TheoLingens11. YvetteMadrid12. DidierMerckx13. BenoïtMiribel14. KathrinMohr15. NickMurdoch16. AntoninPetr17. JosefReiterer18. BenoitSilve19. JonathanSpence20. SimonStermann21. RoyWilliams



AppendixB- CommonLogisticsServicesB.1 Benefits&importancetoemergenciesAcoordinatedresponsemaximisestheuseofavailableassets;reducescompetitionforscarceassets; avoids duplication of work; avoids affected countries being overwhelmed by a highnumber of actors and uncoordinated relief items arriving to their countries; and enablesimpartialprioritizationofwhichreliefitemsarecalledforwardfirst.

CommonLogisticsServices(CLS)improvestheeffectivenessandefficiencyofthehumanitarianresponseinemergenciesthrough:

1. Increasedcoordinationandcollaborationamongactorsandtheirindividualresponsesin emergencies. The mere sharing of available resources can enhance coordinationbetweenhumanitarianactorsduring the responseand if oneor a fewentities takesresponsibility for some of the key common logistics services, the government andrelevantdisastermanagementauthority intheaffectedcountryhaveaclearpointofliaisoninthehumanitariancommunityforlogistics.Thishasthepotentialforimprovedrelationships, partnerships and cooperation, and enables prioritization of the mosturgentreliefitemsfirst,therebyimprovingtheoperationandresponse.

2. Avoid duplication of efforts and unnecessary competition between relief actors.Throughactingjointlyhumanitarianactorscanimprovetheutilisationofscarcelogisticsassetsandreducetheriskofdrivingupthecostsoftheresponseduetocompetitionforscarce resources. Improved utilisation of assets can again reduce the burden andimproveefficiencyinexistinginfrastructureoftheaffectedcountry.

3. strengthen the core work of humanitarian organisations, in particular smallerorganisationsthatdonothavethecapacityorresourcestorespondtothescalerequiredby the context. The financial implications of an emergency can be vast andwith anincreasingnumberofemergenciesandfundingisoftenlimitedordelayed.Byenablinganincreasingnumberofmembersofthehumanitariancommunitytodeliverlifesavingcargo, implementing common logistics services plays a vital role in a humanitarianresponsetoanemergency.Thiscanhavethemostimpactforthoseespeciallyhardtoreachaffectedpopulationsatriskofnotbeingreachedduetheextremelyhighcostsoflogisticsoperationstoreachtheseplaces,e.g.theneedtodeployairassetstoaccesspocketscutoffduetobadordamageinfrastructureorfighting.Thecostoflogisticstoreachthesevulnerablepeoplewouldnormallybetoohighformostorganizationstodoalone and only through common services providing support for multiple missionstatements and commodity types would goods and support be able to reach theseareas. At the same time, common logistics services can free financial and humanresourcesforuserorganizationstofocusontheirmainareaofcompetence.Commonservicesisnotonlyaboutsharingassetsbutalsoaboutsharingstaff.Thisisnotonlytoavoid overlapping, but in many humanitarian contexts, security concerns make itdesirabletoreducethenumberofstaffincertainlocations.

Everyresponseiscontextspecific,sotooistheCommonLogisticsServiceinanoperation.Therewillnotbea“onesolutionfitsall.”Thehumanitariancommunityneedstofocusonwhatcanbeinfluenced and changed, e.g. preparedness, standards, improved inter-operability.Whilewecannot control the nature of emergencies, we can control preparedness, having assets orsystemsfordeploymentofassetsonstand-by,training,awareness,andpartnerships.



B.2 Services&actorsGovernmentsofaffectedcountriesshouldbethemainrespondersinemergenciesandmeettheneedsoftheirpopulation.Manycountrieshavesetupstrongsystemstodealwithemergenciesthrough National Disaster Management Authorities that prepare and respond when anemergency strikes. In recent years, therehas alsobeen a strengtheningof regional bodies25lookingathowcooperationandresponseacrossborderscanbe improved.The internationalcommunity’s role is to support these governmental bodies. For large scale26 emergencies,though,theinternationalcommunityofhumanitarianrespondersmayneedtoplayastrongerrole.

Examplesofgovernmentssettingupcommon logistics services toensure rapidandeffectivemanagementofincomingreliefitemsinclude:

• ThePhilippinesgovernment (Haiyan2013)setupacustomsandclearanceone-stop-shop,whereallnationalauthoritiesinvolvedinclearingincomingcargoworktogetherin one common clearing house to speed up the through put at entry points, bothreducing the riskof congestionat theairport andensuring rapidonwarddelivery topeopleinneed.

• TheNepalesegovernment(priortothe2015earthquake),workedwithWFPandthelogistics cluster on a preparedness project, installing a humanitarian staging area atKathmanduairport.Whenthe2015earthquakestruck,thehubwasfullyoperationalwithin24hours,receivinglargeamountofincomingreliefitems.

Internationalorganisationshaveestablishedseveralcommonservices,including:

• UnitedNationsJointLogisticsCentre(UNJLC),laterreplacedwiththeLogisticsClusterfor coordination, information exchange and provision of common services for itsmembers.Whiletheleadagency(WFP)istheProviderofLastResort,responsibleforovercoming jointly identified logisticsbottlenecks, clusterpartnersmayalsoprovidecommonlogisticsservices–WorldVision(?)andHandicapInternationalforexample,establishedcommonstoragehubsduringthe2015VanuatuandNepalresponses.

• TheUnitedNationsHumanitarianResponseDepot(UNHRD)offersacost-effectivewayfor organizations topreposition relief items in 6 depots around theworld, and alsofacilitatesjointcharterflightsinthebeginningofanemergency.

• The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) offers passenger service tohumanitarian staff inareaswhenno reliable commercial alternativeexists, enablinghumanitarianactorstoaccesspeopleinneed.Investinginasinglecommonpassengerservice,throughtheUN,ratherthanmultipleactors,alsoenablestheinvestmentinacoreunitofexpertsthatmonitorsandcontrolssafetyandsecurity.

• Humanitarian Procurement Centres (HPC) are not-for-profit organisations that arespecialisedinthetechnicalandcommercialmanagementofsuppliesandservices,andoffer this expertise to other organizations. This includes technical assistance inprocurement or supply pre-established stocks, as well as purchasing or logisticscapacity. IFRCGlobalLogisticsService,MSFLogistique,MSFSupply,OXFAM,UNHRD,UNICEFSupplyDivisionandUNOPSaresomeexamplesofrecognizedHPCs.

• Bioport27offershumanitarianlogisticssupporttoNGOs,coveringwarehousing,kitting28andreconditioning.Bioportalsooffersmulti-modaltransportservices.

• Handicap International offers its Logistics Platform project29 which includes fleetmanagement,warehousing,technicalservicesandtraining.



Thecasestudybelowillustrateshowcommonlogisticsservicescancontributetowardsamoreeffectiveandcost-efficienthumanitarianresponse:

Figure1–CLS(AirTransport)intheEbolaResponse

B.2.1 ECHOTheEuropeanCommission'sHumanitarianAidandCivilProtectiondepartment (ECHO) fundslogistics needs during emergencies to facilitate humanitarian relief reachingmore people inneedthroughpartners.ECHOisakeyfundingpartnerinprovidingCommonLogisticsServicesairtransportservicesanddirectlyprovidestransportserviceincertainregionsthroughtheECHOFlightprogram.ECHOalsobuilds logistics capacity forpartnersby funding initiatives suchaswarehouses,andguaranteeslogisticsbothindirectlyinanyfundedactionanddirectlythroughenhanced capacity funds, including projects oriented towards the professionalization ofhumanitarianlogistics.

ECHOalsosupportsoperationalareas,including:

• TheFieldNetworkwherebyECHO-hired logisticians facilitateECHOwide logisticsbutsupporthumanitarianlogisticsaswell.MostrecentlyvisibleduringtheEbolaResponse.

• TheEuropeanUnionCivilProtectionMechanism(UCPM),whichco-finances,togetherwith participating states30, the costs for transporting in-kind assistance provided bythosestates,upontherequestofanycountryintheworld.TheUCPMlegislationthatcameintoeffectatthebeginningof2014alsoprovidesfortheassistancerequestedbytheUnitedNationsanditsagencies,orarelevantinternationalorganisation.

B.2.2 EmergencyResponseCoordinationCentre(ERCC)ECHOalsosetuptheEmergencyResponseCoordinationCentre(ERCC),designedtofacilitatethecoordinationandquickresponsetodisastersacrosstheworldusingtheresourcesoftheUCPM.TheERCCenables theUCPMtoavoidduplication in the response,and to coordinatefinancial and in-kindassistance from theUCPM’sparticipating states.A logistics component,stronglyrelatedtocivilprotectionactions,isfacilitatedthroughtheefficientflowofinformationwithintheUCPMforthepurposeofrespondingtorequestsforassistance.

TheroleoftheERCChasrecentlybeenenlarged.WhilecivilprotectionactivitiesremainundertheUCPM,theERCChasevolvedtobecomeacoordinationhub,facilitatingacohesiveEuropean

Casestudy:In2014,whenEbola-affectedcountrieswereatriskofisolationascommercialairandshippingcompaniesalteredorceasedtheiroperationtothecountries,thehumanitariancommunityurgentlyneededtoidentifyavailableaircargocapacity.Frequentaircargotransporttoallthecountrieswasrequiredforsmallshipmentofsuppliesandvaccinesassoonastheybecameavailable.Fewagencieshadsufficientcargotochargerflightsonaweeklybasis,asmostweresendingshipmentsoflessthan5mtonceortwiceaweek.Tosupport thehumanitariancommunity in identifyingavailable aircargotransport, theAirCoordinationCell(ACC)wasestablished,hostedbyUNICEFandsupportedbyWFPstafffortheLogisticsCluster.TheACCfacilitatedair-cargoconsolidationthroughinformationsharingonavailableaircapacity,bydistributingdailyupdatesto171humanitarianstafffrom42agencies.Threeconsolidationinitiativesweresharedwithpartnersleadingtototalof1144mtofcargobeingconsolidatedonUNICEF,AirlinkandWFPflights.Tofurtherfacilitatecommonairtransport,aStagingAreawasestablishedinCologne,supportedbyUPSandtheCologne-Bonnairport,andstaffedbytheLogisticsCluster.Themost importantairconsolidationopportunitieswere10flightsofferedbyWFPasaCommonLogisticsServiceandavailedtothehumanitariancommunityfromCologne. At least USD1.5m was saved, compared to the best commercial rates provided to the partnerorganisations.40organisationssent932mtofreliefmaterialswiththeflights,rangingfrom49kgto36mt.Morethanhalfoftheshipmentsweighedlessthan5mtandwouldhavebeenatgreatriskforsignificantdelaybeingdelivered.Thepotentialofincreasedeffectivenessandefficiencyinairtransportisevenmoreevidentconsideringthatthe10flightsmadeupaverysmallportionofthetotalairtransporttotheEbolaaffectedcountries.



responsetoemergenciesacrosstheworldbypromotingcooperationbetweencivilprotectionandhumanitarianaid.TheERCChasestablishedlinkswithabroadrangeofstakeholdersbothinsideandoutsidetheEuropeanCommission,including:theEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS),Commissionservicesandcrisiscentres,theEUMilitarystaff,OCHA, IHP,theLogisticsClusterandCivilProtectionNationalAuthorities.

TheERCCisresponsiblefor:

• Collectingreal-timeinformationondisasters,monitorshazardsandpreparingplansforthedeploymentofresources,includingexperts,teamsandequipment

• Workingwithmember states to locate assetsandcoordinate theEuropeandisasterresponseefforts.

• The planning and implementation of civil protection and its logisticsprovisionresultsinresourcesupplytodisasterareas,inclosercollaborationwithotherpartnerstoensurecommonlogisticsservicesandcompletesupplychainmanagement

B.2.3 Military&PrivatesectorsThrough thecommon logistics serviceactors, it isalsopossible to ‘plug in’ support fromtheprivatesectorand,whereappropriate,militarylogisticsassets.TheLogisticsClusterhasformedapartnershipwithkeylogisticscompaniesaroundtheworld,throughtheLogisticsEmergencyTeams31 (LET).Thesecompaniescontribute to the technicalexpertise to theLogisticsClustermembers,aswellasprovidingdirectlogisticalsupportcovering:shipping,airtransport,customsassistance,warehousing,transportandtechnicalpersonnel.DHLhasapartnershipwithOCHA,outsidetheLET,thatdeploysDisasterResponseTeamstaskedwithdecongestingairportsduringtheinitialphaseofanemergency.

Atthestartofasudden-onsetnaturaldisaster,theLogisticsClusterwillcoordinatewithmilitaryactors32tocoveroperationalgaps.

B.3 RisksandchallengesforCLSA increasing reliance on common logistics services requires increasing investment if existingservicesaretobemaintainedandnewservicesaretobeadded.Organisationsprovidingserviceswillneedtoincreasebothstaffandstaffcapacities,andtheirsystemswillneedtomanagelargertasks.Fundingmodalitiesmustbestructuredtoavoidoperationscoming tohaltbecause (1)commonlogisticsservicesareinsufficientlyfunded,and(2)organizationshavereliedtooheavilyonCLSandhavenotsetasideenoughfundsfortheirownlogistics.

UsersofCLSmustalsobesurethatprioritizationisimpartialandthatallusershaveavoice.

B.4 Whatnextforcommonservices?Familiarise the humanitarian community with concept of CLS and the benefits that can begained from using shared services. Without awareness, organisations may be sceptical ofallowingotheragenciestotransport/storetheiritems,ormaynotknowhowtoproperlyaccesstheservicesavailable.ItisvitaltodiscussandshareinformationonCommonServicesavailableathumanitarianforums,bilaterally,andthroughgreaterinformation-sharing.

EmphasiseprovisionofInformationSharingasapriorityfunction:itisonlythroughinformationsharingthatresourcescanbeeffectivelypooled,sharedandcoordinated.AsCLSsplayaroleincoordination (aswell facilitating theservices theyareproviding) theyshouldbeopento thewhole humanitarian community, adequately funded and needs to keep partners in goodstanding.



Familiarize government counterparts33 with CLSs and to train them in the basics ofhumanitarian logistics, as part of preparedness exercises. Engaging national and localnetworksfurtherisalsoneededtoachievethefullpotentialofCLS.

Increasecooperativeinter-organisationalpreparednessefforts,establishstagingareasandpre-define potential coordination cells. International actors should increase engagement withnationalgovernmentsonpreparednessmeasures,inordertodevelopabetterunderstandingofwhateachpartycancontributetoemergencyresponse,andtoestablishmechanismstobequicklyactivatedinemergencies.WhiletheLogisticsCapacityAssessmentsareauseful,existingtool,thereisaneedtogobeyondassessmentoflogisticsinfrastructureandserviceproviders,andmovetowardmorejointplanningandtraining.

Where limited logistics assets are available there needs to be a strong confidence in themechanismsforprioritizing34themovementofreliefitems.Theexistingarrangement–wherepriorities are set by the Humanitarian Country Team and the Logistics Cluster – needsmaintenance and strengthening to ensure Common Services are are neutral, aiming only tomaximizetheimpactforaffectedpopulation.

Existing internationally established services – including UNHAS, UNHRD and other LogisticsCluster CLSs,whether offered byWFP (as cluster lead) or cluster partners – should exploresynergies and harmonise processes to improve “customer service” and lower barriers toaccessingtotheseservices.

Strengthening of Global Humanitarian Logistics Fora35 as important vehicles for strategicthinking and learning, promoting the sharing of pooled resources, as well as developingawareness, coordination and partnerships at the Global and field levels.While the LogisticsClusterhasasolid,establishednetworkofpartnerships,itsmandateisoperational,ratherthanstrategic,focus..

DevelopingtheconceptofCommonServicesasaone-stop-shop,especiallyinthecaseofcriticalgovernmentlegislatedareas–asisbeingexploredforCustomsforemergencypreparedness–offersenormousopportunityforimprovingresponsivenessinadisaster.

Toprepareandscalecommonservicesfortheupstreampipelinehasalwaysbeenchallengingandastrongfocusshouldbeplacedonpredictingdemandtobeabletoadequatelyrespond.

The potential benefits of joint contracting and procurement, where actors could utilizeframework agreement negotiated jointly with service providers – both internationally anddomestically – requires further investigation. For example, further coordination of jointprocurement, as a form of ‘Humanitarian Amazon’ for services and procurementmay offerscopetoreduceprocurementandcontractinginefficiencies.



AppendixC- SupplyChainCoordinationC.1 LogisticsactorsandcoordinationSothequestionthatemergesishowcanhumanitarianlogisticscoordinationbeimproved–and,indeed, expanded to incorporatenational and local engagement – given the realityoutlinedabove,andwhatmodelsexistthatmightbeclonedinordertodeliversuchimprovements?Inshort, given that logisticsasa corebusinessprocessandoperational requirement forNGOs,INGOs, IOs, Governmental organizations, UN, how can any organisation make good on thedeliveryofacommodityaspartoftheirprogrammeworkwithoutinvestinginlogistics?Andifaninvestmentshouldbemade,shouldwenot,ashumanitarianactors,worktominimizetheduplicationaroundcommodityprocurement,warehousing,anddelivery?

In responding to these questions, we look first at the coordination between humanitarianagenciesandactorsandtherequirementfortheintegrationofmulti-agencyefforts.Indoingso,itisimportanttorecognisethatthisisnotsolelytheprovinceofthehumanitarianlogisticianand so it is instructive to consider how the inter-agency coordination challenge has beenovercomeinothercontexts.

C.2 CoordinationwithmilitaryWherethereisamilitarypeace-keepingforcepresent,typicallyunderaUNmandaterequiringthemtosupporthumanitarianassistance,therearesomepotentialbenefitsinrequestingtheirparticipation in a post-disaster/emergency operation either to provide security or to lendresourcessuchastransportassets.Thatsaid,someagenciessuchastheRedCrossfamilyandseveralNGOswillnotacceptsuchengagementinconflictsettingsforanumberofreasons,mostnotablytheprincipleofneutrality. Indeed,theverypresenceofmilitarypersonnelatClustermeetingsmaybecontentiousforothermembers.TheuseofthemilitarybyUNagencies(andthustheCluster)isinanycasegovernedbytheIASC‘Oslo’guidelines,whichrestrictstheuseofmilitaryassetstobeinga“lastresort”.

Thatsaid,thereissomediscretionlefttotheagencyheadsin-countryandthereareanumberofexampleswheremilitaryassistancehasproved invaluable suchas in thecaseofTyphoonHaiyan where many nations provided military assets. However, even where it is deemedappropriate to request military assistance, military resources cannot be guaranteed to beavailableinatimelyway.Forexample,intherecentearthquakesinNepal,thedelaybetweentherequest for,andarrivalof,militaryaircraft fromarelatively fewWesternmemberstatesclearly increased the challenge of logistics operations in the immediate aftermath of thisdisaster. As humanitarian logisticians, we have learned the importance of considering non-traditionalmilitaryactors,especiallywhenthesearelocatedinrelativelycloseproximitytothedisaster.However,thisinturn,requirespreparednessandaccess,andthisimpliestheneedforgreatercoordinationandtrainingexercises–notleastwiththemilitarywherestaffturnoverissohigh.Inshort,wemustlearnhowtoworkbettertogether.

InOCHA,withintheConsultativeGrouponHumanitarianCivil-MilitaryCoordination,aLogisticsWorkingGroupwasformedin2011asaresponsetotheoverwhelmingmilitaryreliefprovidedintheaftermathoftheHaitiearthquake.Thisisaimingtoachieveabetterunderstandingofwhatmilitaryassetsarelikelytobeavailableunderthe‘lastresort’headingincertainscenarios,whetherornottheyareunique,andtheprobabilityoftheiruse.ThefindingsofthisgroupwerekeyinguidingtheCMCoordcommunitytowardsabetterplanningofthelikelyneeds,forming



thebasisofpolicydecisionsanddevelopingmilitarytrainingcourses.Theoverallobjectiveistoprovidelogisticiansinthefieldwithoperationalguidancetosupporttheworkingrelationshipbetweenthemilitaryandthehumanitarianlogisticians.Thiswouldhelptominimisedelaysbyretainingapracticalandcoordinatedapproachtoworkingalongsidethemilitary.Awiki-basedplatformthatcanbeusedasastep-by-stepmanualforrequestingandusingmilitaryassetsisonlyavailablecurrentlywithWFP,butthishasthepotentialtobedevelopedandusedmorebroadly.

Asidefromassetsharing,civil-militarycoordination(CMCoord)hasimportantimplicationsforcivilprotection.Whenadisasterstrikes,localandnationalauthoritiesarethefirstresponders.Local Emergency Management (LEMA) and National Emergency Management Authorities(NEMA)areresponsibleforlifesavingmeasures.

Whenacountryisoverwhelmedbyadisaster,authoritiesmightcallforinternationalassistance.In that case, rapid response mechanisms of the humanitarian and emergency responsecommunityareimmediatelyimplemented.Ahighnumberofreliefandhumanitarianworkersarecomingintothecountryandimplementtheiroperations–oftenwithoutproperlyliaisingwithDisasterManagementAuthorities,whicharestillinchargeoftheresponse.NationalCivilProtection(CP)isthekeyplayerinthedisasterresponsemechanism.

TheclassicalhumanitarianassistancedidnotworkwithCivilProtectionin-countryinthepastbutnow,unitsfromotherstates’CivilProtectionincreasinglyareinvolvedintheinternationaldisasterresponse.Thisengagementcouldeitherbebasedonabilateralorregionalagreement,orembeddedinatransnationalresponsemechanism.

Experiences derived from emergencies over the last years indicate that there is a gap andpotentialfrictionbetweentheinternationalhumanitariananddisasterresponsecommunityanddisastermanagement authorities of an affected country.Missing or poor coordinationwithnationalCPmighthamperrescueandreliefefforts.

#RoleofUNDAC(UN),UCPM(ECHO)&civilprotection

Atoolforthecoordinationandinteractionbetweentheinternationalhumanitariancommunityand international and national civil protection is actually in place: United Nations DisasterAssessmentandCoordination(UNDAC).UNDACispartoftheinternationalemergencyresponsesystemforsudden-onsetemergencies.UNDACwascreatedin1993.ItisdesignedtohelptheUnited Nations and governments of disaster-affected countries during the first phase of asudden-onset emergency. UNDAC also assists in the coordination of incoming internationalrelief at national level and/or at the site of the emergency. Assessment, coordination andinformation management are UNDAC's core mandates in an emergency response mission.Specifically in response to earthquakes, UNDAC teams set up and manage the On-SiteOperations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) to help coordinate internationalUrban Search andRescue (USAR) teams responding to thedisaster - essential ifUSARassistance is to functioneffectively.Also, theEuropeanUnionhasagoodexampleonhow itcouldwork:UCPM,TheUnionCivilProtectionMechanism,shallaimtostrengthenthecooperationbetweentheUnionandtheMemberStatesandtofacilitatecoordinationinthefieldofcivilprotectioninordertoimprovetheeffectivenessofsystemsforpreventing,preparingforandrespondingtonaturaland man-made disasters” and “promote solidarity between the Member Statesthrough practical cooperation and coordination, without prejudice to the Member States'primary responsibility to protect people, the environment, and property, including culturalheritage,ontheirterritoryagainstdisastersandtoprovidetheirdisaster-managementsystems



withsufficientcapabilitiestoenablethemtocopeadequatelyandinaconsistentmannerwithdisastersofanatureandmagnitudethatcanreasonablybeexpectedandpreparedfor."ThecoordinationroleoftheUCPMistoprovideconsistencytotheEUcivilprotectionresponsebutsuch response goes under the overall coordination of the country affected and UN OCHArespectingitsroleaslead.

#RoleofCP

CP is important for response as a) access to infrastructure and community b) use of assets,equipment and tools c) good network. International actors often ignore civil protection. Preparedness needed for training of national CP on international responsemechanisms andtrainingofinternationalhumanitariancommunityontheworkofcivilprotection.FurthermoresuchinteractionandcoordinationbodieslikeUNDACshouldbemorepromotedandreinforced.Alsothroughtrainingandawarenessraising.

Overall,theinternationalhumanitariancommunityneedstoreviseitsopiniononCivilProtectionwhichisoftennotconsideredasakeypartner–but,infact,isanextremelyessentialactor!



AppendixD- InstitutionalPreparednessAkeyareaofemphasisforthehumanitariansupplychainmustbetofocuson“thecriticalrolesoftheprivatesector,governmentand,aboveall,localactorsandcommunities[which]shouldbe viewed as integral to responding to humanitarian needs”36. As an example, the PARCELproject37isaimedatincreasingthecapacityandindependenceoflocalNGOpartnerstorespondtohumanitarianemergencies.

Asitisnotpossibleforthehumanitariancommunitytobeavailableeverywhere,allthetime,anessentialprerequisitetoinstitutionalpreparednessistoregularlyconductriskassessmentsto identify locationsthatmaypotentiallyrequireanemergencyresponseeffort.Thesectionsbelowarepredicatedonthisassumption.

D.1 Strengtheningthecapacityofnationalgovernment!!RAISEDIN14-OCTMEETING.INPUTREQUIREDFROMCONTRIBUTINGAUTHORS

Ensuring the response preparedness of national government is of paramount importance indevelopingasustainable,long-termcapacitytobothrespondtocrisesandtoreduce–orbetteryet,proactivelyprevent–theworstoftheimpact.Utilizingcountry-ledsystems,includingthecivil-protectionentities38,isessentialtothegovernmentmaintainingownershipoftheprocess,whichcanoftenbefurtheradvancedthroughsouth-southcooperation.

Duringadisasterresponse,theLogisticsClusterhastraditionallyfocusedoncoordinatingUNAgenciesandinternationalNGOs,leavingagapwhenitcomestogreatercoordinationbetweennation states and with civil society actors. This gap can be addressed through supportingincreased interaction between highly-placed supply chain mangers and select departmentswithintargetedgovernments–forexample,CivilAviationAuthorities,Customs(seeboxbelow),Border authorities – has the potential to greatly ease these functions in the event of anemergency.Operational planning – such as Logistics Capacity Assessments39, scenario-basedlogistics response plans and the establishment of Staging Areas40 – have been successfullyutilized–particularlyinAsia-tosupportNationalDisasterManagementOrganizations(NDMOs)fortheirnationalemergencyresponseplans.

Forexample,includingkeygovernmentofficialsfromrelevantdepartmentsinjointtrainingprogrammes(above)cangenerateanumberofbenefits:

• Development of professional networks: Should a disaster be declared, the governmentofficialsincludedinthetrainingarealreadyfamiliarwiththeircounterpartsinneighbouringcountries(assumingtheyhavealsoparticipated intraining),aswellaskeyhumanitariansupply-chainprofessionalsrespondingtotheemergency.

• Propagatinga standard, corebodyofknowledge:Havingdisaster-responsesupplychainpersonnelandgovernmentofficialsworkingfromthesamebodyofknowledgecansimplifyinteractionsandreducemisunderstandings

In addition to joint trainings, having supply chain professionals working with selectedgovernmentdepartmentspriortoanemergencybeingdeclared:

• Aswithtraining,thevalueofdevelopingprofessionalnetworkscannotbeunderstated

• Providesthehumanitariancommunitywithanunderstandingofthe(1)constraintsfacedbythedepartments,and(2)thebureaucraticprocesses



• IsanopportunitytosocialisehumanitariansupplychainSOPsandindustrybestpractice(intheeventthegovernmentofficialshavenotattendedtrainings).Atbest,theproceduresused by the government department and those recommended by the humanitariancommunity canbemore closely aligned.At the veryminimum, socialisinghumanitarianemergencyresponseSOPswithineachdepartmentpriortoadisasterbeingdeclared,canreassurethegovernmentofficialsthattheirroleisnotbeingusurped,shouldadisasterbedeclared.

Thefocusboxbelowshows,intheexampleoftheCustomsDepartment,someoftheconcretestrengtheningactivitiesthatcouldbeconsidered:

Figure2-AddressingCustomsBottlenecks

D.2 Utilizingexistingin-countryNGOpartnerships!!RAISEDIN14-OCTMEETING.INPUTREQUIREDFROMCONTRIBUTINGAUTHORS

Thehumanitarian landscape is changingandemergency response is increasingly tackledatanational rather than international level, with greater emphasis on supporting the disasterresilienceofvulnerablepeople.Thisprocesscanbefacilitated,andassisted,byINGOsbuildingstronglinkstoin-countryNGOs.ThatINGOideallywillbecomethefocalpointforinteractionsforotherinternationalorganisationsshouldanemergencybedeclared.EXAMPLENEEDED

A preparedness strategy ideally would be developed around these other internationalorganisationsworkingwith,andsupporting,thefocal-pointorganisation,tostrengthenitslocalpartners,ensuringtheyarereadytotakealeadingroleinemergencyresponseactivities.

Focus:Customs

Customs bottlenecks are frequently experienced in the humanitarian supply chain, with few governmentshaving adequate people or systems in place to facilitate and regulate the arrival of outside relief. This isexacerbated by the lack of procedures that have been simplified and appropriately adapted to facilitateincoming aid, as well as a lack of knowledge of, or preparation around, the procedures available fromhumanitarianoperators.QUESTION:Arethegovernmenteversuspiciousoftheproceduresbeingofferedbythehumanitarianoperators?

• Fromtheperspectiveofthecustomsdepartmentofficial,anumberofimportantrisksneedtobeaddressed:The sheer number – and variety – of international responders (each with their own documentation),inappropriateemergencygoods,poorqualitygoods,poordocumentationandabuseofrelaxedproceduresareallmajorissues.

An emphasis on building greater capacity within local government could significantly improve customsproceduresatthetimeofadisaster.Thesestepsinclude:

1. SignCustoms Agreements between theUnitedNations and the government concerningmeasures toexpeditetheimport,exportandtransitofreliefconsignmentsandpossessionsofreliefpersonnelintheeventofdisastersandemergencies.

2. Includerelief-aidspecificcustomsproceduresintonationallegislationandnationalemergencyresponseplans.

3. Developsystemsandprocedures,pre-disaster.Thisincludes:managementofunsolicitedin-kindreliefaidbyeasyidentification;prioritizationandprocessingofhumanitarianrelief;andexpeditingclearanceandreleaseofreliefconsignmentsatborders

4. IncludeCustomsofficialsindisastersimulationexercises&LRTtobetterunderstandingoftheroleofeachkeyplayerandoftestthecapacitytomanageemergencysituations.



D.3 Strengtheningin-countryprivatesectorpartnerships!!RAISEDIN14-OCTMEETING.INPUTREQUIREDFROMCONTRIBUTINGAUTHORS

Marketpreparednessisanotherbeneficialinvestmentthatcanenableall-modalityassistanceifdisasterstrikes(cashbasedintervention,in-kinddonations,etc).Focusingoncriticalmarketsthat need ‘bolstering’ before the next emergency would improve response for futureemergencies. A key element is the support, and development if necessary, of existingcommercialin-countrysupplychainproviders.Thebenefitsfromthisinclude:

• Buildingamoreresilientin-countrysupplychain,moreresistanttoshocks.Asaccesstodependablelogisticsnetworksplaysakeyroleineconomicdevelopment,fundsspenton developing the capacity of logistics suppliers not only aids preparedness, butcontributestotheoveralldevelopmentofthecountry

• Buildinganetworkofsuppliers,anddevelopingrelationshipswithkeyorganisations• Developingadeeperknowledgeofthelocalmarketcontext,providingabetterbasisfor

developingdisaster-responsestrategies.• Developingstrategiesfor‘sharing’thelimitedresources(transportation,storage,etc.)

oftheprivatepartnersintheeventofanemergency,bothto(1)reduceinter-agencycompetition for theresources;and (2) tobeawareofgaps in resources (lackofsea-goingvessels,say)

• Establishmentoffairpricingforservices,to(1)avoidthepotentialfor‘price-gouging’once an emergency strikes41; and (2) to allow contingency planners to build budgetestimatesintoplans.

Intheeventthatanemergencyisdeclared,theuseoflocalsuppliers,ifpreparednessstrategieshavebeenenacted,include:

• Accesstoan‘instant’networkofserviceproviders,fullycognizantof local languages,culturesandmarketconditions

• The‘multipliereffect’meansthateverydollarspentonsupply-chainlocalproviderswillbenefitthelocaleconomy–ratherthanjuststayingwithintheinternationalcommunity

Moreworkalsoneedstobedonearoundtherulesofengagementforhumanitarianlogisticswith the private sector. There has been limited progress in this area notwithstanding thewillingnessofcommerciallogisticscompaniestoengage.

Themain opportunities to date have been the partnerships of the LET (Logistics EmergencyTeams)withWFPaswellastheOCHA/UNDP/DPDHLagreement,butthelearningfromtheseventuresneedtobeextractedandpublicisedacrossthecommunityasawhole.Inshort,whilstsomemightsayhumanitarianactorsarelackingincoordinationamongstthemselves,thisisnolonger enough –wemust alsomakeourselves relevantwhen it comes to engaging andnotcompetingwiththeprivatesector.

D.4 RefiningAid-AgencyResponsethroughresearch!!NEW SECTION. CONFIRMATION & ADDITIONAL INPUT REQUIRED FROM CONTRIBUTINGAUTHORS

Inadditiontotrainingstaff(see“Error!Referencesourcenotfound.”,pError!Bookmarknotdefined.) the involvement of tertiary-education institutions opens the possibility for thedevelopmentofOperationsResearch(OR)facilities,withresearchaffectingeveryaspectofthesupplychains.Someexamplesinclude:



• Lessons learned from previous operations, as well as being fed back into trainingcurricula, can also become the basis for further research (‘lessons learned’ become‘lessonsimplemented’).Thisisespeciallyrelevantwiththegeopoliticalchangeslikelytobebroughtaboutbyclimatechange

• Studyandincorporatebestpracticesfromtheprivatesectorwhereorganisationsfacesimilarchallengeswhilebeinginamorefavourablepositiontoinvestandinnovateintheir supply chains - although the humanitarian sector clearly has its specifics, theprivatesectorisoftenfarmoreadvancedinmanagingandoptimisingitssupplychains..

• Activelystudycommercialandmilitarysupplychainoperations• Asthetechnologyadvancesandthehumanitariancontextevolves,supplychainswill

need to adapt. Cash, voucher and in-kind transfers to beneficiaries, and themanagementoftheresultanthybridsupplychains.

• Supply chain optimisation (see later chapter)will similarly evolve, and research intoadvancedanalytics,operationsresearch42andinnovationareneeded.

• Researchwaystobetter forecastbeneficiarynumbers,developingexistingtechniques(vulnerabilityassessmentandmapping,historicaldata)aswellasinvestigatingnewertechnologicaloptions(mobilephonemetadata,etc.).

•

INSEAD’s Humanitarian Research Group, Georgia Tech’s Health and Humanitarian LogisticsCentre, and Lugano’s Advanced Studies in Humanitarian Operations and Supply ChainManagementaredevelopingthescienceofhumanitarianlogistics.TheKuehneFoundationhasalsobeenattheforefrontofinitiativestoimprovehumanitarianlogisticseffectivenessthroughtheestablishmentoftheKuehnelogisticsuniversityinHamburgandviatheir‘H.E.L.P.’divisionthatsupportshumanitarianorganisationstobetterconfiguretheirsupplychains.

TheGlobalHealthClusterrecentlyemulatedthelongstandingmodeloftheInternationalSearchand Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) and published their “Classification and minimumstandards for Foreign Medical Teams in sudden onset disasters”43, developed with thecooperationofover30NGOswhoarepartnersoftheGlobalHealthCluster44.Theestablishmentof research facilities and dedicated training institutions can similarly help the humanitariansupplychaindevelopandpublishminimumoperatingstandardsasanimportantbuildingblockforprogress.



AppendixE- ProfessionalizationoftheSupplyChainE.1 HumanResourcePreparednessAsinanyindustry,thehumanitariansupplychaincanonlybeimprovedifpeopleattheheartoftheprocessarerecruitedandtrainedappropriately.Thespecificnatureofemergencyresponsework,whereexperienceandpre-existingnetworksofcontactscanmakeahugedifferenceinthe speed and efficacy of an intervention, the retention of these individuals is of criticalimportance,as istheirongoingprofessionaldevelopment– inconjunctionwithprofessionalsfrom other humanitarian organisations.Whereas previously a logisticianmight have been aformercommercialtruckdriver,todays/heisrequiredtoundertakemarketassessmentsandcash&voucherdistribution,aswellasthemoretypicalprocurement,transport,trackingandtracing,customsclearance,andwarehousemanagementfunctions.

Following the 2004 tsunami, commercial logistics has been used as the main reference forprofessionalization,withtheprivatesectorofferingvaluableexamplesofagile,leanandflexiblelogistics deployment networks. While a useful guide, many aspects of the emergencyhumanitarian supply chain are, however, distinct from their commercial cousin45, insteadbearingacloserrelationshiptomilitarylogistics,coveringadiverse–andchangeable–rangeoflogistical,geographic,climatic,politicalandculturalenvironments(indeed,manyhumanitarianlogisticians have a military background, their previous training and experience helping toeffectivelyimproviseinhighlycomplex,dynamicandconstraineddisastercontexts).Inyetotherkeyrespects,thehumanitarianemergency-responsesupply-chainisunique:disasterresponsesupply chains, for example, require professionals froma disparate rangeof organisations towork together in chaotic situations46.Alsounlike commercial andmilitary supply chains, theemergencysupplychain,must,whereverpossible,make itselfobsoletethroughempoweringlocalorganisationstoundertakethework.

Inshort,thereisaneedfortheincreasedprofessionalisationofthehumanitariansupplychainsector. Within the humanitarian logistics community, there is an increasing appetite forcertification, with the 2012 Fritz Institute-sponsored Humanitarian Logistics Conferencehighlighting“…thecalltoinstilsector-widecompetenciesandstandardlanguage,andproviderecognizedtraining”,andconcludingthat“AcertificationprocessforHumanitarianLogisticsisrequired”47.Notonlywouldthishelptoprovideamoreconcretecareerpathforsupplychainprofessionals,withbenefitsforrecruitmentandretention,itwouldalsohelpensurethattheyarebetterequipped–bothassupplychainprofessionals48andashumanitarianprofessionals49.–toplayamoreintegralroleinanalysisanddecision-making,andtherebyinformprogrammestrategy.

Thereareanumberofchallengesthatneedtobeaddressed:

1. The lackofacareerpathcanbeadisincentive forcommercial supply-chainmangerswishingto jointhehumanitariancommunity,andcanmakeretentionofexperiencedhumanitarian supply chain managers difficult. How can a formal career path bedeveloped, so that aid organisations can attract and retain skilled supply chainprofessionals?



2. How can the lessons learned and knowledge gained from previous operations beincorporated into a formal body of knowledge to improve the skills of existinghumanitariansupplychainprofessionalsandinformnewcomerstothefield?

3. Emergency response operations require supply-chain professionals from differentorganisationstoworktogethereffectivelyinchaoticcircumstances.Howcanthisinter-organisationalcooperationandinformation-sharingbemademoreeffective?

4. ToquotealogisticsdirectorfromalargeINGO,“Inemergency,IspendmostofmytimeexplainingwhatIamdoing,justifyingtheworkofmyteamsinsteadofthinkinghowtodo it well”. How can the role of the supply chain, the constraints it faces andopportunities it offers, be more widely understood within the humanitariancommunity?

E.2 IndustryAccreditationThe Humanitarian Logistics Association (HLA) serves as a catalyst to enhance theprofessionalizationofthehumanitariansupplychain,andtopromote itsstrategicrole intheeffective and efficient provision of emergency assistance. The association supports traininginitiatives,bestpracticeexchange,andrepresentationforagrowingworldwidecommunity50ofpractice.Concreteeffortsincludeworktodefineacareerpathwayforlogisticsandsupplychainspecialists to indicate how to move more easily between humanitarian organisations, andbetweentheprivate,militaryandhumanitariansectors.

Asan industrybody,withastrategic (ratherthanoperational) focus,andnotbeingaffiliatedwithanyparticularorganisations,theHLAalsoprovidesanidealhometosupportotherstrategicinitiativesoutlinedinthispaper:

• Developstandardisedcurriculaandtrainingprogrammes(inconjunctionwithsuitabletrainingorganisations).Standardisedtraining:

o aidsinbuildingacareerpathby(1)allowingemployerstoempiricallyassesstheskill-levelofpotentialrecruits;and(2)enablingindividualstoproactivelybuildtheirskill-set;

o provides a formal way of incorporating lessons from previous disasters andother organisations into coursework for later generations of supply-chainprofessionals - theexchangeof skillsand themeans to fosternew ideasandinnovationswillmakeadramaticdifferencetotheavailabilityoffuturecapacity;

o allowsgapsinknowledgetobesystematicallyaddressed

• Expanduponthecommerciallybackedinitiatives liketheLogisticsEmergenciesTeam(LET)51 programme that enables commercial52 logisticians to gain disaster-responseexperiencethroughcompany-backedsecondments.

• Pushforthedevelopmentofinformationanddata-exchangestandardsfortheindustry• Encourage the development of key-performance indicators that can be compared

acrossorganisations

Thisissueisrelatedpartlytochallengesregardingdatavisibilitybutalsotoout-datedbusinesspractices.Ifagenciesdonotadapttobettermetrics,dashboards,reportingandaccountability,thegapwillcontinuetowiden.Furthermore,logisticianswishingtotransitionfromtheaidtotheprivatesectormaynothavetherightskills.



To broaden global humanitarian response capability and capacity, and to allow for ‘cross-pollenation’ of ideas, it is important that supply-chain professionals be able tomove easilybetween the private and aid sectors. An essential prerequisite is the development of anaccreditationsystemforsupplychaincompetenciesandtraininghistory.TheHLAissupportingthe creation of such an accreditation system to recognise and certify skills, training andexperience. The HLA is also launching a career pathway project to help describe careertrajectoriesforhumanitariansupplychainprofessionals,andtoguidetrainingserviceproviders.

E.3 StandardisedTrainingInordertocopewiththegrowingcomplexityofhumanitariandeployments,trainingforsupplychainprofessionalsdoesexistbutisgenerallyeitherorganisationspecific53orsectorspecific.54The Fritz Institute / CILT(UK) humanitarian logistics certification programme offers a highlyregardedpackageofentry-levelqualifications55,andINSEAD’sHumanitarianResearchGroup,Georgia Tech’s Health and Humanitarian Logistics Centre, and Lugano’s Advanced Studiesin Humanitarian Operations and Supply Chain Management are developing the science ofhumanitarianlogistics.TheKuehneFoundationhasalsobeenattheforefrontofinitiativestoimprovehumanitarianlogisticseffectivenessthroughtheestablishmentoftheKuehnelogisticsuniversityinHamburgandviatheir‘H.E.L.P.’divisionthatsupportshumanitarianorganisationstobetterconfiguretheirsupplychains.

Standardised, formal training provides a way for the investigation – and incorporation – oflessonsidentifiedinpreviousoperationstobeassimilatedintothebodyofknowledge,creatingalearningcycle.Itisanessentialelementinsupportingmanyoftheinitiativesdiscussedinlaterchapters:

• Supplychainoptimisationrequiresstaffwithbothpracticalandtheoreticalbackgroundinawiderangeofdisciplines,includingtransportation,programme,procurement,riskanalysis,operationsresearchandmarketanalysistonameafew.

• Generalised, ‘softer’skillsets,nottraditionally intheportfolioofa logisticianarealsobecoming increasingly important, including those necessary to support NationalGovernmentstodevelopemergencyresponseprocedures,andadvisinglocalpartnersonoperationsmanagement.

Anobviousbenefitaccruingfromstandardizedtrainingisthecommonbodyofknowledge56thatprofessionalsfromacrossorganisational,culturalandlinguisticbackgroundscandrawupontowork together more efficiently. There is, however, another, less obvious benefit to cross-organizationaltraining,thatcanbevaluableduringanemergencyresponse:thedevelopmentofprofessionalnetworks– ifwecanimproveourunderstandingofhowtoworkbetterwitheachotherpre-crisis,wewillinevitablydoabetterjobduringthecrisis.

The Logistics Cluster’s bi-annual Logistics Response Training (LRT) courses offer practicaldisaster-response simulations, bringing together participants from a wide range oforganisations.Theprofessionalnetworksdevelopedbyparticipantshaveprovedinvaluableinlater emergency-response operations, with greater cohesion across organisations, andcompatibleSOPsandstandardizedframeworks.

Training and innovation centres fully dedicated to the humanitarian supply chain are stilldrasticallylacking.

Developingstandardisedtrainingcurriculaaroundsupplychainsinemergencyresponsethatarespecificallytailoredforgovernments,localhumanitarianorganizations,militariesandrelevant



external stakeholders is critical if the humanitarian community is to be able to respond toincreasing demand. In addition to both classroom lessons and hands-on training (located ingeographicallystrategiclocations57),Training-of-Trainers(ToT)programmeswillhelpensurethesustainabilityandfuturerelevanceofthetraining.



AppendixF- Agile,OptimisedSupply-chainsAsupplychainthatisbothoptimized(fine-tunedtoknownmarketconditions)andagile(respondsquicklytoshocks)isnecessarytorespondeffectivelyandappropriatelytoprogrammeneeds,andtomakemostefficientuseofscarceresources.Itrequiresadeepknowledgeofthelocalcontext,andconstantanalysis&monitoringofthemarketanditssupportingsupplychain.Thepreparednessactivitiesalreadydiscussed–stafftraining,governmentpartnerships,partnershipswithin-countryNGOsandpartnershipswithcommercialsupply-chainoperators–arecriticalcomponentsinachievingsupplychainagilityandoptimisation,asiscloserintegrationwithProgramme.

F.1 SupplyChainOptimizationAnoptimizedsupplychainusesforwardplanningandmarketknowledgetotakeadvantageofexternalfactorstoachieveefficienciesandcostsavings,includingseasonalavailabilityoffoodstuffs,seasonaltransportoptions(wet/dryperiods),anticipatedprice-fluctuationcycles,amongstothers.Althoughadisaster-responsesupplychainisinitiallyoptimisedasapreparednessactivity,theoptimizationprocessshouldcontinuethroughoutthelifeofthesupplychain

Giventhesudden,oftenunexpectednatureofdisaster-response,itisnosurprisethatsupplychainplanninghastraditionallybeenablindspot.However,movingfroma(stilllargely)reactivetoaproactiveplan-basedsupplychainmanagementofferssignificantopportunitiestoimprovethequalityandspeedofservicedelivery.Improvedcollectionandanalysisofmarketandsupplychainintelligence,forexample,aidsbettersourcingandlogisticsnetworkdesign.Otherfactorspreviouslycoveredinthispaper,butwhichhavespecialapplicationtosupplychainoptimizationare:

• IntegrationwithProgramme:InadditiontounderstandingProgrammeactivitiesunderwaypre-emergency,closerintegrationofprogrammeandsupplychainalsoallowsopportunitiesforadisaster-responsesupplychainto‘piggy-back’ontoexistingstructures,minimisingdisruption&duplicationwithregularprogrammeactivities

• Training:Theprovisionofstaffsuitabletrainedinaspectsrelatedtooptimisation,includingriskmanagementandmarketanalysis

• Partnershipswithnationalgovernments:Establishmentofprofessionalrelationships,understandingandalignmentofgovernmentSOPs,understandingoflegalconstraintstoaidprovisioninanemergency

• In-countryNGOpartnerships:Betterunderstandingofmarkets,culturalcontext,seasonalvariationsindemand,(potentially)affectedpopulations

• In-countrycommercialsupply-chainproviders:plantomakeuseofcommercialsupplierswhereverpossible,understandconstraints

Otherinitiativesthatcancontributetoawelloptimizeddisaster-responsesupplychaininclude:

• UseofCommonLogisticsService:AswiththeUNHRDnetwork,CLSareakeyelementinoptimisingtoday’sdisaster-responsesupplychain,centralisingtheprocurementand



storageof disaster-relied commodities.UNHRD localities allow forupstreamgrowth,and supply delivery by sea or air. In addition to providing a ‘one-stop-shop’ forprocurement, UNHRD partners also benefit from cargo-transportation optimisationthroughsharedservices58.

• TheuseofCLSisnotwithoutdisadvantages,however,withaconsiderablecostandtimeoverhead imposed for the convenience it affords. Sourcing relief items closer to apotentialeventoffersawaytoreducethecost,importrestrictionsandleadtime,whileencouragingresilienceinthelocaleconomy.59

• Prepositioning of appropriate relief commodities60 in, or near, the country beingtargeted

• Collaborativeplanningwithvendorscanfacilitatesupplyguaranteesandimprovelead-timesthroughframeworkagreementsandVendorManagedInventory.

Tobeeffective,supply-chainoptimisationinitiativesneedtobeholisticinnature,withafocuson strengthening communication across functional boundaries, such as demand forecasting,supply chain planning, and performance management. Supply chain optimisation requirescoordination (at minimum), collaboration (preferably) or integration (ideally) between anorganisation’s core andenabling functions61, between its headquarters and field levels, and,particularlyindisasterresponse,betweendifferentpartnersinthehumanitarianecosystem62.Largerorganisationswillalsoneedtobalancebetweenlocallymanagedoperationsandglobalstrategicsupplychaincoherence:decentralizationcanincreaseflexibility,whilecentralizationcanimprovecostefficiencies.

Demand forecasting, for example, is a critical step in an efficient supply chain is – and aparticularly difficult task in disaster-response planning63. Demand forecasting requires therelevant core functions (logistics, procurement and programme) to coordinate and reachagreementonademandplanthataccountsforfinancialandoperationalconstraints,andanyriskslikelytodisruptsourcing.

Anecessaryprerequisitetosupplychainoptimizationistoensureperformanceobjectivesareclearly defined, understood and most importantly, measurable64: it is only throughmeasurement and comparison that supply chain improvement can be claimed. Thedevelopmentofindustry-standardsupply-chainKPIsisnecessaryfororganisationsoperatinginsimilarenvironmentsaretocompareperformance,andthereforerelativeefficiency.

F.2 SupplyChainAgilityFollowing well established industry standards65, a high performing supply chain should beresponsive, reliable,costefficientand,perhapsmost importantly inhumanitarianresponses,agile.Aresponsivesupplychaindeliversquicklytonewneedsandplansaheadtominimiseleadtimes.Areliablesupplychainpredictablydeliversinaccordancewithtime,locationandqualityrequirements.Acostefficientsupplychainmaximisestheuseofavailableresourcesincludingassets.

Anagilesupplychain,throughthepre-emptivedevelopmentofcontingencyplans,isabletorespondquicklytounexpectedchangesinconditionsthatimpactthesourcingordeliveryofcommodities,includingswitchingsuppliers,changingtransportmodalities,andtheerection,closureorrelocationoftemporarystoragesites.Inthiscase,whilethecontingencyplanswillinitiallybedevelopedduringthepreparednessphase(andthencontinuallyrevisedthroughoutthelifeofthesupplychain),theywillonlybeenactedasneededduringtheresponse(and



recovery)phasesoftheoperation.Theneedtoswiftlymovebetweenin-kind,cashandvouchersmakesagilityanevermorecriticalattribute.



AppendixG- ProvisionofCashVsIn-KindAssistanceElectronic cash (e-cash) offers the humanitarian community a rare opportunity tosimultaneously reduce costs, increase coverage and empower beneficiaries. E-cash typicallycomesinthreeforms–thatofasmartvoucher(typeofdebitcard)thatistoppedupregularlyeitherwithpointsorcurrencyvalue,intheformofmobilecash(essentiallySMScredits)66orviaafinancialservicesprovider(bank,remittanceagentetc.).Cashinhandisalsoprovidedeitherunconditionallyorascash(payment)forwork.

Whilein-kindaidmeetstheprimaryaimofkeepingpeoplealive,itdoessowithconsiderablecosts:

• Ithaslonglead-times(procurement,transport,handlingandonlythendistribution)• itisexpensivetohandle(transportation,storage,loading&unloading,spoilage)• itremovesbeneficiarydignityandchoice(eg.forbasketcontents67,distributiontiming

orlocation,noalternativeifinappropriatefoodstuffsareprovided)• itcandisruptlocalmarkets• in the caseof commodities donatedby thirdparties (a frequentoccurrence in high-

profiledisasters),thereisariskofscarcesupplychainresourcesbeingusedtotransport,store,andoften,dispose68ofinappropriate,unwantedordangerousgoods.

Theabilitytocheaplyandeasilytransfercashtobeneficiaries–especiallyinadisasterresponse– offers considerable advantages to both the affected population and to the aid agenciessupporting them.Whencombinedwith theaddedbenefits thataccruedue to themultipliereffect69,andthedegreetowhichthiscanassisttherecoveryphase, it isnosurprisethatthetransfer of e-cash is enthusiastically promoted amongst the humanitarian and donorcommunities.

Inordertobeafeasibleoption,however,twoessentialcaveatsexist:

• First:theremustactuallybesomethingtobuy(thatisappropriatetobeneficiaryneeds,isavailablepredictably,insufficientquantityandatareasonableprice70);and

• Second:thevendorsmustaccepttherelevantformofe-cash.

The humanitarian supply chain plays a critical role in (1) analysing the localmarketplace todetermineifthetwocriteriacanbemet,assessingtheriskofshockstothemarketplace,anddeterminingwhetherthemarketplacecansupporttheadditionaldemand;and(4)supportingthemarketplaceanditssupplychain,toensureessentialitemsremainavailableduringandafterthedisasterresponseeffort.

G.1 AmixedapproachWhile “cash and associated transfer technologies provide a significant opportunity forinnovationand[to]facilitatenewanddiversepartnerships,includingwiththeprivatesector…[itshouldberecognised]thatcash-basedtransfersarenotapanaceaandthatcertaincontextsmayrequiretheprovisionofin-kindassistance.Itiscriticalforthechoiceoftransfermodalitytobedeterminedbycontextandnotsupply-driven”71

It is important toacknowledge the limitsof cashprogramming in circumstanceswhere localmarkets are unable to support demand. If there ismarket or supply chain fragility, amixedapproach(acombinationofcashandgoods)canhelptoimprovesupplychainefficiencythrough



reduced volumes and associated costs, while increasing programme flexibility. Graduallyincreasing the portion allocated as cash can assist market recovery, allowing it to supportadditionaldemand.Oncethemarketisabletofullysupportcashtransfers,in-kindassistanceshoulddiscontinue72.

Taking a market-appropriate approach to cash versus in-kind versus mixed assistance isimportant,asitaddressesimmediateneedaswellasopportunitiesforeconomicrecoveryandlivelihoodcreation:Humanitariancrisisresponseisfirstaboutmeetingthebasicneedsofthepopulationwhilelayingthefoundationswheneverpossibleforimprovedconditionscomparedtothesituationpriortothedisaster.

Itisimportanttonoteherethat,regardlesswhethercashorin-kindassistance,thebeneficiarycontinuestobearalltherisk:

• Inthecaseofin-kindaid,ifpurchaseorhandlingcostsincrease,beneficiarieswillreceivelessfoodasaidagenciesmeethighercostsagainstfixedbudgets.

• Inthecaseofcash,ifpricesinthelocalmarketspike,thesameamountofcashwillhavealowerpurchasingpower

Inmarketsthatcansupportbeneficiarydemandforessentialcommodities,theuseofamixofin-kind73andcashcanmitigatetherisktosomedegree,butrequiresconstantmonitoringandintervention.

G.2 RoleofthesupplychaininmarketanalysisTypically,supplychain(specifically,logistics)personnelhaveonlybeenresponsibleforensuringthedeliveryofcommoditiestocrisis-affectedpeople.Withtheadventofcashtransfers,supplychainhasmovedfromanexecutionroletoaplanningroleduringpreparedness,andholdsastrongmonitoringfocusduringemergencyresponse.Supplychainisresponsiblefor:

• Analysingthecapacityofthelocalmarkettosupportcash-basedinterventions• Analysingtheriskstothesupplychainthatsupportsthelocalmarket• Developing contingency plans and alternative supply chain options should the local

supplychainfail

Supporting this changed,andmore complex, role,dependsheavilyonotherareasdiscussedearlier:

• Greater integrationbetweenprogrammeand supply chain is critical for end-to-endmarketanalysisandthepreparationofcontingencyplans

• Researchintotheimpactofcashupondisaster-struckmarkets&theirsupplychainstodevelop more appropriate interventions: Tools for analysing markets in disaster-response contexts have only been developed relatively recently, and are often notsystematicallyusedattheneedsassessmentandmonitoringstagesofanintervention.Indecidinguponcash, in-kindormixedassistance,bettermechanismstounderstandthefunctioningoflocalmarketsbothbeforeandduringacrisisareneeded.Althoughguidanceisbeingdeveloped74forthehumanitariansupplychain,moreworkisneeded.

• Training of supply chain professionals to facilitate market-based programming andeconomicrecoveryactivities,aswellasassessingtheimpactofanemergencyonlocalmarketconditions,understandingtheconnectionsofa‘targetmarket’tonationalandinternationalsupplychains,andmonitoringcommodityvariationsandmarkettriggerstobepreparedforalargerangeofresponsescenarios.



G.3 RoleofthesupplychaininmarketsupportThelocalprocurementofserviceswillhelptostrengthenserviceprovisionwithinagivenmarketenvironmenttherebymaximizingthepositive impactofhumanitarianoperationstothe localeconomyinasmuchthatbyusing localsuppliers,thelocalstructuresendupbeingreinforcedandwillbebetterprepared to supply services to their community. In this case, logisticsandsupplychainexpertiseisneededtoassessandcontractwithvendorsandsuppliersofgoodsandservices.

G.4 MonitoringusageofcashtransfersThemovetocashtransfersdoesnotremovetheneedformonitoring.Achallenge ishowtomonitor theuseofunrestrictedcash transfers,ascash-based interventionsmove fromsmallscale,lowimpact,‘monitorable’leveltolargerscaleprojects.Itisimportanttoreassesswhatreally needs to be monitored, and at what level of detail. In particular, current modes ofmonitoring cannot measure the benefits to a community that come from the cash-basedmultipliereffect.

Onepotentialsolutionistomeasuretheimpactuponthelocalmarket(inadditiontoexistingstandard programmemeasures). This approach could assess, for example, whether there adifferentmixofcashandotherformsofassistancecouldcreatepositivesynergies,whatmixofcashandin-kindaidaremosteffective,andhowcanotherformsofassistancebecombinedwithcashmosteffectively.



Thecasestudybelow,althoughnotbasedoncash-transfers,providesanexampleofin-kindtocashmix,andillustrateshowmonitoringmarketimpact(inadditiontoindividualbenefit)leadstoamoresustainableintervention.

Figure3-ACFFilters

Theuseoftechnologyisimpactingthewayinwhichmonitoringcanbecarriedout.Thereareseveralinitiativesunderwaytodevelopinformationsystemplatformsfore-transferprograms.Forexample,theKitforAutonomousCashTransferinHumanitarianEmergencies(KACHE),isanACFprojectsupportedbytheWFPthatseekstoutiliseelectroniccashpaymentsinpreviouslyinaccessibleareas,whetherduetoisolation,insecurityorlimitedinfrastructure.Theproductisa self-contained kit that can be shipped to any locationwhere an emergency occurs.75 Thefeaturesofsuchproductsfocusnotonlyontracking,butalsoonprovidingstrong,rapidanalysiscapabilityforprogrammemanagers.Thereissignificantpotentialforacoordinatedapproachandthecreationofaplatformwhereagenciescouldshareandconsolidateprogrammedata.Therehasbeendiscussionaroundthefeasibilityforbeneficiariestoholdoneidentificationcardinsteadofonecardperorganization.Thisrequirementisbeingfurtherstrengthenedbytheneedforthecreationofacommonhumanitarianidentification(andotherfinancialdata)standard,without which it is impossible for millions of people in the developing world to becomefinancially included. Furthermore, it would give greater consideration to the dignity of

CaseStudy:ThecaseofwaterfiltersinColombia:ACF-SpainmarketsupportstrategyACF-Spain implementedan innovativemarket support project inColombiatoensuretheavailabilityofwaterfilters in poor rural communities with high incidences of diarrheal diseases, infant mortality and chronicmalnutrition.Initially,ACF-Spaindistributedfilterswithtwopreinstalledceramiccandlesandtwospares,guaranteeingsafedrinkingwater for 16-20months. After that period, however, the filters became unusablebecause no spareceramiccandleswereavailableinlocalmarkets.ThefiltersweremanufacturedinBrazilbutACF-SpainwasbuyingtheminsmallquantitiesinBogotaforshort-termprojectsinruralcommunities.ACF-Spaintookresponsibilityforthewholesupplychain fromthecapital, toregionalmunicipalityandupto thefinalpointofdistribution.ThecoststoACF-Spainwereveryhighcomparedtotherealcostofproduction:thefinalcostofonecandlewasUSD20-30,whereasthecosttotheBogota-baseddistributorwasaroundUSD2.Thelimited,expensivesupplyofsparesfromBogotahadamajoreffectonthesustainabilityandimpactoftheintervention.Toovercometheproblem,ACF-Spaindevelopedamarketbasedsupplychainmanagementstrategytogeneratea sustainable end-to-end commercial supply chain. First, they developed a partnership agreement with thenational importer of filter candles to expand distributions to regional suppliers with goodmarket coverage;second,theyidentifiedpotentialdistributorsinlocalareaswherepublichealthprojectshadbeenimplementedand finally, communicated to all commercial actors the purpose andbenefits of broadening the scaleof themarketsupportstrategy.Anend-to-endpricemodelwasformulated,identifyingreasonableprofitmarginswhilealsoensuringfinalcostwouldnotbeabarriertothepoorestandmostvulnerablecommunities.Acommunicationplanwasthendevelopedforthecommunities,featuringexistingbeneficiariestodemonstratetheavailabilityofspare filtercandles.ACF-Spaindonatedfilterunits to localsuppliers tobeexhibitedintheirshops and published posters and leaflets to identify points of sale. ACF-Spain visited the worst affectedcommunitiestospreadthemessage.Thenewsalsoreachedothercommunities,whereACF-Spaindidnothaveinterventions,andthesehavesinceshownincreasinginterestinsettinguppointsofsaleforfiltersintheirvillages.Bypromotingamarketshiftfromsmallsingleagents,thataddedhighcosttolimitedsaletransactions,tosuppliersinterestedinlargevolumesandstrategicpositioning,pricesatthepointofsalewentdownbyatleastfivefoldtoaroundUS$5. Therefore, throughexperienceof previousactivitiesandby linking supplychain innovationstoprogrammedesign,veryfewresourceswererequiredtodramaticallyincreasemarketcoveragetoaddresspublichealthneed.It should be noted that ACF-Spain did not commercialize any product; instead, by liaising with all marketstakeholdersandmonitoringpricingwithinthesupplychain,theyassuredbothavailabilityandaffordabilityoftheproduct therebybenefittingfrommarketefficiency.Asaresult,communitiesaffectedcouldfinallyfindanaffordablemeanstoaccesssafedrinkingwater.(CurrentlythisapproachhasbeensuccessfulinthedepartmentsofPutumayoandNariñoandACF-SpainislookingintoimplementingthesameprogrammeinCordoba).



beneficiaries and would prevent a duplication of work among agencies collecting data toassociate and generate ID cards and smart vouchers. However, there are numerous issuesrelatedtothisidea,nottheleastofwhichrelatedtodataprivacy,databasemanagementandsecurity.Tohelpaddresssuchissues,WorldVisionhasbeenworkingwiththeGovernorateofDuhokinNorthernIraqtoenablethemto‘own’andmanagedatacapturedviaLMMS(lastmilemobile solutions – awell regardedbeneficiary registration and item tracking tool)76. Severalagenciesarealsoworkingonmechanismstopermitmoreeffectivesysteminteroperabilityinordertomaintainbeneficiaryprotectionwhilemaximizingknowledgesharing.Harnessingthepotentialforeffective,secure,datamanagementwithinandamongaidorganisationsandtheirpartnersisnolongerachoice,butanobligation.

Figure4-E-cardsinLebanon

CaseStudy:WFPE-CardsinLebanonWFP has been delivering assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon using e-cards since October 2013. Theinnovativee-cardprogrammewaschosenovertraditionalformsoffoodassistancebecauseitallowsbeneficiariestochoosetheirownfoodinacountrywherestrongmarketsexist.Aspartof itsapproachtoresponsibleprogrammingWFPand itspartners— includingUNHCR—conductedathoroughe-cardvalidationexercise.Thee-cardholderswereinformedabouttheexerciseonemonthinadvancebySMS,throughpostersandbywordofmouthinWFP-contractedshopsandotherkeylocations.Some177,231households(857,495individuals)werepartofthevalidationexercise.E-cardsvalidatedduringthemid-Aprilexercisewillbeuploadedrapidly toallowhouseholdstobuytheirAprilcommodities.Source:ValidationReport,WFPLebanon,March2015



AppendixH- ImplementingIndustryStandardsH.1 PerformanceMeasurement(KPI)Standards!!MOREINFORMATIONREQUIRED

Currentlythemajorityofaidorganisationshavenokeyperformanceindicators(KPIs)inplace[tomeasuretheirsupply-chainoperations].Critically,manylargerorganisationsarehinderedbytheir inabilitytogaugetheirownperformanceagainstothers,whichtherefore impedestheircapacitytomeasureefficiency.(Mizushima2013).Toaddresstheissue,theFritzInstitutehasinitiatedaninteragencyproject77tocreateasetofstandardKPIs(duetoconcludebyend2015)thatwillhelptoestablishprofessionalbestpracticeandasupply-chainmodelrelatedspecificallytoeffectivedisaster-responseinterventions.

Having standard KPIs supports post-crises evaluations. A more systematic first responders’evaluationprocesswouldreflecttheactivitiesofINGOsduringemergencyresponses.TheFritzInstitutehassupportedorganisationssuchastheBritishRedCrossSociety,USAID/OFDA,theInternationalRescueCommitteeandUNHCRtoconductsupplychainassessments.Thesehavedemonstrated the importance of sector-wide humanitarian supply chain managementperformancemeasurestotheimprovedlong-termeffectivenessofhumanitarianaction.

UseofcommonKPIsallowsdonorstobetterunderstandthevalueofsupply-chainoperations,andallowsorganisationstotargetareastoimprovesupply-chainefficiency.

Sharingcommonpracticesbetweentheaidandprivatesectorswouldbringnumerousbenefitsto humanitarian planning and operations yet aid agencies tend to create unnecessaryadministrativeworkloads for themselveswhen theyuse theirownmetrics; reportingagainsttheseisnothelpfulforthewidercommunity.

Understanding the impact of any disaster response and the associated cost effectivenessremainsaclearmeasurementchallenge78,withapaucityofavailablestandards,benchmarksand indices, the absence of which makes both assessment and the ability to learn fromexperiencemoredifficult.Thislackofstandardsextendstotrainingwith,atpresent,noclearwaytoassesstheabilitiesandcompetenciesoftheorganisationsandpeoplewhovolunteertohelpanaffectedpopulation.Whilstmanyorganisationsareworkingtoovercomethischallenge,itwasnotedinthediscussionatthe2012HumanitarianLogisticsConference,furtherworkisneededtodevelopsimple,universal,KPIs15.

Standardising KPIs, in addition to benefiting to operations management, can also reducespending on tailored audits. As organisations move toward cash transfers, clear servicedefinitionsareneededsothatrequestscanbeproperlyunderstoodanddeliveryperformancemeasured.

H.2 Commondata-exchangeStandards!!MOREINFORMATIONREQUIRED



Clearcommunication,especiallyduringanemergencyresponseandwheremultipleorganisationsareinvolved,aboutthetypesandquantitiesofvolumesmovingthroughthesupplychain,continuestobeamajorproblem.Dataaboutthesecommodities,inaformthatcanbesharedinaconsistentmannerbetweenorganisations,willgoalongwaytoresolvingthis.Consistent,unambiguousinformationaboutcommoditiesmovingthroughthehumanitarianpipelineallowsforbetter,morecosteffectiveplanningforonwardtransport,handlingandstorage,allowingthecommoditiestoreachtheirdestinationfaster.NOTE:Useoftheresearchfacilities,alongwiththeISOtoworkonstandards?TheHLA/LCwillneedtofirstdeterminethoughWHICHofthemanycommunicationchannels/datastreamsitwishestostandardise.

Build a framework for greater interoperabilitywithout implying an absolute commonality ofprocesses–forexample,anumberofUNAgencies/NGOs(a‘coalitionofthewilling’)agreetocooperate on a voluntary basis to explore common training regimes, common capabilitystandards,commoncommoditycataloguesandcommonITsystems,andassociatedprocesses,and through thismechanism develop a roadmap to achieve a significantly greater level ofinteroperabilityhighlightingtheefficiencyandeffectivenessbenefitsthatwouldensue.



AppendixI- TechnologicalDevelopments####Recommendthatthischapterberemoved####

I.1 LogisticsInformationTechnologies####Extremelyambitious.TheRITAexperienceshouldbeareminderhowincrediblythiswillbetoachieve.

Mostofthetransactionsandhumanitarianlogisticsreportsarestillpaper-basedorhandledinspreadsheetsreducingtransparencyandreducingtheabilitytohaveareal-timeunderstandingof operations. the ability to see a real-timedashboard KPIs allowsdecisionmakers tomakebetterinformeddecisionsanddevelopevidencebasedstrategiesinsteadofrashreactions..

I.2 DeliverybyDrone####Aninternalproject?IstheWHSinterestedinthislevelofdetail?

Newairoperationstechnologiesarealsoemergingthatcanreducecosts.ForexampletheuseofUAVs(unmannedaerialvehicles,ordrones)ortheinnovativemeanstosafelyandaccuratelydrop emergency supplies from aircraft are being tested with the UN by ‘Skylife’ which hasdevelopedanaerialdeliverysystemthatcanbeused incomplexemergenciessuchasSouthSudan

I.3 EnterpriseResourcePlanningSystems#### Extremely ambitious. Would remove this and instead bulk up the data interchangesection.

Seamless synchronization throughout theend-to-enddisaster-response supply chainprocesscanonlyhappenwhenallstakeholdershavefullvisibilityatalltimes.AnERP79systemsallowcompanies to track and trace physical, financial and information flows, providing a singlerepository to record and consult data. While most humanitarian organizations haveimplementedsuchtools,criticallastmilesupplychainoperationsareoftenonlylooselycoveredandrequiremoreattentionas this is thepieceof thesupplychainwherethegoodsactuallyreachthoseinneedandalleviatehumansuffering.

Virtual supplychainmanagement for rapid responsemobilisationshouldbeour longer termvision.Forthattohappen,weneedextensivesupplychainvisibility,moreinformationsharing,andcollaborationamonghumanitarianactorsandsuppliers.Virtualsupplychainsenabledbyanonline platform80 for quickmobilization of relief goods and associated services by qualifiedsupplierswould likely lead tomore responsive and transparent humanitarian supply chains.Virtual supply chain capabilitieswould improve themanagementofupstreamsupply chains,whilefullcoordination,transparency,collaborationandassetsharingwouldberequiredforanoptimalmanagementofdownstreamsupplychains.

Therearealsoopportunitiesto integratemainpartnersontocompanies’systems inordertoguaranteesupplychainvisibilitywhereoperationsareoutsourced.

I.4 Traceabilitytechnology####Aninternalproject?IstheWHSinterestedinthislevelofdetail?



Traceability technologies common in the industry, such as barcoding and RFID81, should beadopted by humanitarian organizations while sector wide efforts are needed to furtherstandardizereliefitems.

I.5 Accesstocommercialdata####Extremelyambitious.Thismightseemmorerealisticifaconcretepathcouldbestated.

Preparednesseffortswillincreasinglyneedtounderstandmarketsbeforeacrisisandhowtheymightchangeifaffected.Thechallengewiththecurrentpreandpostcrisismarketassessmenttoolsisthattheyarelabourintensiveandthereforepotentiallyexpensivetoimplement.Global,regional,nationaland localmarket informationanddata is scatteredamongmanydisparatesources. For relief commodities and services, the ability tomonitor prices, trade flows andavailabilityissomethingthathumanitarianaidmanagersshouldanalyseonanon-goingbasis.

However,data likecommoditiesprice index,volumesofthesupplychain,fuelrates,averageenterprise size, existing infrastructures, and relationships between the different marketstakeholders is not readily accessible via auser-friendlyplatform. Information is limited andaccesstoreliableeconomicindicatorsthatwouldfacilitatetheunderstandingofmarketsystemsis difficult to obtain.Overall, humanitarian practitionersmust be better equipped to handlemarketvolatilityandworkingwithabroaderrangeofsupplierstomaximizepositiveimpacttovulnerablepeople.Havingtherightinformationcanbridgeknowledgegapstoempowerbetterinformed decisions aboutwhether or not, and how, to intervene to ensure that vulnerablepeople are assisted. Market features and beneficiary needs change over time, often quiterapidly. The speed of data collection and ability to generate real time context analysis willstrengthenagencies’capacitytoquicklyadapttheiractivities.

Humanitarianlogisticiansandprogrammeplannersshouldexploittheuntappedpotentialtouseglobal data sourcesofmarket information in a semior fully automatedmanner. Thiswouldsupport existing early warning and early action systems, pre-crises market assessment andanalysis, as well as market and programme monitoring and evaluation, and could help tocommunicate the macro-economic picture of disaster prone areas. By partnering with theprivatesector,asuitablemarketinformationplatformcouldbeformedforusebyhumanitarianagencies. To accomplish this, an analysis of what currently exists among a variety ofGovernment,commercialandopensourceplatformswouldbenecessary.There isanurgentneedtocreateaninterfacethatgathers,aggregatesandreportsonrealtimemarketinformationforfoodorotherimportantgoodsandservicesfrommicrotomacrolevels.Thisapproachshouldoffer better value for money at the assessment, delivery and monitoring stages of a crisisresponseoperationduetopotentialeconomiesofscaleandbetterinformationsharing.Whilethismayresultinimproveddecision-makingonthetypeofassistanceprovided,whetherdirectlytobeneficiariesortosupportlocalmarkets,itwillrequiregreatercollaboration.

I.6 RemoteOperations####WhatisitthatwewanttheWHStohelpuswithhere?

Increasingly,therearechangesinthecontextofemergencyoperationswithsignificantneedsemerging in urban and conflict environments. Due to insecurity, organisations must oftenmanagethemovementofgoods,cashorvouchersremotely.InsettingslikeSyria,IraqandtheCentralAfricanRepublic,deliveringanykindofassistance isparticularlychallenging. Inthesesettings,cashcanofferadvantagesyettherearesignificantconcernsregardingthepotentialfordiversion. Thereare increasingly innovativeways inwhich these concerns canbeovercome.



Biometricdatarecognitionanddataanalysiscanfacilitatethemanagementofremotelylocatedstaffandoperationsthroughcheck-ins,fingerprinting,andcardchipswithphotorecognition.Technology is now making this possible, although there is still considerable unexploitedpotential.TaketheworkofIRCin“deployingauniqueSMSvouchersysteminnon-governmentcontrolledareas(NGCA)ofEasternUkraine.Thesolution,calledTalonSMS,generatesuniqueconfirmation codes for vendors during each transaction, enrols and’ said Emergency ERDCoordinatorAlanGrundy,‘thisisanewandbetterwaytoimplementvoucherprograms.’"82



1 Some60%oftheincomeofaidagenciesandnon-governmentorganisations(NGOs)isspentonprocurement,transport,warehousingandlastmiledistributionactivities.Tatham,P.H.,andPettit,S.J.(2010),“Transforminghumanitarianlogistics:thejourneytosupplynetworkmanagement”,InternationalJournalofPhysicalDistributionandLogisticsManagement,Vol.40No.8/9,pp.609-622

2 “Tomanyhumanitarians,thedefinitionoflogisticsisopentolooseinterpretation…TheFritzInstitutedefinedlogisticsas‘theprocessofplanning,implementingandcontrollingtheefficient,cost-effectiveflowofandstorageofgoodsandmaterialsaswellasrelatedinformation,frompointoforigintopointofconsumptionforthepurposeofmeetingtheendbeneficiary’srequirements’(ThomasandMizushima,2005)”-VanWassenhove,L.N.(2006)."BlackettMemorialLecture-Humanitarianaidlogistics:supplychainmanagementinhighgear.",JournaloftheOperationalResearchSociety57(5)p475.

3 TheHLAwasregisteredin2009asaprofessionalassociationwithintheaidsector.Itaimstoenhancetheprofessionalismofhumanitarianlogistics,andtotakeastrategicviewofsupply-chain’sroleinthedeliveryofreliefassistance.

4 Völz,Carsten(2005)“HumanitarianCoordinationinIndonesia:AnNGOViewpoint”,ForcedMigrationReview,July,pp.26-27

5 HundredsofinternationalNGOs,thousandsofnationalNGOsandmanyinformalgroupsofwell-wisherswereregisteredinSriLankaalone,letaloneThailandandIndonesia.

6 Asof2015,thedifferentclustersare:CampCoordination&Management,EarlyRecovery,Education,EmergencyShelterandNFI,EmergencyTelecommunications,FoodSecurity,Health,Logistics,Nutrition,ProtectionandWaterSanitationHygiene(WASH)(Source:www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/clusters/global)

7 In2012,anevaluation,jointlycommissionedbyWFP,theNetherlandsMinistryofForeignAffairsandUNICEF,analysedtheGlobalLogisticsCluster’s(GLC’s)performanceandfoundthatpartnersweregenerallyverysatisfiedwithitsoperations.Source:reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp251521.pdf

8 SomeNGOsremainuncomfortablewithhavingtooclosearelationshipwiththeUN.Thischallengeshouldbeaddressedthroughimproveddialoguetoaddresstheseconcerns,andworktowardssensibleandpragmaticsolutions.

9WFPPositionPaperfortheWHS,August2015,p110 “Climatechangeaffectsthefrequency,intensity,spatialextent,durationandtimingofextremeweather…”

leadingto“increaseddisasterfrequencyandimpact,conflictandinternaldisplacement,compoundcrisesandchronicvulnerability”(OCHAPositionPaper,ClimateChange–version4,29April2014),www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/topics/environment/document/ocha-position-paper-climate-change

11 “…peopleaffected…hasalmostdoubledoverthepastdecadeandisexpectedtokeeprising.Inearly2014,internationalaidorganizationsaimedtoassist52millionpeopleincrisis,….[and]Thecostofinternationalhumanitarianaidhasmorethantrebledinthelast10years”(OCHA“SavingLivesTodayandTomorrow”,2014)docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHASLTTWebFinalSingle.PDF

12 In2014,arecordUS$24.5binhumanitarianfundingwasprovided,a19%increaseover2013,thepreviousrecordhigh.FundingtotheUN-coordinatedappealsalsoincreased,upby41%fromUS$12bfromUS$8.5bin2013.However,eventhis41%risefailedmeetincreasedrequirementsofUS$19.5b,duetothenumber,size,complexityanddurationofcrisesbeingattended.Source:“GlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport2015”,p19,www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/GHA-Report-2015_-Interactive_Online.pdf

13 TheGlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport2015putstotal2014UN-coordinatedrequirementsatUS$19.5bn,ofwhichUS$7.5bnisforsupplychainactivities(usingthe60%estimate).A1%savingequatestoUS$117m

14 Forexample,accountingforlogisticalcomponentssuchas:sourcinglead-time,transportconsiderations,storagerequirementsandconstraints,etc.).

15 Cabotetalin‘DaretoPrepare:TakingRiskSeriously.FinancingEmergencyPreparedness’.ODI.201416 10yearsonwhathavewelearntindisasterresponse?–DevelopmentProgresswebsite–Dec.201417 “Whereiseveryone?Respondingtoemergenciesinthemostdifficultplaces”,July2014,MédecinsSans



Frontières18 Theotherfactormentionedinthereportwassecurity19 FritzInstitute(2012),“HumanitarianLogisticsConference2012:TheChangingfaceoflogisticswithinthe

HumanitarianSector”,FritzInstitute,availableat:www.fritzinstitute.org/prgSC-HLC2012-proceedings.htm(accessed3Feb2015)

20 Kovács,G.,andTatham,P.H.(2010),‘WhatisSpecialAboutaHumanitarianLogistician?ASurveyofLogisticSkillsandPerformance’,SupplyChainForum:AnInternationalJournal,Vol.11No.2,pp.32-41.

21 Tocomplementthecorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)initiative‘MovingtheWorld’startedbyTNT,theWorldEconomicForumatDavosin2005supportedthecreationoftheLogisticsEmergencyTeams(logcluster.org/logistics-emergency-teams)asapartnershipbetweenleadinglogisticscompanies(Agility,UPS,Maersk)andtheLogisticsCluster,toprovidesurgecapacityduringinterventionsindisaster-strickenareas.Seeweforum.org/videos/logistics-emergency-teams

22 TheHLAiscurrentlyconsideringasimilarprogrammeformilitarylogisticians23 Animatedexamplesofthemultipliereffectcanbeseenatwww.logcluster.org/cashandmarkets24 Theremustbe(1)appropriategoodsavailableforpurchaseatapricethatremainsreasonable;and(2)an

abilityforvendorstoaccepttheformofcash(e.g.e-money)thatisbeingtransferredtotherecipients25 Forexampls:EmergencyResponseCoordinationCentre(ERCC)ofECHO;theASEANCoordinatingCentreFor

HumanitarianAssistance;andCentrodeCoordinaciónparalaPrevencióndelosDesastresNaturalesenAméricaCentral(CEPREDENAC)

26 forexample,largescalesuddenonsetdisastersorwidespreadpandemics.Contextswherethegovernmentisunwillingorunabletorespond(inconflictsituationswheregovernmentwillnotorcannotaccesspartofitsterritory)

27 BioPortwascreatedin1994byformerhumanitarianlogisticians.ItislocatednearLyoninternationalAirport,France.

28 Kittingistheprocessofassemblingofseparatecomponentsorpartsintoasinglepackage,foreasydeploymentinthefield.Healthkits,comprisingofhundredsofseparatemedicalitems,areacommonexample.

29 FirstdevelopedbyAtlasLogistiquewhichmergedin2006withHandicapInternational30 TheMechanismcurrentlyincludesall28EUMemberStates,withtheadditionofIceland,Montenegro,

Norway,Serbia,andtheformerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia.TurkeyhasrecentlysignedtheagreementstojointheMechanism.Seeec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en

31 Atthetimeofwriting,theLETconsistedofAgility,MaerskandUPS.32 Duringanaturaldisaster,wherethehumanitariancommunitydecidesitisappropriate,andaslastresortin

accordancewiththeOsloGuidelines.33 NDMOsandotheragencies34 Intheinstancethatthereare277requirementstomovecargoandonlyavailabilityfor75,thehumanitarian

communityneedstohavefaithinthemethodofprioritizationtoselectwhich75aremoved35 IncludingtheLogisticsCluster,HLAandFleetForum36 WFPPositionPaperfortheWHS,August2015,p3.37 PARCEL=PartnerCapacityEnhancementinLogistics;seeparcelproject.org38 Developingstrongerpartnershipsbetweenhumanitarianandcivilprotectioncapacitiesisessentialtothe

securityandprotectionofbothciviliansandhumanitarianworkers.Developingthisrelationshipisoutsidethescopeofthispaper,asitdoesnotinvolvethedisaster-responsesupply-chain.

39 LogisticsCapacityAssessments(LCAs)contain“…informationrelatedtothelogisticsinfrastructureandservicesinagivencountry[organised]…inastandardwayacrossmultiplecountries[shared]…bothwithinWFPandwiththehumanitariancommunityglobally”.Seedlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/LCA+HomepageSeedlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/LCA+Homepage



40 Asanexample,responsetothe2015Nepalearthquakewashugelyadvantagedbythepre-disaster

establishmentofaHumanitarianStagingAreanexttoKathmanduairport.41 The2015Vanuaturesponsewasanexampleofhowlocalsuppliersofsea-vesselswereabletotakeadvantage

oflimited(sea-worthy)capacityandinter-agencycompetitiontochargeexorbitantrates.42 Operationsresearchisadisciplinethatdealswiththeapplicationofadvancedanalyticalmethodstohelp

makebetterdecisions.InstituteforOperationsResearchandtheManagementSciences(INFORMS)43 Norton,I.,VonSchreeb,J.,Aitken,P.,Herard,P.,andLajolo,C.(2013),“Technicalcriteriaforclassificationand

minimumstandardsforforeignmedicalteams(FMTs)”,GlobalHealthCluster,availableat:www.who.int/hac/global_health_cluster/list_of_guidelines_for_emergency_response.pdf(accessed3Feb2015).

44 GHC[GlobalHealthCluster](2013),“GlobalHealthClusterPartners”,availableat:www.who.int/hac/global_health_cluster/about/partners/en/index.html(accessed3Feb2015).

45 Humanitarianareoftenin“…particularlyuniqueandhighlyvariableevents,ofteninresource-poorandlimitedinfrastructureenvironments,withmultipleorganizationstryingtoworktogetherinresponseactivitiessimultaneously…increase[ing]thecomplexityofrespondingtotheseevents.”–GeorgiaInstituteofTechnology(2009),“HumanitarianSupplyChainManagement–AnOverview”,at:drops.dagstuhl.de/volltexte/2009/2181/pdf/09261.ErgunOzlem.ExtAbstract.2181.pdf

46 Itis“lastmile”delivery(actuallydeliveringintothehandsofthoseinmostneed)thatcontinuestopresentabigchallenge,anddifferentiateshumanitarianlogisticsfromitscommercialandmilitarycounterparts.UrbancontextsandconflictsuchasintheMiddleEastareexamplesoflastmiledeliverywheresupplychainsneedtobemoreagile,moreflexibleandbetterabletorespondtofrequentbutsmallerdistributionneeds.TheSyriancrisishasdemonstratedthatamoredecentralisedmodelisneededwhereorganisationscannotoperateonthefrontlinesofresponseinhighlyinsecuresituations.

47 FritzInstitute(2012),“HumanitarianLogisticsConference2012:TheChangingfaceoflogisticswithintheHumanitarianSector”,FritzInstitute,availableat:www.fritzinstitute.org/prgSC-HLC2012-proceedings.htm(accessed3Feb2015)

48 Kovács,G.,andTatham,P.H.(2010),‘WhatisSpecialAboutaHumanitarianLogistician?ASurveyofLogisticSkillsandPerformance’,SupplyChainForum:AnInternationalJournal,Vol.11No.2,pp.32-41.

49 AccordingtotheConsortiumofBritishHumanitarianAgencies(nowtheSTARTNetwork)CoreHumanitarianCompetencyFramework,humanitarianworkersneedtodemonstratecompetenceinarangeofgenericnon-technicalskills

50 Asof2015,theHLAhasnearly3,000membersin106countries51 Tocomplementthecorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR)initiative‘MovingtheWorld’startedbyTNT,the

WorldEconomicForumatDavosin2005supportedthecreationoftheLogisticsEmergencyTeams(logcluster.org/logistics-emergency-teams)asapartnershipbetweenleadinglogisticscompanies(Agility,UPS,Maersk)andtheLogisticsCluster,toprovidesurgecapacityduringinterventionsindisaster-strickenareas.Seeweforum.org/videos/logistics-emergency-teams

52 TheHLAiscurrentlyconsideringasimilarprogrammeformilitarylogisticians53 ResponsiveaidagenciessuchasMSF,OxfamandSavetheChildrenInternationalareretainingprofessionals

responsibleforsupportingandtrainingfieldlogisticians54 TheBioforceInstitute(bioforce.asso.fr)aimsto“increasetheimpactandtherelevanceofemergencyaction

anddevelopmentprogrammesbytrainingandprovidingsupporttothoseinvolved”,butis,atpresent,focusedmainlyonthehealthsupplychain.

55 TheCertificateinHumanitarianLogisticscoursewaslaunchedinSeptember2006andteachesthebaseprinciplesoflogisticsandsupplychainoperationsinthehumanitariancontext.1,200studentshavesofarenrolled(fritzinstitute.org/prgsc-cert_main.htm)

56 Fromthebasic(commonindustryjargon,standardsofmeasure,constraintsofdifferenttransportmodes,etc)throughtodetailed(customsprocedures,commondata-exchangestandards).Fornewcomers,suchtrainingalsomeansbasicsofemergencyworkarecoveredpriorto‘beingthrownintothedeepend’:whilethereisnosubstitutefor‘learningonthejob’,comingintoanemergencysituationwithasolidfoundationofknowledgeenables(1)thenewsupplychainprofessionaltobecomeeffectivemorequickly,withlessmistakes;and(2)



meansthattheycanfocusontheuniqueaspectsoftheparticulardisasterresponse,ratherthan’thebasics’.57 BioforceInstitute,forexample,hasdeployedatrainingcentreinBurkinaFaso58 Forexample,inthe2013Philippinesresponse,eachUNHRD-originatingflightcarriedgoodsfrommultiple

organizations,ratherthanorganisationsarrangingseparateflights,andhavingmanyplanespartiallyempty.Inadditiontothecostoftransport,thisisalsoanimportantconsiderationinreducingairportcongestion.

59 Taylor2012.‘TheApplicationofValueChainAnalysisfortheEvaluationofAlternativeSupplyChainStrategies’60 Thepre-positioningprocesshashadbeneficialsideeffects,suchasthedetailedspecificationofreliefitems,

allowinglogisticianstochoosethemostappropriateproducts.Thereisadanger,however,thatasspecificationsbecomemorerigid,sourcingoptionswillbecomelessflexible,andfewervendorscancompetetoprovidesupplies.Theover-specificationofemergencyitemscanalsoresultinanimpositionof‘western’standardsratherthananacceptanceoflocallysourcedproducts

61 Corporatefunctionsincludebothcorefunctions(fundraising,programmedesign,procurement,logistics,andmoneymanagement)andenablingfunctions(humanresourcesandinformationtechnology)

62 ConsiderableprogresshasbeenmadebytheLogisticsClusterinensuringlogisticscoordinationamongkeyhumanitarianstakeholders.

63 Astechnologyimproves,mobilephonesurveysanddigitalbeneficiarycardsprovideexamplesofhowbeneficiariescanbedirectlyinvolvedinshapingdemandforecasts,withsomehumanitarianorganizationshavingalreadyimplementedinnovativesolutionstointegratebeneficiaryintelligenceintotheirdemandforecastsandsupplychaindesign.Seesection“Error!Referencesourcenotfound.-Error!Referencesourcenotfound.”,page38formoreinformation.

64 Operationsresearchistheuseofadvancedanalytics,basedonquantitativeinputs,tosupportdecisionmakingandcontinuousimprovement-52necessarytodemonstratetheefficiencyandeffectivenessofoperationsthroughevidence-baseddecisionsandrigorousperformancemanagement.

65 SCOR(SupplyChainOperationsReference)model:www.apics.org/sites/apics-supply-chain-council/frameworks/scor

66Mobilecoverageisrapidlyspreadinginmostdisaster-pronecountries,bothgeographically(theareasinwhichmobilephonescanbeused),aswellassocioeconomically(simplecheaphandsetsbecomingavailable,andessentialtotheverypoor).Mobilephonesallowuserstoconductmicro-transfers,withouttheneedforbankaccounts.Cheaphandsetsenablingpeopleto‘pluginto’afunds-transfernetworkwithalmostzerobarrierstoentry,offersenormouspotentialforempowerment.

67Itisimportanttonotethatin-kindreliefgoodsarenotrestrictedtofoodstuffs–theymayalsoincludenon-fooditemsforshelter,WASH,etc.

68The2015Vanuaturesponsesawmanymetrictonsofmold-infectedricebeingshippedintothecountry.Thenotinconsiderablecostsassociatedwithunloading,storing,transportinganddisposingoftheinediblericecouldhavebeenbetterspentonotherassistance.

69Agoodintroductiontocashandmarketsandthemultipliereffectcanbeseenatwww.logcluster.org/cashandmarkets

70 Assessingthepricepriortostartingthecashtransfersisoneaspect.Theotherisassessingtheimpactofthecashtransferuponprocess:itispossiblethatinterventionsmayquicklyexhaustsuppliesinlocalmarkets,andatthatpointvendorsmayincreasepricesassupplyincreasinglycannotmeetdemand.

71WFPPositionPaperfortheWHS,August2015,p3.72(1)Whenin-kindassistancecontinuesfortoolongandthereisnoclearexitstrategy,movingfromresponseto

recoverycanbeslowed;(2)Thecostsavingsinherentinmovingfromin-kindtocash,particularlywheregoodswouldbesourcedinternationally,canbeused,forexample,toincreaseeithertheamountpaidtoeachbeneficiary,orthenumberofbeneficiariesserved.

73Amajorconstraintistheleadtimesinvolvedinprocuring,transporting,importingandhandlingin-kindcommodities.Inanemergencyresponsethisprocesscanbeexpedited,butdoingsousuallyoccurscostpenaltiesinprocurement(e.g.lesscompetitivebids,prefercloservendorovercheaperbutmoredistantvendor,etc.)andtransport(airvssea)

74Thelogisticsclusterisworkingcloselywithrespondersonthis-seewww.logcluster.org/cashandmarkets.



75ElectronicCashTransferLearningActionNetworkNewsletter,MayUpdate2015.

76http://odihpn.org/magazine/lmms-going-the-extra-mile-in-duhok-kri/77 Seewww.fritzinstitute.org78 Tatham,P.H.andHughes,K.(2011),“Humanitarianlogisticsmetrics:whereweare,andhowwemight

improve”,Christopher,M.G.,andTatham,P.H.(eds),HumanitarianLogistics:MeetingtheChallengeofPreparingforandRespondingtoDisasters(Ed1),KoganPage,London

79 EnterpriseResourcesPlanning80 SimilartoplatformsusedbycompaniessuchasAmazon81 RadioFrequencyIdentification82 ElectronicCashTransferLearningActionNetworkNewsletter,AprilUpdate2015.