WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES?n-aerus.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/... · housing titling programmes; participatory budgeting and micro-lending. The paper discusses two such innovations:

XVI N-AERUS Conference

WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES?

Exploring and learning from transformations and actors in the cities of the South

Dortmund, 19-21 November 2015

Supported by

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XVI N-AERUS CONFERENCE:

WHO WINS AND WHO LOSES? Exploring and learning from transformations and actors in the cities of the South

19th-21st November 2015 in Dortmund Germany

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IMPRINT

Publisher:

N-AERUS coordinating committee: Cecilia Cabrera (UBA, Buenos Aires, Argentina) Alexandra Linden (GIZ GmbH, Cities Development Initiative for Asia /CDIA, Manila, Philippines) Enrico Michelutti, (University of Udine, Italy)

Layout: Kevin Schmidt, Katrin Gliemann

Conference Organizing Committee:

TU Dortmund University: Genet Alem, Eva Dick, Nina Ganser, Katrin Gliemann, Wolfgang Scholz

Habitat Unit, TU Berlin: Paola Alfaro d'Alençon

N-AERUS XVI Dortmund, 19th – 21st November 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Imprint ii Table of Contents iii Introduction (EN) 1 Introduction (FR) 5 Introducción (ES) 9 Conference Poster 13 Programme 14 Pictures 16 Roundtable 1 17 Keynote Speech: PROF. DR. LOCHNER MARAIS, UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE, 18 SOUTH AFRICA The Role of Secondary Cities in Managing Urbanization in South Africa Keynote Speech: PROF. DR. WILBARD J. KOMBE, ARDHI UNIVERSITY, TANZANIA 26 Rapid Urbanization under Poverty: Coping with new emerging Mosaics in African Cities Aditi Solanki, Sejal Patel 45 DIVERSITY IN URBANISM CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIUM SIZE TWIN TOWNS - A CASE OF SHEOGANJ AND SUMERPUR Ana Cláudia Duarte Cardoso, Ana Carolina Campos de Melo, Taynara do Vale Gomes 64 THE EXTENSIVE URBAN IN WESTERN AMAZON: PATTERNS OF SPATIAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN SIX CITIES OF PARÁ, BRAZIL Louise Barbalho Pontes, Ana Cláudia Duarte Cardoso, Luna Barros Bibas, Taynara do 76 Vale Gomes INTO THE EMERGENCE IN AMAZONIAN CITIES - MARABÁ: LOSSES OR POTENTIALS? Chloe Hill 92 SOCIAL RESILIENCE WITH RESPECT TO RAPID URBANISATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMPLOYMENT GROUPS WITHIN PERI- URBAN CHENNAI Charrlotte Adelina, Chloe Hill, Robert John, Tobias Kuttler, Sudhir Chella Rajan, 107 Avilash Roul, Christoph Woiwode PERI-URBAN DYNAMICS AND SUSTAINABILITY IN CHENNAI: THE CASE OF SRIPERUMBUDUR


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Chun Wang, Xiao Li 128 NEW SPACES OF URBANIZATION IN RURAL AREAS OF METROPOLIS TIANJIN (CHINA) CAUSES, PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES Martina Pacifici, Karin Regina de Casas Castro Marins 138

SCALE ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN LANDSCAPE HIERARCHY IN VULNERABLE SETTLEMENTS IN SÃO PAULO Belkacem Belkhemsa, Nadia Djelal 155

LA PRODUCTION D‟ESPACES PUBLICS FACE AUX NOUVEAUX DEFIS MONDIAUX. CAS DE LA VILLE DE TIZI-OUZOU Roundtable 2 168 Keynote Speech: PROF. DR. ALAN GILBERT, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, UK 169 Cross-National Policy Transfer in Regional and Urban Policy: Learning from the South Papers Astrid Ley, Josefine Fokdal , Peter Herrle 189

WHOSE BEST PRACTICE? LEARNING FROM TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS OF URBAN POOR Philipp Horn 198 INDIGENOUS „RIGHTS TO THE CITY‟ LESSONS FROM A COMPARISON OF TWO LATIN AMERICAN CITIES

Ahmed Osama Bakry 213 NUBIANS BETWEEN STATE APPROACH & SELF-ORGANIZED INITIATIONS - ONE WOMAN SHOW VILLAGE: THE CASE OF QUSTOL VILLAGE RETURN DREAM OR A MIRAGE: THE CASE OF WADI KARKAR PROJECT Petra Wiesbrock 230 ENCOUNTNERS WITH PARADOXES OF PLANNING IN NAI HIEN DONG Huang Huang, Millicent Awialie Akaateba 246

EXPLORATORY PRACTICES OF POST-RURAL URBANIZATION IN CHINA: PROCESSES, ACTORS AND PERFORMANCE Smruti Srinivas Jukur, Sejal Patel 261

GOVERNMENT OR MARKETS? AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RHETORIC AND ONGOING PRACTICES IN PRO-POOR HOUSING PROGRAMS IN INDIA Carolin Pätsch 285 FROM ADVICE TO BEST PRACTISES - RANGES OF POLICY TRANSFER AND THEIR TRANSFER OUTPUTS IN KIGALI, RWANDA Jaan-Henrik Kain, Belinda Nyakinda, Nicholas Odhiambo, Michael Oloko, Silas 300 Otieno, Patrik Zapata, María José Zapata Campos


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TRANSLATING CITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS: REFRAMING, ANCHORING AND MUDDLING THROUGH Hassan Elmouelhi, Mohammed Alfiky, Mahy Mourad, Amr Abdelaal, Lukas Born, 321 Philipp Misselwitz, Mohamed Salheen

DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES IN CAIRO INFORMAL AREAS - PLANNING, REALIZATION AND LOCAL PERCEPTIONS Roundtable 3 348 Keynote Speech: PROF. DR. MARGARITA GREENE, PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD 349 CATÓLICA DE CHILE, SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE, CHILE The Expanded Field in the Built Environment: Explorations and Future Scenarios for the Formation of the Future Professionals Keynote Speech: PROF. DR. HARRY SMITH, HERIOT WATT UNIVERSITY, GB; DR. 376 ENRICO MICHELUTTI, UNIVERSITÀ DI UDINE, ITALY Redefining the City of the South in the Context of the Crisis: The Experience of N-AERUS 2008-15 Eva Álvarez de Andrés, Patrik Zapata, María José Zapata Campos 385

“TAKING” INSTITUTIONS: FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TO NEW POLITICAL PARTIES IN SPAIN Marija Maruna, Ratka Čolić, Josefine Fokdal, Carsten Zehner, Danijela Milovanović 408 Rodić, Ksenija Lalović COLLABORATIVE AND PRACTICE ORIENTED LEARNING ON DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT IN POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION COUNTRIES Claudia, Rodríguez Seeger, Vanessa, Rugiero De Souza 422

RIESGOS SOCIO-NATURALES Y DÉFICITS FORMATIVOS, UNA COMBINACIÓN DESASTROSA EN SANTIAGO DE CHILE Lucia Ruiz Pozo 438 LOS ESPACIOS CIUDADANOS DE FORMULACIÓN DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS COMO ESPACIOS DE APRENDIZAJE, DE GESTIÓN DE CONOCIMIENTO Cecilia Cabrera, Mariano Scheinsohn 459

EL DESAFÍO DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN CRÍTICA - UNA REFLEXIÓN ENTORNO A LAS INSTITUCIONES, LAS PRÁCTICAS Y LAS POLÍTICAS Emilie Pinard 470

FROM EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE TO ALTERNATIVE BUILT ENVIRONMENT PRACTICES - A RESEARCH BY DESIGN PROCESS TO SUPPORT HOUSING PRODUCTION IN MAPUTO Anna Mazzolini 483

URBAN VULNERABILITY THRESHOLDS IN THE NEW SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN CITIES - THEORETICAL INSIGHTS FOR THE UPDATING OF THE URBAN RESEARCH AGENDA

Roundtable 2 Learning from diverse experiences beyond ‘Best Practices’


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ROUNDTABELE 2:

Learning from diverse experiences beyond ‘Best Practices’

Cross-National Policy Transfer in Regional and Urban Policy Prof. Dr. A. Gilbert


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KEYNOTE SPEECH: PROF. DR. ALAN GILBERT, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON, UK Cross-National Policy Transfer in Regional and Urban Policy: Learning from the South

CROSS-NATIONAL POLICY TRANSFER IN REGIONAL

AND URBAN POLICY:LEARNING FROM THE

SOUTH

Alan Gilbert



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ONE WAY TRANSFERFor centuries, most urban and transport planningpractices evolved in the North and were thenpassed on to the South.For many years this was a simple outcome ofcolonial rule; new policies were simply imposedon the subordinated nation.

ONE WAY TRANSFERWith independence governments gained moreautonomy over their policy choices but even whenpolicy adoption was voluntary, most innovationscame from the North.Very little in the way of new initiatives everemerged in the South and virtually nothing wasever transferred from there to the North. Equally,there was little transfer of urban knowledgebetween Africa, Asia and Latin America.



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TRANSFERS FROM NORTH TO SOUTHThe list of ‘urban’ transfers is long:Architectural tastes (for example, English style, thenCalifornian, more recently post-modern);Master plans designed by influential Europeanarchitect-planners like Karl Brunner, Le Corbusierand Otto Koenigsburger;New cities (Abuja, Brasilia, Ciudad Guayana,Dodoma and Islamabad); andShopping malls, fast food restaurants, gatedcommunities and CCTV cameras (virtuallyeverywhere).

CAUSES OF THE ONE WAY FLOW

‘Forced learning’ was still common, forexample, in the form of IMF ‘conditionality’and USAID contracts.But, in general, few transfers were forced ontothe recipients. Many were acceptable becausethere was apparently no alternative, aperception that was encouraged by theemergence of transnational ‘epistemiccommunities’.



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Northern techniques had more prestige thanlocal ways; they came from ‘higher status’countries.University education in the North was critical.For example, in the transfer of monetaristthinking to governments in the South.Similarly, the wonders of new towns, masterplans and GIS systems were diffused throughthe graduates of Northern planning schools.


Commercial interests e.g. metro systems.Consultants: local and international.Loans for projects. The multilateral development banks



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DANGEROUS INNOVATIONS?Many innovations from the North have clearly offered real improvements to countries in the South. But many have been dangerous. Many have been extremely expensive and have put pressure on the limited budgets of Third World governments e.g. Metro systems.Such forms of advanced technology have often fostered too strong a belief in progress and undermined trust in worthy indigenous technology e.g. cement for adobe or wood. The ‘backward’ bicycle in China.

DANGEROUS INNOVATIONS?Many planning methods imported or inherited from thenorth have also been harmful insofar as they have failedto take account of the needs of the poor e.g. Brasilia.The process of globalisation hastened the process oflesson learning from the North. Increasingly, every cityin the South felt the need to compete globally and, inorder to do so, to replicate the appearance of cities in thedeveloped world. Every city needed its skyscrapers,world trade centres, modern airports, hotel chains andcyber cafes. Transforming Southern cities into modernmetropoli was the counterpart of offering tax incentivesto foreign companies to invest.



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SIGNS OF OPPOSITION

Of course, there had long been opponents ofthis one-way transfer of knowledge andtechnology.Gandhi’s early advocacy of appropriatetechnology.Schumacher’s argument that ‘small isbeautiful’.Illich’s plea for tools of conviviality and theintermediate technology schoolChina: Walking on two legs.

INNOVATIONS FROM THE SOUTH

Transfers of knowledge from the South to the North are not entirely new: – the bungalow came from India; – new-fangled dances such as the cha-cha, rumba,

samba, salsa and the tango from Latin America; and

– the European taste for Asian cooking. But until say 1980 little in the way of urban innovation had emerged from the South.



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SIGNS OF CHANGE?Since 1980 or so various urban innovationshave emerged from the South: self-helphousing titling programmes; participatorybudgeting and micro-lending.The paper discusses two such innovations:Bus Rapid Transport systems (BRT) that weredeveloped in Curitiba and Bogotá; andCapital housing subsidy policy that wasdeveloped in Chile.

BRT SYSTEMSThe pioneer BRT system originated in Curitiba in 1963, although dedicated bus lanes were not operating until 1974.



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CURITIBA’S BUS SYSTEM

CURITIBA AS EXEMPLAR

Curitiba’s much praised system was copied, toone degree or another, in a number of LatinAmerican cities, including Quito, Porto Alegreand São Paulo, and was clearly the inspirationbehind the Transmilenio bus system in Bogotá.In 1996 the United Nations Conference onHuman Settlements (Habitat II) praisedCuritiba as “the most innovative city in theworld”.



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TRANSMILENIO: THE PEARL OF BOGOTÁ

CURRENT ROUTES



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TRANSMILENIOTransmilenio has received many accolades. AnItalian transport specialist declared it to be ‘theworld’s most important urban transportproject’ and it was awarded the StockholmPartnership Prize in 2002. During its first fiveyears of operation it was visited by thetransport authorities of 37 different countriesand members of the design team began totravel the world extolling its virtues.

TRANSMILENIO

The system has been so effective that it hasalso become one of the favourite transportprojects of the World Bank. Currently, BRTsystems have been initiated in 186 cities,mostly in Latin America but increasingly inChina and North America. This constitutes arapid rate of growth; worldwide there wereonly 19 systems in 1975 and the 27 in 1980.



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CAPITAL HOUSING SUBSIDIES

For years, housing policy in poor countriesfollowed practice developed in the North:public rental housing schemes; mortgagefinance; home ownership as panacea.Of course, faced by the much greater shelterproblems of poor countries, none of thesesolutions were likely to be wholly successful.Some indeed did little to help.



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THE CHILEAN HOUSING MODEL

Developed from 1974.Subsidies for the ‘deserving’ poor: savings andtargeting of Ficha-Cas.Transparent and honest allocation systembased on amount and period of saving.Subsidies for demand not supply.Cutting back on government intervention.

CHILE: SOCIAL HOUSING



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HOW REAL WAS CHILEAN AUTONOMY?

Chile decided its own future when Pinochettook power.But its decision makers were heavilyinfluenced by what was to become theeconomic orthodoxy of the 1980s.For a while, the ‘Chicago Boys’ were allpowerful.The housing model was a hybrid, a localinvention created within the rubric ofneoliberalism.

WHY DID THE CHILEAN SYSTEM SPEAD?

It seemed to work effectively in Chile. It had increasedhousing production considerably, provided decentaccommodation for many among the poor and hadactually begun to cut the Chilean housing deficit. Itsdesign also offered fiscal advantages; it allowedgovernments to distribute subsidies more widely at alimited and controllable cost.The model fitted the rules of neoliberal restructuring. By1995, up-front capital subsidies were de rigueur inWashington. The Chilean model was inserted into mostWorld Bank and IADB housing projects.



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WHY DID THE CHILEAN SYSTEM SPEAD?

The World Bank and Inter-American DevelopmentBank began to send Chilean housing officials to othercountries in Latin America so that they could explainthe success of the Chilean experience.Chile had gradually become a status nation, a countryworthy of learning from principally because of itseconomic ‘miracle’ and its transition to democracy.This was particularly the case in Spanish America,where Chile shared a common language and was‘psychologically proximate’ to its neighbours.

EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER

Eventually, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador,Panama adopted subsidy models stronglyinfluenced by Chilean practice andconsiderable interest had also been shown inGuatemala, Paraguay, Uruguay andVenezuela.By 1993, a Chilean-type model, or at leastelements of the Chilean model, had becomeacknowledged ‘best practice’.



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MORE EVIDENCE OF TRANSFER

Chile had also achieved some standing in theUS; USAID even financed the publication ofthe proceedings of a seminar held at theSequoia Institute entitled If Texas were Chile.

CONCLUSIONSInnovations from the South have rarely beenwholly original; most have owed someintellectual debt to thinking in the North. BRTafter all had its precedents in Runcorn andLiège and Chilean housing policies would nothave developed without the heavy influence ofChicago economics. Similarly, many of theSouthern innovators had Northern experience.



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WHY HAVE INNOVATIONS FROM THE SOUTH BEGUN TO APPEAR?

First, a great part of their appeal lay in their cost –both BRT and capital subsidies were cheaper thanthe alternatives. They represented value formoney compared with building metro systems orgiant public housing schemes.Second, neither innovation required much in theway of advanced technology.Third, although they were innovations of theSouth, their diffusion received considerable helpfrom the multilateral development banks.

WHY HAVE INNOVATIONS FROM THE SOUTH BEGUN TO APPEAR?

Fourth, transferring knowledge had becomeeasier than ever. The internet has been vitaland quicker flights have allowed politiciansand professionals to travel the world in searchof new solutions. They have also allowed theinnovators to sell their ideas more easily toother countries.



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HAVE THE SOUTHERN INNOVATIONS MADE A REAL DIFFERENCE?

Transferring Chilean experience to other parts of the world has also proved exasperating as Chilean experts sent to advise other governments soon found out.I also recall a discussion in USAID about how misguided one official felt that another department had been in providing so much financial support for Hernando de Soto, the Peruvian who became so influential in Washington during the Reagan administration and who has successfully peddled titling programmes across the world.

BRT IS LESS THAN PERFECT

Curitiba: Despite the success the system has beensubject to criticism. Overcrowding is common at peaktimes and none of the routes extend beyond themunicipal boundary of the city which forcespassengers in the generally poorer outlying suburbs tohave to change buses and pay two fares. The systemhas also faced declining patronage and lost 14 millionusers between 2008 and 2014 while other Braziliancities maintained or increased public transportusage.[Plans are underway to install an undergroundmetro on claims the BRT cannot provide sufficientcapacity.



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HAVE THE SOUTHERN INNOVATIONS MADE A REAL DIFFERENCE?

They have not always proved wholly successful. In Colombia,efforts to establish BRT systems in other cities have beenfraught with problems and Transmilenio is currently veryunpopular in Bogotá.

Satisfaction with Transmilenio

Year Per cent2008 492009 352010 302011 332012 282013 292014 15

PROBLEMATIC TRANSFER

Similarly, BRT’s transfer to Chile was highlyproblematic. Transantiago “… has been adismal failure, increasing further the times oftravel, nearly collapsing the subway, resultingin continuous social protests and challengingthe government” (Trumper and Tomic, 2009:170).



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IMPERFECTIONS IN CAPITAL HOUSING SUBSIDY PROGRAMMES

Creates ghettos of poor people – no one can move house.Creates isolated communities distant from employment e.g. South Africa.Deterioration of the housing stock.Cheating.

BUT INNOVATIONS FROM THE SOUTH MUST BE AN IMPROVEMENT

The spread of ideas from the South has to be a positive development if only because the experience of countries in the South is more likely to replicate similar conditions elsewhere. And, if the two innovations described in this paper have proved to be less than perfect, they have arguably been far more successful than earlier housing and transport policies.As such, their example is worthy of study and it is to be hoped that the South will develop more policies of its own.



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THANK YOU

Whose best practice? Learning from transnational networks of urban poor A. Ley, J. Fokdal, P. Herrle


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WHOSE BEST PRACTICE? LEARNING FROM TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS OF URBAN POOR

Astrid Ley1, Josefine Fokdal 2, Peter Herrle3

(1) International Urbanism, University of Stuttgart [email protected] (2) International Urbanism, University [email protected] (3)TU Berlin [email protected]

ABSTRACT Recognizing the urgent need to move beyond generalization and universal application of solutions to

urban development in the south, this paper suggests to change perspective from an agenda set by

international agencies and instead to learn from transnational networks of urban poor and their transfer

of knowledge crossing borders and jumping scales.

In spite of the magnitude of urban poverty and the spatial expressions thereof often faced with high

risks of evictions and lack of access to services, little focus has been given to transnational networks of

urban poor providing solutions at scales to improve living conditions for urban poor in Asia and

Africa. The objective of this paper is to point out and reflect on the gap between an international

development agenda and ‘best practices’ showcased by these networks. The networks investigated re-

scaled their transnational learning either in terms of regional or issue-based networks or networks

sharing similar socio-economic backgrounds. This re-scaling is meant to strategically strengthen

exchange of experience – not only in terms of ‘best practice’ but also in terms of ‘messy experiences’.

It raises the question of ‘whose best practice?’ and ‘how to learn from new forms of actors in urban

development?’

KEY WORDS Best-practice, knowledge transfer, transnational networks, urban poor

mailto:[email protected]




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AGENDA SETTING IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES1 As the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reach their due date in 2015, it is appropriate to

reflect on the achievements and the magnitude of their impact. Whereas eradicating poverty as one of

the main objectives has largely failed, it is crucial to reflect on the reasons behind before moving on to

new agenda setting through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The United Nations

Conference on Sustainable Development, RIO+20, underlined the importance of creating SDGs with a

common goal for everyone for ‘the future we want’. Coordinated by the Sustainable Development

Solutions Network (SDSN), civil society, academia and other institutions have been mobilized to

engage with the suggested SDGs and their indicators. Unique to these goals are, among others, that

they include a specific urban sustainable development goal with the objective of making ‘cities and

urban settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ (SDG no. 11). The urban goal includes the

following aspects: housing, transport, planning, heritage, vulnerability, environment, public space,

urban-rural, policies and capacity development. The SDGs were adopted in September 2015 at the

Sustainable Development Summit in New York. This is now followed by another important event,

Habitat III2, to take place in Quito in October 2016, were the New Urban Agenda will be discussed

and agreed upon.

Part of the global agenda-setting that has increasingly taken place since the 1990s are ambitions to

showcase positive, innovative examples on the ground that help to make policy models travel between

places. A driving force in this context was the first Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 with the

call to create Local Agenda 21 processes and providing numerous best-practice examples for a

transformation towards sustainability. Likewise in the 1990s the role of government, and local

government in particular, has changed against the light of neoliberal reforms that gave more weight to

private actors as well as citizens and civil society in the planning process under the framing of new

public management, enablement, partnerships, participation and governance. Best-practices therefore

not only reflected on what to do on the ground but also on the process of how to engage with actors

outside city-government. Gonzalez (2011) asserts that cities use best-practices to create positivist

perspectives on urban development. Mössner and Gomes-de-Matos (2015) caution that models are

produced by expert knowledge in order to use symbolic best-practice examples to make policies

travel.

This transnational urban policy transfer is not taking place outside the field of powerful interests: on

the contrary, there are powerful interests that make some policies to be transferred than others. Peek

and Theodore (2001) also speak of “fast policy transfer” and that quick-fixes are also promoted by

international organizations.

Agencies like UN-Habitat do not fall short of propagating policy mobility or “knowledge transfer”

through showcasing best-practices. However, decades of showcasing examples such as Curitiba

(sustainability), Porto Alegre (citizen budget) and Toronto (climate change mitigation) have not

produced a wide distribution but rather led to irritations both on the sending and the receiving side

stemming from a lack of adaptation to specific contexts and relating conditionalities. The results had

1 The paper is based on a DFG funded research on “Housing for the Urban Poor: From Local Action to Global

Networks” with field data from South Africa, Thailand and the Philippines. 2 Habitat III is the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development.



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negative impacts on the ground and led to a general questioning of the transferability of ‘successful’

solutions. Moreover, policy transfers are linked to capacities to make them work somewhere else.

McCann (2011) therefore highlights, that notwithstanding the efforts by international organizations,

poverty-stricken local governments would be rather excluded from the learning-process and from the

circuits of policy mobilities.

It can therefore be argued that urban development in an era of policy mobility and best-practices is far

from producing truly localized solutions. Despite serious efforts for decentralization and the

proclamation of increased participation in the field of housing and urban development, attempts to

create more inclusive cities, have largely failed to improve the situation for the urban poor in most

cities of the global South. On the one hand, it has been argued that local governments often lack

resources and capacities to actually translate these ‘paper tigers’ into action on the ground. On the

other hand, new patterns of knowledge transfer have emerged that are based on increasing civil society

engagement. They offer new means of interaction with the state at the local level, while at the same

time networking at the global level. The resulting practices are rooted locally and at the same time part

of transnational exchange processes. Beyond the importance of urban poor constantly creating,

negotiating and facilitating interactions between civil society and the state, little focus has been given

to transnational networks of urban poor providing solutions at scales to improve living conditions for

urban poor in Asia and Africa. The focus of this article is on transnational networks of urban poor in

the field of housing and urban development and their mechanisms of transfer of knowledge from one

country or continent to another.

‘LEARNING POLITICS’ AND THE TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS OF URBAN POOR According to McFarlane (2011: 65), there are two forms of ‘learning politics’. Firstly, groups define

the object of learning. This can be legal knowledge to enable resistance or politicizing technical

knowledge, e.g. access to services. Here the Right to the City movement is a case in point. The

concept of the Right to the City, as articulated by Henri Lefebvre (1968; 2007), calls for a radical

modification of power relations in the production of urban space, away from a dominance of capital,

the state (and the planner) and towards more civil society engagement through participation and

appropriation. The concept was strongly advocated by civil society groups in Latin America and

Europe during the 1990s and has since traveled to become a global call for recognition and protection

of human rights in urban settings (e.g. UN Habitat 2010; see Cirolia et al. 2015 for the Right to the

City concept in the South African context). However, Cirolia et al. 2015 highlight that transnational

concepts have the potential to mobilize around city-wide development concerns, but they also raise

concerns that transnational concepts such as Right to The City have had limited impact due to a

fragmented civil society and lack of institutionalization in local government taking South Africa as a

case in point. The second form of ‘learning politics’ is linked to what is conceived as valuable

knowledge around which social movements campaign. This latter approach towards ‘learning politics’

is rather a coalition or alliance across various groups with similar foci and understanding of forms of

learning than a confrontation based on claiming rights. Collective learning processes have helped

communities to recover from past experiences of eviction and marginalization and to move towards

creating a common voice in urban development (e.g. ACHR 2001; Mitlin 2015).



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TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS AND TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE ACROSS BORDERS – THEIR SOLUTIONS AT SCALE Transnational networks of urban poor investigated are the Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI)

and the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR)/Urban Poor Coalition Asian (UPCA)

constellation bound through the Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA) program. SDI is

active in more than 34 countries around the world and operates at the local level through federations

and supporting NGOs. At the global level, the Urban Poor Fund International (UPFI) is a revolving

fund financing projects at the local level and advocating and acquiring funding through donors at the

global level. The ‘sister’ model ACHR is a Thai based NGO network operating throughout Asia. In

2008 ACHR launched the ACCA Program with the aim of supporting communities throughout Asia

with small scale and medium scale funding of upgrading interventions or housing projects, by 2014

communities in 215 cities in 19 countries across Asia have received funding and implemented changes

(ACHR 2014). Out of the network of communities receiving ACCA funding, the UPCA platform was

established in 2012. Whereas the SDI ‘alliances’ include federations and NGOs based on savings in

each national context, the Asian counterpart has a regional scope of a NGO network (i.e. ACHR)

supporting a community-based network (i.e. UPCA). These networks practices the second form of

‘learning politics’ mentioned above, they share similar methods for mobilization, co-production and

dissemination of knowledge, and provide solutions at scale. Local communities and federations build

the foundation at the local level, supported by a local NGO, while global key players navigate and

advocate at the global level. Mobilization of communities or federations is mainly done through

savings and self-enumerations. Through savings, financial instruments are established that empower

the urban poor to make decisions based on their socio-economic status. Self-enumerations are a tool

for mapping communities that are often not captured by official data. The enumerations generate data,

build capacities and empower the urban poor to negotiate with local government in threat of eviction

or resettlement. An effective way of manifesting know-how and capacities and at the same time

exhibiting ‘best-practices’ is by setting precedence through projects. Housing exhibitions and toilet

exhibitions are ways of spreading ‘best-practices’ among network members and the same time

manifesting feasible solutions and capacities towards the local government (McFarlane 2011). In

addition to these methods, horizontal exchanges are one of the core mechanisms of learning, sharing

and disseminating knowledge within the networks. Peer-to-peer exchanges expose federation and

community members to similar problems in different locations and create a common understanding of

the complexity of the problems faced in the domestic context. Whereas these methods are mainly

meant for internal mobilization, capacity building and knowledge generation, they are increasingly

being applied towards external actors, beyond the community or federation members and are being re-

scaled (Ley et al. 2015).

RE-SCALING The transnational networks discussed here aim at scaling up their approach from federation, to

community-wide, as in the case of South Africa and from community to city-wide

(Boonyabancha/Kerr 2015). Moreover, they have rescaled and moved away from universalized

transnational learning to tailor-made learning hubs. In contrast to many multi- and bilateral agencies,

the transnational networks are constantly adapting and changing their approach. The ‘learning by

doing’ progress allow for high flexibility to navigate in contested environments (Boonyabancha/Mitlin

2012).



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COMMUNITY- AND CITY-WIDE NETWORKS Whereas in the Asian network of community organizations was from the beginning settlement-wide

and separated from local saving groups, in other contexts such as South Africa a shift from member

based to settlement-wide ways of organizing only emerged recently. The underlying reasons were to

show greater legitimacy for interacting with local government as well as to manage to move away

from a product orientation in housing to a broader upgrading approach.

Whereas collective learning processes have long been linked to small scale interventions, federations

and local communities, the recognition that chronic poverty, unequal access to infrastructure and

services can only be tackled at a city-wide scale has gained popularity among transnational networks

of urban poor. Similarly the transnational networks advocate increasingly for city-wide engagement

and networks to break out of the project isolation and narrow focus on local project issues. City-wide

organized funds with contribution from local government, international donors and local community

groups as well as data-collection on city-wide scale are initiatives in this regard and provide first

evidence for an engagement and learning process as citizens beyond the particular local groups.

REGIONAL LEARNING HUBS AND ISSUE BASED LEARNING EXCHANGE Recognizing the challenges of exchanging and learning across continents, cultures, socio-economic

backgrounds and political systems, the SDI network has increasingly built regional learning hubs.

Each of the hubs facilitates learning activities, monitoring and evaluations relevant for the

communities and federations in the region. South Africa, India and Thailand have for long been

learning hubs – best practices – within the networks, however, since the appointment of the Philippine

Alliance as the new Southeast Asian hub, many visitors from the region are focusing on the

Philippines. Also on the African continent several regional learning hubs have been established: One

example for a learning exchange across Africa is the 5-cities network that brings together local

federations and government representatives from South Africa, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Kenya

to share experiences around informal settlements and upgrading.

The polycentric network of learning hubs create more of an exchange on shared issues and common

learning experiences than a centralistic focus on best-practice. In addition, regional learning hubs

create a stronger cohesion among neighboring countries, especially when external actors, such as

politicians are invited to take part in a collective learning process. Expanding the shared learning and

knowledge production towards external actors involved with the issue at stake further pushes the

boundaries of what is perceived as valuable knowledge by local politicians, development agents and

experts (i.e. ‘learning politics’).

Another way of organizing the learning exchange is around similar issues. Thereby exchanges are

facilitated for federation groups around particular issues. For instance communities close to railroads

that are threatened by relocation. In the case of SDI such an exchange was organized between India,

Liberia and Kenya.

SIMILAR SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS The previous approach of central learning hubs led federations and communities to replicate strategies

not suitable for the local context. For instance federations in low-income countries tried to imitate

what they saw in subsidy environments in India or South Africa (Ley et al. 2015). In addition to the

rescaling from global to regional learning hubs, there is a tendency to facilitate cross-regional

exchanges according to socio-economic backgrounds. ‘You find that middle income countries have



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much more to share with one another than middle-income with low-income countries […]’, outlines

the coordinator of the SDI secretariat (Interview, 13 March 2012). This re-scaling is an attempt to

learn from past experiences of failing replication of solutions being transported from middle-income

countries to low-income countries (e.g. Thailand and the model of Community Organizations

Development Institute (CODI)). Further, there is an increasing tendency to facilitate shared learning

experiences among federations with similar ‘maturity’. Similar to the re-scaling along the lines of

shared socio-economic background, the level of ‘maturity’ of the federation also influences the

capabilities and thereby the possibilities of transferring ‘best-practice’ from one context to another.

Even if the above learning exchanges have been rescaled from a universalized global exchange to

regional, issue-based or socio-economic characteristics, it needs to be highlighted that the conditions

on the ground still vary significantly. Therefore for instance the ‘Urban Poor Coalition Asia’ (UPCA)

network recognizes the opportunities of cross-border exchange in regional proximity, but still

highlights the different maturities of local groups, the different political circumstances they are

embedded in and last but not least the lack of a shared language to communicate.

Re-scaling of strategies is meant to strategically strengthen exchange of experience – not only in terms

of ‘best practice’ but also in terms of ‘messy experiences’ raising the question of ‘whose best practice’

or ‘whose knowledge count?’ (e.g. Chamber 1997) and witness the adaptability and flexibility of the

transnational networks investigated.

WHOSE BEST PRACTICE? Where the application of ‘best-practices’ differs between multi- and bilateral agencies and the

transnational networks of urban poor discussed here are, first, that international agencies tends to only

focus on ‘best-practices’ and not on ‘bad’ or ‘messy’ experiences. The transnational networks

facilitate learning exchanges and shared experiences to exhibit ‘best practices’ as well as sharing

‘messy experiences’ as the SDI coordinator of the Philippine hub explains:

“We have a lot of experience also, that savings is lost. Savings was lost 15 years ago. It’s a minimal

issue now….So, we highlight the “goods” and the “bads” on what the experience of the Federation is.”

(Interview with Homeless Peoples’ Federation Philippines, Inc. Quezon city, 09.11.12).

Learning from bad experiences, the Philippine Alliance started to give communities 6 months to get

themselves organized and start savings, like a probation period, before communities can become

members of the network. If the communities fail, they can still be affiliated with the network.

Second, ‘best practices’ defined by international agencies often rely on expert knowledge where as the

‘best practices’ within the transnational networks rely on collective learning and knowledge. As the

transnational networks are increasingly up-scaling their approach to provide solutions at scale in the

field of housing, the need for expert knowledge increases. In the case of ACHR and UPCA, they have

a technical support network of architects, planners and engineers, the Community Architects’ Network

(CAN). In a similar manner, but on a national scale, the Philippine Alliance has recently created the

‘technical arm’ Technical Assistance Movement for People and Environment, Inc. (TAMPEI) of the

Alliance. This introduces ambivalence between expert knowledge and collective knowledge, with

danger of falling into the same trap as has for decades been manifested by international agencies.



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Nevertheless the roots of knowledge exchange in the networks described here lie with the direct

encounter of people and their backgrounds rather than the adoption of ready-made concepts that may

have proven successful elsewhere. As a matter of fact, in the early phase of the federation movement

in South Africa, SDI was facing the problems of acceptance when organizing communities followed

the same patterns as in India.

Third, international agencies tend to have a strong focus on traveling policies and exchange of

knowledge, rather than common learning and sharing experiences as practiced by the transnational

civil society networks. Policy transfer as promulgated by international agencies, tends to reinforce

power relations and interests at a local as well as at a global scale. This observation support the

argument of some observers, that development aid is a business sector, reinforcing the skewed power

relations, often anchored in the past (e.g. Teschner 2015). Peer-to-peer exchanges are extremely

effective in breaking down power relations and in facilitating learning processes. Being exposed to

‘best practices’ or sharing experiences on a certain issue allow for a critical reflection of the best way

to transfer the knowledge to other local contexts, rather than implementing a specific solution. The

basic formula is that such exposures build on the direct social interaction between those who are

concerned, i.e. slum dwellers, activists etc. This concept works because the transfer is not limited to

‘solutions’ but also implies an exchange of their cultural, political and social backgrounds, or in short:

their prerequisites and framework conditions. This ‘thick’ mode of communication seems to be more

effective and lead to more sustainable results compared to the institutional participation approach.

Fourth, in the light of neoliberal reform encouraging participation of civil society in planning

processes, ‘best-practices’ in the global agenda setting further include the mode of engagement

between various actors, with a preference for participatory planning in the field of urban development.

In references to Arnsteins ladder of participation, there are various ways of interpreting the

participatory mode of engagement between local government and civil society. Participatory planning

has been criticized for reinforcing power relation and for imposing global agenda on the local context

(e.g. Cooke/Kothari 2001). The transnational networks investigated here, tend to move beyond modes

of participation towards co-production and partnership with city governments (Mitlin 2008; Watson

2014) as a ‘best-practice’ for engagement with the state. A case in point are the increasing numbers of City Development Funds (CDF) that are being set up across Asia and in South Africa the Community

Upgrading Finance Facility (CUFF) is a similar attempt, though in its infancy. The CDFs allow for leverage of funding on a city-wide scale and open up for urban poor to be critical, capable voices in urban development and accountable partners for co-production (Ley et al. 2015). In spite of decentralization policies and increased participation adopted by international agencies in

the field of urban development, the global agenda, such as the MDGs, has largely failed to improve the

situation for the urban poor in the cities of the global South. In the mirror of eroding urban governance

and the persistence global power relations, the ‘best-practices’ showcased by transnational networks of

urban poor have demonstrated successes in terms of a more sustainable and inclusive urban

development.

CONCLUSIONS Transnational networks have developed models for a ‘flexible’ facilitation of inclusive learning

processes that deserve to be taken seriously. Not only are their practices capable for developing



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solutions at scale and improving living conditions for the urban poor in Asia and Africa, they also

point towards a re-adjustment of the relationship between governments and the civil society. This

paper argues that ‘best-practices’ showcased by the networks presented in this paper differ sharply

from the ‘best-practices’ operationalized by international agencies in ways of conceptualizing

knowledge and in questioning persisting power relations between involved actors at local as well as

the global scale.

Then how to actually learn from new forms of actors such as transnational networks in urban

development?’ A balance between needed expert knowledge and shared learning experiences through

direct encounter of people and ‘thick communication’ seem to be crucial. In addition, the strong focus

on learning versus knowledge, as propagated by international agencies, calls for recognition of

‘learning politics’ as a strategy reconfiguring what valuable knowledge is. Thereby the need to break

down power-relations in order to move beyond traditional means of best-practices and ‘business as

usual’ can be fertilized by learning form the transnational networks. Their recent rescaling initiatives

show ambitions to create effective learning environments. In contrast to other best-practice transfers

these networks seem to have learned from past difficulties of universalized transfer of approaches to

more fine-tuned and tailor-made knowledge sharing environments. Finally, the trend towards co-

production is reflecting a further step towards new interactions between state, international agencies

and civil society. Maybe the time has come when the way, how transnational networks are extending

knowledge and understanding their allies, has the potential to become a ‘best practice’ itself, albeit on

a different level and practiced by actors who carefully watch the line between the agencies of the

development business and their own clientele.

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Mobilizing the Right to the City in South Africa. In: Herrle, P., Ley, A. & Fokdal, J. (eds.) From

Local Action to Global Networks: Housing the Urban Poor. London: Ashgate, 159-174.

Cooke, B. & Kothari, U. (2001). The Case for Participation as Tyranny. In: Cooke, B. & Kothari, U.

(eds.) Participation. The New Tyranny? New York: Zed books.

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to Global Networks: Housing the Urban Poor. London: Ashgate.

Mössner, Samuel; Gomes de Matos, Catarina (2015): “The hidden planners? Academic knowledge

production and urban planning” Paper presented at the RC21 International Conference on “The Ideal

City: between myth and reality. Representations, policies, contradictions and challenges for

tomorrow's urban life” Urbino (Italy) 27-29 August 2015. Download: http://www.rc21.org/en/wp-

content/uploads/2014/12/C2-M%C3%B6ssner-Gomes-de-Matos.pdf

Peek and N. Theodore. (2001). Exporting workfare/Importing welfare-to-work: Exploring the politics

of Third Way policy transfer. Political Geography 20: 427-460.

Teschner, K. 2015. Urban Grassroots Movements and Agencies of Development Cooperation. In:

Herrle, P., Ley, A. & Fokdal, J. (eds.) From Local Action to Global Networks: Housing the Urban

Poor. London: Ashgate, 125-142.

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Indigenous ‘rights to the city’ P. Horn


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INDIGENOUS ‘RIGHTS TO THE CITY’

LESSONS FROM A COMPARISON OF TWO LATIN AMERICAN CITIES

Philipp Horn

University of Manchester [email protected]

ABSTRACT Research on planning for diverse and cosmopolitan cities often centres on case studies in the global

north and fails to take into the account the complex challenges faced by ethnically diverse and divided

cities in the global south. Interested in generating conceptual and practical ideas on ‘planning for

diversity’ in the latter context, this paper introduces findings from recently completed comparative

urban research in Bolivia and Ecuador – two countries which recognise indigenous ‘rights to the city’

in political constitutions. Relying on the method of a variation-finding comparison and drawing on

theories of social actors, urban governance and asset accumulation the paper critically examines the

implementation of indigenous ‘rights to the city’ in the capital cities La Paz and Quito. It is argued that

there exists an ongoing discrepancy between legal rhetoric on indigeneity and actual urban policy and

planning practices undertaken by officials in national and local governments who are often guided by

perceptions of the city as ‘white’ space in which indigenous rights are subordinated to individual

rights or to principles of market-driven urban development. The practices of governments are

contrasted to urban indigenous people's aspirations, asset demands and associated attempts to (re)gain

access to collective living, working and cultural spaces. Drawing on the findings from both cities, it is

argued that ‘planning for diversity’ in cities of the global south and elsewhere should be guided by

decolonial principles which are responsive to the context-specific aspirations and asset demands of

historically marginalised groups such as indigenous peoples.

KEY WORDS Indigeneity, right to the city, assets, comparative urbanism, Bolivia, Ecuador



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INTRODUCTION In the former colonies urban expansion and migration to the city challenged historically established

patterns of ethno-spatial segregation. Approximately fourty per cent of the world’s indigenous

population already live in cities (UN-Habitat 2010). Current research on urban indigeneity takes two

positions: Some studies emphasise that indigenous peoples’ could not improve their living conditions

by moving to cities. The evidence provided in this literature suggests that they remain

disproportionately poorer than other urban residents and continue being confronted by exclusion and

discrimination (del Popolo et al 2007; Hodgson 2011; Li 2000). In addition, urban indigenous peoples

are often reported as outlawed from specific indigenous rights-based agendas ratified by international

organisations and governments since the 1980s (Speiser 2004; UN-Habitat 2010).

Other scholars – mainly working on cities in the global north – have developed frameworks which

emphasise ‘what could be done’ to plan for more inclusive cities in which the interests and demands of

indigenous peoples are taken into account (Jojola 2008; Porter 2010; Sandercock 1998). This research

recognises that planning – guided by Western understandings of individual/ universal rights – often

contradicts indigenous collective/ communitarian worldviews. To depart from dominant planning

models and practices which oppress the indigenous ‘other’ these scholars – influenced by theories on

communicative action, multiculturalism, agonistic democracy or the ‘right to the city’, argue that

planning should emphasise difference instead of erasing it, adapt a decolonial approach, and focus on

building consensus between different groups. Such studies have been critiqued for their assumption

that culturally different groups – living in deeply divided societies – can find consensus (Watson 2003;

Yiftachel 2006). In addition, despite offering useful ideas on ‘what could be done’ to create more

inclusive cities, these studies do not offer examples on ‘what is actually done’ in policy and planning

practice in cities where governments – at least on paper – promote diversity and indigenous ‘rights to

the city’. This paper intends to address this knowledge gap by introducing findings from recently

completed comparative urban research in Bolivia and Ecuador – two countries which recognise

indigenous ‘rights to the city’ in political constitutions.

By way of contextual background the paper briefly describes how urban indigeneity has been

incorporated in Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s new constitutions. It then introduces a conceptual framework

that goes beyond recent frameworks on planning for ethno-racially diverse cities (Porter 2010;

Sandercock 1998), elaborating a practice-centric approach which focuses on a variety of social actors

involved in the translation of indigenous ‘rights to the city’. It emphasises the importance of an asset

accumulation framework for the study of ordinary indigenous peoples interests, demands and

associated practices to claim their constitutional ‘right to the city’. A brief description of the research

methodology – a qualitative, comparative case study approach – is followed by a presentation of

results from research conducted in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador which highlights a set of

conflicting realities in the way indigeneity is actually addressed in urban policy and planning practice.

CONTEXT – INDIGENOUS ‘RIGHTS TO THE CITY’ Bolivia and Ecuador are particularly interesting for a study on the role of indigeneity in urban policy

and planning. Both countries are home to a large urban indigenous population – more than one third of



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Bolivia’s 6.2 million and one quarter of Ecuador’s one million indigenous peoples live in cities (INE

2014; INEC 2014). Unlike countries elsewhere in the world, Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s governments

recognise urban indigeneity in rights-based agendas. This is visible in new constitutions – ratified in

2008 (Ecuador) and 2009 (Bolivia) – which incorporate the specific demands of urban indigenous

community-based organisations (CBOs) who mobilised for the recognition of their cultural and

political practices as well as for access to urban services such as water and electricity during large

scale insurgent uprisings in the early 2000s (Becker 2010; Lazar 2008).

The constitutions promote cities as decolonial spaces which follow the principle of Buen Vivir (the

good life). Buen Vivir originates in indigenous worldviews. It is distinct from western development

concepts that focus on individual wellbeing. Instead, Buen Vivir emphasises that development should

occur in community and with respect for diversity (Gudynas 2011). To ensure Buen Vivir in cities

Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s constitutions emphasise that policies in sectors as diverse as housing, spatial

planning, or healthcare should follow intercultural principles and address the interests and demands of

previously marginalised indigenous peoples (Nolte & Horn 2009). Ecuador’s constitution also

introduces the ‘right to the city’ according to which residents are “(…) entitled to the full enjoyment of

the city and its public spaces, under the principles of sustainability, social justice, respect for different

urban cultures and balance between urban and rural areas” (CPE Ecuador 2008, art. 31). Both

constitutions also recognise specific indigenous ‘rights to the city’ – including the right to prior

consultation about interventions taking place on their territories, the right to territorial autonomy and

indigenous justice (CPE Bolivia 2009, art. 30; CPE Ecuador 2008, art. 57).

CONCEPTS – SOCIAL ACTORS, URBAN GOVERNANCE, ASSETS Despite studies which critically examined how Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s new constitutions address

urban indigeneity (Goldstein 2013; Schavelzon 2015), little research has been conducted on the actual

translation of constitutional rights for indigenous peoples living in cities. This paper contributes to this

knowledge gap. It departs from previous research which – often focusing on cities in the global North

– offered ideal-type solutions on what could be done to address urban indigeneity (Porter 2010;

Sandercock 1998). Instead, it is guided by the practice turn in planning theory (Flyvbjerg 2009;

Watson 2003) and conceptualises the translation of constitutional content into urban policy and

planning as a process undertaken by a multiplicity of social actors who operate within a specific

structural environment and define their practices according to established norms and rules but also in

relation to themselves (Touraine 2000: 902).

Central to the urban policy and planning process are social actors involved in urban governance

(Pierre 1999). In Bolivia and Ecuador, where governments promote a ‘return of the state’ (Grugel &

Riggirozzie 2012), local and national government officials represent central actors involved in urban

governance (Crabtree & Chaplin 2013). As outlined in previous studies conducted in cities situated

elsewhere in the global south, such actors do not per se follow legislative guidelines when undertaking

policy and planning interventions. Yiftachel (2006), for example, demonstrated how government

authorities in Israel declared collective land-use patterns of Bedouin nomads – which are recognised

within international legislation for ethnic minorities – as illegal. He also showed how the government

used this planning strategy to displace Bedouins in order to provide Jewish settlers with the right to

dwell. Similarly, Roy’s (2009) research revealed how public authorities in Mumbai invented states of

exception to legalise land grabbing processes undertaken by wealthy elite groups while declaring land



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grabbing processes of the urban poor as illegal. In line with the above mentioned studies, this paper

recognises that policy makers and planners often work in conflicting political environments and – in

addition to the law – define their practices in such a way that they conform with personal interests or

with demands of actor-coalitions whom they represent.

In a context in which constitutional reforms do not automatically lead to practical changes, planning

research on cities of the global south increasingly shifted its focus to the practices of ordinary people

who operate outside official realms of urban governance (Holston 2008; Miraftab 2009; Moser 2009).

This literature is often influenced by Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the ‘right to the city’ – here defined as

an outcry to plan cities in accordance to the interests and demands of ordinary and marginalised urban

residents. This paper contributes to this literature by exploring how urban indigenous peoples, in

Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s current political context, actually manage to address their own interests and

demands, and claim their constitutional ‘rights to the city’. To achieve this, the paper relies on Moser’s

(2009) asset accumulation framework. Moser (2009: 18) defines assets as stock of physical (land,

housing etc), financial (savings, credit etc), human (labour, education, health etc), natural

(environmentally provided resources) or social (rules, norms, trust embedded in social relations)

resources that can be acquired, developed, improved and transformed across generations. She also

emphasises the importance of moving beyond well-stablished assets and to focus on intangible assets

such as political (contacts to actors in governance, knowledge of rules and rights), cultural (dress,

appearance, or specific habits and values which people identify as appropriate) or aspirational capital

(vision of the good life) which may further affect what people want in life.

An asset accumulation framework has been used as a diagnostic and analytical tool to identify the

interests and demands of the urban poor but also of transnational migrants (Appadurai 2004; Moser

2009; Moser & Horn 2013). These studies showed that people of different age, gender or identity

articulate different demands for assets which can change over time, generation and space. Demands

for one asset such as housing – generally portrayed as the most important asset (Moser 2009;

Satterthwaite 2008) – are often related to aspirations for other assets such as urban services or work.

An asset accumulation framework is not only useful for the identification of what urban indigenous

peoples want in life; it also helps in generating an understanding of how they get what they want and

claim their constitutional ‘right to the city’. A central assumption of asset accumulation frameworks is

that assets provide people with the capability to be and act (Bebbington 1999). In addition, Sen (1997)

emphasises that the acquisition of assets is associated with a person’s empowerment as it enables them

to confront and negotiate with authorities and to influence or change the political environment that

governs them. Opportunities to access and accumulate assets depend on personal and structural

factors. First, the more assets a person possesses the more likely the person is able to contest and

negotiate access to other assets (Moser 2009). Second, the capacity of a person or community to

access assets also depends on a variety of structural factors such as existing norms, rules or power

relations (ibid). Within a specific structural environment ordinary people generally make use of their

own negotiation and contestation tactics to address their interests and to influence urban policy and

planning processes from the bottom-up.

METHODOLOGY – DOING QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE URBAN RESEARCH The empirical findings presented in this paper derive from qualitative data collection (semi-structured



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interviews, participant observation, focus groups, document analysis) undertaken as part of a larger

PhD research project1 in 2012 and 2013 in La Paz, Bolivia and Quito, Ecuador. Due to La Paz’s and

Quito’s status as capital cities, it was relatively easy to approach different actors in urban governance

involved in the translation of constitutional contents. The cities were also home to a diverse

indigenous population. In La Paz it was decided to work in peripheral neighbourhoods which were

inhabited predominantly by indigenous migrants and by indigenous residents who had always lived in

this area but whose territories had been absorbed by urban expansion. In Quito, urban indigenous

peoples rarely lived in one neighbourhood but they often worked with other members of their

communities of origin in markets. It was decided to conduct research predominantly with one market

vendor association which represented indigenous migrants who worked on the central San Roque

market – Quito’s historical indigenous centre (Kingman 2012).

By focusing on two case-study cities, this paper showcases findings from actual comparative urban

research. Drawing on theories on comparative urbanism, it recognises the challenge of working across

a diversity of ‘ordinary’ cities which are characterised by their own context-specific cultural,

economic, political and social characteristics but are nevertheless interconnected (Robinson 2002). To

reflect on La Paz’s and Quito’s unique features as well as on their interrelations it was decided to

combine a set of comparative approaches (Tilly 1984): Following individualising comparisons, the

paper accepts that understandings of indigeneity differ among members of different indigenous

communities and government institutions in each city. Guided by a universalising and encompassing

approach, it also acknowledges that both Bolivia and Ecuador recognise international legislation on

indigenous rights but implement these rights differently. Overall, however, this paper mainly relies on

a variation-finding comparative approach. Variations in the findings between the cities are assessed in

relation to the unique processes and factors that shaped the translation of indigenous rights within each

city.

FINDINGS

GOVERNMENT PRACTICES

Unlike Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the ‘right to the city’ which emphasises the need to plan cities

according to residents’ interests and demands, in La Paz and Quito it was mainly government officials

– and not ordinary indigenous peoples – who defined what indigenous ‘rights to the city’ meant in

practice. Governments rarely translated new constitutional contents on urban indigeneity into actual

programmatic interventions. The reasons for this gap between legal rhetoric and practice, however,

differed between the cities. Historical continuities or what Bourdieu (1977: 54) calls habitus –

practices which are a product of history and operate “(...) in accordance with schemes generated by

history” – helped explain why urban indigeneity was hardly addressed in national legislation as well as

in urban policies in La Paz. Despite constitutional rights recognising urban indigeneity and a growing

number of indigenous peoples living in cities, government officials generally associated indigeneity

with criteria established by the colonisers such as rurality, tradition and backwardness. A senior

official in the ministry of autonomies explained this as follows:

In cities where modernity has been developed we respect private property and individual rights

1 For further details see Horn (2015).



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according to the liberal model. By contrast, in the rural areas and particularly in our indigenous

territories we subordinate individualism to collective indigenous rights.

Guided by such a colonial habitus, government authorities drafted new legislation which restrict the

application of specific indigenous rights (ie for autonomy, indigenous justice, or collective land

management) to rural areas in which so-called ‘indigenous original peasants’ lived. Meanwhile,

indigeneity was not recognised in new legislation on cities – places historically conceived as ‘white’,

western, and modern (Hardoy 1973). This was the case for the 2012 ‘Law to regulate property rights

over urban estates’ which – guided by western property models – recognises individual tenure rights

but not collective indigenous land rights.

Local governments also applied spatialised understandings of cities as non-indigenous places. The

municipal government of La Paz – predominantly responsible for the administration and planning of

Bolivia’s capital city – hardly recognised specific indigenous rights. Instead, it focused on providing

access to universal rights and services. In participatory processes it involved urban residents (vecinos)

organised in neighbourhood associations and did not invite indigenous CBOs such as indigenous

peasant unions. In policy sectors such as spatial planning and land management it followed the

LRPUEH which only recognised individual tenure rights.

Unlike in La Paz, in Quito gaps between legal discourse and implementation practice could not be

explained by historical factors but by the fact that specific indigenous rights conflicted with the

political agenda of government authorities who sought to increase state control in urban governance

and to disempower political opposition forces which included the country’s indigenous movement (see

also Becker 2011). Guided by such an agenda, the national government closed institutions – such as

the ‘national council for the development of indigenous nations and peoples (CODENPE)’ which was

predominantly composed of staff with indigenous movement affiliation. Distinct government priorities

could also be noted in the work of Quito’s municipal government. Here, specific indigenous rights –

ie for prior consultation – were ignored once they conflicted with the government’s economic

development agenda or with the ‘rights to the city’ of wealthier interest groups. The director of the

municipal commercial unit explained this as follows:

In the city there are a lot of tourists and San Roque has a lot of potential for tourism and for private

sector investment. The indigenous vendors in the area disturb this development. In this city no one

should disturb anyone else. My right to the city stops once I violate the rights to the city of others.

Indeed, during fieldwork in Quito’s predominantly indigenous San Roque area the municipality,

without consulting relevant indigenous organisations, was in the process of closing down collective

indigenous work, living and cultural spaces in order to regenerate the area and make it more attractive

for tourists and wealthier urban residents [fig. 1].



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[fig. 1] San Roque market in 2013 (photo by the author)/ Municipal vision of the San Roque area (image and right to publish received from municipal government of Quito)

While it was possible to denote discrepancies between constitutional rhetoric and practice, the findings

from La Paz and Quito do not confirm with studies conducted elsewhere in the global south which

suggested that the practices of actors and institutions involved in urban governance often represent the

cause for problems such as discrimination and exclusion from rights (Roy 2009; Yiftachel 2006).

Instead, the findings suggested that different institutions of urban governance in La Paz were

composed not of monolithic but heterogeneous social actors. In Quito, this tendency was evident in the

work of some zonal administrations which targeted indigenous interests and demands (ie hiring

Kichwa speaking staff or providing traditional medicinal treatment) in policy areas such as culture or

healthcare. In the selected case-study neighbourhoods situated in La Paz’s Ovejuyo district – areas

affected by municipal boundary conflicts between the urban municipality of La Paz and the rural

municipality of Palca [fig. 2, fig. 3] – different spatialized understandings of identity and rights

confronted each other. To increase its tax base and regain political control over urbanised territory,

Palca adapted an indigenous rights-based approach and granted local residents with the right to own

land collectively and in autonomy. In contrast, La Paz did not recognise indigenous rights but

provided indigenous residents with individual tenure rights and access to basic services such as water.

Whether such a universal/ individual or collective/ indigenous rights-based approach confirmed with

the interests and demands of indigenous residents is discussed below.



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[fig. 2] Background to the selected neighbourhoods in La Paz (map received from municipal government of La Paz and elaborated by the University of Manchester’s Cartographic Unit)

[fig. 3] Setting boundaries between La Paz and Palca (photo and right to publish received from a local resident)

URBAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S ASSET DEMANDS

Unlike previous studies which highlighted the importance of housing (Moser 2009; Satterthwaite

2008), the findings from this research suggest that land is the most crucial asset for urban indigenous

peoples. In each city indigenous peoples associated land with opportunities to preserve traditions and

The selected indigenous neighbourhoods were situated in the southern district of Ovejuyo (see map). Until the late 1980s this area was rural and inhabited by indigenous residents who – in the past – used to work on the local hacienda. Following land reforms in 1952, the hacienda system was abolished and residents were granted with individual and collective land titles by Palca. By the 1990s the area became affected by urban expansion. As a consequence of rapid urbanisation taking place outside its boundaries and interested in increasing its tax base, the municipality of La Paz redefined its boundaries in 1995 through the municipal law 1669 and incorporated this neighbourhood. La Paz’s legal claim was neither fully legal nor did it stay uncontested as Palca continues to claim administrative authority over the area.



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practices which the literature on indigeneity often considers stereotypical for a rural and authentic

indigenous lifestyle (Field 1994). Particularly elderly indigenous people in La Paz and Quito

associated land with the preservation of a peasant lifestyle and with opportunities to cultivate

agricultural goods (natural capital). In La Paz, indigenous residents sought to preserve collective

ownership rights over their lands. They also wanted to manage their territories in autonomy and

according to their own governance principles (political capital). The increased influence of the

municipal government of La Paz in the area was seen as threat to their autonomy. Associations of land

as a collective resource were also highlighted by indigenous migrants in Quito’s who – confronted by

the closure of their market spaces in San Roque – aspired to regain access to new collective living,

working and cultural spaces elsewhere in the city. Oscar, an indigenous migrant working in San

Roque, explained why collective spaces are so important:

Most of the people in the city want to have a house, a car, and some money to spend on their family.

We want this as well but we also want to build our community in the city. Living, working, learning,

celebrating, and experiencing life together in community is the most important aspect for us. It allows

us to keep our indigenous traditions alive.

Understandings of indigenous traditions did, however, differ amongst indigenous peoples. In La Paz

the association of land and urban space with ancestral rural traditions (cultural capital) was expressed

by elderly migrants and residents. During their annual festival - the Fiesta de la Virgen de Merced –

they intended to bring the countryside into public spaces of the city [fig. 4]. In contrast, younger

indigenous people from both cities fused their indigenous traditions with modern urban culture. For

example, in La Paz youngsters mixed Aymara with Spanish urban slang during HipHop shows on the

streets of their neighbourhoods [fig. 4].

[fig. 4] The ‘indigenous’ cultural occupation of public spaces: Ancestral dances vs. Aymara rap (photos by the author) Besides preserving their sense of community and revitalising traditions within a specific space in the

city, most indigenous peoples approached in both cities also associated land with the accumulation of

assets that rarely conformed to a static, essentialised, and traditionalist understanding of indigeneity. In

La Paz and Quito, indigenous peoples aspired to receive individual tenure rights from municipal

governments to access modern amenities such as water, electricity, and roads (physical capital). In

addition, urban indigenous demands for collective land should not automatically be conflated with

aspirations to preserve indigenous traditions. This was visible in La Paz where some indigenous

residents sought to regain access to collective land to later subdivide and sell it expensively on the

city’s land speculation market. In this context, land was associated with monetary profit (financial



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capital) and the destruction of ‘indigenous communities’.

Overall, in La Paz and Quito indigeneity was not a static but a dynamic social category which changed

in meaning over time and space and meant different things to different people – ie leaders, men,

women, youngsters, the elderly, migrants, etc. Land though was central for everyone – it was

associated with the preservation of indigenous traditions but also with opportunities to benefit from

modern amenities and economic opportunities available in cities.

ACCESSING ASSETS – NEGOTIATION TACTICS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

Urban indigenous communities in La Paz and Quito were not passive but composed by social actors

who wanted to fulfil their own interests and demands for assets as much as this was possible in the

political environment that governed them. Unlike in the 1990s where indigenous CBOs engaged in

insurgent urbanism (Becker 2010; Lazar 2008), in the current political context they mainly relied on

invited spaces; they approached government authorities for political negotiations or engaged in

participatory processes.

Community leaders played a central role in political negotiations as they obtained the relevant social

(connections to people in government) and political capital (knowledge of existing rules) required for

engaging with government authorities. Leaders also obtained another skill to succeed in negotiations –

in each city they performed different identities and relied on multiple political tactics. Unlike existing

work on ‘strategic essentialism’ (Hale 1997; Spivak 1996) which emphasised how indigenous peoples

mobilised on their indigenous identity to access rights, the findings from La Paz revealed that leaders

tactically moved between multiple officially-recognised identity categories to access assets. This was

explained by Luciano – an indigenous resident who, together with members of his peasant union,

negotiated with Palca to access collective land but simultaneously, as leader of a neighbourhood

association representing migrants, negotiated with La Paz to access urban services: “With Palca you

should be indigenous but you cannot wear a poncho when talking with the functionaries in La Paz. To

get the things we want from them we need to act and talk like them.” As suggested by this testimony,

when interacting with Palca leaders had to perform as authentic and traditional ‘indigenous original

peasant’ subjects while in negotiations with La Paz they became ‘white’ residents (vecinos) of the city

[see also fig. 5].



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[fig. 5] An indigenous leader voicing in interaction with authorities in Palca – left – and La Paz –right (photo by the author) In Quito, leaders maneuvred less between identity categories but more between political affiliations.

Juan Carlos, an indigenous leader from San Roque, explained this as follows:

Our governments change fast. You need to become flexible and never show whom you support. To get

things done you work with every government and support their agenda. Sometimes we need to be with

the indigenous movement and sometimes not. What matters is that you have good relations with all of

them.

Leaders such as Juan Carlos highlighted how in the 1990s and early 2000s they affiliated themselves

with the national indigenous movement in order to resolve problems such as the threat of eviction

from their work spaces. Such affiliations were no longer useful after President Rafael Correa’s

political party won a majority in Ecuador’s national and in Quito’s municipal government in the mid-

2000s. As outlined previously, officials in these governments viewed indigenous movements as part of

the political opposition and systematically disempowered them. Confronted by such political changes,

indigenous leaders altered their negotiation approach. They now hid their indigenous movement

affiliation and supported a political agenda – on city centre revitalisation and market relocation –

which they previously opposed. This allowed them to negotiate access to new living spaces for

members of their community in Quito’s southern periphery.

The work of indigenous leaders often benefited members of indigenous communities in La Paz and

Quito. During focus groups conducted in both cities research participants highlighted that without their

leaders they would have not received access to crucial assets. In La Paz leaders brought public

infrastructure and services such as water, electricity or roads to their neighbourhoods. In Quito leaders

provided their members with access to new vending and living spaces.

Relationships between leaders and community members were, however, not straightforward but

complex and characterised by conflicts of interest. The selected indigenous communities – like urban

communities elsewhere in the world (DeFillipis 2001; Moser 2009) – were divided places

characterised by their own internal hierarchies and unequal power relations. Three examples illustrate

these conflicting realities: First, leaders did not always distribute resources equally to all community



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members. This was visible in La Paz where leaders – predominantly elderly men – mainly ensured that

urban infrastructure and services reached their own homes and the homes of close male friends or

neighbours. Second, leaders sometimes (ab)used their position to personally enrich themselves. This

could be observed in Quito where leaders used their position as providers of housing outside the San

Roque area as an opportunity to generate monetary profits by selling plots of land to community

members but also to anyone else interested in buying it. Third, the activities of leaders and their CBOs

sometimes stood in direct opposition to the asset demands of other indigenous community members.

This was evident in the selected neighbourhoods in La Paz where some leaders wanted to receive

collective land ownership rights from Palca over areas which were already inhabited by indigenous

migrants who themselves held individual tenure rights from La Paz.

CONCLUSIONS Unlike previous studies which focused on the nexus between urban indigeneity and exclusion or

developed ideal-type solutions on ‘what could be done’ to plan for ethno-racially diverse cities, this

paper assessed ‘what is actually done’ in two Latin American cities – La Paz and Bolivia – where

governments included urban indigeneity in rights-based agendas. A first findings of this paper is that

specific indigenous rights and planning models which advocate the design of more inclusive,

intercultural and diverse cities – such as those established in Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s new

constitutions but also the one’s developed by planning scholars such as Sandercock (1998) – are

unlikely to materialise in practice in settings where public officials responsible for their

implementation hold a range of preconceived notions (ie of cities as non-indigenous spaces), follow

different political priorities (ie addressing the interests of the wealthy and not of indigenous peoples),

or operate in conflictive political environments (ie when operating in areas affected by municipal

boundary conflicts). Nevertheless, it was also shown that urban planning practice in La Paz and Quito

was not monolithic as some actors – ie those representing Quito’s zonal administration or the

municipal government of Palca – openly addressed urban indigeneity.

Second, the findings presented in this paper challenge generalisations made in previous studies which

– guided by static, essentialist, or romanticist understandings of indigeneity – portrayed urban

indigenous peoples as ‘others’ who express interests to preserve their traditions and exercise their

collective rights (Jojola 2008; Porter 2010). Instead, it was shown that urban indigenous peoples

articulated multiple and contradictory interests and demands. The use of an asset accumulation

framework was hereby particularly useful as it uncovered how demands for land – a particulalry

important asset – were often associated with the preservation of a communal and traditional lifestyle

but also with aspirations to lead a modern and capitalist life in the city. In terms of the latter aspect,

urban indigenous peoples were not that different from other city dwellers. The application of ‘western’

planning models which focus on the provision of individual/ universal rights and services should

therefore not automatically be interpreted as anti-indigenous. Instead, such an approach may in fact be

responsive to the interests of most urban indigenous peoples.

Third, the findings challenge understandings of ‘harmonious’ indigenous communities and, instead,

eveal that leaders – who played a key role in negotiating access to assets such as land with government

authorities – not always had the collective interests of their community in mind but often (ab)used

their position to enrich themselves personally and to preserve their powerful position. Hence,

governments should pay more attention to power relations and internal conflicts occuring within the



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heterogenous indigenous communities with whom they work. They should create invited spaces which

are open not only to leaders but also to ordinary indigenous residents including women and

adolescents.

While mainly referring to La Paz and Quito, the findings presented in this paper are also relevant to

other cities which are composed by large indigenous population groups who claim their rights for

recognition and inclusion. The outcomes emphasise that, instead of following a set of a priori

assumptions of what constitutes a decolonial and more inclusive urban policy and planning approach,

it is important to identify what indigeneity and indigenous ‘rights to the city’ actually means for

different social actors involved in urban governance but also to indigenous target groups themselves.

In order to achieve this, future research could apply the conceptual and methodological approach used

in this paper to other ‘ordinary’ cities and produce theoretically-informed, empirically-grounded and

policy-relevant findings on the different, potentially contradictory, and constantly changing meanings

of indigeneity as legal, lived, and planning category in diverse global urban contexts.

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Nubians between State Approach & Self-Organized Initiations A. O. Bakry


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NUBIANS BETWEEN STATE APPROACH & SELF-ORGANIZED INITIATIONS ONE WOMAN SHOW VILLAGE: THE CASE OF QUSTOL VILLAGE RETURN DREAM OR A MIRAGE: THE CASE OF WADI KARKAR PROJECT

Ahmed Osama Bakry Affiliation1: Masters student at IUSD1 Egypt (integrated urbanism & sustainable design) program [email protected]

ABSTRACT Dealing with Nubia region, a set of complex issues are intermingled and correlated. The Nubia region at Upper Egypt and north Sudan as one big community and a set of ethnic groups, were living among the Nile having a relations and trades, developed areas and one culture and identity among the history. A set of migrations and forced displacements took place to that community at several times 1902, 1912, 1933, and 1964 for different reasons, yet mainly for controlling the water of the Nile, building dams and reservoirs (Merdan, A. 1999). In the last decades, and for more than 60 years Nubians were raising the issue of return. Among these migrations which took place either at the same settlements place or far distant to be a total forced displacement, the Egyptian Nubian desire was obvious to return back to their original places. As a consequent of the Egyptian Nubians desire and lobby, two return approaches were offered, from the state and the Nubians. One approach as a self-initiation taken by the Nubians and it has indicators of success (case of Qustol village return) in 1978, the other return led by the government in 2009 and it seems to fail (Wadi Karkar project). Recently, the Egyptian constitution 2014 stated clearly in article no. 236 chapter 6 that the Nubians have the right to return in the next 10 years and the government has to support that. Hence it opens the track for researcher to work on the Nubians case and the process of return by the lake to their original places. This paper aims to discuss the two cases in a comparative way, in order to learn from the success and failures, for better return process in the future. As well as giving a brief on the history of Nubia to 1 IUSD: integrated master’s program between Stuttgart University in Germany, and Ain Shams University in Egypt.



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assimilate the Nubian culture and their motive of return among the last decades. The paper divided into three complementary parts, at commence it gives a concise on the old Nubian villages and way of living in order to assimilate their cultures, secondly it stated the political decisions among different regimes and there effects and implications on Nubia region and Nubians. Eventually it ends by tracing the two previously stated cases in a comparative approach in order to give directions to the decision makers, as well as enhancing the policies which affect their urbanism.

KEY WORDS Self-initiated, Nubians, approach, return, Lake Nasser, governmental attempts



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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY The research mainly focus on the cases of the Nubian return around the lake, either it held by the government or the Nubians, In order to understand the motive of the return from both sides, and the way of approaching that. As well as the paper aims to understand the deficits which took place in both cases, and how to overcome them, furthermore learning from the Nubian attempt and the seams of success for the future. The paper is based on literature about Nubia and the case studies, as well as on two one day visits in 2012 and 2014 to Qustol village, as well as a week field trip to the first case. Juxtaposed the paper based on semi structured interview which was held with the Nubian residents and activists, and on observations and statistics. According to the research limitations the semi structured interview was the most beneficial method. In addition to that, a comprehensive collection to the articles was done for the last 7 years in order to have an overview on the government opinions and Nubians aspirations.

OLD NUBIA Nubians were a group of people who were living in Upper Egypt and North of Sudan, from the 1st cataract at latitude 24, till the 6th cataract at latitude 19. Nubia was divided into two regions as shown in figure 1: Lower Nubia, Upper Nubia, according to the flow of the Nile to the north, heading to the Mediterranean Sea (Shetawy et al. 2013). As Merdan (1999) mentioned that the Egyptian Nubians who were living in the lower Nubia between the first and the second cataract, are divided into three ethnic groups, Kenuz, Arab and Fadija respectively from north to south. They were settled in 40 villages along the Nile for a distant of 350 km.

[fig. 1] the all Nubia region source: maps of world. [fig. 2] the three Egyptian Nubian clans’ villages.



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The first ethnic group Kenuz (Matouki) inhabited the North part after Aswan city and for 150 km along the Nile. The Kenuz people are having extinct Nubian dialect called Matouki which is similar to the people of Dongola in Sudan. The Kenuz group inhabited 18 settlements (Khalil, A. 2013). The second Ethnic group Arab (Aliqat) inhabited the next 40 km and speaking the Arabic language inhabited 5 settlements. The last ethnic group is the Fadija (Mahas), who inhabited the last 130 km till the second cataract or the Egyptian Sudanese border, they inhabited 17 settlements. They are speaking in another dialect which differs from the Kenuz one; it is called Fadija dialect (Al Amir, O. 2013). Upper Nubia located in northern Sudan between the Second and Sixth Cataracts of the Nile. This region included 5 clans: Batn El Hajar, the Abri Delgo reach, the dengola reach, the Abu Hamid reach and the Ahendi reach representing three ethnic groups: Sukkot, Mahasi and Dongolawi, from the north to south respectively.

CONCISE ON THE NUBIAN CULTURE In order to understand the motive of the Nubians to return around the lake after a set of successive forced displacement, a concise on the history and culture of the Nubians must be assimilated. The Nubians are the most peaceful people as it was stated in many literatures. Their life is simple, self- organized and self-managed. They are living in separated villages and settlements away from each other, yet still some trade, blood relations and filiation between the neighbor villages and between lower and upper Nubia. They were living among the Nile, which affects their daily life, habits and traditions. As Merdan (1999) argued that the settlements were located among the Nile River, however away for few hundred meters for utilizing the shoreline for cultivation or for practicing their social habits. There are two types of the settlements forms; either in grid morphology or an ad hoc free pattern form, the grid ones are mostly to South and vice-versa with the organic pattern. Figures 3 and 4 show the different in the settlements patterns.

[fig. 3] The grid pattern of the Nubian settlements [fig. 4] The organic pattern of Nubian settlements Source: Merdan, 1999. Source: Merdan, 1999. The climate at the Nubia region is characterized by the extremely overheated period, arid region, clear sky and dry atmosphere. The temperature ranges from 16 degree till 49 degrees, which much various between summer and winter. As a consequent to the climate, the economic base of the Nubia region was shaped. The Nubian economy was based on three axes; first on agriculture especially palms cultivation which result in commercial date production, as well as it played an important role in the Nubian character and daily routine, secondly on fishing from the Nile, eventually on animal ranching. According to some Nubian residents, the palm productions were shared between the merchants, land owners and the village residents equally, afterwards it could be inherited to the next generations. On



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the other side the Nubian festivals and ceremonies are mainly related to the prelisted economic activities. Accordingly the Nubians had 4 main ceremonies; the palm harvesting, the Mawlid (i.e. religious event), birth and death, and the marriage. The marriage ceremony lasts between two weeks to 4o days in front of the bride’s house. The Nubians were and still well known for the generosity and honesty. The woman has a major rule in the Nubian life especially in the absence of the man who travels seeking for jobs. The women had major rules in irrigating the land, besides decorating the houses and the facades, as well as keeping the community bonds and ties strong. On the other side and as a continuation of the Nubian house, the houses were built out of local materials, e.g. rocks, stone, clay (which called Galous) and cover the ceiling with the palm leaves. The materials were fully adapted to the hot dry climate. The houses were plastered by colorful pigments and symbols; each has its own meaning (Serag, Y. 2013). More over the Nubians were using the credit system in purchasing, which an indicator for the trust in the community members. Eventually, the Nubians had a distinct culture in different dimensions and identity, from which their distinction exist.

[fig. 5] Old different Nubian villages source: Zigler, 1963.

POLITICAL DECISIONS IMPLICATIONS ON NUBIANS In the last decades, and for more than 100 years, Egyptian Nubians were affected to a set of migrations and forced displacements. Four migrations took place in; 1902, 1912, 1933 and 1964. The first three successive migrations took place at the same settlements’ spatial position, the Nubians just go up the hill furthermore, due to constructing Aswan reservoir; however the last migration was a total forced displacement which result in displacing 39 Nubian villages to Komombo (50 km up Aswan city), due to the construction of the High Dam (Mahgoub, Y. 1990). Accordingly the Nubians were affected deeply in different aspects and dimensions because of that decision of displacement. Among different regimes they tried to tackle the Nubian issues and to fulfill their needs by return around the Lake Nasser, yet nothing concrete achieved. In order to understand the situation in Nubia and their motive to return to their original places, an analysis for the major political events along the history must be studied. The next figure done according to different literature showing different eras’ and the political decisions impact on Nubians in a chronological order. As well as the figure shows the contribution of the all presidents since 1954 to the Nubian issue. Accordingly the two cases of return could be studied and analysed.



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[fig. 6] Nubian political implications time line 1, Source: Author.

[Figure 7] Nubian political implications time line 2 Source: Author.

ONE WOMAN SHOW VILLAGE: THE CASE OF QUSTOL VILLAGE SELF INITIATED RETURN VILLAGE START UP It is obvious the Nubians desire in different discourses and their willingness of return to their original place. In 1973 president Sadat issued a decree which stated that the Nubians have the right to return around the Lake Nasser, as a result of adopting the idea of invading the desert and having critical mass on the borders and the periphery (Serag, Y. 2013). As it is discussed with the mayor of Qustol 2015, according to the decree two villages of Qustol and Adendan in 1972 took the initiation as a self-



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decision and returned around the lake at the same position of their old Nubian villages. Around 200 Nubians from Qustol village went through the relocation process from Komombo to around Lake Nasser. Most of the new village residents were governmental employed and took an un-paid leave for reclaiming the New Qustol village. Moreover each house hold has the right to reclaim 5 Feds. The Nubian decision was supported heavily from the government. This return could not been achieved successfully without the government interfere. It was organized by the socialist union afterwards. Qustol and Adendan return is called Takamol project. Two more villages tried to return and have the same path (Abu Sinbel and Balana). This socialist union offered the Nubians from Qustol and Adendan several services e.g. water pump machines to bring water from the lake, 8 trucks, number of cows and live stocks, 18 houses for Qustol and 30 ones for Adendan, lastly, it paid 30 L.E for each Nubian per month for this resettlement till the land became productive. The support of the authorities was to the extent that Sadat build a presidential house there.

[fig. 8] New Qustol village return by the lake, 1978 [fig. 9] New Qustol village location

The following discussion provided evidence that the New Qustol village by the lake was developed by the hands of the Nubian original settlers. The Nubians built 88 buildings out of local materials e.g. mud and rocks, on the Nubian style. Each building having its own self decoration, courts and Mastaba. The village was built 2 km away from Lake Nasser borders and 35 km from Sudan border. It was restricted to build constructions directly by the lake, to leave the stated distance as a buffer zone for the lake (Almasry Alyoum, 2012).

Later, The water was offered by a well, established by Lake Nasser developmental company for land reclaiming, As well as the electricity produced by a generator, established by the same company. A Tuk-Tukc shuttle service is used as transportation between the village & the marine; it was donated by a Company as a charity. Moreover the marine is the only way of transportation from and to the village. The boat was offered by the local council to transport people from & to Abu-Simbel in order to have wider connections. However, the boat sails from 8 am to 4 pm, 3 times a week, otherwise the village settlers could not transport from the village. Nowadays a new military marine is opened and make the connection easier, every day from 8Am till 5Pm.



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[fig. 10] Qustol village by the lake catalog, Source: Author visit trip

QUSTOL STATUS QUE In 1986, the number of inhabitants reduced heavily from 250 to be 25 settlers in the all village. This reduction was due to two reasons; first drought occur causing reduction in the water level for 100s meters from which affected the cultivation of the lands, secondly the new regime adopted different ideology after President Sadat assassination, accordingly the governmental employed inhabitants could not have an unpaid leave any more. However, the number of inhabitants reduced gradually till the population become between 8 to 10 residents at the village in 2010. However the population according to the CAPMAS 2006 census is 470 persons. Moreover most of the time the village can be considered as one woman show village as Tahra (the 95 years old) is the only woman who refuses to leave the village, in addition to being companionless most of the time.

[fig. 11] Hagga Tahra, the woman who refused to move out Source: Author field visit The physical situation was degraded in the last 5 years. The buildings which inhabited in 2012 were Between 4 to 5 buildings. A problem occurred to the motor which lifts the water from the well, which results in the desertification of the land (Almasry Alyoum, 2012). However Tahra and her family were maintaining it the last 10 years. On other side the electricity comes for few hours at night. Recently, Tahra mentioned that 70 palms were died since 2010 till nowadays. Eventually it is obvious that there



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is no attention is drawn from the government towards the village. Recently, in the field study 2015, the local council is studying a project of introducing the electricity through solar panels. Om Tahra mentioned to Almasry Alyoum (2012): “If I moved from here I will die” “My husband, died while irrigating the palms” “Nasser hate us that’s why he displace the Nubians, but Sadat like Nubians” “My dream is to reclaim the land before I die”. On the other hand, the minister of planning “Hassaballah Elkafrawy” after Sadat got assassinated stated that; “Your father is died”. As well as the head of Qustol agriculture association “Nasser Gasho” stated that; “When the boat starts & comes back, life starts and ends for us” “Most of people left because of lack of services” “They want to return, but how”

A new window of hope was opened to Om Tahra and the village residents after opening Qustol trade terminal between Egypt & Sudan on the borders in 2014. This terminal could work in paying the Government attention towards Qustol village by the Lake Nasser, as well as acting as an economical opportunity to refurbish the market there, besides relying on the terminal as a future economic base beside cultivations. Hence, from the case of Qustol village, it was obvious how Nubians are attached to their original lands and having the willing of return in a self-initiation approach and after struggling with the basic needs and the government. As well as a lot of learnt lessons and seems of success in this case, it could be useful for the future for better returning process. The following discussion will introduce the other case of Wadi Karkar project, from then a comparative analysis will be done through different aspects and dimension cross cutting with the stated cases, and trying to figure out the lessons learnt and the deficits

RETURN DREAM OR A MIRAGE: THE CASE OF WADI KARKAR PROJECT On the contrary of the Nubians aspirations and demands which was declared to Gamal Mubarak in 2009 visit, the government started on rush and under the pressure of time a new project of Nubians return “Wadi Karkar project”. The idea of the project was juxtaposed with Gamal Mubarak visit to Komombo. Wadi Karkar area which is located 22 km south west Aswan city center, was not mentioned as a potential destination from the Nubian side. The possible relocations is discussed later in chapter 8 (the analysis. As it is mentioned before that 5521 houses are the rest of these compensations and the project is taking a part from it. Among different discourses, Wadi Karkar project was criticized, from the perspective that the land is not reclaimable for agriculture purpose, besides does not meet the Nubians aspirations. However this criticism, in March 2010 the minister of



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housing “Ahmed El Maghraby” declared the starting of Wadi Karkar project. According to Almasry Alyoum (2012) the project came to light as it was supported politically by Gamal Mubarak, as a promotional material to go for the next presidential elections.

[fig. 11] Wadi Karkar project location and conceptual photo Source: Aswan governorate

Wadi Karkar project constructed on 460 feds, besides other 10,000 feds to be for agriculture related purposes for the Nubian settlers. The project is on a distant of 800 m from Aswan – Abu Sinbel high may, 8 km from Aswan airport, and 6 km from the lake Nasser. The project is divided into 8 villages; each village has a number of buildings of 258 to end by having 2000 houses for the all project. This Number of houses expected to have number of inhabitants of 14,000 Nubians. The all project has a central zone for services consists of; local unit, police station, post office, telecom building, social building, market, clinics, mosque, youth center, celebration hall, greenery & open spaces, and primary and secondary schools. Each village has a small mosque, beside playgrounds and markets. By narrowing down to the building scale, each house has an area of 220 m2, 75 m2 out of them was roofed which consists of; Two rooms, kitchen, bathroom, open court, guest house & Mastaba (Bashry, R. 2010). On the other hand, the project was done over a military owned land, and the responsibility of the constructions went for the military and the ministry of housing. Accordingly, the military had to construct 4 villages and the ministry of housing the others. However the project was dedicated to the Nubians expats of the villages Dahmeet, Ambercab and Dabood, who were not covered in the relocating process of 1964 to Komombo. Every Nubian has the right to reclaim 5 feds. Eventually, 1572 houses were delivered o Nubians in early 2012 by the president Morsi. However, the status quo of the project that in 2014 only around 500 Nubians who were still living in the villages of Wadi Karkar. This because of the departure of the rest, as the result of the market and services are not activated till nowadays, besides that there is no economic base over there. As a consequent of the departure of the Nubians, scholars expect that the village tend to be a ghost city in the next few years. However, according to the statistics of Almasry Alyoum (2014) the project costs around 2 Milliard Egyptian pound. Other Nubians sell the houses after its delivery to Saiidis, as this house a part of the old compensations for their ancestors. This make it more difficult to be inherited. Accordingly, they decide to sell it and distribute the money.



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[fig. 12] Urban mapping to Wadi Karkar project map [fig. 13] Wadi Karkar village houses source: source: Author based on Google map Almasry Alyoum The project was criticized heavily in the last years from different actors. At commence the Nubians criticized the project although their passion of return, it was mentioned that; - The project is in the desert and far away from the lake by 6 km, although their culture is heavily affected by the Nile. - The cultivation area was not handed over to the Nubians since the project started till now. - The houses are close to each other which contradict with the Nubian culture. - No economic base for the area as a part of a holistic vision of the region. - The services and markets were not activated and mobilized even after handling over the houses to Nubians. - Hence, a better planning could be achieved to the area by integrating the Nubian in the planning process (Serag, Y. 2013). It is argued from Nubian leaders, that the project is not mobilized by intention from authorities. They claim that the authorities just want to offer the rest of compensations in a rush and without having a clear vision. As well as the authorities seems they want to fail the project to claim that the Nubians after all these regular demonstrations, they do not want to return. Accordingly this will hesitate the Nubian stand to the public in the media. Moreover, the minister of housing “Ahmed El Maghraby” after he announced the start of the project match 2009 and declared that the land is reclaimable, he stated in 2010 that the land is not valid for agriculture purposes according to the ministry of agriculture. Furthermore the military as well criticized the project and recommended to shift it to Wadi El Aml. In addition to the stated criticism, the Egyptian Nubians Association for lawyers criticized the project into 4 main things: - The buildings & constructions must be revised by Nubian engineering committee. - Revising the financial state of the project.



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- Deciding the developmental projects which will takes place at the area either agricultural or industrial which fits the Nubian culture. - Integrate this project as a part of a wider developmental plan for the lake region and as a start of relocating the all villages with the old names. However the stated criticism, other Nubians received the project willingly, as they mentioned it is the start of return. However no participation took place in the all planning process from the authorities, yet just one Nubian leader was supporting the idea but even criticizing the process and the output of nowadays. Hence, after the all stated criticism, it is still questionable how this project continued, and came to light, besides who took the decision to continue the project? (Abo Zeid, M. 2012)

FACTORS AFFECTING THE RETURN The next table will provide a comparison between the two cases of return, from then a significant factors can be deduced for a future successful return by the lake, and better planning.

Aspect Qustol village Wadi Karkar project

Social life - The people were interconnected to each other’s, as they came as one group (community) - The buildings are far from each other, adapted to the Nubian ideologies of wide spaces, yet they gather at the Mastaba outside the house on daily base, besides cultivating lands.

- After the delivery of the houses in 2012, Nubians left the villages in 2014, a matter of not felling the sense of belonging to the place, besides other related reasons. - They complained about how the buildings are close to each other and better planning could be achieved at the area

culture - Buildings materials are local and the constructions were done by Nubians, in order to raise the sense of belonging. - The village is two km away from the Lake, which close enough to the old Nubian style - The Nubians cultivated palms, moving on the same track of the old Nubia.

- The government tried to adapt the constructions to the Nubian culture, yet does not succeed to have the full Nubian features. - The project is 6 km away from the Lake beside fully located in the desert which make it difficult to Nubians to get adapted. - The land which is dedicated to be used for agriculture purpose was questionable according to the Ministry of agriculture.



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Motive - People were self-motivated after Sadat decree, as they took the decision as a self-organized and initiated. - The unpaid leave for the Governmentally employers motivated them to work hard instead, to have a standard earnings.

- Despite the Nubians willingness of return, the motive to settle was not obvious, as the matter that there were not integration in the planning process. As well as the project is offered to the expats who do not share the same passion like others.

Economic - The Nubians directly after their return they received lands for reclamation, which gave them a chance to earn for living, as well as they gain money support from the authorities

- The economic base of the project was not obvious to Nubians, especially after knowing that the land is not reclaimable, in addition to not activating the services.

Process - 200 persons went directly with their furniture, in order to settle and start a new development by the lake.

- The planning process is done according to collaborative work and coordination between different stakeholders.

- The project was done under pressure of time and synchronizing with the revolution of 25th of January 2011, thus make the relocating process with the Nubians on rush and questionable.

Sustainability - The village succeeds to sustain although the harsh atmosphere it faced in the last years, however

- According to the status Quo of the project and the number of inhabitants, the villages tend to

it need more concern and support. - Om Tahra as the only person in the village prove an evidence that the Nubians have a welling to return by the lake, yet more inhabitants need to be supported to settle in the village and develop it.

be Ghost city in the next years; hence the sustainability of the project is questionable.



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Political support - The Sadat decree to the Nubian was beneficial for them as the main supporting channel, In addition to other support from other Governmental bodies was clear e.g. Socialist union. However the following regimes did not adopted the same ideology and ideas which affect the village existence badly.

- The project was politically supported from the Governmental stakeholders, especially after the revolution all regimes tried to listen to the different needs of the Nubians and others (Salah, M. 2012), yet the intension of the authorities with such project is questionable

[table 1] Cases of return comparison

LEARNT LESSONS By analyzing the two return stated cases, a set of learnt lessons was obvious, in order to enhance the future plans:

- It could be beneficial if the government foster the Nubians to return to Qustol, rather than

starting a new project of Wadi Karkar, and carrying the risk of the failures. The infra-structure could be easily enhanced at Qustol with less than the money paid to establish a new project having new villages.

- Some Nubians are so much attached to their old lands and willing to stay and exert effort to reclaim lands, others despite they are already having houses and constructions they left the village of Wadi Karkar as a matter of not fitting their culture, and others.

- The political decisions among history had implications on Nubians in various dimensions, yet a support must be given to Qustol village and Qustol Village inhabitants in order to sustain.

- The Government must think beyond their normal approaches and conventional planning method, and try to know why the self-initiated case tends to succeed despite the harsh circumstances.

- The government as well is exerting efforts and money for the Nubian return, however their real intensions is questionable. On other hand if a study is done before initiating the project, it might give the government more direction in the right track to follow. The government still wants to handle the rest of compensations, however if it is offered in different way it might be more beneficial for both sides. Wadi Karkar project is offered for the Nubian expats who do not that attached to the old place, plus having inherit problems. However the ones who have the desire for return who are settled at Komombo, yet a deep study must done.

- Qustol village has a great opportunity to act as the South gate to Egypt, and foster Egyptian-Sudanese relations by trading through the new terminal.

It can be concluded that there are some factors affecting the return must be studied and planned carefully, for avoiding conflicts:

- Political will and a clear vision. - Integrating Nubians in the plans.



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- Understanding the socio-cultural aspect of the Nubians and their motive. - Analyzing the region potentials carefully. - Fast economic base for the relocated residents. - Governmental support e.g. services, infra-structure, loans and easing legislations

There is also other factors might be integrated in the future regional plans and nubians have influenece in, and critical to be taken into consideration:

- 1- village new locations, - 2- villages sizes, - 3- village character, prevailing culture, - 4- functionality, - 5- village patterns, - 6- and building typologies.

These factors are deduced from the research and are practiced through the field study

CONCLUSION In the case of Qustol village, despite the harsh circumstances, the Nubians decided to sustain the village for more than 35 years. Om Tahra as the only settler in the village for some periods gives an evidence on how the Nubians are willing to return, as well as give a reflections on the Nubian culture. On the other hand, the project of Wadi Karkar, although the political support which was given to it, it tend to be a ghost city in two years after finishing the first phase of the project. Hence, and according to the contradictions in the last stated cases, a socio-cultural analysis of the Nubians must be done in order to understand their motive of return, besides why the cases went differently?

On the other hand an attention must be drawn to Qustol village as a matter that it has seems of success and could be easily enhanced, especially after having a new chamber of hope after the opening of Qustol trade gate. Eventually, after analyzing the self-initiation approach and the state approach, government must consider the Nubians in the planning process and assimilate the Nubian culture in order to overcome the failures and deficits. As well as it was obvious that the self-initiation approach seems to fit the Nubians as it gives them the sense of ownership, yet it need to be facilitated and supported from the government by political decisions and providing services and infra-structure.

REFERENCES Abd El Hamid, H. (2014) Hagar El Shams; the linkage between the Lake and Qustol & Ashket Gate. Elmasry Elyoum, 12th of August. retrieved from: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/500265.

Abd El Fattah, S. (2012) Starting handling over the houses to Nubians at Wadi Karkar. El-Balad, 1st of Dec. retrieved from: http://www.el-balad.com/259584. Abo zaid, H. (1964) the displacement of the Nubian people. Cairo: ministry of social affairs.

Abo Zeid, M. (2012) Nubian concerns about Wadi Karkar. El-Ahram El youm, 8th of May. retrieved from: http://www.masress.com/ahram/168168.

Al Amir, O. (2013) the Nubia-Land of gold: sun never sets. Cairo: Kenuz.

Al Soghayer, A. (2010) Nubia and Lake Nasser: Secrets and Monuments. Cairo: Agyal.

http://www.masress.com/ahram/168168



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Aswan governorate (2011) Resettlement of Nubians in Wadi Karkar project [WWW] Available from: http://www.aswan.gov.eg/HaykalTanzemy/Almdreatt/Housing/HousingServices/Karkar/default.aspx [Accessed 02/02/2015]. Bakry, M. (2014) the people of the Nubia: Guidance "Sisi" to create housing for the Nubians "good signs" for the issuance of a presidential decree to return resettlements. Al-Ahram, 1st of Dec. retrieved from: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/ Bashry, R. (2010) Wadi Karkar [WWW] Available from: http://abnelnuba.blogspot.com/2010/09/blog-post_9764.html. [Accessed 9/01/2015]. El Maghraby, A. (2010) Wadi Karkar land is not reclaimable. El youm El Sabaa, 20th of August. retrieved from: http://www.youm7.com/story. Egyptian constitution (2014) Chapetr6, Article 236. Gamal, A. (2012) Om Tahra; Abd El Nasser evicted us as he hate us, After Sadat they told us your father is died. Elmasry Elyoum, 17th of March. retrieved from: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/166930. Gamal, A. (2012) Qustol & Adendan the abandoned African Gate. Elmasry Elyoum, 12th of March. retrieved from: http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=331182. Hamza, M (2012) Mamdouh Hamza reveals Wadi Karkar project development. El youm El Sabaa, 20th of July. retrieved from: http://www.youm7.com/story/2010. Khalil, A. (2013) Nubia: human and history. Cairo: Madbouly library Mahgoub, H. (2012) Wadi Karkar project; resettlement or forced displacement. Elmasry Elyoum, 29th of Sep. retrieved from: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/500265. Mahgoub, Y. (1990) The Nubian experience: A study of the social and cultural meanings of architecture. USA: The University of Michigan. Merdan, A. (1999) Development concepts and implementation strategies for new settlements-with spatial reference to Aswan dam Lake region-Egypt. Stuttgart: Universitat Stuttgart. Mohamed, M. (2012) handling 1300 houses to Nubians in Wadi Karkar. El Masryoon, 15th of June. retrieved from: http://www.masress.com/almesryoon/142668. Ona today (2012) General Nubian Union refuses to hand over Karkar houses to Nubians. Ona today, 18th of Jan. retrieved from: http://www.masress.com/ona/260282. Ragheb, K. (2014) Way to Qustol . Elmasry Elyoum, 28th of August. retrieved from: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/511529. Ragab, A. (2012) Wasted 2 billion pounds in Wadi Karkar [WWW] Available from: http://www.masress.com/moheet/425563. [Accessed 10/01/2015]. Ryad, M. et al (2010) Journey in the time of Nubia. Cairo: Egyptian general authority book.

http://www.aswan.gov.eg/HaykalTanzemy/Almdreatt/Housing/HousingServices/Karkar/default.aspx

http://www.aswan.gov.eg/HaykalTanzemy/Almdreatt/Housing/HousingServices/Karkar/default.aspx

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Serageldin, M (1982) Planning for the New Nubia 1960-1980. In: Taylor, P. (eds.) the Changing Rural Habitat; Volume I: Case Studies. Singapore: Aga khan, pp. 59-82. Serag, Y. (2013) Nubian Resettlement Challenges Between past memories and present settings. Cairo: SB13. Shetawy, A. et al (2013) The Myth of Nubia, Egypt: A Vivid Potential or Desert Mirage. Cairo: SB13.

Encounters with Paradoxes of Planning in Nai Hien Dong P.Wiesbrock


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ENCOUNTNERS WITH PARADOXES OF PLANNING IN NAI HIEN DONG

Petra Wiesbrock

4sing GmbH, Hamburg, Germany [email protected]

ABSTRACT The starting point for carrying out a research project on the urban neighbourhood Nai Hien Dong in

the city Da Nang in Vietnam was the author's astonishment about the difficulties in fully

understanding the Vietnamese planning system in spite of having worked for an urban planning

project of the German International Development Cooperation Agency “Gesellschaft für Internationale

Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH” in Vietnam. This lead to ask the following questions, which are

attempted to be answered in the present article: What were the circumstances behind the lack of the

understanding of the Vietnamese planning system by GIZ’s staff member’s? What role can an

international organisation like GIZ play to support the complex process of a cities strategic

planning? And how can the current situation be improved?

The research showcases that due to complexity and availability of only fragmented information

particularly in fast transforming cities, urban planners become increasingly challenged and traditional

planning methods are no longer sufficient. International development cooperation organisations like

the GIZ could play a significant role to support the challenging task of urban planning and strategy

development e.g. by counterbalancing the governmental approaches, to stress discussions and

providing methodological advice. However, the example of the GIZ’s project showed that current

working approaches are not yet adapted to this increasing complexity and the role of informality and

especially knowledge gathering and presentation are still unexploited.

Focusing on the case study of Nai Hien Dong in Central Vietnam the research examined alternative

ways of knowledge-gathering and illustration i) by especially investigating questions and topics that

were surprising, unclear or seemed to be contradictory and ii) by intentionally inventing paradoxes in

order to describing insights gained in a way that allows to present contradictory few points and



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incomplete or fragmented information.

KEY WORDS Intellectual instruments, Paradoxes; Vietnam; Urban Planning; GIZ



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The starting point for carrying out a research project on the urban neighbourhood Nai Hien Dong in

the city Da Nang in Vietnam was the author's astonishment about the difficulties in fully

understanding the Vietnamese planning system in spite of having worked for an urban planning

project of the German International Development Cooperation Agency “Gesellschaft für Internationale

Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH” in Vietnam. When starting my traineeship at the GIZ, I expected that

working for an urban planning project would naturally lead to an understanding of the planning system

and the city's structure. The reason for this lack of understanding might be the organisation’s working

approach and applied methodologies. The knowledge of the staff and consultants are mainly based on

secondary sources and these are concentrating on known facts rather than open questions. Moreover,

the work related to the strategic planning was focusing on the general city developing and learning

from best practices and therefore not taking the local context sufficiently into consideration e.g. by

working on case studies with regards to this subject. This lead me to ask the following questions,

which I attempt to answer in the present article:

What were the circumstances behind the lack of understanding of the Vietnamese planning system by

GIZ’s staff members?

What role can an international organisation like GIZ play to support the complex process of a city’s

strategic planning?

And how can the current situation be improved?

In order to answer these questions the research followed an alternative working approach and applied

methodologies in an experimental manner. Particular points of concentration were issues that were

surprising, were unclear or seemed to be contradictory - in other words paradoxes. The comparison of

both, GIZ’s working approach and the author’s own research give insights of factors leading to

insufficient knowledge and ideas how the current situation could be improved.

The paper is structured in three parts: The first part explains the relevance of using new ways of

intellectual instruments, in particular paradoxes. The second part underlines the need for planning by

explaining the contextual situation of urbanisation and planning in Vietnam and Da Nang as well as

the GIZs working approach in this specific project. The last section describes 3 examples of paradoxes

as results of the case study in Nai Hien Dong in combination with a methodological reflection about

GIZs and the author’s own working approach.

LEARNING FROM… PARADOXES "We ourselves, the whole society and the urban user were causing the crisis of the city" (Lefèbvre

1967) states Henri Lefèbvre in his article “the right to the city”. Thus, it should also be up to us to try

our best to resolve this crisis. It is only the social life that can lead to change and create valuable cities.

To achieve a transformation, intellectual instruments can help:

Au point où nous en arrivons, signalons l’urgence d’une transformation des démarches et des

instruments intellectuels. En reprenant des formulations employées ailleurs, certaines démarches

mentales encore peu familières semblent indispensables.” (Lefèbvre 1967, p. 31).



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However, it is necessary to learn from failures, transform existing instruments and look for new

approaches.

Ananya Roy emphasises in her article „Urban Informality. Towards an Epistemology of Planning “that

although most of the urban growth, changes and challenges are taking place in the developing world,

most theories remained rooted in the developed world.

[...] I trace such a root by discussing one key theme of Third World research: urban informality and

policy responses to informality, such as slum upgrading and land titling. My goal is not so much to

evaluate these policies as it is to highlight some of the distinctive challenges and paradoxes that they

present for planners. (Roy 2005, p. 147)

What are paradoxes? How can they be applied? And could the use of paradoxes be a new approach for

urban planners and analyst leading to an epistemology of planning?

The word paradox derives from the Greek word páradoxos: pará = contrary to, vice and dóxy =

opinion. Although paradoxes are already applied in other academic disciplines like mathematics,

physics, psychology, literature and philosophy using various methods and definitions, they are not yet

an acknowledged approach in the field of urban design, research and planning. Within the context of

the research project on the urban processes in Nai Hien Dong the theoretical discussion in the article

“paradoxes as sceptical arguments” of Frank Kennetzky turned out to be useful. He noticed in most

contexts paradoxes are mentioned as “something that occurs” (31). This would imply that paradoxes

are something that “happens” and that they are seen as a mistake or misconception. He counters this

approach by highlighting that paradoxes are usually constructed intentionally and that exactly this

construction can be of great value (31). By showing and formulating paradoxes, it is possible to

illustrate the limitations of systems as well as to help crystallise present problems in a sharp and vivid

form. In the research the author experimented with the methodological approach and applied them in

practice i) by especially investigating questions and topics that were surprising, unclear or seemed to

be contradictory and ii) by intentionally inventing paradoxes in order to describing insights gained in a

way that allows to present contradictory few points and incomplete or fragmented information.

This article focuses on the results of the research in the neighbourhood of Nai Hien Dong. The area

was chosen because of its dramatical changes regarding physical structure, land ownership and state

determination during only 10 years. It is one of the oldest parts of the city and remained until 2000 a

fisher village with ancient housing structure and informal land ownership. However, this changed

rapidly after the city’s authorities decision to modernise and formally integrate the area in the city

[fig.1,2]. The significant change within a short period of time initiated by the city’s authorities

showcase the city's developments and planning processes condensed like under a burning glass and

therefore making it particularly interesting for the research.



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[fig. 1] Nai Hien Dong in 2000

[fig. 2] Nai Hien Dong in 2012 What is distinctive about this research in Nai Hien Dong, is the absence of official planning material,

process documentation or data. It was clear from the very beginning that it would be difficult to gather

an approximately complete or objectivised set of information. However, in order to be able to disclose

the complex situation and transformation processes in the neighbourhood, a holistic research approach

was necessary. This latter combines triangulation with the concept of paradoxes following the idea of



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Roy and Kannetzky.1 Triangulation

2 includes the linkage between different methodological

approaches (e.g. qualitative, quantitative, interview, observations) as well as the origin of different

methodological perspectives (history, present situation, future scenarios). [fig.3] The use of paradoxes

focused on two aspects: Through confrontation and pursuing of apparent contradictions or aspects of

surprise the researcher's own foreignness is emphasised. This can help especially foreign researchers

to identify wrong assumptions based on cultural differences and general key issues in the planning

process and highlight limitations for both, the reseacher’s knowledge as well as planning intentions in

the area. The explanation of these phenomena supporting this process of reflection, sharpen the issue

and presents them for third parties in an illustrative way without reducing complexity.

[fig. 3] Research methods applied (Triangulation)

RAPID TRANSFORMATION UNDERLINING NEED FOR PLANNING AND NEW INSTRUMENTS Vietnam is in a phase of rapid transformation: economy, society and politics are reorienting, rural and

urban structures are changing fundamentally. The process of restruction and modernisation with its

radical changes presents constantly new challenges and raises questions about the speed of change,

political orientation, social and cultural differentiation.

Vietnam remains a Social Republic since its reunification in 1976. However, in the 1980th the country

went through a fundamental political and economic restructuring process called “Doi Moi”. During

this process the former state-controlled economy with a state property system changed to a market

economy with private ownership, which led to a reintegration in the world economy. The opening

process of the market and positive economic perspectives led to a strong growth of foreign investment

in Vietnam. In 2007 foreign investments reached 20 Mrd USD – the same volume like India

(Willibold 2008).

1 See Roy, espacially p. 278ff and Kannetzky 2002, Chapter 7 2 See Flick 2010, p.278ff for an insightful reflection about this methodolical approach.



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However, for a few years economic growth rates are not stable anymore and several signals indicate

an economic crisis: Between 2008 and 2011 the inflation rate decreased from 27% to 23%, the stock

market yielded for about 50%, numerous enterprises went bankrupt and real estate prices dropped.

Nevertheless, Vietnam remains at present time one of the fastest growing economies in the world with

a growth rate of 7% per year (1998-2007) (Frehner 2008).

[fig. 4] Uncompleted construction in Nai Hien Dong after investor went bankrupt Economic growth comes along with increasing prosperity. As a result, the poverty rate decreased from

58% in 1993 to 10,6% in 2010 (General Statistics Office (GSO) 2011, p.62). Increasing household

income has led to improved living conditions and rising consumption. This holds true especially for

urban areas and politically defined economic centres, whilst other areas like rural mountains remain

poverty zones. The result is a rapid urbanisation with a dramatic increase of migration to urban areas.

In total Vietnam has a population of 85,8 million. Urban population increased from 23,7% in 1999 to

29,6% (25,4 million people) in 2009. According to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GOS) the

urban population in 2020 will reach 45% (44 million people) (62).

Developments in the coastal city Da Nang mirror current national development processes. As the

fourth biggest city of the country with around 900,000 inhabitants and one of five cities as well as the

core city of one of the country's three economic zones, the city has an increasing significance on

national level and is characterised by a dynamic development. Economic growth and industrialisation

leading to rapid urbanisation and dramatic increase of migration in urban areas, a liberalisation of the

economy, the privatisation of municipal land, internationalisation, increasing wealth and

environmental challenges shape Da Nang's current development.

The financial situation is one of the city's greatest challenges. Most of the financial allocations depend



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on national and international loans. The cities own resources are limited and mainly based on non-

sustainable income of land disposal.

Moreover, environmental problems and destruction caused by a combination of numerous factors like

the industrialisation, increasing demand for raw materials, energy demand, level of motorisation and

low dense urban construction land pose major challenges to the city.

In June 2013, the Urban Planning Institute (UPI) on behalf of the Ministry of Construction (MoC)

generated a new Masterplan for Da Nang. The GIZ project “Environmentally and Climate-friendly

Urban Development in Da Nang” was supposed to support and advise the city's authorities in this

process. However, the GIZ's influence and impact on the process of generating such a plan was

marginal.

The plan underlies the vision to strengthen Da Nang's position as a cultural, socio-economic and

military centre of the central region in Vietnam. Decentralisation, decreasing population density and

functional segregation with separate areas for tourism, new urban centres, new industrial areas and

particularly large-scale projects focusing on high income or luxury complexes are core development

targets. Furthermore, the plan proposes the enlargement of the infrastructure network and transport

system. From a European perspective, the plan contradicts the concept of an environmental and

sustainable planning in several aspects. For example decentralisation and low population density will

lead to urban sprawl and therefore loss of the cities green space and agricultural land that is already

limited. Functional segregation implies longer transportation ways from living areas to working places

and therefore increasing motorisation. Hence, there is a clear need to voice criticism and initiate

discussion for improvement. [fig. 3, 4]

[fig. 5] Functional planning 2020 for Da Nang



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[fig. 6] Population distribution 2020 for Da Nang Although it was GIZ’s mandate to support the process’ outcome, the impact and influence was low.

Main reasons for this might be that the authorities did not want other actors to have a look behind the

scenes. However, the author's research project and in particular the use of paradoxes indicates that the

GIZ's lack of influence and missed opportunity to have a real impact on development processes in

Vietnam was at least partially due to the GIZ's own working approach: i) GIZ's approach is action

oriented, knowledge generation is not prioritised and is based on information gathered from formal

sources and concentrates on formal processes; ii) the city as a whole stands in focus and is not

contrasted with small-scale developments in individual neighbourhoods; iii) theories, definitions and

working approaches are rooted in the developed world, projected to the developing world and

differences are not sufficiently reflected upon.

INVENTING PARADOXES The transformation process in Nai Hien Dong is a complex issue. Factors on parcel, neighbourhood,

city, national and global level, numerous actors and interests which are strongly characterised by an

economic balancing act between market economy, socialism and law enforcement taking influence on

the development. Inventing paradoxes turned out as a useful method to disclose and present this

complexity in a condensed way. In the following paragraph three paradoxes are showcased that are

especially giving insight and food for thought about limitations and opportunities for the work of an

international organisation like GIZ to support strategic planning in a dynamic developing city. The

paradoxes are founded on the analyses of the planning process and against the background of the

authors’ personal experiences shaped by the work with European planning education and culture and

the work with GIZ.

Paradox 1 – Planning without plan: One example for a question not sufficiently discussed in the

framework of the GIZ’s project is the definition of a masterplan. Although there is no clear definition

for the term “masterplan” a common European understanding of the concept exists: A masterplan is an



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instrument of planning to develop a framework for future development. The plan is orientated towards

long-term objectives that are determined by the specific situation and development of the area.

Fundamental elements of the masterplan is the flexible operation with the possibility of adaption in

order to react to unpredictable developments. Rather than a plan as a physical document, the process

of development concentration on participation and harmonisation of different actors is core element of

the plan (Gesellschaft für Hafen-und Standortentwicklung mbH (GSH) 2000).

The research about the development of Nai Hien Dong and the urban planning system illustrated a

significantly deviating understanding of the terminology in Vietnam. Vo Van Ha, architect and urban

planner in Da Nang states the primary function of the plan is related to marketing for large investment

projects:

The main purpose of the map is to have a general map of Da Nang city for the city’s VIPs such as the

directors of the departments, so they can hang it on their walls. The map should help people who are not from Da Nang to get a rough overview, to see where everything is and what the important spots in the city are. (Ha, Interview 22.05.2013)

Walter Koditek, Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM)-expert of the UPI under

MoC, points out that masterplans in Vietnam are not integrated plans:

The masterplan – or as I call it: the Construction Masterplan – is not a comprehensive and integrated planning; it is not a masterplan. Instead, it shows much more a vision that the cities strive for. It is a possible future – a distant goal. It is not based on a survey or includes a strategic environmental assessment; it is not understandable as realistic prediction or based on consolidated background data. (Koditek, Interview 22.05.2013)

The result of the analysis of planning material in Nai Hien Dong contains at least five “masterplans”

containing elements with relevance for spatial planning. All this points to the fact that there is

currently no masterplan existing in Da Nang – at least at what we refer to as a masterplan from a

European perspective. Addressing this issue in an early stage in the project could/may have clarified

GIZ’s tasks and ambitions in this respect.

Paradox 2 – Unlimited Planning with limited resource: Representatives of Da Nangs planning

authorities are famous for their ambitious statements about their vision for the cities’ future

development. The goal is to develop a large modern city with high quality living standards, to become

more civilised, wealthy and environmentally friendly. Moreover, every citizen should have a work

place and an apartment at their disposal. Extreme poverty should be eliminated and a minimum

standard of education should be available.

Against this background, it was just a matter of time until Nai Hien Dong as a poor neighbourhood

close to the city centre became a focal area of governmental modernisation plans. As a symbol for the

willingness to strive for the vision, changes were initiated. The first priority was to have visible results

like the construction of modern houses and large streets. [fig.7] In order to avoid large pressure on the

household budgets the water disposal system remained un-planned and unimplemented. Already after

a short period of time this turned out as a serious problem: increasing pollution of the bay and an

immense stench in the whole neighbourhood were the consequences. However, the cities’

municipalities did not dispose of their own sufficient financial means to finance the water disposal



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system.

[fig. 7] New multi-floor residential buildings and large street infrastructure in Nai Hien Dong A more precise examination of the communal financial household underlining and widen the paradox

of unlimited planning with limited resources even more. In principle, the financial budget consists of

two parts: national allocations and returns from allocations of land use rights. [fig. 8] Both income

sources are neither stable nor sustainable. The possibility of the city to convert land into urban

construction land and to sell this land is limited. Until now, Da Nang has been allocated a substantial

portion of national taxes. However, this could change soon, because the portion is also related to

growth prognoses and related planning activities. To allow Da Nang to grow and therefore ensure

financial income the city’s authorities continuing to plan new street infrastructure and urban

development projects. Given the fact that already more urban space is available than needed at current

state, lower density became formulated as a target to justify new projects.

For GIZ, getting insights into these details at an early stage of the project would have helped to

understand the position of the authorities and the importance of the municipal financial planning

paradoxes. It could even have been redirecting the whole project focus from Master planning to

financial household planning, which is in this case setting the fundamental basis for sustainable and

environmental planning.



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[fig. 8] Example of changes regarding land use and ownership in the Nai Hien Dong Paradox 1 – Non-Planning as a plan: Urban informality describes the dynamic processes in cities

where power structures and relations are re-negotiated. According to Ananya Roy these processes are

determined by legal authorities:

The planning and legal apparatus of the state has the power to determine when to enact this

suspension, to determine what is informal and what is not, and to determine which forms of

informality will thrive and which will disappear. (Roy 2005, p.147)

In other words, the state with its capacities is determining what is legal or illegal and what is

legitimated and illegitimated. In theoretical discussions about urbanism, the processes are also called

urban informality. These processes can also be observed in Nai Hien Dong. [fig.9]



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[fig. 9] Urban Informality Under the strong political leadership of Nguyen B Thanh Da Nangs authorities, the cities

modernisation was pushed forward following the example of Singapore. As a visible neighbourhood

encountering the city centre from the other side of the street Nai Hien Dong became a point of interest

in the late 1990th and the early 2000. The transformation process initiated by the governmental

authorities incorporated the complete restructuring of the area including the resettlement of the 14

5000 inhabitants, new infrastructure, construction of social houses and formally defined ownership

situations.

However, not everything was and is planned by the city’s authorities - and this on purpose. The whole

northern part of Nai Hien Dong is still fallow and neither infrastructure nor utilisation is planned. Due

to its location close to the sea bay the area is attractive, but at the same time hard to sell, because

environmental conditions in the bay are distressing. Despite the environmental pollution and the

national real estate crisis the city’s authorities still speculate that investors are interested in investing.

Thereby they are hoping to improve the financial household budget. Currently, a large part of the

city’s income is generated by allocation of land use rights. To remain capable of acting, the city is

depending on sales from land. Selling to big continuous areas to investors is particularly interesting to

the city, because usually the investor will also take over investment cost for infrastructure and thus, the

city is profiting directly. The “un-planned” areas or waiting plots for investors are now either laying

completely fallow or being temporarily squatted. [fig. 10, 11]



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[fig. 10] Fallow land in Nai Hien Dong

[fig. 11] Squatted area in Nai Hien Dong Another dimension of the paradox is expressed in the exceptional decision making position of the

city’s People’s Committee (PC). Existing plans including relevant elements for urban planning are



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based on different legal sources and created by different departments. To give an example: The Urban

Land Use Plan developed by the Department of Natural Resources and Environment is based on the

Land Law while the Construction Plan developed by the Ministry of Construction is founded on the

Urban Law. Each department has the mandate to follow specific interests and reach defined targets.

Hence, there is a strong willingness to implement its own plans and visions, and cooperation with

other departments has less priority. Officially, it is not regulated which plan has priority in case of

contradictions. If incoherent planning is leading to dispute between two departments, it is the PC of Da

Nang who decides. Due to this state of exception, the People’s Committee has a decisive influence on

planning and decisions in practice.

Consequently, spatial planning procedures are particularly complex and have a high level of non-

transparency, notably for international actors with a different planning culture. Hence, relying only on

formal sources and statements of authorities will most probably lead to an incomplete and distorted

picture of urban planning processes in practice. GIZ’s research about the planning system was mainly

founded on official reports and interviews with representatives of the local government. Therefore,

many important information about planning practices outside of the formal planning structure

remained uncaptured.

All these details cannot be found in documents or plans about the city’s development. They are the

result of observations on site, comparison of plans and interviews. The depth of information was not

reached or transferred in GIZ’s analysis and work. The reasons for it might lay in GIZ ‘s inherent

working structure.

GIZ’s project offer and proposals deriving from former projects in the region leading to a commission

by German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Based on these

experiences and first conversations between GIZ and potential governmental partner organisations the

outline of the project with a duration of 5 years was shaped. After setting up an Implementation

Agreement (IA) between GIZ and the partner organisations an indicator based Monitoring Matrix was

prepared. The purpose of this so-called “Wirkungsmatrix” is to ensure the quality of the project and

measure its success. Consequently, the project’s character is significantly influenced and dependent on

these indicators describing measurable actions e.g. conducting a workshop or writing a report.

Activities with the purpose of knowledge gathering particularly in an explorative manner or

knowledge management within the project are rare. In case they are applied they focus on “hard

science” like collections of facts and figures based on formal information provided by authorities or

extracted from reports. Investigations built on observations, informal interviews with residents or

subjective sketches are not used. Also, documents reporting about open questions, apparently

contradictories or process confrontations in a transparent way are rare.

Due to GIZ’s mandate, it is most likely that the approach will remain action oriented. However, it is

conceivable to concentrate more on case studies and soft science rather than general planning and hard

facts. Moreover, the question arises, what potentials could be revealed by combining science and the

work of development cooperation?



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CONCLUSION - OPPORTUNTIES THROUGH TRANSGRESSION This paper has acknowledged the opportunities for urban planers by experimenting with new ways of

intellectual instruments. Due to complexity and availability of only fragmented information in

particularly in fast transforming cities urban planners become increasingly challenged and traditional

planning methods are no longer sufficient. Notably, this applies in cities with a high level of urban

informality where power structures are reshaped by the state authorities in a dynamic process like in

the case of Nai Hien Dong illustrated. The analysis of the GIZ project “Environmentally and Climate-

friendly Urban Development in Da Nang” underlining the need for alternative working approaches,

but also highlighting that their action oriented approach can lead to knowledge gaps and therefore less

meaningful results. However, to give reasonable advice and implement meaningful actions a well

founded research is key. This opens for future inquiry about the combination of research and the work

of development cooperation especially in the complex and more and more challenging field of urban

planning. Moreover, the project itself could conduct a deeper dive in case studies or probes about

urban informality as a starting point and feed back these experiences to the overall context could lead

to better a understanding and consequently enhanced, tailored actions and advise. Particularly the use

of Paradoxes could help to raise awareness about the own role of foreignness and at the same time

identify and describe key issues and limitation in a condensed and transparent way. With a well-

founded knowledge background International Development Cooperation Organisations like GIZ could

play a significant role to support the particular challenging task in rapidly changing cities of urban

planning and strategy development e.g. by counterbalancing the governmental approaches, to stress

discussions, provide methodological advice and disclose processes.

REFERENCES Flick, U. (2010). Triangulation. In G. Mey, K. Mruck (Eds.), Handbuch qualitative Forschung in der Psychologie, (pp. 278-289). Wiesbaden.

Frehner, Willibold (02.2008). Vietnam: Zwischen Weltmarktintegration und sozialer Inklusion – auf der Suche nach einem neuen Ordnungsmodell. Web Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Web 21 October 2015. <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_12986-1522-1-30.pdf?080211181104>

General Statistics Office (GSO) (2011): Migration and Urbanization in Vietnam. Hanoi.

Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung mbH (GSH) (03.2000). HafenCity Hamburg. Der Masterplan. Web HafenCity GmbH Hamburg. Web 22 October 2015 < http://www.hafencity.com/ upload/files/files/z_de_broschueren_5_arbeitsheft_4.pdf>.

Ha, V. V. (22.05.2013). Interview

Kannetzky, F (2002). Paradoxien als skeptische Argumente? Web Universität Leipzig 26 June 2013. Web 18 October 2015. <http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~kannetzk/Texte/pd_Resuemee.pdf>.

Koditek, W. (22.05.2013). Interview

Lefèbvre H. (1967). Le droit à la ville. In L’Homme et la société, No.6, (pp. 29-35).

Roy, A. (2005). Urban Informality. Toward an Epistemology of Planning. In Journal of the American Planning Association. Vol.17, No.2 (pp. 147-157).

http://www.hafencity.com/upload/files/files/z_de_broschueren_5_arbeitsheft_4.pdf

http://www.hafencity.com/upload/files/files/z_de_broschueren_5_arbeitsheft_4.pdf

http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~kannetzk/Texte/pd_Resuemee.pdf

Exploratory Practices of Post-Rural Urbanization in China H. Huang, M.A. Akaateba


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EXPLORATORY PRACTICES OF POST-RURAL URBANIZATION IN CHINA: PROCESSES, ACTORS AND PERFORMANCE

Huang Huang1, Millicent Awialie Akaateba2

(1) Habitat Unit, Faculty VI, TU Berlin [email protected] (2) Habitat Unit, Faculty VI, TU Berlin [email protected]

ABSTRACT Since the Reform and Opening-up, China embraced market economy as its new development agenda.

Rural, as a pivotal area for a typical agricultural country like China, since then, decreased as an

essential supplier of productive factors under a capitalist urbanization process. Its traditional, social,

political and cultural characteristics have been overlooked. Dualistic urban-rural policy, which was

formulated to protect the most suffering stratum in Chinese history, has somehow widened the gap

between urban and rural China through the romanticized urban planning process.

However, rural urbanization by means of low-cost resource and intensive capital investment has been

recognized recently to be problematic, both economically and socially. As a result, since 2013 an

official decision was taken regarding this recognition. It greatly encouraged different forms of

exploratory practices in a post-rural urbanization era. Chongming Xianqiao and Huangyan, located on

the eastern coastal area of China, stand out as typical cases. Chongming Xianqiao is mainly urbanizing

through a series of exploring projects whereas Huangyan’s urbanization process is based on a long-

term cooperation between local authorities and University exploratory practice. Through in-depth case

studies of these practices in these two urbanizing areas, this research will compare the differences

between regular ‘best-practices’ and exploratory practices, focusing on urbanization processes,

decision-making negotiations and socio-spatial performance among others. Possible new mechanisms

of post rural urbanization development, future urban-rural relationships and rural social values will be

further disused in a critical perspective.



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KEY WORDS Post-Rural Urbanization; Exploratory Practices; Rural development; Planning



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INTRODUCTION Economic growth and industrialization have become self-legitimating, extending their effects to entire

territories, regions, nations, and continents. As a result, the traditional unit typical of peasant life,

namely the village, has been transformed. Absorbed or obliterated by larger units, it has become an

integral part of industrial production and consumption (Lefebvre 2003:18).

As in China, this modification and transformation of villages accelerated greatly since The Reform

and Opening Up in 1978, an event of great importance in Chinese history. Since then, China embraced

market economy as its new development engine, and together with the extreme dichotomy policy1

between rural and urban, new formation processes, both tangible and intangible, were adopted. Rural,

as a pivotal territory for a typical agricultural country like China purely decreased as an essential

supplier of productive factors under a capitalist urbanization process and its traditional, social,

political and cultural characteristics overlooked.

During the past 35 years, Chinese economic boom has greatly contributed to basic industrialization,

sound infrastructure, material wealth, as well as ‘creative destruction’(Harvey, 1989, 2007; Brenner,

Marcuse, & Mayer, 2012) to the rural through a series of land policies [fig. 1]. These policies were, to

some extent aimed at providing cheap rural land and labor to maintain the expeditious economic

growth and rapid urbanization. In 1988, for the first time, the Constitution of People’s Republic of

China stated that the land use right could be changed in accordance with the law. During the following

years, other laws and regulations were issued which further opened the door of legally introducing

rural land to the land transaction market. These policy changes on the one hand seemed to construct a

fair land market and gradually eliminate the effects of dualistic urban-rural policy; however on the

other hand, they largely accelerated the rural urbanization in a demolished way. It is obvious to

observe the connection between the changing land policies and the transformation of the rural spatial

structure from Fig 1. The village and township enterprises boomed in southern China, which led to a

fragmented rural context in the late 19th century; followed by industry park development in eastern

rural China in the beginning of the 20th century and a new socialist village construction largely

promoted all over the nation since 2005. Rural urbanization formation followed the pace of the

changing national land policies. Urbanization rate represented by urban resident population rapidly

increased from 37.66% in 2001 ( China Association of Mayors ) to 53.73% in 2013 ( International

Eurasian Academy of Sciences) and still maintains an increasing annual growth rate. Sadly however,

rural land and labour are not permanently “endless”, hence rural urbanization by means of low-cost

resources and intensive capital investments has been recognized recently to be problematic, both

economically and socially.

1 Dichotomy policy, which was made to guarantee the most suffering stratum in Chinese history, widened the gap between urban and rural China. As a foundation of PRC the constitution protects the ownership of the land to rural population.



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[fig. 1] Rural Land Strategy Changes since 1978, Source: http://arts.cphoto.net/Html/jzxs/tpgs/110800140.html; https://www.google.com/maps; http://www.santaihu.com/2014101103.html

For decades, urbanization in China and even the academic discourse on urbanization were, implicitly

or explicitly, guided by western developed theories of Liberalism, Keynesian economic theory, Neo-

Liberalism, Neo-Keynesianism and so forth. To tackle the problems of rural urbanisation outlined

earlier, the Chinese government adopted a strategy of enhancing rural urbanization to stimulate

domestic demands when both fund investment and foreign trade were trapped and providing more

urban household registration2

to solve the labour shortage. The local government implemented large-

scale demolishing projects; merged numerous small villages into big ones; built villagers’ apartments

and transformed traditional crop planting to large-scale agricultural to spare more lands for

2 Urban Household Registration and Rural Household Registration is the most important element in the dualistic urban-rural policy in China. Registered to different area leads to different social welfare, social responsibilities and so forth. It is nearly impossible to transfer from Urban Household Registration to the Rural Household Registration due to the Land Law which simply states that only the rural population own farmland and land to build their own houses. But transfer to the Urban Household Registration happens naturally as the urbanization process is initiated.

http://arts.cphoto.net/Html/jzxs/tpgs/110800140.html

https://www.google.com/maps



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urbanization construction3.

These seemed to be rational solutions to the problem of rural urbanisation. However, they were only

rational to support the current capital circulation. Despite these solutions, in-depth research on the

fundamental problems of China’s rural urbanization showed huge potential disasters in the near future.

The Blue Book of City Competitiveness 2012, released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,

officially suggested that for the past decades, urbanization patterns have been unsustainable. Major

problems were identified as incomplete urbanization of population and excessive urbanization of land.

The problems would worsen in the future if government persist on promoting urbanization through

urban land expansion [fig. 2].

[fig. 2] The Transformation of Modality of Rural Area Source: http://www.santaihu.com/2014101103.html; http://www.panoramio.com/photo/50451900

The picture above shows that modality transformation, including urban villages and unrecognizable

villages all over the nation, happened in different areas in China in the past decade. The problems are

far more serious than what were limitedly indicated in the picture [Fig. 2]. Besides the changing land

policies which were mostly capital accumulation oriented, rural development formula could also be a

critical cause of the current situation. Regularly, there is an officially approved “best practice” of rural

development which completely follows the formula developed from urban planning practice. It

follows a process of local government committing qualified planning institutions for planning

documents, including instructions, planning strategies, planning maps and so forth, and the documents

will be approved by higher level authorities before implementation. However this imperfect urban

planning formula is, at least, conducted by specialists who are perfectly familiar with the urban

conditions in urban development. All the problems of urbanisation discussed earlier were recently

evaluated and an official decision taken on them in 2013. Construction of beautiful countryside was

officially stated as the development goal for rural China for the very first time, in the Central

Document Number One, 2013. Later that year, President Xi Jinping proposed a poetic purpose for the

next era of urbanization in China as: ‘To expand forests, lakes and wetlands in urban areas, to make

3 The Chinese government established the strictest farmland protection system worldwide to guarantee food and ecology safety since 2006, which rigorously required a minimum of 1.2 million square kilometers of arable land. The amount of increasing construction land is annually planned as “construction land quota” by the central government and distributed to local government.

http://www.santaihu.com/2014101103.html

http://www.panoramio.com/photo/50451900



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mountains and rivers visible in the cities, and to let people remember the old times’4, during the

Urbanization Conference. These strong political statements, implicitly or explicitly, constituted a

crystal clear goal for rural development and as well enhanced greatly the exploratory practice of

Beautiful Countryside. Although the exact or realistic route is still at an exploratory stage,

considerable practices have been implemented, which kick-started a journey of post-rural urbanization

towards achieving equitable development.

CASE STUDY OF EXPLORATORY PRACTICE IN HUANGYAN, ZHEJIANG PROVINCE

SHATAN VILLAGE

Shatan village is geographically situated to the east of Zhejiang Province [fig. 3] within the Yangtze

River Delta but not facing serious pressure from rapid urbanization presently. ‘Nine mountains half

river half farm’ a well-known slang perfectly describes the natural environment and human-land

relationship in the Village. The registered population of Shatan is 1,097 but the population actually

living there is 952. The village is as large as 191.3 hectares and its construction area is 27.25ha,

according to the Yutou Township Land Use Master Plan, which takes up 14.24% of the whole village.

Shatan evolved from Song Dynasty (1259), and the villagers are mostly the descendants of the

guardians who guarded the local Taiwei Temple that was constructed to commemorate a hero who

died from firefighting at that time.

[fig. 3] Location of Shatan in Yangtze River Delta [fig. 4] Village structure in Shatan Source: authors’ own photograph Source: authors’ own photograph The spatial and social structure started to change in 1995, when the first village industry started, which

brought in more jobs and environmental pollution as well. Affected by changing land policies, new

villages were gradually built-up5 since 2005, which are not so called villages any more but village

apartments not better than what is shown in [fig 2]. However since 2013, new exploratory planning

practices were initiated here. These practices were led by a strategic protocol between local

government and Tongji University which was rated top in the field of academic research on urban-

rural planning.

4 http://en.people.cn/90882/8500060.html 5 The villagers sold their land to the village collective in 2005 for the new village. As a result, they do not have land to plant anymore and have to find other jobs to live on.



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[fig. 5] Rural planning process and actors in every crucial phase Source: Authors’ construct Unlike the regular planning process, this new kind of planning practice did not follow the formal

process from short-time field investigation to the official planning document. The planning started

from a large-scale field investigation by a team of masters’ students from Tongji University who

majored in urban-rural planning, led by an experienced professor. Instead of two to three days of

fieldwork, they stayed for over a month and the fieldwork was comprehensive, involving participant

observations, questionnaire interviews, and group interviews. Through these research methods, the

planning team observed the local needs and provided local perspectives which aided in the later

formation of planning strategies. Since it is common knowledge and almost impossible to find a local

rural planner, these methods and cooperative mechanisms proved useful in the new practice.

[fig. 6] Fieldwork in Shatan Village Source:Authors’ own photograph

In-depth discussions were conducted among the professional team and local governors, including

township governors and village governors elected by all the villagers. Consensus was reached on the

concept of rural development which protects traditional characteristics. Therefore, demolishing of old

buildings did not suit the new concept of retaining historical local building style anymore.

Consequently, how to optimize the village to meet increasing need of new functions without

demolishing old buildings became a dilemma under circumstances of limited funding, limited

construction land quota, and the role of an administrative village6. The abandoned public buildings

were chosen to be new catalytic objects in future development. These buildings were planned to be

transformed into public service spaces and tourism spaces in the near future. An experimental project

of transformation of an old veterinary station was conducted first. The basic façade and old

6 Administrative village is the smallest unit of rural autonomy management in China.



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construction structures were well preserved. What improved were the internal spaces, which were

adjusted to suit multiple uses. The old veterinary station was accepted by the locals and became a rural

E-commerce store and a temporary planning exhibition room as soon as it was completed. This first

experimental project is really important. Instead of several planning sketches on document, it provided

a vivid example of how these optimizing projects will be done so that the concept is more assertive

and accepted by the locals and higher governors. More and more funding was attracted with more

projects promoted through this exploratory process.

[fig. 7] Comparison of transformed veterinary [fig. 8] Improved public places station Source: Huangyan Practice, author's Source: Zhang, L., author's own photograph own photograph What needs to be emphasized is that, not only was the decision-making process carried out through a

series of discussions – as opposed to a pile of documents done by professionals, but also the project

construction involved the use of the skills of local craftsmen7. These local craftsmen may lack

technical planning perspectives but they did possess local/traditional construction skills and wisdom.

So whilst the professional planners supervised the whole construction process, the local craftsmen

contributed their skills in the construction fields. Necessary adjustments were made on the spot, hence,

it was actually a mutual decision-making process involving constant dialogue and discussion through

every step.

The outcomes we could see through the rural development strategy in Shatan Village were actually the

decision of multiple levels and actors, including local governors, professional teams, local skilled

craftsmen and occasionally local villagers. Another vital actor, who was not always involved in the

discussion but in charge of the practical funding, was the higher-level agriculture officer. All these

actors played important roles through the whole process, especially the university professor who was

vital to every decision and attracted more political attention.

WUYANTOU VILLAGE

The rural development practice in Wuyantou is similar to the process in Shatan. The Village is situated

very close to Shatan village but under administration of another town, with similar natural resources

but more valuable in built environment. Unlike Shatan village, Wuyantou is a normal village which

does not have to provide any public services to villages around it, and its spatial structure is clearly

divided into an old and a new part. There are 281 villagers registered in this village with just about

three to five households currently living in the old village most of whom are very old people. Many of

the villagers are now living in the town, which is only 10-15 minutes by car or motorcycle.

7 In the past, most constructions in China were done by skilful craftsmen and issues concerning planning were mostly done by geomancy masters.



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In Wuyantou, a historical built-environment of the Republican Period of China is the outstanding

feature in the village. Before this exploratory planning practice, a large amount of money (2 million

CNY equals to about 276 thousand EUR) had been spent on this small village to maintain one old

historical settlement with the intention of revitalizing the village through tourism development.

However the results were not satisfactory.

[fig. 9] The spatial structure in Wuyantou (old village), Source: TV Station of Huangyan District The exploratory rural practice started in 2014. With a smaller population and a simpler function, it

appeared to be easy to conduct the planning practice for the locals most of whom were old and were

satisfied as long as the built environment was improved. However for the planning team it was still

challenging to actually develop a suitable plan for this shrinking village and preserve the precious

historic buildings and spatial structure. In-depth field investigation and interviews were the first step

and were followed with a consultation stage with all the other actors, in this case mainly the local

governors. The decision was made to start with infrastructure optimizing of an old bridge and the

transformation of a carpentry workshop. These two projects could be considered experimentations of

the cooperation among the professional team, local governors and craftsmen. The trust relationship

was established through times of negotiation, communication and exchange of advice among the

actors. Famous bridge professionals invited by the leading planning professor, contributed to the old

bridge repair project, which was to be demolished by local governors. This was because of the lack of

an appropriate method to maintain the bridge.

[fig. 10] The old bridge after reparation and the transformed old carpenter studio Source: authors’ own photograph



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Following the satisfaction of both local and high-level government officials with these two

experimental projects, more attention was given to this small village. As was the case in Shatan,

professional advice did not end at the planning phase as in a normal planning project, rather, the

professional team supervised the whole construction process of each and every project through weekly

visits and full-time online consulting. What was even gratifying was that the villagers who were not so

much involved in formulating the plan somehow got involved during the construction phase. Where

they had different ideas or views of the plan or the construction process, planning was adjusted

accordingly after discussing with the villagers and mutual consensus always reached through

communication and explanation. With a very clear concept, the built-environment greatly improved

and is still improving.

[fig. 11] Communicating and supervising during construction Source: First two (left to right) are authors’ own photograph; the third by Zheng, W. Aug. 2015 Emanating from the two cases presented, the effects of the exploratory rural practice in Huangyan are

obvious: 1) new functions were introduced into the villages, which vitalized local lives and provided

for a more competitive future; 2) traditional building styles and spatial structures were respected and

preserved which improved territory-identity in the area; 3) the improved built-environment in the

villages brought more funding from higher level government through annual development budget

which offers promising development opportunities. All these are benefits emanating from the new

exploratory practice. However, based on participant observations and interviews with the local

villagers and local governors after 1-3 years implementation of the rural planning practice, some

critical questions have to be considered. Firstly, in view of the limited annual funding, is it a better

choice to improve public services for future development compared to other choices, like improving

current living conditions in the new village? Although the villagers approve and have a positive

attitude towards the new practice going on in the village, and also indicate that their children would be

more than happy to come back if the tourism development offers more job opportunities, they still

have second thoughts about the practice as well. Some fears and second thoughts commonly expressed

include: “There might be only at most 7%-10% of locals benefiting from the tourism development” or

“The money could be used to improve our social insurance”. So the priority criteria are still a crucial

problem.

Secondly, vital actors that were not included in the plan development process were property developers. Normally property developers are involved in the planning practice at a very early stage but these projects were largely supported by government funding so it is still early to say if the market will support this kind of rural revitalization or not. Moreover, if the developers who control the money were involved without government funding, will the projects still be developed as what had been done with government funding? This is particularly important because the local government has a strong



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sense of preserving the traditions of the villages but developers are usually more interested in the short-term benefits. Thirdly, in these exploratory practices, the most important actor is the professor from a top-ranked University who is really experienced on the one hand, and on the other hand willing to spend a large amount of time in the area to understand the local perspectives, communicate with concerned staff, observe local characteristics and do continuous planning sketches and adjustments with local governors, craftsmen and even villagers. This cannot be easily replicated in another area without this vital actor, because whether the practice is successful or not largely depends on a planning professional, especially his understanding, judgment and concept. This notwithstanding, the experiences and theory developed from these practices would be extremely valuable to other rural development practices.

A CASE STUDY OF EXPLORATORY PRACTICE IN CHONGMING ISLAND, SHANGHAI

XIANQIAO VILLAGE

Xianqiao Village geographically situated in the middle of Chongming Island is the third biggest island

in China. The village is as large as 140 hectares. About 1,683 villagers are registered to this village

and it is divided into eleven villager teams. There was a textile industry near the village in the 1980s

but it was moved out in 2010 to allow for the official promulgation of the ecological island

constructive outline of Chongming. This policy officially released the local governors from GDP

assessment8 thus making ecological development theoretically, the only route for future development

in Chongming since then.

[fig. 12] Location of Xianqiao in Yangtze River Delta [fig. 13] Overview of Xianqiao Village Source: Author's own photograph Source: People’s Daily, 01 Oct. 2013, section 2 Planning practices of post-rural urbanization in Xianqiao are different from the former cases as they

were mainly initiated through a series programs, both official and private. In 2008, Xianqiao was

fortunate to be chosen as one of two experimental villages, and received a large amount of money to

transform toilets and improve other infrastructure. This project actively involved the locals and the

results were impressive. Later in 2010, under a project dubbed “Peach Bloom Experiment”, teachers

8 The GDP assessment was an official criterion to assess the work of governors according to the growth of local GDP during their tenures.



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and students from the College of Design and Innovation of Tongji University rented two hectares of

land to introduce a new concept of rural development. Six rural cooperatives were also established to

develop a different kind of eco-agriculture the same year. Because of the aged local population,

villagers were more than happy to rent their lands to these cooperatives, which were operated by local

rural entrepreneurs. Whilst the villagers rent their land to the cooperatives, the cooperatives in turn

employed the villagers, which formed a win-win scenario. Rural tourism and E-commerce stores,

based on local eco-agriculture were developed afterwards. At present there are eleven rural hotels,

eight of which are operated by locals and the other three operated by university teachers and students,

and several E-commerce stores selling local bio-agriculture products. Decisions on these projects from

conception to implementation were discussed between the local government and representatives of

village teams [fig. 14], and consensus was reached. However, based on the authors’ interviews

conducted during the field investigation, the main actors in these projects should be considered as the

higher government and local government because the local people had no choice. They held a positive

attitude and approved the projects as long as the programs offered were to improve their built-

environment without compromising their interests.

[fig. 14] Post rural-urbanization process in Xianqiao, Source: Authors’ own photograph

[fig. 15] Improved infrastructure: Bus station, Solar street lights and Fitness trail, Source: Authors’ own photograph

[fig. 16] Local rural cooperatives, Source: Authors’ own photograph



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[fig. 17] Local rural hotel, Source: Authors’ own photograph

It is apparent from the pictures that Xianqiao village greatly benefited from a series exploratory

programs since 2008. The original village spatial structure, local houses with courtyards and rural

characteristics were well preserved, which provided a fairly strong regional identity; the infrastructure

and public services were improved [Fig. 15]; rural cooperatives established [Fig. 16]; tourism slowly

and gradually developed [Fig. 17] among other benefits. Despite these benefits, some critical issues

and questions still need to be raised and seriously considered after the seven years of the exploratory

rural development practice. These are: considering the fact that in order to receive construction

funding from higher-level government, the development programs locally launched were based on

officially decided programs but not based on the results of investigations on local needs, a critical

question is whether these programs represented the best choice for the local people 2) Until now, most

projects were directly or indirectly dependent on government support. It is difficult to predict with

certainty whether rural development will still follow this eco-development route or other choices will

be made if official funding is lacking or government focus shifts to different directions. Thus the

sustainability of this exploratory practice is still questionable; 3) The annual income of 15000 CYN

(equivalent to about 2,070 EUR) per year per hectare, earned by villagers from land rent was very

small to support their livelihoods. Most of the locals thus had to go out to work to supplement their

incomes. For instance, during the field investigation a local governor reported, “Even though some

(about sixty) farmers were hired by the local rural cooperatives, many other villagers had no jobs and

had to go out in search of job opportunities. Leaving confortable houses on the island and going to the

center of Shanghai to struggle for a living is thus against their will.”

CONCLUSION Decades of misunderstanding of urban-rural relationships, which consider urban areas as the

fundamental arena of capitalist spatiality (Brenner, 2000) and rural areas as subsidiary factor

resources, led to negligence of rural development and widened the gap between urban and rural China.

In order to change this development mechanism, exploratory planning practices were initiated in rural

China since 2008. Huangyan and Chongming Xianqiao are two typical examples of these exploratory

practices. Both planning practices in Huangyan and Chongming Xianqiao could be considered a

success, to some extent because the built-environment was improved, local culture maintained, and

government attention attracted among other benefits. Considerable improvement was thus achieved if

compared to what happened in the former phase, not only judging from the superficial appearance but

also considering the rural development purpose and its accomplishments. However critical problems

cannot be ignored especially the issue of how the rural development mechanism will be sustained in

the absence of government funding and interest. Neither the long-term professional teams that

participated nor the experimental programs that were directly or indirectly supported through political



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funding could be considered as sustainable. The development of a local internal development

mechanism was more preferable and sustainable.

The exploratory planning practices are, from the authors’ point of view, if not enough to construct an

influential theory at present, but, more than enough, at least a crucial resource for policymaking. For a

long time in academia in China, practice is closely linked to theory. However, policy making, on the

other hand, constantly lacks connection with actual practices but is rather more closely related to the

governors’ intention. It is obvious that policies are powerful in shaping and transforming the rural,

including rural social structure, human-land relationships, and spatial characteristics among others. So

besides land policies, more adaptable and feasible rural policies are needed in promoting sustainable

and healthy post-rural urbanization mechanisms in China.

Unlike planning practice in urban areas particularly metropolitan areas, that produces ‘space products’

for the market which are purchased by citizens who have the right or ability to choose to buy or not, in

rural China, the planning practice leads to spatial products which villagers do not have the ability to

choose but to accept9. This makes the biggest difference between planning practice in urban and rural

areas in China and reveals why it is very important to involve local villagers as much as possible in

rural planning practice. However this is always the most challenging aspect of rural development

practice. Based on the authors’ field investigation, most of the villagers, even with enthusiasm, could

not understand any kind of planning documents and with pictures they may easily be deceived into

accepting rural development interventions. Thus, methods of public participation need to be creatively

formed if a sustainable development mechanism is to be achieved.

It can thus be concluded that since post-rural urbanization is still at a very early stage in China, both

systematic indigenous research and advanced experience are needed. Of critical concern will be the

need to focus on its sustainable development mechanisms, urban-rural relationships, rural social

structure, rural urbanization actors, and rural spatial formation among other related issues.

REFERENCES Brenner, N. & Marcuse, P. & Mayer, M. (2012). Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City. London; New York: Routledge.

Brenner, N. (2000). The Urban Question: Reflections on Henri Lefebvre, Urban Theory and the Politics of Scale. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24(2): 361-378.

Harvey, D. (2007). Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 610(1): 21–44.

Harvey, D. (1989). The Urban Experience. Reprint. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lefebvre, H. (2003). The urban revolution. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wang, X. & Jiang, Y. (2004). Analysis and Outlook of Circulation Policieson Rural Collective Construction Land Tenure in China. China Land Science 23(4): 38-42.

9 Only the “Villagers Class” that legally own lands that were distributed to them. They have a special human-land relationship, which normally indicates that the villagers will not leave their land.



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Yang, G. & Dai, T. & Zhong, P. & Wang, X. & Pang, L. & Liu, L. Zhang, L. (2015), The Huangyan Practice. Shanghai: Tongji Press.

China Association of Mayors. (2003) China Urban Development Report: 2001-2002. Beijing: The Commercial Press.

International Eurasian Academy of Sciences, China Science Center of International Eurasian Academy of Sciences. (2014), The State of China Cities: 2014/2015. Beijing: China City Press.

China’s National Land Use Policy Outline (2006-2020). (2008). Beijing: Xinhua News Agency.

Governments or Markets S. Jukur, S. Patel


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GOVERNMENT OR MARKETS? AN EVALUATION OF POLICY RHETORIC AND ONGOING PRACTICES IN PRO-POOR HOUSING PROGRAMS IN INDIA

A case of Pune, Maharashtra

Smruti Srinivas Jukur1, Sejal Patel2

(1) Graduate, Faculty of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT) University, Ahmedabad, India. [email protected] (2) Associate Professor, Faculty of Planning, Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology (CEPT ) University, Ahmedabad, India. & Phd Fellow, Faculty of Geo-Information Science and Earth observation (ITC), University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands. [email protected].

ABSTRACT Concentrated investment and employment opportunities in select areas has driven rapid urbanization.

Cities tend to make demands on land and other resources that are disproportionately high in relation to

the available land and existing population (UN Habitat, 2008). Provision of housing especially to the

lower income groups is a global challenge in most developing countries. With more than a billion

people and a current housing shortage of over 18 million, mostly among the lower income group,

India joins the struggle (HOHUPA, 2011). Housing needs of the lower income group citizens is not

favoured by the markets (Mukhija, 2001), hence its provision becomes a responsibility of the

government (C.Doolittll, 1982). In its constant evolving imagery of meeting this shortage, from slum

clearance to social housing to partnership with private, the Indian government has experimented itself

with several programs. But, does it really have the capacity to manage the deficit? Citing capacity

limitations, the abysmal performance in all its programs is taken for granted but, scientific analysis of

the causes of failures remains rarely attempted. Taking cue from this basis, the research evaluates

three pro-poor housing programs in terms of efficiency and efficacy and compares them with market

driven housing solution, in this case, Slum Rehabilitation Authority. The efficacy is assessed in terms

of intended outreach vs actual realizations on the ground, while the efficacy is assessed in terms of

changes in living conditions of the affected population. The paper matrixes through the various



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programs and identifies unexplored gaps, and compares that with market based solution in terms of

efficiency and efficacy. It concludes with citing the uncoordinated multiplicity of government

agencies and various stakeholders being a primary factor limiting the success of such interventions,

thereby recommending a better orchestrated program approach, mainly played through a sophisticated

state intervention.

KEY WORDS Pro-poor housing; policy practice gap; Role of government; Efficiency, Efficacy, India



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INTRODUCTION India with 1.2 Billion people and world’s fourth-largest economy (World Bank, 2013) is one among

the third world nations which have experienced the most rapid growth in population the underlying

pressure on the government to improve the living standards of the people, have caused the inability to

implement essential reforms in the rural areas. The underlying cause of the movement of so many

rural people to move to cities for better quality of life in the past few decades (Satterthwaite, 1989). It

is seen that these cities are growing at the rate of 1.70% to 4.18% in the peripheral Areas, as compared

to only 0.40% to 3.90% in the core, creating intense pressure on land (MoHUPA, 2008-09). Constant

shifting from agriculture to service industry has led the rural people to urban areas in search of

employment and better quality of life. Hence, pressurizing the cities to supply adequate services,

infrastructure and provision of housing facilities. Such increased demand has led to financial

constraints and challenged the ability of the government to manage within limited resources. The rapid

pace of urbanization, stress on Land and infrastructure has led to substantial shortage in housing.

Despite the advantages in urban areas, the poorest inhabitants often live in exceptionally unpleasant

and unhealthy conditions, these urban dwellers live hand to mouth and their demands for shelter and

basic services are not met by markets. Markets favour well defined property rights and people willing

to pay for complete services, making it tough for the economically weaker sections in the society.

Thus making the responsibility of the government to provide housing for the poor (C. Doolittll, 1982).

Housing is the most intrinsic need and an indicator of socio-economic development of the country.

Over the past few decades there is serious housing shortage. With the current 18 million urban housing

shortage (MoHUPA, 2008-09). According to the tenth five year plan the gap between the demand and

supply and supply and satisfaction has been widening. Confronting threats between escalating

urbanization and urban housing shortage it is expected that by 2051, India would be 50% urban with

major cities and metro’s attracting a major portion of the rural population, this has posed a major

challenge to the government and housing institutions (Induraya.Rajan, 2008).

31.16% are living in urban areas, it is expected to increase by 50% by 2050. The urban housing

shortage in the country at the end of 10th Five-Year plan was estimated to be 24.71 million for 66.30

million households (HH) 88% (21.78 million) of this shortage pertains to Economically Weaker

Sections (EWS) and another 11% (2.89 million) for Lower-Income groups (LIG). The middle and high

income groups are only 1% (0.04 million) (MoHUPA, 2012)1. As per the beginning of the 12th five-

year plan- the estimate of 14.7 million housing shortage (11th five year plan -18.5 million). Out of this

95% is linked to EWS and LIG it can come through the subsidized government housing programs. In

favour of this subsidized housing programs for Economically Weaker Section (EWS) and Lower

Income Group (LIG) either Direct Subsidy or Direct Loan had been initiated. In the past two decades

alone programs like VAMBAY, National Slum Development Programme (NSDP), Integrated Housing

and Slum development Programme (IHSDP), BSUP and Rajeev Awas Yojana (RAY) have been

implemented. If we look at the current 14.5 million, BSUP targeted only 1 million Dwelling Units

(DU) which is only 7% of the total housing shortage, of which 52% were constructed and only 35%

were occupied by the end of BSUP, these are the kinds of issues which lead to this research.

1 Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation (MoHUPA) is the apex authority of for government of India, for formulation of housing policy, programme and implementation of specific programmes of urban poverty and slum improvement at national level.



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The distribution of Slum population - State wise shows that of the total 93.056 million slum

population, Maharashtra alone had 18.1 million slums 2(Census, 2011) estimated to increase by

20.557 million by 2017, and has seen considerable efforts in meeting the housing defect for EWS

through policy interventions and hence has been selected for research.

RESEARCH RATIONALE Under pro-poor housing ear markings have been made by various programs in the last few decades,

starting from “Housing for all” (MoHUPA, 2011) in 2MHP (two million housing programme) to

JNNURM (Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission) which focused on the poor the

programs were adopted to provide subsidised housing for the EWS category. The government thus

facilitated the housing provision. However, later the global debate of housing advocacy advising the

governments to not involve directly in providing housing rather let the market provide started in the

late 1970’s, in response to which governments allowed the involvement of the markets (in 1965) and

other lateral institutions to intervene, to upgrade the slums and provide services. However, it has been

studied that government subsidised projects are financially not sustainable and heavily subsidised with

poor management.

The World Bank recommended and suggested privatization of housing delivery (World.bank, 1993).

Following this the government of Maharashtra was given a central government grand in 1985

(Jagdale, 2014) to bypass the bureaucratic delays and quick implementation. The state government

hence launched Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRD), which was decentralised and private sector

based. This was an invitation for private developers to redevelop the slums with a condition of insitu

redevelopment and the state would reward additional Floor Area Ratio (FAR) or Transfer

Development Rights (TDR) as incentive. These are the two main approaches in Maharashtra where we

can see the government facilitating pro-poor housing and on the other hand also inviting the private

developers to take up slum up gradation where the government plays the role of enabler.

But, the question of the outreach of both these approaches (in terms of what has been stated in the

rhetoric and what has been the outreach) in terms of targets and end user satisfaction has not been

researched in the case of Maharashtra, and hence has been taken for study. The findings would

identify gaps and good practices can be recommended for future programs.

LITERATURE REVIEW The immigrants have economic, social needs which fail to afford the market and hence, are forced to

bear the burdens of negativities of urbanization and have no choice but to live in slums with poor

living conditions. This resulting increase in demand housing is reflected in shortage of 18.8 million

dwelling units (DU’s) in 2012 which has reduced from 24.7 million in 2007 in urban areas. The GOI

2 A slum defined by the Census of India as residential areas where dwellings are unfit for human habitation by reasons of dilapitation, overcrowding, faulty arrangemnets and design of such buildings, narrowness of faulty arrangemnet of street, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities or combination of these factors which are determintal to saftey and health. Identified as compact area of atleast 300 popultion or about 60-70 House holds.



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reported that 10.55 percent and 7.41 percent respectively in Economically Weaker Section3 (EWS) and

Lower Income Group (LIG) category of the total 18.8 million (MoHUPA, 2012).

This study is an effort that focuses on the EWS sector and the initiatives that have been taken by the

government and the need for approach to overcome this problem. Housing sector and its performance

is fundamentally the product of the market forces, the demand and supply interplay determines what

the people are willing to pay for what they consider being worth (World.bank, 1993) with increased

demands and competitive forces, the markets fail to cater needs of the lower sections of the society, it

is inevitable that the government takes measures in provision of housing through introducing housing

policies that favour the EWS category and promote the markets and financing institutions to support

the same. According to the GOI (Government of India), MoHUPA the categories are defined by the

size of houses, which range between 300 to 1200 Square feet.

[fig 1] Role of GOI, 1st to 12th year plans, Source: Compiled from MoHUPA and allied Reports.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN PROVISION OF SUBSIDISED HOUSING Traditionally it has been debated whether housing is a public good or not? If it is not, then do markets

cater to the needs of all? If it is a public good then it means it has to be met with by the government.

But, does the government have enough capacity to meet all the housing shortage of the country?

The global discourse is that government should be encouraged though enabling instruments adopt

policies that enable market forces to work. (World Bank, 1993) suggested that there needs not be a

3 The definition of categories of EWS, LIG and HIG are defined by the income criteria’s, criteria for EWS section is <INR 1.5 lac per annum, the LIG section is INR 1.5-3 Lacs, and MIG INR 3-1 Lac per annum. These income criteria’s which defines the standard of household and on the basis of which the beneficiaries are decided are proposed by MoHUPA which was revised as households with income upto Rs. I lac classified under EWS and income between Rs 1 Lac – 2 lac will be classified as LIG .



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shift in the way housing policy is perceived. Markets govern most of housing production and hence

they must be considered. It is seen in the case of Nether lands how the government has failed in

providing social housing and markets have performed terrifically. In the case of Singapore the

government has succeeded to provide social housing with markets failure (Linden, 2009). Largely, the

empirical analysis says that the role of the government to be that of a facilitator that enables the

markets to provide housing (Kalarical, 2005). Contrary, Turner (1972, 1979). suggested that the

communities should take initiatives of improving the housing conditions and that the government must

reduce direct involvement, which led to a major influence to the policy makers The role of the

government in India however has shifted from slum clearance and evictions, to subsidised employee

housing, to infrastructure provision and then higher role of the markets. Related to this alone scholars

and researchers say differently. Social housing is not the right approach to meet the deficit there are

policy failures (Patel, 2013).

BASE LINE PROFILE OF THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND CITY OF PUNE Maharashtra is a state in the Western region of India. It has 9.28 percent of the total country’s

population, it presents the existence of affluence and Poverty both at high levels. With a population of

112 million (Census, 2011) and housing shortage of 1.94 million the state has one of the maximum

housing shortages. The city of Pune is the second most populous city in the state of Maharashtra after

Mumbai. It is strategically located and has Ghats and hills to its topography. Of the total population of

2.5 million 32.5 percent lives in slums (Mashal, 2009). Many pro-poor housing programs have been

implemented in this city and hence has been taken for this research.

[fig 2] Pro-poor housing programes



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PRO-POOR HOUSING PROGRAMS- BASE LINE PROFILE

VALMIKI AMBEDKAR MALIN BASTI YOJNA (VAMBAY)

Launched in 2001, with an objective to provide shelter or upgrade the existing shelter for the EWS

category, with a vision to achieve ‘Shelter for All’ (MoHUPA, 2001). The beneficiaries identified

were urban slum dwellers as defined by the 2001 census. There were special reservations for the

backward classes including physically and mentally disabled people. The mode was direct subsidy and

loan, providing DU’s and special provision of sanitation under Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan, subcomponent

of the scheme. The financing pattern was 50:50 share, 50 per cent by the GOI and balance 50 per cent

to be arranged by the state government with ceiling costs prescribed prescribed both for dwelling units

and community toilets. The state’s share consisted of funds from any source in the form of subsidy or

loan from Housing and Urban Development Corporation Limited (HUDCO) or from any other

budgetary support including the resources of local bodies or the beneficiary. A State Level Nodal

agency (SLNA) was formed for the implementation. The monitoring was entrusted with the State level

Co-ordination Committee (SLCC), which constituted of the project officer, the Secretary of the Urban

Local Body (ULB) and the Community Development Society (CDS). Suitable NGO’s (Non-

Government Organizations) wherever available were to be associated for supervision and guidance of

the construction on site. Community participation was limited to the construction of the house and

contribution of labour, to achieve economy in cost and ensure quality in construction which leads to

greater satisfaction of the house by the beneficiary. This programme was later in 2006 subsumed under

BSUP programme.

BASIC SERVICES FOR URBAN POOR (BSUP) Launched in December 2005, it is a sub-Mission under Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal

Mission (JNNURM).The objective was focused attention to integrated development of Basic Services

to the Urban Poor in the cities covered under the mission. Includes Provision of Basic Services to

Urban Poor including security of tenure at affordable prices, improved housing, water supply,

sanitation and ensuring delivery through convergence of other already existing universal services of

the Government for education, health and social security. The funding pattern was 50:40:10 viz centre,

state and beneficiary .Central sanctioning and Monitoring Committee and SLNA was formed under

MOHUPA for periodic monitoring. The ULB was responsible for implementation of the projects.

Community participation was limited to beneficiary contribution and designing of the DU’s.

SLUM REHABILITATION AUTHORITY (SRA), IN MAHARASHTRA- Evolved from 1974 over various schemes, launched in 1995 .The Government of Maharashtra

launched this unique approach which caters to the problems of slums, initially in Mumbai then in

Pune. The approach is market based where the government has created a working model that gives

cross-subsidy to the private developers. Under this scheme the state government tried to implement the

unorthodox strategy to improve the housing conditions of slums in the city. This approach is contrary

to the traditional approach of incremental housing. The slum development involves demolition and

redevelopment at a high density. The re-developed buildings include both the market rate housing to

the new buyers and cross-subsidised housing to the original inhabitants. The role of the government



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here is of a facilitator where key policy changes through land development regulations have allowed

this increased density through redevelopment in the slums of the city. Thus, providing cross-subsidy

for the slum dwellers from the increased permitted intensity. The implementation and monitoring is

the responsibility of SRA for initial mortgage period of ten years. The operation and maintenance is

done by the developer through funds raised by the community for an initial period of two years, later

to be taken care by the society formed by the community. Community participation is the key driver of

this scheme, it is to be ensured that minimum 80 per cent community consent is required at all stages

till the completion of the project.



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[table 1] Program Matrix- Mode, Roles and Responsibilities



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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Mixed methods i.e. Qualitative and Quantitative methods are used to achieve the objectives. Critical analysis for data collected through secondary sources in Qualitative and statistical analysis through Quantitative, through semi- structured interviews of key persons Interviews and of the programme beneficiaries. Formative research was carried out, key issues for the enquiry were identified on the basis of literature study, insights from own involvement and from secondary and reconnaissance survey. The settlement profiles were studied through involved focus group discussion of the key persons. The programs have been assessed based on their target versus actual outreach gaps .i.e. the number of dwelling units sanctioned Vs Units constructed vs units allotted vs units occupied. The improvement in standard of living of the intended beneficiaries will indicate the efficacy of the programme. This assessment is structured around a set of key questions derived from the principles of shelter for all. This includes economic development, quality of life and safe environment-laid down by the GoI, Urban Housing and Habitat Policy in 2005, and reiterated in 2007 in the report submitted to the committee on Economic, social and Cultural rights (ECOSOC) of the United Nations (Menon-Sen and Bhan, 2008). The indicators are access to health, education, livelihood, public transport, Infrastructure, secure tenure and ownership of the dwelling unit. To evaluate the programme efficacy through improvement in the standard of living, a stratified random survey (10% sample size of total households) was conducted, with beneficiaries in each project stratified according to their departure slum sites. First household was picked from draw of lots, identified as the starting point for the survey, thereafter every fifth house in each sub-stratum was selected. The selection of the projects under each programme is based on, the minimum two years’ time-lag post occupancy, considered as settling period.

[fig 3] Note: Project locations-Pune.



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In the adjoining Map the specific colour represents the displacement and resettlement locations from specific departure slum to relocation site. VAMBAY and BSUP 1 are Relocation cases and BSUP2 and SRA are Insitu redevelopment cases.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS The secondary and primary data collected and collated are analysed in two levels. Firstly, the

programme outreach and then the user satisfaction in terms of improved Standard of Living.

PROGRAMME EFFICIENCY

The Efficiency is evaluated by the programme performance i.e. its target achieved by the given total

input. The gaps in terms of dwelling units targeted Vs the sanctioned unit’s vs constructed units Vs

allotted units Vs occupied units. For the programme to be 100 percent efficient the units occupied are

the units targeted. This indicator also measures the efficiency of the government to utilize the funds

and of the financial agencies.

[fig 4] Statistical Analysis from Primary and Secondary data compiled From the above efficiency analysis [fig 4] from the government subsidised programs VAMBAY

shows highest occupancy with 83% in comparison to BSUP. Both the BSUP Relocation and In-situ

have achieved 45% and 48% occupancy respectively. However, the distance of displacement being the

major cause for post-displacement impoverishment, the highest gap in occupancy has been observed in

BSUP relocation. The market based program of SRA has been an outlier with a gap of 75% in



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between sanctioned and constructed, this is seen due to robust community participation and hence

approvals and clearance processes. But it remains consistent through all the stages until occupancy.

The number of dwelling units constructed has seen 100 percent occupancy.

The following table shows the sample framework for House hold survey, January to March 2015. Resettlement

site

Name of departure slum

Original No.s of HHs on departure slum

No.s of HHs evicted from departure slum

No.s of Resettled HHs

BSUP

(Warje)

Siddhart Nagar 400 400 390

Dandekar pool 239 195 195

Paud Phatak 351 100 98

Laman Tanda pashen

611 98 98

Sagar Colony 225 195 195

VAMBAY

(Hadapsar)

Dandekar pool 80 50 30

Chamdegalli, Bhavanipet

58 58 30

Koregaon Park 350 350 50

Anand nagar 300 100 30

Kamgar Putla 180 100 100

TOTAL 2794 1646 1216

[table 2] Sample Framework for Household survey, January to March 2015 Note : The data above has been aggregated from various sources such as NGO s involved in community mobilization i.e SPARC, Shelter Associates and MASHAL and from our field survey. The resettled houses are as per the survey.

PROGRAM EFFICACY Efficacy is assesed by the level of satisfaction achieved by the program to the commmunities post

occupancy. Here the intended result of program is improvement in standard of living post resettlement.

It is a quantifiable pre-determined measures of standard of living. Eight indicators have been identified

based on two frameworks, first is Cernea’s (2000) IRR framework the second is the framework for

standard of living by United nations comittee on Econimic Social and Cultural rights (ECOSOC)

adopted bt Menon-Sen and Bhan (2008).



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Indicator Specific Indicator( measured as) 1 Access to Livelihoods Loss of working days Sustained loss of job Increased distance to work and Modal shift from NMT to Private modes

hence associated transport cost. Increased monthly expenditure as percentage of income and percentage change in income

Increase in debt 2 Access to Education Increase in distance School dropout ratio and loss of school attendance days Increased distance, mode shift from NMT to private modes hence,

travel cost and monthly cost for education vis-à-vis income

3 Access to Health Access to nearest Primary Health Care (PHC) and higher-order health facilities

Increased monthly expenditure on health as percentage of income 4 Infrastructure Lack of access to basic infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation

and solid waste management. Water supply- Measured in terms of average hours of supply in a day and distance to facility

Sanitation- Availability of onsite facilities, individual or community toilets compared to previous location and connection to sewerage network. Solid waste management- management systems existing, if any, within the site for door to door collection and its efficiency

5 Access to Public Transport

Increase or decrease of distance to access nearest bust stop

Mode shift from NMT to Private modes and increased monthly expenditure on transport as percentage of income

6 Type of Dwelling Unit

Size of DU as specified in the rhetoric

Access of natural light and ventilation Access to emergency and decreased vulnerability as to the previous

location Presence/absence of Community participation

7 & 8

Ownership and Tenure

Ownership status and security of tenure

Transfer in ownership and rent as percentage of total

[table 3] Indicators for Standard of Living, Source: Compiled from (Patel at al,, 2015 and Menon-Sen and Bhan, 2008)



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ACCESS TO LIVELIHOODS The location of land is a determining factor in the urban areas, also with respect to new opportunities

for livelihood plays an important role is the overall wellbeing of the communities. The primary

indicator here is thus temporary loss of livelihood in working days and permanent loss if any. In case

of resettlement in locations the other indicators are increased in distance to work and shift from Non-

Motorised transport (NMT) and Public Transport (PT) to motorised and private modes and increase in

average monthly expenditure on transport as percentage of monthly income vis a vis departure slum.

Policy Practice VAMBAY- The policy does not include any support to the displaced families or livelihoods or capacity and skill building.

The Relocation departure sites varied from the nearest location of 4kms (Anand nagar) to 8.2 Kilometres. Resettlement were not within the same wards. 15% of the workers lost employment permanently till the date of survey. Main workers could not find alternative employment in vicinity and had to switch to self-employment as shown in fig [6]

BSUP The policy does not include any support to the displaced families or livelihoods or capacity and skill building.

Relocation- It is revealed that no surveyed household was resettled within the same ward. Mean relocation distance is 6.2 kilometers.This resulted in loss of permanent employment in 35% of workers. Average loss of income days was 120 days. The site is located in the city periphery and hence new opportunities are absent fig[5] The average debt per household is INR 1, 08,000 Insitu- According to survey there is a loss of income of 18% due to monitoring of construction and lack of support for transit accommodation. This however did not affect permanent livelihood. Average debt per HH is INR 1, 00000.

SRA- The policy clearly specifies support for transition but is silent on livelihood.

The survey shows no loss of income as the transport and shifting cost are taken care by the developer.

[table 4] [fig. 5] BSUP- Warje Main workers switch to self-employment [fig 6] VAMBAY-Hadapsar



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ACCESS TO EDUCATION FACILITIES Loss of access to education and health facilities leads to deterioration in the economic and human

wellbeing. This form of impoverishment is measured by the school dropout ratio and the loss of

school attendance days due to the relocation process. The other indicators are increase in distance to

school, modal shift from NMT and PT to Motorised Private Transport and associated increase in

monthly expenditure on education as percentage of monthly income vis a vis departure slum.

[table 5]

ACCESS TO HEALTH FACILITIES Loss of access to health facilities leads to deterioration in the economic and human wellbeing. Access

to health facilities is interpreted as access to PHCs and public hospitals. Loss of access forces

households to shift to private facilities which eventually increases average monthly expenditure on

health as percentage of monthly income vis a vis on departure slum.

Policy Practice VAMBAY- Guidelines state “Availability of school at the resettled location as mandatory for project sanctioning” (Government of India, 2001).

Despite the policy mandate, there was no school in the vicinity of the site. The increase in distance from the school has resulted in 10% of permanent dropouts and an average loss 45 days of school attendance in the relocation process.

BSUP- There is no clear mandate on access to education in the guidelines for resettled households. However the guidelines make a perfunctory reference by stating that ‘Convergence of health, education and social security schemes for the urban poor could be an admissible component within BSUP’(Government of India, 2009b). This implies that existing schemes in a city or state pertaining to these sectors could be converged and supported under BSUP.

Relocation- About 40 % of the students have permanently dropped out from schools. The average loss of attendance in the relocation process is 117 days. This is also because the displacement took place in middle of an academic year. Nearly, 60% of the students shifted from NMT and PT modes which has increased the average monthly expenditure for transport as percentage of monthly income by 12 %.

Insitu- 90% of the children between 3-16 Years go to municipal Schools, 10% private. There has been an average loss of 12% with 35 days due to interim demolition and lack of support or mobilization.

SRA- There is no mention of access to education in the policy.

The relocation is Insitu and hence does not affect the access to education. Nearest Municipal school is within 1km radius.



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[table 6]

ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE Loss of access to basic infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation and SWM leads to worsening of

human and social wellbeing. Water supply is measured in terms of average hours of supply in a day

Policy Practice

VAMBAY - Policy states availability of Primary Health Care (PHC) facility mandatory for project sanctioning (Government of India, 2001).

There is no PHC available around the site, the distance to the nearest functioning PHC is 3 kilometers. For higher order health facilities the nearest government hospital is 20 kilometers away from site. As a result 100% households have shifted from government to private health facilities.

BSUP - Guidelines suggest perfunctorily by stating “convergence of health schemes existing in the city/state with the BSUP program” (Government of India, 2009b). Detailed Project Report appraisal checklist inquires ‘whether provisioning for community centre, community primary health care centre, primary education centre, parks and open spaces has been made in the DPR’ (Government of India, 2009a).

Relocation- There were no convergence of health scheme available on site. The distance to PHC is 2 kilometers and to government hospital is 16 kilometers. The increase in average monthly expenditure on health care as percentage of monthly income is 13%.

Insitu- 90% of the children between 3-16 Years go to municipal Schools, 10% private. There has been an average loss of 12% with 35 days due to interim demolition and lack of support or mobilization.

SRA - No mention of Health in the policy. The policy aims at Insitu development and possibility of rehabilitation in the nearest possible location, due to which the access to health is same as previous and does not affect the communities. For advanced health the hospital is 1km radius.



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and distance to the facility. Sanitation is measured by availability of on-site facilities, individual or

community toilets compared to previous location and its connectivity to sewerage network. For SWM

door to door collection and its efficiency is assessed.

Policy Practice VAMBAY- The policy states that the Urban Local Body (ULB) must provide drinking water on the site before the commencement of work from either municipal resources or urban water supply programs. “The ULB will need to mobilize other resources for provision of water supply, sanitation etc. on site” (Government of India, 2001).

In contrary to the policy, as informed by the communities drinking water and electricity were not provided on site for initial two years post occupancy. The community depended on the canal water which is at a distance of 2 kilometers from the site. The current average water supply is 3 hours per day. The toilets are connected to sewers. There is a community hall on site and it is functional as mentioned in the guidelines however, there are no recreational facilities.

BSUP- The guidelines specifies” improved water and sanitation facilities ensuring delivery through other existing universal service” (Government of India, 2009).

Relocation- The current water supply is for 4 hours per day. However, the topography of the site is uneven and the reservoir tank is positioned at the lowest elevation. Hence water has to be pumped up to the buildings resulting in high energy consumption by the communities at higher elevation and uneven distribution of bills and discord within the community. Sanitation- Individual pour flush toilets and connnection to sewer network. Insitu- Water supply is for 4 hours daily, two hours in the morning and 2 hours in the evening. There is 100% up gradation for water infrastructure. Improved sanitation with individual toilets have been implemented, but drainage systems are not in place.

SRA- The ULB must provide drinking water on the site before the commencement of work from either Municipal Resources/ Urban water supply programs, 25% funds under scheme for water supply. Where necessary hand pump must be installed.Sanitation- Drainage system to be provided, individual toilets if not possible then community toilets to be provided. Electricity- Provision of Electricity supply by the ULB

Water supply is for 4 hours daily, two hours in the morning and 2 hours in the evening. 80% of the tenements have tanks and hence water is stored, hence no issues w.r.t water supply. Initial one year the developer takes care of the

maintenance. Individual toilets have been

provided.

[table 7]



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Policy Practice VAMBAY- The policy guideline mandate transport link but not public transport link by stating that “Urban Local Body will need to mobilize availability of social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, transport links etc. which are mandatory for sanctioning of VAMBAY projects”(Government of India, 2001).

Our survey shows a drastic shift of 80% of work trips by NMT and PT to private and motorized modes. There is no transport connectivity from site to the nearest bus stop, which has increased the average monthly expenditure on transport as percentage of monthly income by 12 % vis a vis departure slum.

BSUP- The policy guidelines did not make provision for access to public transport on resettlement sites.

Relocation- On departure slums, 90% work trips were by NMT and PT which are reduced to 30% on BSUP site. Increase in average monthly expenditure on transport as percentage of monthly income is 12% vis a vis departure slum site. The location of the nearest bus stop is 1 km with poor frequency of 1 bus per hour per direction. From the survey it’s revealed that the ULB had agreed to the bus route near to the BSUP site previously but denied this post occupancy Insitu- The nearest bus stop is within 0.5 Km.

SRA- No mention of Health in the policy.

Nearest Bus stop is Ram Tekdi Bus stop at the distance of 0.3 Km

[table 8]

ACCESS TO PUBLIC TRANSPORT (PT) Connectivity to PT is measured as increase or decrease of distance to nearest bus stop, the frequency

of bus service and shift from PT to Private and Intermediate Public Transport services (IPT).

[fig 6] Distance displacement for resettled sites.



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TYPE OF DWELLING UNIT Size of DU as specified in the rhetoric Access of natural light and ventilation Access to emergency

and decreased vulnerability as to the previous location. Pre

Policy Practice VAMBAY- The guidelines state “No hard and fast type design is prescribed for VAMBAY dwelling units. However plinth area of a new house should normally be not less than 15 sqmtr. The layout, size and type design of VAMBAY dwelling units would depend on the local conditions and preferences of the beneficiary. Incorporation of disaster resistance features in design units shall be made compulsory” (Government of India, 2001).

The carpet area of dwellings was decided on the availability of funds with PMC which contradicts the basic per capita space requirement. The beneficiaries were consulted for design but were not considered during implementation. However most resident expressed satisfaction with one of them stating that ‘the site layout is well planned in terms of access to natural light, ventilation and emergency evacuation.

BSUP- The DPR appraisal checklist inquires “Whether the floor area of dwelling unit is equal or more than 25 sq.mtrs? Whether each dwelling unit comprises two rooms, kitchen and a toilet?” (Government of India, 2009a). Thus minimum standards of dwelling size is mandated in the checklist.

Relocation- the DPR was prepared by private consultants appointed by PMC but DPR was not shared in public domain and hence the designs and beneficiary list were neither made public nor shared with the beneficiaries. This was expressed by a community leader who stated ‘we were not consulted in terms of design preferences or affordability to pay our contribution ’ii. There were unseen land issues which emerged after project was sanctioned, hence the building heights were increased from groun+5floors to ground +8 floors without any consultation with communities. Insitu- House Design as per DPR evolved with community participation, especially the women of the HH. 25 sq.mt.(G+1) which includes 1 multipurpose room, 1 bedroom, 1 cooking alcove with wash area, 1 bath, 1 water closet.

SRA- The carpet area is fixed 25sq.mt.per tenement.

The dwelling unit are with good quality construction, good ventilation and access to services. The designs are approved by the community and varies from developers.

[table 9]



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[fig 7] Dwelling Unit BSUP-Relocation. [fig 8] Dwelling unit VAMBAY

[fig 9] BSUP-Insitu Street and Dwelling unit.

OWNERSHIP AND TENURE The ownership of dwelling implies economic wellbeing. The lack of ownership till completion of

mortgage period and renting out in this duration because of inability to pay mortgage are indicators of

impoverishment



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Policy Practice VAMBAY- The policy states that “The title deed should be in the joint name of husband and wife alone. Till the repayment of loan, if any, the house built with VAMBAY funds along with land shall be mortgages to the Governemnt/ concerned Urban Local Body”(Government of India, 2001)

85% of the households were owners and 15% are transferred owners or second owners All owners have completed mortgage payment of INR 30,000 over a period of 10 years.

BSUP- Policy mandates “A joint ownership or primary in the name if the woman of the household” The ownership lease period is 10 years (Government of India, 2009b).

Relocation- All households were first allottees and renting out was not witnessed. However 31 % of allotted dwellings remained unoccupied by the allottees. The community leader cited ‘distant location from departure slum and livelihood and other opportunities’ for the unwillingness of most of such allottees to shift here Insitu- All the HH were First allottees and renting was not seen.

SRA Ownership of the tenement is in joint ownership with the women of the HH

The dwelling unit are with good quality construction, good ventilation and access to services. The designs are approved by the community and varies from developers.

[table 10] The quality of life indicators have been evaluated based on rhetoric reality practice. The evaluation on

ground of efficiency and efficacy for each programme leads to the conclusion that although

VAMBAY scores best in delivery but is least in terms of efficacy or improved standard of living of the

communities. The BSUP insitu has given tenure rights but failed in design aspects. The BSUP

relocation has performed poor in terms of efficiency and efficacy both. Although the living conditions

have improved but at the cost of livelihood and education. The SRA projects on the contrary have

proved to be an extremely good practice, having showed high construction efficiency and very high

efficacy in terms of end user satisfaction. .. The success of the SRA model being the role of the

government being that of a facilitator, it has let the markets to intervene to provide solutions through

cross subsidy, at the same time ensures the community interests. It has very clear identified roles and

responsibilities and forces the developer for minimum 80 percent community participation for the

project sanctioning at all stages which leads to very high level satisfaction and improved standard of

living post occupancy.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS The research validates the literature that the government should encourage through enabling

instruments and adopt policies that enable market forces to implement pro poor housing. In this case



282

of Maharashtra the role of the government as a facilitator to enable markets has proven to be more

successful both in terms of programme outreach and end user satisfaction in improvement in the

standard of living. The SRA scheme has performed the best in all aspects.

The research validates the findings of Patel et al (2015) that relocation distance (in case of VAMBAY

and BSUP) is the most significant cause of post-displacement impoverishment and must be adequately

addressed in the policy. This is the root cause of chronic loss of livelihood and permanent loss in

education among the displaced families. Loss of access to community facilities and health risks are

weakly addressed in both BSUP and VAMBAY policies and practice by the local government related

to the same is even weaker.

The failure of both BSUP and VAMBAY in terms of efficiency and efficacy is attributed to the lack of

clear roles and responsibilities in the design of the programs and most importantly in completed

exclusion of the communities from the entire process there is clear lack of awareness in the

communities and no financial support models leading them to debts. In the absence of appropriate

guidelines, the beneficiaries are virtually excluded from the process of design, planning

implementation and management of resettlement processes in the government subsidized pro-poor

housing in the case of Maharashtra.

Lack of understanding of the needs of community by the government has led to poor occupancy, poor

satisfaction, and further impoverishment of the beneficiary households on new sites, corroborating the

findings of Patel in similar research in Ahmedabad and Indore (Patel and Mandhyan, 2014; Patel et al.,

2015).

A comparative assessment of the government subsidized housing programs versus the market provided

housing program indicates the latter to have performed better in the both the aspects of efficiency and

efficacy. The research concludes that the primary reason for limited success of the housing programs

in India is the multiple agencies involved and lack of coordination as well as clarity of defined roles of

each agency leading to weak implementation of programs on ground despite weak presence of policy

rhetoric’s.

With 14.5 million housing shortage and the failure of BSUP the research feeds back into the current

affordable housing and slum upgrade programs and policies.

Post National elections of 2015 and with the new government’s vision of “Housing for all by 2020”

mass construction by government of 20 Million housing directly by the government, it is important to

recognize finding of this research among others (Mahadevia et al., 2013; Patel, 2013; Patel and

Mandhyan, 2014; Patel et al., 2015) and reconsider and redefine the role of government in delivery of

Affordable housing to urban poor. If this findings and writing on the wall is not heeded than it will be

one more case of humungous loss of exchequer’s money, wasted in ill-conceived government

subsidised housing programs with poor efficiency and poorer efficacy. Instead to meet t this target, the

government must enable the policies to incorporate the markets with sound regulatory and

accountability measures for the markets. This would mean a change in the role of the government

from that of a provider of subsidy to that of a facilitator, which enables the markets to meet the

demand.



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From advice to best practice C. Pätsch


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FROM ADVICE TO BEST PRACTISES

RANGES OF POLICY TRANSFER AND THEIR TRANSFER OUTPUTS IN KIGALI, RWANDA

Carolin Pätsch

Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus – Senftenberg (BTU) Faculty 2, chair urban management [email protected]

ABSTRACT ‘Planning diffusion’ is as old as ‘city developers’ interact, which they probably have been doing since

planned development of cities takes place. However, the types of ‘planning diffusion’ changed over

time. Currently the international spreading of planning ideas happens in ‘new forms and flows’1 and

ranges from global policy transfer to the ‘physical design for nation building’2. In this field ‘planning

diffusion’ constitutes concepts of learning, policy transfer and urban models. The paper observes

outputs of ‘planning diffusion’ in the case of Kigali, Rwanda. Rwanda’s development in the last 100

years was highly influenced from outside. Imported ideas and approaches to urban planning are just

one example of policy transfer. Currently ‘planning diffusion’ in Kigali varies from transfer of policies

via international development aid to informal exchange, i.e. through city networks. ‘Planning

diffusion’ by consulting of an international planning firm from Singapore falls in this range. The paper

examines this ‘planning diffusion’ process and discusses the ranges of policy diffusion in Kigali

within the framework of a master plan. The aim of this article is to reveal the different kinds of advice

(i.e. best practice) in order to reveal the ranges of ‘planning diffusion’ in the definitions of the master

plan.

KEY WORDS urban planning, planning diffusion, policy advice, best practice

1 Healey, 2010, p. 1 2 Ibdn, p. 3



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AN APPROACH TO ‘PLANNING DIFFUSION’ Current phenomena of ‘planning diffusion’ in urban fields range from urban modelling and best

practice to consultancy and international workplace exchange. Regarding its long history and wide

field of objectives, ‘planning diffusion’ has become part of the planning tradition of countries.3

Working with inspirations or external advice is an integral part of the daily urban planning practice of

city administrations.

Once ‘planning diffusion’ takes place, formerly unknown ideas and instruments of urban design enter

the toolbox of urban planners and therefore enter also the institutional structures of the planning

system. Although the process of ‘planning diffusion’, to a certain degree, takes place unconsciously4,

it requires a positivist urban planning movement in the receiving country.5 Diffusion processes

‘involve complex processes of translation, interpretation and adaption’6. Therefore ‘planning

diffusion’ is the de-territorializing and [re-]territorialising of policy knowledge, which has a high

political notion.7 Policies of a country, due to ‘planning diffusion’ or not, are ‘intensely and

fundamentally local, grounded, and territorial’8 because the local interests of politics connects it to the

places.

At present, different conditions shape ‘planning diffusion’. The fruitful transfer of ideas highly

depends on commonalities with the original frame. However, unintended consequences of the

circulating concepts, ideas or physical forms are possible. Therefore conditions of a successful transfer

do not solely depend on the technique. According to Healey it is the rate of urbanisation, global

economic relations, and transnational as well as global networks, which influence the transport of

ideas.9 Consequences of the second condition are homogenised planning approaches, which are assets

for internationally operating firms and developers. The standardised approaches are targeted by cities

to win the competition of investment and consumption.10

In addition, underlying assumptions of

objects and attitudes of the diffusion agent are conditions for a successful transfer.

Even though ‘planning diffusion’ is a subject in various fields of research, typologies of ‘planning

diffusion’ rarely are. Dolowitz and Marsh analyse forms of transfer in these categories: copying,

emulation, combination, and inspiration.11

Ward distinguishes between imposition, borrowing, and

synthetic innovation. 12

Although the case can be categorised along both approaches, the typologies of

Ward are more promising because Ward’s distinction offers better reference to integrate the ‘planning

diffusion’ phenomena of the case. In addition the typologies offer helpful categories to analyze the

relation between the diffusion parties.

3 Ward, 2002, p. 3 4 However the respective behaviour and motivation are actor specific and often lie beyond urban planning objectives. 5 Ibdn, p. 402 6 Healey, 2010, p. 5 7 McCann, Ward, 2011, p. xxi 8 Ibdn, p. xiv 9 Healey, 2010, p. 6-7 10 Ward, 2002, p. 6 11 Dolowitz, Marsh 2000, p. 13 12 Ward, 1999



287

Ward developed typologies based on power relations, which refer to context and milieu.13

Therefore

endogenous key features of these typologies differentiate according to initialisation of the diffusion

and to the power relation between exporting and importing party.14

According to Ward it is important

that these categories are ‘not static descriptions’15

. There are very often changes within the process and

overlaps of the typologies.

[fig. 1] The relation between exporting and importing party in a process of ‘planning diffusion’ according to Ward (1999): imposition (left), borrowing (middle) and synthetic innovation (right). (own illustration) The main driver of ‘planning diffusion’ by imposition

16 is the exporting country that does not

recognise ‘indigenous democratic or property rights’.17

Imposed diffusion triggers several graduations

concerning the reaction of the native (importing) community or government. Although indigenous

action against the imposition exists, the imposing party succeeds due to means of pressure. A typical

context for ‘planning diffusion’ by imposition is the colonial age: planning ideas were often

transferred unmodified from the colonial motherland to the colonies. Examples of this diffusion are

urban planning of the French in the Maghreb, i.e. Casablanca18

or the British Town Planning Act,

which spread through the colonies, i.e. Singapore and Australia.

The initiator of the process, the importing country, shapes the outputs in the borrowing typology.19

It is

optional whether the importing country is borrowing planning approaches from a single or multiple

sources. The selective borrowing does not happen randomly. However it is mainly based on common

cultural or technical features.20

In the diffusion process the objects are adapted to local circumstances.

Ward incorporates planning approaches and social models into the borrowing category. Examples of

this diffusion are the spread of societal models like the garden city or planning approaches of the 20th

century by i.e. events or waterfront developments.

The third of Ward’s categories is synthetic innovation, which is not a clearly independent category

because it is often the outcome of different borrowing processes. The imported ideas and practices are

‘synthesized with other ideas and practice to create what became, in effect, further innovation’21.

In the process of ‘planning diffusion’ different agents operate as medium: politicians, urban planners,

researchers, activists, and policy consultants. Globally acting agents bring the best practice from their

13 Ward, 1999, p. 53 14 Ibdn, p. 55-58 15 Ibdn, p. 58 16 Ward names authoritarian, contested, and negotiated imposition. 17 Ward, 1999, p. 55 18 Ibdn, p. 56 19 Ward names selective and undiluted borrowing. 20 Ward, 2002, p. 403 21

Ward, 2002, p. 402



288

countries or bring a set of models of good policy.22

Globalisation is the reason for expanding networks

and communities throughout ‘Circuits of knowledge’23

in academia and practice in the 21th century.

These ‘circuits’ frame the operation of planners and they impact ‘planning diffusion’. Furthermore the

policy propagation intensified by new media: i.e. websites, blogs, and professional publications. Thus

city development becomes part of international networks of policymakers.24

Internationally operating

planning firms and real estate developers are particular actors for urban development. In addition

international development agencies promote ‘planning diffusion’ because they impose conditions for

financial support to the cities of the south.25

Urban policy subjects are forced onto the urban agendas

of cities due to the mandatory fulfillment of specific indicators. This is not intrinsically bad or

undesirable because it forces putting important issues on the table. However it has an impact on the

respective planning practice of the city because internationally recognized objectives reach to the

urban agenda. Apart from objectives, international development aid agencies often promote the

diffusion of ideas of best practice because their application seems to help cities fulfilling the required

indicators. Best practices are promoted by i.e. the UN, which offers online databases of best practice

models in various fields26. This means best practice policies become ‘preapproved’ because they have

been named a model27

for a specific development.

Best practice transfer is a special type of ‘planning diffusion’. The spreading of best practice is part of

‘planning diffusion’ in a globalised society.28

Even though the focus and scope of best practice reaches

from policy to the design of urban spaces, best practice can be seen as the figurative appearance of the

transfer of ideas. By definition, best practice is the ‘way in which measures are carried out based on

state-of-the-art technology, scientific principles as well as practical experiences and official

recommendations’.29

Best practice has the capability of promoting policy transfer as well as learning.30

Therefore the employment of best practice can help overcoming a lack of knowledge31

while the

choosing of best practice has always a political dimension. However best practice is not a universal

remedy. Just like for ‘planning diffusion’, the application does not release decision makers from the

necessity of confrontation with challenges and framework conditions in both environments: the best

practice context as well as the case. Bulkeley argues that the use of best practice stipulates the change

of ‘the nature and interpretation of the policy problem’.32

According to Bulkeley policy transfer

appears as discursive process33

, which has the same notion as the synthetic innovation of Ward.

22 McCann, Ward, 2011, page xxi 23 Healey, 2010, p. 5 24 McCann, Ward, 2011, p. xiv 25 Ward, 1999, p. 54; Stren, Halfani, 2001, p. 469 26 Governance and human settlement: http://www.unesco.org/most/bpunchs.html (checked on 19/9/2015); human settlement and environment: http://www.bestpractices.org/ (checked on 19/09/2015) 27 McCann, Ward, 2011, p. xxi-xxii 28 Healey, 2010, p. 13 29 Evert, 2010, p. 68 30 Bulkeley, 2004, p. 1035 31 Ibdn 1035 32 Bulkeley, 2004, p. 1029 33 Ibdn



289

METHOD: PLANNING DIFFUSION CHECK After the more general considerations about ‘planning diffusion’, questions about the necessity of

knowledge and application process arise. Why do we need to know about urban ‘planning diffusion’?

‘Planning diffusion’ takes place due to diversifying challenges. Therefore cities are looking for models

to addressing them appropriately. Even though ‘planning diffusion’ seems to be a more or less

academic problem, cities should pay attention to the ambiguity of the transfer. Understanding the

processes is important in order to understanding the transnational flows of knowledge34

as well as to

dealing consciously with ‘planning diffusion’ and avoiding constraints of the transfer.

How can ‘planning diffusion’ be distinguished from ‘normal’ urban planning activity? The objective

of the ‘planning diffusion’ check is to understand the genesis of urban planning activity. The method

matches definitions of instruments developed by consultants of implementation activities on the

ground. Thus it is not important to reveal the origin of the planning instrument35

. It is used to reveal

the source of the employed activities.

[fig. 2] Procedure of planning diffusion check based on the Kigali case (own illustration) The planning diffusion check provides an analytical scheme for operationalized instruments, i.e. for a

master plan in the Kigali case. Therefore the planning diffusion check arranges applied

implementation mechanisms into types due to policy transfer and to types of unspecified (local) origin.

The planning diffusion check provides arguments to develop a critical attitude toward consultancy.

This is done by linking advices and definitions of the urban plan, the master plan in this case, to urban

planning activities of the city. The matching is carried out by the categories: implementation activity

due to definitions, required implementation mechanism and additional implementation mechanisms.

The latter category groups all activities, which have no root in the detailed physical plan. The

mechanisms of the second category are stipulated by the detailed physical plan but not directly

integrated in its definitions. Therefore this is not ‘planning diffusion’. Solely the implementation

activities of the first category are a result of ‘planning diffusion’. In case of best practice the diffusion

check generates arguments for whether the best practice is transformed according to local conditions.

Since the planning diffusion check is an operative and straightforward tool, it has limitations of

34 Robinson, 2011 35 It is most unlikely that the instruments are invented in the previous source. However, the instruments are more likely results of previous planning diffusions.



290

application: While the planning diffusion check is employed to analyse the relationship for defined

elements, the genesis of activities apart from the definition of the plan is not revealed. The planning

diffusion check can not reveal cause and effects of urban planning. Another limitation factor of the

planning diffusion check is the missing consideration of cultural aspects. The planning diffusion check

is a one-dimensional analytic tool to reveal the origins of new ideas but not the underlying motivations

and the forces of adaptation. Understanding the underlying forces and consequences demands holistic

analytical approaches, which must be based on the cultural background of planning

Below, ‘planning diffusion’ is observed by the case of Kigali, Rwanda. The analysis of the case helps

to understand the phenomenon and its effects of development control regulations.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF KIGALI The phenomenon of ‘planning diffusion’ in Kigali is diverse because Rwanda borrows strategies in a

wide range of fields from several countries with different backgrounds and political systems.

The cultural context of Rwanda is historically shaped by imposition phenomena and currently uses

borrowing processes, which often lead to synthetic innovation.

On the one hand financial constraints make way for planning diffusion. Currently, it is one of the

major objectives of Kigali’s politicians to attract international capital from development aid and

private investment. The impact of international aid agencies is obvious, because Rwanda currently

receives monetary36

support in various issues. On the other hand the country also obtains technical

advice37

from various governments, which make way for planning diffusion.

This paper uses a target-orientated analysis of the diffusion by advice, which focuses on the outcomes

of steering instruments. The analysis focuses on planning diffusion by international consultancy for

master plans. The paper argues that the detailed physical plan of Kigali generates new definitions and

implementation instruments and therefore favours planning diffusion. Despite the potentially

ideological notion38

of this planning diffusion process, the master plan offers precise instruments for

urban steering practise in Kigali. The regulations, which are introduced by the master plan become

part of the urban planning practice in Kigali, which stipulates several changes in the toolbox of

steering instruments. The fact that the Rwandan urban planning system is not mature makes the

example even more fruitful. The paper assumes that due to the huge need of effective steering attempts

the Rwandan planning framework welcomes steering advices, which favour planning diffusion.

Urbanisation is a relatively recent process in Rwanda, which has a long tradition of dispersed

settlements. Kigali was founded by German colonizers in 1907. Thus the objectives of the Belgian

colonial power and missionary religious objectives never favored urban centers for the country, neither

36 40% to 45% of the national budget is foreign aid (Faujas, A., 2012, p. 72) 37 Among them are Singapore state agencies, i.e. Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (SCE) which cooperate in international consultancy expertise and advice for several policy directions. 38 Kigali attempts to completely change its image by the master plan (Watson, 2014, p. 3). The renderings which transport the vision of the plan show a modern city with high rise buildings. Therefore the City image of Kigali has a special position in the efforts of the government to create a new common identity for the country.



291

in pre-colonial nor in colonial time.39

Belgian planners always rejected urban centers.40

Only after

independence in the 1980th French urban planners developed a master plan for the city of Kigali.

41

The growth of Kigali accelerated in the 21th century due to population increase and post-genocide42

politics. Returnees from Diaspora and post-genocide politics accelerated the urbanisation of the

country and the growth of Kigali. The post-genocide governmental efforts always considered Kigali as

the only urban center within the country and therefore endowed it a special status in urban laws and

strategies. Nearly all public functions and administrative entities were grouped and centralized in

Kigali. In 2005 Kigali reached about half a million habitants and in 2011 1,059,00043

people lived in

Kigali. The population is estimated to double until 2022 due to demographic and economic

conditions.44

The estimated future growth of the city is still reinforced by the political will to push

urbanisation.

‘Sustainable urbanisation’ is the development objective of the city45

, which is the initial point for the

mandate to develop urban master plans. Therefore the Kigali Conceptual Master Plan (KCMP) was

developed in 2008. It provides conceptual and spatial development objectives for the next 50 years.

Subsequently the Detailed Physical Plans (hereinafter master plan) were developed, which ‘review the

planning directions and strategies’ and provide precise definitions by zoning plans and development

control regulations.46

After approval the planning document became the main resource for urban

planning activities in Kigali.

[fig 3] spatial vision of the KCMP (source: Ministry [fig. 4] Summary of the existing situation in Kigali of Infrastructure (2008): Kigali Conceptual Master by Surbana (source: City of Kigali (2013a): Plan. p. 94) Detailed Physical Plan for Gasabo and Kicukiro, Kigali. Master Plan Report. Kigali. p. 4)

39 Berlanda, 2012, p. 136 40 Ibdn, page 1 41 Michelon, 2012, p. 123 42 The genocide in Rwanda happened in 1994 and lead to a change of the regime. The article groups all politics after this incision in post-genocide. 43 Enquête Intégrale des Conditions de Vie (EICV) 3: 20010/2011 44 City of Kigali, 2012, p. 6 45 Head of One Stop Center City of Kigali, 2014 46 City of Kigali, 2013a, p. ix



292

Both plans were developed by internationally operating firms. The KCMP was developed by OZ

Architecture from Colorado, U.S. whereas the master plan of Kigali was developed by Surbana

International Consultants Pte Ltd (hereinafter Surbana) from Singapore. The fact that the detailed

physical plans are developed by Surbana stresses the claim that planning diffusion is the underlying

phenomenon. Unless both plans potentially favour planning diffusion, the KCMP offers a long-term

vision without any spatial definitions and operationalisation. This makes it less interesting for a

planning diffusion observation. Even though further research about the urban planning relation of

Singapore and Rwanda is needed, the scale of definitions of the master plan makes it a good example

to researching this issue.

The master plan consists of the Detailed Physical Plans of all districts (Gasabo, Kicukiru,

Nyarugenge), Zoning Plan Regulations, a Transportation Master Plan, Urban Design Schemes for

specific estates, and an Implementation Strategy. All sub-plans of the master plan can be accessed

online and the zoning plans are available through a WEBGIS47

. The content of the detailed physical

plan as well as the ways of their communication create an international planning regime in Kigali,

which facilitates the attraction of international investment.48

Furthermore, it partially offers the design

for the creation of ‘high-quality space,’ which have a certain demand due to economic growth.49

The master plan primarily defines mechanisms of development control. Since its adoption in autumn

2013, the zoning has been the basis of development control in Kigali. Its definitions incorporate the

type of use, development intensity, and the settings as well as the height of buildings.50

The implementation strategy offers mechanisms of implementation to Rwandan planners. The strategy

consists of the following main elements51

:

the managing of the master plan and the zoning regulations,

capital improvement projects,

catalytic projects,

integrated strategies for land consolidation,

increasing capacity for master plan implementation,

priority recommendations and precise guidance for special issues, i.e. case studies of

implementation mechanisms.

RANGES OF PLANNING DIFFUSION IN KIGALI The mandate of Surbana to carrying out the detailed physical planning in Kigali started the planning

diffusion process. The urban planning and architecture consultants are contractors under instruction of

47 http://www.masterplan2013.kigalicity.gov.rw/, checked 19/09/2015 48 Watson, 2014 49 Rothenberger, 2010, p. 79 50 City of Kigali, 2013c, p. 2 51 City of Kigali, 2013b



293

the mayor of the City of Kigali.52

Despite this clear power structure, the agent structure is much more

divided. Even though the company itself can be seen as an agent that delivers knowledge to Kigali, the

actor centred view reveals much more inhomogeneous structures. Architects and urban planners with

different backgrounds in planning culture work for the company Surbana, who act as agents of

diffusion. In addition to the team of Surbana, which travelled to Rwanda every three weeks53

an Italian

architect of Surbana served as an adviser to the Kigali city administration permanently. The paper

claims that because of their cultural backgrounds the advisers act differently in the planning diffusion

process. In addition access to decision structures differs for permanent and temporary presence in the

Kigali administration. The planning diffusion by master plan therefore derives from different power

relations and on a multi-cultural ground.

In contrary to former approaches of master planning in Kigali54

, the implementation strategy

operationalizes the master plan and makes it applicable for the Rwandan administration. Therefore the

implementation strategy is an instrument of planning diffusion because it incorporates the master plan

into everyday planning action. The important indicators of planning diffusion are implementation

activities due to the instruments offered by the implementation strategy. The implementation strategy

consists of advices in different dimensions, which vary in their degree of content and in their degree of

adaptation to the Rwandan context: general principles of urban development are explained and precise

advices on i.e. administrative structure as well as best practice examples are presented.

The general principles and advices of urban development, i.e. on land consolidation, are presented as

in a textbook even though the Kigali case is referred. The author assumes that the textbook character

of the advices is helpful for the Kigali administration because most of the urban planning staff has a

lack of experience regarding the steering of urban development projects.

The setup of new departments is part of the precise advices in the master plan. Each setup advice

provides information on the role and responsibilities, mandate, tasks, positioning-structure-capacity as

well as guidelines to reach the objectives.55

The advices directly refer to the Kigali planning

framework and point to existing stakeholders to whom they assign specific objectives and

responsibilities. These advices are applicable to the operating of the units in Kigali56

, which makes it

directed to the business of daily urban planning. One example is the advice for the urban design unit

which is advised57

and whose setup was planned in 201458

.

52 However this is not the focus of this discussion, the articel acknowledges that the power relation between Surbana and City of Kigali is sophisticated and can vary upon each sub-case. 53 master plan team, 2014 54 The 1983 master plan of Kigali, the Schéma d’Aménagement Urbain (SAU) has never been implemented due to missing operationalisation (partly based on a weak urban steering structure) and a lack of financial resources (Michelon, 2012, p. 122-124). 55 City of Kigali, 2013b, p. 34 56 ‘Considering that the existing capacity of One-Stop Center is completely exhausted while handling the day-to-day planning applications of the city, and the capacity of the infrastructure team […] Hence, the Office of Infrastructure and Urban Planning is proposed to be restructured as the Kigali Urban Development Department (KUDD) with larger capacities and wider role for the implementation, coordination, review and management of the Master Plan.’ (City of Kigali, 2013b, p. 38) 57 City of Kigali, 2013b, p. 38 58 construction permit unit, 2014



294

Best practice examples are presented in the appendix and refer to practices from different countries.59

The urban planning implementation mechanism and the housing implementation mechanisms built

upon the Singapore case. There are best practices of land allocation strategies from Japan (land

pooling) and India (land pooling, land swap). Furthermore examples of urban upgrading from India

(slum rehabilitation and slum improvement) and Latin America (integrated slum upgrading strategies)

are given. Even though the description of the best practices is broad, each case study concludes with a

number of key learning points. These learning points address a specific direction, i.e. objective,

management and organization or finance,

The openness of the best practices provides options for interpretations, which is in-line to Bulkeley

who defines the dealing with best practice as a discursive process, which challenges and reframes a

policy (Bulkeley 2004: 1). Although the process of choosing the best best practice model is unknown,

it is likely that the rationalities of the best practises are built upon Singapore’s experiences and filtered

through Rwandas political objectives, which remain stable in the process (Bulkeley 2004: 1033).

PLANNING DIFFUSION BY REGULATION OF DEVELOPMENT CONTROL – OUTPUTS OF PLANNING DIFFUSION The diffusion check of the development control regulations for the master plan reveals implementation

due to definitions. Development control regulations are implemented in the same way as the

definitions in the master plan, which differ from previous regulations.

There are several documents within the framework of Rwandan planning, which frame the conditions

of development control. The Urbanization and Building Regulations in the City of Kigali60

was the

planning document that preceded the master plan. This textbook consists of administrative procedures,

urbanization regulations, and building regulations. Amongst others, the regulations address the type of

usage regarding the intensity of the development as well as settings and heights of buildings. The

Urbanizations and Building Regulations belonged to District and Neighbourhood Plans, which fixed

the spatial distribution.

Currently there are development control regulations on national and city level, which complement

each other. On the national level, the Rwanda Building Control Regulation61

aims to be the ‘standard

reference for the regulation of building design and construction’, which is based on British

standards62

.63

This superior document provides definitions of i.e. general terms, administrative

procedures for plan approval, design requirements, and constructions. On the city level, the master

plan offers a refined development control by Zoning Plan Reports for each district and a city wide

zoning map (see WEBGIS). This extend of definition did not exist in the Urbanization and Building

Regulation of the City of Kigali.

59 City of Kigali, 2013b, p. 59 60 The regulation was developed in 2007 and was in practise till 2013. 61 The author refers to the version adopted in April 2009. Currently a revision is underway. 62 The British planning system depends of a development plan and development control to ensure the change of land use. 63 Ministry of Infrastructure, 2009



295

The categories of development control in the Zoning Plan Reports are: permitted, conditional, and

prohibited land uses.64

Like the previous Urbanization and Building Regulations in the City of Kigali,

the Zoning Plan Report defines buildings, building coverage, and necessary building measures.65

The

zoning regulations of the master plan in Kigali incorporate the type of use, development intensity, and

the settings and height of buildings. There is a separate Zoning Plan report for each District. Therefore

the Zoning Plan Regulations are on the level of urban design regulations.

[fig. 5] Example of zoning (City of Kigali (2013). Detailed Physical Plan for Gasabo and Kicukiro. Nyarugenge district zoning plan report. p. 12)

In contrast to the Urbanization and Building Regulations, the zoning of the detailed physical plans

offers a comprehensive definition system, which establishes international practice.66

In opposition to

the system of intended land use, which was used before, it refers to a citywide plan. Notwithstanding

the citywide plan, the regulations make no difference between existing and planned land use.

Furthermore the zoning regulations of the master plan include roads, but not existing buildings. The

definitions of the land use plan resemble those of Singapore. In contrast U.S. development control is

constituted by a plan of the entire community, which is often called ‘master plan’. In the hierarchically

lower level, the zoning codes consist of text and maps for the entire municipality. This plan does

neither consist of existing buildings nor infrastructure.67

Therefore the newly established system has common features to other development control systems,

i.e. Britain and Singapore. Even though the planning diffusion check revealed ‘planning diffusion’, the

attribution to a specific planning family68

is not yet possible.

64 City of Kigali, 2013c, p. 2 65 Ibdn, p. 6-10 66 Ibdn, p. 2 67 Hirt, 2010, p. 4 68 To assign a system to a planning family dedicated indicators have to be applied. For methodology considerations see i.e. EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (1997).



296

THE RWANDAN WAY – REFLECTIONS ON ‘PLANNING DIFFUSION’ The described above development is a glimpse of the current status of a long tradition of ‘planning

diffusion’ in Kigali. Currently several processes of ‘planning diffusion’ take place and the consultancy

for the master plan is just one example. Most of them are borrowing processes in different

formulations, i.e. development control and best practice. The output of the borrowing process is a

synthetic innovation. Even though the master plan is the main planning instrument, Kigali still

practices multi-polar learning. Complex structural forces, individual agency, and institutional cultures

shape the diffusion process.69

Consultants from different agencies support the urban planning

administration. In 2014 consultants from CIM and GIZ worked at the ‘One Stop Center’ of the City of

Kigali and in the Ministry of Infrastructure and consultants from UNHabitat worked for the Rwanda

Housing Authority. The possible effects of the multi-cultural backgrounds of the advice need a closer

look.

Furthermore the paper revealed that the implementation strategy consists of different types of advices.

It became obvious that consultancy offers different definitions, which give way for different forms of

‘planning diffusion’. Considering the differentiation due to power relation of Ward the following

categories can be drafted for Kigali: The advices on textbook level are propositions and therefore

provide Rwandan planners with power of decision. The institutional advices for i.e. the set-up of

specific units are adapted to the context. Although the power of decision is on Rwandan side, it is very

likely that Rwandan planners act according to the clear propositions. The best practice advice lies in

between the textbook advice and the specific advice and offers space for discursive reflection.70

Therefore the decision power remains clearly on Rwandan side.

The process of implementing the master plan is underway, which brings the best practice from the

supra-territorial71

level down to the local territory. Therefore the transfer can not yet be fully

described. The institutional framework is in constant transformation. Although the degree of adoption

of the best practices is still unclear, it is assumed that there is no one-to-one application of the best

practice. Previous Rwandan experience with the application of internationally recognised planning

instruments feed the assumption that the translation of the best practices will be highly local. Despite

the application of urban upgrading in Kigali, no integrated urban upgrading project (social, economic

and spatial measures) took place till 2014. However it urban upgrading was largely understood as

upgrading of the land value by developing new building typologies. Therefore the paper assumes that

Kigali’s urban planners will define the handling of the best practice advice, i.e. for land consolidation.

The so called home-grown initiatives in Rwanda also feed the argument of re-territorising of urban

policy. The performance system ‘imihigo’ is one example. ‘Imihigo’ are performance contracts of

every governmental entity and every individual person with the president on a yearly basis. They

ensure policy directions and result in considerable consequences in case of failed fulfillment. These

home-grown initiatives are copied from international development projects where they are used to

monitor the projects.72

Despite having the same objective, the parties of the contract differ and the

instrument is adapted to a different objective. Hereby the position of self-determinacies in urban

69 Healey, 2010, p. 6 70 Bulkeley, 2004, p. 1033 71 McCann, Ward, 2011, p. xxiv 72 Chemouni, 2014, p. 258



297

steering in Rwanda is manifested.

Therefore Kigali is an example of an urban assemblage, which is not a status of a city, but the ‘form’

in which a mobile policy trickles down to the local level. The observation of ‘planning diffusion’ is a

snapshot in time. Due to the temporarily character of assemblages it focuses on the reorganisation of

flows.73

This means ‘the travels and transfers, political struggles, relational connections, and territorial

mobilities [are] brought together to constitute urbanism’74

.

The paper favors best ‘planning diffusion’ and best practice transfer because it helps to transform

planning systems despite all constraints. It is not the transfer but the way of application, which is

crucial. The transfer has to deal with struggles throughout the diffusion process, like: extent and depth

of learning, development, and usage of ideas as well as the control of space qualities.75

If the transfer

is a conscious reflection and adaption process, ‘planning diffusion’ can be an ace in urban

development.

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Translating City development Projekts in informal Settlements Kain, Nyakinda,Odhiambo, Odhiambo, Oloko, Otieno, Zapta, Zapta Campos


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TRANSLATING CITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS: REFRAMING, ANCHORING AND MUDDLING THROUGH

Jaan-Henrik Kain1, Belinda Nyakinda2, Nicholas Odhiambo3, Michael Oloko4, Silas Otieno5, Patrik Zapata6, María José Zapata Campos7

(1) Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden [email protected] (2) Department of Environment, Kisumu City, Kenya [email protected] (3) Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University of Science & Technology, Kenya [email protected] (4) Maseno University, Kenya [email protected] (5) Kisumu Waste Management Services and Chairman SWM Sacco/cooperative, Kenya [email protected] (6) University of Gothenburg, Sweden [email protected] (7) University of Gothenburg, Sweden [email protected]

ABSTRACT Numerous programs have been launched to deal with the serious solid waste predicaments in informal

settlements. However, in both policy and research, there is an increasing concern with the disparities

that exist between solid waste policies and what they actually achieve in practice. Informed by the

case of the city of Kisumu and its Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan (KISWAMP),

this paper examines how municipal waste management programs are translated into practice in

informal settlements. It is based on action-research carried out by a multidisciplinary and

transdiciplinary group of researchers, through focus groups, participatory workshops, collaborative

action, in-depth interviews, document analysis and observations. City management literature and the

concepts of reframing, anchoring and muddling through are used to understand the KISWAMP and its

implementation. It starts by reconstructing the history of KISWAMP and how it became a project.

Then, it examines what original aspects of KISWAMP were actually translated, i.e. which ones faded










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out and which ones became stabilized into and travel as best practices to other locations. The analysis

shows how KISWAMP was translated into practice by reframing the meanings and status of waste as a

profession, as a policy and as a critical service worthy to pay for among residents. KISWAMP also

thrived to anchor the program into existing waste entrepreneurship practices . Municipal officers and

politicians were also trained to connect the plan within the municipality, yet as many moved,

KISWAMP remained weakly bounded to city budgets and decision-making processes. Trust also grew

among residents being served by the new waste collection services. Yet in lower-income settlements

with insufficient assets to anchor the project, distrust and resentment grew instead. Skips in the new

waste transfer points soon disappeared and were not regularly evacuated. Still, the skip idea did not

totally vanish as it was recovered by the new KUP program. A final aspect in the implementation of

KISWAMP was the ability of waste entrepreneurs and officers to develop ways to muddle through

arbitrary and loosely coupled partnership arrangements to evacuate transfer points; waste pickers’

coping strategies to compensate low paid labour;; or residents’ persistent illegal disposal of waste

where the skip used to be.

KEY WORDS Policy implementation; implementation gap; best practices; framing; anchoring; muddle through;

waste management; informal settlements



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INTRODUCTION Many cities in the Global South are challenged by vast inadequacies when it comes to managing urban

solid waste, and especially in informal settlements. Numerous programs have been launched to deal

with such waste predicaments applying different approaches, from bulldozing informal settlements

and substituting informal waste pickers by multinational corporations (Fahmi and Sutton 2014) or

instigating top-down donor-funded projects (Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013b) to strengthening

grassroots initiatives (Yates and Gutberlet 2011, Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013). Yet, there is an

increasing concern regarding the disparities between the ambitions of these different policies and what

is actually achieved in practice, especially when it comes to top-down programs, (Pressman and

Wildavsky, 1973, Mosse 2004, Owens et al 2006, Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013).

To develop a better understanding of this gap between policy and practice, this paper examines how

policies and programs are translated into practice in informal settlements in a Global South city. The

case that informs the analysis in the paper is the Kisumu Integrated Sustainable Waste Management

Plan (KISWAMP) in Kisumu, Kenya. KISWAMP was funded by the Swedish International

Development Agency (SIDA) through the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-

Habitat) and implemented from 2007 to 2009.

The paper builds on literature on city management and organization studies (e.g. Czarniawska, 2002,

2010, 2013; Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013, 2015) for its analytical framework. More specifically,

the paper applies the concepts of framing and reframing (Goffman, 1974), anchoring (Czarniawska,

2002) and muddling through (Lindblom, 1959, 1979). The objective is to understand and explain how

the KISWAMP program has been translated into practice, and more specifically what aspects of

KISWAMP were translated, which aspects faded away, and which aspects were stabilized and

travelled further as best practices.

The following section introduces the literature on policy implementation and waste management in

cities of the Global South. Next, the theoretical framework is presented. Thereafter the methodology

section explains how the data used in this paper was gathered and analysed. The empirical data is

presented in the form of a reconstruction of KISWAMP and it translations, in this way describing the

situation of waste management in Kisumu and its informal settlements. We continue by analysing the

KISWAMP translations as reframing, anchoring and muddling through actions. The paper concludes

with a discussion on how policy gets translated, fades away, stabilizes and/or travels.

WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS Many waste management programs, with different approaches, have been implemented in informal

settlements of the Global South. Infrastructural programs have often been initiated by bulldozing

informal settlements, followed by a reconstruction of both housing and infrastructure (Patel, 2013). In

other cases, local entrepreneurs and their informal waste management services have simply been

substituted by private corporations (Zapata Campos and Hall, 2013). Other waste management

programs, often financed by international agencies, have been designed and implemented top-down,

securing the compliance of local actors through their high dependence of the resources provided by the



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donors (Sampson, 2003).

However, public officials can also use donor-funded waste management projects in ways that better

suit the city’s needs (Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013b). There are projects where the focus has been

on residents and waste pickers as co-producers of basic services in partnerships with local

governments, rather than as recipients of services from aid programs (see Zapata Campos and Zapata

2013a; Yates and Gutberlet 2011). However, successful programs at the micro-level still face many

challenges. For instance, it can take decades for an innovative and alternative solution to be scaled up

to other parts of the city or to other cities (Hardoy, Miting and Sattherwhite, 2001). Achievements can

fade when the funding dries up since ‘‘induced networks’’ and public-private partnerships can find it

harder to achieve self-management (Tirado Soto and Luiz Zamberlan, 2013).

A common ingredient in co-produced waste management programs is the waste transfer points, where

the waste collected from households is stored until the municipality evacuates it to landfills or

recycling. If the city fails to evacuate the transfer point, the private or community partners will get

problems as people in the settlements see an un-evacuated waste transfer station as a potential new

local dump site, i.e. as a negative consequence of the waste collection activity. Governmental

arrangements created for the co-production of waste collection services (e.g. licencing and

remuneration of waste pickers or regular evacuation of transfer points) therefore call for regular, long-

term relationships, where networks and partnership arrangements are integrated in the local

governance structures (Joshi and Moore, 2004). The functioning of such partnerships often rests on the

support from municipalities and NGOs for warehouses, equipment, and promotion of the work of

waste-pickers in the settlements (Tirado-Soto and Luiz Zamberlan, 2013).

Co-produced waste management services also rest on the strengthening of local governments, building

capacities of municipal officers, and establishing collaborative arrangements between local actors.

Otherwise, there is a high risk that local governments remain suspicious about the role waste pickers

can play or that they simply do not fulfil signed agreements (see Yates and Gutberlet 2011; Zapata

Campos and Zapata 2013; Joshi and Moore 2004).

As described, many different types of both top-down to bottom-up waste management initiatives have

been launched to tackle the serious solid waste predicaments. Yet, both in policy and research there is

an increasing concern with the disparities that exist between these policies, especially top-down

programs, and what they achieve in practice (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973, Mosse 2004, Owens et

al 2006, Zapata Campos and Zapata, 2013).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Czarniawska (2002, 2004) conceptualises city management as a complex action net consisting of

collective actions connected to one another according to a particular instiutionalised pattern at a given

time and in a given place. She maintains that from a pragmatist perspective, the organising of cities

(including the formulation and implementation of policy) involves three specific types of action:

framing and reframing (Goffman, 1974), anchoring (Czarniawska, 2000, 2004) and muddling through

(Lindblom, 1979).

Framing and reframing refers to the process of changing the frame of interpretation of the world in



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order to take successful action by bringing out old frames and pushing in new frameworks (Goffman,

1974). Anchoring converges with the process of reframing and refers to the process of testing new

ideas on potentially involved parties in order to enrol them and to secure cooperation or minimize

resistance (Czarniawska, 2002, 2004). Policies and programs are transformed by those who are

enrolled in them, such as public officers, aid staff, community members, residents or local

entrepreneurs. Consequently, projects are translated into the different logics of the intentions, goals

and ambitions of the many people and organizations they bring together (Mosse, 2005). Muddling

through (Lindblom, 1979) describes how the priority of planning and governance activities is not

primarily about reaching goals or putting plans in operation. Rather, “it is about coping with daily

problems (or managing, as the double meaning of the word in English astutely suggests)”

(Czarniawska, 2001, p.2). In the analysis and discussion sections, we return to the theoretical

framework and discuss the translation of the KISWAMP program into practice from the three aspects

in our theoretical framework: framing and reframing, anchoring, and muddling through.

METHODOLOGY The paper is based on a case study of the Kisumu Integrated Sustainable Waste Management Plan

(KISWAMP), funded by SIDA through UN-Habitat and carried out in Kisumu, Kenya from 2007 to

2009. Albeit KISWAMP ended in 2009, the program has influenced waste management in Kisumu

until today. It has also gained new relevance as a policy document through a new development

program, the Kisumu Urban Project (KUP). KUP has reviewed KISWAMP to create a new policy

document on integrated solid waste management (County Government of Kisumu, 2015). This ten

year strategy is to guide new investments to improve waste management in the city from 2015 to 2025.

We have therefore gathered data about KISWAMP’s implementation phase 2007-2009, KISWAMP’s

subsequent implications on practices until mid-2015, and how the KUP has picked up KISWAMP

elements in emerging policies and practices.

Action-research was carried out in Kisumu by a multidisciplinary and transdiciplinary group of

researchers during 2014 and 2015. The team consisted of a public official, a waster entrepreneur and

five researchers from different disciplines. Document analysis, observations, in-depth interviews,

focus group discussions, stakeholder workshops, and waste clean-up exercises have been used to

collect data. Interviews and workshops covered a wide range of stakeholders, such as residents, waste

pickers, waste entrepreneurs, recyclers, community-based organizations (CBOs), non-governmental

organizations (NGOs), public officials from ward, city, county and state levels, researchers, UN-

Habitat officers, development aid donors and professionals, and a former Mayor of Kisumu. All

interviews, workshops and focus group discussions were recorded for detailed analysis. Several focus

groups included residents and waste pickers in two informal settlements in Kisumu, Nyalenda and

Obunga. Several waste clean-up exercises were also organized in Obunga and Nyalenda.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT IN KISUMU’S INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS In this section we first describe the key traits of Kisumu’s waste management and introduce the

situation of its informal settlements and the provision of critical services. Then, we reconstruct how



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KISWAMP has played a major role in the attempts to address the needs of Kisumu’s waste

management services until today.

WASTE MANAGEMENT IN KISUMU’S INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Kisumu is the third largest city in Kenya, with an estimated population of 600.000 (Municipal Council

of Kisumu, 2009), and a rapid urbanization rate of almost 5% yearly (Onyango & Kibwage, 2008).

Kisumu is the center of Kisumu County, and the second most important city in the large Lake Victoria

Basin.

The city has a planned city center and a large unplanned peri-urban fringe where more than 50% of its

population live in informal settlements with very poor housing conditions and exposed to frail service

delivery, unclear legalities, and poor policy design (Onyango & Kibwage, 2008) (see fig. 1). Although

the situation varies from one informal settlement to another, in places such as Obunga, vehicle

accessibility is more or less limited to bicycles for the interior of the slums. Access to main roads is

mostly by handcarts, as potholes and damaged drains limit the use of motorized transport. Community

toilets and showers are scarce and unhygienic. Household waste is hardly collected. The unhygienic

living conditions cause serious health problems, with diseases like malaria, and typhoid (Onyango &

Kibwage, 2008).

[fig. 1] Informal settlements in Kisumu. B: Obunga, D: Manyatta, H: Nyalenda. The Kachok dump site is located just above the letter H in the map. Source : Cities without slums – UN-Habitat (2002) Waste collection in Kisumu is carried out by the City Council, registered companies with permits, and

small private (sometimes informal) entrepreneurs. The City can only manage to collect solid waste

from the Central Business District (CBD) and market areas. Other areas, including most residential

areas, are managed by private collectors with very limited capacity and depending on the residents’

financial ability and willingness to pay for the services. Despite efforts to improve the solid waste

management services, the current daily collection of garbage is poor. Collection estimates range

between 25% of the daily generation of 385 tons (County Government of Kisumu, 2015), 20%

(Nodalis Counseil, 2009) and the very low 7% (Onyango & Kibwage, 2008). The remaining

household waste is mainly left in open pits in the settlements (59%), burnt (23%), or scattered along

roadsides (10%) (Onyango & Kibwage, 2008) (). However, as more than 60% of the waste is organic



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and more than 25% other recyclables (Onyango & Kibwage, 2008), the potential for improvement is

significant.

KISWAMP In the mid 1990s SIDA commissioned a study on environmental management in the Lake Victoria

region, concluding that urban waste is a major polluter of the lake. In 2003a participatory consensus-

building process was initiated to create and sustain Kisumu as a liveable and viable city. It was

coordinated by the now defunct Municipal Council and supported by UN-Habitat and SIDA with the

aim to assemble strategic responses to the city’s development challenges. As a result of this process,

the Kisumu City Development Strategies 2004-2009 (CDS) were developed. This document was

adopted by the Municipal Assembly as development blue print for Kisumu City and identifies Solid

Waste Management as a key challenge that requires immediate intervention.

These activities defined waste management as a priority for Kisumu (interview with UN-Habitat

officer) and a number of challenges were identified: a lack of planning and strategies for waste

management; old by-laws whereby, for example, waste picking was illegal; poor access to funding;

and the City’s infrastructure, equipment and abilities were utterly insufficient for providing services to

an increasing number of residents (interview with former municipal officer). The development of the

CDS lead to setting up Kisumu Action Team (KAT) with representation from the private and public

sectors, civil society and academia to spearhead its implementation. A solid waste management

(SWM) working group emerged from KAT, with representation from city wide SWM stakeholders

and SIDA funded an environmental impact assessment for the Kisumu landfill in 2005.

As a result of these simultaneous processes, a joint proposal to SIDA was developed by the Municipal

Council of Kisumu, UN-Habitat, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the NGO Practical

Action, and the SWM Working group in 2006: the Kisumu Integrated Sustainable Solid Waste

Management Plan (KISWAMP). The proposed plan aimed at involving CBOs, small and micro

enterprises, and civil society organizations in providing waste management services for the urban

poor. Here, it borrowed heavily from the good practices in urban environmental management,

employment creation and improved service delivery developed by the ILO in Dar es Salaam through a

Public Private Partnership (PPP) approach. In summary, the objectives of KISWAMP were to

(KISWAMP, 2009):

Create awareness on the rights and roles of the members of the public in solid waste management

Strengthen the council’s institutional capacity in planning, delivery and management of waste

services

Enforce reviewed by-laws, as well as fee collection, monitoring and evaluation systems

Promote private sector linkages and pro-poor public-private partnerships to create employment

and wealth for the urban poor especially women and youth

Provide start-up machinery for the Municipal Council

Relocate the current dumpsite to a long term sanitary land fill

Create new and support exisiting waste management initiatives among waste collection groups

and informal waste pickers, i.e. by establishing a micro-finance institution



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Promote the KISWAMP model within the Lake Victoria region

After approval, the proposal was funded with USD 874,500 by SIDA to run from August 2007 to June

2009. A Local Coordinating Unit was created to manage KISWAMP, with the SWM Working Group

at the center of the implementation, supported by Maseno University, UN-Habitat, SIDA, the City and

civil society organizations. External consultants were contracted to train and strengthen the abilities of

policy makers and officials in the city and county councils, as well as to carry out technical studies

regarding routes for collection and collection vehicles and systems. ILO, together with the Polytechnic

University, trained community groups and CBOs, operating in the informal settlements were brought

to the program for its implementation.

KISWAMP thus originated as a top-down program with a participatory approach and the ambition to

integrate already existing practices in its design. It was designed to be experimental and later up-scaled

to other cities around the Lake Victoria and beyond (interview with former municipal officer). At the

end of the program, key achievements included: baseline survey on SWM in Kisumu; Kisumu

Integrated Sustainable Solid Waste Management Strategy 2010-2020; KISWAMP Communication

Strategy; review of SWM by-laws; environmental awareness creation; capacity building and training

for waste actors; KIWAMA Savings and Credit Co-operative (SACCO) for waste actors and a

guarantee fund for waste actors; and purchase of SWM vehicles and equipment (UN-Habitat).

It is however important to note that KISWAMP lacked an investment plan and when the program

ended in 2009, the Municipality failed to budget appropriately and further implementation was hence

not possible. Moreover, the developed strategy was not formally adopted as a policy by the municipal

assembly and the by-laws developed to enforce the policy also failed to comprehensively implement

the recommended policy directions. Consequently, when this is written, 2015, the KISWAMP

program has only been partially implemented. During our field studies we could see how solid waste

management in Kisumu continues to suffer from weak finances, feeble political and institutional

support, poor community attitudes, and lack of a systematic approach as observed already in 2008

(Onyango & Kibwage, 2008) (Kain et. al., forthcoming). The open waste dump located within the

urbanized area is a disaster. The City barely manages to collect waste in the CBD and main markets

due to lack of staff and machinery. More affluent households contract different types of private actors

to collect their waste while the majority of the households in informal settlements are left with few

options to deal with their waste. The result is a massive accumulation of waste on foot paths and

empty lots, in drains, along roadsides and at the locations were the waste skips used to be located

when still operated through KISWAMP. However, services of small private entrepreneurs are

increasingly gaining ground also in the informal settlements among those households that can afford a

small fee for collection (Gutberlet et. al., forthcoming).

Today, a new development program, the Kisumu Urban Project (KUP), is reviewing and partially

recovering the KISWAMP program. Through its Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste

Management Strategy, KUP aims to construct a sanitary landfill, resuscitate some of the KISWAMP

strategies, and continue to support Kisumu City’s and County’s waste management policies. The

proposed measures include involvement of the public in policy and by-laws reviews to promote

awareness; provision of adequate resources for SWM; strict enforcement of environment laws and by-

laws; empowering local community agents and enforcement committees; establishment of transfer

points in all zones; rationalization to avoid multiple licenses; and simplification of licensing



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procedures (County Government of Kisumu, 2015).



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2003 City Development Strategies Program SIDA 1990s Lake Victoria Environmental Strategy (Kisumu, Kampala, Isone) Lake

Victoria Water & Sanitation Program ? Baltic sea? SIDA

1996 Lake Victoria Environmental Management program 2004 The Lake Victoria Region Water and Sanitation Initiative UN-Habitat, African

Development Bank 2005 Environmental impact assessment for the city landfill SIDA 1997-2005

Waste management project in Dar es Salaam: Support to the delivery of environmental services by the small-scale private sector

ILO

Creation of the Kisumu Action Team (KAT) 2006 Negotiations for the formulation of KISWAM and formulation of the

Program SIDA, ILO, UN-Habitat, KAT and City of Kisumu

2007 2010 Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Program African Development

Bank 2010 Mwanza, Kisumu exchange of good waste management practices (clean-

ups). European Investment Bank UN-Habitat

2010 Skips are placed in strategic sites in the city KISWAMP 2013 Initiation of the Kisumu Urban Project (KUP) The French

Development Agency 2014 Waste management is working poorly with waste accumulating in all parts

of the city. Skips have disappeared and the locations are turned into illegal dump sites.

2015 KUP picks up KISWAMP in its new Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Strategy

KUP, Kisumu County

[table 1] A chronology of the KISWAMP program.

ANALYSIS: HOW WAS KISWAMP TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE? In this section, based on KISWAMP’s original goals and activities, we examine what actions have

been translated into practice, which ones have faded out, and which ones have become stabilized into

‘best practices’ and travelled to other parts of the city or to other cities in the region. Table 2

summarizes the activities proposed by KISWAMP together with the translations of those activities

into practice in Kisumu’s informal settlements and the city at large.



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KIWSAMP ACTIVITIES

TRANSLATIONS INTO PRACTICE

Promoting waste micro-entrepreneurs and CBOs

From 3 to 12 strong entrepreneurs, transformation of some CBOs into micro-enterprises Successful, but based on already existing practices Waste entrepreneurs, when operating successfully, generate trust among households and at the City But no waste entrepreneurs are active in the poorest slums, such as Obunga, where the residents are lost in translation The Kisumu Waste Management Association (KIWAMA) was created The credit guarantee scheme is under utilized and the KIWAMA SACCO is having difficulties Low pay and unhealthy working conditions for waste pickers, especially for the most exposed and informal group, “scavenging” around households and at the city waste dump Local, national and international waste picker networks are emerging

Citywide sustainable waste management strategy

A baseline survey, a consultation process and a strategy document were created, but no measures were implemented in the informal settlements Waste management gained status in the City Politicians and officials were trained but they dispersed to other engagements Institutional empowerment stopped when the money dried up since political and financial sustainability was not well considered

Waste transfer points

Skip containers were placed in transfer points for waste collection from informal settlements, but not done in collaboration with the communities or informal waste pickers already active in the area The skips rusted, were not insufficient, were not regularly emptied, were vandalised and stolen, of the wrong size, and not replaced when broken or stolen No maintenance nor financial mechanisms were planned Nowadays the locations where the skips used to be are illegally used as informal dumps by residents and private collectors, but also as secondary collection points for waste picker entrepreneurs

Pro-poor partnerships

Collaboration arrangements between the City and the waste pickers to evacuate waste transfer points and collection points remain loose and arbitrary

Promoting the KISWAMP model as best practice

KISWAMP can be evaluated as a program with a good participatory design, well grounded in local practices, which failed to be subsequently implemented. Yet it is described as successful story by many of the involved actors. The KISWAMP experiences and challenges are now used to review waste management strategies for a more effective implementation under KUP.

[table 2] KISWAMP in translation

WASTE ENTREPRENEURSHIP Most interviewees agree on that a positive aspect was that KISWAMP’s formulation was “90%” based

on what was happening in Kisumu (Personal interviews with former municipal officer and former UN-

Habitat officer) such as existing waste picking practices and youth groups active in the informal

settlements. The project succeeded to identify and mobilize the existing local entrepreneurship. It

supported existing CBOs, as well as the transformation of some youth groups into micro-

entrepreneurs. The program provided training and capacity building via ILO. They also promoted

study trips, for example to Dar es Salaam, to learn what another ILO project had achieved.



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This component of the program was evaluated as very positive by most participants as it developed

capacity and created jobs in low-income areas. Waste was turned from something to discard into a

resource: “waste is money, considered as employment opportunities” (Personal interview with former

municipal officer). As a result, the number of strong entrepreneurs grew from three to twelve. Some

women groups were also encouraged to produce handicraft in the form of collars or bags from

recycled products such as plastic bags or old paper calendars (Personal interviews with Tema Tema

women group within Bamato CBO).

KISWAMP also supported the creation of the Kisumu Waste Management Association (KIWAMA)

and the KIWAMA SACCO. A seed money fund linked to a credit guaranteed scheme was created to

be managed by the SACCO. Only a few entrepreneurs benefited but because of the weak financial

management structures, the SACCO has since remained dormant possibly due to loss of funds.

Although the association has not been fully active in the last years (personal interview with waste

picker organization), it is used as a joint voice to lobby the administration when necessary. An

example is when they filed a complaint against the County to prevent a multinational waste

corporation to get the monopoly of waste collection in the city.

Waste picker organizations in Kisumu are also members of international and national waste

management organization and exchange experiences with other organizations in Nairobi and

Mombasa. Through international networks (e.g. WIEGO) the experiences of these entrepreneurs and

CBOs travel out and new ideas are brought in (interview with Bamato CBO). They also contribute to

the diffusion of KISWAMP as a best practice.

In the neighbourhoods where waste pickers are now established and provide a wide service, residents

acknowledge that the environment is cleaner (Focus groups in Nyalenda and interviews with residents

in Manyatta). These entrepreneurs have gained the trust from neighbourhoods to establish a waste

management service in which they can rely and for which they can pay. They have succeeded to create

a market for waste collection services in spite of the sometimes delimited resources among the

residents. Even so, the working conditions for the actual waste pickers are often harsh and unhealthy,

especially for the most informal waste pickers, “scavenging” around households and at waste dumps

for recyclables to sell (Focus groups in Nyalenda and Obunga). Also, waste pickers will not get a

salary if they are sick or if they do not work for other reasons. Their income from recyclables are also

skimmed by international market fluctuations or local market deficiencies.

In spite of the positive experiences from waste entrepreurship, informal settlements, such as Obunga,

with the lowest-income residents and weaker CBO networks, but with a very significant needs of

improved waste collection services and employment opportunities were somehow forgotten by the

KISWAMP, and left out of the pilot implementation. One respondent argued that “there was no level

of awareness” in Obunga (personal interview with municipal officer). The lack of conditions to make

entrepreneurial waste collection services succeed discouraged focus on these parts of the city.

WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE CITY ADMINISTRATION

Some interviewees argued that as a result of KISWAMP, waste management had gained higher status

within the city administration (personal interview with former Mayor). Several UN-Habitat officials

agree, in separate interviews, that the program was successful because “KISWAMP was a Kisumu

City’s affair and it was adopted at the policy level”. As a result of the program, “a waste management



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system and a strategy is put in place” (personal interview with former UN-Habitat officer).

Nevertheless, many respondents argue that even if the program was well formulated and grounded in

participatory processes, it failed to be fully implemented. Some respondents argued that political and

financial sustainability was not well considered in the plan and that the institutional empowerment to

the city council did not work as planned. Despite the training activities to strengthen politicians and

officers, capacity has been lost as many public administration officers are no longer working for the

City. When the money dried up the activities stopped and the qualified staff left. Also, according to

some respondents, the existing management structure within the City’s Environment Department and

existing policies do not fully allow operationalization of PPPs. An example is the temporary

recognition letters given to waste operators by the City which do not allow them to operate into more

formal areas of the city (personal interview with former municipal officer).

In relation to the failed implementation of KISWAMP, critical voices from CBOs also complained

that “there was a problem of local ownership” as UN-Habitat managed the project from Nairobi from

which “they were patronizing us”. According to these interviewees, the external control over the

decision-making of KISWAMP was hindering its implementation and the involvement of civil society

and local authority (personal interview with local NGO officer).

WASTE TRANSFER POINTS

In 2010, a number of waste skip containers were placed at strategic locations in the city to provide an

infrastructure for collecting household waste in informal settlements. However, not enough skips were

provided by the program, and some were of the wrong size or too fragile. The program also failed to

provide the right mechanism, equipment and financial resources to maintain, and to evacuate the skips

when they were full. Even the design of the skips was criticized by some, arguing that the lack of

adaptation of a technology that was imported from a different (European) context explains why the

skips did not work. Also, the implementation of the skips was not done in collaboration with the local

communities or the informal waste pickers already active in the area. All in all, the result was that

most skips rusted, were vandalised or sold as scrap-metal.

Even though the skips are now missing (the last surviving ones being used at the central markets),

residents still dispose their waste at the sites where the skips used to be, creating a number of illegal

dump sites, although their illegitimacy may be questioned since these are still the sites where waste

should formally be collected (Scholarly workshop on waste management in informal settlements,

Kisumu 2014). Illegal or not, those locations are the few points in the city that resemble and function

as secondary waste collection points, linking the informal settlements to the city waste dump and used

by both waste entrepreneurs and the city. However, since these spaces are not properly prepared to

store waste and waste is evacuated rarely and irregularly, neighbours complain about the conditions of

the place.

PRO-POOR PARTNERSHIPS

The establishment of pro-poor partnership arrangements had been planned by KISWAMP to be

developed between the waste picker entrepreneurs and the City to evacuate and transport waste from

the settlements to the city dump site. Yet these arrangements remained loose and informal. As

mentioned above, some of these spaces where the skips used to be are instead informally used as



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transfer points. For example in Manyatta, waste transfer points are full of waste during collection days

(Friday and Saturday) with the consequent inconveniences for the neighbours who often complain.

The informal arrangements to evacuate this waste vary from waste picker to waste picker. For example

in Migosi two entrepreneurs (personal interviews with local waste entrepreneurs) have informal

agreements with the municipal waste truck driver. Many other small waste pickers transport their

waste to the dump site by push carts or just dump it illegally elsewhere, for example at the locations

where the skips used to be or in empty lots along main roads. A particular problem is that the fees to

be payed at the dump site seem to vary depending on position and negotiating power, being

detrimental to the goal of getting as much waste to the dump as possible.

PROMOTING KISWAMP AS BEST PRACTICE

KISWAMP’s implementation was also seen as a failure as it not only failed to carry out some actions,

such as the establishment of functioning waste transfer points, but also failed to raise further resources

to be replicated to other informal settlements (interview former mayor and UN-habitat). Nevertheless,

the KISWAMP program, or rather accounts of it, have travelled well outside of Kisumu. For example,

the ideas of establishing environmental pedagogic centers spread out towards Uganda and Tanzania

(Personal interview with former municipal officer). In 2010 Mwanza and Kisumu municipal officials

visited each other to exchange experiences. In Mwanza, community clean-ups lead by women has

turned out to be very successful although such ideas may well have other origins (personal interview

with UN-Habitat officer). Another expression of how well KISWAMP has travelled internationally as

a best practice is it being presented frequently at the World Urban Forum and other conferences

(personal interview with former UN-Habitat officer).

Moreover, KUP has taken up some of the successful stories from KISWAMP in their review of Kisumu’s waste strategy. The reviewed KISWAMP will continue building at local best practices developed by residents, CBOs and private enterprises, more than at what other cities are doing (personal interview with project consultant). In words of one of the consultants in charge of the strategy review, the aim is “to beat it [the strategy] with success stories”. As a result, both the CBOs and the waste entrepreneurs that succeeded to survive, and some of them to continue growing after KISWAMP, are seen as ‘best practices’ (master ideas, norms of success that are taken for granted for a given situation) to be up-scaled and diffused by KUP thoroughout the city and to other cities in the region. KUP also aims to retake the idea of transfer points and turn them into waste recovery centres, supported by processes of waste separation at source. Another practice that has been turned into a norm are community clean-ups as a main mechanism for waste management in poor neighborhoods, sometimes in parallel, and reinforcing, the work of local waste entrepreneurs.

DISCUSSION In the following section we discuss the translation of the KISWAMP program into practice from the

three aspects of policy implementation of our theoretical framework: framing and reframing,

anchoring, and muddling through (see Table 3).



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FRAMING AND REFRAMING

The formulation and implementation of KISWAMP brought in new values, dimensions, and meanings

related to waste management for the different actors: residents of informal settlements, waste pickers,

municipal officers and politicians.

Firstly, waste was reframed from a problem into a resource and a source of employment by aligning

KISWAMP to existing waste entrepreneurship practices. The transformation of citizens and youth-

groups into entrepreneurs was an idea disseminated previously by NGOs in Kisumu’s informal

settlements. This approach to turn public services into business and work opportunities for low-income

residents is widespread in the international aid development sector and have been promoted during the

last decades by international organizations such as ILO and UN-Habitat (Thieme, 2015). Existing

waste entrepreneurs providing services in Kisumu’s informal settlements were thus practices to which

UN-Habitat and ILO officers and consultants could easily relate to as a fruitful approach. They were

aligned with their organizational repertoire of master ideas/solutions addressing the lack of critical

services in these contexts. KISWAMP picked up ideas that were already familiar, reframed them and

packaged them as new. This process of self-imitation has been labelled as auto-morphism

(Czarniawska, 2002; Schwartz, 2009) whereby ideas are selected and adopted (namely the existing

waste entrepreneurship practices) as they remind involved officers of their own past activities and

organizational repertoire.

Secondly, waste management services were reframed as a necessity in informal settlements and

residents were enrolled in new waste collection practices and persuaded to pay for these new services.

CBOs and entrepreneurs marketed (or framed) the need for waste collection services in these

communities via community clean-ups where they cleaned up the neighbourhoods without charge and

showed the value of a clean environment and, hence, of waste collection services. Waste entrepreneurs

contributed with their work to reframe ideas and demands of cleanliness (Douglas, 1978) in these

communities.

Thirdly, waste management was introduced as a municipal strategy that gained status internally. Waste

management was reframed, beyond traditional definitions of collecting and managing waste, into an

environmental, social and economic policy. By so doing, it generated new values and achieved higher

status both among politicians and municipal officers.

Yet, despite the revalorisation of waste pickers as a profession, the stigma of waste picking still

persists, especially for those informal waste pickers who work individually. Similarly, and despite the

progress made in many neighbourhoods, for many residents waste collection is not yet a service they

are willing to pay for, different from for example water supply or toilets. Additionally, other groups,

such as landlords, were not included in the framing of KISWAMP and they are critical gatekeepers

against the inclusion of waste services as critical and unavoidable ones. Finally, informal settlements

with lower-income residents, such as Obunga, were left out of the framing by KISWAMP. The

absence of sufficient economic resources in the project and the lack of strong resident associations

dissuaded, among other reasons, project managers to implement KISWAMP in settlements as Obunga,

in this pilot stage.

ANCHORING In order to gain internal adopters within the municipality, politicians and municipal officers were



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trained and engaged in a number of activities to support the new idea that resulted from the

KISWAMP reframing of waste management in Kisumu. A network of local waste actors was created

and strengthened to secure cooperation (e.g. through joint study trips to other cities). Yet, the

subsequent scattering of officers and politicians into other positions has weakened the anchoring of the

KISWAMP program into the city management budgets and decision-making processes.

However, KISWAMP succeeded very well in linking the project to existing waste entrepreneur

practices in informal settlements, in strengthening existing entrepreneurs and in recruiting new ones.

Training, credit access and networking were the strategies used by KISWAMP to anchor the idea of

waste entrepreneurs as providers of waste collection services in informal settlements and as a source

of employment. In particular, KISWAMP succeeded to knot a tighter network between the involved

actors, e.g. by creating collaborative platforms where actors could reflect and exchange experiences

and knowledge (Granovetter, 1985).

Existing and new entrepreneurs delivering quality services generated trust among residents of informal

settlements and, by doing so, they anchored the new services into the everyday practices of households

in these communities. The fact that entrepreneurs often worked in the same neighbourhoods where

they lived contributed to the anchoring of these new practices. As local entrepreneurs, they are

embedded in socio-spatial and commercial relations of proximity and trust in their neighbourhoods,

making use of the social capital available (Mair and Martí, 2006; Barinaga, 2014). Conversely, in

informal settlements left out of the framing of the project, such as Obunga, distrust and resentment

grew after the implementation of KISWAMP, partially explaining the weak replication to these parts

of the city.

The waste transfer points and the skips were also part of ideas that were not sufficiently anchored in

the residents’ practices, in the local designs, materials, and ongoing waste activities. Yet the idea

stayed, although blurred and twisted, as residents continued disposing of their waste at these points

even when the skips rusted and disappeared.

Although the ideas of waste transfer points and PPPs largely turned dormant, they are now recovered

by KUP in the new waste strategy. KUP aims to stabilize these two components that were

insufficiently anchored by KISWAMP. Previous studies on policy implementation show that “an idea

cannot catch on unless it already exists for some time in many people’s minds, as part of a master-

idea” (Czarniawska). Unlike the waste entrepreneurship model, waste transfer points and PPPs were

new ideas brought by KISWAMP to Kisumu. If they now have gained the position of master ideas as a

result of KISWAMP, the chances for them to catch on and anchor in informal settlements could be

higher with the new KUP program.

The KUP program seems to be “consolidative” of ideas previously disseminated by KISWAMP. In the

words of the consultant in charge of the review of the program, “I’m not going to push new ideas in

the review of KISWAMP”, meaning that the purpose is to scale up KISWAMP’s experimental

achievements by anchoring already existing practices such as the local waste entrepreneurs, the half

vanished waste transfer points, and waste PPPs. Previous research also shows how it takes many ideas

to accomplish a simple action (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). For waste entrepreneurs in informal

settlements to efficiently collect household waste, more stable collaborative arrangements between

entrepreneurs and the City have to be established, e.g. securing that the waste transfer points are

evacuated regularly.



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MUDDLING THROUGH

The design and implementation of KISWAMP in Kisumu can be described in terms of muddling

through (Lindholm, 1959, 1979), whereby the different actors involved cope with daily problems one

at a time, and where the policy and the practices that are finally implemented become loosely coupled.

First, despite the efforts made by KISWAMP to formalize informal waste entrepreneurship, the

provision of these services still relies on informal work and relations. In other words, the provision of

critical waste services remains loosely coupled to formal work. Waste pickers continue gaining low

salaries and suffer from health issues and the vulnerability of fluctuating market prices and tariffs. As

a result, informal waste pickers have to muddle through their daily livelihoods to guarantee their

survival.

Second, in the informal settlements residents continue to dispose of their waste at the waste transfer

points, where the infrastructure (the skips) are missing and the place is seldom evacuated by the

municipality. Even though this practice potentially is illegal, residents steer, or muddle through, their

activities to turn “bad” into “less bad” circumstances (Long, 2001), to cope with the lack of

infrastructure and service provision.

Third, the City’s waste management policy and its implementation are also loosely coupled due to an

insufficient anchoring in human and material resources. For example, there is no sufficient budget

allocated for the waste truck and the waste truck driver has to find different arrangements with local

waste pickers to purchase fuel and evacuate some of the waste from the settlements to the city dump.

As a result of this, pro-poor partnerships remains arbitrary and a loosely coupled arrangements.

Similarly, as there was no budget allocation, nor financial mechanisms, to maintain the skips, when

the first ones rusted or were stolen they were never replaced.

All in all, the design and implementation of KISWAMP responds to strategies of muddling thorough

at all level, and illustrate the everyday challenges of governing urban informality (Roy and Alsayyad,

2004).



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Framing and reframing Anchoring Muddling through Waste entrepreneurship

Waste reframed as a resource and a source of employment Existing waste entrepreneurs reframed as KISWAMP initiatives

Linked to existing waste entrepreneurship Strengthen local, national and international networks Waste entrepreneurship model travels away as best practice

Informal work based on fluctuating market prices and tarriffs, buffered by low salaries: waste pickers have to muddle through to gain their livelihood

City management Waste gains status of municipal strategy

Municipal officers and politicians are trained to gain internal adopters (but many fade away)

City policies and practices are loosely coupled: e.g. no budget for fuel for waste truck nor maintenance of containers, current city management structure.

Pro-poor partnerships Informal settlements

Waste management marketed by entrepreneurs as a critical service in informal settlements Lower-income settlements were left outside KISWAMP

Local waste entrepreneurs deliver quality services in local communities and build trust among residents Lack of social capital in Obunga to anchor the project

Arbitrary and loosely coupled pro-poor partnership arrangements

Waste transfer points Informal settlements

A new idea brought by international partners

Not well anchored in local materials, design, community’s practices and and ongoing waste activities

Residents continue disposing of waste “where the skips used to be”. Adopting of temporary transfer points by waste entrepreneurs.

[table 3] Framing, anchoring and muddling through KISWAMP

CONCLUSIONS A final aim of KISWAMP was the promotion of the KISWAMP model to other cities in the region.

Despite the diversity of challenges faced in relation to the improvement of waste management in

informal settlements, UN-Habitat and others work to develop and spread common solutions, such as

youth-groups as waste entrepreneurs and waste transfer points. These agencies function as carriers of

public management knowledge and ideas, with a huge capacity to spread practices and master ideas. In

the case at hand, KISWAMP was instrumental for UN-Habitat to test these solutions. In words of a

UN-Habitat official, “we wanted governments to take up what we had developed and had

demonstrated what was workable”.

These organizations, being development brokers (Lewis and Mosse, 2006) or idea-carriers, are

interested in experimentation, in finding best practices, and developing standard solutions/master ideas

to the improvement of basic services in informal settlements that can be replicated elsewhere. This is

why, when asked about KISWAMP, the UN-Habitat official valuated it as “it demonstrated

something”, “it was useful”. The fact that some officials in UN-Habitat interpret KISWAMP as a

success, while local actors see it as a failure illustrates how the implementation of city strategies is not

about whether or not these strategies succeed to work, but how they work (Mosse, 2005: 646) for

whom, where and when. For an organization oriented towards knowledge development and the

generation of master ideas/best practices, the loosely coupled (or even malfunctioning) relations



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between KISWAMP and the practices it seeked to change, was not an obstacle to turning some of its

components into best practices to be spread to other cities and governments. By packaging only parts

of the KISWAMP program they succeed to abstract the solutions from their context and interpret them

as successes when juxtaposed to already existing master ideas (Mosse, 2004). In this way, the master

ideas are not affected by the specificities of how well or not they were brought into practice (reframed,

anchored and muddled through) in their previous place and time. For the Obunga residents,

KISWAMP failed to frame Obunga into its scope of activities and did not deliver the vital services the

neighborhood has been deproved of. For municipal and county officers, KISWAMP is nevertheless

recalled as something positive, and as a result the new KUP waste management strategy retakes and

strives to implement parts of it. One may reflect on if these officers build their image of KISWAMP

on the story told by UN-Habitat and donor agencies or on the experiences of their inhabitants. This is

important since being adopted as a success story within the policy network and cultures (Rap, 2006) of

donor agencies does not necessarily guarantee success also in the more complex realities of the poorer

neighborhoods of Kisumu.

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Development Priorities in Cairo Informal Areas Elmouelhi, Alfiky, Mourad, Abdelaal, Born, Misselwitz, Salheen


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DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES IN CAIRO INFORMAL AREAS

PLANNING, REALIZATION AND LOCAL PERCEPTIONS

Hassan Elmouelhi1, Mohammed Alfiky2, Mahy Mourad3, Amr Abdelaal4, Lukas Born5, Philipp Misselwitz6, Mohamed Salheen7

(1) Senior researcher, Habitat Unit, Berlin Technical University, Berlin, Germany. [email protected] (2) Researcher, IUSD Lab, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt. [email protected] (3) Researcher, IUSD Lab, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt. [email protected] (4) Researcher, IUSD Lab, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt. [email protected] (5) Research Associate, Urban Development, Campus El-Gouna, Berlin Technical University, Berlin, Germany. [email protected] (6) Chair International Urbanism and Design, Habitat Unit, Berlin Technical University, Berlin, Germany. [email protected] (7) Director, IUSD Lab- Integrated urbanism and sustainable design, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt. [email protected]

ABSTRACT Few years after the beginning of the Egyptian dramatic political changes, one of the biggest challenges

in Metropolitan Cairo remains largely unchanged: The congestion and urban deterioration in its vast

informal neighborhoods. The situation has become more critical due to the recent boom in informal

growth while economic uncertainties threaten the poorest households. The changes have led to the

emergence of a multitude of new local actors beyond those sanctioned by the old regime, radically

changing the power-dynamics in neighborhoods. This research questions how the experience of

integrated and participatory neighborhood upgrading, under the old regime can be revisited and re-



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conceptualized as a tool to approach the challenges set by impoverished informal neighborhoods. How

can new possibilities for participation in the new political context be embraced? How can post-

revolution civil society mobilization be utilized as a potential to forge new effective partnerships with

governmental and international development cooperation agencies? The research aims at developing a

theoretical framework for developing priorities for inhabitants’ needs within informal settlements that

is sufficiently flexible to accommodate local physical, social and cultural specificities of each area.

While broadening an understanding of post-political changes dynamics in Cairo’s informal settlements

context, the output of this project helps policy and decision makers as well as community

representatives to forge effective partnerships in future upgrading projects.

The project relies on empirical analysis of the early planning stages in upgrading projects when

participatory structures and priorities are being discussed, decided upon and developed into concrete

improvement measures, in addition to the current on-going practices. In a case study approach of two

informal settlements: Manshiet Nasser and Istabl Antar, the practice of prioritization processes for

urban upgrading projects are examined by grassroots and externally initiated interventions by the

government and international development cooperation.

KEY WORDS Informal settlements; development priorities; perceptions; local initiatives; and international

development cooperation



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INTRODUCTION This paper presents the ongoing research project entitled: Development Priorities in Cairo Informal

Areas: Planning, Realization and Local Perceptions – DEVEPER1. Some of the so far achieved

findings are being shared and discussed in this paper. The trigger behind this research is the difficulty

to define the development priorities of an informal settlement when it comes to the complexity of the

problems, and the relations between the stakeholders. To tackle this problem, a methodology has been

designed, starting by literature review of the development cooperation discourse, and the change in

Egypt’s urban policies on the national level. This leads to the empirical study, and the analysis,

findings and results reached so far, with some preliminary conclusions for the research as a whole. The

research aims at:

Mapping and understanding urban development interventions in Cairo informal settlements

through development cooperation, governmental, and grass roots initiatives, as well as their

decision making processes regarding interventions, and how this is related to the residents’ needs.

Helping to build understanding of local dynamics (e.g., social and cultural). An understanding

that is vital for the development of effective, genuinely inclusive and sustainable neighborhood

upgrading strategies.

Proposing recommendations and methodologies for prioritization process for intervention.

RESEARCH PROBLEM, QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

The motivation behind this research was the lack of a clear vision about how the decisions are taken

within informal settlements urban intervention projects that aim at the areas’ development. Having a

closer look to in order to answer the research questions, through empirical research based on carefully

selected two informal settlements as case study areas in Cairo. A variety of initiatives and projects are

selected for investigation, whether done by development cooperation, government or local residents.

Examination of development priorities formulation process in urban upgrading is achieved through

answering the following: How has the process of formulating development priorities for, and within,

neighborhood upgrading projects changed since the early 1980s and since the Egyptian revolution in

particular? Which processes/methodologies were used to define development priorities within

neighborhood upgrading projects since the 1980s? What has changed since the revolution? How do

development priorities reflect different social, economic, cultural aspects of the local population

(places of origin, lifestyle, profession, gender, religion, generational differences, etc.)? Who was

included and who was excluded? How did project initiators chose/involve other actors/stakeholders?

How are issues of representation and legitimacy being dealt with? How can upgrading projects be

understood as prisms reflecting local power Dynamics? What conflicts arose in the priority

formulation? What conflict resolution tools were employed?

1 Partners: TU Berlin (Habitat Unit) & Ain Shams University (IUSD Cairo-Lab). Fund: German Egyptian Research Fund (GERF) by (BMBF) & (STDF)



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LITERATURE REVIEW This covers the discourse of dealing with informal settlements and the development processes on three

levels; international, national, and local scales. The following part presents a quick overview regarding

international discourse and theory on informality, before focusing on the case of Egypt. To relate the

research at a broadly international contextual level to the Egyptian national level through to the area

specific cases, this part gives an overview of the international discourse on informality in the urban

development context; Tackles important definitions and concepts (participation in intervention,

governmental institutions, (international) development cooperation, and grassroots initiatives.).

INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

During the elapsed phase, on the global scale, the focus was on reviewing urbanization process and

urban development in the global south that is much related to the phenomena of urban informality and

informal settlements.

There is no single definition for urban informality, whether institutional or expert-based, depending on

the perspective of how it is approached. The most common definition states that: “Slums are neglected

parts of cities where housing and living conditions are appallingly poor. Slums range from high

density, squalid central city tenements to spontaneous squatter settlements without legal recognition

or rights, sprawling at the edge of cities. Slums have various names, favelas, kampungs, bidonvilles,

tugurios, yet share the same miserable living conditions.” (UN-Habitat 2003, p.10)

Informal settlements embody a precariousness of status at every level, with many factors contributing

to their unsatisfactory living conditions, such as problematic and inherently ambiguous tenure, defined

as, “the degree of confidence that land users will not be arbitrarily deprived of the rights they enjoy

over land and the economic benefits that flow from it” (UN-Habitat 2008, p.5). A slum, therefore,

generally “combines the characteristics, of; a) inadequate access to safe water; b) inadequate access to

sanitation and other infrastructure; c) poor structural quality of housing; d) overcrowding; and e)

insecure residential status” (UN-Habitat 2003, p.196).

However, the economic status of informality, demonstrates how informality often depends on strong

social networks between residents (Elmouelhi 2014, p.22). “Informality is considered as an economy

of survival as it helped the urban poor and migrants to survive under harsh conditions.” (Cited Herrle,

1982) Slums and squatter settlements are “places where people are creating ingenious and sustainable

solutions to the problems they face, collaborating in unexpected ways to make something out of

nothing.” (Smith, 2011. p61) This is augmented by the flexibility that exists in slums, and their

potential for rapid growth (El Mouelhi 2014): “the ability of communities, their physical, social,

political and economic systems and their buildings and settlements, to withstand hazard generated

forces and demands, to bounce back rapidly and to adapt to cope with future threats.” (Davis, I. 2005.

p4)

RESIDENTS’ NEEDS IN URBAN CONTEXT

When we approach the issue of dealing with informal settlements, residents and their needs should be

discussed. Turner & Fichter (1972) have raised the crucial question of; “who will decide how basic life



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needs are to be satisfied, Government agencies, Giant corporations, or people themselves?” Today

these questions are asked with a special urgency in the field of urban upgrading. Harms highlights

some important aspects that define priorities for governments vs. those of residents as follows:

“… At the national level, massive housing deficits are most apparent, and solutions that combine

speed, economics of scale and industrialization seem perfectly appropriate. On the other hand from

the user’s point of view, primary considerations are availability (low rent or price level), quality,

location in relation to jobs, good schools, transportation, and sufficient control over one’s living

space to make a personalized home” (Hans H. Harms, 1972, p.73).

Richards and Thomson 1984) identified the basic services as follows: health care, water supply,

human waste disposal, schooling, and improving residents’ mobility. However, physical upgrading of

slums (with street networks and improved infrastructure) makes social and economic sense, while

socially, upgraded slums improve the physical living conditions, quality of life, and access to services

and opportunities in cities. Economically, upgraded slums trigger local economic development,

improve urban mobility and bring in an enormous economically productive sphere into the physical

and socioeconomic fabric of the wider city (Un Habitat Website).

The literature also covers various approaches of dealing with Informal settlements to overcome their

problems. Governments had several approaches, however, it has passed through a series of changes in

the context of international cooperation. This had implications on the countries that received the

assistance whether this was called aid, donations, technical support or development cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FUNDING Donors are either (bilateral or multilateral). Bilateral foreign aid is funding directly obtained from

donor governments and channeled to the recipient governments2. This also includes some

development-oriented banks (e.g. KFW from Germany). While multilateral organizations, obtain

funding from several donor governments and spend it on projects in various countries (WHO, World

Bank, UNICEF, different UN organizations). Such organizations collect aid from different sources and

direct it to specific projects in recipient governments (Milner, & Tingley, 2013) (Easterly & Pfutze,

2008). Another form of international cooperation could be explained through the model developed

recently by GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), a German state owned

company. Using the German government’s money, it also started to apply for funds from other donors

(e.g., EU Funds), as the case of PDP/GIZ in Cairo.

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT Role of State is a factor that needs to be clarified in this context. For a state to receive foreign aid and

assistance in the development sector, they are required to implement the policies of the development

agencies as a prerequisite for the aid assistance. In such a case, the state’s role becomes limited to

mediating between external and local interests. “The state’s mediating role was to accede to the

donors' demands for participatory forms of urban projects, but constrained by domestic political

agendas fortuitously supported by a resistant bureaucracy” (Zetter & E. Hamza, 1998). In addition,

this form of development assistance in urbanization produces a dependency model, in “which

urbanization is dependent on the requirements of the empirical power and not on the emerging new

2 e.g., USAID - USA, DANIDA - Denmark, and GIZ - Germany



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requirements of the local society” (Harms, 2012).

Some of the concepts derived from the urban experiences of the developed donor countries are

replicated in the recipient countries and fail to address the specificity of the local contexts in the

recipient countries. For example, ‘community participation’ is actively promoted by development

agencies such as the World Bank as a requirement for development projects. Recipient countries,

when acquiring development assistance within urban interventions, therefore, had to respond to

international donors who associated community participation with housing sector projects for sites and

services and squatter upgrading as a condition of project assistance (Zetter & E. Hamza, 1998; Hamdi,

1993). This form of policy - with many different interpretations of its meaning and purpose —

consequently failed to recognize the conceptual complexity of community participation when

translated to local conditions, is making it a largely tokenistic gesture (Zetter & E. Hamza, 1998).

Selectivity of Priority Projects is an important aspect that is considered in our research. In general, the

selection of projects is generally not based on an effective tool for determining specific selection

criteria. It is not

“…determined by the inherent capacity and needs of particular areas but by broader state interests

which themselves were determined and supported by international political interests and particular

ideologies of urban development projects. For example, certain areas are merely selected as projects

for the flow of development aid because 'community participation' was deemed an essential

component” (Zetter & E. Hamza, 1998).

However, a hypothesis could be argued in this research, that coordination between Funds and Projects

usually does not take place unless there is a central organization responsible for it, with access to

information and a high level of coordination between different stakeholders.

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, GRASS ROOTS MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY Community participation has increasingly become adopted as an approach in the provision of urban

upgrading (Tageldeen, 2003). According to Desai there are several explanations for the community

participation concept. She stated: “… in the political context community participation is presented as

a right where people are entitled to participate in the decision-making process that affects their living

conditions, in other words it is a form of grass-roots democracy” (Desai, 1995). “Grass-roots

development” and “development from below” could also be regarded as synonymous with community

participation, according to Desai. Participation is defined in The United Nation Report of 1979 as

meaning the “sharing by people in the benefits of development, active contribution by people to

development and involvement of people in decision-making at all levels of society”. Desai argues

however, that there is no clear uncontested definition of community participation (Tri et al. 1986: 11),

stating: “Participation can mean whatever one wants it to mean” (Desai, 1995:42-43). Participation is a

process in which people, especially disadvantaged people, influence resource allocation and policy and

program formulation and implementation, and are involved at different levels and degrees of intensity

in the identification, timing, planning, design, implementation, evaluation, and post-implementation

stages of development projects (Imparato and Ruster, 2003, p.20).



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Miessen criticized in his recently published book, “The Nightmare of Participation” (2010), how

increasingly overused the term “participation” has become. When everyone has been turned into a

participant, the often uncritical, innocent, and romantic use of the term has become frightening.

Supported by a repeatedly nostalgic veneer of worthiness, phony solidarity, and political correctness,

participation has become the default of politicians withdrawing from responsibility. Similar to the

notion of an independent politician dissociated from a specific party, this third part of Miessen’s

participation trilogy encourages the role of what he calls the “crossbench practitioner,” an

“uninterested outsider” and “uncalled participator” who is not limited by existing protocols, and who

enters the arena with nothing but creative intellect and the will to generate change. Miessen argues for

an urgent inversion of participation, a model beyond modes of consensus. Instead of reading

participation as the charitable savior of political struggle, Miessen candidly reflects on the limits and

traps of its real motivations:

“This work promotes a conflictual reading of participation as a mode of practice, one that opposes the

brainwave of the democratic facilitator, one that, at times, has to assume non-physical violence and

singular decision-making in order to produce frameworks for change.” (Miessen, 2010, p.13)

Integrating “participatory approaches” into “national policy-making”, has blurred the boundaries

between “bottom-up, people-centered, process-oriented and ‘alternative’ approaches” and “top-down,

technocratic, blueprint planning of state-led modernization” (Hickey & Mohan, 2004, p.4). The true

beneficiaries seem to be big NGOs rather than local people (Davis, 2006, p. 76). From a Middle

Eastern perspective, Bayat deplores the hyperbole about NGOs, pointing out that "their potential for

independent and democratic organization has generally been overestimated” (Davis, 2006, p. 77).

To conclude, participation in urban development should not be a goal by itself. It does not provide a

guarantee for the success of any project that claims to include participation among its methods. The

ability of participation to help the residents to express their needs and reflect on their reality is not

necessary the way that their priorities are considered while taking decisions for intervention.

CHANGES IN NATIONAL URBAN POLICIES IN EGYPT

INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL URBANISM IN EGYPT “Ashwaiyyat, the plural for ashwaiyya (literally meaning ‘half-hazard’), is the term used in public to

refer to the informal communities in Egypt, some of which 111 exist in the greater Cairo area. Official

estimates put the total number of these settlements at about 1,034, accounting for about 12 million, or

45 per cent, of Egypt’s urban population. Land invasion accounts for a very small proportion of these

settlements ...” (Bayat & Denis 2000 p.185)

Egypt has a major problem with informal settlements which have emerged across the whole country,

but mainly in the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) (ISDF, 2010). The phenomenon of informal settlements

started to appear in Egypt during the mid-1950s during its quasi-permanent state of war (El-Batran &

Arandel 1998), and as a result of the impact of Nasser’s government’s policies (El Kafrawy, 2012).

These were not only housing policies, but also an expression of the government’s orientation towards

socialism, privatization, etc. that directly affected different aspects of people’s lives, including the

need for proper shelter. These policies were directly embodied in a host of issues, including



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inadequate housing policy provision for those who most needed it, centralization of industries and job

opportunities in Cairo, and no investment in rural areas, leading to the rural to urban population influx

into the cities. These policy flaws were further amplified as a result of informality always being

discussed in isolation from a national housing policy. Egypt’s deficiency in land management systems

was exacerbated by corruption in the local administration (Shaat 2014). Constant power struggles

between ministries with conflicting interests resulted in a failure to coordinate and an often-

contradictory system of urban planning (Ibrahim and Sherif, 2008). According to Ben Nefissa (2009),

Egypt’s particular form of governance is still attributed to “excessive centralization, lack of

transparency, and communication failures between the administrative apparatus and citizens.”

Egypt has been experiencing the emergence of overpopulated urban centers due to rapid and uneven

urbanization. Internal migration used to be a major cause of hasty urbanization, especially rural-urban

migration in the mid 1970s. The increase of rural population from 9 million in 1900 to 20 million in

1975, besides the decline of average per capita of agricultural land from half an acre to nearly one

sixth of an acre, land fragmentation laws and the increase of land rents, all combined led to increased

rural unemployment and increased number of landless families that led to massive migrating

population to the urban areas, mainly Cairo and Alexandria (Azim, 2011). ‘Egypt has seen a vast

population surge over the past forty years as a result of rural to urban migration. Subsequently, its

population rose from 24 million in 1952 to nearly 50 million in 1986 and is expected to reach more

than 90 million by 2025 (Arandel and El Batran, 1997, p. 1). However, the current net in-migration to

Cairo stands at almost zero (Sims, 2010, p. 32). Informal settlements work as transit areas for

immigrants who settle in these areas for two main reasons; security of living with relatives that

previously migrated and the cheap living expenses (Salheen, 2005, Elmouelhi 2014). Thus, kinship

plays an important role in the structure of informal settlements, as mostly residents share the same

traditions and culture from their rural origins (Elmouelhi 2014).

DEALING WITH INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Constant power struggles between ministries with conflicting interests resulted in a failure to

coordinate and an often-contradictory system of urban planning (Ibrahim and Sherif, 2008). Egypt’s

particular form of governance is still attributed to ‘excessive centralization, lack of transparency, and

communication failures between the administrative apparatus and citizens’ (Ben Nefissa 2009)



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[fig. 1] The rockslide of Moqatam hill - MN. (Source: Al-Masry Al-Yoom newspaper. 10.9.2008)

PRE-POLITICAL CHANGE 2011 The main Ministries that have been involved in dealing with the built environment in Egypt are: the

Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development (MoHUD), the General Organization for

Physical Planning (GOPP), and Governorate and local districts administrations. The responsibility of

urban development used to belong to MoHUD, (Runkel 2009, p. 44), until 1973 when the GOPP was

established as a separate entity within it.

The Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) was formed by the Presidential decree no.305

in 2008 to deal with the informal areas scattered across Egypt. It started its work in 2009 after the

formulation its board and the establishment of certain guidelines (Gohar 2014; Khalifa 2011). The

ISDF gets its main source of funding from the Ministry of Finance (Gohar 2014) after permission from

the Ministry of Planning. The ISDF set a target to make a “National Map of Slums” in Egypt (ISDF

2012a). Another important partner is the Urban Upgrading Units (UUU) were established in 2007, and

funded by GIZ till 2009 as a part of decentralization process. Developed as a model, these have now

been generalized in all governorates (starting 2010) with no real clear role3.

Elected entities in Egypt are mainly associated with the parliament. Since 2011 there has been some

intervals without a parliament. Local popular councils, which are more concerned with local

governance, were disbanded by a court rule in June 2011. Therefore, it is not an easy task to define the

role of each of these entities with regards to upgrading informal settlements, particularly in terms of

identifying a means of communication between them.

In the Egyptian context, international development cooperation has started in mid 20th century.

Political changes in Egypt that have started 2011 have implications on the national state urban policies

3 Other examples of governmental entities: The General Administration for Urban Harmony (NOUH) has nothing to do with informal settlements, but is still involved in dealing with the built environment.



330

regarding dealing with informal settlements. This is also reflected on the international cooperation

strategies dealing with that issue.

POST POLITICAL CHANGES (2011) AFTER REVOLUTION Since 2011, the situation has been static regarding dealing with informal settlements due to political

unrest. However, in June 2014, the minister for MURIS (Dr. Laila Iskander) started to gather different

responsibilities regarding informal settlements under the ministry’s control4. On the other hand, there

will probably be a change in their roles of the Ministry of Housing and the GOPP the regarding

renewing existing urban areas within cities, especially informal settlements. This issue is still not clear

and is yet to be investigated. A few months after its establishment, the MURIS has started giving a

direct fund to 50-100 NGOs according to a Prime Ministerial Decree (Eskandar, 2014).

However, the question has been raised as to why the ISDF focuses on unsafe areas (slums) as a

priority, even though, according to the ISDF statistics, they only form about 5% of the total number of

informal settlements. Widening the scope of the MURIS to include unplanned areas does not meet the

capacity of the ministry, and no data is available for the unplanned areas until now5. The approach

now is changing from physical interventions to a more socio-economic one as announced by the

minister in several interviews (2015)6.

The relation between NGOs and donors is also changing. Before 2011, national security police and the

local office of the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSSA) had to approve the project. Now, they only

have to be informed, as the approval comes from the ministry of international cooperation. Currently if

the project is on a governmental level, not all NGO’s have to take approval from MOSSA7, they just

need to give them ‘notice’.

The rolls back of the 2011 revolution could influence the results of our study, as well as the change in

the political will and the possible role of the newly established MURIS. It has formed a possible

addition to the intended objectives, till it was dissolved in September 2015, and its responsibilities

have been assigned to the ministry of housing.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN EGYPT Some working international organizations are actively involved in the process of urban development

in Egypt, especially that of informal settlements. They either act as donors or they are funded through

other international donors as a third party. According to a report survey by JICA (2011) it is confirmed

that most international foreign assistance projects have done many efforts to introduce and disseminate

4 For example, the solid waste management department from the Ministry of Environment probably moved across to MURIS’s responsibilities. 5 In the kick-off meeting (November 2014), Elmouelhi posed this question to Dr. Darwish (MURIS). Dr. Darwish agreed on this opinion. 6 MURIS has a socio-economic department (was headed by Ms. Manal Shahin). Socio-economic development interventions have a history of being quite weak. There is an idea of establishing a department of investment in the ministry, which includes civil society and upgrading.



331

an integrated approach that is new to Egypt. International organizations, represented by GTZ and UN-

HABITAT, have supported the government’s effort for slum upgrading alongside a community

participatory approach. USAID provides financial assistance for ISDF (JICA 2011) and also works

with local NGOs/CBOs. International NGOs, foundations and private sector entities, such as Aga

Khan in Al-Darb Al-Ahmar, and HSBC in Dar Al-Salam area, have assisted raising the general living

standards8.

GIZ9, through their partnership with the government, the ministry of planning

10, initiated many

projects as one of the main actors in development process of informal settlements. GIZ do not

intervene in areas where relocation is an option, which might explain why Istabl Antar was never

included in their intervention projects. The Participatory Development Programme in Urban Areas

(PDP), initiated in 2004, was supposed to be terminated by GIZ in 2011 until they secured extra funds.

With regards to the coordination between donors and governments in Egypt, it is clear that Egypt’s

political instability affects its development cooperation negatively. GIZ got a fund for urban

development from the EU (€40 million) which is currently undergoing, and which ISDF had no idea

about according to MURIS (the assistant for the MURIS minister). This could be because of the

change in the governmental structure, as the agreement was with the minister of planning and

international cooperation and MURIS was not yet established when the fund was allocated. This fund

is relocated in the end of 2014 to the ministry of international cooperation to the MURIS11

.

The timeline for dealing with informal settlements in Egypt reflects historical and political events

shows important political events that have taken place in the second half of the 20th century in Egypt

and places them in relation to the national policy with regard to the cities, urban planning and informal

settlements, the establishment of new government agencies on this issue or with regard to the

involvement of some international organizations in development cooperation (see fig.2).

Recently, upgrading informal settlements has increasingly become a common interest for the

government, international development cooperation organization, national NGOs and private sector.

Consultants besides to research institutes at universities, together with activists, all of them share thae

same interest, and several activities and events have started to take place as a base for local discourse

based on practices. Hence, defining the issues on local area level, and transforming this into

intervention decisions still lack a clear methodological vision or steps. Different attempts by different

entities in the last decades worth to be studied and analyzed.

8 Other example: Micro finance projects conducted under the SME (Small Medium Enterprise) Development funded by CIDA covers slum and informal areas also in collaboration with local NGOs. 9 Formerly known as GTZ till 2011 10 Formerly the ministry of economic development 11 After there is no MURIS, the future of these projects is still not announced yet.



332

[fig. 2] Diagram that shows main stakeholders who deal with informal areas development (source: authors)

Through observing the impact of the Egyptians’ mobilization in the so called January 25th and 30

th

June revolutions, several urban activists started to work on the ground with different informal areas in

unprecedented forms of collaboration. These unexpected changes require some efforts to map and

identify the stakeholders’ new roles, which consequently means there is an urgent need for extra

research time to be invested in understanding the new dynamic urban mobilizing context on both the

national - state level and civil society level, and their new relations.



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[fig. 3] Timeline for dealing with informal settlements in Egypt as a reflection to historical and political events

EMPIRICAL STUDY Manshiet Nasser and Istabl Antar are selected as case study areas (fig.3), considered as similar cases



334

with almost the same problems, but with time difference. They share similar conditions and

characteristics, no secure tenure for the land and the houses, built on desert state owned land, with

different level of development and previous/on going interventions. The aim of selecting similar case

studies was to narrow down the comparative study to have a comprehensive outcome.

[fig. 4] Location of MN and IA

Mapping interventions in both areas has helped out for better understanding of the so-called

development dynamics from different perspectives (Government – International Cooperation – Local

initiatives by NGOs/CBOs and residents). In addition, it serves as base layers for the analysis phase.

MANSHIET NASSER Several researchers have worked on studying MN as one of the largest Cairo informal areas, and being

the most attractive area for interventions in the last decades. Starting in the 1970s till now hundreds of

development projects have been implemented in MN, which is also attractive for researchers to

analyze the area12

.

After the government changed its plans of demolishing it in 1997 to be a legalized area, the BMZ

decided to support the decision through financing PDP-GTZ program. A study for the socio-economic

conditions of the area was conducted in 1998 by the National research center for social studies and

crime. The announced reasons why MN is chosen to be the first application for the rehabilitation

12 For example: Furniss (2012) who worked on Cairo's Garbage Collectors in Zabaleen area in MN, Runckel (2009) worked on the land tenure of MN.



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process are: the largest area and the highest density within Cairo informal areas; its location on one of

the main arteries of Cairo (Autostrad); a main part in the master plan of Fatimid Cairo; Possibility for

extension on a hinter desert land for the relocation area (Al Doweka); The low economic and low

environmental conditions; Lack of infrastructure and social services; Lack of green areas; Mixed use

between housing, industrial and commercial activities (as a negative characteristic).

Several local power entities are found on the ground. There are associations of residents who belong to

the same origin (upper Egyptian village or governorate) “Rabta”: Sons of Banga, and sons of Asyut.

Some Neighborhood initiatives (or NGOs) have been initiated after the revolution. There is a huge

network of NGOs in the area (Runckel 2009). One of MN sub districts is Al-Doweka, that had the

rock fall accident killed several people and destroyed houses in the area in 2008, and this had a huge

impact on the national Egyptian policy, which led to the establishment of ISDF by a presidential

decree.

According to PDP (2006), the area is divided into 9 Planning Zones (PDP 2006)13

. The most important

activities for the residents of MN: 65% craft and administrative activities, 21% entrepreneurship, 14%

activities related to garbage collection. In Ezbet Bekhiet 86% of the buildings are made of bricks and

concrete. Its Population: 37.000 (2003), and about 75 % of the residents are from Upper Egypt. 52 %

of the residents are literate (Piffero 2009), 45,7 % are below the lower Egyptian poverty line, 85 % are

self- employed; 55 % work within the area, 57 % of the units are rented; 60% tap water access.

The physical conditions are currently much better compared to the time prior to GTZ projects have

been implemented (prior to 1998), according to some residents. This is mainly due to the infrastructure

provision and many other physical upgrading interventions. Nevertheless, despite the amount of

interventions done by many different development cooperation and governmental entities, the area is

still considered in the Egyptian context as informal area, and most of the residents belong to the less

income groups.

Manshiet Nasser was the most mentioned in the newsfor having problems since late 1960s (mentioned

as part of the housing crisis that Egypt was going through at that time. The whole Mansheyet Nasser

project should be evaluated to avoid its problems when executing new housing projects) (Mobashir14

2015). Other than that it was mentioned in context of service provision (water networks renewal to

provide water needs to the area), polluting activities, cleaning campaigns and some criminal activities.

Medical services are not sufficient, even after the Sheikh Zaied Hospital was open in 2014. Several

residents complained that it is not functioning well, no enough doctors and no equipment. Tenure issue

and land titling for the MN area has failed several times due to several reasons: due to the

infrastructure provision, the feeling of secured tenure has increased, as this is a sign that the

government is not going to evict the area after spending this large amount of money. The residents

refuse to pay the amounts of money specified by the governorate claiming that those prices are

exaggerated. Actually they do not feel that they need to legalize the ownership. Legalization would

consequently increase the costs in the area. The good location of MN in Cairo, and having the

infrastructure makes the area more attractive for residents who belong to middle income category.

13 Planning zones: MMN 1 – Ezbet Bekhit, MMN 2 – Masakin, MMN 3 – Asfal Razaz, MMN 4 – Gamia, MMN 5 – Maadissa, MN 6 – Khazan, MN 7 – El Zarayib, MN 8 – Aala Razaz, MN 9 – Wadi Faraoon. 14 Urban Management master student- TU Berlin (2015)



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ISTABL ANTAR

It is considered as a part of Ezbet Khairallah. Its boundaries differ in official documents than from its

residents’ perceptions. In this research we identified certain boundaries that we define as Istabl Antar.

Not much literature is available, only the work of the summer school (2011)15

. Parts of the findings of

that work are used to compare between the situation at that time (2011) and the current situation in the

year 2015.

According to El-Faramawy: “Ezbet Khairallah and Istabl Antar are unplanned communities built on a

twenty-five meters high natural platform that extends from the Mokattam Mountain. Looking north,

Ezbet khairallah overlooks the Ain El-Sira Lakes surrounded by an area that has been developed with

public building and museums. Looking south, Ezbet Khairallah and Istabl Antar overlook the Nile at

a distance. It is clear that their location has high potential and development value.” (El-Faramawy,

2013)16

The area has been mentioned in newspapers in several occasions, mainly dealing with the “unsafe”

part of Istabl Antar, according to the ISDF categorization, and the rocks foundation treatment and

trimming (Mobasher, 2015),. Another topic is mentioning the Shakes or 'eshash' situation, numbers

and responses to them by their demolishing and provision of housing units to the inhabitants (on

public land). Another context the area was mentioned is related to the issue of the area's children labor

and their education status, in addition to their potential and the activities of some of the NGOs (e.g.,

Tawasol) were also highlighted regarding integrating them in some cultural activities.

The area different parts have different physical conditions (buildings and infrastructure), and also the

residents’ socio-economic conditions and needs. However, it is considered a complex case if

compared to other informal areas in Cairo due to the following: Part of the studied area is categorized

according to ISDF as “unsafe”: 1st grade. Part of it has been already evicted (i.e. Least security of

tenure). Complex ownership issues; Poor Accessibility conditions; Infrastructure has been recently

introduced (2013); International development cooperation also recently started to work in the area.

The area has changed on the level of the physical conditions compared to the conditions in 2011-2012.

The area between the Gabakhana monument and the football playground is now paved through a

project implemented by Al-Nour and funded by CRS. Facades facing the ring road are painted (ca.

500 m) 2 years ago 2013 (CRS). Water supply and sewage network are provided by the government

(after 2011).

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RESULTS On the local level, and due to the change of Istabl Antar area conditions, the criteria of selecting

intervention projects had to be redesigned. Istabl Antar’s physical conditions have changed from the

time of our submitted proposal (2012) compared to current conditions (the start date of the research

project in 2014), especially regarding infrastructure, provided by the government between 2012 and

2014. Consequently, international development cooperation organizations were attracted to the area

and have initiated several projects, which was not the case by the time of this research proposal. This

would require some modifications for the research methodology and adaptation to the current

situation, especially regarding the selection of the case study projects/initiatives in Istabl Antar.

15 Summer school organized by ASU and TU Berlin, and funded by the DAAD. 16 El-Faramawy, A. (2013) http://faramawyali.blogspot.de/ visited 25.4.2013



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PROJECTS, INITIATIVES OR INTERVENTIONS?

A significant part of the work is the detailed research on individual projects, the projects in the two

areas have been researched some of them are investigated in the further course of the next phases of

the project in more detail. A distinction is made between physical and socio-economic projects.

Physical projects are categorized as follows:

Infrastructure provision through projects or initiatives (roads, electricity, sewage or water supply).

Greenery / landscaping / open space17

: Projects that deal with green areas, the upgrading of public

spaces or with lighting and street furniture.

Rehabilitation / construction of new buildings: Projects or initiatives that affect the construction

or rehabilitation of housing.

Services: Projects or initiatives that are supplying the residents / inside with care services (e.g.

education, health).

For all projects, the following information were investigated, which also form a crucial criteria in the

selection process of the projects:

- Period of implementation before or after January 2011; - Stakeholders and actor typologies: citizens initiatives, local organizations such as NGOs or

CBOs, government organizations or the International Development Cooperation - Project status: Running, completed or stagnant

This paper focuses on three different projects that represent different types of interventions that have

taken place in Manshiet Nasser and Istabl Antar. The case study projects are classified according to

the initiator, the source of funding and the time of implementation. The selected projects in MN are:

The two GTZ community service buildings (1998-2003), and the Facades painting project by MURIS

(2015). The selected projects in IA are: Ring road stairs, and Facades painting by MURIS (2015)

Local residents Local NGO Government International cooperation

MN Facades painting by MURIS (2015) 2 GTZ community service

buildings (1998-2003)

IA Ring road stairs

Facades painting by MURIS (2015)

[fig. 5]

STAKEHOLDERS’ ANALYSIS

The stakeholders that are active in the urban development field in both areas of Manshiet Nasser and

Istabl Antar were identified (see fig. 6&7). In both areas, we can find external interventions that vary

between international development cooperation as donors, and the local NGOs. The main difference

between both areas is the time in which these external interventions have started. It is clear that IA is

still newly introduced to the development market, only recently after 2011, and after the infrastructure

has been provided by the government (2013). While Manshiet Nasser has a long history of external

interventions, which is somehow still taking place, but in a less pace, and mainly depending on the

local NGOs.



338

[fig. 6] Stakeholders Analysis of MN

[fig. 7] Stakeholders Analysis of IA The timeline for the development projects are studied in detail and in the two studied areas. It becomes

clear how the interventions have changed before and after the Revolution. It has been largely achieved

long-lasting national or international projects and not local initiated projects before the revolution, so

the interventions after the revolution are much shorter, more numerous and locally initiated primarily.

In Istabl Antar, before 2011, almost all initiatives and interventions were done within the concept of



339

self-help either by the residents themselves, or initiated by NGOs18

. This situation has changed after

2011, and the area has become more attractive to international development organizations. In the

following part, 2 timeline are shown (fig. 8 & 9).

[fig. 8] Timeline for projects and interventions in Manshiet Nasser

18 For example: The football playground (Al-Nour/Sohbet kheir) that ended up with a conflict between the two NGOs.



340

[fig. 9] Timeline for projects and interventions in Istabl Antar

PROJECT 1: GTZ: 2 SERVICE BUILDINGS- MANSHIET NASSER The two buildings were designed and built through the first phase of GTZ’s work in the area of Ezbet

Bekhiet (1998-2003) during the involvement of El-Meniawy and David Sims. The two buildings were

not completed when the second phase started according to Shaat. In the second phase (2004-2007) the

two buildings were completed. The 2 land plots were taken by GTZ.19

According to the priority of

needs of the community, the first building was made at the beginning for the “Rawabet”, as El

Menyawy wanted to make something similar to the Bedouins “Magles el Magales” or (council of

councils) to solve the problems of the area and to be a replacement to the government. Both buildings

were mainly designed as community service buildings. One building contains a post office, a

registration office and a local unit for the ministry of social solidarity, in addition to spaces for

“Rabta” (fig. 5). Afterwards they have been used by NGOs/CBOs. The other building is mainly for

NGOs. Most of the NGOs were established in parallel with the constructions of the two buildings,

even the one he is a co-founder, El Bedaya foundation. They manage a day care for area’s kids.

According to El-Meniawy, the residents were part of the project from the early beginning; they were

involved through focus group discussions, questionnaires and interviews for over a year. Participation

was from the beginning from deciding the priority, then in the design the needs inside the building,

they used to make focus group discussions with men, women, children and youth. By asking residents

who is managing the 2 buildings right now, no body could answer.20

19 One land plot was a Cowshed possessed by a thug, who was about to shoot El Meniawy, while the other land was abandoned. 20 The only story that was mentioned was after 2011 revolution, the building of local authority was burnt. Later, and during the renovation of this building, the officials moved to one of GTZ buildings, and used the spaces of the NGOs, which had to move out. Then, they let them in again when their local authority building was ready.



341

[fig. 10] GTZ Building with different service functions (e.g. post office, unit of social solidarity)

To mention an example, “Um Taha” (63 years) praised the role of the NGOs, either on the level of

seasonal financial assistance, or projects that hire youth of the area temporarily, in addition to the

number of nurseries that provide service for many families in the area. Another woman (mid 40s), who

works in Bedaya foundation, mentioned that the upper floor is not actually used, and the public

common toilettes are closed. All the interviewees declared the importance of the post office, from

which many residents get their monthly pension from the ministry of social solidarity. The registration

office (Shahr ‘Aqaary) seems to be neglected, as it was not mentioned by any of them, which makes

sense, as the reason behind its establishment was mainly for the land titling proposed by the GTZ

(Shaat 2015).

PROJECT 2: RING ROAD STAIRS – ISTABL ANTAR Just after the construction of the ring road (2002), as there was no connection to the ring road, and no

transportation. So the residents decided to make the stairs for themselves to connect them with the rest

of Cairo. The cost was covered by most of the neighbors.



342

[fig. 11] Ring Road Stair (first stair)

According to Mokhtar (resident, 65 years), he built the mosque over looking the ring road in the

ground floor of his house; he constructed the first stair (see fig.8) for those who see the mosque so

they can reach it from the ring road. Another evidence, according to residents, around 27 death

happened as people used to cross the ring road to the other side after they are dropped off from the

transportation. Accordingly, the stairs were essential so they pass to Ezbet Khayrallah through the

tunnels. Mokhtar benefited from the project as he built a kiosk.21

To conclude, although this initiative is totally financed and implemented by the residents, with no

external financial or technical assistance, it is clear that the ring road stairs initiative has an impact

from the residents’ perspective, as the area became more accessible to both residents and outsiders.

Also, some kiosks where built as a way of economic revenue. The number of possible beneficiaries is

relatively high, especially if we consider the low cost, and the short time of implementation for that

initiative.

PROJECT 3: FAÇADES PAINTING (MANSHIET NASSER AND ISTABL ANTAR) Announced in 2014 by (MURIS), aiming to upgrade the facades of 4 informal areas in Cairo and Giza.

It was claimed to apply the public participation, and provide a source of income for the young

residents during the project’s implementation (short term), in addition, to help them learn a craft, that

would help in upgrading themselves and their area, according to Prof. Abdel Baky (the project’s

consultant) “…that leads to the sustainability of upgrading ideas.”

21 He mentioned that during the first days of the 25th January revolution, he and his neighbors had to stay awake the whole night as members of the popular committee, so he started to make tea and sell it, then it developed to be a kiosk that sells snacks and cigarettes.



343

The residents were looking for stability after the training period provided by the construction company

“Arab contractors - Osman Ahmad Osman”, and to be officially recruited as promised by the MURIS,

although this idea faced some obstacles from the official procedures. According to Ms. Shahin22

: “the

number of candidates from the areas’ youth was around 300. The company asked them to hand in

some official documents, military service status, and criminal certificate, in order to complete their

recruitment process23

. This decreased the numbers of the eligible youth to 30 or 40”. Other reason of

decreasing the number of participants in the training phase was the low daily per deem24

.

[fig. 12] Painting Facades in Istabl Antar

From the residents’ perception about the project that was investigated, some of the painted houses

owners have shown their satisfaction towards the project, as it makes their houses look better. Some of

22 Former director of socio-economic development sector-MURIS till July 2015, and was involved in coordinating the facades painting project. 23 We can argue that these difficult requirements were just to decrease the possibility to recruit any of the youth by the construction company. This shows an example of when the formal system conflicts with the informal one. 24 According to Ms. Shahin, another reason for the failure of the idea was the low per deem, which was 40 L.E (aprox. 5 EUR)/day, which is considered low by many of the young residents compared to what they earn if they drive a Tuk-Tuk (80 L.E/day).



344

them complained that the houses from inside need plumbing maintenance, which is not included

within of the project. Although the consultant mentioned that the residents were asked about the colors

that they prefer for their houses, several residents has mentioned that they were not asked at all about

their opinion. All of the interviewees in both areas mentioned that they know the real reason hidden

behind this project, which is to make the area looks better for the outsiders who pass by the area, to

satisfy the “important people, politicians, ministers, etc.”. Several residents from both areas argued

that their area has more urgent interventions towards problems like water supply, garbage, and health

and education services. This reveals their dissatisfaction from the government’s interventions in their

areas and the mistrust towards the state.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS At the current phase of this research, and based on our analysis so far, and through studying the

development processes that have occurred, the results would lead to strengthen the following

arguments regarding development process of Manshiet Nasser:

In MN on the long run, coordination between different stakeholders, donors and actors was minimal,

as no kind of continuation or follow up. Since GTZ left the area, no follow up for assessing their

interventions has been conducted.

Most of the NGOs leaders in MN nowadays have worked with GTZ in the period between 1998 and

2007. They attended several trainings and capacity building courses. They were encouraged to

establish NGOs (i.e. for the GTZ buildings). This could be seen as a positive output through capacity

building for local leaders. At the same time, speculation of development business could be seen as a

negative a side effect. Through the short interviews with different NGOs workers in the area, we could

witness a clear competition atmosphere between NGOs, but at the same time, there are several cases

that two or more NGOs cooperate together in the same project/fund in a complimentary way.

For Istabl Antar, the area conditions have changed a lot compared to in 2011. Infrastructure was

provided by the government and almost covers all houses, except in some areas, where the water

supply provided through the local initiative of Al-Nour NGO is still functioning.

Local initiatives are more successful compared to external interventions, as they touch

As a consequence of infrastructure provision, the residents’ feeling of Security of tenure increased, so

buildings became higher and their conditions are better in certain parts within the area compared to the

situation in 2011. On the other hand, more interventions by development organizations have taken

place (i.e., physical and non-physical), and in return, the number of local initiatives by the residents

has decreased. It is argued that it is also related to the assurance that the government is not going to

evict the whole area.

The conflict between the local CBOs/NGOs working in Istabl Antar area was obvious. Some of them

could work together in joint projects, but competition on donations and funds is of high existence.

For the facades painting project in both areas, we can argue that MURIS was looking for a fast

product, due to the political instability and aspiration to show the government’s achievements. The



345

residents’ priorities, which increased their mistrust towards the government. Participation was

announced, just as a cover to reach the main outcome of the painted facades. The residents are not

convinced that they are part of the process. In MN, as a matter of fact, only 4 young residents

participated in the implementation.

Recommendations for the process of forming development priorities in future neighborhood upgrading

projects would only be achieved after answering the following question: how can priorities for urban

development of informal settlements be set up in a way that meets the residents needs in a compromise

with other stakeholders (government, development cooperation, and NGOs)? How can the practices

of development priority formulation in both case study areas be compared in terms of approach,

successes, failures and challenges? What lessons learnt can be drawn from both case studies to build a

better, more holistic understanding of current practices, and to improve methodologies and approaches

to urban upgrading (e.g. forming participatory and inclusive local planning structures, conducting

participatory needs assessments, setting up transparent and inclusive prioritisation processes, etc.)?

How could these lessons be applied to future projects?

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