#3 Paper 1 – 2011

Paper 1 – Peacemaking, peacekeeping – International Relations 1918–36Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses…; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the enforcements of the provisions of the treaties, disarmament and the London Naval Conference (1930).

SOURCE A – Statement by US president H. Hoover at a press conference about the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, 22 July 1930. Taken from “The American Presidency Project” (online).

I shall have the gratification [pleasure] of signing the naval treaty this afternoon at 3 o’clock. With the ratification by the other governments the treaty will translate an emotion deep in the hearts of millions of men and women into a practical fact of government and international relations. It will renew again the faith of the world in the moral forces of goodwill and patient negotiation as against the blind forces of suspicion and competitive armament. It will mark a further long step toward lifting the burden of militarism from the backs of mankind and to speed the march forward of world peace. It will lay the foundations upon which further constructive reduction in world arms may be accomplished in the future. We should, by this act of willingness to join with others in limiting armament, have dismissed from the mind of the world any notion that the United States entertains ideas of aggression, imperial power, or exploitation of foreign nations.

SOURCE B – Extract from British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy 1900–1936 by Phillips Payson O’Brien, 1998. The author is a lecturer in Modern History at the University of Glasgow, UK.

With the first London Naval Conference the naval arms race control process reached its apex [peak]. Parity [equality] between America and Britain was agreed to for every type of warship while Japan had accepted a smaller ratio for every category except submarines. The tragedy of the London Conference is that while it marked a considerable success in the arms control process, it was not a lasting achievement. Within six years naval arms control would be at an end. No ships were scrapped and naval construction increased markedly after the conference. It must also be kept in mind that the London Naval Treaty was a temporary agreement. The British were careful to tell the Americans that the London agreements extended only until 1935, after which the Royal Navy “would have to have more cruisers”. Also, when the French and the Italians chose not to sign the London agreements the British inserted a clause which would enable them to withdraw.

SOURCE C – Cartoon published in British magazine Punch in 1929, depicting US president H. Hoover and British prime minster R. MacDonald (both standing), Italian prime minister B Mussolini and French foreign minister A. Briand (both sitting). Take from Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1923-1933 by Richard W Fanning, 1955.

SOURCE D – Extract from The Lights that Failed by Zara Steiner, 2005.

Neither the Italians nor the French signed the new limitation pact. France and Italy shared a common land border and were colonial rivals in North Africa. Relations, particularly since Mussolini had taken power, were uneasy, if not strained. For the Italians, lagging far behind the French, the navy became more than a status symbol; it would herald [signal] the building of the new empire. The French argued that if parity [equality] was conceded, the Italians could concentrate their fleet in the Mediterranean and achieve local naval superiority as the French fleet was dispersed through the Mediterranean, the English Channel, and North Atlantic.

The London Naval Treaty of 1930, with only three signatures to its key provisions, represented the high point of inter-war naval limitation; it could not be extended and could not be maintained. There were unique political reasons that had made the apparent compromise possible: American reluctance to translate financial power into naval might; the British decision to cut back on naval construction; and the continuing conservatism of the government in Tokyo.

SOURCE E – Extract from a speech by Winston Churchill to the British House of Commons, 2 June 1930.

This conference is the supreme failure of all conferences. We have seen what it does for our naval defence. But what of other countries? France and Italy – their relations have been definitely worsened. There was no particular assertion of naval competition but, by bringing this on to the table, you have compelled both these nations to assert a demand for absolute parity [equality] which will undoubtedly lead to large naval expenditure. There is tension created between America and Japan which did not exist three months ago. And what of Anglo–American friendship? It is important, as I believe it is the foundation of future safety. And after five years of this it will all have to be done over again. Once again the Great Powers will meet around the table, having focused their attention upon these details, and compare their naval power more. This time, in 1935, our navy will be definitely and finally weaker. I cannot think that it is a wise course of policy for us to pursue.

1. (a) What, according to Source B, was the significance of the 1930 London Naval Conference? (3 marks)

(b) What is the message con eyed by Source C? (2 marks)

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources D and E about the London Naval Conference. (6 marks)

3. With reference to their origin, purpose, and content, assess the value and limitations of Source A for historians studying the 1930 London Naval Conference. (4 marks)

4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the extent to which you agree with the view that the London Naval Conference was unsuccessful. (9 marks)

Answers – Markscheme

1. (a) What, according to Source B, was the significance of the 1930 London Naval Conference? It was the apex of the naval arms race control process; Parity (equality) between America and Britain was agreed to for every type of warship; Japan had accepted a smaller ratio for every category except submarines; Although it did not last, it marked a considerable success in the disarmament process; When the French and the Italians did not sign the treaty Britain inserted a clause that would allow it to withdraw.

1. (b) What is the message conveyed by Source C? The cartoon shows the lack of enthusiasm of Italy and France for the Conference. It also shows the hostility between them, as their leaders are pictured looking at one another suspiciously across a table; It shows good relations between Great Britain and the US who are portrayed arm in arm and demonstrating enthusiasm about the prospects of disarmament; The fact that Britain and the US are standing could also be interpreted as an indication of them taking a lead in disarmament conferences.

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources D and E about the London Naval Conference. Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required.

Marks Level Descriptor5-6 • The response includes clear and valid points of comparison and of contrast.3-4 • The response includes some valid points of comparison and/or of contrast, although these points

may lack clarity.1-2 • The response consists of description of the content of the source(s), and/or general comments

about the source(s), rather than valid points of comparison or of contrast.0 • The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors above.

Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required.

For “compare” They both make criticisms of the London Naval Agreement of 1930; Both recognise strains in the relations between France and Italy; Both consider the Treaty to have limited duration. For “contrast” Source E is more critical of the agreement than Source D; Source D addresses some of the reasons why the agreement was made possible; Source E only focuses on effects; Source E focuses on how the agreement could affect Britain in a negative way; Source D offers a more general perspective of the effects; Source E mentions tension between the US and Japan; Source D makes no reference to this.

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A for historians studying the 1930 London Naval Conference.

Source A Origin: Statement by US president Herbert Hoover at a press conference on 22 July 1930.

Purpose: To inform that the US government is signing the treaty on that day. To explain why the US government is supporting the treaty.

Value: It’s an official communication recorded at the time the treaty was made and shows the views of the president of the United States on the significance of the Naval Treaty. This speech offers the rationale of the US government’s public position at this point in time.

Limitations: As a statement to the press, the speech could be serving the purpose of justifying US foreign policy before opposition to the government and before public opinion.

The focus of the question is on the value and limitations of the source. If only value or limitations are discussed, award a maximum of [2]. Origin, purpose and content should be used as supporting evidence to make relevant comments on the value and limitations. For [4] there must be at least one reference to each of them in either the value or the limitations.

4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, discuss the extent to which you agree with the view that the London Naval Conference was unsuccessful.

Marks Level DescriptorsFocus Use of sources Our knowledge

7-9 The response is focused on the question.

Clear references are made to the sources, and these references are used effectively as evidence to support the analysis.

Accurate and relevant own knowledge is demonstrated. There is effective synthesis of own knowledge and source material.

4-6 The response is generally focused on the question.

References are made to the sources, and these references are used as evidence to support the analysis.

Where own knowledge is demonstrated, this lacks relevance or accuracy. There is little or no attempt to synthesize own knowledge and source material.

1-3 The response lacks focus on the question.

References to the sources are made, but at this level these references are likely to consist of descriptions of the content of the sources rather than the sources being used as evidence to support the analysis.

No own knowledge is demonstrated or, where it is demonstrated, it is inaccurate or irrelevant.

0 The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors above.

The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors above.

The response does not reach a standard described by the descriptors above

Apply the markbands that provide the “best fit” to the responses given by candidates and award credit wherever it is possible to do so. The following material is an indication of what candidates may elect to write about in their responses. It is neither prescriptive nor exhaustive and no set answer is required. While it is expected that there will be coverage of at least two of the sources, candidates are not required to refer to all four sources in their responses.

Source material Source A: The source believes that the conference was a success as it produced a treaty that would improve international relations by limiting armaments.

Source B: The source acknowledges achievements in the negotiations (parity between America and Britain; Japanese acceptance of a smaller ratio). However, it also states that “No ships were scrapped and naval construction increased markedly after the conference”. It mentions that the British would need more cruisers after 1935 and had included a clause allowing them to withdraw, which indicates uncertainty about the Conference’s success.

Source C: The source shows that even before the conference had taken place, there was suspicion and lack of enthusiasm among participants. It portrays the tense relations between France and Italy over naval disarmament. Only Britain and the US seem to have reasons to celebrate the conference.

Source D: The source refers to the rivalry between France and Italy and how it affected negotiations over naval disarmament. It also mentions the fact that the Treaty could not be extended nor maintained and was a product of very particular circumstances rather than political will to achieve disarmament.

Source E: The source is very critical of the conference. It considers that it had a negative impact on British naval defence, and that it damaged relations between France and Italy as well as those between the US and Japan. It mentions that the conference’s terms had a limited duration and that negotiations would be more difficult in 1935. It believes Britain would be in a weaker position to negotiate at that time.

Own knowledge

Relative successes: Some level of agreement was reached, such as a 10:10:7 ratio between the US, Britain and Japan; an agreement not to build capital ship replacements between 1931 and 1936 was reached; negotiations in areas such as the size and numbers of vessels each nation was allowed to have shown some success; the treaty also set some restrictions on submarine warfare; also the funds which were saved by the governments could be used to contribute to other areas of their economies affected by the Great Depression.

Failures: The impact of the treaty on Japanese politics contributed to increased nationalism and militarism which eventually led to the withdrawal of Japan from the naval disarmament system; the failure of further negotiations between Italy and France; the treaty allowed escalation of weapons if there was an act of aggression by a non-signatory country; and further details on the negative impact of the treaty on the British Navy. The Anglo–German Naval Agreement (1935) also indicates the limited success of the treaty.