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What Keeps Insurance CEOsAwake at Night?
An Overview and Outlook for the P/C Insurance Industry
May 2002
Robert P. Hartwig, Ph.D., Senior Vice President & Chief EconomistInsurance Information Institute 110 William Street New York, NY 10038
Tel: (212) 346-5520 Fax: (212) 732-1916 [email protected] www.iii.org
Presentation OutlineTough Mission for CEOs but Not Mission Impossible
• Restore Profitability >Restore & Rebuild Capacity• Rationalize Pricing>Focus on the Fundamentals• Improve Investment Returns• Accelerate Consolidation• Add Value through Technology—Insurance Scoring• Restore Order in the Courts• Keep Wall Street Happy• The Challenge of Corporate Governance• The Challenge of Terrorism
RESTOREPROFITABILITY
P/C Net Income After Taxes1993-2001 ($ Millions)
$19,316
$10,870
$20,598
$24,404
$36,819
$30,773
$21,865$20,223
-$7,921-$10,000
-$5,000
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Sources: A.M. Best, ISO, Insurance Information Institute.
2001 was the first year ever with a full year net loss
Highlights: Property/Casualty Full-Year 2001 ($ Millions)
2001 2000 Change
Net Written Prem. 323,977 299,652 +8.1%
Loss & LAE 276,120 238,781 +15.6%
Net UW Gain (Loss) (52,990) (31,220) +69.7%
Net Inv. Income 37,066 40,704 -8.9%
Net Income (a.t.) (7,921) 20,559 N/A
Surplus* 289,649 317,361 -8.7%
Combined Ratio** 116.0 110.1 +5.9 pts.*Comparison with year-end 2000;
**Comparison with full-year 2000; 2001 figure excl. 9/11 losses is 111.8.
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
US P/C Insurers All US Industries LifeDiversified Finl. Comm. Banks
ROE: Financial Services Industry Segments, 1987–2001
Source: Insurance Information Institute; Fortune
2000 Return on Equity: US (Profitability)
1.3%
2.9%
3.6%
5.4%
5.7%
7.0%
14.2%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
Fortune 500
Workers Comp
Med Mal
Comm Multi Peril
PP Auto
Comm Auto
Homeowners
Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
2000
2000 Return on Equity: Mid-Atlantic States PP Auto
2.2%
2.2%
2.9%
6.1%
6.7%
9.7%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12%
Dist. Of Columbia
Virginia
New Jersey
Maryland
Delaware
US
Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
2000
2000 Return on Equity: Mid-Atlantic States HO
-8.6%
0.9%
2.5%
3.8%
16.1%
16.3%
-10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
New Jersey
Dist. of Columbia
US
Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
Source: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
2000
12% After Tax ROE Requires Underwriting Profit
Source: Dowling & Partners
Accident Year Combined Ratio
P : S 90.0% 92.5 % 95.0 % 97.5 % 100.0 % 102.5 % 105.0 % 107.5 % 110.0 % 112.5 %
100 % 13.0 % 11.5 % 10.1 % 8.6 % 7.1 % 5.6 % 4.1 % 2.6 % 1.1 % -0.4 %
110 % 14.0 % 12.4 % 10.7 % 9.1 % 7.5 % 5.8 % 4.2 % 2..5 % 0.9 % -0.7 %
120 % 15.0 % 13.2 % 11.4 % 9.6 % 7.8 % 6.1 % 4.3 % 2.5 % 0.7 % -1.1 %
130 % 16.0% 14.0 % 12.1 % 10.2 % 8.2 % 6.3 % 4.4 % 2..4 % 0.5 % -1.5 %
140 % 16.9 % 14.9 % 12.8 % 10.7 % 8.6 % 6.5 % 4.4 % 2.4 % 0.3 % -1.8 %
150 % 17.9 % 15.7 % 13.5 % 11.2 % 9.0 % 6.8 % 4.5 % 2.3 % 0.1 % -2.2 %
160 % 18.9 % 16.5 % 14.1 % 11.8 % 9.4 % 7.0 % 4.6 % 2.2 % -0.2 % -2.5 %
170 % 19.9 % 17.3 % 14.8 % 12.3 % 9.8 % 7.2 % 4.7 % 2.2 % -0.4 % -2.9 %
180 % 20.9 % 18.2 % 15.5 % 12.8 % 10.1 % 7.5 % 4.8 % 2.1 % -0.6 % -3.3 %
190 % 21.8 % 19.0 % 16.2 % 13.3 % 10.5 % 7.7 % 4.9 % 2.0 % -0.8 % -3.6 %
200 % 22.8 % 19.8 % 16.9 % 13.9 % 10.9 % 7.9 % 4.9 % 2.0 % -1.0 % -4.0 %
225 % 25.3 % 21.9 % 18.6 % 15.2 % 11.9 % 8.5 % 5.2 % 1.8 % -1.5 % -4.9 %
250 % 27.7 % 24.0 % 20.3 % 16.5 % 12.8 % 9.1 % 5.4 % 1.7 % -2.1 % -5.8 %
RESTORE & REBUILD
DESTROYEDCAPACITY
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
Policyholder Surplus: 1975-2001
Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute
Bil
lion
s
(US
$)
Surplus Peaked at $336.3 Billion in 1999
•Surplus decreased 8.7% in 2001 to $289.6 Billion.
•Surplus is now lower than at year-end 1997.
“Surplus” is a measure of underwriting capacity. It is analogous to “Owners Equity” or “Net Worth” in non-insurance organizations
Capital Myth 1: Insurers Have $4 Trillion in Assets to Pay Terrorism Claims
$3,139 (77%)
$931 (23%)
Source: Insurance Insurance Information Institute
The Facts
P/C insurers have $931 billion in assets compared to $3.1 trillion for life insurers
Total = $4.1 Trillion (as of 12/31/00)
P/C
LIFE
Capital Myth 2: P/C Insurers Have Nearly$1 Trillion in Assets to Pay Terrorism Claims
Liabilities ($594.6B)
64%
PH Surplus ($317.4B)
34%
Non-Admitted
Assets ($19B)2%
Source: Insurance Information Institute; A.M. Best
The Facts
66% of Assets are offset by liabilities
(mostly reserves) or are non-admitted
Assets = Liabilities + Policyholder Surplus
Capital Myth 3: P/C Insurers Have $300 Billion to Pay Terrorism Claims
"Target" Commercial*$100 billion
33%
Other Commercial$50 billion
17%
Personal$150 billion
50%
Total PHS = $298.2 B as of 6/30/01
*”Target” Commercial includes: Comm property, liability and workers comp; Surplus must also back-up on non-terrorist related property/liability and WC claimsSource: Insurance Information Institute
Only 33% of industry surplus backs up “target” lines
Fresh Capital: Top 15 Deals(as of April 12, 2002)
CGNU $1,700DSwiss Re 1,600VAxis (Marsh) 1,600SAce Ltd. 1,150SAIG 1,000CDMontpelier 1,000PEConverium 985SAllied World 959SXL Capital 819SEndurance 800V
Arch Capital 763SXL Capital 600DChubb 600DSt. Paul 575TPWellington 564SALL OTHERS 7,281 Total Completed = $24,584
Pending = $8,889GRAND TOTAL = $33,473
Will they shorten the hard market?Type of Issuance: CD=Convertible Debt; D= Debt; PE=Private Equity;S=Stock;TP=Trust Preferred;V=Various Source: Morgan Stanley
RATIONALIZE PRICING
Average Price Change of Commercial Insurance Renewals
9.5%
13.5%
8.8%
10.0%
12.0%
11.0%
8.9%
6.1%
9.5%
8.0%
8.3%
7.9%
9.0%
-1.6%
-1.2%
-0.4%
-7.0%
-6.0%
-11.0%
-6.0%
-10.0%
-7.0%
-3.0%
1.4%
0.8%
3.5%
3.2%
3.2%
2.8%
4.1%
-2.1%
-2.8%
-1.8%
0.2%
-5.0%
-4.4%
-3.5%
-4.3%
-6.6%
-4.1%
-2.0%
-13%
-11%
-9% -7% -5% -3% -1% 1% 3% 5% 7% 9% 11%
13%
E&S
Umbrella
Workers' Comp
Commercial Property
CMP
General Liability
Commercial Auto
Spring 2001 Fall 2000 Spring 2000 Fall 99 Spring 99 Fall 98Source: Conning
CIAB Rate SurveyFirst Quarter 2002
Rate Increases By Line of BusinessRate Increases By Line of Business NoNo
Change Up 1-10%Change Up 1-10% Up 10-30% Up 30-50% Up 10-30% Up 30-50% Up>50%Up>50% Up>100%Up>100%
Commercial Auto 3% 19% 55% 13% 4% 1%
Workers Comp 7% 20% 45% 17% 3% 1%
General Liability 1% 13% 62% 17% 3% 1%
Commercial Umbrella 1% 4% 29% 32% 18% 11%
Commercial Property 1% 5% 39% 34% 13% 3%
Business Interruption 3% 10% 47% 22% 7% 2%
Surety Bonds 8% 20% 28% 7% 3% 1%
Source: Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers
CIAB Rate SurveyFirst Quarter 2002
Rate Increases By Size of AccountRate Increases By Size of Account NoNo
Change Up 1-10%Change Up 1-10% Up 10-30% Up 30-50% Up 10-30% Up 30-50% Up>50%Up>50% Up>100%Up>100%
Small (<$25K) 3% 16% 61% 10% 1% 0%
Medium ($25K - $100K) 2% 4% 60% 25% 3% 1%
Large (>$100K) 1% 6% 45% 27% 6% 1%
Source: Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers
100110
120130140
150160
170180190
200210220
230240
250260
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02*
Rate On Line Index(1989=100)
Source: Guy Carpenter * III Estimate
Prices rising, limits falling: ROL up significantly
Cost of Risk per $1,000 of Revenues: 1990-2002E
$6.10
$6.40
$8.30$7.70
$7.30
$6.49
$5.70$5.25
$5.71
$5.20$4.83
$5.55
$7.22
$4
$5
$6
$7
$8
$9
$10
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01E 02E
Source: 2001 RIMS Benchmark Survey; Insurance Information Institute estimates.
Cost of risk to corporations could rise sharply in 2002; About half of increase due to 9/11
0.9%
-5.9%
-16.9%
-27.3%
-35.6%-37.6%
-35.4%
-22.0%
-40%
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
Workers Comp: Impact of Loss Cost/Rate &
Discounting
Source: NCCI, Insurance Information InstituteP=preliminary*Insurance Information Institute estimates.
2000 AY Combined Ratio: 136
2000 Reserve Deficiency: $20B
Average Price Change of Personal Lines Renewals
6%
7%
6%
6%3%
4%
1%
5%
4%
1%-1%
2%
0%
2%
-2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
Homeowners
Personal Auto
2002* 2001* Fall 2000 Spring 2000 Fall 99 Spring 99 Fall 98*III estimatesSource: Conning, III
Average Expenditures on Auto Insurance: US
668
691
706
704
683 69
3
735
793
$600
$620
$640
$660
$680
$700
$720
$740
$760
$780
$800
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
*
2001
*
2002
*
*Insurance Information Institute Estimates/ForecastsSource: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
Countrywide rates were up 1.5% in 2000 and up est. 6% in 2001, 8% in 2002
Mid-Atlantic AutoInsurance Expenditures vs. US
$1034 $988
$824
$757 $683
$567$469
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
NJ DC DE MD US VA ND
Source: Insurance Information Institute from NAIC Data, 1999.
2 5 3912
Highest in US
Lowest in US
1
Average Expenditures on Homeowners Ins.: US
418
440
455
481 48
8 500
530
567
$400
$450
$500
$550
$600
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
*
2001
*
2002
*
*III EstimatesSource: NAIC, Insurance Information Institute
Average HO expenditures rose by 1.5% in 2000;
Up 6.0% in 2001; 7.0% in 2002
Average HO Premium by Region, 2000
Source: Conning & Co.
$859
$713
$623$565
$506 $495 $482$418 $392
WestSouth
Central
Pacific NewEngland
Mountain WestNorth
Central
Mid-Atlantic
EastSouth
Central
SouthAtlantic
EastNorth
Central
Mid-Atlantic HO-3Insurance Premiums vs. US
$861
$617
$497$487
$372$345 $317
$266
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
TX DC NJ US MD VA DE WI
Source: Insurance Information Institute from NAIC Data, 1999.
4 184942 45
Highest in USLowest in US
Health Plan Costs per Employee
*EstimateSource: Hewitt Associates LLC.
15.6%
10.1% 9.4%7.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
2002* 2001 2000 1999
Annual % Increase
Tremendous cost pressure
Employers want help managing costs
Phamaceutical costs
What is managed care?
Most layoffs in this sector (e.g., Aetna announced Dec. 13 the layoff of 6,000)
Still LT growth industry
Reasons Why Market Will Remain Hard
• Total capital raised less than what was lost from 9/11• Capacity lost is greater than dollar losses from attack
suggestMore caution on the part of insurers/reinsurers means more
capital needed per dollar of risk assumed
• Demand up (we’re more at risk as a nation now)• Reserve shortfalls (e.g, asbestos, WC)• Poor results in many important lines for reason other
than 9/11• Poor investment results• Wall Street pressure
FOCUS ON FUNDAMENTALS
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
U.S.
*Estimate from I.I.I. Groundhog Survey.Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute
Growth in Net Premiums Written (All P/C Lines)
2000: 5.1%
2001: 8.1%
2002 Forecast: 14.7%*
The underwriting cycle went AWOL in the 1990s.
It’s Back!
95
100
105
110
115
120
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00
02**
P/C Industry Combined Ratio
2000 = 110.1
2001 Estimate = 116.0
2002 Forecast* = 108.0
Combined Ratios
1970s: 100.3
1980s: 109.2
1990s: 107.7
Sources: A.M. Best; III
* Based on III 2002 Groundhog Forecast
Combined Ratio Components
108.1 106.8103.1
1.57.8
3.0
0.6
1.4
1.5
100
105
110
115
120
2000 2001E 2002E
"Normalized" Losses Catastrophe Losses Asbestos & Environmental
116.0
110.1 107.5
WTC losses accounted for 4.8 pts. on the 2001
combined ratio
Source: A.M. Best.; ISO.
Kitchen Sink Quarter:2001:Q4
$1,794
$801 $702 $653$388 $267 $175 $109 $69 $40
$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
P/C insurers took $5 billion in miscellaneous
charges against their 2001:Q4 results
Source: Morgan Stanley as of February 8, 2002.
Combined Ratios
Source: A.M. Best, NCCI; Insurance Information Institute
*A.M. Best estimate;**ForecastIncludes dividends to policyholdersAccident year is developed to ultimate
Calendar Year vs. Ultimate Accident Year Countrywide—Private Carrier
123 122
109
10197
99
122
108
121
101
107
120
129
137
129
101
108
115117 118
9695
100
112
133
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01* 02**
Pe
rce
nt
Calendar YearAccident Year
110.
5
105.
0
113.
6 119.
2
104.
8
100.
8
100.
5
114.
3
107.
2
142.
9
108.
8 115.
8
106.
9
108.
5
106.
5
105.
8
101.
6
105.
6
107.
7
110.
1 116.
0
126.
5
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Reinsurance All Lines Combined Ratio
Combined Ratio: Reinsurance vs. P/C Industry
Source: A.M. Best, ISO, Reinsurance Association of America, Insurance Information Institute
2001’s combined ratio was the worst-ever for reinsurers & the 3rd worst ever for p/c insurers in aggregate.
U.S. InsuredCatastrophe Losses
$7.5
$2.7$4.7
$22.9
$5.5
$16.9
$8.3 $7.3
$2.6
$10.1$8.3
$4.3
$24.1
$0.60
5
10
15
20
25
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02**
•Includes $16.6B for 9/11 losses reported through 12/31/01. Includes only business and personal property claims, business interruption and auto claims.**First Quarter 2002.Source: Property Claims Service, Insurance Information Institute
$ BillionsCAT Losses for 2001 Set a Record
•20 events (lowest since 1969)•1.5 million claims
•9/11: $16.6B = 74,000 claims
($60)
($50)
($40)
($30)
($20)
($10)
$0
$101
97
51
97
61
97
71
97
81
97
91
98
01
98
11
98
21
98
31
98
41
98
51
98
61
98
71
98
81
98
91
99
01
99
11
99
21
99
31
99
41
99
51
99
61
99
71
99
81
99
92
00
02
00
1
Underwriting Gain (Loss)1975-2001
Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute
$ B
illi
ons
P-C insurers paid $53 billion more in claims & expenses than they collected in premiums
in 2001
-$2.2-$2.8
-$4.0
-$2.9
-$5.4
-$0.3
-$2.6 -$2.4
-$3.6
-$8.9
-$6.5
-$11.5($12)
($10)
($8)
($6)
($4)
($2)
$01
99
1
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
E
20
02
F
Underwriting Loss in HO Insurance, 1991-2002F
Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute
$ B
illi
ons
Underwriting losses in homeowners insurance from 2000 to 2002 alone are
estimated at $19.0 billion, 14.5% above the $16.6 billion in 9/11 property losses.
Outlook for 2002: Personal Lines
99.5101.0101.1
109.4
103.5
108.2109.5
111.4
107.0
126.0
106.3
117.5
105103
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
*Breakeven Ratio: Reflects AY results, includes investment income; assumes 4% interest rate.Source: A.M. Best
97 98 99 00 01E 02E BE*
97 98 99 00 01E 02E BE*
PERSONAL AUTO HOMEOWNERS
Outlook for 2002: Commercial Lines12
9.0 13
5.5
114.
5
132.
0
143.
0
102.
5107.
8 117.
0
110.
0 116.
5 122.
0
95.0
112
113
107
107
115
107
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
WorkersComp
GL & Prod.Liab
CommercialAuto
CommercialPackage
Med Mal InlandMarine
01E 02E Breakeven*
*Breakeven Ratio: Reflects AY results, includes investment income; assumes 4% interest rate.Source: A.M. Best
IMPROVEINVESTMENT
RETURNS
$0
$9
$18
$27
$36
$45
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
Net Investment Income
Facts
1997 Peak = $41.5B
1998 = $39.9B
1999 = $38.9B
2000= $40.7B
2001 = $37.1E
Source: A.M. Best, Insurance Information Institute
Bil
lion
s
(US
$)
Pricing & underwriting problems were exacerbated by declining investment incomeShort-term interest rates
are under 2%!
Markets Down Considerably in 2001
-7.10%
-13.04%
-21.05%
-25% -20% -15% -10% -5% 0%
Nasdaq
S&P 500
DJIA
Source: Insurance Information Institute
2001 Change in Major Market Indexes
P/C Insurer Portfolio:
64% Bonds
23% Stocks
5% Cash & ST Sec.
8% Other
2002: Not Off to a Great Start
2.76%
-4.42%
-11.86%
-15% -10% -5% 0% 5%
Nasdaq
S&P 500
DJIA
Source: Insurance Information Institute
YTD Change Through May 14, 2002
P/C Insurer Portfolio:
64% Bonds
23% Stocks
5% Cash & ST Sec.
8% Other
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
*
Large Company Stocks*As of May 14, 2002.Source: Ibbotson Associates, Insurance Information Institute
Total Returns for Large Company Stocks: 1970-2002*
Could be headed for 3rd consecutive year of decline for stocks
Last happened 1939-1941 (years straddling Great Depression & WW II)
4.4%3.5%
2.5%
5.7%
8.3%
4.8%5.6%
2.2%
1.0%1.3%
0.3%
-1.3%
5.8%
4.0%3.5%
1.7%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
10%
Real GDP Growth
Source: US Department of Commerce, Blue Economic Indicators, Insurance Information Institute.
Economy is recovering quickly from the recession of 2001
(first recession since 1990/91)
New Private Housing Starts(Millions of Units)
1.19
1.01
1.20
1.29
1.461.35
1.48 1.47
1.62 1.67 1.591.60 1.61 1.58
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 1 02* 03*
Source: US Department of Commerce; Insurance Information Institute*Projections from Blue Chip Economic Indicators.
New Private Housing Starts Annualized starts in early 2001 were
surprisingly strong: Virtually no exposure impact for insurers
Motor Vehicle Retail Sales (Millions of Units)
15.515.5
16.0
17.417.8
17.1
16.2
16.5
15.0
15.5
16.0
16.5
17.0
17.5
18.0
18.5
19.0
19.5
20.0
96 97 98 99 00 01 02* 03*
Source: US Department of Commerce; Insurance Information Institute*Projections from Blue Chip Economic Indicators.
New Motor Vehicle Sales
Sales so far in 2001 are surprisingly strong—up from from 2000’s record pace.
Despite slowing economy, no adverse exposure impact on auto insurers.
ACCELERATE CONSOLIDATION
Insurance Mergers and Acquisitions
7.1 6.9 8.6 5 8.5 12.527
40.856.2
41.755.7
41.5
243 246
171 188149
221
349382
433
300295
468
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
$180
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
Val
ue o
f M
& A
s ($
Bil
lion
s)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Num
ber
of M
& A
s
Value of Deals Number of Deals
Source: Compiled from Conning & Company reports.
1998: 565 deals valued at $165.4 B
8 of the 10 top deals in 2001 were in the Life sector; 2 were Health/Mgd. Care
None of the top10 deals were in the P/C sector
Competition—Still Intense: Number of Insurers: 1970-2000
1095 1059
15751702
2406 2430 2485 2480 2455
1802 17461958
2261 2195
17151563
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000
Property/Casualty
Life/Health
Sources: P/C: A.M. Best; L/H: NAIC.
ADD VALUE THROUGH
TECHNOLOGY
Application of Technology in Underwriting:
Insurance Scoring
Insurance Scoring• What is “Insurance Scoring”?
Insurers use credit information as way of determining individual’s financial stability and responsibility. Not being assessed for ability to repay a loan.
Insurance scores are HIGHLY accurate predictors of future loss in auto and homeowners insurance
Produces more fair, more equitable rating structure Those most likely to impose costs on system pay more Those least likely to impose costs on the system pay less
Does not discriminate by income, location, gender,marital status, etc.
In use by 85% - 90+% of the market (roots back to 1970s)
FICO Scores
Source: Fair, Isaac
1%
5%7%
11%
16%
20%
29%
11%
<= 499 500-549 550-599 600-649 650-699 700-749 750-799 800+
Distribution of Borrower Credit Scores by Risk Tier
Risk TierCredit Score –
Banking% of Borrowers
A (prine) – Good 660+ 70%
A – Fair 620 – 659 18%
B 580 – 619 9%
C 550 – 579 2.7%
D 520 – 549 0.3%
Source: HSH Associates, National Home Equity Assoc.
142
118
100
99
93
83
80
75
71
155
127
118
104
97
92
82 80
72 70
121
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Score Range
Rel
ativ
e P
erfo
rman
ce
Loss Ratio Claims Frequency
Performance by Score
Interpretation:
As score improves (gets larger), performance in terms of loss ratio and
frequency of claims improves
CAS Credit StudyPersonal Automobile Loss Ratio by Credit Categoty
CategoryEarned
PremiumIncurred
LossLoss Ratio
Loss Ratio Relativity
A $74,279 $75,333 101.4% 133
B 158,922 124,723 78.5% 103
C 69,043 47,681 69.1% 91
D 91,746 52,688 57.4% 75
Total $393,990 $300,425 76.3%
Category A – Unacceptable Credit Rating
Category B – No established credit history (or does not meet the definition of A, C or D)
Category C – Good Credit Rating
Category D – Excellent Credit Rating
Source: Casualty Actuarial Society
Fraud & Credit
Source: Conning & Company
49%38%
33%
24% 23%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
300-399 400-499 500-599 600-699 700 +
Percentage of People Saying It Is Acceptable to Increase the Amount of the Claim to Make Up for the Deductible by Insurance Score
Insurance Scoring*• What information is used?
Adverse public recordsCollectionsTypes of accountsPayment timingUtilization of balance relative to limitsAge of accountsNumber of accounts opened recentlyInquiries
*Practices vary by insurer and state
1000
1804
1293
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Zero One Two or More
Number of 60+ Day Delinquencies
Los
s R
atio
Rel
ativ
ity
Delinquencies & Loss Ratio*(Homeowners HO-3)
Interpretation:
Higher number of delinquencies correlated with higher loss ratios
733 723 711 708 711 716 721 722733
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
<$15 $15-19 $20-29 $30-39 $40-49 $50-74 $75-99 $100-124
>=$125
Income ($000)
Cre
dit
Sco
reAverage Credit Score by
Income Group
Interpretation:
Credit score is not significantly correlated with income
Source: American Insurance Association
Insurance Scoring: Is it Fair?• Scoring Models Exclude Factors Such As:
GenderRace IncomeLocationNet WorthMarital StatusAge
• Always used in conjunction with other factors (e.g., driving record, type of car…)
Insurance Scoring: Is it Fair?
• Insurers comply with Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (& subsequent amendments)Firms must have permissable purpose to access
(underwriting of insurance is explicitly listed as a permissable purpose)
Consumer must notified of adverse actionConsumer may obtain free copy of reportConsumer may request full reinvestigationConsumer may dispute reinvestigation results
RESTORE ORDER TO THE
COURTS
TORT-ure
• Asbestos• “Toxic” Mold• Aftermarket Parts• Lead• Arsenic Treated Lumber• Construction Defects• Guns• Genetically Modified Foods (Corn)• Nursing Homes/Med Mal• What’s Next?• Sept. 11??
Average Jury Awards1994 vs. 2000
419759
187 333
1,140 1,185
1,744
1,168
1,727
269698
3,482 3,566
6,817
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
Overall BusinessNegligence
VehicularLiability*
PremisesLiability
MedicalMalpractice
WrongfulDeath
ProductsLiability
($00
0)
1994 2000
Source: Jury Verdict Research; Insurance Information Institute.
Rising Jury Awards
Source: Jury Verdict Research
LESS THAN$100,000
$100,000 -$249,999
$250,000 -$499,999
$450,000 -$999,999
$1 MILLIONAND OVER
1994 2000
52%30%
20%7%
Percentage of Awards at $1 Million and Above (2000)
Source: Jury Verdict Research; Insurance Information Institute
25.0% 24.0%
20.0%18.0%
16.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 14.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Top 10 States
Cost of U.S. Tort System($ Billions)
Source: Tillinghast-Towers Perrin; Insurance Information Institute estimates for 2001/2002 assume tort costs equal to 2% of GDP.
$128.9$129.8$140.8$144.1$148.3
$159.3$155.6$156.0$166.8$168.8
$178.6$197.5$204.2
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01* 02E*
Tort costs consumed 2.0% of GDP annually on average since 1990
Tort costs equaled $636 per person in 2000!
Source: New York Daily News, September 10, 2001
Source: New York Times Magazine, August 12, 2001
Source: New York Daily News, September 10, 2001
232615471722
3413
5722
883
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2000 Q1 2000 Q2 2000 Q3 2000 Q4 2001 Q1 2001 Q2
Texas:Estimated Total # of Mold
Claims
Note: Data are not developedSource: Texas Department of Insurance Special Call for Homeowners mold experience issued July 30, 2001; Insurance Information Institute.
The number of mold claims increased
548% between early 2000:I and 2001:II
Asbestos: Reserve Deficiency and Ultimate Costs Growing
23.9 26.0
31.9
16.1 14.0
33.1
40.0 40.0
65.0
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
1996 1997 2001
($ B
illio
ns)
Incurred Losses to Date Unfunded Future Liabilities Ultimate Costs
Source: A.M. Best.
Reserve Deficiency = $33.1 Billion
KEEP WALL STREET
HAPPY
Insurer Stock Performance:It Could Have a Lot Worse
39.8%
-21.1%
-10.9%
1.8%
-7.0%
-7.6%
-1.2%
-39.3%
-9.1%
18.1%
34.5%
43.4%
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60%
Nasdaq
S&P 500
Banks
Life/Health
All Insurers
Property/Casualty
Percentage Change
2001
2000
Source: SNL Securities; Insurance Information Institute
Insurer Stock Price Performance: Before & After 9/11
Source: SNL Securities, Insurance Information Institute
-21
.6
-9.7 -8
.2
-20
.0 -16
.5
-23.
0
-21.
7 -18.
3
-21.
1
-26.
2
-7.6
-10
.9
-13
.2
-29.
5
1.2
-1.2
-7.0
-15
.9
-35.0
-30.0
-25.0
-20.0
-15.0
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
All Multi L/H P/C Broker S&P500
Per
cent
10-Sep 21-Sep 2001
Total Return
Insurer Stocks: Outperforming the S&P 500
-10.57%
1.55%
4.14%
-1.07%
3.53%
3.36%
-17.90%
-7.70%
-20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10%
S&P 500
Nasdaq
Banks
Life/Health
Brokers
P/C
All
Multiline
Source: SNL Securities, Insurance Information Institute
Total Return 2002 YTD Through May 10, 2002
THE CHALLENGE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
New & Difficult Risk for Financial Institutions
Accounting Problems are Getting Many Companies into Trouble
•Enron fallout much worse than anticipated
•Many companies restating earnings
Corporate Governance: Expensive and Hard-Learned Lessons
• Crisis of Confidence—skepticism is on the rise
Ratings agencies Analysts Regulators
Investors/Creditors Employees Lawmakers
• Regulatory/Legislative Fallout Unclear
SEC opened record 49 financial cases opened in first 2 months of 2002 compared to
18 during same period of 2001
Most new SEC cases are against large companies
• SEC, Administration & Congressional proposals vary
• Surge in shareholder suits has already begun
Breach of Faith
Cover of BusinessWeek,
May 13, 2002
Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits*
*Securities fraud suits filed in U.S. federal courts.**Suits of $100 million or more.Source: Stanford University School of Law;Woodruff-Sawyer & Co.; Insurance Information Institute
164202
163
231188
110
178
236209 216
487
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Shareholders typically recover just 2.56% of amount lost; 1/3 of that
goes to lawyers & expenses**
Serious Implications for Financial Institutions
• FIs exposed to wide variety of risks:
Investment risk (as institutional investors)
Insurance risk (surety, credit guarantees, D&O)
Professional liability (investment banks advisory role)
Reputation risk
• FIs will be targets of regulatory/legal action
Most large FIs are organizationally complex
GLB necessarily increases complexity (BHC tent is big)
As principals go bankrupt, shareholders go in search of deep pockets (Read: Wall Street)
Houston…We Have a Problem
Source: Loss estimates from Morgan Stanley as Feb. 8, 2002; Insurance Information Institute.
Surety26%
Multiple7%
D&O1%
Fin. Guarantee
2%Investment
64%
Total Exposure (Life & Non-Life): $3.796 BillionEnron is the biggest bankruptcy in US history ($31B+)
Equity/debt widely-held as S&P 500 company
Biggest impact in institutional investors/creditors
11 Congressional investigations
56 suits against officers & directors
Will spark similar suits
THE CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM
TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
What’s this Going to Cost & Who’s Going to Pay for It?
Sept. 11 Insured Loss Estimates
• Biggest insured CAT is US and world history ($40B)Hurricane Andrew: $15.5B (1992$); $20B (2000$)
• 100+ insurers worldwide have made announcements accounting for about $22B in insured losses
• Industry loss estimates range from low of $30 billion to $70 billion (consensus = low $40Bs)First WC disaster ($3.5B); 8,000 physically injured First life disaster ($2.7B); 3,000+ killedAnthrax Issue? WC exposure if out of course of employment
• Estimated NYC economic losses are $83 billion• Insurance will pay biggest share by far
Fed. Govt. promised $20B, excluding Victims Comp. Fund• Where would NY be today if terror exclusions were adopted after
1993 WTC bombing?
Source: Insurance Information Institute
Sept. 11 Industry Loss Estimates($ Billions)
Life$2.7 (7%)
Aviation Liability$3.5 (9%)
Other Liability
$10.0 (26%)
Biz Interruption$10.0 (26%)
Property -WTC 1 & 2$3.5 (9%)
Property - Other
$5.0 (13%)
Aviation Hull$0.5 (1%)
Event Cancellation
$1.0 (3%)
Workers Comp
$2.0 (5%)
Consensus Insured Losses Estimate: $38.2B
9/11 Gross vs. Net Losses*(Life & Non-Life)
Primary62%
Reinsurance38%
*Gross: before adjusting for reinsurance recoverables;Net: After adjusting for reinsurance recoverables.Source: Insurance Information Institute, as of February 2002.
Implies $27B in reinsurance involved. System worked because of spread of risk and reinsurance. What about the next attack?
Primary48%Reinsurance
52%
GROSS LOSSES = $49.3 B NET LOSSES = $22.2 B
$10.6B$11.6B$30.4B$18.8B
Insured Loss Estimates* (updated through Dec. 31, 2001)
2,800
2,3682,280
1,740
1,3001,070
820 800 769 700 606 550 450 420 400
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Mill
ion
s
*Midpoint if company has announced range.
**Includes $289MM for ConveriumSource: AM Best, III
Top 15 Groups (pre-tax, net of reinsurance, $ millions)
World: Top 10 Biggest Catastrophes (by insured loss)
$40
$19.6$16.3
$7.1 $6.1 $6.0 $5.8 $4.6 $4.2 $4.2
$0$5
$10$15$20$25$30$35$40 $ Billions, in 2000 $
*III Estimate; Includes life, liability and workers compensation losses.Source: Swiss Re, Insurance Information Institute.
What About the Next Attack?
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Nov. 0
1
Dec. 0
1
Jan-
02
Feb-0
2
Mar
-02
Apr-0
2
May
-02
Jun-
02
Jul-0
2
Aug-0
2
Sep-0
2
Oct-02
Nov-0
2
Dec-0
2
Insurers Overexposed to Terror Risk in 2002
Source: Insurance Information Institute* Excludes workers comp, which will carry no terrorism exclusion.
%
Insurer Exposure to Terrorism
•+/- 70% reinsurance treaties expired 12/31/01
•+/- 30% expire 6/30/02
•Underlying policies renewed w/terror exclusion gradually as they expire
+/-70% Reinsurance Treaties Expired 12/31/01
+/-30% Reinsurance Treaty Coverage 1/1/02 – 6/30/02
0% Thereafter
100%
Rei
nsu
ran
ce T
reat
y C
over
age
Pri
or t
o Ja
n. 1
, 200
2
Proportion of Commercial Risks
With Terrorism Coverage Included in Basic Coverage
UNREINSURED EXPOSURE
UNREINSURED EXPOSURE
GAO Report: Highlights Economic Vulnerabilities
• GAO Report Released February 27, 2002• Major Findings:www.house.gov/financialservices/022702t2.htm
1. Insurers Shifting Terrorism Risk to Property Owners/Businesses Reinsurers withdrawing from market for terrorism Primary insurers excluding coverage as their exposure increases
2. As Business Exposure to Uninsured Risks Rise, so do Potential Economic Consequences Economic consequences from next attack could be more severe
3. Potential Economic Consequences of Not Having Terrorism Insurance are Cause for Concern
• Conclusions Congressional action is “properly a matter of public policy” Consequences of inaction are “may be real and potentially large”
“A decision not to act could have debilitating financial consequences for for businesses…their employees, lenders, suppliers, and customers.”
Government will face difficulties if it waits to act after an attack: “difficult to implements quickly—and extremely expensive.”
Commercial Real Estate: Value at Risk*
Replacement Cost of
Structures52%
Inventory 13%
Equipment & Software
35%
*As of 12/31/2000; Excludes residential real estate.Source: Morgan Stanley, FDIC, Federal Reserve; Insurance Information Institute.
TOTAL = $10.6 Trillion
Without terror bill more of this risk will be shifted to business/property owners
$1.40 Trillion
$3.70 Trillion
$5.53 Trillion
Commercial Real Estate Debt: Debt at Risk*
Real Estate/ Mortagage
Loans85%
Lease Receivables ($0.17 Tr)
2%
Industrial Loans13%
*As of 12/31/2000; Excludes residential real estate.Source: Morgan Stanley, FDIC, Federal Reserve; Insurance Information Institute.
TOTAL = $8.2 Trillion
Without terror bill more of this risk will be shifted to
commercial lenders/landlords
$1.08 Trillion
$6.94 Trillion
A Federal Backstop for Insuring the Peril of Terrorism
• Industry Proposal: Pool (similar to Pool Re in U.K.)Called for creation of pool that would receive premiums for
terrorist act coverage and pay lossesFed steps in only as pool becomes depletedSTATUS = DEAD
• Administration Proposal: Quota Share3-yr plan (then sunsets)
2002: 80% Fed, 20% Private; ret./sharing above $10B…– $12B max industry exposure
2003: $10B insurer retention; 50/50 sharing… ($23B max) 2004: $20 B insurer retention; 50/50 sharing… ($36B max)
Attacked by critics on left and rightSTATUS = DEAD
Source: Insurance Information Institute
A Federal Backstop for Insuring the Peril of Terrorism
• Capitol Hill—SENATE (Banking Committee) 2-yr plan (White House approval for 1-year extension) Industry retains first $10 billion in terror losses 90% fed share above $10B, 10% industryNO BILL PASSED IN 2001
• Capitol Hill—HOUSE (H.R. 3210, passed Nov. 29) 3-year loan guarantee program
Industrywide losses must exceed $1B, or industrywide losses exceed $100 million and those losses exceed 10% of
surplus and 10% of net premium written of an individual commercial carrier.
Criticized by industry for complexity of loan repayment/ assessment formula; some view triggers as too high. Congress recessed Dec. 21 w/o bill for President.
• President spoke on issue April 8 w/business, labor leaders; Cited construction slowdown
• Possible bill by Memorial Day??
Insurance Information Institute On-Line
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