What explains government defeats in the House of … No. 119024892 Module Code: PL3106 3474 words 1 What explains government defeats in the House of Lords? Introduction This research

Student No. 119024892 Module Code: PL3106 3474 words

1

What explains government defeats in the House of Lords?

Introduction

This research will find that the behaviour of the Crossbench group was the main reason for

government defeats in the House of Lords during the current parliamentary term. The paper will be

discussing some of the existing literature on the subject before outlining the changing context in four

areas which the current House of Lords is faced; political, appointments, the number of Peers and

changing numbers of defeats. This will be followed by framework and methodology that will be

used in the research and the analysis of the behaviour of the four parties/groups that will form the

focus of the research. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the findings of the research

before outlining further research in this area.

Literature review

The House of Lords has been neglected by political scientists in comparison to the House of

Commons (Russell and Sciara 2007, 299). However, ‘traditional’ (pre-1999) studies have examined

the relationship between the Commons and Lords during the long period of Conservative dominance

resulting from the presence of hereditary Peers (Russell and Sciara 2007, 300) noting the restraint

with which the Lords acted during periods of Labour government (Bromhead 1958; Morgan 1975).

This domination ended with the 1999 reforms (Shell 2000) and two new approaches to the discipline

emerged. The first was an examination of the relationship between the two Houses post-reform.

These studies noted the Lord’s greater confidence (Russell and Sciara 2006) and assertiveness

(Cowley 2006) resulting from the greater legitimacy the removal of most hereditary Peers brought.

This is supported with empirical evidence showing greater assertiveness of the Lords (Russell 2010)

2


and a strengthening in its relationship with the Commons (Whittaker 2006). This increased

assertiveness is important when accounting for the significant impact defeats in the Upper House

have on government policy (Russell and Sciara 2008). The second approach arises from the

increased number of ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis 2002) in the Lords, resulting from the removal of the

dominant Conservative element in 1999. These studies focus on the factors ensuring government

victories in a Chamber where no majority exists and government Whips have few powers to compel

party members to vote with the government (Judge 2005, 76; Norton 2003). Where defeats are

inflicted the literature has identified two distinct ‘players’; firstly, the growing importance of the

Liberal Democrats on the opposition benches (Russell and Sciara 2007) and, secondly, the ‘subtle

and changing influence’ of the House’s Crossbenchers (Russell and Sciara 2009). This research will

utilise these final two studies to examine government defeats in the Lords during the current

parliamentary term.

Context

Political

In addition to the reforms of 1999, discussed above, there has been political change since 2010 that

has interesting ramifications. The above literature has examined behaviour in the Lords in periods of

majority government. However, the 2010 General Election returned a hung parliament leading to

the formation of a coalition government between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (BBC

2010a; 2010b). That two of the three main party groups are now in government, in conjunction with

the increase in nominations, has had a dramatic effect on group composition in the Lords (see below

for details).

3


Appointments

The rate at which Prime Minister David Cameron has appointed new Peers, and the parties

appointed to, has had a significant effect on the House’s composition. Cameron has appointed, on

average, more Lords per year – 43 – than either Tony Blair (37) or Gordon Brown (12) (Russell 2014;

House of Lords Library 2014). These figures become more significant when considering that Blair’s

number included a major restructuring in order to bring Labour numbers in line with the

Conservatives. Furthermore, 63% of Cameron’s appointments have been to government benches

(compared to 43% and 32% for Blair and Brown respectively) so altering the power balance within

the Lords (see the next section). Arguments that had Labour been in coalition government between

1997-2010 then government appointments would have been as high hold some water. However,

ceteris paribus, appointments between 1997 and 2010 would have resulted in 56% of the Peers

appointed being aligned to ‘government’ parties (authors own calculations using Russell 2014;

House of Lords Library 2014).

Numbers

The above pattern of appointment, in conjunction with a Conservatives/Liberal Democrat coalition,

has shifted the government/opposition balance in the Lords. In the final year of Brown’s

Premiership (2009-10), the Labour Government, with 211 Peers, comprised 29.9% of the House

(Sessional Statistics 2009-10). However, at the end of the 2010-12 session the percentage of

government Peers had risen to 38.9% (Sessional Statistics 2010-12). The bulk of this rise resulted

from the formation of the coalition – their joint share of Peers was 36.4% in the 2009-10 session –

rising to a current 42.1%. As expected the Conservatives have increased their number of Peers to

come in line with Labour – an increase of 42 (22.7%) – while Labour’s number has increased by 5

(2.4%). However, the group experiencing the largest proportional increase is the Liberal Democrats

4


No

. of

govt

def

eats

– seeing their numbers swell by 33 (45.8%) – while the Crossbench numbers have decreased by 5

(2.7%). This research is concerned with how this changed composition has effected the reasons for

government defeats in the Lords (Sessional Statistics 2012-13; 2013-14; Parliament 2015).

Defeats

Fig.1

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

343

Number of government defeats in the House of Lords

108

45 62 72 62

245

175

100

1974-79 1979-83 1983-87 1987-92 1992-97 1997-01 2001-05 2005-2010 2010-2015 Parliamentary term

Source: Parliament 2015 (http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-lords-faqs/lords-

govtdefeats/)

As fig.1 shows, the 1974-79 Labour government suffered over 300 defeats before an 18-year period

of Conservative government when defeats in the Lords averaged just 60 per term. However, the

1999 reforms led to sharp increases in the numbers of defeats for the Labour governments of 1997-

2010. The first two full terms after the reforms saw the governments defeated on 41% and 32% of

all Lords divisions (Parliament 2015), leading to claims of a more assertive House likely to become

more powerful in policy-making (see Russell 2010; Whittaker 2006; Russell and Sciara). However,

http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-lords-faqs/lords-govtdefeats/


5


government defeats in the Lords have fallen sharply post-2010 with just 21% of divisions ending in

defeat (own calculations from UCL 20151; The Public Whip 2015). Further investigation is needed to

determine whether the above factors account entirely for a reduction in defeats, and is beyond this

paper’s scope. But despite this reduction the government has still suffered 101 defeats in Lords

divisions and the rest of this paper will examine the reason for them.

Framework and Methodology

This research will follow the broad framework, albeit in a less detailed manner, laid out by Russell

and Sciara (2007) in their examination of party/group behaviour and government defeats between

1999-2005. The researchers examined behaviour within the newly reformed House in which the

Labour government, facing a large opposition, was required to secure the support (or abstention) of

other groups to avoid defeat. These groups included Labour rebels, Conservatives, Crossbenchers,

Liberal Democrats and Bishops (Russell and Sciara 2007, 305). In contrast, this research will examine

how the present government is defeated when in control of a greater number of seats (between 39-

42%). While still short of a majority, when factoring in division turnout for the Crossbenchers (11%)

and Bishops (3%) between 1999-2010, the coalition has had the potential for a de facto majority

since 2010 (Russell 2013, 109). Consequently, this research will focus on how Labour has been able

to secure government defeats in the House. Two possible ways exist to achieve this; firstly, securing

votes/abstentions from Conservative/Liberal Democrat rebels; secondly, encouraging the

Crossbenchers to vote in large enough numbers against the government. This research’s focus,

therefore, will be on the behaviour of Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Crossbench Peers,

requiring the exclusion of two groups. The first, the Bishops, averaged a turnout in divisions of just

3% between 1999-2010 and so their omission is unlikely to effect the findings (Russell 2013, 109).

The second, the ‘Other’ group – consists of members who have been left other groups, minor party

1

All ‘author’s calculations’ are from UCL (2015) unless otherwise stated.

6


representatives and members of Northern Ireland parties (Russell and Sciara 2009, 34, 36). These

are often grouped with Crossbenchers for voting analysis, yet their inconsistent membership and

low numbers (Russell and Sciara 2009, 36) might present problems for a study of this length and are

therefore omitted.

This research will limit its analysis to the behaviour of parties/groups in government defeats – with

some reference to wider voting behaviour. This sharpens a limitation raised in the original research

providing a framework for this study – that of measuring influence. Defeats in divisions do not

measure the full influence groups have on governments and policy, as often Peers prefer persuasion

over forcing divisions. This results in much negotiation occurring away from the chamber as

ministers offer to review concerns rather than face confrontation in the chamber. Of course,

objections may re-raised if ministers fail to deliver, but this is hard to quantify (Russell and Sciara

2007, 302). A closer analysis of the stages that defeats occur would be needed to determine

whether changes have occurred in this area post-2010.

The remainder of this research will examine the behaviour of the four groups stated in government

defeats. All voting data for the 101 defeats have been collated and calculations made to determine

turnout, the percentage of each group’s votes for/against the government, each group’s cohesion

using the Rice Index2 and the role each particular group’s vote played in the final margin of defeat.

Due to difficulties in obtaining voting data broken down by party/group, comparisons will be made

against the average for 2010-12 or previous sessions. These will then be examined to determine

patterns of behaviour that have contributed to government defeats for each group in turn.

Parties/Groups

2

The Rice Index calculates a group’s votes ‘for’ minus votes ‘against’ before dividing the total by the total votes cast (Desposato 2005, 734).

7


Labour

The average turnout of Labour Peers for government defeats was just under 66% - nearly 10

percentage points higher than the party’s average turnout for all divisions for 2010-12 (author’s

calculations; Russell 2013, 109) – with 99.1% of the party’s votes being against the government. On

only two occasions did defeats occur when more than 2 Labour Peers voted with the government.

The first saw 6 Labour members vote with the government against an amendment on Lords reform.

In a peculiar division in which only 11% of Peers voted on an unexpected, late night, motion (Lord

Norton 2010) the government was defeated 44-29 with 15 government rebels and 18 Crossbenchers

voting against the government (House of Lords Debates 2010). The second occasion was one of a

series of defeats on the Government’s Crime and Court’s Bill, which saw 16 Labour Peers voted with

the government. However, rebellions by 49 Conservative and 29 Liberal Democrats voted with 42

Crossbenchers to ensure defeat for the government (House of Lords Debates 2012). Unsurprisingly,

in government defeats voting cohesion between Labour Peers was extremely high – with a Rice

index of 99.6 over the four sessions (author’s calculations).

To summarise, government defeats for the period examined witnessed a greater number of Labour

Peers voting than average divisions, voting overwhelmingly against the government and as a very

cohesive group. The twice that party cohesion and voting discipline slipped saw a large number of

government rebels and Crossbenchers voting against the government. These results support the

behaviour of Labour Peers in previous research when attempting to ensure government victory

(Russell and Sciara 2007). However, as previously discussed, Labour does not have enough Peers to

ensure victory alone – and this paper will now examine the behaviour of the other players in

government defeats.

Conservatives

8


The average Conservative turnout in government defeats was 59% (author’s calculations) – the same

as Conservative turnout for all divisions in the 2010-12 session (Russell 2013, 109) – and the

proportion of party votes for the government was 95.6% (author’s calculation). On ten occasions

more than 10 Conservative Peers voted against the government on issues including parliamentary

voting, crime and consumer rights, and six of these saw Conservative rebels number greater than 25

(UCL 2015). However, only once was a rebellion of 10+ responsible for government defeat (that is, if

the Conservative votes against had abstained then the government would have triumphed). This

was an amendment concerning whether the AV referendum would be binding if turnout was below

40% – lost by just one vote (House of Lords Debates 2011) – an issue the House conceded just nine

days later (Wintour 2011). For two further defeats Conservative rebels shared responsibility with

Liberal Democrat members3. The first, a disagreement over whether parts of the Financial Services

Bill should be committed to the whole House, rather than Grand Committee (House of Lords 2012),

and the second concerning the ‘”conscience”-type’ issue of youth detention (Russell and Sciara

2007, 302; House of Lords Debates 2014). The fact that only one of the votes in which more than

ten Conservative members rebelled suggests that Conservative Whips in the Lords were willing to

allow their members to blow off steam on issues that would have seen defeat anyway – a fact that

accounts for an average Rice index significantly lower than Labour’s at 93.2 (author’s calculation).

In summary, the turnout of Conservative Peers in government defeats does not deviate from the

party’s average in all divisions of the 2010-12 session. The percentage of votes for the government

are high, and only 1 government defeat is attributable wholly to Conservative rebels. The

Conservative Party’s Rice index is lower than the Labour Party’s which may be explained by the

willingness to allow members to vote against the government in significant numbers. However,

these ‘rebellions’ rarely (just 10%) cause government defeats.

3

The margin of defeat would have been erased had either Conservative or Liberal Democrat rebels abstained.

9


Liberal Democrats

The average turnout for Liberal Democrat members of the House in governments defeats is 64%

(author’s calculations), slightly below the 66% average for all divisions in the 2010-12 session (Russell

2013, 109). The voting behaviour of Liberal Democrat Peers in government defeats undergoes a

shift after 2010-12 in regard to both their loyalty to the government and cohesion. During the first

session, Liberal Democrat Peers voted with the government 91.4% of the time, yet this figure drops

to 74.9% in the subsequent three sessions (author’s calculations). Likewise, party cohesion falls

from a Rice index of 85.75 in the 2010-12 session to just 53.6 thereafter (author’s calculations). This

is illustrated by a greater number of Liberal Democrat members voting against the government than

in support on five separate occasions between 2012 and the time of writing (author’s calculations).

However, on only one of these occasions – an amendment to include the lobbying of special advisers

in the Transparency of Lobbying Bill (House of Lords Debates 2014) – would abstentions from those

rebels have secured victory. Eleven further defeats could have been avoided had Liberal Democrat

rebels abstained; shared responsibility for two defeats – on the Financial Service Bill and juvenile

detention – is discussed above. Those of note in the remaining nine include the defeat inflicted on

government plans for elected police and crime commissioners outside of London, in what was

labelled as an example of Nick Clegg’s promised ‘muscular liberalism’ following the first year of

coalition (The Guardian, 11 May 2011). Further defeats attributable to the Liberal Democrats

occurred on the European Union and welfare reform – areas of coalition tension (author’s

calculations; UCL 2015). However, perhaps the most high profile defeat for the ‘government’ came

in 2013 over an amendment to push back boundary reforms until 2018 (BBC 2013; London Evening

Standard, 29 January 2013). The coalition partners whipped their members in different directions

(Cowley 2015, 153) and 72 Liberal Democrat Peers secured the amendment by 69 votes (House of

Lords Debates 2013).

10


To summarise, although no discernible difference between Liberal Democrat turnout for defeats and

for all divisions in the 2010-12 session exists, a clear distinction in the behaviour of the party in the

Lords after the first year of the new Parliament does. After this point, marked by the government

defeat on rolling-out police and crime commissioners, votes for the government in defeats drop by

20 percentage-points and their Rice index drops by 30. This leads to two defeats that the coalition

partners share responsibility for, 10 that can be attributed to the Liberal Democrats and the split

discussed in detail above.

Crossbenchers

The Crossbench group consists of members4 who are not political aligned to a political party (Russell

and Sciara 2007, 308). Routes through which the group’s members arrive in the chamber include

the civil service, academia and the House of Lords Appointment Commission5 (for a comprehensive

list see Russell and Sciara 2007, 308). The group has, despite its potential as a key actor, been seen

as less significant than numbers suggest (Russell and Sciara 2007, 308). Previous research supports

this view, showing that between 1999-2007: 62% of Crossbencher votes in all whipped divisions

were against the government (Russell and Sciara 2009, 42), turnout for all divisions between 1999-

2010 is low (11%) (Russell 2013, 109) and with a Rice index score of 50 the group is not particularly

cohesive (Russell and Sciara 2007, 308).

However, turnout of Crossbench Peers in government defeats averaged 31.1% over the period

examined (author’s calculations) – higher than the 24% average for the group in all divisions in the

2010-12 session. Additionally, 84.8% of Crossbencher votes in government defeats were against the

government and a Rice Index of 69.7, shows a higher cohesion than the Liberal Democrats in

4

This is the definition used for this research, however, some studies include members aligned to smaller parties. 5

See House of Lords Appointment Commission (2014)

11


government defeats. These factors account for the Crossbench group being attributable for 76 out

of the 101 defeats during this period

Analysis

The findings – that the Crossbench group, in conjunction with a disciplined and cohesive Labour

Party, has been the reason for a large majority of government defeats between 2010-present –

support Sciara and Russell’s (2009) assertions that the Crossbenchers are displaying an increased

and changing influence in government defeats. The behaviour of the Liberal Democrats in coalition,

despite the party’s increasing numbers in the chamber, suggests that the findings by the same

authors (2007) – the Liberal Democrats had gained a new importance – have been tempered by

entering into coalition government.

In the changed political and compositional context of the House of Lords post- 2010, the Labour and

Conservative parties have displayed unsurprising behaviour. The research found that in order to

defeat the government the Labour Party must vote in greater numbers than average and show near

perfect cohesion in voting for amendments. However, as a result Labour’s overall share of the

chamber reducing and facing an enlarged coalition government, they require the support of other

groups to ensure government defeat. Likewise, Conservative Peers voted on the side of the

government in the vast majority of government defeats and showed high cohesion. Despite

experiencing rebellions on around 10% of government defeats only once was the Party wholly

responsible for government defeat.

The two groups that are of greater interest in explaining government defeats are the Liberal

Democrats and Crossbenchers. The Liberal Democrats began their period in coalition by voting with

the government on defeats over 90% of the time and displaying relatively tight cohesion. However,

after the first term – and seemingly as a result of a conscious decision to challenge its coalition

12


partner – these figures reduced significantly. Yet despite this only 10% of government defeats can be

solely attributed to the party during this period. Perhaps as a result of the interest in coalition

tension, these defeats have been widely publicised so suggest the behaviour of Liberal Democrat

Peers has been more influential than in reality. The behaviour of Crossbenchers has been the reason

for the vast majority of government defeats during this period. As a group traditionally seen as

relatively insignificant, independent and lacking coherence, the group accounting for 75% of

government defeats is surprising. This may suggest that the group views itself in a different light in

the face of a potentially dominant coalition in the Lords, but further research would be required to

examine this fully.

However, several notes of caution are sounded on these results; firstly, as discussed elsewhere

(Russell and Sciara 2007, 301-2), a purely quantitative examination fails to uncover the ‘type’ of

amendments the government was defeated on, so failing to reveal the importance of certain

defeats. Secondly, the focus on defeats may create false impressions of group behaviour – and

detailed analysis of all divisions is needed to back up the findings. Finally, this research has been

carried out within the framework of a significant reduction in the number of government defeats

compared to previous post-reform terms and, therefore, behaviour of the groups may have been

accentuated (or diminished). These issues have been beyond the scope of this research but further

examination would add to the understanding of behaviour in the Lords during times of coalition

government. Furthermore, this understanding becomes ever more important in the event of

another hung parliament (as many predict!) after the 2015 General Election.

13


References

House of Lords Appointment Commission, 1 September, 2014, [Online]. Available: http://lordsappointments.independent.gov.uk/ [4 March, 2015].

BBC, 15 January, 2013, Clegg defends Lib Dem approach to boundary review after Lords vote, [Online]. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21024825 [28 February, 2015].

BBC, 12 May, 2010a, David Cameron and Nick Clegg pledge 'united' coalition, [Online]. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8676607.stm [1 March, 2015].

BBC, 7 May, 2010b, Election 2010: First hung parliament in UK for decades, [Online]. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8667071.stm [1 March, 2015].

BROMHEAD, P., 1975. The House of Lords and contemporary politics, 1911-1957. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.

COWLEY, P., 2015. The Coalition and Parliament. In: A. SELDON and M. FINN, eds, The Coalition Effect, 2010-2015. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-158.

COWLEY, P., 2006. Making Parliament Matter? In: P. DUNLEAVY, R. HEFFERNAN and P. COWLEY, eds, Developments in British politics 8. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 36-55.

CURTIS, P., TRAVIS, A. and WATT, N., 2011, 11 May 2011. Police reform bill defeat for government in Lords. The Guardian.

DESPOSATO, S.W., 2005. Correcting for Small Group Inflation of Roll-Call Cohesion Scores. British Journal of Political Science, 35, pp. 731-44.

HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATES, 22.10.14, cols. 679-81






HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATES, 29.06.10, col. 1788

HOUSE OF LORDS LIBRARY, 2014. Peerage creations since 1997. London: House of Lords.

JUDGE, D., 2005. Political institutions in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

LONDON EVENING STANDARD, 2013, 29 January 2013. Biggest split yet for Coalition as Lib Dems vote down boundary changes before 2015. London Evening Standard.

http://lordsappointments.independent.gov.uk/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21024825

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8676607.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8667071.stm

14


MORGAN, J., 1975. The House of Lords and the Labour government, 1964-1970. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

NORTON, L., 2010. Debating Lords reform. London: Lords of the Blog.

NORTON, P., 2003. Cohesion without discipline: Party voting in the House of Lords. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 9(4), pp. 57-72.

PARLIAMENT, 5 February, 2015, Government defeats in the House of Lords, [Online]. Available: http://www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-lords-faqs/lords-govtdefeats/ [3 March, 2015].

PARLIAMENT, 9 March, 2015, Lords by party, type of peerage and gender , [Online]. Available: http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/lords/composition-of-the-lords/ [9 March, 2015].

PARLIAMENT, 15 July, 2014, House of Lords Sessional Statistics 2013-14 , [Online]. Available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldsession/statistics.htm [1 March, 2015].

PARLIAMENT, 9 July, 2013, House of Lords Sessional Statistics 2012-13 , [Online]. Available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldsession/statistics.htm [1 March, 2015].

PARLIAMENT, 22 June, 2012, House of Lords Sessional Statistics 2010-12, [Online]. Available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldsession/statistics.html [1 March, 2015].

PARLIAMENT, 28 June, 2010, House of Lords Sessional Statistics , [Online]. Available: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldsession/statistics.html [1 March, 2015].

RUSSELL, M. and SCIARA, M., 2007. Why Does the Government get Defeated in the House of Lords?: The Lords, the Party System and British Politics. British Politics, (2), pp. 299-322.

RUSSELL, M. and SCIARA, M., 2006. Legitimacy and Bicameral Strength: A Case Study of the House of Lords (Paper presented to the PSA Parliaments and Legislatures Specialist Group), 16 June 2006 2006, pp. 1-19.

RUSSELL, M., 14 August, 2014, Lords appointments urgently need reforming: but how?, [Online]. Available: http://constitution-unit.com/2014/08/14/lords-appointments-urgently-need-reforming- but-how/ [3 March, 2015].

RUSSELL, M., 2013. A Brief Introduction to the Contemporary House of Lords. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

RUSSELL, M., 2010. A Stronger Second Chamber? Assessing the Impact of House of Lords Reform in 1999 and the Lessons for Bicameralism. Political Studies, 58(5), pp. 866-885.

RUSSELL, M. and SCIARA, M., 2009. Independent Parliamentarians En Masse: The Changing Nature and Role of the 'Crossbenchers' in the House of Lords. Parliamentary Affairs, 62(1), pp. 32-52.

RUSSELL, M. and SCIARA, M., 2008. The Policy Impact of Defeats in the House of Lords. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10(4), pp. 571-589.


http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/lords/composition-of-the-lords/

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldsession/statistics.htm

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldsession/statistics.htm

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldsession/statistics.html

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldsession/statistics.html

http://constitution-unit.com/2014/08/14/lords-appointments-urgently-need-reforming-but-how/

http://constitution-unit.com/2014/08/14/lords-appointments-urgently-need-reforming-but-how/

15


SHELL, D., 2000. Labour and the House of Lords: a case study in constitutional reform. Parliamentary Affairs, 53(2), pp. 290-310.

THE PUBLIC WHIP, 4 March, 2015, Divisions Lords - 2010-present, [Online]. Available: http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/divisions.php?house=lords [4 March, 2015].

TSEBELIS, G., 2002. Veto players: how political institutions work. New York; Princeton, N.J: Russell Sage Foundation.

UCL CONSTITUTION UNIT, 2 March, 2015, Government Defeats in the House of Lords, [Online]. Available: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/house-of-lords/lords-defeats [2 March, 2015].

WHITAKER, R., 2006. Ping-Pong and Policy Influence: Relations Between the Lords and Commons, 2005-06. Parliamentary Affairs, 59(3), pp. 536.

WINTOUR, P., 2011, 17 February, 2011. AV referendum to go ahead without 40% turnout rule. The Guardian.

http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/divisions.php?house=lords

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/parliament/house-of-lords/lords-defeats

Documents

What explains government defeats in the House of … No. 119024892 Module Code: PL3106 3474 words 1 What explains government defeats in the House of Lords? Introduction This research