What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy- -- American Journal of Political Science

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What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?Author(s): Mark E. WarrenSource: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 328-343Published by: Midwest Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519886

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CORRUPTION ND DEMOCRACY

A second approach, favored by those seeking em-

pirical measures, views conceptions of political corrup-

tion asdependent upon regimetype and political culture.

Comparativeanalysisshould, in thisview, focus on study-

ing prevailing norms, which can then be used to specify

context-dependent understandings of political corrup-

tion (Heidenheimer 2002; Petersand Welch 1978; Scott

1972). From the perspective of democratic theory, these

approachesareinteresting, since they refercorruption to

public opinion, the ultimate source of judgment and le-

gitimacy in a democracy.But ratherthan treatingpublic

judgment as a dynamic process that, ideally,is structured

by democratic norms and institutions, these approaches

treat norms as static, given by a background culture of

expectations.A third approach, market-based conceptions of

corruption, appearsto

give upnormative references

altogether for a behavioral description of incentives and

opportunity structures.Corruption, in this view, is rent-

seeking behavior facilitated by the monopoly powers of

government (Anechiarico and Jacobs1996). Unlike gov-

ernment, markets check potential abuses because they

disperse power. So ratherthan define ethical constraints

into public offices, it is better to minimize the powers

of government, in this way reducing opportunities for

corruption. As Philp has pointed out (2002, 49-50; see

also Johnston 1996,27), market-orientedapproachestake

for grantedconceptions of public office that enable mar-ket mechanisms and measure corruption against these

norms.

The Modern Conception Focuses on Behavior Rather

than Integrity. If the strengthof the modern conception

is that it is rule-based,allowing for an even-handed appli-

cation of norms and standardsto the behaviorof individ-

uals, it is also its weakness. There are limits to what rules

canencompass,especiallywhenofficials'tasksrequirecre-

ativity,as do manybureaucraticpositions and allpolitical

positions. Rule-based approachesto controlling corrup-tion tend toward rigidity, while devaluing integrity and

professionalism (Anechiarico and Jacobs1996, 193, 202;

Philp 2001, 362-63), which in turn undermines democ-

racy by hamstringing the capacities of government to

serve as a collective agent of the people. Market-oriented

approachesareparticularlyculpablein this respect:reduc-

ing problems of corruption to flawed incentive structures

removes any responsibility for integrity from individuals

and market-orientedorganizations (Thompson 1995, 67;

Johnston 1996).

Closelyrelated,the modern conception of corruptionfails to encompass a particularkind of integritycentral to

democraticprocesses.Under the modern conception, in-

tegritymeans simplythat an official'sbehaviorreflectsthe

norms of her office. While such a conception of integrity

makes some sense within bureaucratic arenas, it is less

meaningful in politicized arenaswhere expectations for

behavior are less settled. Democracies make up for this

quality of politics by placing a premium upon promises,

which are conveyed in speech: a politician has integritywhen his decisions and actions reflect the speech that

justifies them. Conversely,as I shall suggest below, du-

plicitous speech corrupts the currency of promises and

justifications that is the life-blood of democracy,a mean-

ing of corruptionthathas antecedentsin classicalpolitical

thought and is common in everydayuse.

The Modern Conception Is Individualistic. In part be-

causethe modernconception

ofcorruption

is intertwined

with legalistic understandings of individual corruption,

it focuses on individual behavior (Johnston 1996, 13). As

Thompson (1995) has persuasivelyargued, however, an

individualist focus makes it difficult to conceive of insti-

tutional corruption, in which covert norms of exchange

within the institution-access in exchange for campaign

donations, for example-corrupt the overt purposes of

the institution. Focusing on individual behavior detracts

attention from institution-defining norms with corrupt

consequences.

The Modern Conception Is State-Centric. In seeking

to avoid overly broad conceptions of corruption, mod-

ern conceptions have identified the objects of corrup-

tion, "public office," with the state (Friedrich 1989, 15;

Huntington 1968, 69; Nye 1967). Even Thompson, who

has provided the only theoretical approach to the cor-

ruption of democracy to date, identifies the domain

of democracy as coextensive with government when he

writes that "[p]rivate interests contaminate public pur-

poses in a democracy when they influence the govern-

ment without the warrant of the democratic process"

(1995, 28). But it is far from necessaryfor corruption to

involve government for corruption to be political in na-

ture.This point is especiallyimportant in today'sdemoc-

racies, in which politics is increasingly decentered, and

the politicalwork of democracytakes new forms (Dryzek

1996; Johnston 1996; Warren2001, 2003; Young 2000).

In the developed democracies, public purposes are more

and more farmed out to nongovernmental organizationsand profit-seeking businesses. Privateauditing firms are

charged with ensuring that publicly traded companies

provide accurate information on their finances; scien-

tific research teams, drug companies, and hospitals are

331



MARKE. WARREN

chargedwith furtheringpublic health;professional asso-

ciations such as the American BarAssociation arecharged

with regulatingits members in the interest of the rule of

law,andnonprofit development corporationsarechargedwith revitalizingurbanneighborhoods. All suchorganiza-tions can become corrupt in a genericallypolitical sense,

since political corruption is possible whenever a collec-

tivity has within its power-because of its control over

resources-to produceharmsfor which they seek to avoid

accountability in order to benefit its members.

The Modern Conception Fails to Encompass Demo-

craticCapacities to Associate. Finally, n seekingto avoid

global, moralizing concepts of corruption, modernists

shed the ancient and early modern view that a peopleor society may be corrupt. To be sure, the ancient and

early modern views were so encompassing as tobe

use-ful only in relativelyundifferentiated societies (Johnston

1996, 13). But these views did tap an attribute of societythat has a new relevance in today'sdemocracies:namely,that democracies work when their people have capacitiesto associatefor collectivepurposes-a capacitynow com-

monly referred to as social capital.While the ancient and

earlymodern views must be recast to be relevant,unlike

the modern view,theydid include the idea thatcorruptionin a democracy involves, somehow, the mistrust, lack of

reciprocity,mutual suspicion, and greed that undermine

people's capacitiesto associate.In making these indictments, I am suggestingthat we

lack a conceptual guide to the question of what corrup-tion means in ademocracy,mostly becausethe damagesof

corruption have not been relatedsystematicallyto demo-

cratic norms. A conceptual strategy for doing so would

involve two steps. Since all concepts of political corrup-tion arespecifiedby referenceto agood politicalorder,the

first involves identifying a generalnorm of democracy-its defining good-that can be corrupted. I shall refer to

this good as empowerednclusion,which specifiescorrup-

tion as a form of duplicitousexclusion.Second, becausedemocracies today are differentiated n structure-most

importantly,among state,spheresof publicjudgment and

opinion, society, and markets-the meanings of empow-ered inclusion differ by domain. Accordingly,meaningsof corruption referencedomain-specific meanings of em-

powered inclusion. If successful, this conceptual strategywill produce a differentiated conception of corruption,within which domain-specific meanings of corruptionare relatedthrough their common referenceto empow-ered inclusion. The remainder of this articlesketchesthis

two-step strategyfor developing a democraticconceptionof corruption.

Corrupting Democracy

The broadest meaning of political corruption is not in

dispute: political corruption is the inappropriate use of

common power and authority for purposes of individual

or group gain at common expense. Virtuallyallmeaningsof political corruption, ancient and modern alike, share

the following propositions:

A. An individualor groupof individualsis entrustedwith

collective decisions or actions.

B. Common norms exist regulatingthe waysindividuals

and groups use their power over collective decisions

or actions.

C. An individual or group breakswith the norms.

D. Breakingwith the norms normally benefits the indi-

vidual or group and harms to the collectivity.

Differencesamong conceptions of corruption have to do

with how these core propositions are interpreted, espe-

cially with respect to norms regulatingcollective action.

The highly moralized ancient and earlymodern concep-tions made sense for solidarity-based societies with low

levels of differentiation, while modern conceptions pre-

supposed the higher levels of normative differentiation

associatedwith constitutional state-building.

Likewise, a democratic conception of corruption

would require that we interpret each element in waysmeaningful for democratic societies. With regardto A,

in today'sdemocracies, it is not only public officials who

areentrusted with collective power,but also associations,

corporations, and any number of other entities that con-

tribute to collective decision makingandcollectiveaction.

A democratic conception of corruption should thus ex-

tend to any person or group in a position enabling them

to make use of collective powers or make collective deci-

sions. Foranyindividual,a "public"matteris anyin which

a collectivityhas the capacityto affect herlife. Relativeto

the modern conception, then, a democratic conceptionshould broaden he domain to which the notion of politi-calcorruptionapplies,so that it includesnot only the state

(asdoes the modern conception), but also anycollectivitywith control over resources that people need or want. A

corollary involves the broadening of the concept of col-

lective power to include not only state power, but also

(a) the "force"of collective judgment and argument (asin the ancientconception), and (b) controlovereconomic

resourcessufficient to generateharms. That is, the possi-ble domain of political corruption should be coextensive

with the domain of politics,which takeson multiple forms

in contemporary democracies.

332



CORRUPTIONANDDEMOCRACY

With regard to B, the defining norm of a democ-

racyis a second-order norm of process:a political systemshould maximize rule by and for the people. In the tradi-

tion of liberaldemocracy,this second-order norm isbased

on the first-ordernorm that the individuals constituting"the people" are of equal moral worth, such that each is

entitled to benefit from and participatein collective self-

rule. The norm of democratic political equality follows:

every individual potentially affectedby a decision should

have an equal opportunityto influence the decision. The

corollary action norm is that collectiveactionsshould re-

flectthepurposesdecidedunder nclusiveprocesses.nshort,

the basic norm of democracy is empowered nclusion ofthose affectedin collectivedecisionsand actions (see, e.g.,Habermas 1996, chap. 3; Young 2000, 5-6). Democracy

requiresthat individuals have an equal opportunity to af-

fect such collectivematters and that these opportunitiesbeeffective in two dimensions, power and judgment. In the

dimension of power, democracyrequires nstitutionalized

empowerments of individual participation in collective

decisions, such as the right to vote. The corollaryaction

norm implies trustworthyand effective collective agents,such as governments, to convert collective decisions into

collective actions. In the dimension of judgment, democ-

racy requiresequalchances to influence public judgment,actualized in rights and effective opportunities to speakand to be heardin those deliberativeprocessesthat define

the agendas, choices, and public framing of issues (cf.Dahl 1998, 37-38). Thus, relative to both the ancient and

modern conceptions, ademocraticconception of corrup-tion should narrow the normative referents with respectto first-order norms, leaving only the principle of equalmoral worth of individuals, while broadeningits refer-

ence to second-order norms, those having to do with the

processes by means of which collective judgments about

first-order norms aremade.

With regardto C, then, the norm violated by corrup-tion is that of inclusion n collectivedecisionsand actionsof

all affected.Indeed, the very logic of corruption involvesexclusion: the corrupt use their control over resources to

achievegainsat the expense of those excluded in collective

decision making or organization of collective actions.

Although everyform of corruption of democracyin-

volves exclusion, not every form of exclusion is corrupt.A regime may be exclusive, and the exclusions may pro-duce the most despicable evils. But where an exclusive

elite simply holds to different norms than the broader

public, however odious, we would not usually say that

they are "corrupt."They have not departed from, vio-

lated, or undermined public norms, for to speak in this

way is to assume that they recognize these norms. Cor-

out in public, but rathera corrosion of public norms bythose who profess them. Corruption involves hypocrisy.For an elite (or group or individual) to be corrupt in the

democratic sense, it must both profess and violate the

democratic norm of inclusion. Thus, corruptexclusion is

distinguishedbyduplicity,a characteristic hat implies not

just the possibility of condemnation, but also the possi-

bility of immanent critique:the corrupt can be called to

account by their own standards.

The duplicity condition also explains why corruptdecisions and actions in a democracy are alwayscovert:

they could not be justified in public-that is, to those

affected-if they were to become known. Corruption of

democracyis about actionsbeing taken out of publicview,

as a means of excludingthose who have rightful claimsto

be included. The corrupt hide their actions because they

know,or at least intuit at some level,thattheyareviolatingcollective norms. The very covertness of corruption paystribute to the violated norms.

In short, although moral approachessince Plato view

corruption as a matter of individual greed corroding the

moral horizons thatconstitute thecollectivityand its com-

mon purposes, specificallydemocraticcorruption resides

not in the greedperse,but in servingthis greed by exclud-

ing those affected from the processesof collectivedecision

making that might justify the actions.

Finally,with regardto D, the corruption of democ-

racyis a way of indicating one way in which the practicesof democracyfall short of the norms defining those prac-tices. To saythat a democracyis corruptis not, of course,

a general charge that the democracy is imperfect. There

can be many reasons why democratic norms might not

be perfectly realized, such as the limitations that follow

from scale, size, complexity, and the scarcityof politicalresourcessuch as time. Rather,"corruptionof democracy"is a charge directed against those who derive benefits at

the expense of those they exclude from their relationship

owing to the imperfect realization of democratic norms.

These norms could be better realized were it not for theactions of those who gain from undermining, subverting,or otherwise blocking these norms.

For a decision, action, or exchange to count as cor-

rupt, then, it must cause gains for those included in the

decision or action and harmfor atleastsome of those who

areexcluded. The gainsmaybe personalor private-suchas gaining money or the freedom to conduct business

while externalizing costs onto others. Or, as Thompson

(1995) argues, the gains may be professional, as when

a member of Congressexchangesinfluence for campaigncontributions, enablinghis reelection. A corruptexchangethat benefits both parties does not have to benefit both

ruption does not imply normative disagreement fought

333

equally:any exchange is premised on need, and different



MARKE. WARREN

partieshave control over different resources. In U.S.cities,

for example,political machines thrivedby using the pow-ers of government to raise revenues, which they used to

buy votes from those with marginal livelihoods. So cor-

rupt relationships may also involve dramatic inequalitiesof power, even as they produce benefits for those who

would not have otherwise been included.

While the gains of corruption are often easilyidenti-

fiable, harms to specific goods are often more difficult to

detect, since they are often small, incremental, and ran-

domly distributed, borne by abstract and unorganizedothers: environments are marginally degraded, govern-ments areless efficient, officials less competent, buildingssomewhat less safe,consumer products a bit more expen-

sive, and opportunities less equal.But the harms to democratic processes are more

straightforward:t is the fact of exclusion and the duplicityof justification that corrupts democracy,whether or not

specific harms can be identified. What sufferscorruptionare the political processes and institutions that would,

ideally, expose and limit potential harms by includingthose affected in making collective decisions and orga-

nizing collective actions. Importantly, because a demo-

cratic conception of corruption focuses on processes, it

also highlights institutionalized corruption. Duplicitous,

corruption can become routine within institutions, usu-

ally in the form of dual cultures, one of which pays lip-

service to the norms of democratic inclusion, and theother which facilitates and justifies corrupt exchanges.

Arguably, he U.S.Congress nvolves acorruptionthroughthe campaign finance system that has become part of its

culture, so much so that individual members feel justi-fied in doing favors or granting access in exchange for

support "because everyone does it," even as they speakthe languageof inclusion (della PortaandVannucci 1999,

249-55; Thompson 1995, 27-28).

In sum, corruption of democracyis aviolation of the

norm of equal inclusion of all affected by a collectivity

(unjustifiable exclusion). Exclusion (a) is a necessarybutnot sufficient condition for corruption. In addition, two

other conditions arenecessary:

(b) A duplicity condition with regardto the norm of in-

clusion: The excluded have a claim to inclusion that

is both recognized and violated by the corrupt.(c) A benefit/harm condition with regardto the conse-

quences of exclusion: the exclusion normallybenefits

those included within a relationship and harms at

least some of those excluded.

Together (a), (b), and (c) are necessary conditions for

havethesequalitiesmaybe undemocratic, ut theyare

notcorrupt;a), (b),and(c)arealsosufficient o identifythecorruption f democracy.

Domain Differentiated Corruption

The norm of empowerednclusion dentifiesa distinc-

tivelydemocratic onceptionof corruption.But as de-

velopedso far,the conceptremainsabstract n relation

to the institutionsand practicesof democracy.Because

democracies onsist in differentiated nd complemen-

taryinstitutionsand domains,the means and meaningof inclusionwill vary by domain.Thus in order to re-lateademocratic onceptionof corruptiono theinstitu-

tions andpractices f democracy, distinguishmeaningsof the conceptaccording o the domain-specific ypesof inclusion and their norms. If successful, his strat-

egyshoulddevelopas well as relate amiliar onceptsof

corruption.I conceiveof thesedomains n what s becoming he

conventionalway. dealized,hese nclude:

* Thestate,whoseexecutive owers epresentheultimate

locationof collectiveagency, ndprovide hesecurities

andpowersnecessaryor the rights,protections, up-

ports,andfreedomsnecessaryordemocracy. he eg-islativebranches nablerepresentation ithin hestate,as well as providea venueof deliberationocusedonlawandpolicy.Thejudicialbranchesprovide or due

processandtheruleof law.

* The publicsphereor spheres, he web of communi-

cationsthroughwhichpublicopinionandjudgmentsaredeveloped,anduponwhich the legitimacy f state

decisions, aws,andactionsareultimately ased.

* Civil society,the associationsof which serve manydemocraticunctions, ncludingcultivatinghedemo-cratic

apacitiesfcitizens, nabling itizens opressuregovernment, nderwritinghepublicsphere,andpro-

vidingalternative enuesof collectiveactionand con-flictresolution.

* Market economies, with which democracies are

ambivalentlyassociated (Dahl 1998; Dryzek 1996;Lindblom2001).Democratic unctionsof markets n-cludehandlingbillionsof relativelyrivialmattersofeconomiccoordination n waysthatreducedemands

uponstateandassociative enues.

Whileacompletedevelopmentsbeyond

hescope

ofthis

article,t ispossible osketchwhat sdistinctive boutcor-

ruptionwithineachdomainby asking imilarquestionscorruption of democracy:forms of exclusion that do not

334

of each:




* What arethe democratic functions of the domain?That

is, in what waysis the democratic norm of inclusion ac-

tualized?Thisquestion identifies the modes of inclusion

in each domain potentially subjectto corruption.* What are the regulativenorms of each domain as they

relate to democratic inclusion? This question identifies

the domain-specific norms subject to corruption.* Is the domain primarily one of consensus or conflict,

with conflict denoting the more "political"of domains?

This question helps to specifywhether the norms of the

domain are first-order,as they will tend to be in do-

mains where there is consensus about goals, or whether

they are second-order, regulatingpolitical processes of

decision making under conditions of conflict over first-

order goals.

Answers to thesequestions

willprovide preliminary

an-

swers to the questions:

* What is the corruption-defining mode of exclusion

characteristicof the domain?

* What are the harms to democracy?

These questions and their domain specific answers are

summarized in Table 1.

Corruption of the State

Although states with liberal-democratic constitu-

tions typically differentiate institutions according to

functions-legislatures legislate and courts adjudicate,for example-here I referonly to idealizedfunctions and

not to institutions. That is, I am bracketingthe questionas to whether,for example, courts and executiveagencies

engagein the politicalwork of lawmaking. Insofar asthey

do, the democratic norms of legislativefunctions should

also apply to executive agencies and courts.

Corruptionof ExecutiveFunctions

From the perspectiveof democracy,the executivebranch

of the state is not the only location of collective agency,but it is often the ultimate location, owing to the state's

monopoly over legitimate means of coercion (Table 1,column 1). In a democracy, a people's confidence in its

executive is a confidence that it can act in response to

collective problems. Thus, ideally,the mode of inclusion

in executivefunctions is passive,consisting in a trust that

officials will abide by the goals and rules that have been

legitimatelydecided within the more politicalof domains.

The reason trust is an appropriate mode of inclu-

settled: they are the consequences of political processesthat haveproducedenough consensus to support binding

goals, on the basis of which offices with defined purposescan be constructed. Trust presupposes trustworthiness,

which can be hedged by institutionalizing oversight, au-

diting, sunshine laws,an activemedia, and public interest

groups that engage in monitoring. When such devices

and activitiesexist, then trust is warranted(Warren1999,

Forthcoming).The notion thatcorruption involvesviolating a "pub-

lic trust" is thus most applicable to the domain of exec-

utive functions. Consistent with the modern conception,

corruption consists in activities by public officials that

depart from the norms, laws, and expectations of their

offices, from which they realizegains. Governmentas the

trustee and executor of collective purposes is corrupted

(della Porta and Vannucci 1999, 10, 261). Democracy isdirectlyharmed when people lack a collective agent theycan trust to execute collective decisions because they are

effectively disempowered. Indirect harms to democracyalso result: corruption not only leads to inefficient and

ineffective government (della Porta and Vannucci 1999,

256-58; Rose-Ackerman1999, 9-26), but also producesan atmospherethat is arbitrary,permeatedby differential

treatment. Under these circumstances, individuals lack

the securities necessary for association, pressure, voice,

and other modes of citizen participationthat underwrite

democracy.An atmosphere in which even everydayactsof democratic participation requireheroism can induce

or reinforcepassivityand distrust among citizens.

Corruptionof JudicialFunctions

Democracy depends upon public procedures that have

the force of law, combined with the rights and securities

that enable individuals to use these proceduresby voting,

speaking, organizing, and pressuring (Table 1, column

2). The democratic norm of inclusion thus depends upon

a judicial system that provides actionable civil rightsand

liberties,equalstanding, equalprotection, access to coun-

sel, even-handed prosecutors-and assumes, of course,that the police functions of the executivebranchare sub-

ject to judicial control and oversight. The importance of

this kind of judicial system to democracy is not just in-

stitutional, but also psychological: knowable securities,

equally distributed, arenecessaryfor a confident and ac-

tive citizenry.Ascustodians of law, udicialinstitutions ideallyfunc-

tion to ensure that it is applied with fairnessand equity.But because cases are brought where there are conflict-

ing interestsand uncertaintyabout what constitutes fair-sion is that executive functions are, in theory, relatively

335

ness and equity, the norms of judicial institutions are



TABLE1 Locationsand meanings of corruptionin democracy

~~~~~~~~~Domomainms

State

1.Executive

DepartmentsCharacteristics and Agencies

Democraticfunctions Collectiveagency

Domain specificnorms of inclusion

Levelof consensus

Corruption-definingmodes of exclusion

Harmsto democracy

First-ordernorms

embedded in

programgoals,

mission, and

performance;

efficiency

Convergent interests

or consensus

formalized nto

programs

Divergence rom

legitimatelydecidednorms of

office for private

gain;betrayed

public trust

Erosionof powersof

collectiveagency,

resultingfrom

inefficiencies,

inequities,

arbitrariness,

mistrustof gov't

2. Judiciary

Rule of law

Second-ordernorms:

due processaimed

at maximizing

truth-finding,

fairness,andequity

Conflicting nterests

operatingunder

consensus about

legalnorms

Decisions motivated

by gainsotherthan

winning through

argument

Erosionof rights,

protections,

securities;

illegitimate udicialdecisions

undermineruleof

law

3. Legislatures

Representativeawmaking

Second-ordernorms:

openness,

independence,

accountability

Conflictinginterests

interactingunder

consensus about

political

procedures.

Secrecyand duplicity:decisions

responsiveto

money or powerin

waysthat could not

be justified

publiclyFailedrepresentation,

loss of creative

dimensions of

deliberation,

illegitimatedecisions

4. Public Sphere

(Mediaand Other

DiscursiveVenues)

Formationof publicopinion

Second-ordernorms:

persuasionbasedon

the discursive orce of

truth-telling,

rightness,and

sincerity

Conflicting opinions

operatingunder

conditions of free

speechand

association

Duplicity,deception,dissimulationunder

the influenceof

poweror money

Severedrelationship

between collective

decisions andpublic

judgments

5.

(A

Collectrepr

reguand

agresoci

citiz

First-o

emb

and

Conver

with

conf

amo

Partic

reci

gene

reci

Loss of

non

acti

for

stat

geneof d




procedural rather than based on particular outcomes.

Thus, the corruption-defining norms of judicial systems

are not first-ordernorms aswith executivefunctions, but

rather second-order procedures of adjudication. Owingto this quality,judicial institutions indicate something of

the natureofcorruption

within moreopenly political

are-

nas, and, for the same reason, the modern conception of

corruptionis lessadequate.Judicial nstitutions do benefit

from relativelyclearfunctions and expectations:the laws

are known beforehand, even if their demands arenot en-

tirelyclear n particularcases.Likewise, he rolesofjudges,

lawyers,andjuriesin deliberationandjudgment are clear.

These roles, however, are designed to enable proceduresthat approximate truth when the truth is unknown, and

fairness and equity when their demands are ambiguous,

under conditions of conflict. The integrity of the process

involves aconfidence that,when the truthis unknown andthe demands of fairnessand equity ambiguous, argumen-tation and advocacy are the best ways of approximating

true, fair,and equitable outcomes.

Thus what are subject to corruption are not, in

any immediate sense, the outcomes (truth, fairness, eq-

uity), but rather the processes through which they are

achieved-that is, argument. The process is corruptedwhen motivations forgainother than those of winning the

argumententer the process.Ifjurorsarebribed,then their

decisions follow from the bribe rather rom the arguments

placed before them. If lawyershave conflicts of interest,they may lack the motivation to make the strongest ar-

guments they can. If judges seek political or ideological

gains, they can use their considerable influence over the

proceedings to affect the outcome for reasons unrelated

to the truth-finding and equity/fairness-seeking goals of

the process.The harm to democracyis that the rule of law

becomes lesscertain,erodinglegalrights, protections, and

securities. When arguments no longer carry the burden

for determining truth, fairness, and equity, judicial deci-

sions become illegitimate,which in turn corrodesnot only

the culture of law,but also the democratic idea that con-

flicts are best settledby talk structuredby fairprocedures.

Corruptionof LegislativeFunctions

Within democratic systems, legislaturesfunction to make

laws under conditions of conflict (Table 1, column 3).The legislative domain is highly political, in the sense

that it often works at the limits of consensus about col-

lection actions. Its norms are therefore second-order-

those of democratic process. People are included in this

domain through their votes for representatives n com-

petitive elections, aswell as though communications and

ing, demonstrations, and other ways of conveying opin-ions and interests to representatives.The objects of cor-

ruption are, therefore,these representative inkages.The most familiarcorruption of representation s the

buying andsellingofvotes, in electionsas well aslegislative

processes.Vote

buyingand

selling corrupts by breakingthe link between the expressionof interests and opinionsand the enforcement mechanism representedby the vote.

Voting is, however, a notoriously poor means of inclu-

sion: it is low in information, episodic, and conveys at

best the preferences of the winners. Elections and leg-islative votes mostly serve to structure democratic pro-cesses and finalize decisions, while the creative work of

democracy consists in deliberation and bargaining. The

legitimacy of outcomes depends upon justifications re-

sulting from the deliberative process. Thus, the deliber-

ative dimension of representationshould be even moreactivelyinclusive thanvoting: even those who lose can tryto persuade their representativesor mobilize debates in

the public domain through which they hope to influence

their representative-if not directly through persuasion,then indirectly by changing the minds of those likely to

vote in the next election.

The more elusive dimensions of legislative corrup-

tion, then, have to do with inclusion in deliberation-

elusive because, in contrast to the bureaucrat'sperfor-mance standards, a representative'skey role is to create

agreements in the face of conflicts over goals. So what-ever trust constituents place in them cannot be based on

outcomes: no representativecan deliver,not least because

even under the best of circumstancesoutcomes will reflect

a mix of competing interests and voices. Rather,trust in

a representative s well placed when the reasons he givesfor a position are, in fact, the reasons that motivate his

vote, bargain,or compromise. Individualsshould be able

to trust that representatives'decisions are not the result

of the whispered voices of those who have bought ac-

cess through their campaign contributions. This is why,

as Thompson insightfully argues (1995, 126-29; see also

Stark2000, 230-32), the "appearanceof integrity"stan-

dard for representatives s not simply about appearance.In a democracy,policymaking ought to be a public pro-

cess, and, under conditions of representation, can onlybe a public process if citizens can have confidence not

just that the deliberative process is inclusive, but also

that it provides the motivational force behind the deci-

sion. Legislativenorms should therefore reflect not justthe integrity of voting, but also the integrity of inclu-

sive deliberation. Following Thompson (1995, 114-26),

representatives should be fair: that is, open to argu-ments from all potentially affectedby the decision. They

deliberationsenabledby political associations, letterwrit-

337

should be independent: their decisions should reflect due



MARKE.WARREN

consideration f the arguments.Andtheyshouldbe ac-

countable:heyshouldbe able o providereasons o con-

stituentsfor their decisions.This is partlya matterof

character: representativeas integritywith respectof

mattersof commonconcernwhen words areconsistent

with deeds.But it isjust

asimportant

hat the institu-

tions supporta closerelationship etweendeliberations

and decisions.

Legislativeorruption hould herefore e conceived

asshort-circuitingheseaspects f the democratic rocess

(Thompson1995,103).The distinctivemarksof corrup-tion in the legislativedomain are thosethatcontravene

inclusivepublicdeliberation, amely, ecrecyn decision

makingandduplicity n speech.Secrecy anhavemanymotives-some quiteproper-but inlegislativematterst

is often a signthat nfluences re mproper ndvoicesare

excluded or reasons hatcouldnot bejustified n public.Duplicity n speech,whatmanypeoplecalla "lack f sin-

cerity"npoliticians,s asignthat hedeliberativerocesshas been corrupted:he argumentsmadeanddisplayedare not those motivating he decisions. The harms to

democracy redirectandextensive:orruption fthissort

severs epresentativeinkages, reaks herelationship e-

tweendeliberationnddecisionmaking, ndundermines

the creative lementsof democratic onflictresolution.

Corruption of the Public Sphere

As Isuggested bove, he modernconceptofcorruptions

a state-based oncept.Butif contemporaryonceptionsof democracy efer ncreasinglyo forcesoutside of the

state that "makedemocracywork," hould not the con-

ceptof corruptionollowdemocracy eyond hebound-

ariesof the state?Certainlyhere s warrantwithindemo-

cratictheories at least since Jeffersonand Kant,whereit haslong been noted thatliberal-democraticonstitu-

tions constitutenot just governments, ut also publics

through ightsandprotectionsuchasfreedomofspeechand association.Representationf "thepeople"withinthe statepresumes hatthe peopleareconstitutedapartfrom the state; hattheyhave some autonomy romthe

state; hattheyarerepresentedn anongoing processof

public opinionformationcarriedbyvariousmediaand

forums;andthat,asa result,publicopinionhasits own

kind of integrity nd nfluence Habermas 996,329-87;Preuss1995).Ina democracy, ublicopinionshouldnot

only guide, imit,andlegitimate he state,butalsostand

vigilantover the accumulated owersof businessesandotherorganizations.

Whatevernfluence hepublicspherehas, t exertsby

narratives,ndsymbols hatportrayivesandemotions,

throughcollective nterpretationsf facts,and throughdeliberationsboutrightandwrong Table1,column4).Theseelementsofpublicdiscourse nablepeople o form

conceptionsof their nterestsand valuesand to connect

them o theirpolitical

ctions.For hesereasons,nclusion

in thepublicsphere s necessaryorallotherdemocratic

formsof inclusion.Froma democratic erspective,he n-

tegrityof thepublic pheredependsupon ncluding llaf-

fectedbycollectivemattersbyprovidingndividualswith

the opportunitiesand spacesto argueand persuade-that s,to exert"discursiveorce."Discursiveorceresides

in people's apacitieso move others hroughnormative

and factual laimsandto be moved n turn. In a democ-

racy,discursive orce should be the dominantforce-

indeed, he constituting orce-of publicspheres,which

should n turnguide, imit,correct, nd egitimate phereswithinwhichadministrativeower(the state)or money(the market) are dominant (Habermas1996; Young2000).

What ountsascorruption fpublic pheres oesnot,

then,refer o corruption f rightness rtruth.Politics s,in part,constitutedby disagreementsboutwhat counts

asrightortrue.Whatmatters, ather, redeliberativero-cesses: heyhave ntegritywhenpeoplecan makeclaims

to rightness ndtruth,andhopeto motivateotherswith

theirclaimsnways hatarenotreducibleothe nterests f

powerormoney(Habermas 987).From heperspectiveof motivations, peech s corruptnot when t iswrongor

untrue,but when it is strategicallyuplicitous,ntended

to deflect,dissimulate, istract, r otherwiseobscure he

claimsof those who speak, n order o secureprivateor

professional ains.Nodoubtstrategic uplicitysanunavoidableartof

publicdeliberations;t is impossible o imagine nstitu-

tions thatcouldpolicemotivationswithouteliminatingdeliberationtself.But is it possible o containstrategicduplicityby disempoweringt. Institutions an be (and

oftenare)designed o it is difficult orthosewhocontrolresources o get theirwaywithout publicjustification.Mostof thesedesignsarealreadywell-known nprincipleif not alwaysappropriatelypplied n practice: onflictof interest ules,campaigninancing trictures,unshine

laws,public nformation, thicsoversight, uditingunits,and externalwatchdoggroups, o namea few. In addi-

tion, competitivepoliticalprocesses upplyactorswithmotivations o catch heiropponents'duplicities.There-sultsareoften not savory,but theydo placea premium

upon reputationor

integritywhile

increasinghe risks

andcosts of duplicity Thompson2000).In theseways,the corruptionof speechthat is unavoidablen politics

means of symbolic and discursiveforces:through images,

338

mightbelimited n itsharms o democracy.




Although the modern conception offers no guidance

to this kind of corruption, there are ancient as well as

popular precedents. Thucydides complained that in cor-

rupt Athens, men were so ridden with "ambition, envy,

greed,and lust for power"that they became "oblivious to

the importunements of justice, honor, mercy,and 'com-

mon laws ... to which all alike can appeal for salvation

should they be overtaken by adversity."'Used strategi-

callyto further individual gains, "'[w]ordswere forced to

change their ordinary meaning"' (Euben 1989, quoting

from Thucydides, 224-25) to such an extent that public

deliberationlost its force.And in popular usage today we

have no problem referring to, say, newspapers or other

media as corrupt.We do so when we suspect them of hid-

ing or alteringthe news or images under the influence of

power (as with state-controlled media), money (as with

media beholden to corporate sponsors), or ideologicalagendas that systematicallyhide or distort facts (Arendt

1968, chapter 7). Likewise,those professions such as the

sciences whose force depends upon the public veracityof

their claimscan become corrupt,as when researchersalter

their study designs or findings to suit the financial inter-

ests of their sponsors. Corruption in this sense damages

democracy by severing the relationship between public

judgments and collective decisions.

Corrupt Civil Societies

Democracy does best, it seems, in placeswhere civil soci-

ety is constituted by horizontallystructuredgroups,a cer-

tain proportion of which bridge social cleavages(Putnam

2000, 336-49; Warren2001, chapter 7). "Civilsociety" is

the domain of associationsbuilt from common values and

sharedgoals. While there are countless purposes of asso-

ciation, they all depend upon horizontal trust and reci-

procity. Trustmultiplies individual efforts and accounts

for much of the generative power of association, while

reciprocityenables cooperation for mutual advantage.

The democratic functions of associationsfollow from

these qualities: they provide individuals with means

for representation and voice, with alternatives to state-

centered collective action, and resources for resistance

and counterhegemony. In addition, many kinds of asso-

ciations provide for political socialization by enhancing

individuals'political capacities,theirsense of efficacy,and

their knowledge. They will usually learn the value of reci-

procity and trust, and some associations may enhance

toleration and other civic virtues (Warren2001).

The democratic norm of inclusion cannot apply di-

rectly to the associations of civil society. Whereverthere

exclude (Rosenblum 1998). What counts for democracy,

rather, s inclusion in three other senses. First,among the

variety of associative possibilities, individuals should be

able to find the social attachments and membershipsthat

provide opportunities forvoice, representation,collective

action, and socialization into the habits of democratic

agency.Second, exclusions should not combine with re-

sources in ways that enable the associations to external-

ize costs onto others who lack recourse. And third, these

membershipsshould overlapsufficientlyso that, in aggre-

gate, civil society does not consist in mutually exclusive

and segmented associations (Warren2001, 207-16).

Can corruption mean anything in relation to these

kinds of associationalexclusion? The first mode of exclu-

sion, differentialdistributions of memberships,might in-

tersect with corruption,but therearemanyother possible

causes of associational exclusions, such as differences ineducation andeffects of classand race(Verba,Schlozman,

and Brady 1995). The second and third possibilities for

exclusion, however,do havemeaningful senses of corrup-

tion attached to them. To see why, however, it is impor-

tant to note that some kinds of trust and reciprocitycan

function to support corruption. The literatures on trust

and reciprocityincreasinglydistinguish between general-

ized and particularizedversions of trust and reciprocity

(Uslaner2002;Putnam 2000, 22-24). Generalizedtrust is

the propensity trust strangers.Generalizedtrusters find

it easier to form associations, and they are more likelyto join associations that cross cleavagesof family, clan,

race, ethnicity, religion, and class. In contrast, particu-

larized trusters are mistrustful of strangersand tend to

use indicators of clan, race, ethnicity, religion, and class

as cues about whom they should trust. Those who gener-

alize reciprocitywill help others not because they expect

a particularreturn,but because they believe that, should

they need help in the future, someone else will exhibit

the same spontaneous generosity. Generalized recipro-

cators will find it easier to form associative connections

that span groups and generations. Those who particu-

larize reciprocity-that is, demand that any favor be re-

ciprocatedin kind-will tend towardexclusiveexchanges

within associations, since associative attachments func-

tion as guarantees of the exchange. Particularizedreci-

procity thus tends toward exclusiverather than inclusive

attachments.

Generalized rust andreciprocityaregood fordemoc-

racy because they enhance inclusiveness within civil so-

ciety. Particularized rust tends to be bad for democracy,since it builds on and reinforcesgroup cleavages.Partic-

ularizedreciprocityis not necessarilybad for democracyand is often quite appropriate: n marketexchanges and

is freedom to choose associates, there is also freedom to

339

greetings,orexample. ut t is theparticularizedather



MARKE.WARREN

generalizedkinds of trustandreciprocity upon which cor-

rupt forms of associations build when (a) they function

to secure an association'shold over power or money, and

(b) the exclusivityof the bond servesthe interestsof those

within the relationship while harming those who are ex-

cluded. Masonic lodges in Italy,one of the exclusivesocial

venues that supported Italianpolitical corruption, exem-

plified these conditions (della Porta and Vannucci 1999,

165-70).

It is possible to stretch the concept of corruption to

include the notion that a civil society might be corrupt,

however,only with the addition the duplicity condition.

It only makes sense to apply the condition in aggregate,in those societies in which the overallweight of particu-larized trust and reciprocitycause people to form purelyexclusive social attachments. Under these circumstances,

each group seeks benefits for its own members withoutregard for the harms of its group activities, while por-

traying its interests as those of society. This descriptioncomes close to capturing the meaning of corruption in

ancient political theory: Thucydidesand Aristotle,for ex-

ample, held that in a corrupt society "eachpart pretendsto be the whole; each interest to be the common one; each

faction to make its view and voice exclusive. Under such

circumstances the common good is seen (and so comes

to be) a ruse for fools and dreamerswhile the politicalarena is a placewhere factions, like gladiators,fight to the

death" (Euben 1989, 223). This ancient conception res-onates with contemporaryliteraturesthat find, variously,that societies high in generalizedtrust have low levels of

official corruption (Uslaner 2001); that mistrustful and

anomic societies provide conditions for official corrup-tion (Banfield 1958, Rose-Ackerman2001); and that so-

cieties high in social capitalaremore democratic in their

governance (Putnam 1993, 2000; Lin 2001).The harms to democracyof a corruptcivil society are

extensive, including loss of capacity for nonstate collec-

tive action, loss of capacity for disciplining and guiding

the state, and loss of the generativecapacitiesof democ-

racyin favorof a zero-sum game between competing and

mutually suspicious groups.

Marketsand Corruption

The democratic functions of markets are ambiguous:marketstend to support democratization of authoritarian

and totalitarianregimesby pluralizingthe sources of eco-nomic power.Global marketsprovide incentives for such

regimesto become more open, while pressuresof compe-tition provide incentivesfor corruptofficialsto limit their

els of economic complexity and economic development,aswell as a taxbase that enablesgovernment to undertake

collectiveprojectsand responsibilities.But marketsare,and will continue to be, a forcetend-

ing towardcorruption of democracyaswell (Table1,col-

umn 6). The dynamics of exclusion are at work ineverycapitalist market: profit-seeking businesses always seek

to internalize benefits and externalize onto others costs

for such things as education of workers, infrastructure,

and environmental integrity. These dynamics of exclu-

sion are undemocratic-but not necessarily corrupt-inthe sense that there is no directappealto the power hold-

ers. But market exclusion may become corrupt if mar-

ket actors covertly seek to use economic power to in-

fluence democratic processes and agencies of collective

action.

Tendencies toward corruption in this sense are in-herent within capitalist market democracies. The verydifferentiation between economic and political powerthat limits state power and creates an energetic econ-

omy also creates incentives for wealthy actors to buythe resources they do not control-the assent, protec-

tion, and assistance of government (Scott 1972, 28-34;

Rose-Ackerman 1999). As Adam Smith recognized, no

capitalist has an interest in the health of capitalism, but

each does havean interest in transformingprofit-seekinginto rent-seeking. Powerfulactors are motivated to pen-

etrategovernment whereverpossible, if not to gain priv-

ileged access to government contracts, then-and more

commonly in the developed democracies-to affect the

rules of competition in ways favorable to them. More-

over, when a market exists for their cooperation with

economic actors, public officials have incentives for cor-

rupt exclusion: they can use the rules and regulations

they control to create bottlenecks that increase the priceof their services to the wealthy (Johnston 1982, 20-23;de Leon 1993, 28).

These tendencies areculturalas well as structural: n

capitalist societies, a single-minded, instrumental focus

on moneymaking is often so admired that the ethics ap-

propriateto the publicdomain of democracies-the stew-

ardship of common goods and inclusive processes-are

constantly vulnerable to the culture of entrepreneurshipthat surrounds them (Arendt 1965, 254-56; Eisenstadt

1989;della Portaand Vannucci 1999, 7-9, 195).The harms of market-inducedcorruption to democ-

racy are clear and well documented: when equally dis-

tributedrightsand powersare for sale, the ethic of demo-

cratic

equality

is undermined. And whenagents

of the

statesell their regulatoryand monopoly powers, they use

the powers that belong to the people to enhance the pow-takes. Indeveloped democracies,marketsenablehigh lev-

340

ersof economic elites. Not only is the key collectiveagent




of democracy,the state,corrupted,but so also arethe veryrules that enable markets to function.

Conclusion

Our standard conception of corruption-what I have

called the "modern"conception-does some things very

well, such as identifying official misdeeds in arenas of

governmentwith clear definitions of office. But the mod-

ern conception has been outpaced not only by the de-

mocratization of the state-building project,but more re-

cently by diffusions of politics that are changing the veryforms of democracy. Since conceptions of political cor-

ruption depend upon conceptions of appropriatepolitics,it should be no surprisethat the standardconception un-

derplayssome

contemporaryintuitions into

corruption,while missing others altogether.

By making an explicit connection between demo-

cratictheory and the concept of corruption we can make

sense of the diffusion of meanings of corruption within

today's democracies. By conceiving corruption throughthe democratic norm of empowered inclusion, we can

identify the harms to democracy quite precisely,domain

by domain. This is a conceptual rather than an empiricalclaim: whether or not such a democratic conception of

corruption ultimately makes sense depends on whether

it illuminates the evolving normative intuitions withindemocracies as to what counts as corrupt.

It may be, however, that a democratic theory of cor-

ruption can shed light on other features of political cor-

ruption aswell. First,a democratic concept of corruptionrevealswhy charges of corruption can be so often mis-

placed. The concept of corruption carries with it a moral

accusation. In the United States,with its political culture

heavily influenced by Protestantism, moral accusations

are too often aimed at failingsof individual character, hus

distracting from institutional and structuralpatterns of

corruption (Eisenstadt 1989; Thompson 1995). Causes,

locations, and meanings of corruption are consistently

misidentified, often with the help of opportunistic po-litical elites, so that remedies often miss and sometimes

aggravate he problems. A democraticconcept of corrup-tion not only reveals the opportunities for domain slip-

page, but also the challenges for devising solutions that

speakto each domain.

Second, a democratic concept of corruption raises

a warning flag about the dominant metaphor for cures

to corruption, transparency.If corruption in democra-

cies has assumed multiple, complex patterns, then the

metaphor may be limited its usefulness to particularde-

laws. There is an ironyhere: modern technologies promisethe power to expose all. But two other powerful forces

challenge the promise of universalvisibility. First,owingto its complexity, contemporary social and political or-

ganization remains opaque as a whole, even if it can be

unraveled at some points, at some times, and at some

places (Beck 1997). Second, with global market integra-tion outpacing political integration, the possibilities for

secret transactions are multiplying faster than the pos-sibilities for oversight (Johnston 1996). Money is hard

to see and trace. In addition, market-oriented reforms

aimed at lowing transaction costs also maketransparencyever harder to achieve. The metaphor of transparency

may also remain too closely linked with the modern con-

ception of corruption, with its strategiesof institutional

oversight and policing. A democratic conception of cor-

ruption suggeststhat it maybe time to experimentwith adifferentapproach,namely,empoweringthose harmedby

corruption to expose and police abuses (della Porta and

Vannucci 1999, 270-72; Rose-Ackerman 1999; de Leon

1993).

Finally, a democratic concept of corruption should

help to sort out some of the current confusion as to

whether democracy does or does not foster corruption

(Moran2001;Philp 2001). The confusion in almost everycase stems from incomplete characterizationsof democ-

racy,enabling,for example,the common observation that

countries adopting competitive elections and market lib-eralization ("democratization")also experience a rise in

corruption. On a democratic conception of corruption,such correlations should not be surprising. Incompletedemocratization often puts into place incentives for cor-

ruption, while lacking those elements of democracy that

would enable those harmed to fight back. In particular,these effects suggest a deficit in the protectiveelement of

democracy,an old rationale based on the notion that citi-

zensshould have the politicaltools to resistpredatorygov-ernments and officials (Macpherson 1977). If corruption

involvesharms causedby exclusion, akeymeans for fight-

ing corruption will involve empowering those harmed to

protect themselves by democratic means: with informa-

tion, arguments, organization, and votes. In short, more

democracy is likely to be a central part of any cure, as

long aswhat counts as "moredemocracy" alignswith the

norms of empowered inclusion embedded within each

domain.

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Documents

What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy- -- American Journal of Political Science