WEEKLY THREAT ADVISORY NO. 437 … · Universal Maritime Solutions Pte Ltd No. 21 Bukit Batok Crescent, WCEGA Tower, #28-70, Singapore 658065 5. On Aug 17, UKMTO issued ADVISORY NOTICE

Universal Maritime Solutions Pte Ltd No. 21 Bukit Batok Crescent, WCEGA Tower, #28-70, Singapore 658065

WEEKLY THREAT ADVISORY NO. 437

(16 - 22 January 2020)

Summary of Threat Activities and Conclusion

1. Pirate and maritime crime activity in East Africa waters is at a low level.

There were no piracy/criminal related incidents reported this past week.

2. UKMTO is aware of recent military activity in the Gulf Region. There is no

change to the information and guidance recently given to maritime trade

transiting the Gulf area. Vessels should proceed in accordance with their

company and FlagState direction, and are encouraged to report to

UKMTO in accordance with BMP5. UKMTO continues to monitor all

shipping transiting through the Straits of Hormuz (SOH) and recommends

that ships maintain their AIS transmissions throughout the Gulf region,

reporting any irregular activity to UKMTO [email protected] or

+44 (0) 2392 222060

3. UKMTO Notice 004 Jan 2020

3.1. UKMTO is issuing this Notice to global maritime operators in order to

remind mariners and ship operators of the recommended procedures

for transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

3.2. BMP5 remains the basis for merchant ship conduct, reporting and

monitoring in the area. In addition vessels and companies will need to

be aware of their own Flag State guidance.

3.3. All vessels are strongly advised to remain within International Waters

and, where practicable, should avoid transiting through Iranian TTW,

including the areas claimed by Iran around the islands of:

3.3.1. Abu Musa, 250 52’ N 550 02’E

3.3.2. Greater Tunb 260 15’N 550 16’E

3.3.3. Lesser Tunb 260 14’N 550 08’E

3.4. In the event of merchant vessels being hailed masters should respond

with ship’s name, flag state and confirm that they are proceeding in


accordance with International Law. If contacted by Iranian authorities,

it is recommended thatmasters contact UKMTO.

3.5. UKMTO recommends all merchant shipping maintain transmissions on

AIS throughout the region to avoid mis-identification and to assist with

merchant shipping monitoring.

4. MARAD ADVISORY 2018-014-GPS Interference-Eastern Mediterranean

and Red Seas: This revised advisory cancels U.S. Maritime Advisory 2018-

007 Reference: U.S. Maritime Alerts 2018-004A, 2018-004B, 2018-008A.

Issue: Multiple instances of significant GPS interference continue to be

reported by vessels and aircraft operating in the Eastern Mediterranean

Sea. These reports have been concentrated near Port Said, Egypt, the Suez

Canal, and in the vicinity of the Republic of Cyprus. Additional instances

of similar interference were reported in October 2018 near Jeddah Port,

Saudi Arabia. This interference is resulting in lost or otherwise altered

GPS signals affecting bridge navigation, GPS-based timing and

communications equipment. Guidance: Exercise caution when transiting

these areas. The U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Centre (NAVCEN) and NATO

Shipping Centre websites contain information regarding effective

navigation practices for vessels experiencing GPS interference. The

information reaffirms safe navigation practices when experiencing

possible GPS disruption, provides useful details on reporting possible GPS

disruption, and is intended to generate further discussions within the

maritime community about other disruption mitigation practices and

procedures. This guidance also recommends taking note of critical

information such as the location (latitude/longitude), date/time, and

duration of the outage/disruption, and providing photographs or screen

shots of equipment failures during a disruption to facilitate analysis. The

NAVCEN information is available at: https://go.usa.gov/xQBaU. Contact

Information: GPS disruptions or anomalies should be immediately

reported to the NAVCEN at https://go.usa.gov/xQBaw or via phone at

703-313-5900, 24 hours a day. The NATO Shipping Centre has requested

that instances of GPS interference also be reported to them using the

format on their Cyber Interference link:

https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/page10303037.aspx. Cancellation: This

message will automatically expire on May 2, 2019.


5. On Aug 17, UKMTO issued ADVISORY NOTICE 001/AUG/2017: - 1.

Category: Notice. Description: GUIDANCE ON TRANSITS THROUGH THE

BAB EL MANDEB AND ASSOCIATED WATERS. The following information

from the UK government relates to transits through the Bab el Mandeb

(BeM) and associated waters. It replaces previous guidance UKMTO

Notice 001 July 2017 (which refers to CMF advice dated 16 July 2017) and

UKMTO Notice 002 July 2017. Recent attacks against merchant shipping

in the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandeb have highlighted the risks

associated with transiting these waters. Daylight attacks by small boats

were conducted against two tankers in the southern approaches to the

BeM. The method of these attacks has seen two or more skiffs

approaching at high speed. In each case, one or more have fired small

arms and Rocket Propelled Grenades and carried explosives. In both

attacks, the skiffs carrying explosives detonated at a distance from the

target vessel, but the presumed intent was to detonate the explosives

against the hull. The assessment of the attacks against merchant vessels

in the southern approaches to the BeM indicates that due to the low levels

of sophistication, the exposure to the threat is greater in daylight hours.

However, an attack during the hours of darkness cannot be excluded. The

risk of the conflict in Yemen spilling into the maritime domain also

continues to exist in the area to the North of the BeM and around the

Hanish Islands. Even though we do not expect merchant vessels to be

targeted by the forces fighting in Yemen, the threat of collateral damage

to commercial shipping is present and should not be ignored. This threat

is assessed as greater in the hours of darkness (when attackers may be

more likely to misidentify their targets) to the North of the Traffic

Separation Scheme to the West of the Hanish Islands. Therefore,

operating in these waters requires thorough planning and the use of all

available information. The maritime threat environment is dynamic; the

risks will not remain constant for subsequent visits. It is essential

therefore, that Masters, Ship Security Officers and Company Security

Officers carry out detailed Risk Assessments for each voyage to the region

and for each activity within the region. All vessels transiting the Gulf of

Aden and Bab el Mandeb should follow the guidance of BMP 4 to the

maximum extent possible and consider the use of embarked armed

security. Recent attacks in 2017 serve to emphasize the importance of

robustly following this guidance. This information is aimed to help inform

effective mitigating actions and has been developed through cooperation

between Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and UKMTO. The use of BMP4,


armed security, shifting transit times, or any other defensive measures

remain the sole decision of the vessel operator based on its own

dedicated risk assessment and the requirements of the flag state. Cancel

UKMTO Notice 001/JUL/2017 & UKMTO Notice 002/JUL/2017. Any

queries regarding this UKMTO Notice ring 0044 2392 222060 for further

information.

6. U.S. MARITIME ADVISORY 2017-004 / Threat Type: - Piracy / Geographic

Area: Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Gulf of Oman:

U.S. flag vessels are advised to remain vigilant and adhere to the counter-

piracy annex of their approved Vessel Security Plan when transiting the

Sulu and Celebes Seas, in light of recent boarding and kidnappings for

ransom that have taken place in the area. Over the past 12 months, there

have been at least 14 reported kidnappings and one murder, of which at

least ten incidents were reportedly linked to Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a

violent Islamic separatist group operating in the southern Philippines.

Previously, only towing and fishing vessels were targeted and

crewmembers kidnapped. However, since October 2016, ASG has

reportedly targeted three large commercial vessels and one yacht. In

November 2016 ASG boarded a German yacht and killed one

crewmember, and in February 2017 killed the remaining crewmember

after a ransom demand was not met. Thus far, no U.S. vessels have been

involved in these incidents. Guidance: Additional information on this

threat, including specific recommendations for vessels transiting the area,

is available on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy

and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) website at

www.recaap.org. Mariners operating in or near this area are also advised

to consult the Department of State Travel Warnings for this area and the

information can be found at

www.travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/philippines-

travel warning.html. All suspicious activities and events must be reported

to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center at 800-424-8802 in

accordance with 33CFR101.305. A Ship Hostile Action Report (SHAR)

should also be sent to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

at:

http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_nfpb=true&_st=&_pageLabe

l=msi_portal_page_70&subCode=06 as soon as possible following an

incident or suspected activity (including apparent surveillance being

conducted by small vessels/boats).

http://www.travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/philippines-

http://www.travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/philippines-


Reference:

https://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_nfpb=true&_st=&_pageLab

el=msi_portal_page_62&pubCode=0009 for further guidance.

7. ReCAAP WARNIING 01-10-2018 Date: 30 Oct 2018: - The ReCAAP ISC has

received information from the Philippine Focal Point (Philippine Coast

Guard) that a group of approximately 10 ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group)

members armed with pistol, rifles and grenade launcher is planning to

conduct kidnapping activities at any opportune time in undisclosed areas

in Sabah primarily targeting businessmen or ship's crew of foreign vessels

passing through the area. They are using unmarked coloured blue and

white motorbanca locally known as jungkong. Ship masters and crew are

strongly urged to exercise extra vigilance when transiting the waters off

eastern Sabah and Sulu-Celebes Seas. Source: Philippine Coast Guard.

ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) Email: [email protected], tel: +65

6376 3084, fax: +65 6376 3066.

8. Pirate and maritime crime activities in West Africa waters is at high level

There were six criminal related incidents reported during the reporting

week.

9. NIGERIA: On 22 Jan 2020, eight crew members, kidnapped from Greek

tanker HAPPY LADY on 30 Dec, were released.

10. NIGERIA: On 21 Jan 2020, Panama-flagged container ship MSC GRACE

reported being attacked 20nm south of Bonny.

11. NIGERIA: On 20 Jan 2020, a merchant vessel reported being attacked

20nm south of Bonny.

12. BENIN: On 20 Jan 2020, Marshall Islands-flagged container ship ATLANTIC

DISCOVER reported being attacked75nm south-southwest of Cotonou,

Benin.

13. NIGERIA: On 19 Jan 2020, 19 of the 20 seafarers, kidnapped on 15 Dec

from the tanker DUKE, were released.

14. NIGERIA: On 16 Jan 2020, five armed pirates in a small craft approached

an underway tanker 52nm southwest of Bonny


15. In other parts of the world, there were no reported piracy and criminal

incidents against commercial shipping.

16. MALAYSIA: On 21 Jan 2020, armed men kidnapped five crew members

from the Malaysia-flagged fishing vessel, SSK 00543/F, 4nm northwest of

Tambisan, Sabah, Malaysia.

17. INDONESIA: On 21 Jan 2020, four men boarded the Indonesian tanker

HORIZON MARU in Kabil waters, eastern Batam Island, Indonesia.

18. The navies of China, Japan, India, Russia, Korea and Iran continue to

provide escort naval services to their flag vessels due to the continued

presence and danger posed Somalia-based piracy threats. These efforts

combined with the increased deployment of armed maritime marshals on

board commercial shipping have significantly reduce the success of

Somalia-based piracy in the HRA in hijacking commercial vessels of late

but not the presence of pirate groups operating in the HRA. International

Intelligence Agencies’ assessment is that existing presence of Somali-

based piracy threats can easily be translated to successful hijacks as were

experienced in 2009/2010/2011 by should these preventive measures be

eased off by all stakeholders.

19. Weather Conditions. High pressure dominates the weather pattern over

the region producing mostly clear skies. Tropical Cyclone 02A is

influencing all areas; expect increased winds and seas until 17 June.

Southwest monsoon conditions resume after and will continue until

September. Expect increased localized wind flow through the Strait of

Hormuz due to funnelling effects.

Instructions and Piracy Related News

20. Warning for Red Sea, Bab el-Mandab Straits and Gulf of Aden

20.1. There have been numerous attacks and suspicious approaches

reported near the southern entrance to the Bab el Mandeb Strait

during the reporting period. Levels of pirate activity in the Indian Ocean

remain elevated, with five hijacks reported since March 2017 (MT ARIS


13, CASAYR II NO.30, AL KAUSAR, SALAMA 1 and OS 35). The threat of

further attacks and hijacking remains high. All Masters are advised to

exercise heightened vigilance within the High Risk Area (HRA),

stringently implement BMP4 and liaise closely with embarked armed

security teams (AST) and regional authorities. If not making calls in

Yemen, it’s recommended by UKMTO that vessels should use the IRTC

and western lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the Bab el

Mandeb / southern Red Sea region, to provide a greater lee from

Yemen. Further such incidents and hijackings are likely to take place,

and all vessels transiting this region are advised to remain vigilant.

While international naval patrols and anti-piracy measures on-board

commercial vessels have practically eradicated Somali piracy since its

peak in early 2011, poverty coupled with other factors that motivate

pirates remain and some vessels transiting this region may have

increasingly become complacent in the belief that the piracy threat had

diminished.

20.2. While the international community has over the past several

years taken significant steps in order to improve security in the region,

including boosting naval forces in the area and requiring ships to take

protection measures, including reporting in and out of high risk areas,

sailing at top speed as far away as possible from the Somali coast and

travelling with armed escorts on-board, the threat of an attack and

hijacking remained as the real root of the cause on the ground in

Somalia has never been properly addressed. After five years without a

successful attack, analysts say that complacency may have set in and

this week’s successful hijacking is likely to result in potential copycat

attacks, as pirate action groups head-out in a bid to successfully hijack

a commercial vessel. Masters are advised to remain vigilant at all times

inside the HRA and are advised to adhere to strict guidance and

protective measures as set down in BMP5. Sailing yachts should avoid

transiting the HRA. Past activity has demonstrated that pirates will

attack both large and small yachts transiting this region. While

successful attacks and hijackings of merchant vessels have significantly

decreased over the past two years, the possibility of attacks and the

successful hijacking of sailing vessels continue to remain high. This is

due to the reduction of revenue sources from pirated merchant vessels

and the fact that sailing yachts are vulnerable and easier targets. PAG’s

continue to conduct “soft approaches” on merchant ships transiting the


area. Skiffs have approached vessels in order to probe the reaction of

the crewmembers and any possible Privately Contracted Armed

Security Personnel (PCASP) on-board. If the pirate approach does not

elicit a response, the pirates will likely proceed with an attack, in which

additional skiffs may participate. Vessels transiting the greater Gulf of

Aden region should operate under a heightened state of alert. This is

due to increasing tensions in the region, which in turn can escalate the

potential for direct or collateral damage to vessels transiting the region.

These threats may come from a number of different sources such as

missiles, projectiles, or waterborne improvised explosive devices.

Houthi rebels have claimed responsibility for the 1 October 2016 attack

on a UAE vessel.

20.3. UMS HQ advises all vessels transiting this region to report any

hostile activities immediately. Somali pirates have recently shown an

ability to mount hijacking expeditions far out into the Gulf of Aden and

the Indian Ocean, and inshore traffic might be an easier target.

EUNAVFOR spokesperson Commander Jacqui Sherriff said that the

recent series of attacks against commercial shipping again highlights

the need for vigilance and adherence to self-protection measures (by

the deployment of on-board AST) and compliance to Best Management

Practices (BMP) 5. It is crucial that Somali pirates are denied

opportunities to attack vessels so that there will no chance of a

successful hijack. One successful hijack is one hijack too many because

it will encourage and motivate more Somalis to taking up piracy!

20.4. CMF and EUNAVFOR and intelligence agencies have warned of

increased complacency amongst stakeholders which may give rise to

opportunities for piracy action groups and organizations funding piracy

activities to revive the threat. All stakeholders are advised to heed the

latest UN Report on Somalia and the possibility of the piracy threat

being resuscitated back to haunt the shipping community. The report

was shared in WETA No. 378 and WETA No. 379.

21. South Korea to Deploy Anti-Piracy Unit to the Strait of Hormuz

21.1. South Korea’s military said on Tuesday it plans to expand the

deployment of an anti-piracy unit now operating off the coast of Africa


to the area around the Strait of Hormuz, after the United States pressed

for help to guard oil tankers.

21.2. Attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz off the coast of

Iran last year prompted U.S. officials to call for allies to join a planned

maritime security mission. While South Korea, a key U.S. ally, will

deploy its forces to the area, including the Gulf, it will not officially be

joining a coalition of forces known as the International Maritime

Security Construct, the defense ministry said.

21.3. “The South Korean government decided to temporarily expand

the deployment of the Cheonghae military unit,” a ministry official told

reporters, adding that the step would ensure the safety of citizens and

free navigation of South Korean vessels.The decision to divert the navy

unit already in operation southwest of Arabia is a political compromise

that will not require fresh authorization by parliament ahead of an

election in April.

21.4. The Cheonghae unit will continue with its mission while it

cooperates with the coalition, the ministry said, adding that the United

States had been briefed on the decision, which was also explained to

the Iranians separately.

21.5. The Strait of Hormuz is a busy passageway into the Gulf, with

vessels sailing through it approximately 900 times a year for South

Korea, which gets more than 70% of its oil from the Middle East, the

defense ministry says. Sending troops to the area has been a politically

sensitive issue in South Korea ahead of the election. A survey by pollster

Realmeter last week showed 48.4% of South Koreans were opposed to

dispatching soldiers to the Strait, while 40.3% supported the idea.

21.6. Tuesday’s move was broadly supported by lawmakers although

some said it could risk Iran ties and the safety of South Koreans in the

region. A number of progressive activist groups issued a statement

criticizing the decision and said they will stage a protest in front of the

president’s office on Wednesday.

21.7. The Cheonghae unit has been stationed in the Gulf of Aden

since 2009, working to tackle piracy in partnership with African


countries as well as the United States and the European Union.The 302-

strong unit operates a 4,500-ton destroyer, a Lynx anti-submarine

helicopter and three speed boats, South Korea’s 2018 defense white

paper showed. Among its operations were the rescue of a South Korean

ship and its crew in 2011, shooting eight suspected pirates and

capturing five others in the incident. The South Korean troops have also

evacuated South Korean citizens from Libya and Yemen, and as of

November 2018 had escorted around 18,750 South Korean and

international vessels.

21.8. South Korea, the world’s fifth-largest crude oil importer and

one of Iran’s major oil customers, stopped importing Iranian crude from

May after waivers of U.S. sanctions ended at the start of that month.

(Reporting by Josh Smith and Sangmi Cha; Additional reporting by

Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Michael Perry, Clarence Fernandez and

Catherine Evans)

22. Where and Why Do Modern Pirate Attacks Happen?

22.1. When you hear about pirates, the first thing that probably

comes to mind is images of an era long past, with rebellious

swashbucklers gallivanting across the seven seas in search of treasure.

But piracy in the modern era takes a very different form, mostly in

regions where “weak states” are easily corruptible and scarce

economic opportunities in legal forms of work make piracy an

appealing alternative.

22.2. While maritime piracy has seen a decline since its height in

2010, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) still records hundreds

of pirate attacks each year with just over 200 in 2018 alone. Pirate

attacks largely occur in a few “hotspots” around the globe and are

driven by a number of factors ranging from corruption and institutional

weakness to fishing conditions and a lack of economic opportunities.

22.3. Pirate Attack “Hotspots”

22.3.1. According to Brandon Prins a professor of international

relations at the University of Tennessee Knoxville, the major

hotspots for piracy in Africa are the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of


Aden. In Southeast Asia, those hotspots are the Sulu and Celebes

seas as well as the Malacca Strait and Bangladesh.

22.3.2. Notable, however, is even in these hubs of pirate activity, the

rate of pirate attacks has largely declined. During the period

between 2009 and 2011, the IMB was recording more than 400

pirate attacks each year largely driven by Somali piracy. Since

then, attacks have returned to levels comparable to those of the

late 1990s before a slight uptick in the number of attacks last year

22.3.3. “If you compare [the amount of attacks] to something like 2009,

2010, 2011, then it has decreased and decreased

significantly…but the decrease is much larger as a result of this

abnormal increase in Somali piracy,” Prins said. “If you look at

piracy in 1998…you’re probably in the range of 200 to 250

incidents…Once the Somali piracy went away, you went back to

the more average or common amount of piracy.”

22.4. Root Causes of Piracy

22.4.1. Prins, who studies global piracy in partnership with the U.S.

Department of Defense, told The Globe Post there are a variety of

factors that correlate with the hotspots of pirate activity. One

such factor is “weak states” or governments that lack the

resources necessary to effectively combat piracy.

22.4.2. “Weak states,” according to Prins aren’t just associated with

piracy, but also political violence, insurgencies, and terrorism like

Boko Haram in Nigeria.

22.4.3. “There’s probably a connection between individuals that are

part of some kind of non-state violent groups, kind of rebellious

groups or insurgent groups like those in the Niger Delta, and so

members of those groups that are fighting against the state are

also engaged in piracy as well,” Prins said.

22.4.4. Such states have a hard time addressing problems with piracy

because they are economically weak and lack the resources

necessary to adequately challenge pirate attacks. Furthermore,


large populations of people suffer from poverty and joblessness,

which often makes piracy one of the few economically viable lines

of work.

22.4.5. “Governments just don’t have the capability of going out and

addressing this problem,” Prins said. “They don’t have enough

personnel and they don’t have enough vessels, be it Coast Guard

or naval vessels. These states tend to be corrupt as well … That

certainly applies to Nigeria, which is both a weak state, but also a

corrupt state.”

22.5. Piracy and Corruption in Nigeria

22.5.1. Associate Professor at the University of Massachusetts Boston

Darren Kew studies conflict and democracy in Nigeria and

described how corruption influences the relationship between

the Nigerian government and militant groups in the region

including pirates.

22.5.2. “Many individuals within the Nigerian government in positions

of responsibility for dealing with the security crisis are

themselves, in fact, corrupt and are engaged in negotiation

relationships with many of the militant bands, both pirates and on

the onshore militancy groups,” Kew told The Globe Post.

22.5.3. According to Kew, these corrupt relationships take shape in the

form of regulators “selling their oversight” for funding and

security officers who sell weapons or look the other way during

pirate attacks in exchange for kickbacks.

22.5.4. “It’s a fairly stable system in the sense that I think these

bargaining relationships lead to deals being made,” Kew said.

“Generally speaking, there is a tremendous amount of money,

weaponry, oil in particular, and other goods that are moving

through these offshore dark economies.”

22.6. When Economic Prospects are Grim, Piracy Thrives


22.6.1. Prins listed some other factors that contribute to maritime

piracy including economic weakness, poverty, joblessness,

political violence, large populations, and proximity to major trade

lanes which creates the opportunity for piracy. One example of

how this works in practice is the research of Sebastian Axbard who

studied how fishing conditions correlated with the rate of pirate

attacks in Indonesia.

22.6.2. “When you have good oceanographic conditions, you have

more fish and higher incomes for the fishermen and as a

consequence, you also have a lower number of piracy attacks,”

Axbard told The Globe Post. “It really seems to be this income

channel that’s important in this setting and because of

environmental shocks, fishermen in my study are not able to reap

the benefits from fishing, so they turn to this other potential

income source which is engaging in piracy attacks.”

22.6.3. According to Axbard, not only does is research highlight a

connection between income opportunities for fishermen and

piracy, but could also have potentially important implications for

how we interpret the consequences of climate change, which is

projected to change global fishing conditions.

23. It Still Exists Today Piracy Is Not a Thing of the Past

23.1. The maritime piracy has not disappeared from the oceans of the

world. It continues to scourge, in our own hemisphere, the Caribbean

Sea and the coasts of Central America, where centuries ago European

pirates made fortunes. However, the epicenter of the activity is today

around Somalia, in the African continent and in recent year in West

Africa.

23.2. The issue is part of the international peace and security agenda

of the United Nations Security Council, an organization that has just

renewed, on the American initiative, an express resolution on the

matter. The decision is correct since, as of October 2018, near the

capital of that country, there have been repeated attacks on fishing

vessels, with kidnapping of their respective crews, which have been


confronted with some degree of success by the coalition of warships

provided by the European Union.

23.3. The Security Council resolution, at the request of Somalia itself,

allows foreign warships to operate on the coasts of that country, facing

pirate forces, both at sea and on land.

23.4. The international norm calls for all other states to criminalize

maritime piracy and to imprison those of their executors who are

captured. Despite the fact that the issue has been under discussion for

some years, the proposal of the Russian Federation to organize, in

Somali territory, specialized piracy courts, with substantive

international participation, continues, unfortunately, without having

been implemented.

23.5. Confirming the above, there have been many kidnappings of

ships by pirates on the seafront of Nigeria. In some cases, they capture

their crew in exchange for juicy bailouts. In others, the Nigerian Navy

rescue teams achieve liberation, although at the cost of clashes with

blood and fire. The problems of piracy in Nigeria will persist as long as

foreign PMSCs are banned from being deployed on-board vessels to

provide close-in protection to vessels and crew members.

24. West Africa. Haven for Pirates

24.1. The world needs to wake up to the shipping crisis happening in

the waters of West Africa. West Africa is the hub of maritime crime and

human suffering in the shipping industry yet calls for coordinated

responses like those seen in the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean have

so far fallen on deaf ears. West Africa does not have the volume of

traffic as the Indian ocean does.

24.2. In 2019 there were nearly 6 times as many incidents than in the

Indian Ocean for the same period.

24.3. Kidnappings represent 23% of all recorded incidents in 2019.

24.4. Whilst overall incidents are reducing there was a 75% increase

in kidnapping incidents in 2019 compared to 2018.


24.5. Hijacked incidents have risen by 33% but overall account for less

than 7% of incidents within West Africa.

25. Pirates Now Prefer Human Hostages Over Ships and Cargo

25.1. Rohan Ruparelia still has flashbacks from his kidnapping three

years ago—and every time he hears news about pirate attacks, he fears

for the victims. For the last few months, the merchant seaman from

Mumbai has been studying at East Coast College in Lowestoft, England,

in hope of reaching the rank of chief officer when he returns to sea next

year. Life is quiet in the small North Sea town—the way Ruparelia likes

it. That’s also the reason he loves being out at sea. “I don’t like crowds

or too many people around or too much chaos,” he says. “It’s about

solitude. I enjoy that.” But the word from the high seas hasn’t been

calming.

25.2. There have been two large-scale acts of piracy in the waters off

West Africa this month alone. On Dec. 3, 19 people were taken hostage

when hijackers attacked the oil tanker Nave Constellation as it was

anchored off the coast of Nigeria. In the first nine months of 2019, more

than 100 ships around the world were assaulted by pirates, with most

of the hostage-taking occurring in the broad Gulf of Guinea—shared by

Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Cameroon. According to

the International Maritime Bureau, about 86% of the incidents

worldwide took place there. The hijacking of the Nave Constellation is

just one of the latest attacks, says Max Williams, chief operation officer

of security firm Africa Risk Compliance Ltd. “There’s been a spate in the

last 40 days of quite significant maritime security incidents in the area.”

25.3. Ruparelia knows about piracy in the area firsthand. In a single

hijacking in the Gulf of Guinea, he was held prisoner by two sets of

kidnappers. When the negotiations with his ship’s owners didn’t go the

captors’ way, he was beaten. He wasn’t allowed to sleep. He was told

to stand up and stay still as bullets were fired around his feet. Once, he

was stripped naked and made to stand outside in the rain for hours.

“People have this fear; they live in the fear of death. But continuously

being told: ‘I will kill you, I will kill you, I will kill you, I will kill you’…. I

was like, ‘you better kill me, or I will kill you’.”


25.4. “Piracy is a business,” says John Steed of the Hostage Support

Partnership. “And the investors are still putting money in the business.”

He adds, “As piracy is reduced in East Africa, piracy in West Africa and

Southeast Asia has increased.” It feeds off the enormous amount of

global ship traffic, with 11 billion tons shipped internationally in 2018.

Says James Gosling, a consultant for Holman Fenwick Willan’s London

office who was awarded an Order of the British Empire by the Queen

for his work on releasing hostages: “If you ask the average person in

this country where their fridge comes from they would just say the

supermarket. They don’t realize we import 90% of our stuff.”

25.5. Violent attacks targeting crew rather than the ship or its cargo

are on the rise. Munro Anderson, a partner at maritime security firm

Dryad Global, says pirates in West Africa have decided that “actually it’s

more worthwhile to conduct high-risk operations where you target a

vessel, you kidnap the crew, and you get a high payoff.’’ Anderson says

that Dryad has seen negotiation payments ranging from around

$18,000 to half a million dollars. Piracy in West Africa—and defending

against it—cost an estimated $818.1 million in 2017, with contracted

maritime security the biggest expense, according to Oceans Beyond

Piracy, a program commissioned by One Earth Future.

25.6. The time hostages are held as prisoners varies drastically across

the world. Maritime security firm Ambrey expects the Nave

Constellation seafarers to remain hostages for around 28 days. In

Somalia, victims have been held for more than four years, says Chirag

Bahri, a regional director for the International Seafarers’ Welfare and

Assistance Network. Three Iranian men, captured in 2015 from the FV

Siraj, are still prisoners there, he says. Steed, who worked to free

hostages from the FV Siraj, says, “because these are Iranians, nobody

really cares.” His organization did recently manage to free one Iranian

FV Siraj crew member. The reason: His health was rapidly deteriorating

and was losing value as a hostage for ransom.

25.7. Ruparelia’s experience was a mixture of efficiency, comedy, and

terror. When the attack started, he was standing on the navigation

bridge at the top of the Panamanian-flagged Maximus, learning how to

navigate with the third officer. The crew had been trading diesel in the


region, and the ship was drifting in waters off of Ivory Coast that were

marked safe at the time by maritime organizations. The hijackers were

“very, very organized,” he recalls. “They knew what they were doing.”

25.8. They descended on the ship and gunshots ripped through the

air. He and the third officer ran to warn the other sailors to head for the

“citadel,” a safe place at the heart of the ship which, once locked, would

keep anyone out. Thirteen men managed to get inside, but five were

captured by the pirates, who then forced the others in the citadel to

surrender. Within seven days the pirates had repainted the tanker’s

name and given false information to the Togo Navy, whose waters the

ship had traveled to in the meantime.

25.9. Things began to fall apart when the ship passed into Nigerian

jurisdiction. That country sent a warship to shadow the tanker. At that

point, some of the hijackers decided to take Ruparelia and one of his

Pakistani crewmates off the ship and attempt to get back to shore in a

skiff. As Rohan watched his ship sail away from him, he laughed. He was

floating somewhere in the Gulf of Guinea between Ghana and Nigeria,

crammed into a small row boat between nine other men, eight of

whom were pirates. None of them knew how to get to shore, or even

in which direction the shore was. “I was actually laughing at the turn of

events,” Ruparelia says.

25.10. The Nigerian Navy boarded the Maximus and freed the

captured crew after an exchange of gunfire with the pirates stayed on

the ship. Meanwhile, Ruparelia, his colleague, and the other pirates

were at sea for five days without food or water before landing on the

coast of Nigeria. Foraging through trash for food, the hostages and

hostage-takers asked for shelter at the first house they came to. One of

the owners, suspecting foul play, left and came back with what

Ruparelia describes as the local mafia. Very quickly, all 10 men were

prisoners. “I mean the ones who kidnapped us got kidnapped; it was

funny,” he says.

25.11. As it turned out, the original pirates were impossible to ransom

for money and Ruparelia and his colleague found themselves the sole

captives, falling into the secondary market for pirate hostages. They

were taken to the house of “John,” the leader of the group that had


wrested them from their first captors. Next to John’s house was a room

with no windows where the sailors would be imprisoned. Then, the

hostage negotiations began.

25.12. Negotiations with pirates are “all very much the same,” says

Gosling. “They ask for a ridiculous price and depending on your assets

you have to start lower and eventually you agree somewhere in the

middle—and unfortunately you have to bargain, even though people’s

lives are at stake. Otherwise it never ends.”

25.13. Every day, Ruparelia was let out of the room to speak on the

phone to his operations manager, employed by the shipowner, to

attempt to negotiate a ransom. The rest of his time was spent in

darkness. Each day, the men were given a bowl of rice to share. Each

day, too, they experienced yelled threats or bullets flying at their feet.

Then, abruptly, the phone calls stopped. For days the men heard

nothing. John had gone into town, and in the meantime the violence

against the prisoners increased. “For those four days we were at the

mercy of his men, and they did not care how they hit us.”

25.14. John returned one morning and took the two prisoners into his

house. He asked them if they would like a chocolate drink. Ruparelia

became very afraid. Then, John asked him what he would like for

breakfast. “He actually made me an omelet. He did. Then he told me

that ‘today is a good day. I am going to be paid, and you are going to be

freed.’”

25.15. The relief was immense. But the trauma has not faded. In the

three years since, Ruparelia says, “every single day I remember a bit of

it, there is something that flashes in front of me.” Around 26% of former

hostages show symptoms consistent with PTSD, says Conor Seyle,

Director of Research for One Earth Future, who co-authored a report

on the long term impact of piracy on seafarers. “Everything from the

attack itself to the hostage experience if they’re captured can trigger

long-lasting psychological impact in seafarers, and also in their

families.” Bahri of the sea farers network survived an eight-month

kidnapping himself. “Every minute, every second, is kind of a torture,”

he says of his 2010 ordeal. “You’re just surviving.”


25.16. “People are resilient, though,” says Seyle, “and that’s certainly

true for seafarers.” Ruparelia underwent one session of counseling but

he and his adviser both agree he is fit to return to sea. His Pakistani

crewmate was also judged to be all right and has since gone back to

work on a ship. Ruparelia chooses to stay positive. “Maybe someone

else would not have survived,” he says. “Maybe it happened to me

because I could survive it. Maybe. Let’s take it that way.” —With

William Clowes

26. Unlike the presence and substantial involvement of international navies,

numbering more than 25 countries and the legit deployment of armed

security team (AST) on-board commercial vessels transiting the East Africa

and Indian Ocean HRA, the situation in the West Africa HRA is about just

the opposite. Nigerian government laws and regulations prohibit the

deployment of ASTs other than those brokered by local security

companies that used personnel from the Navy which the government has

declared as not supported by it. Besides the Nigerian Navy, there is also

no other naval forces that provides security and deterrence to the pirates

managed by criminal syndicates operating from Nigeria. In other words,

the waters and ports around Nigeria are almost a perfect hunting ground

for the local criminal syndicates. Given this situation, the threat of piracy

at this point of time is higher and more dangerous than that posed by

Somali pirates in the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA, although

depending on the continued presence of the navies of EUNAVFOR and

CMF and the other independent naval forces and the continued used of

on-board ASTs, the situation may quickly reverse. Somali pirates still have

the intent, skills, and resources to attack merchant ships.

27. Fundamentally naval forces and intelligence agencies have repeatedly

called for continued vigilance and preparedness in the fight against the

threat of piracy at both the East Africa and Indian Ocean HRA and the

West Africa HRA. Ignoring these warnings is to place one’s business,

vessels and crew members at risk!

28. UMS HQ therefore advises all stakeholders never to take the security and

safety of their vessels and crew members for granted. CURRENT LOW

PIRACY THREAT doesn’t mean NO PIRACY THREAT!


29. Remember Always “Be Vigilant, Be Safe and Never Be Sorry”

30. UMS HQ wishes all our clients, Masters, Team Leaders and

Maritime Marshals, a Very Prosperous and Happy Lunar New

Year! GONG XI FA CAI!

LTA (NS) Anthony Lim

Assistant Operations Officer

Universal Maritime Solutions

HP: +65 97581690

Documents

WEEKLY THREAT ADVISORY NO. 437 … · Universal Maritime Solutions Pte Ltd No. 21 Bukit Batok Crescent, WCEGA Tower, #28-70, Singapore 658065 5. On Aug 17, UKMTO issued ADVISORY NOTICE