What's So Great about Feeling Good?

What's So Great about Feeling Good?Author(s): Laura A. King and James W. PennebakerSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), pp. 53-56Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449612 .

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Note

Kelli A. Keough, Department of Psychology, Uni- versity of Texas, Austin, TX 78712.

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What's So Great About Feeling Good?

Laura A. King and James W. Pennebaker Department of Psychology

Southern Methodist University

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

John Stuart Mill

Ryff and Singer present a breathtakingly compre- hensive analysis of what it is that constitutes a life well- lived. In so doing, they bring up an important and often-ignored dilemma presented in most empirical research on subjective well-being: that typically, happiness is equated with a good life. It is difficult to argue against the importance of happiness to the good life.

Aristotle argued that all goals were valued only to the extent that they related ultimately to happiness. All other goals are essentially sought in the service of the happiness they promise. Research on life goals and wishes confirms that the pursuit of happiness is a common desire. Richards (1966) found that happiness was a common goal among college students. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) identified enjoyment as a central dimen- sion of human values. The wish for happiness was among the top three wishes among participants in a study by King and Broyles (1997). Clearly, people want to be happy. Yet, as Ryff and Singer acknowledge,

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history is filled with examples of individuals whose lives were by no means good but who were nevertheless happy, as well as people whose lives were by most accounts good ones, but who were by no means happy. Considering psychological well-being in this light is an enormous challenge: How do we separate the good life from considerations of personal happiness?

Ryff and Singer attempt to confront this issue by focusing not on feelings of happiness, but instead on a sense of purpose or meaning in life. The distinction between meaning in life and happiness is an important one. Unfortunately the distinction is difficult to make and maintain; for the most part such a difference is lost throughout Ryff and Singer's discussion. One reason for this difficulty is that meaning in life and happiness are interwoven constructs, conceptu- ally and empirically.

Separating meaning in life and happiness presents quite an empirical challenge. Certainly, meaning in human life may contribute to the good life, independent of happiness. A person may suffer greatly and still possess a strong sense of purpose (Frankl, 1985). How- ever, and importantly, meaning in life is not only a characteristic of a good life; it is also a correlate of happiness (e.g., Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). Research on generativity-the sense that one has left a meaningful legacy for the future-also supports the notion that experiencing a sense of purpose is a vital part of feeling happy (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993).

Self-report measures of meaning in life are likely to tap into positive affect and feelings of satisfaction. Indeed, such relations are presented as evidence for the construct validity of these measures. For example, the Sense of Coherence Scale (Antonovsky, 1988) correlates positively with measures of happiness, well-being, and so forth. It is not surprising that measures including items like, "There is always a solution to the painful things in life," and "Most of the things I do in the future will probably be interesting and fascinating" (An- tonovsky, 1988) should tap into positive affect. This conflation of happiness and meaning is not only a characteristic of self-report questionnaires, but is also typical of many theories of human development. The more developed individual is also the one who is more psychologically adjusted-living happily ever after (with the exception of Loevinger's conception; Loev- inger & Hy, 1996).

Ryff and Singer have highlighted this issue dramatically. Their call for the use of multiple methods of measurement is laudable. Triangulating quantitative and qualitative measures certainly will be necessary to bring clarity to this very complex but important issue.

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In the remainder of this commentary, we seek to expli- cate how focus on negative experiences and suffering provides a means out of the happiness-meaning in life conundrum. We agree that the positive aspects of life have not held the prominence in research that they should, yet we hope to demonstrate that it may be in difficult times that the goods of life truly come to the fore. The tendency of previous research to focus on negative life events is not necessarily a negative bias; rather, we propose that it is in the context of negative life events that the human capacity for positive functioning, for experiencing realistic joy, and for development are most dramatically manifested.

Defensive Processes: Health or Happiness?

Ryff and Singer focus on the essential connections between the mind and body but do not fully grapple with those times when the mind and body disagree. Defensive processes provide a fine example of the ways that mind-body asynchronies may enter into the experience of "the good life" for some individuals. Certainly a great deal of research has shown that some individuals who report a great deal of well-being are actually engaged in psychological defense. We may view such individuals as engaged in "healthy" positive illusion (a la Taylor & Brown, 1988) or more poten- tially destructive repression or denial (e.g., Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993; Weinberger, 1990). In any case, researchers from a variety of areas have acknow- ledged that reality may play a minimal role in the lives of seemingly happy people. Setting aside for the tiimie being the idea that some of this defensiveness is symp- tomatic of psychological health, research examining more destructive defensive processes tends to show that the appearance (and experience) of psychological well-being may take its toll on the body through auto- nomic and cardiovascular activity. This line of research tends to indicate that, for individuals who en- gage in such defenses, the mind says one thing and the body another.

Considering the issue of defense mechanisms leads to another set of issues suggested by Ryff and Singer's ideas. We concur with Ryff and Singer's call for the inclusion of psychological and physiological measures whenever possible, in research on well-being. How- ever, such multiple measurements will inevitably lead to a line of questioning that has not really been ad- dressed: Which outcome measures are paramount? In a sense, if the mind and body always agreed, this question would not need asking. But psychological well-being



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may exist amidst physical illness and psychological distress may certainly exist in the absence of physical illness. When these important variables disagree, where does the psychologist stand? Is happiness, meaning, or survival the outcome variable of choice?

Ryff and Singer call for research that focuses on positive functioning, but the possibility of confounding positive functioning with psychological defense may be another reason for focus on negative states in past research. If individuals are dealing directly with negative life experience, then the issues of defensiveness become less problematic.

The Implicit Quality of the Wonderful Life

Even without considering the issues of awareness and defenses, we are left with a dilemma in terms of measuring the good life. That is, most of the time the wonderful life is being lived not thought about (cf., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). George Bailey didn't recog- nize that he was, in fact, living "a wonderful life," until circumstances forced him to realize it. Why is it that we "don't know what we've got 'til it's gone?"

Emotion theorists have discussed at some length the informative character of negative emotion (e.g., Mar- tin, Tesser, & McIntosh, 1993). Feeling bad tells us that we need to take action to reduce the negative feeling. The informative aspect of positive emotions is another story; if we are feeling good we want to con- tinue feeling good. This sort of framework acknow- ledges that the default setting for most of us is to try to be happy-as happy or happier than we were just a moment ago.

Ryff and Singer rightly acknowledge that negative life events are often opportunities for positive change. It may be that negative experience provides the appro- priate context through which to study and understand positive functioning. The challenge, in teasing apart meaning in life and happiness, is to find people who have forsaken the implicit search for happiness (at least temporarily) to explicitly seek some other end (King, 1997). One possible answer to these questions involves focusing on individuals who have experienced extreme circumstances (i.e., traumatic events or other life- changing experiences).

The ability to appreciate and enjoy the good things in life almost demands the ability to get beyond the painful parts of existence. When a friend dies or we are faced with failure, we often have great difficulty com- ing to terms with the events. Depression, rumination, and illness are all hallmarks of dealing with traumatic events. To return to the good life, then, we must under-

stand why the trauma occurred (to help us avoid facing a similar one in the future) and see its impact on the various facets of our lives.

Talking or writing about traumas is one way by which to move past them. In our earlier work, we discovered that having people write about their deepest thoughts and feelings about traumas resulted in initial feelings of distress. But, within weeks, those who had disclosed their traumas reported greater happiness and well-being than controls who had written about super- ficial topics (e.g., Pennebaker, 1989). More detailed analyses of these studies indicates that the ways people write makes a tremendous difference. Linguistically, for example, the more that people use positive emotion words and, to a moderate degree, negative emotion words, the better their subsequent health. Getting past a trauma, then, demands a certain acknowledgment of all of the emotional consequences of an event. When a friend dies, for example, it may be important to recall the positive times during his or her life as well as the emotional support one felt in the wake of the death (King & Miner, 1997; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997).

Although acknowledging the emotional domains of a trauma is beneficial, it is perhaps more important that the person organizes the event cognitively. Our data suggest that it is critical for individuals to construct a story or narrative to explain the traumatic experience. Constructing a story, rather than having a story per se, may be one of the keys to moving from reliving a trauma to returning to the good life. Thus, finding and experiencing meaning serves as a stepping stone to the good life. Looking at individuals confronting a traumatic life event allows us to examine the search for meaning in the absence of the search for happiness. That is, confronting traumas is likely to be an upsetting experience but in allowing oneself to be upset, the individual is free to seek meaning. Research on negative life circumstances isn't necessarily "biased" as much as it is a reflection of human life-"if it ain't broke, we don't fix it." Importantly, difficult life experiences also can serve to promote personal growth (Helson & Roberts, 1994). Negative events provide individuals with invaluable opportunities for self-discovery and provide us as researchers invaluable opportunities to observe human capacities for redemption and to examine the search for meaning apart from happiness.

On certain points we agree wholeheartedly with Ryff and Singer. Feeling good and having many or- gasms is unquestionably great. But these lofty states cannot be reached unless one's emotional life is in order. When we begin to look beyond feeling good to issues of gaining insight and wisdom, to the lessons of

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illness and health, then we might be getting into truly uncharted territory.

Notes

Preparation of this commentary was supported by National Institute of Mental Health/FIRST Award 54142 to Laura A. King.

Laura A. King and James W. Pennebaker, Psychol- ogy Department, Southern Methodist University, Dal- las, TX 75275-0442. E-mail: [email protected]

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The Quest for Long-Term Health and Happiness: To Play or Not to Play, That Is the Question

Jaak Panksepp Department of Psychology

Bowling Green State University

Public health issues are typically considered in terms of three major dimensions: (a) the genetic and physiological strengths and weaknesses of individuals, (b) the environmental factors that support us and stressors that assail us, and (c) the psychological processes that modify our behaviors in desirable and undesirable ways. The last of these dimensions is where psycholo- gists have traditionally had the most input, with one of the most important modern contributions being the analysis of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1995, 1997). In the arena of public health, population issues and personal issues rarely come together in meaningful ways.

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Now, Ryff and Singer offer a wide-ranging post- modern conceptualization of individual human health and happiness, in which subjective personal issues loom larger than ever before. Taking a philosophical-psy- chobehavioral point of view, they entreat us to greater efforts in the pursuit of wholistic mind-body health as opposed to the traditional alleviation of bodily misery and illness. After summarizing some philosophy con- cerning "the goods" of life, they outline a broad and dynamic strategy for conceptualizing the psychological and physiological correlates of positive health-states of being that are notoriously hard to objectify.



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What's So Great about Feeling Good?