What why how... and everything in between

Cordero 1

Enrique J Cordero

Prof. Rick Levitt

International Relations in The Post Cold War Era

Mid-term Written Assignment

November 4, 2013

What, Why, How... and Everything in Between

Drawing from the context of 18 years of domestic and international business

experience, 39 years of Colombian-American sociocultural influence, and a high

level understanding of the world politics and international relations, my humble

attempt in this paper is first to provide a comparative perspective between

Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism theory and Keohane & Nye’s Complex

Interdependence theory (or “thought experiment” as they call it (p. 269)), and then,

to present a pragmatic application of the two schools of thought into the events of

the Arab Spring.

Part I – Weaving Offensive Realism and Complex Interdependence

In comparing these two theories and understanding the fundamental contradictions

between their basic arguments with the intention of highlighting their opposite

perspectives, I found myself arriving at the conclusion that as instruments of policy

prescription they are in fact strategically similar but tactically different. In other

words, from the perspective of a political theory user, both Offensive Realism and

Complex Interdependence formulate a similar strategic what-why prescription: to

render military conflict irrelevant in pursue of self interest goals; but the tactics, or

Cordero 2

the how, to execute such a prescription are fundamentally different: through

hegemony by accumulation of all possibly attainable military power (Offensive

Realism)1, versus cooperation among states through the use of an interconnected

interdependent network of international actors with soft power tools such as

economics (Complex Interdependence)2. I will focus my analysis on the aspect of

similarity, meaning their common strategic what-why constructs, as I find it more

interesting (and somewhat provocative) to illustrate how these two theories, that in

all their rhetoric claim to be so opposite from each other, are in essence strikingly

similar. I chose not to discuss their tactical differences because there are volumes of

literature dedicated to this endeavor with far more prowess that I could exhibit in

just a few pages; besides, it is a discussion that inexorably will lead to the same

conclusion: they are tactically different in form, format and delivery.

The Offensive Realism theory has at its core a two-legged strategic baseline with

hegemony as the what, and fear of survival of the state as the why.3 However, from

a strategic perspective and to support my analysis, I content that the formulation of

these two elements (what and why) needs to be slightly repositioned. This rationale

obeys to the fact that for hegemony to be the what, or the ultimate strategic goal,

once achieved, it will have to satisfy the fundamental need, or the why, which in

this case is the fear of survival of the state. Nevertheless, history confirms that

obtaining hegemonic power does not guarantee the state’s survival even if that

status is assured for a long period of time. This is what occurred to the Soviet

Union, which after being a regional hegemon for four decades (1949 – 1989) finally

Cordero 3

succumbed due to an ill conceived economic policy. So, what does hegemony really

achieves? According to Mearsheimer “A hegemon is a state that is so powerful that

[…] no other state has the military wherewithal to pup up a serious fight against

it”4, so hegemony eliminates the possibility of military conflict in the system (global

or regional). Therefore, in Offensive Realism hegemony is certainly an important

part of the how as stated previously, but the ultimate strategic goal, or the what, is

to render military conflict irrelevant. Now lets consider Keohane & Nye’s theory.

The Complex Interdependence theory also presents a dual what-why strategic

foundation; however, not as explicit as Mearsheimer’s. Keohane & Nye describe the

goal, or the what, as a complex multifaceted set of issues driven by the individual

goals of transnational actors, and the why as the absence of hierarchy among issues,

in other words, the constant presence of conflicting agendas between those actors5.

Like in the case of Offensive Realism, there is no correlation between this what-why

construct as stated, because achieving this tapestry of goals from multiple

transnational actors will not directly solve for the conflicting agendas issue.

Therefore, it is necessary to reposition them for the purpose of the comparative

analysis. In this case I will assume that the stated what is part of the stated why

which can be rephrased in one single why as: the pursue of multiple conflicting

interests from an interdependent network of transnational actors. So what about

the what? Another fundamental element of the theory, in this case, the

minimization of the role of military force6 as the premise for allowing other goals

such as economical and ecological welfare to take center stage7, is certainly a more

Cordero 4

plausible statement of the what. In fact, Keohane & Nye spend a great deal of effort

in their discourse demonstrating the counterproductive use of military force even

for powerful states with hegemonic status8. Therefore, Complex Interdependence

seeks to minimize the importance of military conflict and the use of military power

as a policy tool, in order to facilitate the pursue of a tapestry of goals from an

interdependent network of transnational actors. In Keohane & Nye’s own words,

“the negligible role of force leads us to expect states to rely more on other

instruments in order to wield power”9. In conclusion Complex Interdependence

offers the same strategic what as Offensive Realism: to render military conflict

irrelevant.

In terms of the strategic why both theories follow the same pattern and that is to

pursue self-interest goals (or an amalgamation of them in the case of Complex

Interdependence) driven by primal human needs. Even though Mearsheimer

promptly discounts Morgenthau’s theory that states are lead by human beings who

have a will to power, hence their power seeking intentions are driven by their

human nature10; Offensive Realism states that the main motivation of power

seeking states is fear for survival which is in line with the physiological needs

principle in Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs.11 Along the same lines, Complex

Interdependence attributes the behavior of states to a desire for fulfilling goals such

as economic and ecological welfare, which in the context of Maslow’s pyramid can be

classified as both physiological and safety needs.

Cordero 5

With this simple comparative analysis I have submitted that despite their attempts

for describing each other as opposite sides of the political theory spectrum,

Offensive Realism and Complex Interdependence have strategic prescriptive

similarities that bring them closer together as exhibit in the table below.

Offensive Realism Complex Interdependence

What

To eliminate the possibility of military conflict in the system

hence To render military conflict

irrelevant

To minimize the importance of military conflict and the use of military power as a

policy tool hence

To render military conflict irrelevant

Why Pursue of self-interest goals:

survival of the state

Pursue of self-interest goals: tapestry of goals from an interdependent network of

transnational actors

How Through hegemony by

accumulation of all possibly attainable military power

Through cooperation among states via the use of an interdependent network of

international actors with soft power tools such as economics

Part II – Pragmatic application of Offensive Realism and Complex Interdependence

into the events of the Arab Spring

First, I would like to present some context using a piece of Spanish American

history. In July 19th, 1810, a group of middle-class, underrepresented, educated

“criollos” (those of Spanish descent born in the Americas rather than in Spain)

gathered at the Astronomical Observatory in Santa Fe de Bogota to devise a plan

to provoke a limited and temporary public disturbance which could then give

rise to an overall feeling of public discontent with the Royalists of Spain.

Their hope was to then take control away from the Spanish. In the morning

of July 20th (Market day) a group of “criollos”, went to Don José González

Llorente´s home (Llorente was a wealthy Spaniard businessman) on the

pretext of borrowing a flower vase for a dinner that was to honor the Royal

Cordero 6

Commissioner Antonio Villavicencio (Villavicencio was a well-known patriot

sympathizer). According to some accounts Llorente refused to lend the vase

with a haughty attitude, something that Llorente categorically denied. The

“criollos” took the vase and broke it to provoke Llorente and thus raised

tempers of the people against the Spanish. Meanwhile, Joaquín Camacho, a

“criollo”, went to the Viceregal palace and requested an open council to

debate a response on an application for the establishment of a governing

board in Santa Fe. The petition for an open town meeting regarding

independence was predictably denied. The people of Bogota then took to the

streets to protest Spanish arrogance12

and what follow was a series of events that lead to the Colombian declaration of

independence. There was no self-immolation in this portion of Spanish America

independence history, but what happened with Bouazizi in Tunisia could be

construed as the “Llorente’s vase incident” in the Arab Spring.

At first glance one has to resist the temptation to swiftly point at Complex

Interdependence as the most appropriate theory to explain the events that started

in Tunisia back in December of 2010 unleashing a wave of “change” in the Arab

World, with repercussions that extend as recent as September of this year with the

events that transpired in Syria. As Keohane & Nye’s argue: “After establishing the

differences between realism and complex interdependence, we shall argue that

complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism.”13

However, once we consider the geopolitical context of the events both, Offensive

Realism and Complex Interdependence, have a say in the matter. It is necessary to

use both approaches, Offensive Realism to explain the exogenous circumstances

Cordero 7

that surrounded the events, and Complex Interdependence to explain the events

themselves from an indigenous perspective.

From an exogenous point of view I will concentrate on the role that the US has (or

hasn’t, as will argue later) played as a hegemon power using the precepts found in

Offensive Realism. To this end we have to look first at several major events that

took place in the region in 2010 previous to the eruption of protests and

authoritarian fallouts in Tunisia and Egypt, and they are: the winding down of the

US engagement in the Iraq war, the escalation of US military presence in

Afghanistan, and the Wikileaks debacle in July of the same year (which exposed the

strained relations between the US and Pakistan).14 Therefore, it can be argued that

the combination of these three elements with direct consequences to the US ability

to “control” and effectively execute its foreign policy and agenda in the Middle East,

put enough pressure in the system, that the riots and chaos unraveled in the Arab

countries (catalyzed by Bouazizi’s act) was a welcomed “unintended” consequence.

One of Mearsheimer’s strategies for gaining (or otherwise sustaining) power is

bloodletting, which consists of making sure that any conflict between one’s rivals

turns into a long and costly endeavor that reduces their strength, while one stays

out of the fighting.15 In this strategy the objective of the non-directly-engaged party

is that once the dust settles (quite literally), its power will increase or at least stay

the same as the power of the two-engaged parties decreases. In this scenario the US

is acting as the party sitting on the sidelines while the different parties involved in

the Arab conflict (united citizens acting as states vs. authoritarian regimes) engage

Cordero 8

each other in a prolonged debilitating process. In the words of Vice President Biden

on an interview with Newshour in January of 2011 answering to the question of

what should the role of the US be in the Egypt conflict: “I think [the US] should

encourage [the people of Egypt and its government] to talk and try to resolve their

differences peacefully and amicably”16, not much action here. This strategy of

inaction has helped the US in refocusing the international community’s attention

from Iraq, Afghanistan and Wikileaks to the ongoing events in the Arab awakening,

while at the same time making strides on important targets like Osama bin Laden

(May, 2011). As the events continue to evolve the role of the US was still a very

passive one until the inaction strategy was almost compromised when the Assad

Syrian regime decided to use chemical weapons against its own people. Fortunately

the US was able to pulled its diplomatic capital and exert its influence over Russia

to diffuse the situation and keep its neutral position in the conflict.

Now, from and indigenous perspective we look to Keohane & Nye’s Complex

Interdependence theory to shed some light into the events that very quickly

expanded across borders in the Arab world motivating its citizens to revel against

its authoritarian regimes. At this point I would like to go back to the passage of

Spanish American history I related before and point out that, like the “criollos” who

initiated a process of independence in Colombia and other countries in South

America, the Arab people that have orchestrated and driven the Arab Spring are

politically underrepresented, young, middle-class, educated people with a lot of time

in their hands (meaning unemployed). This is important to recognize because of two

Cordero 9

fundamental dimensions in the Complex Interdependence theory, sensitivity and

vulnerability. As it is point out by the discourse

Sensitivity interdependence can be social or political as well as economic. For

example, there are social “contagion effects,” such as the trivial but rapid

spread of the fad of “streaking” from American to Europeans society in 1974,

or more significant, the way in which the development of radical student

movements during the late 1960s was reinforced by knowledge of each other’s

activities. The rapid growth of transnational communications has enhanced

such sensitivity… Sensitivity to such an issue may be reflected in

demonstrations or other political action, even if no action is taken to alleviate

the distress (and no economic sensitivity thereby results).17

This is particularly true for the profile of the Arab people who are the main drivers

in the movements across the region. In 1810, “criollos” were energized and

encourage by the ideas of the Age of Enlightenment, “criollos” like Camilo Torres

who drafted the “Memorial of Grievances”, a document that later became

foundational for the liberation movement that extended across Spanish America,

[There are no] other means to consolidate the union between America and

Spain [but] the just and competent representation of [the American] people,

without any difference among its subjects that they do not have because of

their laws, their customs, their origins, and their rights. Equality! The sacred

right of equality.18

In essence, not very much different from the claims we have heard from the voices

protesting on the streets of Cairo and Tunisia. Therefore, sensitivity explains the

motivation and the speed with which the sentiment of the people in Tunisia

reverberated and transferred across to Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Mauritania, Libya,

Cordero 10

Syria and more to come. Complementary, the vulnerability dimension will help

provide an explanation for the level of impact that each individual movement

generated not only on its own regime, but in the one that followed as well.

Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by

external events even after policies have been altered. Since it is usually

difficult to change policies quickly, immediate effects of external changes

generally reflect sensitivity dependence. Vulnerability dependence can be

measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed

environment over a period of time.19

In other words, through the lens of Complex Interdependence, the succession of

events in the Arab Spring are not isolated but a consequence of each other with

varying degrees of cost in each case, but highly vulnerable nevertheless. And this

last element is the one that precipitated the rapid spread of the movement, as it has

been argued by Keohane and Nye,

sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability

interdependence in providing power resources to actors… Vulnerability

interdependence includes the strategic dimension that sensitivity

interdependence omits, but this does not mean that sensitivity is politically

unimportant. Rapidly rising sensitivity often leads to complaints about

interdependence and political efforts to alter it, particularly in countries with

pluralistic political systems.20

Arab regimes have been unable to cope with the high level of sensitivity and the

rapid transmission of people’s sentiment enabled by the power of social media and

the Internet.21

Cordero 11

Now, it is worth considering the risks of this vulnerability manipulation, especially

when the actors are regimes with the ability to draw from their military force and

use it against its own citizens.

Even effective manipulation of asymmetrical interdependence within a

nonmilitary area can create risks of military counteraction.22

This is the case of Syria, which has escalated its use of military force to the point of

using chemical weapons against the opposition in high disregard for any exogenous

consequences, and flying in the face of the Responsibility to Protect initiative.

In summary, I have established that Offensive Realism and Complex

Interdependence are not two extreme poles of the political theory spectrum, but

rather two sides of the same coin that can be used to pay for the political

prescription bus ride. I have also attempted to describe the events of the Arab

Spring from an exogenous perspective using the bloodletting precept in Offensive

Realism against the hegemonic role played by the US, and from a indigenous

perspective to explain the motivation, speed and costliness of the movements across

the Arab world using the sensitivity and vulnerability dimensions of Complex

Interdependence. In the end, the story continues and only history will prove these

assessments accurate or inaccurate.

Cordero 12

REFERENCES

1 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. 2 Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, Fourth Edition

(Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1977), p. 20-21.

3 Ditto as reference 1, p. 32.





8 Ditto as reference 2, p. 35 – 39.



11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow%27s_hierarchy_of_needs

12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florero_de_Llorente


14 Matthias Gebauer; John Goetz, "Explosive Leaks Provide Image of War from Those Fighting It: The Secret Enemy in Pakistan" (Der Spiegel, 25 July 2010).


16 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-‐june11/biden_01-‐27.html


18 Ditto as reference 12

19 Ditto as reference 17

20 Ditto as reference 2, p. 13 – 14.

21 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-‐june11/egypt2_02-‐14.html

22 Ditto as reference 2, p. 14

Documents

What why how... and everything in between