What is belief reasoning? (And why do researchers from the “theory of mind” and social

cognition traditions find it so hard to talk to each other?)

Ian Apperly

University of Birmingham

• Collaborators– Dana Samson– Elisa Back– Jason Braithwaite– Dan Carroll– Glyn Humphreys– Kevin Riggs– Andrew Simpson

• Funding– British Academy– Leverhulme Trust– ESRC– MRC

Overview

• Background

• Recent behavioural data on theory of mind in adults

• Observations, problems and questions about the link between theory of mind and social cognition

What is “Theory of Mind”?

• Folk psychology, mentalising, social cognition

• False belief tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)– Ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

Background on ToM

• We know a lot about development

• We know something about the cognitive and neural basis in adults

• Yet we know almost nothing about the basic operating characteristics of theory of mind processes

– What kinds of mental representations?– Specialised versus generic functional and neural processes?– Automatic versus controlled processing?– What role in on-going cognitive activity (social cognition, communication)?

Why is it important to study ToM in adults?

• Neuroscience research

– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)

– What do they do?

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS

Temporal pole

Medial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mP

FC

ToM (or “mentalizing”, or “perspective-taking”, “mind reading” etc…….)

is not a unitary ability

ToM inferences

Sometimes we must infer mental states

Non-inferential “holding in mind”

Sometimes we are told what someone thinks(and should not confuse this with what we know)

All George needs is the guiding hand of a trusted

friend

ToM Use

Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life

e.g., Interpreting what people say in terms of what they know

Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate?

You was caned?

Respect man, respect

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

Are ToM inferences automatic?

• Rationale:– In a situation where there is no particular reason to make ToM inferences, will the

inferences nonetheless be made?

Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci.

Are ToM inferences Automatic?Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino & Samson (2006) Psych. Sci.

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Condition 1:Incidental False

Belief Task

Condition 2:Explicit belief and

reality tracking

Condition 3:Explicit belief

tracking

Res

po

nse

tim

e (m

s)

Belief

Reality

Condition 1: Monitor Reality Is belief monitored too?

Condition 2: Track Reality and Belief

Condition 3: Track Belief

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

• ToM inferences are not automatic: They require cognitive control

• But this may not always be true

Automatic perspective taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite & Andrews, submitted)

You / He

You / He

2

2

Self / Other Consistent

Self / Other InconsistentDisc position varies

1,2, or 3 discs

Automatic perspective taking?

Main effect of consistencySignificant interaction

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Self Other Self Other Self Other

Discs vary Figure varies Blocked

Consistent

InconsistentRT

(m

s)

Egocentric interference

Automatic perspective taking?

Main effect of consistencySignificant interaction

400

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650

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900

Self Other Self Other Self Other

Discs vary Figure varies Blocked

Consistent

InconsistentRT

(m

s)

Altercentric interference

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

• ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control

Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind

Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.

Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this information

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the chair is yellow”

PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the table is yellow”

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the chair is yellow”

PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the table is yellow”

False belief + reality

Unrelated belief + reality

Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind

Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.

Rationale: Tell participants what the target character thinks Measure difficulty of making judgements about this

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Belief Probe Reality Probe Belief Probe Reality Probe

Information in Sentence 1 Information in Sentence 2

Experiment 1: Self-Paced Reading

False B/R

Unrelated B/R

Pro

cess

ing

Eff

icie

ncy

(R

T/P

rop

ort

ion

Co

rrec

t)

*

**

~

Non-inferential ToM:The cost of holding false beliefs in mind

Apperly, Back, Samson & French (2007), Cognition.

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the chair is yellow”

PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the table is yellow”

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the chair is yellow”

PICTURE PROBESENTENCE 2SENTENCE 1

“He thinks the object on the chair is red”

“Really the object on the table is yellow”

False belief + reality

Unrelated belief + reality

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

• ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control

• To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)

ToM Use

• Rationale– Very easy ToM inference

– Can this inference be used to guide interpretation of speech?

– E.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr (2003)

Apperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).

Instructor: Experimental

Instructor: Control

No-instructor: Experimental

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Ambiguous Relational Ambiguous Relational

Experimental Experimental Control Control

Instructor

No Instructor

Ave

rage

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of e

rror

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ToM UseApperly, Carroll, Samson & Humphreys (under submission).

Behavioural evidence that separates these ToM processes

• ToM inferences may not be automatic: They sometimes require cognitive control

• To “hold in mind” a false belief we must resist interference from what we know (and vice versa)

• Using ToM information can be a difficult task-set to maintain

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM

– ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment

• Neuroscience research

– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)

– What do they do?

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS

Temporal pole

Medial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mP

FC

ToM processing model: (after Leslie, 1992, 2005)

ToMM

Observed Behaviour

Modular: Fast, automatic, domain-specific….

SP

“Executive selection”: Slow? Controlled? Domain-General?

Perceptualinformation

ActionSchemas

Contention scheduling(includes semantic memory)

Stage 1: strategy selection

Stage 2:implementingthe schema

Stage 3: assessingthe implementedschemaProblem

orientation

Goal setting

Episodicmemoryretrieval

Spontaneousschema

generation

Level ofaspiration

setting

Progressivedeepening

phase

Solutionchecking

phase

Delayedintentionmarker

realisation

Strategygeneration

phase

Special-purposeworking memory

Control ofmonitoring

andchecking

Rejection ofschema

Intention

(after Shallice & Burgess, 1996)

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM– ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to

have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment

– Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising”

• Neuroscience research

– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)

– What do they do?

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS

Temporal pole

Medial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mP

FC

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM

– ToM is not one function, and is unlikely to have a simple neural substrate or simple patterns of impairment

– Need to be more precise when asking about the neural basis of “mentalising”

– Important role for cognitive control processes

– Understanding ToM will require more than understanding the functional and neural basis of ToM-specific processes

– Some of the “social network” may be concerned with control processes

– Some processes critical for ToM are almost certainly subtracted out in existing analyses

– Caution when interpreting meta-analyses of imaging data

• Neuroscience research

– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)

– What do they do?

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS

Temporal pole

Medial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mP

FC

The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions

• “Beliefs” in the ToM tradition are usually transitory states closely linked to epistemic access

• But enduring beliefs surely play a similar causal role in explaining and predicting behaviour

– “Transitory versus enduring” is an important dimension– I’m not sure if it can discriminate different kinds of mental states in a clear way

The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions

• The ToM tradition studies beliefs as the causal consequences of epistemic access. Any rational, sentient agent will have such beliefs.

– Contrast with social cognition tradition which tends to see beliefs as characteristics of the target - the “kind of person” they are

– Target characteristics are irrelevant for typical ToM problems– Self-other similarity is irrelevant to these typical ToM problems

• Is it nonetheless an influence?

The relation between ToM and social cognition traditions

• Self-reflection and projection (or egocentric anchoring and adjustment) are possible but not necessary processes in ToM reasoning

– We can make ToM judgements even when we don’t have to infer hidden mental states, when we don’t know reality and when we don’t care about the content of the mental state

Cognitive and neural Basis of ToM

Clever new methods

+ Careful task analysis

= plenty of interesting work

• Neuroscience research

– Consistent set of brain areas for a range of “mentalizing” tasks: “the ToM network” (Frith & Frith 2003)

– What do they do?

Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS

Temporal pole

Medial prefrontal cortex

Lateral view

TPJ

TP

Medial view

mP

FC

Functional and neural processes specific to ToM?

• Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls– Very short stories

– False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies

• Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM stimuli?

Functional and neural processes specific to ToM?

• Step 1: Simpler tasks with tighter controls– Very short stories

– False belief vs. False photograph – identifies similar range of regions to earlier studies

• Step 2: Which regions respond only to ToM-related stimuli?

Left hemisphere

L-TPJ

Right hemisphere

R-TPJ

Responds selectively for thinking about beliefs, desires, intentionsNot for people’s appearance or background social information, (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Wexler, 2005)or non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006)

Responds selectively for thinking about false beliefs and non-social perspective-taking (e.g., Perner et al. 2006)

So what have we found?

• Perspective-taking in left-TPJ? – (Perner et al. 2006)

• ToM is specific to right-TPJ and is independent of processes for inhibition and cognitive control? – (e.g., Saxe, Carey & Kanwisher, 2004)

• We can accept that these findings are informative, but still think that other processes are equally interesting and equally necessary for ToM