SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1272, 26 November, 2015      27-11-2015 12:49AM ET

Duplicitous policiesWhen it comes to Egypt, there is no sympathy when it is the victim of terrorism. Why? Because the West still bristles that Egypt ejected the Muslim Brotherhood, writes Ayman Abdel-Wahab

Wreckage of the Russian plane in Sharm El-Sheikh Print Email

The Russian plane crash in Sinai is a reminder of the challenges that Egypt has faced since 30 June 2013, and the international pressures that it has had to deal with.

Compare the international reaction to the Russian plane crash with that to the recent attacks in Paris and you’ll get the point. In Egypt’s case, accusations came thick and fast. In France’s case, there was an outpouring of sympathy, offers of help and pledges of solidarity.

Then another attack took place in Mali, with gunmen taking hostages in a hotel. Again, pledges of

support and words of sympathy.

None of that occurred in Egypt’s case. A plane crashed and everyone jumped to conclusions. The US and the UK both reacted with accusations, even before the Russians said anything. Suddenly, the crash was the result of terror, and Egypt was responsible for it. It was our fault that terror targeted us, the jury concluded.

At least the Russians took their time. Then they too joined the parade of premature conclusions, cancelled flights and evacuated nationals.

Egypt was faulted without a moment’s hesitation. It was faulted once for wanting to hold a full investigation before announcing the results, and again for being a victim of terror. And the sad thing is that there is nothing new about it — it is part of a trend.

The Western reaction to the plane crash must be viewed in the light of its policies toward Egypt in general. Since Egypt overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood, it has become a legitimate target for all sorts of accusations, denied assistance and reprimanded every step of the way.

The recent backlash against Egypt in connection with the plane crash has nothing to do with the plane crash and everything to do with international bias and misjudgement. When it comes to fighting terror, international policy is simply duplicitous.

It all depends on who is being targeted, and what the outcome is for them. When Paris is targeted, it is a clear threat to the West. But when Egypt is threatened, the West has to think twice about it.

As a result, the international effort to fight terror has been erratic, tainted with the desire to reshape the map of the Middle East, influenced by who is in power and how pliant they are willing to be. Egypt has been on the wrong side of this equation, first by overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood, and then by trying to hold on to its stability amid growing regional turbulence.

In some Western circles, hope persists that the region will acquire a new map, with fewer nation states and more mini-states created along sectarian and ethnic line. This scheme, created with the

interests of Israel and Turkey in mind, is still too attractive to abandon. And Egypt, since it rid itself of the Muslim Brotherhood, is not playing along.

Some Western countries, France in particular, are willing to act seriously in the confrontation with the Islamic State (IS) group. But it is clear that part of the reason IS has survived so far is that not everyone is willing to see its end — not yet, at least.

The horrors committed by IS are helping to fragment the region in just the same way that politicians who advocated “creative chaos” a few years ago were hoping to see.

The international outpouring of sympathy for Paris contrasts with the lack of analysis on why IS has survived so far, and why so little has been done to encircle and destroy it, along with other like-minded groups.

The official statements that came from the West in the aftermath of the Paris attacks acknowledge the danger of extremist groups, but fail to address the reason they have flourished in the first place.

The West, apparently, is willing to focus its attention on protecting itself from IS, but when it comes to Egypt — which is facing threats from extremist groups, including those friendly with the Muslim Brotherhood — there is no hurry.

One would have thought that measures would be put in place to rid the region of radical Islamist groups. One would have thought that these measures would involve close cooperation with regional powers, especially Egypt. But no such luck.

When it comes to fighting terror, too many things get in the way: the ambitions of regional powers, reluctance of superpowers, jockeying by local groups, and also the friendship that some radical organisations, the Muslim Brotherhood included, have developed with international players.

Egypt’s overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood still rankles those Western powers that developed a taste for this particular group, and had hoped to use the Muslim Brotherhood as a spearhead in their regional plans. Scenarios for reshaping the region were toppled along with the Muslim Brotherhood.

And the culprit, Egypt, had to be punished.

The international community may clamour against the horrors of IS, but its planners still bemoan Egypt’s revolt against political Islam. This should come as no surprise. Political Islam has for years championed the cause of Western intelligence. Back in Afghanistan, it helped derail the Russians.

Now it is shredding to pieces the very region Western planners want to reinvent in a more malleable form, made of small mosaic pieces, coloured with ethnicity and bedecked with sectarianism. A region that would be easy to handle, a region that would be easy to divide, a region that would keep Western states happy and their local allies satisfied.

Egypt was ostracised for spoiling the fun, but for a while at least there seemed to be a way out. Its roadmap was going well, and a few Western capitals acknowledged the accomplishments the country has made over the past year and a half.

Then the Russian plane came crashing down, along with hopes for international fairness. Now the country that has stood like no other against political Islam, the root of all radical Islamist terror, is once again in the dock. We’re accused of not fighting terror hard enough, or well enough, or at all.

Again, compare Egypt’s position with that of France. French politicians didn’t blame Belgium for being the conduit for the terrorists who attacked Paris. They didn’t seek the cancellation of the Schengen visa. They took draconian measures after the attacks. No one can blame them, and no one did.

But in Egypt, we were accused, even as investigations remained inconclusive, of being lax in security, of letting terrorists through, and slammed with negative media and flight bans. There has been no mention of how hard we’ve been fighting Islamist extremists, not only in Sinai but all over the country. There has been no sympathy.

While Egypt was being criticised over its human rights record in Sinai, France’s stringent measures were considered business as usual. While Egypt was being slammed for being soft on terror, Muslim Brotherhood officials were given shelter and a voice in foreign capitals.

To this day, the US and Europe defend the Muslim Brotherhood, portraying the group as a political minority that has been deprived of its legitimate rights. To this day, the US and Europe refuse to acknowledge the close links between the Muslim Brotherhood and hard-line militants, including those active in and outside Sinai.

Let’s admit it, the US has dragged out the war on terror for reasons of strategy, to get a better grip on the region and nourish a new generation of allies. Some of this may have been to the advantage of terror groups, including IS.

The US has withheld economic assistance to Egypt and is still putting pressure on its government to give another chance to the Muslim Brotherhood and its friends to destabilise the country. It is all a game of double standards, one in which the rhetoric coming from Western capitals contrasts with their actions and intentions in the region.

 But Egypt cannot afford to be duplicitous in return. We must continue to fight terror and show others that it can be defeated. And we have to keep our hand extended, even to those who doubt us, mistrust us and try to outsmart us.

Do not expect the current pressure on Egypt to go away any time soon. For us, the most important thing is to streamline our political process, build up our institutions and, at some point in the future, engage the US and others in constructive dialogue.

We must remain focused on strengthening our state, our economy and our stability. This is the first line of defence against terror.

The writer is chief editor of Ahwal Masriya and director of the Egyptian Regime Studies Unit at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.

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Issue No.1272, 26 November, 2015      26-11-2015 10:46AM ET

Saudi conference on SyriaSaudi Arabia has announced that it will be holding a conference on Syria in December in what may be a promising development for the embattled country, writes Bassel Oudat in Damascus

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On 14 November, Vienna hosted a third conference on the crisis in Syria, this one designed to help the Syrian opposition form a unified delegation for talks with the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad that may take place by 1 January 2016.

This has turned out to be a thorny issue, since for the past four and a half years the Syrian opposition has done everything but unite. And as the international community presses for peace talks in the country, members of opposition groups have not finished squabbling.

According to leaks from Vienna, three lists were proposed for a possible opposition delegation. The Russians, Americans and Arabs all came up with competing lists, but none cheered the opposition.

The Russian list was said to be too friendly to the regime, the American was too dominated by liberals, and the Arab favoured former regime officials, including dissident vice-president Farouk al-Sharaa, it was said.

No one is sure what criteria were used in making the selections, making it unclear who would emerge to decide the country’s future.

In order to allow the opposition time to organise, Saudi Arabia has announced that it will host a conference on the country in Riyadh on 15 December, with all members of the opposition taking part.

The Saudis intend to invite all the country’s opposition groups, both political and military, to the conference, in addition to civil society representatives, officials from humanitarian relief organisations and independent figures. About 30 opposition armed groups are expected to attend.

The invitation has been favourably received by most opposition members, and UN envoy to Syria

Staffan de Mistura has offered his blessings to the Saudi move, saying it offers the opposition a real chance to develop a unified strategy.

In all, 300 opposition members are expected to go to Riyadh. Of these, a delegation of about 30 will be selected to negotiate with the regime. The negotiations are expected to remain within the framework set by the criteria spelled out during the Geneva and Vienna Conferences.

On the face of it, the new initiative may look like any of the failed attempts of the past few years to find a solution to the Syrian crisis – an act born out of wishful thinking and destined to crumble at the first row at the negotiating table.

But this may not be the case. For the first time in years, every major power involved in Syria is now truly interested in a solution. Russia, fully involved in the crisis, does not want to get bogged down in the country, and Europe, shocked by recent horrors, also wants to see a deal.

Having recently made a deal with Iran, the US is now willing to give Syria the attention it deserves.

Moreover, the Saudis seem more determined than ever to achieve a deal. In recent talks, they stood up to Russia, making it clear that the Syrian opposition, not the regime, must take the lead in deciding the country’s future.

Syrian opposition figure Mohamed Shouk is optimistic about the prospects of the Saudi conference. “If Saudi Arabia is hosting the conference, it will not allow it to fail,” he said.

“Saudi Arabia is in touch with everyone. It is coordinating with its allies, and its king recently conferred with the US, Turkish and Russian presidents. Such a long-awaited conference, so crucial to local, regional and international groups, cannot be allowed to fail.”

Opposition figure Walid Al-Binni advises the opposition to send two delegations to the talks: a military delegation to discuss ceasefire arrangements and a political delegation to discuss the shape of the future political system.

According to Al-Binni, only the military groups can make a ceasefire hold. The political delegation must focus on elections and a new constitution, he said.

“Any party participating in the ceasefire negotiations must have the ability to make it stick. Therefore, the discussions must be conducted by the regime and its supporters on the one hand and the armed opposition and its supporters on the other,” Al-Binni said.

“The political opposition should focus on the new constitution, the elections and the shape of the future state.”

Meanwhile, bickering within the opposition continues unabated. The key group, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), wants to take the lead in the talks, but other groups have contested its credentials.

Among the armed groups, the situation is hardly more reassuring. Many of the fighting groups have allied themselves with diverse backers and by now have developed conflicting agendas.

This bickering among the opposition groups has cost the country dearly and has lost the opposition the trust of the public and the respect of foreign backers. Imposters and opportunists have joined its ranks. Gold-diggers and slogan-peddlers have jumped on the bandwagon, and fortune-seekers have edged sincere figures off the scene.

With the Saudis now at the helm, the opposition should shed its petty differences. If it is able to do so, the country may be one step closer to ending its ordeal.

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Issue No.1272, 26 November, 2015      26-11-2015 10:44AM ET

Erdogan puts Davutoglu in the shadowsErdogan continues to press ahead with his cult of personality, despite the Turkish constitution that remains in force, writes Sayed Abdel-Meguid

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Bir varmish, bir yokmush (as the “Once upon a time” of Turkish fairy tales goes) the deification of the “leader” (that familiar trademark of totalitarian regimes) was a distant memory.

For decades, after shaking off the dust of a decrepit caliphate, Turkey stood tall and proud as a pioneering democracy in a region filled with theocracies and dictatorships. True, its democracy was not without structural flaws.

But there was rotation of authority, fair competition between political parties, and parliamentary elections without intimidation at the polls, substituted ballot boxes, or electricity blackouts on polling day.

But then the three-party coalition government of Bülent Ecevit (consisting of the Democratic Left Party, Motherland Party and Nationalist Movement Party) fell following the early general elections that were held in November 2002. The winner was the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and the handover was done in a civilised manner.

Sadly, much has changed since then. Nowadays, when your average observer hears someone say that Turkey is a byword for freedom and democracy, his/her eyebrows shoot up because stark realities tell otherwise.

Not a day goes by without several appearances of the leader in newspaper headlines and on state-run television stations. Any stray media outlets that fail to follow suit or, worse, which voice criticism are booted off satellites, confiscated or shut down, and their owners, managers and journalists are rounded up, dragged before the courts and tossed into jail.

It’s not for nothing that Turkey plummeted from 99th in 2002 to 154th in 2014 in the World Press Freedom Index.

As though a piece were missing in the portrait of the glorious leader and sole bulwark against the deluge of anarchy and instability, Turkish media this autumn trumpeted the joyful tidings of the forthcoming film, Reis. “Reis” in Turkish means “chief” or “leader” and, yes, the film is a biographical narrative of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Coming soon to a theatre near you.

But try to be patient. Filming is to begin in December on this project that follows the life of Erdogan from the time he was a six-year-old boy until he became mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s, before being prosecuted and sentenced to a brief prison term on the grounds of publicly reciting a poem that was held to incite hatred, strife and national disunity.

The film’s director is Ali Avci, who said, “Like it or not, the reality is that Erdogan is the leader of the last quarter of a century. With these films, we will see the spirit of the reis; we will get to know the reis.”

Not that Erdogan, himself, needs reminding of his heroic greatness, and he hardly needs certificates of excellence in the arts of leadership, as he defines them. With his every action he embodies the very concept of leadership to which testify his magnificent achievements.

There he is at the very centre, benevolently tending to every detail, the whole of Anatolia dependent on his nod or nay. He would have it no other way, in spite of the constitutional provisions limiting the authorities of the president to a chiefly ceremonial role.

But was he not elected to this post in the country’s first direct presidential elections, which gave him 52 per cent of the vote (51.7 per cent actually, but let’s not quibble over such a detail)? Surely this is the expression of the popular will demanding that he shoulder more executive powers, regardless of what the constitution says. Clearly, he thinks so.

On Wednesday, two weeks ago, Erdogan proclaimed that the forthcoming phase will be characterised by a partnership between himself and his prime minister. It required little analytical effort to understand that the occupant of Çankaya Palace, now the seat of the prime minister, will not have a free hand in the design of policy, even if the Turkish system of government is still a parliamentary one.

A sign of this is that the Davutoglu’s new cabinet was not unveiled last Friday as scheduled. The announcement was postponed to Tuesday this past week, which strongly indicates some divergent views between the president and his prime minister.

One source of disagreement, according to Cumhuriyet newspaper, is that Erdogan is set on having his son-in-law, Berat Albayrak, appointed minister of economy. Naturally, he also insists on having an

ultimate say on all the other portfolios as well, and the PM will simply have to make the required changes.

As for Davutoglu, still fresh in his memory is that time when he accepted the resignation of Hakan Fidan as head of Turkish intelligence, but then had to retract that approval when Erdogan objected that he could not dispense with his chief spy and guardian of many secrets.

The president has no authority (under the constitution) to intervene in such matters, but Davutoglu had little choice but to bow to the leader who had condescended to choose him to be his successor as head of the ruling party and the cabinet.

The occupant of Ak Saray, the sumptuous presidential palace that Erdogan had built for himself, has left little doubt regarding the status he envisions for himself and his prime minister. During the G20 summit that was just held in Antalya on 15 and 16 November, Davutoglu was consigned to the shadowy wings while he, Erdogan, basked in centre stage.

In the past, when he was premier, Erdogan represented Turkey in every G20 summit held, because that was what he was constitutionally empowered to do. His predecessor as president, Abdullah Gül, did not attend a single summit. But now that Erdogan is president, a role reversal was in order.

Davutoglu was conspicuous for his absence in every group photo of world leaders at the Antalya summit. The media picked up on this curiosity, which was also the subject of much discussion on social networking websites and in various political circles. Some even began to wonder whether there was a power struggle afoot in the executive authority.

“Is not Davutoglu the prime minister of this country elected by 49 per cent of the vote? Why didn’t he appear anywhere in the G20 summit?” asked deputy leader of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), Mehmet Bekaroglu, via his Twitter account.

Evidently, Davutoglu, sensitive to Erdogan’s needs and temperament, opted to let the reis garner all the limelight and confine himself to a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a cocktail party for participant heads of state, and a formal banquet hosted by Erdogan.

Meanwhile, the climate in Anatolia is as tense and precarious as ever. In addition to the sharp

polarisation that shows no sign of abating, it appears that fundamentalist trends are receiving encouragement and support.

Before a “friendly” match between Turkey and Greece was due to start Wednesday last week (on 18 November), Turkish soccer fans refused to respect the moment of silence to honour the victims of the Paris terrorist attack. In a scene described by some observers as scandalous, soccer fans whistled, chanted religious slogans and proclaimed their allegiance to President Erdogan. They then proceeded to drown out the Greek national anthem.

It subsequently came to light that the Istanbul branch of the JDP youth organisation had launched a campaign via social networking sites to drum up sympathetic spectators for whom the Istanbul municipality reserved blocks of free seats in the stadium.

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The Islamist militant group Al-Mourabitoun said it carried out the attack in cooperation with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The group said it was punishing the government for its “aggression” in northern Mali.

According to media reports, the hotel had 140 guests and 30 staffers at the time of the attack. The assailants, whose exact number is yet to be determined, arrived at the scene in a car bearing diplomatic license plates.

Mali President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who rushed back home, interrupting an official visit to Chad, told reporters that the attack underlined the global threat posed by Islamic militants.

The attack came just one week after ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) assailants killed 130 people in Paris, also attacking similar soft targets: a stadium, a concert hall and restaurants.

Analysts believe that AQIM and its ally Al-Mourabitoun were eager to remind the world of their presence, feeling eclipsed by the media attention ISIS had gained at their expense.

LIVING SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1273, 3 December, 2015      02-12-2015 11:29AM ET

Support for UN envoy to LibyaEgypt and the Arab League have affirmed their support for efforts by the UN’s new envoy to form a unity government in Libya, Doaa El-Bey reports

Shukri discusses with Kobler the political process in Libya Print Email

Foreign Minister Sameh Shukri met with Martin Kobler, the new United Nations special envoy to Libya, in Cairo earlier this week. The two officials discussed the political process in Libya and the progress of efforts to establish a unity government.

At the meeting, Shukri briefed Kobler on Egyptian efforts over the past year to promote stability in Libya, including Cairo’s support of the political process that aims to form a national unity government.

In turn, Kobler briefed Shukri on his consultations with Libyan factions since becoming the UN envoy, according to Foreign Ministry spokesman Ahmed Abu Zeid.

The two officials agreed on the importance of coordinating their efforts in the coming phase, said Abu Zeid. “Shukri reiterated Egypt’s full support of Kobler and his mission and Cairo’s willingness to offer help to the Libyans to maintain Libyan unity and stability in the region.”

Arab League Secretary-General Nabil El-Arabi also affirmed his support for Kobler as the UN envoy seeks to pave the way for a national unity government in Libya.

Arab League Assistant Secretary-General Fadel Jawad said the UN envoy had briefed El-Arabi on the details of his efforts to reach a final agreement between Libya’s warring parties and had expressed the hope the Arab League will play a role in ending the Libyan crisis.

Following his appointment as envoy, Kobler announced that his priorities include restarting talks to form a unity government as a precursor to achieving durable peace.

Kobler, a German diplomat who previously served as ambassador to Egypt and Iraq, replaced former Spanish Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon as the UN’s Special Envoy to Libya last month.

Kobler’s appointment came after Leon’s plan to share power and establish a unity government was rejected by Libya’s rival factions in October. Leon then resigned from his post after accepting a lucrative offer to head a new diplomatic academy in the UAE.

Leon’s plan was based on a unity government led by a presidential council comprising a prime minister, five deputy prime ministers and three senior ministers. Kobler urged Libya’s warring factions to adhere to the agreement.

Libya’s fragmentation following Gaddafi’s ouster in 2011 has resulted in two rival governments: one internationally recognised and based in the city of El-Beyda, the second based in Tripoli.

Two Egyptians were killed in an air attack west of Benghazi last week. The attack occurred just days after the Coptic Church announced that two Christians, who had been missing for a week, had been murdered.

Abu Zeid reiterated the Foreign Ministry’s warning to Egyptian citizens still living in Libya to exercise extreme caution and avoid areas where clashes are taking place.

Earlier this year efforts intensified to bring back thousands of Egyptian workers who live and work in Libya via the Ras Jedeir crossing in Tunisia and across the Libyan-Egyptian border.

The efforts were a response to the beheading of 21 Christian Egyptians by the Islamic State group, at a time when up to 750,000 Egyptians were working in Libya, the majority employed in construction. Egyptians, and particularly Christians, have been targeted by Islamist militias since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.

The death toll has grown steadily. In February 2014 the bodies of seven Egyptian Christians were found near Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, shot in what appeared to be a sectarian attack. In September 2013 an Egyptian was shot dead in Sirte following an argument with two armed men.

Incidents of torture and the kidnapping of Egyptian Christians accused of religious proselytising have also been reported.

Last year saw the abduction of five Egyptian diplomats in Tripoli. They were believed to have been kidnapped in retaliation for the arrest in Alexandria of Shaaban Hadeya, aka Abu Obayda Al-Zawi, the head of the Libyan Revolutionary Chamber, an Islamist group.

The diplomats were released two days later, after Al-Zawi appeared on television to announce that he had been freed by Egyptian authorities. The Foreign Ministry subsequently withdrew all embassy and consular staff from Tripoli and Benghazi.

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SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1273, 3 December, 2015      02-12-2015 11:13AM ET

Self-defeating oppositionOne reason the Syrian conflict has dragged on is that the opposition blocked viable candidates from taking the lead, writes Bassel Oudat

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It is easy to blame the international community for the failure to resolve the Syrian crisis. True, the international community dragged its feet on arming the opposition, in taking coancerted action to remove the current regime from power, in passing UN decisions detailing the shape of a solution and enforcing it. But the international community is not only to blame.

The biggest failure of the Syrian opposition to date is that it failed to bring to the fore powerful figures, trustworthy ones with no history of bloodshed and corruption, men with viable connections inside the country and outside it. There were no shortage of such people, but the opposition was too quick to dismiss them.

Eager to defend its privileges, desperate to grab a share in future power, the opposition has done the unthinkable. It has shot down viable figures that could have rallied the international community behind a regime change while reuniting the nation behind viable goals.

One of the reasons the international community hesitated in overthrowing Bashar Al-Assad, even when he crossed all the red lines, including that of using chemical weapons against civilians, is that it didn’t want to see a power vacuum developing in the country.

Foreign diplomats wanted to have a clear vision of a post-Al-Assad phase, and this vision was hard to come by in the absence of a credible opposition figure at the helm. In the absence of such a figure, the international community dithered, postponed decisive action and bided its time.

The assumption was that if Al-Assad were to be removed from power in the absence of an alternative, the Syrian state might totally collapse, making the rebuilding process harder to manage.

Major countries made it clear to the opposition that they wanted a credible alternative to Al-Assad before action was taken against his regime. Six months into the revolution, the Americans told opposition figures that they were willing to do what it took to change the regime, but only if an alternative to Al-Assad was found.

But the opposition, new to the game of freedom, failed to understand what it needed to do. Instead of coming up with centrist figures who are trusted at home and abroad, it came up with alternatives who didn’t seem credible enough in the eyes of the international community.

At times, the opposition thought that the best alternative was an opposition body, one to be selected through consensus and that, once vetted by the West, could be placed in power. Working under this assumption, Syrian opposition figures and groups jostled each other for position, hoping to become part of the interim regime, the one that would lead the country into the future.

A game of one-upmanship surfaced, with each group trying to discredit credible rivals, and perfectly suitable candidates were dismissed from the scene. This is the reason that the opposition has failed to make any breakthrough for so long. As the tragedy unfolded in the country, the opposition blocked credible opponents and alienated possible allies at home and abroad.

One of the top candidates to replace Al-Assad was former vice president Farouk Al-Sharaa, a man who commanded the respect of the international community for shunning the regime and who has the respect of many in Syria because of his knowledge of how the regime works and his domestic and international connections.

When Al-Sharaa’s name came up, Borhan Ghalyun, chairman of the Syrian National Council, the main opposition group at the time, lent his support to the idea. “The state is very big. It has many employees and military officials and administrators who must be involved in drawing the country’s future, all of which gives credence to Al-Sharaa in leading the interim phase,” Ghalyun said.

But other opposition figures disagreed. Haytham Al-Maleh, who has strong ties with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, undertook a public campaign against Al-Sharaa. “No one who cooperated with Al-Assad [can be] trusted,” he said. It wasn’t long before the Muslim Brotherhood and others used their media to bury the idea for good.

Another candidate was Abdel Aziz Al-Khayyer, an Alawite opposition figure and former political prisoner prized not only for his exceptional intellect and cool mind, but also for coming from a family that is respected by Alawites and Sunnis alike.

Well connected with the opposition, Al-Khayyer had close ties with Alawite army officers and security officials who refused to take part in the killing. He also maintained good relations with the armed opposition battalions. But none of that was enough.

Once again, the Muslim Brotherhood used all its might to smear him. Shortly afterward, Al-Khayyer was picked up at a regime roadblock and disappeared. He had become too popular for the regime to allow to wander freely.

A third figure then surfaced. Dissident Brigadier General Manaf Tlass has the support of a large contingent of dissident officers, which is a major advantage in a country seeking to keep a centre of military gravity during the transition period. Tlass, 51, is well respected, capable and should have no trouble gaining the support of Alawites, Kurds and other clans.

He is also secular, which makes him ideal for fighting terror and extremism. Tlass has strong connections in the region and abroad and is one of the most qualified candidates for leading the country into a smooth transition.

But that wasn’t good enough for the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), which used its powerful media machine to derail the idea. The argument they used is that his father served as defence minister under Hafez Al-Assad, Bashar’s father.

Many in the Syrian opposition are aware that the choice of any of the above men as an alternative to Al-Assad would have accelerated the collapse of the regime, while also supporting the process of healing at home and reassuring the international community of a steady hand at the helm.

The three men all have experience, centrist views and impeccable connections that make them viable candidates to lead the transition. But their potential rise to power, while potentially good for the country, was bad news to the half-wits who had risen so high in the opposition’s ranks, to the incompetent and inexperienced, to the hopeless and hapless who are not about to give up their narrow interests to preserve those of the nation at large.

Mohamed Habash, a co-founder of Third Current, a Syrian opposition group, said that the opposition is too divided to pick a suitable leader. “The meetings of the opposition didn’t produce a leader or even half a leader,” he said. “Every time a figure fit to be a leader of the opposition emerges, he is mauled by predators in the regime and opposition ranks.”

Reem Torkumani, a prominent academic, believes that NCSROF is incapable of producing any viable programmes. “The NCSROF is not a political body. Aside from holding international diplomatic meetings and appearing in the media, it is incapable of getting anything done. It is impotent and incapable of implementing any political programme,” she said.

Syrian opposition writer Hazem Nahar shares this view. “With every sign of international action, the bazaar of the Syrian opposition springs into life, churning lists of names produced by shameless opposition members. Absent from these lists are any viable opposition members who are capable of finding a solution,” he said.

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Issue No.1273, 3 December, 2015      02-12-2015 11:12AM ET

Hariri nominates Assad ally for presidentA surprise proposal by Saad Al-Hariri has upset traditional equations in the Lebanese political arena, with pundits left wondering if it is for real or just a manoeuvre, writesHassan Al-Qishawi

Franjieh Print Email

The leader of Lebanon’s Future Current, Saad Al-Hariri, has surprised Lebanese political circles by nominating the leader of Al-Marada Current, Suleiman Franjieh, a personal friend of Bashar Al-Assad, as president after more than 18 months of the position being vacant.

Franjieh was always a possible candidate since he is a senior Christian leader and one of four Maronite heavyweights. But the backing of Al-Hariri — the son of slain leader Rafik Al-Hariri —was a shock because Franjieh is a close friend of Al-Assad, who is accused by Future Current of assassinating Al-Hariri senior.

An informed Lebanese source told Al-Ahram Weekly about the reasons behind the nomination, which remain a mystery to most Lebanese and even politicians, who were caught off guard by the announcement.

The initiator of the proposal, according to the source, is General Jamil Al-Sayed, former director of

public security, and a hawk of 8 March who was investigated for his involvement in Al-Hariri’s assassination but was found not guilty.

The source said that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri convinced Saad Al-Hariri of the nomination after Al-Sayed proposed the idea to Jumblatt. The source explained that Jumblatt wants to undermine the two top Christian leaderships in Mount Lebanon: General Michel Aoun, leader of the Change and Reform Bloc, and Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Phalange Forces.

If Franjieh becomes president, Jumblatt will not be affected since the former’s stronghold is in North Lebanon, in Qadaa Zgharta, which is far from any regions where Jumblatt has influence in Mount Lebanon.

According to the senior source, Al-Sayed convinced Jumblatt that Al-Assad will remain in power and there is a need to reassure Hizbullah by installing Al-Assad’s closest Christian allies in the Lebanese presidency. It would also reassure the Alawis in Syria.

In return, Al-Hariri would become prime minister and take charge of the economy portfolio, while Franjieh would deal with Syria in his capacity as president. This would be similar to the model of Emile Lahoud-Rafik Al-Hariri during Syria’s presence in Lebanon, before Al-Hariri was assassinated and Al-Hariri’s family and allies accused Damascus of being behind the murder.

The source continued that Aoun’s Liberal National Current and the Phalange Forces Party, the two largest Christian heavyweights in the country, would never accept this choice. Aoun believes he is more deserving of the presidency since he heads the largest Christian bloc in Lebanon and describes himself as the leader of Eastern Christians. This would be his last chance to head the only Christian presidency in the Arab world, since he is already more than 80 years old.

Geagea, meanwhile, would never accept Al-Assad’s friend as president of Lebanon. Sources in the Phalange Party said they want to maintain their alliance with Al-Hariri irrespective of disputes, and that brings together Future Current, Phalange Party and 14 March, formed to confront Syrian dominance.

However, the silence of Phalange Party leader Geaea is telling. The source said that the Phalange is trying to manage the crisis without offending Al-Hariri, who is a friend and ally.

Political analyst Mohamed Shams, an expert on Lebanese politics, believes that Al-Hariri is counting on Franjieh’s allies to undermine the proposal. Shams said that Aoun’s stronghold in Al-Rabya is appalled by the proposal, which would destroy Aoun’s aspirations to sit in Baabda Palace, the seat of the Lebanese presidency.

Franjieh is closer to Hizbullah than Aoun and he trusts the Shia group more than Aoun. But the group would choose Aoun over Franjieh because of the former’s political weight among Christians. It would be unlikely for Hizbullah to enter a confrontation or sever relations with Aoun and Geagea, who may take a similar stand, and thus be at odds with the powers representing the majority of Christians, according to Shams.

He believes this is at the heart of Al-Hariri’s proposal, because he knows his rivals, who are Franjieh’s allies, will not accept it. On the other hand, some believe Franjieh’s nomination is a solution for everyone.

Marcel Al-Ters, who is close to Franjieh’s Al-Marada Current, says Franjieh is the most suitable candidate for Lebanon and the Arab world because his nomination at this sensitive time is a consensual solution for the Lebanese crisis.

According to Al-Ters, many of the poor in Lebanon allies or not will view Franjieh as a logical solution to end the perpetual crisis in Lebanon’s political scene since Al-Hariri Sr’s assassination 10 years ago, and the fractures it caused in the political choices by 8 March and 14 March.

If Franjieh becomes president, this will give Future Current, composed of a Sunni majority, an opportunity to communicate, even if indirectly, with Tehran and Damascus through Franjieh’s strong relationships with both. This would allow Al-Hariri to return as head of the cabinet.

For Shia forces, the relationship between Franjieh and Berri’s Amal group and Hassan Nasrallah’s Hizbullah and his credibility with them represents a fast bridge to restoring a fully operational state.

Regarding the Christian component in Mount Lebanon, no one can doubt the doctrine of this leader from Zgharta and his sacrifices to maintain Lebanon as a sovereign, independent, free state after losing all of his family to the cause.

“Geagea and his Phalange may not endorse Franjieh because of his inconsistent political positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and disputes that estranged the two families, including the 1978 Ahdan massacre,” Al-Ters said.

“There is no reason, however, for the Liberal National Current and Aoun not to endorse Franjieh since the latter endorsed Aoun’s candidacy for president over the past two years. Aoun also knows that Franjieh is most capable of restoring the rights of Christians to power in Lebanon.”

Accordingly, Al-Ters believes Franjieh’s ascension to the presidency is not only a safeguard for many Lebanese rivals, but also for regional political powers interested in stabilising Lebanon, including Damascus, Cairo and Riyadh, which held his grandfather and former Lebanese president, Suleiman Franjieh, in high esteem since he was Saudi Arabia’s friend and also an ally of the Umayyad capital.

“He is the best candidate to lead the Lebanese ship at this sensitive time because of his balanced policies,” he said.

Whether it is a political manoeuvre or a real proposal, the initiative has shaken traditional alliances in Lebanon. It jolted relations between the Phalange and Future Current, and even created a crisis inside Future Current. At the same time, it may have brought old Christian rivals Geagea and Aoun closer together.

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Issue No.1273, 3 December, 2015      02-12-2015 11:10AM ET

Shia power struggle in IraqAt the root of the Iraqi Shia’s troubles lie the competing ambitions of their leaders, writesSalah Nasrawi

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The first thought that must have crossed the minds of many Iraqis when they learned about the fight that broke out between a Shia member of parliament and a Shia politician at a Baghdad television building was that the much-feared Shia power struggle had come to pass earlier than many had expected.

“This is a state of militias,” was a comment widely posted by Iraqis on social networks this week, referring to the surge in the number of Shia paramilitary groups in the country and the increasing militarisation of the Shia political factions and their meddling in both public life and state affairs.   

The brawl began in the reception area of the Dijla TV station when MP Kadhim Al-Sayyadi of the State of Law bloc and Baligh Abu Galal, a spokesman of the Citizen’s Bloc, accidently ran into one another.

Both groups are within the Shia National Coalition that has been in control of the Iraqi government

since the US-led invasion in 2003 that toppled the Sunni-dominated regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.

The brawl started when Abu Galal, scheduled to appear on an evening talk show, did not return the greetings of Al-Sayyadi when the later appeared in the reception area on his way out of the studio. The bickering that followed quickly escalated into a fight that turned into shooting.

Both Al-Sayyadi and Abu Galal have a long history of squabbling with other Shia politicians, sometimes inside parliament or on the air. In May, Al-Sayyadi was beaten up by Shia Sadrist Movement MPs during a debate to elect two ministers. A few months ago, Abu Galal was at the centre of a dispute with an influential Shia tribe that had accused him of slandering an MP belonging to the tribe.   

Beneath the chaos looms a complex struggle between Shia leaders that reveals much about the country and the surprisingly opaque nature of power in Shia-led Iraq. On the surface, the Shia National Coalition is a broad grouping encompassing the country’s main Shia factions. Real power, however, rests with an inner circle of oligarchs.

The most recent, and probably the most daunting conflict, grew out of the reforms that Iraqi prime minister Haider Al-Abadi has promised to carry out in response to the widespread protests that have taken place since August against rampant government corruption and poor services and in favour of calls for change.

The struggle has also been fueled by the rise of the Shia militias that first arose after the US-led invasion to confront Al-Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups and were reinvigorated following the seizure of swathes of Sunni-populated territory in Iraq by the Islamic State (IS) group, threatening Baghdad and Shia-dominated central and southern Iraq.

Al-Abadi’s reforms, though too meagre to matter, have been met with resistance by the Shia oligarchs who dominate the government and parliament. Last month, the parliament withdrew its support for Al-Abadi’s reform package, accusing the prime minister of overstepping his powers.

Many of Al-Abadi’s reforms, such as scrapping top government posts, target Shia politicians accused by protesters of corruption, incompetence and negligence. Among those whose jobs have been axed is Al-Abadi’s predecessor Nuri Al-Maliki who has the post of vice-president in Al-Abadi’s administration.

Some of the measures introduced by Al-Abadi, including cuts to the hefty benefits received by MPs and senior officials that have been key demands of the protesters, have been challenged by Shia politicians who use their positions to fill their pockets through endemic corruption.

Four months after promising the reforms, Al-Abadi is still battling opposition that threatens his authority. Last month, Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone was again declared off limits a few days after Al-Abadi said he would open it to the public. Lifting restrictions on the 10 square km area has been a major demand of the protesters.

But the emergence of the Shia militias remains the most serious challenge to Al-Abadi. The Iran-backed paramilitary forces that have officially become part of Iraq’s armed forces as the Hashid Al-Sha’bi, or Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), are quickly moving to the centre stage of Iraq’s politics and becoming a threat to Al-Abadi’s authority.

Last month, PMF leaders pressed the parliament to send the draft 2016 budget back to the government, demanding increases in funding for their units which they said was not sufficient to allow them to fight IS.

They leaders have also been pushing for increases in the numbers of the Forces, which are now believed to include some 120,000 fighters and aspire to play a larger role in the country’s domestic security.

Al-Abadi seems to be under the hammer of his fellow Shia politicians, who are taking advantage of Iraq’s troubles to cash in on his faltering efforts at curbing corruption, improving government efficiency and taking down IS militants.

The future of Al-Abadi’s government is currently the most discussed topic in Iraq. In recent weeks, there have been frequent reports in the Iraqi media about efforts by Al-Abadi’s opponents to call for a no-confidence vote in his government in parliament.

Other reports have suggested that the beleaguered prime minister has lost the support of Iraq’s most senior Shia cleric, ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who has been backing Al-Abadi’s reforms. During a visit

to Najaf, the seat of Al-Sistani’s authority, last month, Al-Abadi did not meet the cleric, a sign that Al-Sistani is probably discontented with the slow pace of reforms.

Opposition to Al-Abadi is also growing within his own Dawa Party, and Party leader Al-Maliki, who fought to stay in office and prevent Al-Abadi from taking over following last year’s elections, is widely believed to be working to overthrow Al-Abadi.

In a stunning remark, the head of the Party’s bloc in parliament, Ali Adeeb, told the Washington Post last week that Al-Abadi was perceived to be “illegitimate.” The statement reflects the deep divisions within the Dawa Party, which has shelved a conference planned this month to elect a new leadership and review the stances taken by Al-Abadi.

After 13 years in power following their rise in US-occupied Iraq, the Shia religious parties are sinking into ever-deeper disarray. Their corrupt and power-greedy leaders are sacrificing competence and unity in the face of the country’s political chaos.

Their maneuvering to block the badly needed reforms, insistence on clinging onto power, and in particular their fierce competition for power and resources have led them to be at war with themselves.

Worse still, the increasing role played by the militias and the militarisation of the Shia groups could drive the country into a political showdown. The prospect of an internecine Shia war looks steadily more alarming and its possible impact on Iraq’s national politics is growing.

On Saturday, Al-Abadi made a passionate appeal to his rivals to abandon a “competition which is aimed at finding fault with others”. He urged them “to belong to the country and not to their political affiliations”.

As if to test the will of his opponents and disperse perceptions about his own weakness, Al-Abadi also trumpeted his achievements in terms of reform and vowed to continue implementing his anti-corruption programme.

Both assertions, however, are now looking rather doubtful.

Al-Abadi may stay in office until the end of his term in 2018, thanks to the complicated political procedures that will be needed to find a replacement. But he will be a lame duck at the mercy of a conglomerate of Shia oligarchs and militia leaders whose agenda is to keep the government under their control.

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SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1273, 3 December, 2015      02-12-2015 11:08AM ET

Climate conference opensSome 150 world leaders converged on the French town of Le Bourget outside Paris this week for the UN Conference on Climate Change, writes David Tresilian in Paris

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The long-awaited UN Conference on Climate Change, formally dubbed the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), opened on Monday.

The conference, to run until 11 December, is the first meeting on climate change to take place on such a scale since the Copenhagen Conference in 2009 failed to reach an agreement. In attendance on the opening day were US President Barack Obama, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, among many others.

It is hoped that the meeting will lead to a new international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, believed to be responsible for climate change, and keep global warming below the commonly agreed limit of 2° C. A temperature rise beyond this limit is expected to cause catastrophic changes to the global climate.

However, voices were already being raised during the conference’s opening days on the difficulties likely to be encountered before any such agreement can be reached.

One hundred and forty-seven of the 196 parties to the UNFCCC, within which the conference is taking place, submitted plans to reduce their emissions, known as Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), by the deadline of 1 October. These INDCs are not, however, thought to offer sufficient measures to keep temperature rises within the 2° C limit.

According to information circulating at the conference, even if all the INDCs were implemented, and those received represent only 75 per cent of members of the UNFCCC and 85 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, this would likely lead to a rise in temperatures of between 2.7 and 3.3° C; in other words, well above the 2° C target.

On the opening day, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the issue of how much developed countries should contribute to efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, and how much they should contribute to the mitigation and other efforts made by developing countries that have historically not been responsible for the emissions thought to be responsible for climate change.

India would “play its part,” Modi wrote in the UK newspaper the Financial Times earlier this week. “We have pledged that, by 2030, we will reduce emissions intensity by at least 33 per cent of 2005 levels, and 40 per cent of installed power capacity will be from non-fossil fuel sources,” he said.

But in return, “justice demands that, with what little carbon we can still safely burn, developing countries are allowed to grow” and that they receive increased assistance from the developed countries that have historically benefitted from burning the fossil fuels thought to be responsible for climate change.

A French negotiator at the conference, Laurence Tubiana, told the UK newspaper The Guardian this summer that the “most difficult” element of an agreement could be the issue of the rich countries most responsible for global warming financially helping poorer countries adapt to climate change.

An essential part of any agreement, according to conference literature, will be to mobilise $100 billion every year after 2020 in financial support for developing countries to help them adapt their economies and mitigate the effects of climate change.

Security was stepped up in the French capital on the meeting’s first day, with roads leading to Le Bourget closed to traffic and France as a whole on alert after the 13 November attacks in Paris, in which 130 people died, claimed by the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group.

Public demonstrations have been banned in France under the emergency laws in force until February, with the result that while demonstrations took place across the world urging the leaders gathered at Le Bourget to act while there is still time to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in France itself there were fewer signs of public engagement.

A demonstration in Place de la République in Paris on Sunday, scene of the “Je suis Charlie” demonstrations following the Charlie Hebdo and kosher supermarket killings in Paris in January and now home to an impromptu memorial for those who died in November, degenerated into violence between activists and riot police.

Monday was “one long photo opportunity” for world leaders attending the conference, in the words of one participant. The days and weeks to come, however, will see intense negotiations on a draft agreement that has already been presented to participants, along with meetings of the subsidiary groups responsible for monitoring and implementation aspects.

A first revision of the draft agreement is expected to be presented to the French presidency of the conference on 5 December. The new text will then be negotiated by the 196 countries that are members of the UNFCCC, before arriving at a Paris Agreement by the end of the conference on 11 December, which will be signed at a ceremony planned for early 2016.

There are questions, however, regarding the form any eventual agreement will take. US Secretary of State John Kerry, perhaps with an eye on how unpopular cuts to greenhouse gas emissions are likely to be in the US, said in November that the agreement was “definitively not going to be a treaty” and there were “not going to be legally binding reduction targets like Kyoto,” referring to the 1992 Kyoto Protocol, the only previous legally binding climate change agreement.

His statement brought an immediate reaction from the EU. Miguel Arias Cañete, a spokesman for the EU climate commissioner, said, “The Paris Agreement must be an international legally binding agreement. The title of the agreement is yet to be decided, but it will not affect its legally binding form.”

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, currently presiding over the Paris conference, told the French newspaper Le Monde on Sunday that any agreement “should be legally binding.”

He continued, “Calling it a treaty could cause problems in America because then it would need to be approved by Congress. But an agreement made in Paris that could then be rejected by the Chinese, American or Indian authorities would obviously lose its force.”

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Issue No.1274, 10 December, 2015      09-12-2015 10:43AM ET

Talks in Athens

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PRESIDENT Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi flew to Athens on Tuesday to attend a trilateral summit with the Greek and Cypriot presidents.

Upon his arrival, Al-Sisi met Greece’s President Prokopis Pavlopoulos and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. He is also scheduled to meet with the Greek minister of national defence, Panos Kammenos. They are expected to discuss military and security relations in light of current challenges in the region.

Al-Sisi was invited to Greece by Pavlopoulos to attend the trilateral summit with Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades on 9 December.

The trilateral summit between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, held on a periodic basis, promotes strategic and historic relations, broadens future cooperation, and strengthens the longstanding and historic friendship between the three countries, according to Ambassador Alaa Youssef, the official presidential spokesman.

“Cooperation on energy issues is the main subject in the three-day talks in Athens,” Youssef said.

The summit is part of an ongoing programme of regular summits aimed at encouraging cooperation on strategic matters across the board, including agreements signed between the nations.

The leaders hope to reinforce agreements reached at the first trilateral summit, held in Cairo in November 2014, and the second, hosted by Cyprus in Nicosia in April 2015.

“The summit is expected to realise joint interests and strengthen longstanding relations between the three countries, which have been developing remarkably well in various areas of cooperation,” Youssef said.

The three sides are expected to address ways to promote security and stability in the region. They will also discuss regional security developments, including weapons proliferation and the repercussions of terrorism in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region. The ongoing refugee crisis was also on the table.

Al-Sisi was scheduled to hold a bilateral meeting with Anastasiades on the sidelines of the trilateral summit to exchange views on ways of enhancing bilateral cooperation.

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HERITAGE

Issue No.1274, 10 December, 2015      09-12-2015 10:29AM ET

New Suez Canal: A hostage of the global economyThe development of the Suez Canal was long overdue but returns have so far been disappointing because of the slowdown in global trade, writes Omar El-Shenety

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The Suez Canal is one of the most important global waterways, with a tenth of the world’s trade passing through it. For Egyptians, the importance of the Suez Canal extends far beyond the thousands of Egyptians who died while digging it 150 years ago. Most Egyptians feel proud when they remember Gamal Abdel-Nasser nationalising the canal in the 1950s to use its proceeds to finance the High Dam in Aswan.

The revenues of the Suez Canal, despite being a strategic national asset, for decades have been too small when compared to its strategic importance. Revenues at best reached little more than $5 billion. For years, experts have been talking about developing the Suez Canal area with master plans proposed to create an added value for the traffic passing, but nothing materialised, at least until recently.

Last year, the Suez Canal region became the focal point of economic development strategy in the country. With the launch of a major development project in the area, people expected it to be for the development of the axis around the canal. They were surprised to find that the development will be directed towards the canal itself, with the widening and deepening of the current waterway, digging a new parallel canal as well as digging a few tunnels under the canal.

The development project, branded the “New Suez Canal”, received huge media coverage as a national project, and LE64 billion worth of investment certificates were raised from the public to finance it. There were still, however, many question about the viability of the mega-ventures from various experts, although the general public was happy to see national projects launched.

Looking at the project from an objective lens, the widening and deepening part looked straightforward: the canal needed to accommodate larger ships, which are becoming the trend in the shipping industry.

Still, digging a new waterway seemed like a very questionable venture. It was supposed to raise the capacity of the canal but the old capacity was not fully used. Saving passing time was an expected outcome, which is definitely positive, but its incremental return is not significant.

Digging tunnels was meant to allow for the smooth flow of people and goods to and from Sinai. It is definitely a positive and will increase local trade as well as development of the Sinai. But digging such tunnels is a long-term infrastructure project.

As such, going for nine tunnels in the short or even medium term is questionable, especially at a time of scarce financing and a huge backlog of delayed investment projects across the country.

With the launch of the new canal, reality turned too far from expectations, simply because of the latest dynamics in the global economy. The coincidence of recession in Europe with the economic slowdown in China has resulted in decreased global trade growth, which was reflected in decreased traffic going through the Suez Canal and, accordingly, lower revenues, against all official expectations. Revenues dropped by more than 20 per cent in last fiscal year.

Traffic is dependent on global trade, which has fluctuated over the last decade, growing at around eight per cent during 2004-2007, then declining by more than a tenth during 2008-2009 as a result of the financial crisis, then recovering its losses in 2010-2011.

After that, it maintained a slow growth rate of between two and three per cent during 2012-2014, before declining in 2015. Such developments have been directly reflected in the fluctuation of Suez Canal revenues.

With the current negative trade growth outlook, Suez Canal revenues are not expected to live up to official estimates and will probably stay lower than 2013-2014 levels for the coming couple of years, before global trade picks up again.

The decrease in dollar revenues is definitely bad news for the Central Bank. After deducting interest expenses on the certificates, the net cash going to the government will witness a considerable decline in the short term.

The Suez Canal Authority shouldn’t have a problem covering interest expenses and, later on, refinancing the certificates when they mature by issuing new certificates. Hopefully, in a few years, global trade will recover and revenues will rebound to repay the cost of the expansion project, but this will take quite a long time to happen. In addition, the return on the tunnels will take years if not decades to materialise given that tunnels are long-term infrastructure investments.

Despite the disappointing results of the New Suez Canal, the government proceeded with the development of the Suez Canal axis with the launch of the development of the East Port Said area. This includes digging a new waterway connecting the port there with the Mediterranean, and establishing a few industrial zones and new residential extensions to Port Said and Ismailia cities. A few highways will also be established to connect the area with the national road network.

Developing the Suez Canal axis is overdue. The area was neglected for decades, without serious development despite its great potential. The launch of such a development project after disappointing results so far from the New Suez Canal highlights the determination of the government to develop the area and turn it into a key driver for economic development in the country.

In contrast to the New Suez Canal, the development of East Port Said is limited in cost. The new waterway has been on the table for years as it connects the port to the Mediterranean, thus easing access to the port without the need for ships to go through the Suez Canal, which should reflect positively on competitiveness of the port and its revenues.

However, it is unclear how much the new waterway will cost and how this cost will be allocated between the Egyptian government and port operator.

The development of East Port Said should revive the area. Yet like any infrastructure project, its returns are long term by nature. The development of this phase is not as costly as the New Suez Canal that was launched last year, while its long-term sustainable returns could be much higher.

From an economic standpoint, the development of the axis, including projects like East Port Said, should have taken priority over digging the New Suez Canal.

Despite such huge potential, the materialisation of these results depends heavily on foreign investments. The new industrial zones are expected to attract foreign investors and companies to establish plants and global logistics centres in the area, which would lead to hiring people that move with their families to live in the new residential areas. As a result, the new road connections will be used to move people and goods across the country.

Foreign companies should be interested in being present in such a strategic axis but probably not in the short term. The negative global economic outlook means that companies will shy away from making big investments.

The turbulent political and security situation regionally will also mean that investors follow a “wait and see” approach. So again, the development of the Suez Canal area has fallen hostage to the global economy, which doesn’t seem favourable in the short term.

Bottom line: the development of the Suez Canal is an indisputable gain and was long overdue, but its returns depend heavily on the state of the global economy. The results of the New Suez Canal have been so far disappointing because of the slowdown in global trade.

The launch of axis development seems like a step in the right direction, but its results will take several years to materialise, given the slowdown in the global economy. This will delay the flow of foreign investment needed to develop the area and achieve the expected results. So we had better manage our expectations.

The writer is managing director of Multiples Investment Group. Print Email

HERITAGE

Issue No.1274, 10 December, 2015      08-12-2015 08:41PM ET

From San Bernardino to DamascusPresident Obama’s address to the American nation following the San Bernardino massacre set the right tone and should encourage US leaders to see more clearly where their interests lie in fighting terror, writes Hussein Haridy

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US President Barack Obama gave an address to the American people from the Oval Office on Sunday, 6 December, in the wake of the mass shooting in San Bernardino, California. On Wednesday, 2 December, two radicalised Muslim Americans opened fire at a social centre and killed 14 innocent people.

In his address, President Obama described the massacre as an “act of terrorism, designed to kill innocent people.” He added, “So far, we have no evidence that the killers were directed by a terrorist organisation overseas, or were part of a broader conspiracy here at home.”

However, the US president made clear that the two had gone down what he rightly called “the dark path of radicalisation.” As would be expected, President Obama spoke of his efforts as commander-in-chief to confront terrorism and terrorist organisations that have tried to harm the United States, whether Al-Qaeda and its leadership or Islamic State (IS).

He pointed out as far as IS is concerned, he has been briefed daily on its activities for the last seven

years, presumably by his top intelligence officials. He assured the American people that the United States will prevail in its fight against IS “by being strong and smart, resilient and relentless, and by drawing upon every aspect of American power.” This was one of the most relevant parts of Obama’s message to the American people.

In this context, Obama laid out his future strategy to deal with the evolving threat of IS without being drawn to order the deployment of US ground forces. He promised to continue hunting down terrorist “plotters” in any country where it is necessary. The United States will continue, as well, to provide training and equipment to tens of thousands of Iraqi and Syrian forces fighting IS on the ground.

He referred to the deployment, already in place, of US Special Operations Forces who can, to quote the US president, “accelerate that offensive.” In the meantime, the United States will keep working with “friends and allies” to stop IS operations.

It is intersting to note in this regard that Obama said that Washington has “surged intelligence-sharing with its European allies” since the December attacks in. He also said that both the United States and Turkey are working together to seal the Turkish-Syrian borders.

The most interesting part in the strategy that President Obama laid out was the part concerning the Syrian crisis. He said that an integral element of this strategy is finding a political solution to this crisis in the framework of the Vienna process, without precisely explaining how.

So questions remain as to whether the White House, in order to successfully implement its vision on how to defeat IS militarily on the ground, will bring the Syrian army into the array of forces that must be deployed on the ground to defeat IS.

As a matter of course, John Kerry, the US secretary of state, dealt with this point in his remarks last Thursday, 3 December, before the ministerial meeting of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe that took place in Belgrade.

The most important question in this respect is whether the United States, with its allies and partners, is willing to work with the Syrian government in the war against IS and other terrorist groups operating on Syrian soil. Personally speaking, I doubt if what President Obama described as a “sustainable victory” over IS can be achieved without involving the Syrian government in this war.

The Syrian army is the only force that could fight IS decisively at present. The Syrian forces that Obama talked about in his address to the American nation are not reliable, plus it would take years to turn them into a highly disciplined military force capable of regaining territories lost to IS in Syria and Iraq over the last two years, along with holding these territories in the face of counterattacks by IS.

President Obama asked the US Congress to vote to authorise the continued use of military force against IS, making it clear that the United States should not be drawn into a long and costly ground war in Syria and Iraq.

The US president made it a point — and it was the right message from the Oval Office — that the war going on against terrorism in the Middle East is not a fight between America and Islam, adding that IS does not speak for Islam.

To drive this important point home, Obama said that the vast majority of terrorist victims around the world are Muslims. He further stressed that the real problem that Muslims worldwide must confront is the spread of “extremist ideology.”

I could not agree more. And in this respect, I would allow myself to kindly request that Obama invite Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi to the Oval Office, and the sooner the better, to discuss how best the United States could be on the “right side of history” in fighting terrorism and extremism.

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Issue No.1274, 10 December, 2015      08-12-2015 02:34PM ET

A visit to Saudi ArabiaA recent visit to Saudi Arabia showed that the Saudi people care for the country’s pre-Islamic heritage as well as its Islamic monuments, writes Zahi Hawass

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I was recently invited to visit the Saudi capital Riyadh by Saudi Prince Sultan bin Salman. I was able to see great museums and great site management of major pre-Islamic and Islamic sites. I was really impressed by the fantastic work being done on the conservation and restoration of these sites. At the end of my visit I was also captivated by the city of Riyadh and how it has developed into a major city with all the cultural activities, development, and high-rises that have made it one of the most beautiful cities in the Arab world.

I asked many people how this had come to be, and all of them said that King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz, the custodian of the two holy mosques, was the one who had transformed the city, even calling him the “architect of Riyadh.” The king was previously prince of Riyadh for more than 50 years.

During my visit, Prince Sultan bin Salman, president of the Saudi Commission for Tourism and Antiquities, invited me to a major conference dedicated to the late king Fahd bin Abdel-Aziz. I was able to meet King Salman and was honoured to see the man who has done such great things for the antiquities of Saudi Arabia.

He recently announced the inauguration of the first stage of a project for the restoration and site management of the area of Al-Gigiry at Al-Diriyah and also announced that Al-Diriyah had been designated as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. This is a message to the world that the Saudis care a great deal about their pre-Islamic antiquities as well as their Islamic monuments.

When he was prince of Riyadh, King Salman cared deeply about the Al-Diriyah project, wanting to bring it to life again. He announced the restoration project and appointed a committee to supervise the work, of which I was the head.

When the conference on King Fahd began, I was delighted to learn that Saudi Arabia was documenting the activities of this great man who was a born leader. More than 1,000 photographs of his activities were shown, many of them with prominent world leaders with whom he met. There was also a film on his life that was a lesson to children about how to become a great leader. When the event was finished, I was able to meet King Salman, who recently, together with President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, was able to unite the Arabs for the first time to save Yemen from a new enemy that could be a danger to the whole world.

Prince Sultan was keen to follow the site management of Al-Diriyah, because this is a site that is close to his heart and he had often seen the site with his father when he was a child. He thought then that the mud-brick houses at the site could raise the awareness of the Saudi people, because it records the story of the struggle to free Al-Diriyah from an attack by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, who had been sent by Mohamed Ali.

Prince Sultan is planning to build five museums at Al-Diriyah and to convert an old building into a historic hotel, as well as produce a sound and light project. The plan is to make the site full of activities.

During my stay, I was also able to visit the National Museum in Riyadh. This is a wonderful museum in a new architectural style that presents pre-Islamic and Islamic objects in beautiful displays. I gave a speech on my work and the discoveries I have made during my career. The lecture was attended by Prince Sultan bin Salman, Ali Gaban, vice-president of Tourism and Antiquities in Saudi Arabia, and my friend Saad Al-Rashid, who is now a consultant to the Saudi Antiquities Department.  

At the end of my lecture Prince Sultan announced his hope that Ali Gaban and I would document the relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia during Pharaonic times. We know that an inscription of the name of Ramses II was recently found in Saudi Arabia.

Prince Sultan also announced the king’s approval for the exhibition “Roads of Arabia” to tour the world.

My other important visit was to the Masmak Museum. All my life I have wanted to create a museum to explain the history of Cairo, and I planned this with my friend Louis Monreal, the director-general of the Aga Khan Foundation. But the project was left unfinished because of the 25 January Revolution. As a result, I was delighted to see that the Masmak Museum tells the history of Riyadh from its beginnings when it was attacked by Ibrahim Pasha. The Museum displays the weapons that were used for the liberation of the city, items concerning the customs and daily lives of the people, and photographs of the princes of Riyadh.

Prince Sultan also arranged for me to visit the governorate of Al-Oula, especially the site of Madain Saleh, the most famous site in the kingdom. I went in the company of Jamal Omar, the director of the National Museum. Though my itinerary included the chance to meet Prince Faisal bin Salman, the Prince of Al-Medina, in the event I was unable to meet him because of the visit of a world leader to the city. But I did go to visit the Prophet Mohamed’s mosque and also saw the Medina Museum, housed in a former train station that in the past received people from Turkey on the pilgrimage.

I was very impressed with the changes that have occurred in Al-Medina, even since the last time I saw the city two years ago. We took a car to Al-Oula, about a three-hour drive. We stayed in a small hotel, and I was able to meet many foreigners who had come to visit the site.

Madain Saleh is a fascinating site. It is introduced by a visitor’s centre and a plan of the roads that lead to the tombs, as well as information about the tombs themselves. It is an example of excellent site management. The tombs are unique and were constructed in different architectural styles, with inner burial chambers and inscriptions about their owners. During the visit, I also visited the old city and went up the neighbouring mountains to a height of about 2,000 metres in order to take in the beauty of Al-Oula.

All of these achievements regarding Saudi sites and museums, as well as the return of thousands of stolen artifacts from inside and outside Saudi Arabia, are due to the vision of Prince Sultan bin Salman. However, it seems that the curse of the Pharaohs is always after me. On my return from Al-Oula airport

The cabinet: The rise and fall of Egypt’s governments

The 123 governments formed since the Khedive Ismail set up the country’s first cabinet 140 years ago tell the story of Egypt’s political, economic and social development, writes Kamal Rayan

The Police Academy: Trials and tribulationsAs police practices once again come under scrutiny, Ahmed Morsyreviews the changing face of the Ministry of Interior’s training centre for officers

The Press Syndicate: Campaigning for freedom of expressionThe headquarters of the Press Syndicate, once a bastion of protest, is struggling to defend the rights of its own members, reports Ahmed Morsy

The Supreme Court: Justice in the balanceCairo’s Supreme Court, the symbol of justice in Egypt, has amply witnessed the steadfastness of the judiciary in the face of the challenges brought against it, writesSayed Saleh

Rabaa Al-Adaweya Square: From sit-in to cenotaph

Amany Maged recounts the story of a square that changed its name and face

The Coptic Cathedral: Cross of unityMichael Adel records the fundamental junctures in the history of the Coptic Cathedral

Al-Azhar: Authority and legitimacyAmany Maged explores the crucial role Al-Azhar plays and should continue to play

Dam: Building continuesImposing a de facto reality has been Ethiopia’s policy regarding the controversial Grand Renaissance Dam — a policy that became even more obvious in 2015, writes Doaa El-Bey

Hard times for the former giant of Arab mediaMaspero, where the Arab broadcasting industry was born, is now nostalgic for its past glory.Mohamed Abdel-Baky spent time inside the building that once produced the region’s most important broadcasts

ECONOMY

The Suez Canal: Navigating historyThe Suez Canal, following its expansion, once again proved itself to be one of Egypt’s major economic and geopolitical assets this year, writes Niveen Wahish

Al-Dabaa: Egypt’s nuclear dream Al-Dabaa will host Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, writes Ahmed Kotb

Ghazl Al-Mahalla: Revamp neededEgypt’s Misr Spinning and Weaving Company, an industrial symbol since the early 20th century, is now in urgent need of modernisation, much like many other state-owned companies, writes Mona El-Fiqi

Sharm El-Sheikh: The city of peaceSharm El-Sheikh was the scene of a Russian plane crash in Sinai this year that has now devastated the city’s vibrant tourism sector, writesNesma Nowar

Back in businessEgypt hosted the much-anticipated Economic Development Conference in March in Sharm El-Sheikh, writesNesma Nowar

Al-Mugamma: Endless paperworkOver the decades, Al-Mugamma has earned itself a reputation for being the epitome of unnecessary red tape and bureaucracy, writesNiveen Wahish

Farmers adapt to changing industryHigh production costs and lack of marketing have become commonplace problems for farmers growing crops. Mona El-Fiqi listens to the inhabitants of one village

WORLD

Refugee camps: The Syrian diasporaMillions of Syrian refugees face harsh conditions in makeshift camps inside the borders of neighbouring states, writes Bassel Oudat

Tartous: Russia’s naval portalThe town of Tartous has flourished since the Russians made it their naval base in Syria, but the situation may be short-lived, writes Bassel Oudat

Palmyra: Destroying Syria’s LouvreThe archaeological site of Palmyra in Syria figured among the victims of the Islamic State terrorist group this year, writes David Tresilian

Benghazi: Road to stabilityA federal system in Benghazi and Derna’s tribal unity are crucial for Libya’s autonomy, writes Kamel Abdallah

Mosul’s rendez-vous with historyThe future of a city once celebrated as Iraq’s gateway to the world is now in doubt, writes Salah Nasrawi

Palestine: Endless struggleThe future appears grim for Palestinians, which could lead to a full intifada that might spill over to other Arab states, including Jordan, writes Mohamed Gomaa

Tragedy in MeccaTragedy struck the city of Mecca twice this year during the annual Muslim pilgrimage, writes Ashraf Abul-Yazid

Vienna seals nuclear dealThe historic city of Vienna was the venue for the signing of this year’s nuclear agreement with Iran, writesCamelia Entekhabifard

Sousse: Beacon of hopeThe city of Sousse, like Tunisia as a whole, is recovering from the terrorist attacks that struck its beaches in June, writes Lassaad Ben Ahmed

Taksim Square: Heart of IstanbulIstanbul’s most famous public square continues to be a lightning rod of national political sentiment, particularly over the identity and rules of governance of modern Turkey, writes Sayed Abdel-Meguid

Riad Al-Solh Square: People powerRiad Al-Solh Square in downtown Beirut has long been a symbol of political authority and a focal point for movements aiming to contest it, writes Hassan Al-Qishawi

Boko Haram deadliest terror in the worldAs Boko Haram tops the world’s terrorist killer list, Dan Glazebrookasks questions about US reluctance to assist Nigeria in stamping out the deadly group

Mali: Restoring TimbuktuTimbuktu is getting back on its feet after being occupied by extremist jihadists, but the problem of Islamist violence remains rife in north and sub-Saharan Africa, writesHaytham Nuri

Shock and awe in ParisThe French capital was hit by a series of terrorist attacks this year inspired by the extremist ideology of the Islamic State and other armed Islamist groups, writes David Tresilian

The UN’s unruly dominionThe five permanent UN Security Council members ended 2015 as divided as ever, and yet dominant. Emerging powers are hedging their bets on Security Council reform amid a changing world, writesGamal Nkrumah

SPORTS

The people’s stadiumInas Mazhar tells the story of Cairo International Stadium which has become an integral part of the nation’s social fabricOPINION

to Riyadh, a sandstorm closed the airport, leaving me stuck for nine hours. Print Email

Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 09:32PM ET

The cabinet: The rise and fall of Egypt’s governmentsThe 123 governments formed since the Khedive Ismail set up the country’s first cabinet 140 years ago tell the story of Egypt’s political, economic and social development, writesKamal Rayan

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On 18 September, Egypt’s 123rd cabinet was formed under Prime Minister Sherif Ismail, almost 140 years after the formation of the country’s first modern government. In September 1878, the Khedive Ismail ordered Nubar Pasha to form a cabinet that had among its members Ali Pasha Mubarak as minister of education and awqaf (religious endowments)

The 123 cabinets formed since then tell a story of Egypt’s political, economic and social development. Governments were removed and others were replaced at critical times in the nation’s history.

The first batch of governments that appeared under the British occupation often failed to survive

more than a few weeks at a time. But during the period spanning 36 years under former president Hosni Mubarak, the country had only seven cabinets, not counting minor reshuffles.

Over the past four years and because of the political instability that followed the 25 January Revolution, seven governments have been formed — equal to the number in the 30 years of Mubarak’s rule.

The shortest government in Egyptian history was that of Ahmed Naguib Al-Hilali Pasha, which was formed on 22 July 1952, just a day before the Free Officers Revolution rendered it obsolete. The longest in recent memory was that of Ahmed Nazif in the 1990s, which lasted for 11 years.

Between July 1952 and January 2011, Egypt had 46 cabinets. Of these, five were under the presidency of Mohamed Naguib, 12 under Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 16 under Anwar Al-Sadat, and 13 under Hosni Mubarak.

Between January 2011 and September 2015, Egypt had eight cabinets, of which three were under the former ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), one under ousted president Mohamed Morsi, and two under transitional president Adli Mansour, with the final two being under President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi.

 This year, the cabinet headquarters witnessed an unprecedented event when Salah Helal, a former minister of agriculture, was arrested in connection with a corruption scandal as he stepped out of the cabinet premises. A few hours before the arrest, prosecutors had issued an arrest warrant for him. At the end of the weekly meeting of the cabinet, Helal was asked to tender his resignation. Moments later, he was in police custody.

Many people have thought that Ismail’s government, formed in September, is an interim government that will not last more than a few months. This notion was born of the tradition that says a new government should be formed after the election of the new parliament, in keeping with constitutional traditions.

As a result, many of those nominated for ministerial positions in the Ismail cabinet declined to accept them. But President Al-Sisi gave the new government the kiss of life when he said that under the constitution the government would not have to resign after the elections. It would simply need to present its programme to the new parliament, and if the parliament approved it, it would stay in office.

It is therefore ironic that this government, which many considered to be an interim one, will be the first that the president has not been able to dismiss or even reshuffle without the consent of at least one-third of the parliament, in keeping with the constitution.

The ministers of the Ismail government are now preparing a comprehensive government programme to present to the parliament. It will be the first since the declaration of the republic in June 1953 whose future depends on the parliament’s approval of its programme.

The 2014 Constitution gives extensive powers to the government, including immunity against dismissal by the president without parliamentary approval, and allowing the parliamentary majority to name the prime minister if it wishes to do so. But some expect the constitutional provisions giving the parliament such powers to be amended in the course of next year, if a campaign led by some public figures succeeds in persuading the parliament to amend the constitution.

The Ismail government also failed in its first practical test when torrential rains hit the coastal city of Alexandria in October. The president wasted no time in holding a meeting with the government and instructed it to change its methods of crisis management. The government survived the pressures with the least possible damage, choosing to dismiss the Alexandria governor from his post.

It then did the same in the recent exchange-rate crisis, deciding to dismiss the Central Bank governor following a sharp increase in the dollar’s exchange rate versus the pound. The crash of the Russian plane after it had took off from Sharm El-Sheikh on 30 October constituted another challenge for the government, but one it handled it with remarkable success.

 

SIXTY YEARS OF GOVERNMENT: The first government after the 1952 Revolution was led by Mohamed Naguib and formed on the same day the republic was announced. The second cabinet was also led by Naguib, with 20 ministers on board and Gamal Abdel-Nasser serving as interior minister. Fellow Free Officers Abdel-Latif Al-Baghdadi was minister of defence and Salah Salem was minister of national guidance.

On 22 February 1954, Naguib resigned in protest against the arrest of key national figures, including

Wafd Party leader Mustafa Al-Nahhas, and Nasser took over the reins of government. From 25 February to 8 March 1954, Nasser was prime minister of a cabinet of 19 ministers. He promoted his long-time friend Abdel-Hakim Amer to major-general and made him commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

From 8 March to 17 April 1954, Naguib resumed his post as prime minister after protestors took to the streets demanding his return. Naguib’s cabinet included 18 ministers, and Nasser continuing to serve as vice-premier. From 17 April to 28 June 1956, Nasser became prime minister in a cabinet of 24 ministers. Salah Salem became minister of Sudan affairs. Naguib stayed on as president, but only temporarily. He was dismissed from all public posts on 14 November 1954.

From 29 June 1956 to 7 October 1958, Nasser served as both president and prime minister in a cabinet of 21 ministers. This was the first government to be formed following the new 1956 Constitution. In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, known as the Tripartite Aggression in Egypt, Nasser created a new ministry, called the Ministry of Port Said Affairs, and set up the ministries of agricultural reform and public works.

From 7 October 1958 to 20 September 1960, Noureddin Tarraf, the first civilian prime minister since the abolition of the monarchy, served as prime minister. His cabinet was formed after the establishment of the Egyptian-Syrian Union, christened the United Arab Republic (UAR), on 22 February 1958.

The UAR’s interim constitution, ratified on 5 March 1958, abolished regional ministries and created a Cairo-based united cabinet. A united parliament, known as the Maglis Al-Ummah, or Council of the Nation, was also formed.

From 20 September 1960 to 28 September 1962, in the turbulent days before the union with Syria collapsed, Kamaleddin Hussein took charge of the cabinet. His cabinet, which included Syrian ministers Akram Al-Hurani and Salaheddin Al-Bitar, lasted a little over a week, however, and the two-state union was formally disbanded on 28 September 1962.

From 29 September 1962 to 1 October 1965, Ali Sabri led a cabinet of 25 ministers. He created new ministries for the Aswan High Dam, scientific research and higher education. On 25 March 1964, ministries were created for electrical power, housing and utilities, and irrigation; the Ministry of Industry was divided into two, one for light industry and one for heavy industry.

From 1 October 1965 to 10 September 1966, Zakaria Mohieddin served as prime minister and minister of the interior in a cabinet of 22 ministers. He set up a Ministry for Tourism and Antiquities. From 10 September 1966 to 19 June 1967, Mohamed Sidki Suleiman served as prime minister in a cabinet of 26 ministers. Mohieddin had earlier resigned in a row over the introduction of austerity measures.

From 19 June 1967 to 28 September 1970, Nasser himself served as both president and prime minister in a cabinet of 28 ministers. His main objective was to rebuild the country’s economy and defence after the 1967 War. He brought in Mahmoud Riad as foreign minister, Mohamed Fawzi as minister of defence, and Tharwat Okasha as minister of culture. Nasser died on 28 September 1970.

From 20 October 1970 to 17 January 1972, Mahmoud Fawzi became prime minister in a cabinet of 26 ministers. This was the first cabinet Sadat’s rule. Fawzi introduced two new ministries, one for civil aviation and another for mineral resources.

From 17 January 1972 to 26 March 1973, Aziz Sidqi served as prime minister in a cabinet of 32 ministers. He introduced a Ministry for Maritime Transportation.

From 26 March 1973 to 20 September 1974, Sadat served both as president and prime minister in a cabinet of 30 ministers. He sought to assert his authority in the face of student protests and ahead of the 6 October 1973 War. He brought in novelist Youssef Al-Sibaai as minister of culture.

From 25 September 1974 to 16 April 1975, Abdel-Aziz Hegazi led a cabinet of 35 ministers, introducing a ministry for oversight and another for petroleum. He began implementing Sadat’s Open Door economic reform policies and passed laws to stimulate foreign investment.

From 16 April 1975 to 5 October 1978, Mamdouh Salem, a former interior minister, became prime minister, leading a cabinet of 28 ministers. Negotiations with Israel were underway, and Sadat needed Salem to pacify the home front. Salem cracked down on protestors during the riots of January 1977.

From 5 October 1978 to 14 May 1980, Mustafa Khalil led a cabinet of 33 ministers, creating a Ministry for Construction and Urban Communities. From 14 May 1980 to 6 October 1981, Sadat himself led a cabinet of 29 ministers. Faced with widespread criticism over the Peace Treaty with

Israel, Sadat arrested hundreds of opponents on 5 September 1981. He was assassinated a month later.

From 6 October 1981 to 2 January 1982, Hosni Mubarak assumed power as acting president and led a cabinet of 25 ministers, all of them members of Sadat’s last cabinet. From 3 January 1982 to 5 June 1984, Fouad Mohieddin led a cabinet of 30 ministers. He appointed Kamal Al-Ganzouri as minister of planning and Safwat Al-Sherif as minister of information.

From 5 June 1984 to 4 September 1985, former intelligence chief Kamal Hassan Ali was appointed prime minister, leading a cabinet of 32 ministers. Ali also served as interior minister in the same cabinet.

From 5 September 1985 to 9 November 1986, economist Ali Lotfi served as prime minister in a cabinet of 30 ministers, replacing Ali who had resigned for health reasons. Lotfi was also chairman of the Economic Committee of the then ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

From 11 November 1986 to 2 January 1996, Atef Sedki served as prime minister in a cabinet of 30 ministers. Egypt was then subjected to a campaign of violence by Islamist extremists, one of whom assassinated writer Farag Fouda in the early 1990s. The government lasted for ten years, during which it promoted Open Door-type policies and sought to rein in the influence of extremists.

From 4 January 1996 to 5 October 1999, Kamal Al-Ganzouri became prime minister in a cabinet of 30 ministers. In July 1997, following the killing of 58 people by extremists in the Luxor massacre, Al-Ganzouri fired Hassan Al-Alfi from the Interior Ministry and replaced him with Habib Al-Adli.

From 10 October 1999 to 9 July 2004, Atef Ebeid became prime minister in a cabinet of 32 ministers. A former public sector minister, Ebeid initiated a wide-scale programme of privatisation. He kept several long-serving ministers in his cabinet, including Safwat Al-Sherif, Youssef Boutros Ghali and Farouk Hosni. He floated the Egyptian pound in 2003, ending the multi-tiered exchange rate the country had pursued for years.

From 9 July 2004 to 30 December 2005, former telecommunications minister Ahmed Nazif became prime minister in a cabinet of 34 ministers. At 52, Nazif was the youngest prime minister in Egyptian history. He brought several prominent businessmen into the government, including Rashid Mohamed Rashid as minister of trade and Mohamed Lotfi Mansour as minister of transport.

From 31 December 2005 to 29 January 2011, Nazif was reinstated in office after Mubarak’s win in the presidential elections in 2005. He closed down the Ministry of Youth and Sports and continued to pursue pro-business policies. His government stepped down days after the 25 January Revolution.

From 31 January to 3 March 2011,  Ahmed Shafik, a former minister of civil aviation, became prime minister in a government of 25 ministers. He was the last prime minister to be appointed by Mubarak and continued to serve for a few weeks under the then-ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

From 3 March to 1 December 2011, Essam Sharaf, a former transport minister, became prime minister in a cabinet of 29. His association with the 25 January Revolution earned him the post, and he started his new career by visiting Cairo’s Tahrir Square to pay homage to the young revolutionaries.

But his cash-starved government failed to rise to the nation’s rising expectations, and the post-revolutionary turmoil proved too daunting for the government’s attempts to restart the economy.

From 1 December 2011 to 25 June 2012, Al-Ganzouri was called in to serve as prime minister once again in a cabinet of 30 ministers. His cabinet, in which half of Sharaf’s ministers stayed put, took over amid widespread riots following bloody confrontations near the cabinet’s offices on 16 December 2011.

As prime minister, Al-Ganzouri tried to steer the economy towards stability, but like most post-revolutionary politicians, he spent most of his time fire-fighting rather than formulating consensual policies.

From 24 July 2012 to 8 July 2013, Hesham Kandil, a 50-year-old former minister of water resources and irrigation, became prime minister in a cabinet of 30 ministers. His was the first and last cabinet to serve under ousted president Mohamed Morsi.

From 16 July 2013 to 24 February 2014, Hazem Al-Biblawi, a former minister of finance, became prime minister in a cabinet of 33 ministers. He was the first prime minister to be appointed by interim President Adli Mansour.

Al-Biblawi introduced a new Ministry for Transitional Justice, and brought back the Ministry of Investment. Continued riots plagued his tenure, and he resigned in frustration over the proliferation of labour strikes.

From 24 February to 8 June 2014, Ibrahim Mehleb, a former housing minister, became prime minister in a cabinet of 31 ministers. He kept half of Al-Biblawi’s ministers in office, but resigned for reasons of protocol upon the election of Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi as president on 8 June 2014.

From 17 June 2014 to 12 September 2015, Mehleb was reinstated as prime minister in a cabinet of 34 ministers. He introduced a Ministry of State for Urban Development and Informal Areas and abolished the ministries of information and administrative development.

His justice minister resigned in May 2015 over statements deemed offensive to the working classes. His agriculture minister was arrested in September 2015 over corruption charges. The government was also shaken by continued labour protests against a new civil service law that changed the rules for the promotion of government employees.

From 19 September 2015 to the present, Sherif Ismail, a former minister of petroleum and mineral resources, has been prime minister in a cabinet of 33 ministers. He has kept half of Mehleb’s ministers in office, merged several ministries (higher education and scientific research, health and population, and education and technical education), renamed the Ministry of Transitional Justice as the Ministry of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, and created a new Ministry of State for Immigration and Expatriate Affairs.

 

THE SHWIKAR PALACE: The cabinet’s current headquarters on Qasr Al-Aini Street is located in what was formerly known as the Shwikar Palace. This Italianate mansion, hardly visible from the street today, was once home to Princess Shwikar (1847-1947), a great-great-granddaughter of Mohamed Ali and, for a while, wife of the future King Fouad I.

Princess Shwikar was the daughter of Prince Ibrahim Fahmi and Princess Nagwa. She was married to Prince Ahmed Fouad, later King Fouad I, but the two had serious marital troubles. When Shwikar complained to her brother, Prince Ahmed Seifeddin, that Ahmed Fouad was physically abusing her, the brother shot the future king at the Mohamed Ali Club, seriously injuring him.

Seifeddin claimed insanity, was incarcerated for a while in Egypt, and then spent time in a mental institution in the UK, after which his whereabouts became the subject of conflicting media gossip.

Shwikar herself remained in Egypt with her full titles and managed to keep up cordial relations with the young prince who was to become King Farouk I. She ran a number of charities, started a women’s magazine in 1945 called Al-Maraah Al-Gadidah, and entertained politicians and writers at her famous Sunday salon.

The Shwikar Palace once commanded an unobstructed view of Qasr Al-Dubara and Saray Ismailia across the area’s tree-lined streets. Neither of the last two buildings still stands, but the ley line of what was once monarchical glamour can still be seen in the trappings of modern bureaucracy.

Princess Shwikar sold the palace to King Farouk, the son of her former husband, who turned it into the cabinet headquarters. The Saray Ismailia gave way to the commanding presence of the Mugamma, a vast building designed on modernist lines, which has served as government offices since it was finished in 1951.

Shwikar bought the palace from Ali Pasha Galal, another member of the royal family, and renovated it in the highest Italian and French fashion of the period. When Farouk bought the palace, Shwikar moved out of the palace and into a house built by her son, Mohamed Wahideddin, in Matariya, where she lived until her death in 1947.

In 1987, 40 years after her death, the Matariya building was given historic status, legally protecting it from demolition or alteration.

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Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 09:28PM ET

The Supreme Court: Justice in the balanceCairo’s Supreme Court, the symbol of justice in Egypt, has amply witnessed the steadfastness of the judiciary in the face of the challenges brought against it, writes Sayed Saleh

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One would be hard put to find an Egyptian who does not know the Supreme Court Building in Cairo.

It is a landmark as familiar as the sun in the sky to all, regardless of social or educational background. Yet few people may be aware that this very same building once served as the headquarters of the Zamalek Club.

Not long after founding the club in 1911, Georges Marzbach, a Belgian lawyer who served as chief magistrate of one of Egypt’s “mixed courts”, decided to move its headquarters from Qasr Al-Nil Street to a new location on 26 July Street.

He wanted to expand the club, which was growing and becoming more popular among Egyptian and expatriate young people. The move was made in 1913, at which point the name was changed to the Mukhtalat Club. It was not until 1959 that the club settled into its current premises in Mit Okba in Mohandessin and acquired its present name of the Zamalek Club.

The Supreme Court was designed by Egyptian architect Mohamed Kamal Ismail, who drew on Italianate architectural influences, as evidenced in the building’s towering columns, majestic façades and large interior spaces.

The building houses several judicial bodies, including the offices of the prosecutor-general, Court of Cassation, Court of Appeals and Supreme Judicial Council. It also serves as the premises of the Cairo Lawyers Syndicate.

It houses a number of courtrooms, the most famous of which is named after Abdel-Aziz Fahmi, the celebrated judge, lawyer, politician and poet, and a prominent figure in the Egyptian nationalist movement in the early 20th century.

The Abdel-Aziz Fahmi Courtroom is another symbol of justice in Egypt. Beneath the lofty ceiling of this chamber some of Egypt’s most celebrated lawyers and judges have been heard, arguing many of the country’s most important cases in the course of more than three-quarters of a century.

After the 25 January Revolution, the Supreme Court became a place where demonstrators of various

stripes converged. It was seen as a refuge for the defenders of a cause. Protestors from diverse occupational backgrounds aired their grievances from its steps. Even judges striking against the judicial authority law staged a sit-in there. The Supreme Court has borne testimony to many post-revolutionary events, not least demands for retribution made for the martyrs of the January Revolution.

The Court of Cassation in Cairo is similarly famous. This grand edifice, constructed 84 years ago, is on the premises of the Supreme Court. The Court of Cassation is the peak of the country’s judicial system, in accordance with the constitution and the law, which places it at the forefront of the Egyptian court system. It has also been at the forefront of public and media attention, as it has the final say in legal cases.

It has saved many people condemned to death, as was the case for the defendants in the “Trial of the Century” that investigated those charged with ordering or collusion in the killing of peaceful demonstrators during the 25 January Revolution.

The Court of Cassation has a bench of 10 judges who deliberate on cases that have been heard in 18 criminal court circuits and 12 civil and civil status circuits in Egypt. It serves to unify the interpretation and application of the law and as a recourse for defendants appealing verdicts issued against them.

 

THE LEGAL YEAR: 2015 could not end without recording the heroic acts and steadfastness of the Egyptian judiciary in the face of various challenges and threats, not least of which have been the terrorist attacks targeting many of its members, from the 24 November massacre of judges in Al-Arish to the 29 June assassination of prosecutor-general Hisham Barakat.

The 12 months of sorrow that the judges have experienced, including the deaths of their colleagues in Al-Arish and the assassination of the prosecutor-general, as well as the bomb detonated in front of the Supreme Court in Cairo and the series of terrorist cases brought before them, never once deterred them from the performance of their duties.

Their spirit of self-sacrifice has been boundless, and it manifested itself most recently in their supervision of the parliamentary elections to complete the third juncture of the roadmap announced in the wake of the 30 June Revolution.

As events this year showed, despite the onerous tasks before them and the formidable challenges and threats, Egypt’s judges were commensurate to the magnitude of their responsibilities.

“2015 was filled with challenges,” said Judge Mohamed Hamed Al-Gamal, a former head of the State Council. “It was a year of crucial issues that riveted the attention of public opinion at home and abroad. Among these were the terrorism-related cases surrounding the Al-Arish massacre that claimed the lives of many judges, the assassination of former prosecutor-general judge Hisham Barakat, and the assassination of the son of Counsellor Salah Abdel-Ghani, deputy president of the State Litigation Authority.”

Among the most salient events this year were the rulings reversing guilty sentences against defendants who had been condemned to death for killing demonstrators. Judge Ahmed Al-Zend was also appointed minister of justice to replace Judge Mahfouz Saber, and Judge Nabil Sadek was appointed successor to the late prosecutor-general Hisham Barakat.

Not only members of the judiciary were targeted by terrorists; so too were its institutional symbols. In March, a bomb was detonated in front of the Supreme Court, killing two people and injuring three others. The attack did not diminish the judges’ resolve and determination to serve truth and justice, however.

In May, Judge Ahmed Al-Zend took the oath of office as minister of justice before President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi. He succeeded Judge Saber Mahfouz, who had tendered his resignation against the backdrop of the controversy stirred when he said that he would never appoint the “children of rubbish collectors” to judicial posts.

The Al-Arish massacre claimed the lives of three judges and their driver. It was carried out by the Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis group just hours after the head of the Cairo Criminal Court, Judge Shaaban Al-Shami, announced that he would submit his findings on the Wadi Natroun prison break case to the Grand Mufti. The case involves deposed former president Mohamed Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood leaders, Hizbullah members and other defendants.

Clearly, the perpetrators of the attack were seeking to wreak vengeance against the judges and to intimidate the judiciary. This message was confirmed through the terrorist attacks against the Port Said Eastern District Preliminary Court and the Assiut Courts Complex, and the Molotov cocktail attacks by Brotherhood militants against the Al-Sadat Court.

The assassination of the prosecutor-general, with a car bomb that targeted his convoy in the suburb of Heliopolis, triggered a pall of sadness among his colleagues in the judiciary and the Egyptian people as a whole.

However, that heinous terrorist attack, as Justice Minister Ahmed Al-Zend described it, only increased the determination of the judges to implement the law. “The martyrdom of Judge Hisham Barakat will not deter the judges of Egypt and the members of the prosecution-general from the performance of their lofty mission and their constitutionally stipulated duty to apply the rule of law against terrorists and other perpetrators of criminal acts,” he said.

“These terrorist crimes fall within the framework of desperate attempts on the part of terrorist elements to deter judges and prosecutors from the performance of their duties to correctly apply the principles of the criminal law. These crimes will only reinforce the determination of the members of the judiciary and the prosecution-general to enforce the law courageously and without fear or trepidation.”

The assassination of the prosecutor-general while he was fasting during Ramadan was “a hideous act that exposed the iniquitous depths of these terrorist groups and their determination to intimidate members of the prosecution-general and the courts after the sentences handed down against the Muslim Brotherhood leaders,” said Adel Amer, a legal expert and director of the Egyptian Centre for Legal, Political and Social Studies.

Those groups had failed to deliver their message, he said. “They only strengthened the resolve and determination of the members of the judiciary to enforce the law and establish the principles of justice regardless of the sacrifices.”

He continued, “The swift meting out of justice is the shortest road to carrying out the mission of the courts to deter and confront crime.” Amer added that the many challenges the judges face — threats, terrorism, the rising number of cases — compel members of the judiciary to complete their investigations into terrorist-related cases and issue rulings against defendants as quickly as possible so that those convicted can serve as examples to deter others who might contemplate committing terrorist crimes.

On 20 September, Judge Nabil Sadek took office as the new prosecutor-general. He took the oath of office before President Al-Sisi, who then spoke with the newly sworn-in prosecutor about the crucial

role the prosecution plays in carrying out justice in terrorist-related cases, the importance of working with the official oversight agencies in fighting corruption, and the need to resolve the cases and issues that have been kept pending during over the recent period.

The two men also spoke of the dynamism that the prosecution-general needed to bring to bear on a variety of issues and in a manner appropriate to the three battles being fought simultaneously: against terrorism, against corruption and, the third, to promote development.

 

PROMINENT TRIALS: On 6 September, former minister of agriculture Youssef Wali, former advisor Ahmed Abdel-Fattah and others were prosecuted in the case referred to in the press as the Bayadiya Island Trial. The defendants are charged with illegally selling land to business tycoon Hussein Salem at below-market prices and misallocating more than LE700 million of public funds.

On 13 September, the same court, the Court of Cassation in the Supreme Court, was the venue of the Steel Licences Trial involving business tycoon Ahmed Ezz. The hearing was to contest the guilty verdict handed down against Ezz in late 2013, and the 37-year prison sentence.

On 5 November, the Court of Cassation was also the scene of the last phase and final measures in the trial of deposed former president Hosni Mubarak on charges of killing peaceful demonstrators during the 25 January Revolution. “The Trial of the Century”, as it was known in the press, riveted domestic and international public opinion for four years.

Earlier, the court had accepted the prosecution’s request to contest the “annulment” of the Criminal Court’s decision, refusing to hear the case against the former president on one charge, namely “collusion in the deliberate murder of demonstrators.” This time the Court of Cassation ruled for a retrial. The court ruled in favour of the deposed president, as well as his sons Gamal and Alaa, and the other defendants in the case.

On 12 October, the court annulled the death sentences handed down against six defendants in what is known as the Kerdasa Case. The Court of Cassation ruled to accept the appeal submitted by the prosecutor-general and five defendants against the verdict handed down against them by the Criminal Court which prosecuted them on charges of storming the Kerdasa Police Station at the time of the breakup of the Rabaa Al-Adaweya sit-in in Cairo in late 2013.

On 15 October, the Court of Cassation resumed hearings on the appeal filed by 38 defendants in the Rabaa Al-Adaweya Operations Room Case, contesting the verdicts passed against them by the Criminal Court. The defendants had been variously condemned to life imprisonment or execution.

The Court of Cassation also heard the appeal filed by the prosecution-general against the verdict acquitting former tourism minister Zoheir Garana and former housing minister Ahmed Al-Maghrabi of charges of profiteering and squandering public funds.

Earlier, Judge Abu Bakr Awadallah, who presides on the bench of the Cairo Criminal Court, had overturned a guilty ruling against the two defendants in a previous trial on these charges.

One of the most high-profile cases of 2015 was the Marriott Cell Case involving 20 Egyptian and foreign journalists, including an Australian, two British nationals and one Dutch national. The case acquired its name as the defendants were alleged to have used the Marriott Hotel in Zamalek in Cairo as their base of operations.

Investigations claimed that the defendants had created a media network headed by an Egyptian-Canadian dual national who was alleged to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The defendants were charged with falsifying and fabricating video footage and broadcasting it via the Al Jazeera television channel with the purpose of distorting Egypt’s reputation in the international community.

2015 also saw major corruption scandals brought before the courts, among them the case surrounding the Ministry of Agriculture that led to the resignation of former minister Salah Hilal and the director of his office, Mohieddin Mohamed Said. Also implicated were Ayman Gamil, a businessman who was accused of bribery, and Mohamed Foda, said to be an intermediary.

The acting prosecutor-general said that the Ministry of Agriculture corruption case had involved officials who had received bribes in the form of tangible assets and had demanded real estate from Ayman Gamil in exchange for enabling him to acquire some 2,500 acres of state land in Wadi Natroun. The “gifts” had included an appointment as a working member of the Ahli Sporting Club with an honorarium of LE140,000, clothing from upmarket stores to the tune of LE230,000, mobile phones worth LE11,000, and a Ramadan breakfast banquet at a luxury hotel costing LE14,500.

In addition, the families of the bribe-takers had asked the briber to cover the travel expenses of 16 persons for the pilgrimage to Mecca to the tune of 70,000 Saudi riyals per person. There was also a request for a luxury home in 6 October City valued at LE8,250,000.

In November 2015, famous business tycoon Salah Diab and his wife and son Tawfiq were arrested shortly after Prosecutor-General Nabil Sadek issued a warrant to confiscate the money and property of 17 businessmen owning six major firms.

The businessmen were charged with illegal dealings connected with the sale and acquisition of state land, violations of building codes, the illegal use of agricultural land, the appropriation of public funds, profiteering and brokering illegal transactions. The prosecutor-general issued travel bans against officials and businessmen implicated in the corruption scandals until the investigations were complete.

If 2015 was a year in which the terrorist menace reared its head, threatening the judiciary and its members, it was also one in which the judges and prosecutors redoubled their resolve to contend with many formidable challenges, from terrorism to corruption. They were more determined than ever that justice would prevail.

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HERITAGE

Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 09:04PM ET

Dam: Building continuesImposing a de facto reality has been Ethiopia’s policy regarding the controversial Grand Renaissance Dam — a policy that became even more obvious in 2015, writes Doaa El-Bey

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“Numerous meetings of the National Tripartite Committee (NTC) took place this year, in addition to various meeting of the foreign and irrigation ministers of Cairo, Addis Ababa and Sudan. And the outcome is nothing,” said a diplomat who spoke with Al-Ahram Weeklyon condition of anonymity.

“The only achievement is building nearly half the Renaissance Dam. So what is the use of negotiations regarding that issue?”

Nine meetings of the NTC have been held so far, the latest of which was held on 11and 12 December, in the hope of conducting technical studies to determine the impact on Sudan and Egypt of Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam. The committee consists of four representatives and experts from each of the three countries.

The 12 and 13 December meetings of the tripartie committee in Khartoum were concluded with  no final agreement. A new round of trilateral talks will take place on the 27thof December.Meanwhile the building of the dam is going ahead at full speed. Some experts have cast doubt on the

negotiations track, saying they fear that negotiations will still be underway when the dam is fully built.

Abbas Sharaki, a professor at Cairo University’s Institute for African Research and Studies, said that the negotiations are a waste of time and have led to deadlock. He expects that very soon the failure of the negotiations process will be declared.

“It is obvious that negotiations in their present form have no value whatsoever. However, the Egyptian government has repeatedly depended on showing good intentions, declaring that it seeks a peaceful solution via negotiations before resorting to escalation,” he said.

Maasoum Marzouk, former assistant to Egypt’s foreign minister, regards Egypt’s reliance on good intentions as political naiveté.

“Ethiopia is clearly adopting the technique of procrastination and buying time, while the de facto status of a fully built dam is gradually imposing itself on the ground,” he said.

Although 2015 witnessed some positive steps towards resolving the dam crisis, like signing the Declaration of Agreement and President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s visit to the Ethiopian parliament, it also saw setbacks that proved without a doubt that Addis Ababa is using the negotiations to buy time.

Ethiopia asked Egypt to postpone the ninth round of their tripartite meetings in Cairo to late October, after Egypt had sent out the official invitations. The meeting was originally to have been held 4-5 October but was delayed until November.

The meeting was expected to discuss the urgent issue of the withdrawal of one of the consultancy firms commissioned to evaluate the impact of the dam. Representatives also wanted to discuss controversial points ahead of technical studies to determine the impact of building the Ethiopian dam.

Ethiopia also asked for the adjournment of the six-party meeting — including the foreign and irrigation ministers of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as technical consultants ⎯slated for the first week of December in Khartoum.

“Repeated requests to postpone sessions on the pretext that Addis Ababa is busy with other matters show that resolving the dam issue is not a priority for Ethiopia. In addition, the more time passes, the more the de facto reality of the dam is imposed on the ground,” said the diplomat.

The Khartoum meeting which took place on 11-12 December was expected to focus on speeding up implementation of the technical procedures agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles on the dam signed by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan in March.

Relations between Egypt and Sudan have also impacted the flow of negotiations. Sudan was initially opposed to the building of the dam. But that position changed in December 2013, when Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir declared his support for the dam. He said it would benefit Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudan then played the role of mediator between Egypt and Ethiopia, and later became a mere spectator.

Recent tensions between Cairo and Khartoum in part explain why the tenth NTC round, scheduled to have been held on 21 November in Khartoum, was postponed. The media initially quoted Sudanese sources as saying that the tenth round was postponed due to “strained political relations” between Egypt and Sudan.

Then it was claimed that the meeting would be held in December, prior to or in parallel with the six-party meeting. But this never happened.

The withdrawal of Deltares, the Dutch consultancy firm, in September was another problem that sidetracked negotiations. The firm’s withdrawal left Egypt with the task of having to choose another consultancy firm, which could take another six months.

That aside, the two consultancy firms that were supposed to submit studies on the impact of the dam have twice failed to meet the set deadline. The first deadline was in August and the second in September. The two companies were commissioned by the NTC to conduct the studies.

Pope Tawadros’s “historic” visit to Ethiopia was seen as a possible opportunity to resolve the dam crisis. The Coptic Pope paid the first visit of its kind to Ethiopia in September and participated in the celebrations of the Ethiopian Feast of the Holy Cross.

Although the pope stressed that the visit was religious, and intended to consolidate ties between the Egyptian and Ethiopian churches, there were high hopes that it would ease tensions between the two states and give the dam negotiations a boost.

But the dam and its effect on Egypt’s water quota remains a cause of schism between Egypt and Ethiopia. Conflict over the issue goes back to before the January 2011 Revolution, with Egypt attempting several times to prevent the dam’s construction due to concerns over its effect on the amount of water reaching Egypt.

Egypt depends on Nile water for 95 per cent of its water needs. Most of this water comes from the Blue Nile. Differences took a sharp turn when Ethiopia diverted the course of the Blue Nile to start the building process in May 2013.

While negotiations had failed to resolve their differences, the two countries decided to open a new page of cooperation after President Al-Sisi met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn at the African Union Summit in Equatorial Guinea’s capital of Malabo in June 2014.

The two leaders agreed to form a joint committee in the following three months to enhance bilateral relations between the two countries. The foreign ministers of both states issued a joint statement after that meeting in which they stressed that Ethiopia understands the importance of the Nile to Egypt and that Egypt understands the Ethiopian plan and its need for development. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan then formed the NTC to study the possible downstream effects of the dam.

In another confidence-building measure, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan met in Sudan in March this year and signed the Declaration of Principles on the dam. The declaration included cooperation between the three countries regarding their water needs in order to improve sustainable development and regional economic integration. All three countries also agreed to not cause harm or damage to any of the signatories.

The statement issued by the two ministers and the Declaration of Principles signed in March are gestures of goodwill on the part of Egypt, according to Marzouk. “They were benchmarks that should have been followed by more tangible steps toward resolving this crisis. Until now, Egypt has offered various concessions that were not reciprocated by Ethiopia,” he said.

After signing the Declaration of Principles, the three countries agreed to sign contracts with the

French and Dutch consultancy firms to carry out studies on the dam’s possible effects on water access in downstream countries. The studies were also expected to determine the time period it would take for the dam to be filled, and possible environmental and social impacts of the dam on Egypt and Sudan.

Construction of the Renaissance Dam is scheduled for completion by 2017. It will be Africa’s largest hydroelectric power plant, with a storage capacity of 74 billion cubic metres of water and a height of 145 metres. The dam’s foundation stone was laid on 2 April 2011 by the then-prime minister, Meles Zenawi.

Egypt currently receives 55.5 billion cubic metres of Nile water while Sudan gets 18 billion cubic metres, as per a 1959 treaty. Egypt is already suffering from a water deficit of 20 billion cubic metres. That deficit is likely to increase.

Coming generations are going to suffer from the challenging problem of water shortages, Marzouk said. “We are in dire need to look for other ways to reduce that shortage, like nuclear stations to desalinate seawater,” he said.

HERITAGE

Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 08:52PM ET

The Suez Canal: Navigating historyThe Suez Canal, following its expansion, once again proved itself to be one of Egypt’s major economic and geopolitical assets this year, writes Niveen Wahish

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The first thing Egyptian students learn when they take geography is that Egypt is in a central position on the world map, overlooking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. It is this position that has enabled it to house the world’s longest man-made waterway, the Suez Canal, which is the shortest marine route between the West and the East, enabling ships to save time, fuel and operating costs.

The distance from London to the Arabian Gulf using the Suez Canal is 43 per cent shorter than going around the Cape of Good Hope.

According to the World Shipping Council, the distance around Africa is 11,300 nautical miles (20,900km) and would take 24 days. Sailing via the Suez Canal, the journey is 6,400 nautical miles (12,000km), a 14-day trip.

For centuries, and as far back as the pharoahs, there had been attempts to connect the Mediterranean and Red Sea with the Nile. But it was only in 1854 that the French diplomat and engineer Ferdinand

Marie de Lesseps succeeded in enlisting the interest of the Egyptian khedive, Said Pasha, in a project to build the Suez Canal.

In 1858, the Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez, the Suez Canal Company, was formed. It was to dig the canal, operate it for 99 years, and then return it to the Egyptian government.

The company was originally owned chiefly by French and Egyptian shareholders. But in 1875, the khedive Ismail sold Egypt’s shares to Britain because he was overwhelmed with debts, having used up enormous resources on huge infrastructure projects.

Ismail’s foreign debt and the sale of Egypt’s shares in the canal entrenched foreign involvement in Egyptian affairs, and by 1882 Egypt had become a de facto British protectorate.

The British interest in Egypt emanated from its interest in the Suez Canal, which provided it with easy access to its empire in India.

Even when Britain withdrew its soldiers from the rest of Egypt it continued to station troops along the Suez Canal.

Egypt regained full control of the canal when then-President Gamal Abdel-Nasser nationalised it in 1956, the action triggering the Tripartite Aggression by Israel, followed by Britain and France, against Egypt. The aim of this aggression, sometimes called the Suez War, was to regain Western control of the Suez Canal.

The geopolitical importance of the canal has meant that the West has long been wary that Egypt might take the decision to close the canal to international traffic, and in 1956 the canal was closed for around six months.

During the 1967 War, ships were sunk in the Suez Canal, and traffic came to a standstill and remained so for eight years. The canal also was at centre stage during the 1973 War against Israel. Egyptian troops crossed the canal, broke through Israeli fortifications on the east bank, and regained control of Sinai.

The canal was reopened in 1975. Since then it has undergone several operations to widen and deepen it. This year it received a major expansion, allowing it to accommodate two-way traffic. The original completion of the 160-km waterway in the 19th century took ten years of hard work in which thousands of lives were lost.

The three canal cities —Port Said at the northern entrance, Ismailia towards the middle of the canal and Suez at the southern end — are shaped by their proximity to the canal. Port Said came into existence in 1859, the year digging began. Ismailia came into being the year the canal was opened. This was where settlers from around the country came to search for work connected to the canal. Suez was a small city before the canal was built and has grown exponentially since.

The revamping of the canal in 2015 to allow two-way traffic saw the digging of a new 72km-long and 24metre-deep parallel canal, representing approximately the middle section of the existing 145-year-old Suez Canal. Thirty-five km of canal were dug as part of the new project, in addition to the expansion and deepening of two sections, the Great Bitter Lakes bypasses and the Ballah bypass, to a total length of 37km.

The new waterway shortens the transit time through the canal from 18 to 11 hours. According to the Suez Canal Authority (SCA), it reduces the waiting time for vessels to three hours at most, instead of the previous eight to 11 hours, cutting costs and making the Suez Canal even more attractive for shipping companies.

The New Canal was created at a cost of some $8 billion and was funded by the Egyptian people through investment certificates at an interest rate of 12 per cent. The funds were raised in a record six days in September 2014.

Although the sale of the Suez Canal certificates succeeded with flying colours, some economists have criticised the terms for adding to the already gaping national budget deficit. The government is responsible for paying the interest rate on the certificates, as well as paying them out when they mature. Egypt’s budget deficit stands at around 11.5 per cent of GDP. The target for the 2015-2016 budget is to reduce the deficit to 9.5 per cent.

The New Canal allows for the doubling of the number of vessels crossing, from 49 to 97 per day, and is expected to increase the canal’s revenues from the current $5 billion annually to $13 billion by 2023, according to Mohab Mamish, SCA chairman.

The canal’s hard currency earnings have been one of the steady sources of foreign revenues for the government since the 2011 Revolution. Other sources, including foreign direct investment and tourism, have been badly hit in the years since.

Around eight per cent of global sea-borne trade currently passes through the canal. As an article entitled “Why Suez Still Matters” in the US Foreign Policy magazine put it, “For all of Ismail’s shortcomings, he and his uncle, Said Pasha, understood that the creation of the canal would have a long-term, transformative effect on Egypt. The vital waterway placed the country at the centre of global commerce and of important geostrategic issues of the age.”

Global trade has not, however, been faring too well in recent years. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), economists have lowered their forecast for world trade growth in 2015 to 2.8 per cent from the earlier forecast 3.3 per cent, and reduced their projection for 2016 to 3.9 per cent from 4 per cent.

This is attributed to a number of factors that weighed on the global economy in the first half of 2015, including falling demand in China, Brazil and other emerging economies, falling prices for oil and other primary commodities, and significant exchange rate fluctuations.

If these numbers turn out to be correct, the WTO says 2015 will mark the fourth consecutive year that annual trade growth has fallen below three per cent and the fourth year that trade has grown at roughly the same rate as world GDP, rather than twice as fast, as was the case in the 1990s and early 2000s.

“Volatility in financial markets, uncertainty over the changing stance of monetary policy in the United States, and mixed recent economic data have clouded the outlook for the world economy and trade in the second half of the year and beyond,” the WTO said.

Maritime experts say the New Suez canal has been built for the next 100 years and not just for today, meaning that the increased capacity is necessary, particularly in the light of the present congestion in the canal.

Moreover, the doubling of navigation is only one part of the planned development of the Suez Canal. What is really counted on to boost growth and create jobs is the overall development of the Suez Canal region. Plans are now underway for the development of the Suez Canal Area Development

Project (SCADP) which covers a number of locations within a 650-square-km area and including the three canal cities.

Maritime and port activities make up the core of the project, which includes six ports: East and West Port Said, Ain Sokhna, Al-Adabiyah, Al-Arish and Al-Tor. The master plan focuses on developing East Port Said as a transshipment port and Ain Sokhna as an international and domestic port and industrial centre.

Just as these cities grew when the first Suez Canal was established, it is hoped that the new projects will mark a new phase of growth, with Egyptians from across the country moving to take up work on projects in the area. The SCADP is projected to create one million jobs over the next 15 years. Some believe that this figure is too low, considering that Egypt’s annual need for new jobs is 500,000.

Beyond 2030, it is hoped that an additional 2.5 million jobs will be created. The jobs will serve the area’s population and at the same time will attract others to the area. The cost of infrastructure that will be needed in the area are estimated at some $15 billion.

The region will be governed by a slightly modified version of Law 83/2002, which applies to special economic zones. The law establishes a sole authority with full administrative powers within the designated zones. The law will only apply within the economic zones and not the entirety of the Suez Canal area.

Former minister of local development Ahmed Darwish was chosen a couple of weeks ago to head the new authority. His appointment has been hailed by many as a good choice.

Two further milestones have been identified for 2030 and 2050. By 2030 there will be 400 factories in the 22-square-km industrial area adjacent to East Port Said. The go-ahead for the project was given a couple of weeks ago by President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi when he inaugurated a project to develop an industrial, seaport and logistical complex in the eastern part of Port Said.

The development of the East Port Said project, which includes the expansion of the area’s harbour and the development of an industrial zone, is set for completion in two years’ time.

LIVING SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 08:48PM ET

Al-Dabaa: Egypt’s nuclear dream Al-Dabaa will host Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, writes Ahmed Kotb

Zohr and the nuclear plant are aimed to end Egypt’s chronic energy shortage Print Email

The coastal city of Al-Dabaa, along the Mediterranean Sea, is 170 km west of Alexandria. It is part of the Marsa Matrouh governorate, stretching 60 km along the coastal line.

The city gained strategic and political importance after a presidential decree was issued in 1981 stipulating that 15 km of the city and about three km deep into Al-Dabaa would be the site of the Egypt’s nuclear power plant.

But it was only this year that actual steps were taken to make the plan come true. After several delays since the 1980s, an agreement was finally signed between Cairo and Moscow on 19 November .

The agreement commits the two countries to build a nuclear power station that will start operation in 2022, securing about 50 per cent of Egypt’s energy needs, according to officials.

 The deal with the Russian nuclear firm Rosatom says it will finance and construct four third-generation reactors within the next 12 years, with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts (MW) each, for a total of 4,800 MW. The Al-Dabaa site is considered suitable for eight reactors.

This Russian-built plant will be located on the same spot that was specified back in the 1980s.  It will be built on approximately 12,000 feddans, according to the Egyptian Survey Authority of the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources.

Calls for the establishment of a nuclear plant go back to the 1950s. However, for various reasons, including foreign political pressure and few energy shortages at the time, the plans were shelved until the 1980s.

Several studies of the area, conducted over many years, show that it is more suitable than other suggested locations across Egypt, including the Red Sea, because it is less prone to earthquakes and has suitable meteorological conditions and ground water movement, as well as sea currents and tides.

“Choosing the Russian company was only because it had the best offer. It had nothing to do with politics,” said Mohamed Al-Yamani, spokesman of the Ministry of Electricity and Energy.

The third-generation reactors to be built in Al-Dabaa, Al-Yamani said, provide the highest level of safety and operate with normal pressurised water that prevents any radioactive leaks. The leaks that occurred in the Fukushima and Chernobyl reactors occurred in reactors that operated using boiling water.

 Details about the value of the Russian deal are not officially available . President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has announced that a Russian company will finance the project, and that the loan will be paid over 35 years with revenues earned through the production of electricity generated by the nuclear power plant. The Al-Mal financial newspaper has reported that the power plant will cost some $25 billion.

 Locals whose land has been taken by the government for the site of the nuclear reactors have started to receive compensation. In November, residents of Al-Dabaa who were affected by the nuclear plan received LE120 million , the first installment in a total compensation expected to reach LE360 million.

The government is compensating residents who used lands in the area for herding and cultivating olives and wheat, even though the lands were originally state-owned. The outstanding LE240 million will be given to inhabitants in two future phases. The second phase is expected in January 2016.

 The compensation was calculated at LE30,000 for each of the 12,000 feddans, a sum that was approved by Al-Sisi. He had promised “appropriate compensation” after leading negotiations with the population of Al-Dabaa a couple of years ago, when he was minister of defence.

After intensive negotiations, Al-Sisi agreed to meet their demands. These included monetary compensation and job opportunities for residents.

A Bedouin-style residential city with 1,500 housing units is currently being built on 2,300 feddans. The land was allocated by presidential decree by Al-Sisi in November 2014 for housing the people of Al-Dabaa.

 The residential area is scheduled to be ready by the beginning of 2016 and will include health-care units, markets, roads and sports courts. The services were not part of the original deal between the government and the locals: Al-Sisi has described it as a “gift to the people of Al-Dabaa .”

Things were not always so rosy. In January 2012, residents of Al-Dabaa stormed the nuclear station site and tore down its walls and camped out on the land.

They refused to give the land back to the Nuclear Power Plants Authority before reaching a settlement that compensated them for damages, and demanded that the government choose another location for the nuclear plant. In September 2013, they handed the site back to authorities after the settlement was reached.

According to Ibrahim Al-Oseiri, former consultant to Egypt’s Nuclear Power Plant Authority, finding an alternative location for the project would have been very costly and time consuming.

“Studying and choosing another venue would take about four years,” he said. Al-Oseiri said that the cost of moving the project to another site would cost more than $25 billion , in addition to the funds already spent on Al-Dabaa.

“We had already been losing about $8 billion annually over the past 30 years due to delays in implementation.”

Besides, Al-Oseiri added, all the studies have shown that Al-Dabaa is the perfect location for the electricity-generating nuclear station, without having any harmful effects on touristic investments in the city.

The investments were introduced to Al-Dabaa in 2004 by Ibrahim Kamel, an industrialist and high-ranking official in former president Hosni Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party .

At the time, the shift towards tourism development suggested that the state had changed its mind on nuclear energy. In 2006, however, Mubarak announced that the nuclear plant project would be revived and built in Al-Dabaa.

The January Revolution in 2011 delayed the start of construction once again, but serious steps were made to re-launch the nuclear project under Al-Sisi’s government.

Egypt had planned to build a nuclear power plant in Al-Dabaa in 1984, but the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 made citizens in Egypt wary of supporting any nuclear project at that time. The government decided to put the project on hold, and it has been on and off since then, until last month’s agreement with Rosatom.

 Al-Oseiri said that the nuclear power plant will save Egypt about $1 billion in energy spending per year, adding that Egypt’s current total electricity generating capacity amounts to around 30,000 MW, and that Al-Dabaa is expected to provide an additional 15,000 MW to this capacity .

Nuclear energy is part of the government’s plan to diversify its energy sources to prevent any future crisis resulting from shortages in electricity, said Al-Yamani.

Total electricity production currently rests at about 32,000 MW, and the highest consumption recorded was 28,000 MW last summer.

The periodic nationwide blackouts in 2014, especially during the summer when air conditioners in homes are heavily used, proved that the growth rate of domestic demand cannot be covered in the long term by conventional electricity projects.

Once an energy exporter, Egypt has turned into a net importer during the last two years  because of declining oil and gas production and increasing consumption. It is trying to speed up production at recent discoveries to fill its energy gap as soon as possible.

The discovery of the Zohr gas field in 2015 is expected to plug Egypt’s acute energy shortages and save it billions of dollars in imports.The new find is  the biggest in the Mediterranean with an estimated 30 trillion cubic feet of gas.

 Investments in solar and wind energy projects will rise significantly following the approval of the feed-in tariff scheme by the government in September 2015 , after lengthy studies determined a fixed tariff for energy produced from projects under the new system.

The system allows any individual or company, public or private, to generate electricity from wind and solar energy and sell it to the national grid.

New renewable energy projects worth $13.5 billion are expected to be set up by 2022, according to the Ministry of Electricity and Energy.

Egypt aims to generate 20 per cent of its electricity through renewable resources by 2020, up from the current less than two per cent. “However,” stressed Al-Yamani, “nuclear energy is key to securing Egypt’s long-term energy needs.”

The Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) was held under the slogan of “Egypt the

Future” in the Red Sea resort of Sharm El-Sheikh from 13 to 15 March, and attended by the representatives of more than 112 countries.

It aimed to breathe new life into Egypt’s economy, battered by four years of political turmoil, and to place Egypt on the global investment map. Egypt pinned great hopes on the summit and Egyptian ministers and investment bankers toured the world to promote the conference and drum up support.

Around 2,000 delegates attended, including the CEOs of major multinationals, representatives of international financial institutions, businessmen, both domestic and foreign, as well as top-level officials from regional and international economic organisations.

The government said the conference was a success and that it had achieved its goals, boasting that deals worth tens of billions of dollars had been signed with major multinationals at the event.

Deals finalised were valued at $36 billion, a figure that increased to $60 billion when projects and loans by international financing organisations were included, the latter alone accounting for $5.2 billion. This was in addition to a $12.5 billion aid package from the Gulf countries.

Some $6 billion in Gulf aid in the form of deposits was received by Egypt in April from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. An additional $6.5 billion was to be injected into Egypt’s economy by the Gulf states in the form of investments and aid. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have extended $23 billion in aid and investments to Egypt since June 2013.

Meanwhile, projects valued at billions of dollars were also negotiated over the conference’s three days but were not included in the final figures. These mostly related to memoranda of understanding that may take some time to materialise as solid contracts.

One of the major deals signed was with Siemens. The German industrial giant says it will invest 10 billion euros ($10.5 billion) to increase Egypt’s energy production capacity by up to a third by 2020.

Most of the announced deals were in the energy sector, in electricity or oil and gas, and in both down- and upstream operations. Top officials from the Italian energy giant

 Eni, the US’s General Electric, the UAE’s Ittihad Integrated Petroleum & Chemicals, and the UK’s British Petroleum (BP) signed agreements with Egyptian ministries on the fringes of the conference.

The largest deal was signed with British Petroleum, which committed $12 billion to developing gas resources and condensates in the West Nile Delta over four years.

In November, Egypt went on to sign five oil and gas exploration deals worth around $2.2 billion with Italy’s Eni.

Those deals were also the result of the EEDC, according to the Petroleum Ministry. During the EEDC, a heads of agreement document was also signed. The proposed deal, worth an estimated $5 billion, is designed to develop Egypt’s oil and gas resources and increase the security of return on Eni’s investments.

The biggest deal at the conference was for exploration in the Gulf of Suez and Nile Delta with an investment of $1.5 billion. The second was in northern Port Said in the Mediterranean, with a minimum investment of $500 million.

Minister of Planning Ashraf Al-Arabi said in an interview with the Al-Mal newspaper in August that the results of the EEDC fell into two categories. The first included contracts signed during the conference, mostly in the energy and petroleum sector, and these have all materialised.

The second included memoranda of understanding, some of which have been turned into contracts, while others have not. Al-Arabi said that turning memoranda of understanding into solid contracts depends on negotiations that might or might not lead to contracts.

The fact that most of the deals at the conference were in the energy and real estate sectors raised concerns among some observers, who feared that the new projects would not create jobs and that the benefits would be reaped by only a lucky few.

They believe that these projects are a reminder of Mubarak-era projects that brought in foreign investment and increased growth rates but did not help relieve poverty and income inequality. This capital-intensive investment model, dating from before the 2011 Revolution, achieved a growth rate

of seven per cent, but the trickle-down effect never happened and only the business and ruling elites got richer.

Along with energy and gas deals, Egypt also unveiled plans to build a new administrative capital east of Cairo. The new city will be built on 700 square km of land between Greater Cairo and the Red Sea.

The project, estimated to cost $45 billion, was originally planned to be built by Capital City Partners (CCP), a private real estate investment fund founded by Emirati Mohamed Alabbar, chairman of Emaar Properties of Dubai and the man behind Burj Khalifa, the tallest building in the world.

CPP signed an initial agreement for the mega-project at the EEDC. In June, however, Minister of Housing Mostafa Madbouli acknowledged that there were “complications” in the contract negotiations with Alabbar.

In September, the government announced that it has signed an agreement with a Chinese company to build and finance the administrative part of the planned new capital. Construction will begin in January 2016, and Egyptian contractors will be given the opportunity to bid for parts of the project.

Also during the conference, Egyptian businessman Naguib Sawiris said he was ready to invest $500 million in Egypt and was diversifying his telecoms business into infrastructure, energy and transportation, sectors which need major funds.

While some observers have questioned the conference’s achievements, arguing that the announced deals were not actually firm commitments and that the terms favoured foreign investors at the expense of domestic labour, the EEDC had major political and economic significance.

On the political front, the level of international support, led by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, dispelled any lingering question marks over the legitimacy of the political roadmap Egypt adopted following the 2013 removal of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi.

On the economic front, the conference signalled to the world that Egypt was back in business and succeeded in finalising deals worth tens of billions of dollars. But experts say that Egypt should still

address various challenges to boosting investment, the most important of which are bureaucracy and corruption.

The Syrian refugee crisis, the worst such displacement in generations, is far from over. Nearly five million people have crossed the borders into nearby countries. Left to the tender mercies of the local authorities and international relief efforts, they huddle in makeshift camps.

The longer their ordeal continues, the worse their living conditions become as one country after another grows wary of the social and political consequences of their stay. According to UN sources, 4.7 million Syrian refugees now live in neighbouring countries, including two million in Turkey, 1.2 million in Lebanon and 630,000 in Jordan.

But whether they are in Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon, the refugees tell a similar story. They are accommodated in tents or pre-fabs with inadequate water for washing and drinking, primitive sewage, and too few schools and hospitals. Except in Turkey, the refugees have no or little access to work, and they don’t feel safe or welcome.

One million children have dropped out of school as a result of the lack of schooling in the camps. Poor and vulnerable to disease, the refugees face discrimination, claim that they are mistreated by the security services, and say that the inhabitants of nearby villages and towns view them with suspicion.

A main concern in the countries hosting the refugees is that the Syrians may end up staying for years, straining budgets and potentially upsetting the delicate balance among local ethnicities and factions.

Accordingly, these countries are starting to treat the Syrian refugees more harshly, presumably to get them to move back home, or move them on to Europe, which is now bracing for an influx of starving and penniless refugees.

Not only are the refugees prevented from working in most of the host countries, they are often denied refugee status and denied residence. Those who managed to get residence papers at the beginning of the crisis are now having trouble renewing their permits. Conditions in the camps are also kept to the minimum needed to sustain life.

To understand such reactions, the fragility of the demographic composition of many of the host

countries should be borne in mind. Often, these countries are home to a blend of ethnicities and groups that find it hard to coexist even at the best of times and may turn on each other if their livelihoods, land or status are perceived to be under threat.

Citizenry is a precarious concept in most of the host nations, and all of them are continually trying to preserve a fragile balance of local interests.

TURKEY: At the beginning of the refugee crisis, Turkey flung its doors wide open to the Syrian refugees, a decision that has cost its government $7 billion in funds so far. Turkey created camps for the refugees and provided them with housing, healthcare and education. It even allowed those who entered legally to work.

Then the mood changed. Now the Turkish authorities are likely to act as if they want the camp inhabitants to return to Syria or flee onwards to Europe. This attitude has been dictated by Turkey’s mistrust of the Syrian Kurds and by concern that there will be frictions between the mostly Sunni refugees and the sizeable Turkish Alawi community, which is largely sympathetic to the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

Turkish officials are convinced that the semi-autonomous Kurdish state in northern Syria is a threat to Turkey’s national security. Their fears are not unfounded, as Turkish Kurds, seeing the success of their secessionist brothers in Syria and Iraq, may want to join them in a Greater Kurdistan.

Turkish authorities also fear that clashes may erupt between the two million refugees from Syria, who are mostly Sunni, and the half million Alawite Turks who feel affinity to the Syrian regime for sectarian reasons.

LEBANON: Backed by Hizbullah and Iranian forces, the Lebanese army is said to be conducting searches and arresting Syrians in refugee camps in Lebanon. Some of those arrested have apparently

been handed over to the Syrian authorities.

Adding to the atmosphere of mistrust, some Lebanese politicians have accused Syrian refugees of involvement in terrorism. This was the justification given after the Lebanese army shelled the refugee camps. With the Lebanese media also taking a position of hostility toward the refugees, many of the Syrians now feel that they are being held in open-air prisons, unable to move freely or look for jobs.

Lebanese authorities initially allowed relief organisations to create the camps, which are located in the most impoverished parts of Lebanon: the north and the Biqaa Valley. But as the influx continued, the numbers of Syrian refugees increased to the point where they now constitute nearly one-quarter of Lebanon’s population.

At present, the Lebanese are not only worried that the Syrians may take jobs away from them. They are also worried that their presence will stir up tensions between local Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon.

The continuing involvement of Hizbullah in Syria is another cause for concern. The recent bombings in Beirut did not reflect well on the refugees, who are now facing increased suspicion, as potential terrorists may be hidden within the wider displaced Syrian community.

As tensions persist among the various factions in Lebanon, the authorities have grown less welcoming towards the Syrian refugees, who are now viewed as a further element of instability in an already unstable country.

JORDAN: According to the available reports, one family out of three in the Syrian refugee camps in Jordan have now pulled their children out from school so that they may be employed in odd jobs to help their parents.

Nearly 13 per cent of all Syrian refugee children in the country are working instead of studying. Many families say they don’t have enough food, as relief supplies have dwindled. Some complain they are being treated harshly by the police and are viewed with suspicion by the general population.

When hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees first arrived in Jordan, the authorities allowed them to set up camp in remote desert areas where they lived in substandard conditions. The refugees pose no direct threat to Jordan’s security, but their numbers have grown to the point where they now make up nearly 20 per cent of the population.

A poor country, with limited resources to feed the additional population, Jordan is now strained beyond endurance. And it cannot help but think of the last time refugees came in such numbers: Palestinians who left their land in 1948 and then again in 1967 now constitute nearly 60 per cent of Jordan’s population.

Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 05:37PM ET

Palestine: Endless struggleThe future appears grim for Palestinians, which could lead to a full intifada that might spill over to other Arab states, including Jordan, writes Mohamed Gomaa

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The grassroots Palestinian uprising in the towns and cities of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, has entered its fourth month against the backdrop of provocative Israeli policies and actions.

Ongoing settlement expansion, the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the decision to close this Muslim holy place to worshippers on Jewish feast days have inflamed Palestinians’ religious and patriotic passions. Violent clashes between young protesters and occupation forces have continued since September to the present.

The significance of this uprising is not just that it may evolve into a third intifada but also that it has brought a shift in the centre of gravity of developments inside Palestine, from Gaza to the West Bank. This is the first time such a geographic shift has occurred since December 2008, and perhaps even before then.

During this entire interval, news of Israeli military operations against Hamas and the militia factions

in Gaza (Cast Lead, Pillar of Cloud, Pillar of Defence) have garnered the lion’s share of public attention.

Locally, people tracked body counts: more than 2,200 people were killed and at least twice as many wounded in a single operation — Pillar of Defence — in July 2014. Abroad, the media followed the international and regional diplomatic and political activities that attempted to contain the flames and restore calm to Gaza.

Then, in the aftermath of the Israeli attacks, talk of reconstruction efforts and the attendant conferences on this subject occupied most of the rest of regional and international attention toward the Palestinian cause.

The upshot of this was that the West Bank had virtually vanished from the scene. It received little media or political attention apart from brief periods, lasting no more than a few months, in which the Obama administration tried to restart negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel. This occurred twice: in 2010 and 2013.

Apart from those few months, the West Bank disappeared behind the smoke and dust generated by the bombing and destruction of Gaza. This is actually quite an irony, as there is really no comparison between the relative weight of the West Bank and Gaza in the Palestinian national project, whether in terms of geography, demographics or even the requirements of Israeli security.

The West Bank is more than 16 times larger than Gaza. The population of the West Bank is about 1.2 million more than that of Gaza. Jerusalem is in the West Bank. The West Bank is the main source of subterranean water. It is adjacent to the coastal plain in Israel, home to about 80 per cent of the Israeli population.

 

THE WEST BANK RETURNS TO CENTRE STAGE: It appears that the popular uprising has now restored the balance and given the West Bank the attention it merits. The uprising entered its fourth month with, on the Palestinian side, more than a hundred dead, hundreds of wounded and 2,300 arrests, in contrast to more than 20 Israelis killed and twice that number wounded.

The Palestinians have demonstrated an amazing determination to sustain the confrontation against the occupation, despite the extraordinary brutality of the siege.

Some observers do not see a future for this movement in view of the chaos that is raging throughout the region as a whole. It is also true that the uprising still lacks an effective framework in the form of a clear political programme to drive it, unify efforts and promote its sustainability until it yields something positive and concrete for the people under occupation.

However, it is also true that the uprising has refused to ebb quickly, even if Palestinian factional animosities have prevented it from gaining momentum and developing into an overwhelming popular tide.

In light of the foregoing, we can say that what is currently taking place in Palestine might be headed in the direction of what we might term an “intifada of attrition”, as opposed to a comprehensive confrontation.

Israeli policy, up to now, has been to strike forcefully and relentlessly at the flash points, especially after Israeli lawmakers made it easier to kill Palestinian youths. But there is no sign, as of yet, of a move to reoccupy Palestinian cities or even levy punitive economic measures against the PA.

Certainly this would be informed by a number of calculations. Above all, Israeli authorities do not want to see a repeat of the destruction of the Palestinian security agencies that occurred during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, when many members of those agencies joined the intifada, with some assuming leadership positions.

Also, the uprising activities so far lack a concrete organised structure that can be targeted in an open confrontation; otherwise, we would be seeing full-scale incursions into the cities as a practical response to a broadening of the scope and organisation of the intifada.

Until now, the reaction of all Palestinian factions has essentially been to sit on the sidelines and shout encouragement. This presents no useful target for the occupation.

 

MESSAGES TO FOUR FORCES: It is important to note that the current uprising, which has taken the form of individual acts of resistance and relatively limited confrontations against the Israelis, delivers messages to four forces that have emerged in the occupied territories during the past 20 years.

These forces are not an antithesis to the activist youths. Nor are they necessarily driven by unpatriotic or dishonourable motives, or are unwilling to engage in confrontation. However, it seems that they have been transcended by a new way of thinking.

The first of these forces is the PA. Perhaps the addressee is not so much the individual leaders of Palestinian factions themselves, but rather its composition and function as a bureaucratic institution that offers job opportunities to youth but within the framework of security and political regulations emanating from political agreements. The message delivered during the past four months is that PA mechanisms and institutions no longer activate or regulate the movement of the street.

Moreover, the PA no longer embodies a project for a state or national independence that is satisfactory to the street. It has lost its ability to convince the youth of the efficacy of its instruments and means and, therefore, its ability to attract members of the new generation.

Naturally, the current uprising has aggravated the crisis of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and cast into relief that organisation’s failure to rejuvenate itself by bringing on board new generations.

The second recipients are the post-Oslo economic and social forces. Whether economic projects, companies or even NGOs, these were to be the forces — according to the ideas and plans of donors and investors — that would presumably shape the features of the future. But they have gradually lost that role.

Many of these organisations/NGOs have begun to review their work plans, outlooks and even their funding mechanisms with an eye to developing a more realistic approach in light of the occupation, Israeli policies, the demands of conflict and the burst illusion of peace.

The third force is dedicated itself to creating a new reality that would overcome Palestinian rifts and

factionalism. This took the form of youth movements that began to surface in 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring that had just erupted in several Arab countries.

However, these movements soon began to reproduce the shortcomings and ailments of the factionalism that had tried to transcend the same types of rifts and schism, personal rivalries, and inability to formulate a clear and unifying programme. The result was that they lapsed into merely reacting to events, having lost the scope or ambition to evolve into a cohesive and effective political force.

The fourth is made up of the popular resistance committees, especially those operating in rural areas, which were formed to fight the Separation Wall. These committees were instrumental in filling a certain gap in national action and they achieved some important successes.

However, they lacked strong grassroots foundations and were unable to mobilise people behind them. Perhaps they had better luck developing international and global support than they did local support.

They were certainly the object of attempts on the part of the factions and the PA to contain and rein them in. In all events, they have lost much of their momentum despite popular respect for them that, in any case, remained somewhat passive in view of the lack of active backing.

 

ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE, US AVERSION: During his visit to Washington in November, Binyamin Netanyahu said that there would be no peace and no withdrawal before 20 years. Naturally, he was playing his familiar double game: working to win more time while pouring more fuel on the flames. Nevertheless, I believe that Netanyahu, this time, was not just expressing his own point of view or that of his party, or even his government.

He was reading between the lines of the current Israeli social and political scene, which is characterised by systematic shifts toward ultranationalist extremism and exclusivism, and religious fundamentalism on top of that, as well as the mounting influence of the “settler lobby” in legislative and executive decision-making circles.

I also believe that Netanyahu’s proclamation came as a shock to all who had negotiations in mind.

He was frank enough to admit the “Israeli realities” to which so many politicians have turned a blind eye.

Nearly a quarter of a century after the Madrid Conference and more than 20 years after Oslo and the creation of the PA, Netanyahu wants to prolong the whole process another 20 years. At the same time, he refuses to give any indication that the next two decades will bring the Palestinians anything different to the two preceding decades.

The Palestinians, for their part, are simply required to believe him, pin their hopes on his long-term plans, and exercise the highest degree of self-restraint as Israeli policies and interests take their course.

Given that Netanyahu’s remarks coincided with a spate of decisions for wholesale settlement expansion in the West Bank, even a blind man can see what the occupied territories will look like 20 years from now. It is perfectly obvious that Netanyahu’s plan is to buy time and calm in order to push through his project of gobbling up the rest of Palestinian land and Palestinian rights with minimum cost.

Unfortunately, all these Israeli positions, practices and policies coincided with an American reluctance to intervene between the Palestinians and Israelis. In the month that Netanyahu visited the US, the Obama administration made it clear that it had no intention to promote an “initiative” for a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during its remaining time in the White House.

The leaks to this effect were more in the nature of statements issued by Washington in advance of Netanyahu’s visit. The administration is no longer certain, according to these “leaks”, that the so-called “two-state solution” is still possible given all the changes that have been imposed on the ground in the West Bank and Jerusalem, the abovementioned changes in Israeli society, and the signs of a possible third intifada.

The American leaks signify that, for Washington, the Palestinian-Israeli subject has been put into the deep freeze for at least the next two years, during which US elections will be held and a new administration will come to power. In that two-year period, the US will be busy with elections and administration hand-over.

The Palestinian question will hover in a vacuum that various parties will seek to fill, politically and diplomatically, by initiatives that will be devoid of substance and merely serve as a way for European

capitals to while away the time and forestall the descent over the precipice into comprehensive confrontations.

Meanwhile, on the ground, various parties will enter the fray of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations as the vacuum heightens the chances that the grassroots uprising will evolve into a third intifada, and this in turn opens up more prospects for the various Islamist movements.

 

POLITICAL VACUUM PAVES THE WAY TO CONFLICT: Putting negotiations on hold for the next two years will strengthen Palestinian voices calling for the escalation, and perhaps even the militarisation, of this Intifada. The PA will find itself in a very awkward position.

Its Arab allies and international friends expect it to contain the situation and put a lid on Palestinian anger, but it no longer has the domestic clout or influence to succeed in this task. This in turn will strengthen the hand of Palestinian parties who have given up hope for the two-state solution.

They now advocate for “thinking outside the box” and lean towards a “one-state solution.” This solution would be much more difficult and complicated to realise than the two-state solution, not least from the Israeli perspective which is adamant on the Jewishness of the Israeli state and fearful of the Palestinian demographic bomb.

At the same time, the vacuum will strengthen the hand of Islamist forces that will see the conflict over Al-Aqsa as an avenue to reassert themselves and strengthen their influence, and as a means to shift the trenches of the “liberation” struggle to the broader spaces of a religious war.

It certainly helps propel things in this direction when Jewish feast days occasion the organised entry of Jewish settlers into Al-Aqsa Mosque following the forced expulsion of Muslim worshippers by Israeli soldiers. This phenomenon has occurred numerous times.

Occupation forces come into the mosque before 8am to clear the way for Jewish settlers until around midday. It has been billed as a kind of timeshare for the holy precinct. True, this practice appears to have subsided somewhat. However, this is only temporary.

Every step of this nature is geared towards partitioning Al-Aqsa chronologically and physically (to designate places where Jews can stay whenever they want). In this regard, preparations for a new infrastructure for the precinct features special gateways and barricades to monitor and control the entry and exit of Muslim worshippers.

One can already foresee whole days when Muslims are not allowed into the mosque, as occurs at the Ibrahimi Mosque (Cave of the Patriarchs) in Hebron.

In sum, a new front is on the verge of opening in a region already ablaze with numerous fronts in many states, while the Palestinians are staring at two fraught years without the smallest glimmer of hope of any improvement in their lot in the years that follow.

Certainly, some of the fallout from Palestinian recalcitrance will reach other Arab spheres, foremost among which is Jordan, which should prepare itself t

P Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 05:36PM ET

Tragedy in MeccaTragedy struck the city of Mecca twice this year during the annual Muslim pilgrimage, writes Ashraf Abul-Yazid

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Two years after the end of the Ottoman Empire, in the wake of the First World War and the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic, the Arab region clamoured for a revival of the caliphate.

On 3 March 1926, delegates from Muslim countries, including Egypt, accepted an invitation from King Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud to discuss the matter. The gathering was held in Mecca, and Abdel-Aziz immediately announced his desire to be the next caliph. But there were other would-be caliphs.

King Hussein bin Ali of the Hejaz, a rival of Abdel-Aziz, had already made a failed bid for the caliphate. Egypt’s King Fuad I was also eyeing the prestigious position.

On 25 March 1924, the then grand imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Mahmoud Al-Gizawi, the president of Egypt’s Supreme Sharia Court, Sheikh Mohamed Al-Maraghi, and the grand mufti, Sheikh Abdel-Rahman Qoraa, among other scholars, signed a document claiming that the Ottoman caliphate fell short of Islamic laws and set out the terms and conditions for the creation of a new caliphate.

In 1925, the chairman of the Islamic Council in Palestine, Sheikh Mohamed Amin Al-Husseini, tried to organise a conference in Palestine for similar purposes, as did religious scholars in Delhi in India.

As a result, at the 1926 meeting Abdel-Aziz wasted no time in presenting the audience with his bid for the caliphate. “When the state of war [in what became Saudi Arabia] and the fate of the country rested in our hands, the people of good judgement in the Hejaz did not wish to wait for the convocation of an Islamic conference as they were unsure who would come to it. Instead, they sent us pledges of allegiance,” Abdel-Aziz said.

“We turned these pledges down with due humility. Then the people of influence and resolve in Najd, who were the main pillars in purging the country and who are the mainstay of security in the country, for it is on their work that all reform depends, expressed the same view,” he told the delegates.

“We then had to accept the pledges of allegiance because we — the family of Al-Saud — are not tyrannical kings or selfish rulers. Instead, we are duty bound to the rulings of the Sharia.

“You will see with your own eyes and hear with your own ears from those who came before you to this land to perform the pilgrimage how security is well established in the entire land of Hejaz and how, between the two holy shrines, the land is as safe as it has ever been,” he added.

Much of the claim of Abdel-Aziz to the Muslim caliphate emanated from his ability to secure the safety of pilgrims to Mecca, a task that he accepted as a religious duty and a mark of honour, and one that he said qualified him for the highest office in the entire Muslim world — that of caliph.

In the end, none of the other hopefuls were able to prosecute their claims, and the Arabs had to improvise other methods of working together, the later Arab League and other such organisations included.

But Abdel-Aziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia, and his successors continued to take pride in their role as the protectors of the pilgrims, often using the humble title “Servant of the Two Holy Shrines” to assert their central status in the world’s grandest religious ritual, the pilgrimage to Mecca, which is a gathering of worshippers that matches no other and that keeps growing by the year.

As the pilgrims grew in number, the Saudis kept expanding the perimeter of the Kaaba, known as Al-Haram Al-Makki, to accommodate ever more visitors. But managing this grand, and ultimately lucrative, ritual hasn’t always been easy. Violence, accidents and human error have claimed many lives over the years.

Ousting the formidable Hussein bin Ali from power in the Hejaz, Abdel-Aziz assured his listeners in 1926 that, with the power of the sword in one hand and the blessings of the Quran in the other, he would continue to enforce law and order in the land.

“Of money I have nothing... but I have the sword and the Quran,” he said. “The money belongs to the people of the Hejaz, whom I defend and protect,” Abdel-Aziz told visiting dignitaries during the 1933 pilgrimage season.

Two years later, three Yemeni pilgrims attempted to assassinate Abdel-Aziz. He survived the attempt, suggesting that God had wanted him to continue his mission to protect pilgrims against acts of violence. “God in His grace allowed me to survive,” he said. “I ordered the gates of the sanctuary closed and completed the tawaf [ritual walking].”

WAITING FOR THE MAHDI: Fast forward to 20 November 1979, when a son of Abdel-Aziz, King Khaled of Saudi Arabia, faced another surge of violence in Mecca.

A man by the name of Joheiman Al-Oteibi had brought a few hundred supporters to the city where they attempted what may have been a coup d’état, though this is not how Al-Oteibi described it. Instead, he claimed to be acting out of allegiance to the hidden imam, or mahdi, a man who, according to religious tradition, is sent by God to bring justice to the world.

This tradition goes back to a hadith, or saying, of the Prophet Mohamed to the effect that “God will send to this nation at the beginning of every century someone who will renew religion.”

Leading a group of fighters numbering anywhere between 200 and 600, Al-Oteibi claimed that one of his blood relatives, a man named Mohamed bin Abdallah Al-Qahtani, was himself the mahdi. The group barricaded itself into Al-Haram Al-Makki and called on Al-Qahtani to come and accept its pledge of allegiance.

Dozens died in the ensuing clashes and, on 9 January 1980, King Khaled had some of the insurgents executed in public. One of the half-brothers of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s, a man named Mahrus bin Laden, was arrested briefly in connection with this mutiny.

But the bin Laden family mostly backed the Saudi government. A company owned by the family was involved in the expansion of Al-Haram Al-Makki at the time, and it offered information to the police that helped apprehend the insurgents.

Al-Oteibi’s insurrection was a wake-up call to the Saudi government, and it reacted by opening the way for hardline jihadists to go to Afghanistan where they could channel their zeal into battles with the invading Soviets. The jihadist movement, of which Al-Qaeda is only a part, was born from this desire to give the extremists a remote place in which to expend their energies.

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini claimed in a public statement that the US had planned Al-Oteibi’s insurgency. Mobs then attacked US embassies in Pakistan and Libya. On 31 July 1987, Iranian pilgrims staged demonstrations against US policies in Mecca. There were clashes with police and more than 400 people perished, most of them Iranian.

Meanwhile, as the numbers of the pilgrims coming to Mecca grew, Saudi Arabia introduced successive plans to accommodate them. Under King Fahd, another son of Abdel-Aziz, the Saudi government spent about $20 billion on expanding the perimeters of the Kaaba, the holy shrine in the middle of Al-Haram Al-Makki.

By confiscating large swathes of land lying immediately around the older areas, the Saudi authorities were able to expand the total area of the shrine to 356,000 square metres, allowing it to accommodate 773,000 worshippers.

The expansion angered some locals who found it too intrusive, and some of the buildings that were demolished for the expansion were important parts of the city’s religious history. Their concerns were shared by some architects and archaeologists, local as well as foreign, who complained that Mecca’s skyline was being disfigured by modern flyovers and high-rise hotels, with their modernistic lines and glistening glass façades.

DOUBLE TRAGEDY: In 2015, tragedy Mecca struck twice. The first was caused by heavy machinery hired to carry out another expansion plan that would bring the total area of Al-Haram Al-Makki to 1.5 million square metres, large enough to accommodate 2.3 million pilgrims. Over the course of the expansion, the Saudi government had confiscated nearly 5,882 properties next to the shrine’s perimeter.

It was at 5:10pm on Friday 11 September that a giant crane teetered and came crashing to the ground

in Al-Haram Al-Makki in Mecca, killing 111 worshippers and injuring more than 230. No link has been established between the crash of the 200-metre crane and the anniversary of the Twin Towers attacks in the US in September 2001.

The Iranians, who have no love for Saudi Arabia, immediately lashed out at Riyadh, saying the Saudi government was “not qualified” to organise the pilgrimage and urging the formation of an international body to take charge of Mecca. The Iranian newspaper Kayhan said that Mecca should be run by a Muslim “Council of Custodians”, for example.

Then a second tragedy took place. A stampede in the Valley of Mina in eastern Mecca left 1,358 dead, including 464 Iranians, 165 Egyptians, 120 Indonesians, 101 Indians and 99 Nigerians, according to Saudi figures. The real death toll may, however, be higher since Egypt has thus far declared 190 of its nationals dead and 45 missing in connection with the incident, a higher figure than that released by the Saudis.

One report said that the convoy of a Saudi prince in the area had triggered the stampede. Eyewitnesses claimed that the tragedy could have been averted had the authorities opened VIP tents located on both sides of the road to relieve the pressure on the main thoroughfare.

Not letting this opportunity pass, Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, again questioned the ability of the Saudis to organise the annual event. During a speech at the UN, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also demanded an investigation into the causes of the tragedy.

Taksim Square is situated metres away from the Bosphorus and the elegant palaces that testify to the splendours of Ottoman architecture as well as to the last throes of the “Sick Man of Europe” in the early 20th century. It is also an easy walk from that square to the famous and recently re-inaugurated Inönü Stadium, home ground to the Beşiktaş team. Presiding over the square on one side is the iconic Atatürk Cultural Centre, often simply referred to by its Turkish initials AKM. The building has been out of use since 2008, ostensibly on the grounds that it needs structural refurbishment, although there had actually been reports of plans to demolish it. Across the way stands the Republican Monument, built to commemorate the creation of the modern Turkish state. Unveiled in 1928, five years after the founding of the new republic, the monument stands as a symbol of modernism and progress.

HERITAGE Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 05:24PM ET

Shock and awe in ParisThe French capital was hit by a series of terrorist attacks this year inspired by the extremist ideology of the Islamic State and other armed Islamist groups, writes David Tresilian

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Paris was hit by two sets of terrorist attacks this year, the first in January and the second in November, making the French capital a new target in the Islamist terrorism that has affected countries throughout the Middle East and has now set its sights on Europe.

In January, 17 people died when Islamist gunmen opened fire at the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo and at a kosher supermarket in Paris. The deaths, the work of French nationals of North African descent Cherif and Said Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, a French national of West African descent, shocked the world and led to a march of one and a half million people through central Paris in protest at the attacks and in solidarity with the victims.

Thousands of banners read “Je suis Charlie” (I am Charlie) as a way of expressing solidarity with those who died, along with others reading “Je suis musulman” (I am Muslim) and “Jihadistes, arrêtez de caricature le Prophète” (Jihadists, stop caricaturing the Prophet). The magazine had been attacked by Islamist extremists because of its publication of cartoons satirising the Prophet Mohamed, while the kosher supermarket was at least in part targeted in retaliation for Israeli actions against the Palestinians.

Following the January attacks, questions were asked about the reasons behind the radicalisation of some members of France’s young Muslim population, leading them to carry out extreme acts of violence, and what can be done to treat the problem at its roots and not simply by repression.

Many such young French extremists have links with Islamist terror groups abroad, including the Islamic State (IS) group in Syria and Iraq, and have received training and weapons from such groups. Both the Kouachi brothers who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attacks and Coulibaly had such links and have been shown to have trained with them abroad.

However, the January attacks, shocking as they were as a direct assault on the freedom of expression in France, were overshadowed by a second set of Islamist terrorist attacks, this time on 13 November. Eight Islamist gunmen and suicide-bombers claiming affiliation with the IS group attacked bars and restaurants in the east of Paris along with the Bataclan, a music venue popular with young people, in horrific acts of violence that killed 130 people and left over 350 wounded.

At the same time, three gunmen blew themselves up outside the Stade de France football stadium in Saint-Denis north of Paris during a match that was being attended by French President François Hollande. Seven of the eight gunmen blew themselves up either in suicide attacks or during shoot-outs with police. Most of the men have been identified as French nationals of North African origin, and most are believed to have travelled to Syria for training with IS.

Since the attacks took place, information has been appearing in the French and international press on the backgrounds of the eight men who carried out the attacks, with a depressingly familiar picture emerging. Most were born in France, not always in particularly deprived circumstances, usually in small towns or city suburbs. Most seem to have had ordinary childhoods before falling into delinquency and then becoming progressively more and more radicalised.

The criminal backgrounds of the terrorists, all young men in their late twenties or early thirties, drew attention once again to the path from “delinquency to radicalisation to terrorism,” as Hollande put it in a speech to the French parliament in the week following the November attacks. “It is painful to say so, but these were French citizens who killed other French citizens,” Hollande said. “Individuals who, living on our soil, went to fight in Syria or Iraq and often formed networks that helped each other depending on circumstances.”

While the authors of the terrorist attacks seem to have been marginalised by French society, or at least to have lived chaotic lives marked by delinquency and crime, their radicalisation seems to have taken place as a result of the added ingredient of the terrorist ideology of IS and other groups. In the wake of the attacks, questions have been asked about why the French intelligence services failed to prevent the attacks and the adequacy or otherwise of the government’s response.

Yet, the overriding reaction among the public has been a desire to get back to life as normal as quickly as possible after the horrifying attacks and not allow the actions of a group of criminal young men to disrupt life in the French capital further. Unlike in January, when demonstrations took place across France in protest against the attacks on freedom of expression and in support of the victims, there have been no public demonstrations in the wake of the November attacks since these have been placed off limits by the emergency laws adopted after them

However, impromptu memorials have appeared outside the bars and restaurants in the French capital’s 11th arrondissement where the attacks took place, together with a larger memorial consisting of flowers, candles, and cards carrying expressions of condolence, grief and determination, in the Place de la République in the northeast of the capital, which was the scene of the largest of the January demonstrations.

The French media have also been memorialising those who died in the attacks, the French newspaper Le Monde carrying appreciations of each of the victims every day since mid-November. The series has underlined not only the terrible acts of the November criminals, cutting short the lives of 130 mostly young people gathered to enjoy a music concert or a meal or drink with friends, but also the cosmopolitan energy of today’s French capital, which is a magnet for young talent from across the world.

However, amid the desire for steps to be taken to ensure that this takes place there have been fears that a poisonous climate could be being created in France of economic and social exclusion among some young French Muslims, mixed with the extremist ideology offered by IS and similar groups and calls from some French politicians for harsher measures than those adopted by Hollande’s Socialist Party government in the wake of the November attacks.

Writing in this month’s edition of the monthly Le Monde diplomatique, French lawyer Patrick Baudouin, honorary president of the International Federation for Human Rights, an international human rights group, said that in responding to terrorism by restricting individual liberties, already happening in France under the emergency laws instituted following the November attacks, the French government may be adopting policies that are “both counter-productive and illegitimate.”

The laws, in force until February with the prospect of a constitutional amendment to allow further actions, include a “range of coercive measures,” Baudouin wrote, including “curfews, the searching of premises at any time, increased control of the Internet, closure of public places, the banning of public demonstrations, house arrest, increased electronic surveillance, and the banning of associations thought to be a threat to public security.”

These measures have already led to what some commentators have seen as alarming actions by police against groups and individuals not necessarily involved in terrorism.

According to a report in Le Monde on 4 December, since the introduction of the emergency laws 2,235 properties have been searched by police in connection with the November attacks, 263 people have been arrested and 330 have been placed under house arrest. Three French mosques have also been closed on suspicion of having links with Islamist terrorism.

The danger of such actions, Baudouin wrote, was that they could lead to “a loss of liberty without any concomitant gain in security.” Terrorism aims to spread terror and intimidate the population, he added, but reacting to it by introducing more repressive legislation could simply lead to “making ordinary citizens the main victims of it.”

In the meantime, security has been stepped up in Paris to new levels, with police and security personnel being placed prominently in public places and outside department stores, museums, private businesses and even public libraries. Residents and visitors to Paris are having to get used to being scanned by metal-detectors and having their bags opened and IDs checked as part of their daily routine and in the wake of concerns that are likely to last for many months to come.

The Bataclan, the music venue at which some of the worst of the killings took place, remains closed, the street in front laden with cards and flowers. The Bonne Bière café where five people were shot dead on 13 November reopened to customers on 4 December. The Petit Cambodge restaurant, where 15 people died, has announced plans to reopen in mid-January 2016, followed perhaps by the nearby Le Carillon and La Belle Equipe, also hit by the attacks.

At the moment, all are still almost inaccessible behind a sea of flowers. HERITAGE

Issue No.1275, 17 December, 2015      14-12-2015 05:23PM ET

The UN’s unruly dominionThe five permanent UN Security Council members ended 2015 as divided as ever, and yet dominant. Emerging powers are hedging their bets on Security Council reform amid a changing world, writes Gamal Nkrumah

HERITAGE

Issue No.1276, 31 December, 2015      30-12-2015 04:15PM ET

Russia, Turkey and the rise of Islamic StateTurkish policy has made the Islamic State group stronger, but Russia’s policy has been far more cynical, writes Kyle Orton

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Turkey concluded its biggest investigation to date into Islamic State (IS) operatives on its territory late last year and blacklisted 67 people. This provides a good moment to review what Turkey’s role has been in the rise of IS, especially amid the escalating accusations from Russia that Turkey is significantly responsible for financing IS.

The reality is that while Turkish policy has, by commission and omission, made IS stronger than it would otherwise have been, so has Russia’s policy. And the latter has been far more cynical than Turkey’s and has been deliberately intended to empower extremists to discredit the rebellion against Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad.

Turkey’s focus on bringing down Al-Assad and fear of Kurdish autonomy led it into these policies and now, having seemingly found the will to act to uproot IS’ infrastructure on Turkish territory, there is the problem of actually doing so when IS can (and has) struck inside Turkey. The concerns about the external funding mechanisms for IS, while doubtless important, obscure the larger problem: IS’ revenues are overwhelmingly drawn from the areas it controls and only removing those areas can deny IS its funds.

Turkey shot down a Russian jet on 24 November, the first time since 1952 that a NATO member had brought down a Russian military aircraft. Ankara claimed that its airspace had been violated and numerous requests to withdraw were ignored. The Russian plane landed in northern Syria: one pilot, Oleg Peshkov, was killed in the descent by the Turkoman rebels of Alwiya Al-Ashar (The Tenth Brigade) and one, Konstantin Murakhtin, was later rescued. Moscow then imposed economic sanctions against Turkey, including limiting tourism and banning charter flights and also trade in certain foodstuffs.

Russian President Vladimir Putin then raised the stakes on 30 November by accusing Turkey of perpetrating the shoot-down in order to protect IS, with which the Turkish government has commercial interests, notably in oil, but also in weapons. Moscow subsequently accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of personally profiting from the criminal trade in oil with IS.

The reality is quite otherwise, of course. As David Butter of the UK think tank Chatham House put it, given Turkey’s reliance on Russia for energy “if oil was a consideration for the Turkish authorities … they would have had good reason to hold fire.”

Russia attempted to buttress its claims of an IS-Ankara oil trade by having its ministry of defence publish a map, among other “evidence,” purporting to show the three border crossings through which this trade takes place. But the problem is that not one of the border crossings on the map is controlled by IS. Bab Al-Hawa in Idlib is controlled by rebels at war with IS; Hasaka is controlled by a mix of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) that Turkey is bombing inside Syria and the Al-Assad regime; and Zakho is in Iraqi Kurdistan, where IS has been unable to penetrate. After forces led by the PYD, the Syrian branch of the Turkish Kurdish PKK, pushed IS out of Tal Abyad in June, the only border crossing left to IS was Jarabulus.

Worse, Moscow’s accusations against Turkey were not only untrue, but had the feel of being a self-projection. IS sells nearly half its oil to Russia’s client the Al-Assad regime through Russian businessmen, and Russian weapons bound for the regime are a “top source” of IS weaponry.

Russia has also helped the Al-Assad regime in its efforts to strengthen extremist forces in overpowering the nationalist rebels, including by sending IS fighters from the Caucasus to the Fertile Crescent and most recently by preventing US air strikes against IS in northern Aleppo while bombing the rebels fighting against IS by essentially providing IS with air cover.

That said, it is true that Turkey has pursued policies that have strengthened IS, driven primarily by the desire to see Al-Assad overthrown and finding that the United States was effectively on the other side, which meant Turkey had to go it alone. From 2011 until shortly after IS stormed into the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in mid-2014, Turkey maintained effectively an open border with Syria. Anecdotal reports abounded of visible foreign jihadists heading for IS-held areas of Syria via Turkey being waved through customs.

There was a Turkish crackdown against IS later in 2014, with border crossings closed and some vetting taking place of those crossing between Syria and Turkey. Some would-be IS holy warriors were even arrested. Turkey, however, still has not closed down a 60-mile stretch of its 565-mile border with Syria that is held by IS.

 

Turkish oil sales: The accusation that IS is, or at least was, trading oil in Turkey is undoubtedly true.

In October 2014, David Cohen, the US undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, gave a speech in which he said that “according to our information, as of last month, ISIL [IS] was selling oil at substantially discounted prices to a variety of middlemen, including some from Turkey, who then transported the oil to be resold. It also appears that some of the oil emanating from territory where ISIL operates has been sold to Kurds in Iraq, and then resold into Turkey. And in a further indication of the Al-Assad regime’s depravity, it seems the Syrian government has made an arrangement to purchase oil from ISIL… We estimate that beginning in mid-June, ISIL has earned approximately US$1 million a day from oil sales.”

The evidence is that by late 2014 and early 2015 under the pressure of the US-led coalition airstrikes,

IS’ oil income was severely diminished. But IS’ oil revenues appear to have crept back up later in 2015. US treasury sanctions at the end of September 2015 disclosed that Sami Al-Jabouri, an Iraqi who had been an IS official and deputy in southern Mosul, was IS’ supervisor of oil and gas, antiquities, and mineral resources operations beginning in April 2015.

At that time Al-Jabouri had, in collaboration with Fathi Al-Tunisi (aka Abu Sayyaf), IS’ “oil minister”, “worked to establish a new funding stream for ISIL from increased production at oil fields held by the organisation.” It might well be that IS’ oil income is now decreasing again: US military officials said at the beginning of December that over the previous 30 days, more than 40 per cent of IS’ income from oil had been “affected”.

As to official Turkish complicity in the IS oil trade, the first direct evidence that this had occurred came in May 2015 when Al-Tunisi was struck down by a US Special Forces raid and captured data provided some details.

“[Al-Tunisi] was almost unheard of outside the upper echelons of the terror group, but he was well known to Turkey,” a US commentary on the data said. “From mid-2013, the Tunisian fighter had been responsible for smuggling oil from Syria’s eastern fields… and Turkish buyers were its main clients… One senior western official familiar with the intelligence gathered at the slain leader’s compound said that direct dealings between Turkish officials and ranking IS members was now ‘undeniable’. There are hundreds of flash drives and documents that were seized there. They are being analysed at the moment, but the links are already so clear that they could end up having profound policy implications for the relationship between us and Ankara.”

But whatever was previously the case, the current level of oil transactions between IS and Turkey is believed to be minimal, not least because IS’ ability to refine fuel has been reduced by air strikes and there is little market for crude oil in Turkey. There is also the fact that Turkey has “clamped down on key supply routes” to IS.

“Long before Islamic State took root in Iraq and Syria, local smugglers ferried oil, gas and other supplies in and out of Turkey… For a small cut of the action… poorly paid border officials in the region sometimes looked the other way. But Turkey started stepping up its campaign against oil smuggling from Syria in 2012… In 2014, efforts intensified [and] the operations suffocated the illegal fuel trade,” said one official in the Hatay provincial governor’s office in Turkey.

“Turkey has doubled the number of troops on the Syrian border to 20,000, erected hundreds of miles of razor-wire fencing, installed powerful floodlights and dedicated 90 per cent of its drone flights to

border surveillance. It’s like the US-Mexican border, where, despite America’s war on drugs and all its preventative enforcement, narcotics from Mexico continue to enter the country,” the official said.

One former US government official who has worked with Turkey on efforts against Islamic State also challenged the Russian claims. “We knew that there was illicit oil smuggling activity along the Turkish border, but Turkey was actively seeking to contain the smuggling,” the official said.

There has been and to an extent there remains the question of Turkey’s willingness to challenge IS operations on its soil given IS’ boasted capacity to inflict “civil and economic chaos” inside Turkey, something that need not be doubted given the precarious state of sectarian relations in Turkey for many years. With Turkey’s need for tourist dollars and its government relying on economic growth for legitimacy as it imposes some ugly authoritarian strictures this has been a serious threat.

Not all of this can be blamed on Turkey’s recent policies — some of the networks IS is using to smuggle oil across borders date back to the former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein regime’s effort to evade sanctions — but it is clear that Turkey has laid the foundations for what would be called, if it happened to westerners, “blowback”.

Well-placed western observers have worried about the “level of support” for IS among the Syrian refugees in Turkey, and Syrian rebels at war with IS have noted that IS “has many spies … in Turkey, and not just spies but killers.” The full force of the latter fact was brought home at the end of October when an IS spy who had infiltrated the Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently (RBSS) activist group working in IS-held areas to expose the group’s crimes, murdered two RBSS journalists, Fares Hammadi and Ibrahim Abdel-Qader, in Turkey.

The IS terrorist strikes — the 6 January suicide bombing in Istanbul, which killed one person; the 5 June bomb attack on the Kurdish rally in Diyarbakir that murdered four people, the bombing of the largely Kurdish peace rally in Suruc on 20 July in which 33 people perished; and finally the bombing at the Ankara railway station on 10 October that massacred 102 people, essentially Turkey’s 9/11 — seem to have stiffened Turkish resolve. When Turkey concluded its investigation recently, it was notable that of the three named major IS agents operating on Turkish soil, two had already been arrested.

Halis Bayancuk (aka Abu Hanzala), a senior IS leader based in Istanbul, was rounded up in late July, and Asaad Khelifalkhadr (aka Abu Suhayf), a key provider of logistics and supplies to IS foreign fighters arriving in Turkey, has also been taken into custody (admittedly on charges related to his fake passport rather than terrorism). The man still at large, Ilyas Aydin, is undoubtedly more important than the other two — he is IS’ leader in Turkey — but one has to assume he got the

position on some kind of merit, so it is hardly surprising he should have proven more elusive. Dismantling the networks IS has established inside Turkey while the government effectively turned a blind eye will be a massive undertaking, even with the will to do so.

 

Turkish support: As the conflict has worn on, another fact has become salient: Turkey fears the internal effects of a Kurdish state on its border more than the IS group.

The Turks joined the anti-IS Coalition in August, but it quickly became apparent that Turkey’s primary goal was constraining the PYD/PKK, against which the majority of its forces were targeted. Ankara had been spooked by the PYD linking up their Jazira canton with Kobani in June by punching across the northern Raqqa Province, and it has made it clear that any effort by the PYD to move west of the Euphrates River and connect with the Efrin canton will trigger a direct military response. One of IS’ great survival skills has been to make itself an enemy of everybody and priority of nobody.

Some of the most serious accusations against Turkey to date are of direct support, in the form of weaponry supplied by Turkish intelligence, to Jabhat Al-Nusra (Al-Qaeda in Syria). Turkey’s support has helped make Ahrar Al-Sham, the most extreme majority Syrian insurgent group that has links to Al-Qaeda, one of the most powerful forces in northern Syria. And Turkey has not been coy about this.

During an effort to construct a unified list of vetted insurgents, the US used a colour code: green (trusted allies), red (enemies), and yellow (those somewhere in the middle). America put Jabhat Al-Nusra and Ahrar Al-Sham in the red category, but Ankara put them in the yellow category, “gambling that they could build a moderate rebel force by nudging groups in the middle toward the green, friendly category.”

“We ultimately had no choice but to agree to disagree,” said Francis Ricciardone, the US ambassador to Turkey until August 2014. Moreover, since the formation of Jaysh Al-Fatah earlier this year, an insurgent coalition which includes both Jabhat Al-Nusra and Ahrar Al-Sham, Turkey has openly provided it with support. In short, Turkey’s government has a deeply problematic view of the insurgent landscape in Syria, quite apart from its view of and policies towards IS.

So Turkey has played an unhelpful role in IS’ rise. But the problem with saying that Turkey, or Saudi

Arabia, or Qatar, are really behind IS is not just distortion. There is also intellectual laziness. The wish is father to the thought: if IS is being bankrolled by some nefarious foreign actor, then the solution is simply to shut down the funding and watch IS wither. Unfortunately, defeating IS will not be that simple.

Smuggling to the outside world, including through Turkey, of oil and antiquities has been important, as has the importation of foreign fighters who have no social connections to the local areas and thus no compunction in obeying orders to commit the most appalling atrocities that help to suppress any inkling the population might have to revolt. The foreigners are largely unskilled and get used as suicide bombers and cannon fodder.

And there really are underexplored areas of IS’ finances. There was a very interesting investigative report recently on the possible earnings IS has been receiving from money laundering through Iraq’s banking system — a revenue stream in amounts to dwarf anything being talked about from oil — and the unwillingness of the Iraqi political class to tackle this because unravelling IS’ holdings would unravel everybody else’s and potentially leave people vulnerable to charges of funding terrorism. There is also the problem that Iran, the real power behind the throne in Baghdad, is using the same system to help finance its own operations, notably the war against the Syrian population.

But, helpful as all these revenue streams are, focusing on them obscures the self-sustaining nature of IS’ statelet.

In terms of weapons, IS has gained some weapons from careless shipments to the Syrian rebels and even confiscated some weapons from them, but these are negligible. IS’ weapons are largely taken from the Iraqi military, as well as from the Al-Assad regime directly and the above-mentioned Russian and Iranian weapons shipments to the regime.

There is no credible evidence that Saudi Arabia has ever funded IS, nor Qatar, come to that, despite the clear funding Doha provides to Hamas and Ahrar Al-Sham and the deniable mechanisms Qatar at least has operated in letting supplies get to Jabhat Al-Nusra.

Foreign donors do contribute to IS, but the amount they contribute has never mattered: between 2005 and 2010, which includes the period when IS was at its absolute nadir, driven from controlling any territory, forced underground, and its leadership shattered, documents show that IS never received more than five per cent of its budget from abroad. IS has only gained in strength since then, gathering to itself the real source of its wealth: captive populations.

The population over which IS’ 80,000-square-mile statelet rules is estimated at around 10 million. The extraction of zakat from this population and a sophisticated system of “taxes” charges the population on everything from agricultural profits and livestock to the jizya (poll tax) on non-Muslims and the confiscation of the property and assets of people marked as IS’ enemies.

Destroying the IS group’s finances, effectively and sustainably, means denying it control of territory. Any other conclusion is an attempt to circumvent the difficult task of finding a way to roll back IS’ territorial control.

The writer is a Middle East analyst and an associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society in the US. Print Email

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Issue No.1227, 1 January, 2015      31-12-2014 04:59PM ET

Russian economic woesThe Russian economic crisis has been casting its shadow over the Egyptian economy, reports Sherine Abdel-Razek

Amid the tensions in Cairo-Washington relations after the toppling of former president Mohamed Morsi, Egypt has been largely betting on Russia not only as a political ally and source of arms, but also as an important economic partner.

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This was obvious in President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s two visits to Russia in less than a year, the first of which even before his election as president.

The first official visit of Al-Sisi to a non-Arab country after his election was to Moscow, where he discussed setting up a Russian Industrial Zone in the Suez Canal area and negotiated a free-trade zone between Egypt and the Moscow-led Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Moreover, the sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union since March due to Russia’s position on the Ukrainian crisis gave Egyptian exports an advantage.  

Moscow has responded by imposing an embargo on food imports from countries that have hit Russia with sanctions.

Egyptian exporters, especially those of oranges and potatoes, stepped in to the breach, aiming at increasing Egyptian exports of agricultural goods to Russia by at least 30 per cent. In return Russia pledged to increase its wheat exports to Egypt.

“Founding councils like the Specialised Council for Education and Scientific Research gives people hope for the future. It has always been a public demand that the president should have advisors in this particular field, since there are many challenges facing education, including maintaining a balance between quantity and quality, financing education and pricing educational services, a lack of balance between specialties and the needs of society, the lack of adaptation of education to technological and scientific developments, and standards for training teachers,” said Amr Salama, an education consultant and American University in Cairo (AUC) counsellor, at a panel discussion at AUC on Egypt’s Education Crisis in November.

The panel aimed at discussing the challenges facing education in schools and universities and scientific research in Egypt.  

President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi visited Kuwait on 5 January at the personal invitation of Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. The visit, the first since the president came to

power last June, underlined the strong ties between the two countries and represented an opportunity to convey Egypt’s appreciation to Kuwait for its support following the June 30 Revolution.

Al-Sisi’s visit aimed at reassuring Arab, foreign and local investors about the business atmosphere in Egypt ahead of March’s economic summit. The ministers of foreign affairs, petroleum, international cooperation and investment accompanied the president on his tour.

During the visit, the president discussed investment and bilateral agreements with Kuwaiti officials and met with Kuwaiti businessmen and members of the trade and industry chambers to discuss possible investments as well as methods of increasing current Kuwaiti investments in Egypt.

They also discussed Kuwait’s participation in the upcoming economic summit.

Presidential spokesman Alaa Youssef said that the visit had focused on economic affairs. “The president had assigned ministers to prepare reports for files that should be given priority during the visit,” Youssef said.

Trade volumes between the two countries totalled close to $3.2 billion in 2013, including oil and its derivatives. “Kuwait is ranked fourth on the list of the largest foreign countries investing in Egypt and third among Arab countries, with total investments of some $2.8 billion representing 927 companies.

These companies operate in the construction, manufacturing, agriculture, finance and service sectors,” Youssef said. Egypt has shares in the capital of 2,736 Kuwaiti companies, he added.

Al-Sisi’s visit to Kuwait came amidst attempts by some countries to damage relations between Egypt and Kuwait. Reports had been published in newspapers and run on TV prior to Al-Sisi’s visit aiming at stirring up public opinion against Egypt. Some columnists in Kuwaiti newspapers had been against Al-Sisi’s visit, saying that Kuwaiti investment would be better off it it remained in Kuwait.

A few days before the president’s visit to Kuwait, Moroccan TV ran a report about the president which said that Al-Sisi had “led a coup” against ousted former president Mohamed Morsi, thus leading to the “abolition of democracy.”

Issue No.1228, 8 January, 2015      07-01-2015 01:08PM ET

Optimism/pessimismThe coming year could see deepening crises grip the Middle East, yet for some the reasons for cautious hope outweigh the reasons for doom and gloom, writes Abdel- Moneim Said

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Last year’s harvest immediately prompts us to predict what the following year will bring. It appears that this is one of our intrinsic human characteristics. People are always annoyed at the current year in which they are living. In all of my 66 years I have never encountered anyone who was pleased with the year that had just passed.

Curiously, many years later you would find people yearning for the good old times of years gone by. This tendency has given rise to nostalgia for the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and so on. The beginning of this current century is still too close to us.

But its time will come and at that point we will find people reminiscing wistfully about the days of the “Spring”, “the revolution”, the “youth movement”. Perhaps they will recall how “primitive” computers were in those days and the time they got their first “Android” and how that was really the “Bronze Age” in communications technology.

In short, time undergoes a kind of historical warping and that warping extends into the future with its blend of apprehension, pessimism and optimism — an emotional and psychological cocktail that packs a certain amount of happiness and, perhaps, greater quantities of melancholy.

Sociologists for the most part avoid making predictions. For some time only economists have been bold enough to do that, although, more recently, strategic experts have begun to foray courageously into the forecasting realm. This courage has its origins in the enormous pressures exerted by economic interests whose stakeholders are eager to learn how much the world economy will grow and in which sector or sectors, so that they can determine where and when to invest.

As for those with strategic interests, they are unable to take political or strategic decisions until they know whether or not stability will prevail and who will remain a friend or turn into an enemy. In all events, when Carnegie’s political experts were asked which part of the world would experience the most “headline-making crises” in 2015, 75 per cent of them answered, “the Middle East”. The reasons are not difficult to identify.

The region has not yet stabilised and if it had not been happy when oil prices were sky high imagine its mood when prices hit rock bottom. Also, if people had not won happiness and comfort when there was an “Arab Spring”, what will their condition be like now that the spring has turned to winter and that post-spring era brought ruin upon destruction?

The US Council on Foreign Affairs is equally pessimistic about the year that has just arrived. There are dozens of pending global crises and problems, from Ukraine in Europe and its repercussions on Russian-Western relations, to Syria where international and regional powers, religion and the state, Sunnis and Shias and the old and new interweave in a region that is historically rife with conflict and heritage. This year may be the year of eruption or at least the brink of eruption.

Still, pessimism is not entirely ubiquitous. Aaron David Miller, an advisor on the Middle East in the Clinton administration, proclaimed the death of the “peace process”, which was, in essence, a “process” or “peace-seeking”. Yet he is quite upbeat about the coming year. Naturally, he cites the usual reservations but he offers a number of cogent arguments to substantiate his mood.

First, as he writes in Foreign Policy, there could be a US/Western deal with Iran over the Iranian nuclear question. While negotiations in 2014 failed to bear fruit, such is the nature of negotiations and one might regard the period until now as the necessary preparatory phase. The Iranians are under enormous pressure due to the plunge in oil prices and the effects of sanctions.

Obama has just entered the third year of his second term as president and can now concentrate on making his mark in history, in spite of obstructions from Republicans in Congress. Foreign policy is the realm for this purpose.

If Obama can clear the way for the restoration of relations with communist Cuba, which is 90 miles off the shore of Florida, the path to Tehran with which Washington is fighting against Daesh (the Islamic State) is possible. In other words, the meal that has been simmering on a low heat during 2014 should be ready to serve in 2015.

Second, the Israeli election will be held in March and this open horizons to changes in the Israeli political structure. Israel is like other “democratic” nations in which people grow bored with leaders who hang around too long, which is certainly the case with Netanyahu, who has managed to stay in power longer than any other Israeli prime minister.

Meanwhile, rivals are waiting in the wings, whether relatively new faces, such as Herzog from the Labour Party, or older ones that have not had their full chance yet, such as Tzipi Livni. Also, the Israeli mood is changing, the region is seething with changes and the world is constantly turning. Only Netanyahu remains in place and it is clearly high time for him to go.

With Netanyahu out of the way a serious peace process could begin between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Miller regards this as his third cause for optimism because a resolution to that eternal conflict in the Middle East would remove a chronically painful thorn. Of course, some Arabs as well as some Israelis mark this down under the “pessimistic” heading.

However, Miller, for whatever reasons, takes heart in the fact that the conditions have arranged themselves in a manner conducive to the resumption of negotiations. These include the Arab Peace Initiative, Hamas’s weakness, and the lack of military alternatives for both sides leaving the negotiating table as the only available course.

Issue No.1228, 8 January, 2015      07-01-2015 02:05PM ET

Arabs against extremismArab intellectuals gathered at the Bibliotheca Alexandrina to discuss strategies to combat extremist thought. Ameera Fouad attended

HERITAGE Issue No.1228, 8 January, 2015      07-01-2015 01:52PM ET

What next after Palestine's ICC bid?President Abbas has applied for Palestine’s membership in the International Criminal Court, paving the way for trials of Israeli officials on war crimes. Whether this will ever happen is an open question, writes Amira Howeidy

The one thing both Palestinians and Israelis agreed on earlier this week, in describing Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s move to admit Palestine as a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a “desperate” act, might be accurate. But the legitimacy, necessity and repercussions of the move are hotly contested between the two sides, even a week later.

It will take the international court 60 days to process and accept Palestine’s membership. This is perhaps the start of the ICC’s biggest challenge and a real test for its relevance as an arbitrator of international justice as the explosive case of the longest occupation in modern history arrives at its porch. 

All the nine investigations opened by the ICC since its inception in 2002 have been limited to the least politically controversial situations in African civil wars and conflicts. It has been criticised for focusing on sub-Saharan Africa and black Africans only while turning a blind eye to allegations of war crimes elsewhere, including in the Middle East.

Because Palestine — whose territories are under Israeli occupation since 1967, as per the UN, and which has been negotiating the creation of its state with the Israelis for over 20 years, and failing in the process — was previously not officially recognised as a state, it couldn’t sign the ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute.

But in 2012 Palestine was recognised by the UN as a non-member observer state, which gave it the opportunity to sign the Rome Statute. Despite two wars by Israel on the occupied Palestinian enclave of Gaza since, Palestinian Authority Chairman Abbas refused to take the historic step of joining the ICC due to intense pressure and threats by both Israel and the United States.

Abbas also hoped to use the threat of the ICC — and its possible subsequent indictment of Israeli officials — to pressure Israel into accepting a final agreement allowing the creation of a Palestinian state.

After failing to do so, he submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council last week for the Israeli withdrawal of the occupied territories by 2017, which did not pass. In just 48 hours, Abbas retaliated by signing the Rome Statue. 

The PA later announced it would make a second attempt at its draft resolution to end the occupation, after the composition of the UNSC’s non-permanent members changed early this week.

Now that Abbas resorted to the “nuclear option” and “crossed the red line” the immediate reaction from Israel and the US has been to debate how to punish him and the PA. Israel said it would withhold the monthly $120 million of tax and customs revenues it collects on behalf of the Palestinians and gives to the PA, while the US, which advised against this measure, said it was considering revising its $440 million aid package to the PA.

But even in retaliating, Israel and the US have to weigh their options and the consequences of their threats.

“It was in the Israeli and American interest to make severe threats in order to deter the Palestinians from joining the ICC,” said Nathan Thrall, a Jerusalem-based analyst with the International Crisis Group, “But now that the Palestinians have actually done so, both Israel and the United States need to ask themselves what is in their interest.”

Both want to preserve the PA and the security cooperation with Israel that is the PA’s lifeblood. So any punishment Israel enacts against the PA, “will have to avoid threatening its existence or put Israel at risk of taking on the economic and security burden that the PA now carries, thanks in large part to the financial support of Europe, the US, and to a lesser extent the Arab states,” Thrall added.

SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1228, 8 January, 2015      07-01-2015 01:31PM ET

Moscow’s dubious initiativeRussian efforts to arrange talks between the Syrian regime and opposition have led to disaffection, reports Bassel Oudat in Damascus

For nearly a month the Russians have been trying to get interlocutors from the Syrian regime and opposition to sit down together for talks in Moscow. They have already invited a group of people supposedly representing the opposition for these talks, but including individuals believed to be close to the regime, thus compromising Moscow’s bid to act as a credible mediator.

The Russian Foreign Ministry says that its officials will not attend the meetings and that the talks will have no particular agenda. All the invitations have been handed out to individuals, not to specific parties and groups, it says. According to Russian diplomats, the regime has also vetted the names of the participants, a privilege that was not offered to the opposition.

But the way the Russians have handled their own initiative has been so offensive to the opposition and to Syrian public opinion in general that many of those who had promised to attend are now rethinking their decision. And those who will go to Moscow may face the prospect of ostracism, or worse.

As opposition members made their position clear in the Syrian media, several revolutionary groups threatened anyone who went to Moscow with future charges.

Louay Safi, a key opposition figure, was confident that the Moscow initiative would go nowhere. “Under current conditions, any negotiations sponsored by Moscow will not lead to regime change. On the contrary, the Russian leadership will try to boost the authority of [Syrian president] Bashar Al-Assad,” he told the Weekly.

“Any opposition member who acts in a manner that could strengthen the regime will be held accountable for it,” he added.

According to Safi, the absence of a powerful political body representing the opposition and enjoying national and international respect had encouraged the Russians to offer their initiative.

Syria’s main opposition groups said they could not approve of any talks that did not lead to regime change. Any future talks had to start from where the previous Geneva talks had ended, they said. The final communiqué of these talks called for the formation of an interim government with full executive powers to supervise the transition to democratic rule.

Some opposition members said that talks were inconceivable unless a ceasefire is in place and the regime ends its blockade on certain areas and releases the thousands of prisoners it is holding.

Borhan Ghalyun, a key opposition member, said that any talks held with the regime would do more harm than good.

“If the Syrian opposition agrees to talk to representatives of the regime outside a specific political or legal framework and without preconditions, this will be a death sentence for the Geneva negotiations and the decisions passed by the UN Security Council,” he said.

“The only winners in the current scenario are the Russians,” who are likely to try to promote their agenda at the expense of the Syrian opposition, he said.

On Tuesday an army spokesman announced that the body of an officer had been discovered two days after he went missing from the village of Al-Mahdiya, near Sheikh Zoweid. The spokesman said Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis had claimed responsibility for the officer’s kidnapping.

The announcement was made as elite anti-terrorist teams launched an offensive against suspected followers of the militant group. Ten alleged members of Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis were killed in the operation and dozens of suspects were arrested. Bases believed to have served as transit points for the Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis members were also destroyed.

Last week the terrorist organisation killed a Sinai Bedouin whom they accused of cooperating with security forces.

All sides of the Syrian opposition agree on the need to unify their positions. The hardliners, however, insist on excluding the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad from any future plans while the so-called “soft” opposition says that the matter should be left for the whole nation to decide.

According to current plans, several Syrian opposition groups intend to meet in Cairo on 22 January to discuss a common roadmap for the country’s future. Four years after the start of the Syrian revolution there is still no single programme for the opposition. This failure to unite has affected the opposition’s credibility and led to missed opportunities.

Cairo seems like a logical setting for the opposition meeting. Egypt has so far declined to offer money or arms to any of the factions fighting in Syria, and is seen as an acceptable location by most regional and international players.

HERITAGE

Issue No.1229, 15 January, 2015      13-01-2015 09:47PM ET

Lebanon’s Syrian-refugee time bombIneffective aid programmes, the bitterness of winter and sheer numbers make Syrian refugees in Lebanon a potential existential threat to an already fragile country, writesHassan Al-Qashawi

efugee children warm each other by cuddling together (photos: Reuters) Print Email

As though they had not suffered enough from machine gun and missile fire, one of the coldest and bitterest blizzards in living memory has turned the lives of displaced persons in Syria and neighbouring states into an unmitigated hell.

In Lebanon, conditions for the more than 1.1 million registered Syrian refugees and untold thousands of unregistered ones are harsher than ever. Most of these people, who now number almost a third of the Lebanese population, live in makeshift camps or shantytowns situated in the north of the country. This higher elevation receives the harshest snowstorms and freezing temperatures.

Although no official figures are available from the Lebanese government or UN organisations, there have been reports in the press of numerous deaths, mostly children.

Lebanese Minister of Health Wael Abu Faour acknowledged the lack of any official statistics regarding the number of victims of the storm, whether among Syrian refugees or Lebanese citizens. He said that information on the subject was being gathered.

The health minister said that the performance of national and international organisations in coming to the aid of Syrian refugees was unsatisfactory. He said that he had issued a decree that anyone residing in Lebanon, whether Lebanese, Syrian refugee or other foreigner, should be treated for the effects of the harsh weather conditions in government hospitals free of charge. The process would be coordinated with the minister of social affairs.

He added that the NGOs that responded at the beginning of the Syrian refugee crisis were ineffective during the recent blizzard because of a lack of coordination with the government.

Abu Faour’s remarks reflect the general view of Lebanese officials and public opinion on the negligent response of the international community towards the refugee crisis in Lebanon, which has come to pose an existential threat to the country.

They hold that the international community is cutting back its aid, not only jeopardising the lives of the refugees, especially under brutal weather conditions, but also driving them into the arms of terrorist organisations such as Daesh (the Arabic name for the Islamic State group).

A municipal official from the northeast village of Arsal told Al-Ahram Weekly that Daesh is, indeed, taking advantage of the reductions in international assistance, in order to lure and recruit Syrian refugees. There are around 120,000 refugees in and around that village with a Lebanese population of 35,000.

At the same time, the measures Lebanon has taken to control the influx of Syrians into the country have triggered international criticism, from Washington and Damascus in particular. They have also stirred criticisms at home, among allies of the Syrian regime, although not from that regime’s closest ally in Lebanon, Hizbullah.

It is also noteworthy that one of the most enthusiastic supporters of these measures is Lebanese Minister of Interior Nehad Al-Mashnouq, a member of the Future Movement, which ardently supported the Syrian revolution and welcomed the Syrian refugees.

Lebanese Public Security Director General Abbas Ibrahim, known to be close to the Shia duo,

Hizbullah and the Amal Movement, said that restrictive measures will remain in effect despite criticisms.

One of the most vehement critics of the measures is Walid Jumblatt, who has adopted a position that deviates sharply from other Lebanese political forces. The Druze leader has opted to flatter Al-Nusra Front and Daesh, banking on the possibility that they will win in Syria. He has said that Al-Nusra Front is not a terrorist organisation and, on another occasion, said, “May Al-Nusra and Daesh forgive me.”

Some Lebanese Arab nationalists are critical of measures intended to restrict the influx of Syrian refugees. They describe them as an expression of Lebanese chauvinism, adding the reminder that Syria hosted Lebanese refugees from all of Lebanon’s civil wars.

Despite the complaint about chauvinism, and grievances that some Syrian refugees have voiced regarding poor treatment, Lebanese anxiety over the Syrian influx seems understandable.

It is estimated that the overall Syrian refugee population in Lebanon is nearing the two million mark. There are also several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees. Meanwhile, Lebanon is ranked as one of the world’s largest emigrant nations, as measured by population ratios. There are villages that are almost entirely uninhabited, especially in Christian areas, while Syrian refugee camps are overflowing. Most of these are located in rural and primarily Sunni areas.

The agricultural sector has come to rely on Syrian labour. According to the Lebanese minister of labour, there are approximately 600,000 Syrian farm workers.

With no solution to the Syrian crisis on the horizon, the refugee population will grow and become more settled, especially with the rise of a new generation of Lebanon-born Syrians. It will be the experience of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon revisited, but on a much larger scale and with the added complication of perceived historical rights. All Syrians, regardless of their particular affiliations, believe that Lebanon is a region that was stripped from their country.

More immediately, there is the pressing problem of the refugees’ humanitarian plight. The more dire the conditions in the camps become, and the more that feelings of alienation and despair spread among the refugee population, most of whom come from poor and conservative rural areas, the more they will become vulnerable to the wiles of terrorist organisations.

Al-Nusra and Daesh have already begun to move in, now that it has become clear that there are limits to the ability of Lebanon’s Sunni forces to exploit the refugees’ bitterness.

Ataba, an area of Downtown Cairo on the edge of Al-Azhar and Khan Al-Khalili, is an important commercial area known for its heritage. The buildings and streets are wide, and people feel connected to the area. During the 25 January Revolution, the pavements were filled with vendors.

Today, people are more likely to be peacefully seated in coffee shops smoking shishas and reading newspapers. The shops are buzzing with people, but there is a chance to ask a salesman in a stationery store what he thinks about Egypt’s forthcoming parliamentary elections.

“Of course, I will vote,” he said. “The elections are a good thing for people to be able to express their views.” When asked to elaborate on what seemed to be a touchy issue, he explained that there are many other issues that need to be grappled with first.

“The street vendors who have moved to the Torgoman Market are now unable to make a living, so there are a variety of issues which need to be handled before the elections,” he said.

European Parliament report that criticises Egypt’s rights record, reports Ahmed Morsy

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The Foreign Ministry has slammed a report issued by the European Parliament that criticises human rights in Egypt, saying it includes allegations and false information and reflects a lack of awareness of the reality on the ground in Egypt.

“Since July 2013 more than 40,000 protesters have been arrested and 1,400 others killed due to excessive use of force by the security forces,” claims the European Parliament report, released on 15 January.

The report calls on the Egyptian government to release all political detainees and expresses concern over “restrictions” imposed on fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression, the right to assembly, restrictions on NGOs and a recent crackdown on homosexuals.

The Foreign Ministry responded on the same day the report was released, issuing a statement which read, in part: “Egypt is perplexed by, and deplores, the 15 January report by the European Parliament on the internal situation in Egypt. The European Parliament’s approach does not serve bilateral

relations between Egypt and the European Union.

“The European Parliament’s report opposes the sovereign will of the Egyptian people and damages bilateral relations between Egypt and the European Union. The report’s content infringes basic principles of the separation of powers.”

The Foreign Ministry called on the European Parliament to ensure that the information on which such reports are based is accurate. “There is little doubt,” the Foreign Ministry statement continued, “that sections of the report, which deal with matters without taking into account Egypt’s culture, religion and social values, will incite Egyptian public opinion.

“The report reflects a determination to impose foreign principles on Egyptian society, encompassing matters such as the rights of homosexuals, abolishing the death penalty and allowing blasphemy under the guise of freedom of speech.”

Some local NGOs and rights activists joined in the criticism. Said Abdel-Hafez, head of the Dialogue Forum for Development and Human Rights, condemned the report. Muslim Brotherhood members and the NGOs affiliated with the Brotherhood were a major source of information used by the European parliament, he said.

Hafez Abu Seada, head of the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, also questioned the report’s sources of information. “It is telling that the report contains the same number of detainees that the Brotherhood falsely claims,” Seada said.

There are no official statistics on the number of detainees since July 2013. Wikithawra, an independent website that has documented detentions since the 25 January Revolution, estimates 41,000 people have been arrested over the last year, and 53 detainees killed in custody since Morsi’s removal. The Associated Press issued a report in May 2014 claiming 16,000 people had been arrested in the previous eight months, describing the detentions as “Egypt’s biggest round-up” in two decades.

Egyptian authorities deny there are any political prisoners in Egypt. All detainees, say government officials, face criminal charges.

National Council for Human Rights member George Ishak told Al-Ahram Weekly that there are no political detainees in Egypt and “all those arrested are being prosecuted according to the law.”

Ahmed Haggag, chairman of the International Relations Committee of the National Council for Human Rights, argues, “We should not pay much attention to such reports. The European Parliament has a history of supporting radical Islamic organisations. The timing of the report’s publication is also suspect. It comes weeks before parliamentary elections and constitutes an unacceptable interference in Egyptian affairs.”

Seada, who was part of a human rights delegation that visited the European Parliament days before the report’s release, insists that the European Parliament’s findings “do not represent the foreign policy of European countries.”

Gamal Eid, head of the Arabic Network for Human Rights, says the furore with which the report has been greeted belies the truth. “The report presents an accurate portrayal of the situation in Egypt and everybody knows that,” Eid told the Weekly.

“Domestic reactions towards such reports haven’t changed since the days of Mubarak. Those denouncing the report don’t care about public opinion, let alone the truth. Their only interest is to please the president. Abu Seada has happily joined a group whose only role is to polish the regime’s image.”

The figure of 40,000 detainees, says Eid, probably underestimates the total. “We estimate that the number of current detainees has reached 42,000, of which 30 and 40 per cent are provisionally detained. But simply to state accurate figures leaves you open to the charge of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Eid also points out that 18 journalists are currently behind bars, the highest number in 35 years.

The European Union has announced that it will not send a delegation to monitor Egypt’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for March. It says monitoring polls in Egypt, where last year’s presidential election fell short of international standards, could undermine the EU’s credibility.

“The decision not to send a full observation mission to monitor the parliamentary election doesn’t matter,” insists Ishak. “The door remains open for any group that wants to observe the poll. We do nothing wrong and have nothing to hide.”

Issue No.1269, 5 November, 2015      04-11-2015 11:57AM ET

‘Prices over the ballot box’At this moment of political transition in Egypt what counts for both the public and the regime is socio-economic success not elections, political economist Hanaa Ebeid tellsDina Ezzat

Issue No.1269, 5 November, 2015      04-11-2015 12:23AM ET

Business jittersEgypt is trying to improve its business regulations, but major challenges remain, writesNesma Nowar

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Concerns over the performance of the Egyptian economy are growing. The 2015 Business Barometer Index (BBI), an index that tracks business environment changes in Egypt over time, slipped one point in the first quarter of the 2015-2016 financial year, compared to the fourth quarter of the previous

year. The ranking reflects the business community’s concerns about the economy’s slow recovery.

The Business Barometer (BB), conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies (ECES), a think tank, shows that these concerns followed a drop in real GDP growth from 4.3 per cent in the second quarter of the 2014-2015 financial year to three per cent in the third quarter.

The index findings are based on a survey of 474 firms on their perceptions about the performance of the Egyptian economy and based on their own businesses for the first quarter of the 2015-2016 financial year.

The BB reveals that the firms’ evaluation of economic growth declined in the first quarter of the 2014-2015 financial year, compared to the preceding one. Such an evaluation is reflected in the firms’ performances, where production fell by two points and both domestic and international sales declined. However, the evaluation is still higher compared to the lower performance in 2013.

This decline in performance has pushed the firms’ outlook for the upcoming quarter (October to December 2015) to be less optimistic than their expectations for the previous two quarters. Firms expect a decline in domestic sales and a huge increase in inventory despite a modest increase in exports, resulting in lower expectations for production and capacity utilisation.

This should ring an alarm bell for the government to revisit its monetary and fiscal policies with a view to stimulate the economy, the report says. It added that efforts in this respect would help reverse the more pessimistic outlook reported by the business community over the period October-December of the 2015-2016 financial year.

The businessmen surveyed identified four major business constraints in the economy: namely, inflationary pressures, corruption, high taxes and red tape. The ECES report showed that businessmen believe that inflationary pressures are by far the most severe hurdle for business in the country, and firms are also concerned that the depreciation of the pound may cause the inflation rate to rise further.

Egypt’s annual urban consumer inflation soared to 9.2 per cent in September, compared to 7.9 per cent in August, mainly driven by higher food prices.

Corruption was cited as the second major impediment facing the business sector, indicating that more anti-corruption measures are needed. High taxes were another constraint for the sector, showing that the new investment law, which cut the corporate tax rate from 25 per cent to 22.5 per cent, is yet to be felt across the business sector.

Taxes are a particular concern for investors. Egypt has also slipped five points in the category of “paying taxes” in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2016 report, to stand at 151st place out of 189 countries. The government has also been slammed for its “unpredictable” tax policies.

The Doing Business report is an annual study that measures the ease of doing business around the world, including the time it takes to open a business, register property, get credit, and protect minority investors, among others concerns.

The report covered 189 economies, with Egypt ranking 151 compared to 126 last year. Egypt’s deteriorating position has been attributed to the slow pace of reform.

The report shows that over the past five years the pace of reforms has declined with Egypt implementing only two reforms, compared to four on average for other economies in the MENA region. Egypt’s ranking on the ease of doing business has not improved over that period and entrepreneurs still face challenges in several areas.

According to the report, importing products to Egypt is time-consuming, requiring an average of 120 hours to comply with procedures compared to a global average of 87 hours, making Egypt perform poorly in the “trading across borders” area (ranked at 157).

In the “enforcing contracts” field, Egypt is one of two economies in the region where it takes more than 1,000 days to resolve a commercial dispute through the courts, giving the country a ranking of 155.

One area where Egypt has made some important progress is in strengthening minority investor protections by prohibiting subsidiaries from acquiring shares issued by their parent company. The report says that Egyptian minority investors can now be more confident about their investments as

conflicts of interest are better regulated.

The report also shows that Egypt is among the best performers in the MENA region in the area of “starting a business.” “Over a decade ago, an entrepreneur in Cairo took nearly 40 days to start a business, but the required time is now only eight days,” says the report.

Additionally, Egypt requires no minimum capital, unlike the majority of MENA region economies, so budding entrepreneurs in Egypt face fewer barriers. But young entrepreneurs may beg to differ, thinking this is the least of their troubles, with bureaucracy being their biggest problem.

The report reveals that Egypt is the best performer in the region in “getting credit” for the holders of bank accounts as credit bureaus cover a significant share of the adult population and collect all the main areas of information to assess credit worthiness.

The government has been looking into legal and administrative overhauls to breathe life into an economy strained by four years of political turmoil following the 2011 Revolution that ousted former president Hosni Mubarak. Economic recovery has been slow, raising concerns across the business sector.

Issue No.1269, 5 November, 2015      04-11-2015 12:21AM ET

Cooling prices

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PRESIDENT Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has promised to rein in the prices of basic commodities by the end of November, announcing that the Armed Forces and the government will work together to provide goods at reasonable prices.

According to Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, the government plans to make products available to the public directly through wholesale markets and upgrade the government’s cooperative supermarkets, as well as increasing the number of outlets that sell goods at reduced prices.

The newspaper said the government will increase the food subsidies available through the smart cards that presently benefit 60 million people at a cost of around LE30 billion. In order to increase the availability of goods on the market, young people will also be given loans to purchase cargo vehicles that they can use to collect vegetables and fruit from government outlets to sell to consumers.

The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade is already providing food commodities at a 20 per cent

discount through 4,000 governmental and Armed Forces outlets in all the governorates. Khaled Hanafi, minister of supply and internal trade, said that these goods are available in cooperation with the Armed Forces to help people buy staples at lower prices.

He said that 34 companies affiliated to the Food Holding Company will provide products at prices 10 to 20 per cent below the market price and that competition between the government and the private sector will benefit consumers.

The prices of many goods started to soar after the government slashed subsidies on petroleum products in July 2014, raising the price of fuel by 78 per cent at the pumps. Experts also attribute the hikes to the dollar crunch, as well as the drop in the value of the pound against the dollar. The Egyptian pound has lost about 11 per cent of its value against the dollar since January 2015.

Egypt’s urban inflation rate jumped to 9.2 per cent in September from 7.9 per cent in August. Economists say that the increase in inflation is due to a surge in food prices in September, reaching the highest rate in five years. Vegetable prices were the most affected, increasing by 26.4 per cent in September and August. The government had forecast an inflation rate of between 10 and 11 per cent in fiscal year 2015-2016, and a drop to seven or eight per cent by 2018-2019.

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HERITAGE

Issue No.1230, 22 January, 2015      22-01-2015 04:27PM ET

De facto devaluationThe value of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar is falling, writes Niveen Wahish

LE/dollar exchange rate Print Email

The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has been allowing the value of the pound to slide. This week the pound’s official rate against the US dollar fell around LE0.15 to LE7.29 by Tuesday. Just prior to the weekend it stood at LE7.14. The move appears to indicate a willingness on the part of the CBE to allow the pound’s value to fall.

The drop in the value of the pound came on the back of several measures taken by the CBE. The CBE’s monetary policy committee decided at its regular meeting to cut the overnight deposit and lending rates, and the rate of the CBE’s main operations, by 50 basis points to 8.75 per cent, 9.75 per cent and 9.25 per cent, respectively.

It also increased the official rate at which it auctions dollars to the market by LE0.15 on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday in three successive auctions, each by LE0.05, pushing the rate to LE7.29, the highest in seven months. The auctions determine the official rate for hard currency. The pound was trading at around LE5.5 to the dollar when the 25 January Revolution broke out four years ago.

The aim of the move is to close the gap with the black market, where the dollar had been trading at around eight per cent above the official rate. Despite the CBE move, however, the black market rate was not tamed and the dollar was still trading at LE7.88 on Tuesday.

“If the CBE wants to make a dent in the rate, LE0.10 is not enough,” said one banker, who preferred to remain anonymous. “This is only delaying the inevitable and causing a haemorrhage of foreign currency.” To really hit the black market, the banker said, the CBE would need to devalue the pound to LE8 per dollar.

Analysts believe the CBE move aims to contribute to a more favourable investment climate, and set the stage for the Egypt Economic Development Conference scheduled for mid-March.

“The government has a clear intention of stimulating and encouraging investment and is taking the right steps to prepare the business environment,” Eman Negm, an economist with investment bank Prime Securities, told the Weekly.

The anonymous banker agreed, saying that policy-makers are aware that investors are worried about the black market and want to put their fears at ease ahead of the meeting in March. “At one point or another the pound is bound to be devalued, as long as there is a black market there is a need for a devaluation,” he said.

The pressure on the Egyptian pound had been mounting in recent months, especially with Egypt’s foreign reserves dropping to $15.3 billion in December, compared to $15.9 billion the month before, and around $20 billion a year ago. Since the Revolution, vital sources of hard currency revenue, such as tourism, have been hit hard. Tourism revenues came to $5 billion in the 2013-2014 financial year, compared to around $12 billion in 2010.

According to Negm, with importers already basing their operations on the black market rate, the CBE thought it best to focus on investor concerns, especially since the inflation risk is contained as food and oil prices are at an all-time low.

She believes that the devaluation will help the economy, explaining that among other things a cheaper currency encourages tourism and makes Egyptian exports more attractive abroad. She estimated that tourism revenues for the 2014-2015 financial year will reach $8.5 billion.

Negm has a more moderate estimate for the value that will be reached by the pound. If the inflation rate remains steady, within the 10 per cent range, Negm predicts that the pound will reach LE7.35 and LE7.40 against the dollar ahead of the March conference.

The CBE’s monetary policy committee said it based its decision on the fact that inflation has slowed down and growth has been showing improvement, reaching 6.8 per cent in the first quarter of the 2014-2015 fiscal year. The headline consumer price index fell by 1.53 per cent month-on-month and 0.07 per cent month-on-month in November and December, respectively, it added.

The committee said this is due to a “seasonal deceleration in the prices of fruit and vegetables, coupled with the decline in the prices of other food items supported by the decrease in international prices.” It added that lower oil prices and the consequent revision in international food price forecasts means that risks from imported inflation continues to be contained.

According to Negm, the decision to cut rates by half a percentage point is a wise one. She explained that the better economic activity “indicates that investors’ confidence in the Egyptian economy is back, ringing the bell for more policies favouring investments.”

Foreign direct investment reached around $4 billion in the 2013-2014 financial year, compared to $3.75 billion the previous year, but still lower than the pre-Revolution level of $6 billion.

Negm also said that local currency saving deposits have noticeably increased to reach LE891.6 billion in October 2014, compared to LE766.12 billion in October 2013, an increase of 16.4 per cent, creating an incentive to invest money rather than leave it deposited in banks.

The anonymous banker, however, disagreed with the decision to cut interest rates, saying that this will make deposits in Egyptian pounds less attractive and cause a further run on dollars, making it more difficult to close the gap with the black market. He said that the obstacle to improving the investment climate is not the interest rate, but red tape and bureaucracy.

Another banker, who also preferred to remain unnamed, concurred. He said that the general political and economic environment is causing both investors and lenders to hold back from taking any risks.

Monette Doss, chief economist at HC Securities and investment, said that cutting interest rates is good for encouraging private borrowing and pushing economic growth. She explained that interbank liquidity has relatively eased, coming in at four per cent of total banking assets in October, compared to an average of 1.6 per cent in the 2012-2013 financial year.

However, she pointed, “The margin is very thin compared to pre-Revolution excess liquidity of 11 per cent of banking assets.” In addition, she worries about future inflationary pressures for reasons including the weak currency and expected subsidy cuts.

Should inflation remain at its current rate, Negm expects another half per cent cut before the meeting in March.

The CBE cut its rates by 1.5 percentage points during the 2013-2014 financial year in an attempt to stimulate economic growth and boosting investment. In July it raised interest rates by one percentage point to contain the inflationary pressures caused by the partial lifting of energy subsidies.

Issue No.1230, 22 January, 2015      22-01-2015 04:39PM ET

Does a French Muslim ‘community’ really exist?France’s Muslim community is a diverse group with broad ethnic origins and beliefs, writes Nadia Henni-Moulaï

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A Muslim president in the Elysée Palace: In his novel Soumission (Submission), released on 7 January, the popular novelist Michel Houllebecq imagines an “Islamist” party at the head of the French government. The fiction, of course, bears no relation to reality.

As Olivier Roy, professor at the European University Institute and an eminent specialist on Islam, writes: “There is not the shadow of the beginning of the establishment of a Muslim party [in France].”

This observation leads us to examine the concept of the Muslim community itself, so frequently spoken of by the media, as well as the approach of politicians to Islam and France’s Muslims. In its

latest study, the National Institute of Demographic Studies reported that France’s Muslim population is 4.1 million, a figure well below the often quoted five to six million.

The study also found that the Muslim community, in terms of its religiosity, is not homogeneous. If 49 per cent of Muslims are strongly religious, 47 per cent define their religious practice as moderate. Four per cent, referred to as “cultural Muslims”, have a detached relationship with Islam.

The degree of religiosity varies according to origin, to generation and even to social status. It is a heterogeneous community, far different from the “monolithic bloc” mentioned by some.

Hanan Ben Rhouma, editor of Saphir News, an online outlet dedicated to the Muslim reality in France, writes: “To believe and to make believe that the Muslim community is made up of members practicing and living their Islam in the same manner is a big mistake.” Launched in 2002, the website claims 750,000 unique visitors each month.

She continued: “There is no Muslim community in the strict meaning of the term. It is characterised by its religious, ideological, ethnic, political and social diversity.”

HERITAGE

Issue No.1230, 22 January, 2015      22-01-2015 03:47PM ET

Europe’s fear of IslamA fatal error is being made as European politicians and movements like Pegida turn against the continent’s Muslims, writes John Keane

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I was on my way home to Australia, after an extended research stay in Europe and the Arabian Gulf, when news broke of the terrible attack on the staff of Charlie Hebdo in Paris. I felt sickened and shaken, but I was not surprised. A violent event of this kind —well planned, cold-blooded, daringly simple and staged in the heartlands of the secular West for a global audience — has been on the cards for some time.

The Paris violence is part of a wider pattern, the latest phase in a longer string of attacks that were misinterpreted by French politicians and journalists as the work of “lone wolves” and “disturbed’ individuals. It’s worth remembering that in late December last year more than 20 people were injured in Dijon and Nantes when men drove vehicles into crowds of pedestrians.

In Joué-lès-Tours, in central France, a 20-year-old Muslim man armed with a knife and shouting “Praise be to God” entered a police station and wounded three officers before he was shot and killed him. Then the violence hit Charlie Hebdo and the Hypercasher supermarket near Porte de Vincennes in Paris. More attacks are surely on the way.

Making sense of this violence is imperative for citizens who care about their world. At a minimum this requires a measure of detachment from the language of outrage and disapprobation that has swept through France and the rest of Europe over the past week. What the world has witnessed is without doubt savage acts of criminal violence.

But, contrary to the prevailing media narratives, these acts of violence are neither simply “inhuman” (as if humanity has a perfect track record in the field of non-violence), nor are they best understood as being an “attack against France,” as French President François Hollande and other politicians have said in recent days.

The violent incidents are also not “lone wolf” events. Nor is the violence to be understood in the terms of clinical medicine, as a “jihadist cancer” (as said by media tycoon Rupert Murdoch), or as the work of mentally unstable people, as French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve has repeatedly claimed.

The barbarism of our times is different. It is political and it must be understood as such, beginning with the chilling fact that what we are witnessing are acts of revenge by Muslim radicals angered by the rise of a new global bigotry: the fear and dread and hatred of Islam. In many parts of the European Union, where more than 20 million Muslim people now live, Muslim baiting has become a

popular sport. The cold truth is that the organised suspicion towards and denigration of Islam is the new anti-Semitism.

Most of my European Muslim friends and colleagues are disturbed by this trend. They point out that rapturous praise of the sacred principle of freedom of expression, fiercely defended by French intellectuals in recent days, is regarded by most peace-loving Muslims as an alibi for insult. They accuse the champions of free speech of muddling the difference between speech that unsettles the powerful and speech that vilifies the powerless.

In fact, a careful genealogy of the principle of free speech shows that these Muslims are on to something. Think of the English writer John Milton’s insistence, in his Areopagitica (1644) and other writings, that “the Turk upholds his Alcoran [Quran], by the prohibition of printing,” and therefore has no taste for the liberty of the press.

Then consider the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which discovered some years ago, to its cost, that liberty of the press is not a simple matter. There is no such thing as free speech without social consequences and political effects. And cartoons are not just cartoons. Parading as “free speech,” they can easily function as weapons of prejudice and the denigration of the powerless.

It is little wonder then that in 2012 much upset was triggered among European Muslims whenCharlie Hebdo published a series of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, including one showing him lying naked on a bed, being filmed from behind, saying “My ass? And you love it, my ass?”

Pornography and brickbats of that kind cast doubt on the claim made by Philippe Val, former director of Charlie Hebdo, in an interview with the BBC last week, that the magazine was run by people “devoid of hate, of prejudice and was respectful of others.”

That may be so, but many thinking European Muslims, for good reasons, don’t see things that way. For them, the doctrine of secularism, with its roots in the French Revolution, is an ideology of state power, just as it was throughout the period of European colonialism.

For these same Muslims, the secularist insistence that “reasonable” men and women must leave God not for other gods, but for no god, is a species of bigotry. It is a power move, an excuse to round on people of faith who refuse to let religiosity wither or be pushed away into the obscurity of private life.

The Muslim rejection of secularism explains why French school officials who refuse to provide alternatives to pork for Muslim pupils, or “kebabphobes” who insist that foreign grilled fast-food is causing the baguette to disappear, are perceived by many Muslims as bigots or hypocrites who pride themselves on “choice” but in fact dish out insult.

Muslims in France and elsewhere in Europe similarly feel insulted by the whipped-up controversies centred on the burqa and niqab, the hijab and chador. They are dishonoured when people (who usually don’t know the difference) say these garments are incompatible with a modern way of life because they oppress women, whose weakness (oddly) makes them potentially dangerous accomplices of terrorism.

For most Muslims in Europe, even the most freethinking among them, such talk is more than absurd, or weirdly contradictory. To them it smacks of political prejudice, which itself is the carrier of discourtesy. The resulting denigration produces a sense of felt humiliation. From here, they point out, revenge is just a few steps away. They are surely right, for when pushed to the limit, intimidation and humiliation can turn murderous.

That’s a standard axiom of psychoanalysis, championed by respected practitioners such as James Gilligan and Adam Jukes, who have shown convincingly that vilification and disgrace are the fuel of murderous acts. Murder is a crime, but it is rarely straightforwardly the apolitical doing of “madmen” or “crazy loners.”

Civil society:Last week’s murderous violence is political in another sense. It’s a reminder that civil society and its rules of peaceful civility and the public embrace of difference are highly fragile constructions that have no historical guarantees.

The “Je suis Charlie” solidarity rallies that have sprung up in France and elsewhere show that these precious civil society values are alive and kicking. But they also show just how gossamer-thin they are, especially when confronted by the darker sides of European civil societies, which are less than civil, not only in their maltreatment and humiliation of Muslims, but also in the way, through unregulated black markets and freedom of movement of people, they facilitate access to Kalashnikov rifles and rocket launchers for just a few hundred euros.

Armed men dressed in black balaclavas are the new symbols of a shameful fact: the global light arms trade is potentially the killer of civil societies everywhere, in Ottawa, Sydney, Mumbai and

Peshawar, and now in Paris. There’s another political fact that shouldn’t be overlooked. It may be unpopular to put things this way, but the bitter truth is that barbarism of the Paris kind is the poisonous fruit of the so-called War on Terror.

Just a few hours after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, Cazeneuve, again quick off the blocks, said that the attacks confirmed the need for a widened global War on Terror. A few days ago, at an international meeting against terrorism, he repeated the point: the “fight against terrorism,” he said, requires a “global approach.”

This way of thinking contains an inner flaw that is literally fatal. It stirs up feelings among many hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide, for whom the War on Terror includes US-led military violence of a frightening kind: drone attacks and B1-B strikes that kill innocent civilians, torture and humiliation at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, dragnet surveillance and support for dictatorships in the Arab world.

Put bluntly, the terrorism we are witnessing is the twin of the War on Terror. That’s why talk of a global war against terror should be rejected and countered by the brave remark scripted by English actor Sasha Baron Cohen in his film Borat (2006).

The comedy says it well in just a few biting words: this permanent “war on terror” is more like a “war of terror.” The drone-led hostilities are experienced by many Muslims as an all-out war targeting all Muslims, regardless of whether they live in Gaza, Cairo or Kabul, Copenhagen or Paris.

There’s a final and much more depressing reason why the Paris attacks matter politically. The violence we have witnessed represents a “black swan moment”, when democratic values and institutions are being challenged frontally by the spread of militia thinking and militarised politics into the heartlands of what was once known as the secular West.

The Cold War through which I lived my early years always felt strangely distant. Its gravest moment, the feverish Cuban nuclear missile crisis of October 1962, may have threatened the planet’s destruction, along with our way of life, but it did so from afar. Due to changes of weaponry and military tactics and the advent of multi-media abundance, this new global War of Terror is potentially everywhere.

It feels as if it could swoop down onto any public space, any bus or train, any business or public

building, at any unexpected moment. The Paris events, we could say, confirm that wars of terror in faraway foreign places are now coming home.

In responding to this trend, many French commentators have noted in recent days how the Paris murders are an assault on democracy. They are indeed, especially because the new barbarism robs innocent citizens of their lives and spreads fear and self-censorship throughout civil society.

But the state antidote to violence is arguably just as threatening. Dawn police raids, red alerts and security checks are bad for democracy. So are helicopters hovering over our heads, troops on the streets, gun battles and, worst of all, the military siege mentality that is settling not just on Muslim minorities, but on the democratic rights of each and every citizen.

The way things are going, democracies in Europe and elsewhere will soon resemble garrison states. It must be noted that the trend turns the stomachs of many European Muslims. From their point of view, the star of democracy no longer shines. Democracy means lying politicians like former UK prime minister Tony Blair, and double-standard hypocrisy (“Be kind to America,” reads one of my fridge magnets, a gift from a Muslim friend, “or else it will bring democracy to your country”).

It stands for unemployment, job-market discrimination, second-class citizenship, or no citizenship at all. Democracy is disappointment, a dismal affair, a code word for Gaza, Libya, Syria and Iraq. At home, in Europe, it means hostile media coverage, street snubs, silence and suspicion, and growing state repression.

It is exactly this trend that the hooded gunmen want to strengthen. Contrary to what has frequently been said during the past week, jihadi actions do not prove that Islam is humourless or that Muslims have a genetic dislike of satire and frank speech. Equally misleading are claims that the Paris attacks are symptoms of a “clash of civilisations” or a regression to the Middle Ages.

The substance and style of the new violence are thoroughly 21st century. Its key aim is strategic: it is designed to trigger tougher anti-terrorism laws, tighter surveillance, the militarisation of daily life and more Muslim baiting.

The point of the Muslim radicals is to accelerate the decline of democracy by demonstrating to their uncommitted sisters and brothers that democracy is a dying sham. We could say that the ultimate aim of the Muslim radicals is to finish off European democracies that are already in a parlous state.

In this aim, they are strangely succeeding, thanks to the perverse fact that they find themselves twinned with populist movements that opportunistically take advantage of Europe’s civil and political freedoms, so as to press home their bigoted claim that Europe is being overrun by Muslims.

Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of the Paris murders will be the way they fuel the growth of populist backlashes against Muslims throughout Europe. High on the opium of general discontent with the status quo, the new populism finds its multi-media voice in settings as dynamic and different as local newspapers and radio stations, Facebook and Twitter, as well as quality television and high-brow literature.

 

Houllebecq and Pegida:French author Michel Houellebecq’s novel Soumission is a prime example of the new literary populism.

Published just last week, it is the most talked-about novel in Europe. Understandably so since it captures the growing political disaffection with mainstream party democracy that is spreading throughout the continent.

Soumission  is a genre-bending dystopia, a middle-class howl against Muslims, a literary depiction of the year 2022, when a thumping majority of voters reject the French left and right. In Houellebecq’s account of the future, the good citizens of France throw their support behind Mohammed Ben Abbes, who becomes the first elected Muslim president of France.

Ben Abbes legalises polygamy, makes trade deals with Turkey and brings the veil and Sharia law to secular France. The change of government triggers obeisance, toady-like submission, like that of the principal character, a dreary academic who happily wins promotion at the rebranded Islamic University of Paris-Sorbonne and enjoys the pleasure of marrying several wives.

Houellebecq has denied that he’s helping to feed the fires of anti-Muslim feeling, yet, in the next breath, he confirms that the scenario sketched in the novel “is a real possibility.” At the street level, in neighbouring Germany, it is exactly this anti-Muslim sentiment that fuels the rise of the Pegida Movement.

Led by Lutz Bachmann, a convicted criminal and son of a Dresden butcher, Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West) is much more than simply a Dresden or a German phenomenon. It is many different things to many different people. It is a rejection of the complacent post-politics symbolised by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It speaks to the unsolved European political crisis and serves as a barometer of the growing public disaffection with mainstream parliamentary democracy.

But Pegida is also much more than a protest against the failing party systems of Europe. It is also a Pied Piper of the new anti-Muslim bigotry. The movement’s is adept at plumbing the depths of civil society. The typical Islamophobe who attends Pegida rallies (referred to as “evening strolls”) each Monday evening is an “angry citizen” (wutbürger) drawn from many different walks of life.

In the ranks of the movement are football fans, educated middle-class people and opponents of factory farming. There are neo-Nazis, Christians, Putin sympathisers, street hooligans and members of the upper-middle class. Pegida supporters and sympathisers may seem a motley crew, but they share important things in common.

They are annoyed with politicians and the political establishment. They curse the “lying media.” They’re sure the prevailing party system doesn’t represent either their material interests or their gut feeling that their nation is drowning in a rising tide of Islam. Pegida people see no need for a New Deal with Muslims, which is what the whole European region now so urgently needs.

They don’t much like people of the Muslim faith. They say they’ve had enough of Muslim asylum seekers, including those who come from the war zones of Syria and Iraq. Pegida people like people like themselves: good, white, upright and hard-working citizens who now want their homeland back.

Surely, the strangest political fact of all is that Pegida supporters consider themselves democrats. They think of themselves as the people of “the People,” as champions of the shortest of short textbook definitions of democracy: self-government of the people, by the people, for the people.

Pegida supporters seem willfully ignorant of the historical fact that since 1945 the norms of democracy have been democratised. Democracy has come to mean much more than winning elections. It now stands for the refusal of arbitrary power, wherever it is exercised.

Democracy nowadays ideally means the public accountability of power, political humility, respect for diversity and complexity, and the refusal of all forms of bossing, bullying and violence against other people, wherever they may live.

These democratic norms uniquely belong to our age of monitory democracy. It is strange and striking that Pegida supporters and fellow travellers want to turn their backs on these norms, and to do so in the name of the old and discredited sovereign people principle.

Never mind the fact that their definition of democracy is exclusionary and potentially murderous, and that it has no room for Muslims. When these authoritarian populists speak of democracy, what they really mean is “You don’t belong here because you are not one of us.”

Pegida populists are, in this sense, recidivists. They want Europe to turn back the clock, to move forward by stepping back in time, into a world where the people supposedly once ruled. “ Wir sind das Volk” (We are the People), they shout at their Monday evening rallies. Just as bigoted people shouted on the streets in the years leading up to 1933.

The writer is director of the Sydney Democracy Network and professor of politics at the University of Sydney, Australia.

HERITAGE

Issue No.1230, 22 January, 2015      22-01-2015 01:41AM ET

Mission accomplished Egyptian mountaineer Omar Samra has successfully raised the Egyptian flag at the South Pole,

telling

‘Doves and hawks’While talks are underway in Geneva, continued fighting on the ground and the kidnapping of a senior official show that Libya is a long way from ending its internal conflict, writes Kamel

AbdallahMixed performancesThe government of former prime minister Hazem Al-Beblawi was unable to fire up the economy, while that of Ibrahim Mehleb has had a mixed performance. Sherine Abdel-Razek reports

Social insecuritiesToo many Egyptian workers pay contributions to social security but get little, if anything, in return.Sherine Abdel-Razek reports

WORLD

New king, same challengesChallenging issues await King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, reports Doaa El-Bey

Essid cabinet under fireTunisia’s political parties have forced a reshuffle of the country’s proposed new government, reportsKamel Abdallah from Tunis

Hezbollah’s responseThe Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah is weighing its options after an Israeli attack on one of its convoys, writesHassan Al-Qashawi

End in sight?Syrian opposition members meeting in Cairo have come up with a ten-point plan to help end the conflict in the country, writes Bassel Oudat in Damascus

Towards a deal on IranUS President Barack Obama is determined to reach a deal on Iran’s nuclear programme before the deadline, despite opposition in Congress, writes Camelia Entekhabifard

SPORTS

Handball heroes The knock-out stage is beginning at the 24th World Men’s Handball Championship in

Qatar, sa HERITAGE

Issue No.1231, 29 January, 2015      29-01-2015 07:34PM ET

Moving towards the votePreparations for parliamentary elections continue apace. Gamal Essam El-Din reports

Archival photo of the HEC during one of their sessions Print Email

The Higher Election Committee (HEC) has set February 1 as the deadline for applications by media organisations seeking to cover parliamentary polls. The vote is scheduled to be held between the 21 March and 7 May.

HEC’s deadline was announced days after the opening of the registration window for local and foreign NGOs seeking to monitor the vote. That deadline ended on 21 January, by which time 63 local NGOs had applied for permits. They include the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR), National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) and Ibn Khaldoun Centre for Development Studies.

Applications from five international NGOs — US-based Democracy International, Norwegian-based Global Network for Rights and Development (GNRD), Swiss-based International Institute for Peace, Justice and Human Rights, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Geneva-based Mosconi Organisation for Human Rights and Development — were accepted.

HEC Chairman Ayman Abbas said the international applicants “have a proven record in poll monitoring and democracy support and a reputation for impartiality and integrity.”

 The European Parliament and the Carter Centre have both refused to take part in monitoring a vote which they claim will lack competition. Hafez Abu Seada, chairman of EOHR, said, “The problem with the European Parliament and the Carter Centre is that they want the banned Muslim Brotherhood to be integrated into the political process which is an impossible demand.”

The registration date for candidates has not yet been set. There is widespread speculation that the HEC will announce a date by next week.

Political parties say are close to finalising their lists of candidates. Wafd Party spokesman Hossam Al-Khouli said on 26 January that the five-member coalition led by the Wafd will be in a position to present a full list of candidates for party-based and independent seats “within days.”

He said that “consultations between the Wafd Party and other secular political forces to forge a broader coalition have almost stalled.” Al-Khouli told Al-Ahram Weekly that a meeting scheduled for 20 January, intended to hammer out “an electoral consensus document” to be signed by all secular political forces, has been indefinitely postponed.

Wafd Party Secretary-General Bahaa Abu Shokaa told parliamentary reporters that the meeting will be delayed until the committee tasked with drafting the consensus document has finished its work. A number of political analysts are busy drafting the document, which will then form the basis of the election platform of its signatory political parties.

“Signatories have to be committed to the goals of the two revolutions of 25 January and 30 June,” said Abu Shoka.

Amin Radi, deputy chairman of the Congress Party, told reporters that Wafd officials have contacted the heads of political parties to inform them the meeting has been postponed until the document is complete.

Secular political forces first met on 17 January, after President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi appealed to them

to form a coalition capable of winning a parliamentary majority. The 17 January meeting was attended by representatives from 21 non-Islamist political parties and four electoral coalitions. It ended with participants agreeing to form three committees.

The first, tasked with drafting the platform document, includes Al-Ahram political analyst Amr Al-Shobaki, former minister of social solidarity Ahmed Al-Boraie, independent political analyst Samir Ghattas and Tagammu Party spokesman Nabil Zaki.

A second committee, led by Mohamed Sami, chairman of the Karama party, was mandated to set the criteria governing the selection of national list candidates. The third committee, led by chairman of the Lawyers’ Syndicate, Sameh Ashour, was charged with compiling the final lists of candidates.

Abu Shoka hopes that when it is finished the consensus document will convince more secular political forces to join the coalition. “We hope political forces and high-profile public figures such as Kamal Al-Ganzouri and political activist Abdel-Gelil Mostafa will join the coalition when they see the consensus document, which will spell out overriding national principles,” he said.

Al-Ganzouri, a former prime minister, and Mostafa are currently preparing their own “national lists” of candidates for the parliamentary polls. Al-Ganzouri’s list is supported by old guard forces affiliated with former president Hosni Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP).

Mostafa’s supporters include revolutionary leftist and liberal forces antagonistic to the regimes of both Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood. Most revolutionary forces have refused to join a coalition that includes Mubarak-era remnants.

“We cannot join an electoral coalition with politicians who have publicly described the 25 January revolution as a foreign conspiracy,” said Medhat Al-Zahed, deputy chairman of the Popular Current. Al-Zahed did, however, tell Al-Ahram Weekly, “We could have second thoughts on joining the Wafd’s proposed national lists if Mubarak-era officials are excluded.”

“While ideological differences between secular forces are perhaps too wide to be bridged, the situation is not helped by some politicians placing personal political interests above unity among all secular forces,” complained Ashour. The chairman of the Lawyers’ Syndicate has announced that he will stand as an independent in the south Cairo district of Al-Moqattam.

dly now witho HERITAGE

Issue No.1231, 29 January, 2015      29-01-2015 07:03PM ET

Justice in the dockMass death sentences handed down by a Minya court have been overturned and a retrial ordered. Ahmed Morsy reports

Archival photo of the defendants in the caged dock Print Email

When, after two brief hearings, a Minya Criminal Court ruled on 24 March 2014 that 529 supporters of ousted president Mohamed Morsi should be executed for attacking a police station, killing one police officer and attempting to kill two others, the verdict was met with an international outcry.

The 152 defendants in detention — the rest were tried in absentia — appealed the sentences. Following the first appeal the death sentences of 492 defendants were reduced to life in prison and upheld in 37 cases.

On Sunday the appeals process reached its end when the Court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest court, ruled on a second appeal and ordered a retrial for all defendants.

On 28 April 2014 the same Minya court sentenced 683 people, Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie among them, to death. On 21 June it upheld the death sentences for 183 of the defendants, including Badie, commuted the death sentences for four others to life in prison and acquitted the remaining 496.

Badie, a defendant in several other cases, was granted a retrial, along with 27 others, because he was sentenced by the Minya Court in absentia.

The glut of mass death sentences handed down by the Minya court was described by the UN human rights office as “unprecedented in recent history” and “a breach of international human rights law.”

The US State Department said it “defies logic” that so many defendants could have received a fair trial in two short sessions. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier called the verdicts “alarming” and said “further mass trials must be suspended.” The EU’s then foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, called on Egyptian officials to ensure “defendants’ rights to a fair and timely trial.”

Such calls have had little impact. On 2 December, days after charges were dropped against former president Hosni Mubarak for complicity in the killing of demonstrators opposed to his rule, a Cairo court sentenced 188 defendants to death for the killing of 13 policemen in on 14 August 2013. This was the same day that security forces dispersed two pro-Morsi protest camps in Cairo in an operation that left hundreds of Morsi supporters dead.

“Mass death sentences are fast losing Egypt’s judiciary whatever reputation for independence it once had,” Sarah Leah Whitson, Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa director, said in a statement issued in December. “Instead of weighing the evidence against each person, judges are convicting defendants en masse without regard for fair trial standards.”

Amnesty International also condemned December’s mass sentencing. “It is telling that the sentences … were handed down in the same week that the case against former president Hosni Mubarak was dropped,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahrouai, Amnesty’s deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa. “This is blatantly a case of justice being meted out based on a political whim.”

The European Union expressed “serious concerns” over the December ruling and said it was following the case “very closely.”

“The EU reiterates its call on the Egyptian judicial authorities to ensure, in line with international standards, defendants’ rights to a fair and timely trial based on clear charges and proper and independent investigations,” Catherine Ray, spokeswoman for EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini said in a statement.

The United Nations rights office condemned “the seriously damaging lack of accountability for human rights violations committed by security forces in the context of demonstrations” in Egypt.

In response to the international condemnation, the Justice Ministry issued a statement underlining that defendants have the right to appeal the verdicts to the Court of Cassation, which can order a retrial.

ut Egypt’s tea Ghada Abdel-K SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1231, 29 January, 2015      27-01-2015 09:58PM ET

Overpriced food?Declines in international food prices have not reached local markets, reports Mona El-Fiqi

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Cereals, vegetable oils, sugar and dairy products all witnessed drops in international prices during 2014, according to UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) figures.

The changes in prices were reflected in the FAO’s Food Price Index, which tracks the prices of five major food commodity groups. Meat was the only tracked commodity that registered a price increase during the year.

The December Food Price Index witnessed a drop of 1.7 per cent from November, and 2014 saw prices drop by 3.7 per cent from 2013, marking their decline for the third consecutive year.

The FAO attributed the price drops to abundant harvests and large stocks combined with a stronger US dollar and falling oil prices.

According to the FAO, the price of cereals dropped 12.5 per cent from the previous year, due to forecasts of record production and sufficient inventories. But the FAO sub-index for meat rose to an annual average of 199 points, up 8.1 per cent from 2013. The other four food groups included in the index fell in 2014 and are at, or close to, their lowest levels in five years.

In Egypt, however, local consumers have not seen these falls in international prices reflected in what they are charged in the shops. Soha Moustafa, a housewife, said, “The prices of products like electrical equipment, furniture and mobiles drop, but food prices never decrease.”

She added that annual increases in her family’s income couldn’t cover jumps in the price of food. “Lunch alone costs LE80 due to the increase in prices, and the drop in international prices does nothing for us,” Moustafa added.

According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS), the annual urban inflation rate rose to 9.8 per cent in December 2014, up from 8.5 per cent in November.

CAPMAS attributed the jump to the higher prices of food and beverage products, including vegetables, fruit, meat, dairy products and seafood.

Blaming the way the local markets are monitored, Shereen Al-Shawarbi, a professor of economics at Cairo University, told Al-Ahram Weekly that increases in international prices usually affect local markets, but this is not the case for falling prices.

When international prices rise by 10 per cent, local prices increase by almost 20 per cent, she said, but if international prices fall, local prices remain stable because traders and importers do not reduce prices, in order to maintain their profits.

Al-Shawarbi had reservations about setting a profit ceiling for traders and importers because such restrictions could lead to corruption. She said it would be better for the Consumer Protection Authority to intervene to cap food prices in local markets.

Runaway local food prices may continue in 2015. The World Economic Outlook report issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects Egypt’s inflation rate to reach 13.5 per cent in 2015, compared to 10.1 per cent in the previous year.

However, Heba Al-Leithi, a professor of economics at Cairo University, said that, contrary to the IMF’s expectations, the inflation rate may begin to fall due to the decline in global oil prices, as well as in international food prices.

“The decision to cut interest rates recently taken by the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is a sign of an expected improvement in the inflation rate,” Al-Leithi said.

The CBE said it based its decision to reduce the overnight interest rate by 0.5 per cent on the fact that inflation has slowed down and growth has been improving. The headline consumer price index slowed down by 1.53 per cent month-on-month and 0.07 per cent month-on-month in November and December.

However, the increase in the dollar exchange rate against the pound could limit the benefits of the retreat in international food prices in local markets, according to Al-Leithi.

The drop in food prices would be mirrored in local markets if prices were left to supply and demand alone, she said. “But as we have monopolies by some producers and importers in Egypt, nothing will change,” Al-Lethi added.

Other factors that push up local prices are transportation costs, especially after recent reductions in fuel subsidies. This is in addition to higher packaging costs. Poor storage can also increase waste, leading to higher food prices, Al-Leithi said.

Egypt is a net importer of food, and its food import bill is high no matter how the value of imports changes, Al-Leithi said, adding that further efforts should be made to increase self-sufficiency in food.

FEATURES LIVING SPORTS HERITAGE

Issue No.1231, 29 January, 2015      27-01-2015 09:52PM ET

Mixed performancesThe government of former prime minister Hazem Al-Beblawi was unable to fire up the economy, while that of Ibrahim Mehleb has had a mixed performance. Sherine Abdel-Razek reports

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Writing in the 14th “Strategic Economic Trends Report” released this week, Ahmed Al-Naggar, an economist and chairman of Al-Ahram, says that the government of former prime minister Hazem Al-Beblawi failed in its attempts to kick-start the country’s economy.

The government received generous Gulf aid, $11 billion, during the one year of Beblawi’s government. This was in addition to the 1991 gift from Gulf countries of a LE60.8 billion deposit. The money was originally given to support the former Mubarak regime because of its stance in the 1991 Gulf War. Importantly, these funds were never used until Al-Beblawi came to office.

While the government used the $11 billion and the LE60.8 billion deposit, according to Al-Naggar, the main author and editor of the report for the past 14 years, the government did not allocate the money towards projects designed to revitalise the economy.

This year’s report dedicates a chapter to the performance of Al-Beblawi’s government, the first

following the 30 June Revolution. It also examines the performance of the present government, led by Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb.

According to the report, Al-Beblawi used most of the Gulf funding to shore up the country’s international reserves. Just before the toppling of ousted former president Mohamed Morsi in the summer of 2013, the government increased the international reserves from $13 billion to $20 billion.

The international reserves fell a few months later as a result of the need to fund the country’s huge trade deficit: more than $15 billion in the first six months of Al-Beblawi’s tenure.

“The negative economic indicators Egypt inherited from Mubarak’s rule worsened under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and during Morsi’s one year in office, and the deterioration continued during the period Al-Beblawi spent in office,” Al-Naggar writes.

Al-Naggar described the performance of the Mehleb government as mixed. While it introduced a minimum wage of LE1,200 for government employees, the minimum wage does not extend to workers in the private sector or those working for public enterprises.

According to Al-Naggar, the decision to set a maximum wage of LE42,000 has acted as a disincentive for the retention of high-level staff. He writes that, in order to offset the wage limit, the management of public-sector banks and companies should have been given the right to an additional percentage of the profits, in order to compensate them for the gap in incomes with their peers in the private sector.

The government’s 234 per cent increase in social security pensions is a good step, he said, as it will both increase the number of beneficiaries and their monthly incomes. But Al-Naggar criticised keeping the threshold of income tax exemptions at LE12,000 per year. This means that workers receiving the minimum wage of LE1,200 per month, or LE14,400 per year, will be subject to taxation.

This did not take into account the inflation rate, Al-Naggar said, adding that the LE12,000 threshold is less generous than the LE9,000 threshold set by the Ahmed Nazif government in 2005, because the purchasing power of LE9,000 in 2005 was equivalent to LE20,000 today.

On the positive side, Al-Naggar said that while the loans and foreign assistance figures in the 2014-2015 budget have declined from LE117 billion in 2013-2014 to LE23.5 billion in 2014-2015, government revenues are still 35 per cent higher than the previous year, which is a positive indicator.

The bulk of government revenues come from taxes, with the largest amounts coming from taxes imposed on commodities and service purchases, as well as income taxes on salaries. The latter are imposed on both those with limited incomes and the wealthy, a shortcoming that Al-Naggar criticised.

On the expenditure side, Al-Naggar said that real reforms in the energy subsidies system have yet to happen, since the government is still providing large private and foreign companies with subsidised energy. He stressed that raising energy prices will not affect the level of foreign investment as other countries competing with Egypt to attract such investment do not subsidise energy costs.

The sudden imposition of high price increases, after maintaining stable fuel prices since 2008, was described by Al-Naggar as an “inefficient” policy. He said that incremental increases over a longer period would have been less agonising for consumers.

He called for wider subsidy reforms that do not increase inflation, as happened after the government increased fuel prices by an average of 76 per cent last July. He gave the example of private transportation costs, which have increased by at least 50 per cent for microbuses.

Shifting to natural gas instead of diesel in bakeries and cars would save LE30 billion per year out of the LE45 billion the country pays to subsidise diesel, according to Al-Naggar.

He praised the changes in electricity prices, as according to the new pricing model, dubbed as “fair,” the price of a kilowatt of electricity in the highest consumption bracket is ten times the value paid by the lowest bracket, which consumes fewer than 50 kilowatts monthly.

On social questions, Al-Naggar said that spending on health in the budget had increased by 26.6 per cent over the previous year, almost twice the inflation rate. However, the spending, equivalent to 1.75 per cent of GDP, is still less than the three per cent of GDP set by the new constitution as the minimum spending on health. Global average spending on this item is 6.6 per cent of GDP.

As for spending on education, the allocation in the budget for both university and secondary education is still less than the four per cent of GDP set by the new constitution, Al-Naggar said.

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Issue No.1231, 29 January, 2015      27-01-2015 09:42PM ET

Social insecuritiesToo many Egyptian workers pay contributions to social security but get little, if anything, in return. Sherine Abdel-Razek reports

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Egypt’s social security schemes have been in place since the 1950s, benefitting around 21 million people every year. They are now in need of restructuring, to better support those who pay into the system. Billions of pounds are contributed to the schemes every year.

Membership of the social security system is mandatory for employees, and voluntary for non-waged workers, such as employers and the self-employed. The system covers public- and private-sector

employees in case of disability, injury or sickness. It also provides old age pensions and maternity benefits.

Contributions are deducted from both the basic and variable pay of the employee and calculated as percentages of the salaries reported to the National Authority for Social Insurance (NASI). The total contribution amounts to an average of around 40 per cent of salary, paid by the employees, employers and the government, with the latter’s contribution set at one per cent.

In the Strategic Economic Trends report, Mohamed Nour Eddin, former head of research at the Arab Bank and an expert on the social security system said it faces various problems and suggested ways to reform it.

Topping the list of problems is the private sector’s low level of participation in the system, either by not insuring employees or by insuring only a percentage of those employed. Sometimes workers are covered by the social security system but their insurable wages reported to the social security authority are lower than their real wages.

Some private companies also list new employees as trainees for at least two years. The lack of supervision of the system has meant that such abuses have increased. In the 1960s and 70s inspectors used to visit private companies to make sure that workers had regular contracts and, for their social security deductions, that their real wages were stated.

Some public and private companies fail to transfer the contributions, including the part the employees pay, to the NASI. The figure for such overdue payments from public companies alone was as high as LE35 billion in 2005.

The slow rate of recruiting new employees in public companies also limits new contributions. Also, The early retirement programme adopted by public enterprises has resulted in almost 500,000 workers benefiting from the system without paying monthly contributions.

Another problem highlighted by Nour Eddin is the minimum value of the contributions, especially in light of low basic salaries and unequal increases in variable incomes. The low maximum value of the contributions, set at LE2,290 in January 2014, limits the value of the benefits the insured person will get.

According to a report referred to by Nour Eddin, the system covers 21.5 million people, which represents only 30 per cent of those in work, as seasonal and informal labour is not included.

The percentage of those included in the system differs from one sector to another. While 97 per cent of those working for the government are insured, only 23 per cent of those working in the private sector are included in the social security system.

Another shortcoming is that only 17 per cent of those classified as poor are insured, compared to 43 per cent in the higher income brackets, meaning that those who really need social assistance often do not get it.

However, the biggest problem with the system is the way the money is invested. Money from public and private pension and insurance funds is deposited with the National Investment Bank (NIB), formed in the 1980s to manage public finances. The government borrows money from the NIB to finance social expenditure, including education and healthcare, together with development projects.

However, this money, paid in by individuals, is not really public money, even though the government borrows it at lower rates of interest than those paid when it borrows from other lenders.

Since 2005, the funds have been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Finance, effectively making it public money that the government can use without referring to its depositors.

Moreover, the NIB has not paid interest on deposits for many years, depriving pensioners and other beneficiaries from money that could have been used to increase pensions or expand the beneficiary base.

Under the 2014 constitution this will change as pensions are described as “private funds, with the right to them and their revenues going to beneficiaries. They are safely invested and are managed by an independent authority,” the constitution says.

The total value of social security assets amounts to LE539 billion. It has been calculated that if the current interest rate on deposits was paid on all monies currently deposited with the government the total value of those deposits would be LE776 billion.

If the current interest rate on loans was added to this money, that amount would rise still further, to LE923 billion.

In 2013, the ministries of social insurance and finance agreed that the debts of the latter, incurred from social security funds, would be repaid over ten years by treasury bonds. The Ministry of Finance has already issued three bond issues to reimburse the debts.

HERITAGE

Issue No.1231, 29 January, 2015      29-01-2015 06:11PM ET

New king, same challengesChallenging issues await King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia, reportsDoaa El-Bey

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Salman bin Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud, 80, was crowned the new king of Saudi Arabia last Friday upon the death of his half-brother Abdullah at the age of 90. His ascension to power has raised many questions about the future of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi royal family and the region, perhaps the most important being whether there will be changes in Saudi policies under the new monarch.

“The stability of Saudi Arabia, one of the biggest Sunni Arab states, the largest producer of oil and the house of the two holy shrines, is crucial for the stability of the whole Arab region,” said one diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity.

He did not expect to see major changes in Saudi policies under Salman, given that he had been Saudi crown prince since 2012, was in charge of state affairs when Abdullah was incapacitated by illness last year, and was taking the throne amid unprecedented regional instability and the threat of terrorism from inside and outside the kingdom.

In his first speech as Saudi monarch, Salman said, “We will continue to adhere to the correct policies that Saudi Arabia has followed since its founding.” He did not mention threats in his speech, but said, “The Arab and Islamic nation is in need of unity and solidarity.”

With the on-going war in Syria, the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) gaining control of parts of Iraq, the growing power of Houthi rebels in Yemen, and increasing tensions with Iran, King Salman is expected to have his hands full as the new Saudi monarch.

There are also domestic challenges, and Saudi Arabia has been threatened by terrorist attacks by Saudi radicals influenced or trained by IS, Al-Qaeda or other extremist groups.

Some Saudi citizens have gone to Syria or Iraq to fight with IS and then crossed the nearly 600-mile frontier that runs mainly through empty desert to carry out attacks against their own country.

The dream of establishing an Islamic caliphate, propagated by IS, appeals to many Saudis, as well as other Arabs. “Some Saudi and other Arabs see in IS a Sunni Muslim force that can protect Sunnis against what has been happening in Iraq, Syria and Yemen,” the diplomat said.

Although Riyadh has taken measures to reduce the terrorism threat, it is still present. Since the start of the war in Syria, and especially after the formation of IS, Riyadh beefed up border security with Iraq and issued new laws that give the government broad powers to arrest those who join or defend IS or other radical groups.

The border security system was initially conceived as a defence against the sectarian war that erupted in Iraq more than a decade ago, but is now primarily seen as a defence against IS.

Saudi Arabia has also made moves to protect its borders with Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen, and it has been made illegal for imams in the country’s mosques to give sermons that seem to sympathise with religious extremists.

Official control of charities suspected of channelling money to radicals has also been tightened.

Saudi relations with the US are expected to remain unchanged under King Salman. The present tense regional situation means that Washington needs Saudi Arabia as much as the Saudis need the US.

Saudi Arabia has backed the US-led coalition fighting IS in Iraq and Syria, and the two countries are concerned about developments in Yemen, which last week led to the fall of the capital, the US-backed government and the presidential palace into the hands of Houthi rebels.

US President Barack Obama was among world leaders who came to Saudi Arabia to offer their condolences on the death of King Abdullah last week. Obama cut short a visit to India and led a US delegation to Riyadh, where he discussed with new King Salman issues including the turmoil in Yemen and the fight against IS.

While Saudi relations with Arab states are not expected to change, efforts boosted by late king Abdullah to improve Egyptian-Qatari relations could be slowed down. The issue of possible Egyptian-Qatari rapprochement came to the fore in November last year when Abdullah called on Egypt to follow Riyadh in ending its disputes with Qatar.

King Abdullah’s calls came after an agreement was reached to put an end to the worst diplomatic rift to have hit the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in years. The agreement was supposed to pave the way for a return of the Saudi, Bahraini, UAE and Egyptian diplomatic missions to Doha.

Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in March last year, after they accused Qatar of interfering in their internal affairs and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt withdrew its ambassador one month earlier.

“King Abdullah’s death may impede or delay efforts to reconcile Egypt and Qatar, especially when the main issues of difference are still unresolved. For instance, Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood or other groups in Libya is still a hurdle to any rapprochement,” the diplomat said.

In the wake of King Abdullah’s death, observers have stressed that the smooth transfer of power from King Abdullah to King Salman and the handing of important positions, such as minister of defence, to the grandsons of King Abdel-Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, proves that the Al-Saud family is as strong as ever and is firmly in control of Saudi Arabia.

LIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Dangerous timesRiyadh’s execution of a leading Shia cleric has fuelled Saudi-Iranian tensions, with possibly

explosive results, Amira Howeidy reports

●●●●●●●

EGYPT

Battling for control of the House

When the House of Representatives holds its inaugural sitting on Sunday it will do so in the absence of a ruling party, writes Gamal Essam El-DinCelebrating Coptic ChristmasMichael Adel reports on the culmination of a mixed year for the Church

Religious reform in questionIslamic researcher and TV announcer Islam Al-Beheiri has been sentenced to one year in prison for misinterpreting the Quran, reports Reem Leila

ECONOMY

Boosting arable landSome 1.5 million feddans are to be added to Egypt’s farmland in the first phase of a mega-project inaugurated last week, writes Mona El-Fiqi

Free Internet blockedA Facebook-sponsored Internet service has been suspended in Egypt, reports Nesma Nowar

WORLD

Tensions mount after Saudi execution

The diplomatic crisis between Iran and Saudi Arabia will need to be resolved if there is to be any hope of a solution to the Syrian conflict, writes Camellia Entekhabifard

Scaling down in Syria?Recent reports suggest that since the Russians intervened in Syria the Iranians have been pulling out of the country, writes Bassel Oudat in Damascus

Yemen talks stallInsecurity has returned to Aden amid Houthi/Saleh alliance calls for Russian intervention in Yemen, writes Ahmed Eleiba

‘Panorama of the absurd’Erdogan’s machinations continue, with 2016 likely to see pressure spike on his foes in parliament, the ultimate goal being to change the constitution in his favour, writesSayed Abdel-Meguid

Africa’s growing terrorAs Islamic State loses ground in Syria and Iraq, it turns a covetous eye to North and West Africa, writesHaytham Nuri

SPORTS

From where they cameShikabala and Mido make a sudden return to Zamalek. Marawan Zayedreports

Ronaldo’s record and more FIFA numbersA few days before the announcement of the FIFA Ballon D’Or awards, world football’s governiHERITAGE

Issue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:34AM ET

Battling for control of the HouseWhen the House of Representatives holds its inaugural sitting on Sunday it will do so in the absence of a ruling party, writes Gamal Essam El-Din

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After three years of political turmoil, and following the conclusion of a two-month election process, a new parliament, the House of Representatives, is due to hold its procedural sitting on 10 January.

Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Magdi Al-Agati says the opening session may well continue into Monday given “the unprecedented number of MPs — 596 — each of whom is obliged to read out the oath.”

“It is likely a second procedural sitting will have to be convened to elect a speaker and two deputies,” he said.

Bahaaeddin Abu Shuka, secretary-general of Wafd Party and an appointed MP, has been selected to head the opening procedural sitting.

“Abu Shuka is 77 years old. He will chair the session in his capacity as the most senior parliamentarian,” said Al-Agati.

“This is a parliament without a majority ruling party, the first since the 1952 revolution,” points out Al-Ahram political analyst Hassan Abu Taleb.

“Under Nasser, the Arab Socialist Union dominated parliamentary life. Under Sadat and Mubarak it was the National Democratic Party (NDP). And then the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party took over when Mubarak was forced from office.”

Now 19 political parties are represented in parliament and none of them has an absolute majority.

“While the vast majority of political factions espouse a liberal, free market ideology, they have expressed different political positions and are riddled with personal rivalries,” said Abu Taleb.

A report prepared by parliament’s secretariat-general lists the four liberal political parties — the Free Egyptians, Future of Homeland, Wafd and Reform and Development — which won the lion’s share, 157, of seats occupied by party representatives. Another nine political parties with links to the now-defunct NDP control 68 seats between them. The Salafist Nour Party secured 11 seats, and five left-leaning parties won nine seats between them.

Party representatives are heavily outnumbered by the 351 MPs who stood as independent candidates, a fact that is likely to lead to heavy bouts of horse-trading.

“As the constitution stipulates that some issues cannot be decided without the approval of a two-thirds majority we can expect to see to political factions making strenuous efforts to forge powerful coalitions and blocs,” said Abu Taleb.

The manoeuvring has already begun. Led by former intelligence officer Sameh Seif Al-Yazal, the “Pro-Egyptian State Coalition”, a grouping of MPs who have vowed to back the political and economic agenda of President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, was trying to win the backing of a majority in the House.

Coalition officials say they already have the support of 380 MPs, 18 short of an absolute majority. “But we have high hopes that another 20 MPs, mostly independents, will join us,” said Seif Al-Yazal.

An early indication of the way the political cards have fallen in the House of Representatives will be the election of the speaker. Seif Al-Yazal predicts constitutional law professor Ali Abdel-Al will get the post.

Abdel-Al’s name shot to the top of the list of candidates after former interim president and the incumbent chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adli Mansour refused an offer by Al-Sisi to be appointed to parliament. Mansour, who said he preferred to retain his position at the top of the country’s highest constitutional authority, would have been one of the 28 MPs appointed by the president in accordance with Article 102 of the constitution.

The list of 28 presidential appointees, issued on 31 December 2015, did include one senior judge, Sirri Siam, a former chairman of the Court of Cassation and of the Higher Council for Judges. But Siam has said he has no intention of standing for the post of the speaker and would prefer to be chosen as chairman of the parliament’s Legislative and Constitutional Affairs Committee.

A second presidential appointee, Bahaaeddin Abu Shuka, secretary-general of the Wafd Party and a leading lawyer, also said he has no intention of standing for the job of speaker.

“I have already been selected as the Wafd Party’s parliamentary spokesman and I am also considering standing for the post of chairman of the Legislative and Constitutional Affairs Committee,” said Abu Shuka.

In a recent TV interview, Seif Al-Yazal said the two elected MPs who have announced they will run for the post of speaker — TV host Tawfik Okasha and former president of Al-Azhar University Osama Al-Abd — lack any real support among MPs, meaning that “Abdel-Al is most likely to be elected.”

Abdel-Al, 69, is emeritus professor of constitutional law at Ain Shams University. He was elected to parliament as part of the For the Love of Egypt list, which was coordinated by Seif Al-Yazal.

Abdel-Al first came to prominence in 2013 when interim president Mansour selected him to be a member of the committee entrusted with revising a new constitution. In June 2014 Al-Sisi appointed Abdel-Al to the legislative reform committee that oversaw the vetting of new political and economic laws.

In 2015 Abdel-Al headed the committee that drafted the exercise of political rights, the House of Representatives affairs and the division of electoral constituencies laws.

After winning a seat in the first round of parliamentary polls in October, Abdel-Al told reporters that the relationship between parliament and the president should be based on cooperation rather than confrontation. “I also want to stress that the For the Love of Egypt Coalition will be a back-up force for President Al-Sisi in the coming parliament,” he said.

Abdel-Al has argued that Article 156 of the constitution, which many experts say obliges parliament to vote on all laws passed since the removal of Mohamed Morsi from office in July 2013 within 15 days of sitting, in fact applies to just 10, or possibly 15 laws issued to deal with matters deemed urgent.

Abdel-Al’s position contrasts sharply with that of Al-Agati.

“Article 156 makes it binding on parliament to discuss all laws passed since the removal of Morsi within 15 days of the opening procedural sitting next Sunday,” Al-Agati told Al-Ahram newspaper on 1 January.

“This is one of the major challenges facing new parliament. As long as we agree that the post-Morsi laws and decree, numbering 292, have to be debated within 15 days, we can differ about how the debate is conducted.”

Al-Agati has proposed that once elected the new speaker should entrust the task of debating the 292 laws and decrees to parliament’s 19 committees which could report back to the house within a matter of days, which “will be enough to meet the requirements imposed by Article 156 of the constitution.”ng body highlighted this year’s career of the nom

FEATURESLIVINGSPORTS

HERITAGEIssue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:27AM ET

Religious reform in questionIslamic researcher and TV announcer Islam Al-Beheiri has been sentenced to one year in prison for misinterpreting the Quran, reports Reem Leila

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On 28 December the Court of Misdemeanours convicted Islamic researcher and TV announcer Islam Al-Beheiri for insulting Islam and sentenced him to one year in jail instead of the initial five. The court convicted Al-Beheiri after Al-Azhar, along with lawyers, filed a lawsuit against him for calling for the removal of what Al-Beheiri called “extremist material” in texts of religious interpretation during his TV show ‘With Islam’ which was aired on the satellite channel Al-Qahera Wal-Nas.

Immediately after his sentencing and before being taken to Tora Prison, Al-Beheiri slammed the court’s decision on his Facebook account. “I’m sentenced to one year in jail. I offered every good thing to the religion and the people, and now I’m sentenced to one year,” said Al-Beheiri who added, “Egypt is the country of justice.”

Al-Beheiri’s lawyer Gamal Said said the ruling was illegal because Giza’s Court of Misdemeanors had previously acquitted him on similar charges. “I will appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) to review the conflicting verdicts,” Said stated.

Lawyers who filed the case against Al-Beheiri stated that he has no chance because the accusations against the contentious preacher were different. They said Al-Beheiri was acquitted of charges related to insulting major Islamic scholars and doubting the sayings of the companions of the Prophet Mohamed. However, in the lawsuit in which he was convicted, Al-Beheiri was accused of insulting Islam, disrespecting God and misinterpreting the Quran. “These are two different charges with two different verdicts and that’s a different story,” said one lawyer who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Meanwhile, Abdallah Al-Naggar, a member of the Islamic Research Centre (IRC), believes that the court has resorted to Al-Hesba law as a basis for its verdict. According to this law, Muslims who express their views which are considered contrary to Islamic Sharia should be persecuted as non-believers. “This was in the old days to protect and preserve Islam as well as Quranic verses against any change or inappropriate interference. This was applied against anyone other than the four imams (scholars): Noaman Ibn Thabet, known as Abu-Hanifa, Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Mohamed Ibn Idris Al-Shafei and Abu Abdallah Malek, known as Imam Malek,” cited Al-Naggar.

Things have now changed, according to Al-Naggar. “Any professional and specialised Islamic researcher has the right to igtehad to come out with different views other than the old scholars. But they don’t have the right to change any of the Quranic verses or Prophet Mohamed’s sayings (hadiths),” stressed Al-Naggar.

At the same time, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) issued a statement the day following the verdict, condemning the court’s ruling, and blaming it for taking into consideration only Al-Azhar’s point of view without considering Al-Beheiri’s. Ishak Ibrahim, a religious freedoms researcher at EIPR, said the court’s ruling shows how powerful Al-Azhar, Egypt’s and the Arab world’s oldest Islamic institution, is and its aim to enforce its guardianship over society. “The ruling shows that calls to review religious speech are nothing more than empty talk. Governmental officials do not truly believe in freedom of expression, belief and opinion,” Ibrahim said.

“Is this the reward for someone who wants to do something good for the country? To be jailed for saying his opinion? Is this what President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has been calling for? The president has been calling for amendments of religious speech since he first came to power in 2014,” argued Ibrahim, who added that people will now refrain from stating their opinions freely “since they will be afraid of being imprisoned”.

In January 2015, Al-Sisi called for a “religious revolution” in a speech which he delivered at Al-Azhar on the occasion of the birth of Prophet Mohamed. In his speech, Al-Sisi urged Al-Azhar scholars to reform many misunderstood religious traditions that might affect the image of Islam, instructing the Endowments Ministry and Al-Azhar to prepare a plan for the desired reforms.

Said, Al-Beheiri’s lawyer, said his client did not insult Islam. “He was simply stating his opinion about certain traditions from the past which could be easily changed to suit the present time. He did not call for changing any Quranic verses or the prophet’s sayings. He just said his opinion.”

On his TV show, Al-Beheiri questioned the credibility of Al-Bukhari’s interpretation of Prophet Mohamed’s quotes and life. “Many sheikhs of Al-Azhar believe it is completely wrong to do this, especially someone like Al-Beheiri, who is not a sheikh or an Al-Azhar scholar or even an Al-Azhar graduate,” said the lawyer.

According to Said, Article 98 of the Penal Code was specifically criticised because it criminalises contempt of religion but only loosely defines the crime. The article also gives judges extensive powers in interpreting the legal text, which usually leads to the conviction of defendants involved in such cases.

In this regard, president of the Egyptian Secular Party Hisham Ouf condemned the domination of Al-Azhar and its scholars’ ideologies over Egyptian society concerning religion. “The court’s verdict is considered a blow to all efforts of renaissance. It is also a huge humiliation to intellectuals, artists and thinkers in Egypt,” Ouf said.

Ouf described Al-Beheiri as a man of letters and was not the first to challenge the credibility of Islamic scholars in modern times, neither in Egypt nor the Islamic world. “Sheikh Mohamed Al-Ghazali published a book in 1989 challenging the quotes of the prophet attributed to Al-Bukhari in a way that angered Salafists and hard-liners in the Arab world. [But] I do not think Sheikh Al-Ghazali was dragged to court over his views or was a secret secular or atheist. Now, Al-Beheiri is being jailed for his thoughts. His imprisonment won’t change his mind or his thinking nor will his supporters change their minds about him or their thinking,” said Ouf.

Moreover, on his Facebook account, parliamentarian and renowned film director Khaled Youssef criticised Al-Beheiri’s verdict, urging the president to intervene and pardon him.

“To the person who called for the renewal of religious speech, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, we all wish that you use your powers to pardon Al-Beheiri until this law is amended so as to be in accordance with the constitution, not just for the sake of Al-Beheiri but to end terrorism and extremism. We all should side with a revival, otherwise darkness will prevail,” wrote Youssef on his Facebook account.

SPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:29AM ET

Celebrating Coptic ChristmasMichael Adel reports on the culmination of a mixed year for the Church

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President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi has been invited to attend Christmas Mass, to be held today, at the Coptic Cathedral in Cairo. The president, who attended last year’s ceremony, had neither accepted nor declined the invitation as Al-Ahram Weekly went to press.

Church officials also have invited a number of MPs, the entire cabinet, heads of political parties and leading journalists.

Father Moussa, head of youth affairs at the Coptic Orthodox Church, said he hoped the president would attend the mass.

“We are hoping for a visit by the president but if he doesn’t come,  it will not change the respect we hold for him.”

The Interior Ministry has tightened security around churches ahead of Christmas celebrations says Father Sergius Sergius, secretary of the cathedral.

While delivering a sermon at Anba Shenoudah Church in Alexandria ahead of Christmas, Pope Tawadros II welcomed the appointment of a number of Coptic parliamentarians by a presidential decree. Egyptians, he said, place great hopes on the new parliament. The service was attended by seven MPs.

In the recent elections 36 Copts won parliamentary seats. Their number has now been boosted by three presidential appointees, meaning that Copts occupy 39 of parliament’s 596 seats.

The new parliament is expected to pass a unified personal status law during its first session and the Coptic Church has already forwarded its own recommendations to the Ministry of Social Justice.

The Church traditionally hands out gifts, including food, toys, and money, to poor families during Christmas. Tawadros’ predecessor, Pope Shenoudah III, once wrote that “poor Copts are more important than buildings, marble, ACs and excursions, for feeding the poor is a religious duty.”

Pope Tawadros II ordered Church officials to visit prisoners during the feast to tend to their needs and offer communion. He also met with representatives of The Fraternity of God, a charity that focuses on helping the poor.

The Shepherd and the Mother of Light, a Church-affiliated charity based in the south of Egypt and run by Amir Ramzi, distributed clothing to 16,000 children in Beni Sweif, Minya, Assiut, Sohag and Aswan.

Archbishop Makarius of Minya said such charitable offerings helped bridge any distance between the Church and its congregation.

The Church Scouts’ Society is also helping organise Christmas celebrations. Scouts are being trained to direct entry into churches, help priests with mass, and organise the exit of congregations.

Following a severe erosion of trust between the Church and the government under the Muslim Brotherhood rule, Church officials now say they are satisfied trust has been restored.

The personal status law remains to be a bone of contention among the Coptic community. Many couples complain restrictions on divorce are draconian. The Church is attempting to address the issue by boosting counselling services before and after marriage.

Over the last year Copts became more active in political life and are now better represented in government and parliament.

The Church has stepped up its campaign against atheism, a phenomenon that has been spreading fomented by a spirit of rebellion among the young.

Speaking to young church-goers in Alexandria recently, Pope Tawadros stressed that in addition to biological, psychological and educational needs people have spiritual requirements, including a “belief in God, in forgiveness of sin and eternal life”.

Tawadros reiterated his condemnation of “all forms of extremism and aberrations,” including same-sex marriage.

The Church is boosting its media presence. Under Pope Shenouda it acquired three television stations — CTV, Agapy, St. Mark TV — and is now examining the possibility of launching additional channels, including one for children.

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HERITAGEIssue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:17AM ET

Free Internet blockedA Facebook-sponsored Internet service has been suspended in Egypt, reports Nesma Nowar

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A no-cost Internet-browsing service, called Free Basics, was shut down on 30 December, two months after Facebook launched the service with mobile operator Etisalat Misr.

Etisalat announced the end of the service on 31 December, saying that the two-month period granted to the company by the National Telecoms Regulatory Authority (NTRA) to run the service had come to an end.

An official from the Telecommunications Ministry told Reuters last week that Etisalat had only been granted a permit to offer the service for two months and the permit had not been renewed by the government.

The service aimed to provide free access to Facebook and some partner websites in developing countries.

HERITAGEIssue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:06AM ET

Tensions mount after Saudi executionThe diplomatic crisis between Iran and Saudi Arabia will need to be resolved if there is to be any hope of a solution to the Syrian conflict, writes Camellia Entekhabifard

Photos of the executed Saudi Shia cleric Nimr Al-Nimr covers Tehran streets (photo: AP)PrintEmail

Amid hopes of finding a solution to the Syrian conflict through a new round of talks, a new source of tension has appeared. This tension, between the two hubs of the talks — Iran and Saudi Arabia — could prove extremely dangerous for efforts to end the war.

Just three weeks away from the talks, scheduled for 25 January in Geneva, last Saturday a prominent Saudi Shia cleric, Nimr Al-Nimr, was executed in Saudi Arabia. His execution sparked outrage and protests in parts of the Muslim world, especially in Iran where the regime is led by a Shia theocracy.

Angry Iranian protesters attacked Saudi Arabian diplomatic missions in Mashhad and Tehran,

setting parts of the buildings on fire and entering the missions in protest against Al-Nimr’s execution.

The attacks challenge reform efforts by the government of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, now emerging from sanctions and preparing to implement the accord on the country’s nuclear programme.

The burning of the diplomatic missions, which under international law and the Vienna Convention are considered the soil of the guest country, have downgraded Iran’s image among the international community.

They are reminiscent of the attacks on the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and the taking of American diplomats hostage. The actions ruined Iran’s reputation and, far more than the Islamic Revolution, led to its international isolation.

For decades after the November 1979 attack on the US Embassy, Iran was challenged economically and diplomatically. Iran has never apologised for the attacks, even during the nuclear talks with the United States. Both nations have decided to put the past behind them and open a new page to the future. Iran is now recognised once more as a major regional player.

Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia have long been soured by rivalry over which of the countries is the real hub of the Islamic world. The religious competition started at the time of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, when Ayatollah Khomeini planned to export it abroad, especially to neighbouring Muslim countries.

The regional competition increased when Iraqi President Saddam Hussain was toppled in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and a Shia government close to Iran replaced the Sunni government in Baghdad. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring and Shia demonstrations in Bahrain, Iran and Saudi Arabia found themselves taking sides and confronting each other more openly.

Syria has been the main victim of this power struggle between countries supporting Iran and those supporting Saudi Arabia. The world powers have seen their interests jeopardised by the emergence of newly formed terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) group and Iran’s expansion of its military in the region.

It took two years of negotiations before the Western powers were able to wrap up an accord on the controversial Iranian nuclear programme. It was hoped that last July’s agreement would also help to calm the crisis in Syria and Iranian and Saudi regional competition.

HERITAGEIssue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:05AM ET

Scaling down in Syria?Recent reports suggest that since the Russians intervened in Syria the Iranians have been pulling out of the country, writes Bassel Oudat in Damascus

A man walks past damaged homes following a snow storm in the northern Syrian city of AleppoPrintEmail

Shortly before the end of 2015, reports indicated that Iran had started to withdraw elite troops from the country’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from Syria. This was followed by speculation that the Iranian military presence in Syria was receding just as that of the Russians was expanding.

The Russians have not commented publicly on these developments, and the Iranians have categorically denied any intention to pull out of Syria, or any frictions with Moscow in this regard.

Iranian officials say that their relations with the Russians are “solid” and that they have no intention of scaling down their support for the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.

But over the past few months a large number of Iranian officers in Syria have been killed, including no fewer than 18 generals from Iran’s Badr Organisation, according to Syrian opposition forces.

Samir Al-Quntar, a key Hizbullah operative, was also killed in an air raid that many assumed was carried out by Israel.

There is speculation that Russia may have been involved in the killing of senior Iranian commanders, as a way of letting Iran know who’s boss. At the start of its intervention in Syria, Moscow told Syrian and Iranian officials that it would not tolerate any opposition and that once the Russians deployed they would be calling the shots, Syrian sources close to the regime said.

For weeks, Iran has been pulling out some of its officers and changing its strategy in the country, either to comply with Russian demands or to play for time.

A senior Free Syrian Army (FSA) officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that Russia has taken over many of the military bases Iran used to have in Syria, the latest being the Al-Shoeirat Airbase in Homs.

Iran has pulled out all its military units from Al-Shoeirat, which the Russians are refitting as a base for their helicopters, the FSA officer said.

“Iran has fought complex political battles to protect its interests from Russian intervention,” the officer added. “But before sending its troops into Syria, Moscow decided that Iran could not be allowed to have a significant military presence in the country.”

Russia, the same officer pointed out, does not mind Hizbullah continuing its mission in Syria. “Russian military commanders have allowed Hizbullah to stay, but they have prevented it from carrying out any operations without prior approval from them.”

Another FSA commander said that Iran has 3,000 military experts in Syria. “Iran did not send fighters to Syria, only commanders and experts. Iran does not need to deploy its own fighters, not with the tens of thousands of Shiite Lebanese and Iraqi militiamen that are willing to do its bidding.”

Although Iran has pulled out many of its military experts and given up strategic positions, it has continued to recruit Lebanese, Afghan and Iraqi Shiites to fight in Syria. Rather than scaling down its presence altogether, Iran seems to be accommodating the Russians while keeping its options open.

Iran has something the Russians lack, which is a strong sectarian affiliation with the Syrian regime. At a later stage in the conflict, the Iranians and the regime may indeed turn against the Russians.

There is an advantage, however, for Iran in scaling down its operations in Syria. The cost of supporting the Al-Assad regime has proven to be more costly than Tehran expected.

But it is hard to believe that the Iranians will now just bow out and let Moscow run the show in Syria. Iran is too invested in Syria and the region to allow this to happen. If Tehran were to pull out of Syria, this might compromise its position in other parts of the region, especially in Lebanon and Yemen.

In short, the Iranians may be pleased to see the Russians pulling their weight at last in Syria, and they may even be willing to let Moscow take the lead. But pulling out of Syria or accepting a much-diminished role in the country is out of the question.

Iranian strategists may also be hoping that the Russians, who are reluctant to put their boots on the ground in Syria, will ultimately need their help. Air raids alone cannot end the current conflict, and even the Russians must be aware of that.

HERITAGE

Issue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:04AM ET

Yemen talks stallInsecurity has returned to Aden amid Houthi/Saleh alliance calls for Russian intervention in Yemen, writes Ahmed Eleiba

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Escalation of the war in Yemenis is almost certain to prevail over progress toward a political settlement. Prospects for a settlement appear to have receded again following the talks in Geneva that began last month, which produced only mutual declarations of animosity. An indication of the enmity was the vow of Houthi/Saleh negotiators vowed to “burn Taiz.”

Two factors lend weight to this conclusion. The first is the deterioration in Saudi-Iranian relations that have reached their lowest point since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The two countries just broke off diplomatic relations and it looks unlikely that they will restore them any time soon in the wake of the burning of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad.

Riyadh has charged that these incidents were engineered by the Basij and directly instigated by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

The second factor relates to political and military developments in two countries’ proxy wars for power and influence in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Saudi Arabia has opened an embassy in Iraq and helped produce a qualitative shift in the Vienna negotiations on the Syrian crisis, although the Geneva talks on Yemen failed to fulfil hopes.

SETBACK IN ADEN, TAIZ: The state of security has deteriorated again in Aden. Abdel Hakim Mahmoud, a Yemeni researcher from Aden, told Al-Ahram Weekly that fighting erupted in the district of Mualla on Sunday and Monday, carrying with it the spectre of a return to the situation that prevailed in Yemen’s southern capital when it was occupied by Houthi/Saleh fighters.

The governor of Aden, Aidrous Al-Zobeidi, imposed a night-long curfew to restore security to the city. He said that gunmen had attempted to attack government buildings and facilities, including the governorate building and the main port.

More ominously, Mahmoud claimed that Al-Qaeda had a role in these developments. He said that officials responsible for administration of the port were connected with Al-Qaeda and refused to hand over the port to security forces. It took a four-hour battle for security forces to seize control of the port.

Mahmoud explained that last week the command of the Southern Resistance in Aden announced that resistance committees will be dismantled and their positions handed over to the legitimate authorities.

However, some factions rejected this decision and refused to hand over their positions. According to local news channels, four of the factions belong to Al-Qaeda and refused to obey directives from the Southern Resistance command.

Outside of Aden, in the vicinity of the governorate, developments are equally grim. As the fighting flared in Mualla and the port, Houth/Saleh forces seized strategic positions in Jebel Al-Qasha that

overlook Al-Anad Air Force base in Lahij. In response, the resistance in the southern governorate created four regiments made up of former soldiers, official armed forces and popular resistance fighters.

Abdel Aziz Al-Majidi is the editor-in-chief of Al-Shahed newspaper. Speaking to the Weekly by phone from Taiz, he said that the growing severity of the Houthi/Saleh siege on that city has made life unsustainable for the people.

The Houthi/Saleh militias, “in an anti-humanitarian act against the people of Taiz”, prevented food caravans from the World Health Organisation from reaching the city and then seized the shipments for themselves, according to Al-Majidi.

He added that the UN had failed to adequately condemn such actions. He also reported that militias have mined mountain roads, making it extremely hazardous to go into or out of the city.

TALKS LEFT UNCERTAIN: With regard to political setbacks, the Yemeni presidency announced from its headquarters abroad that the Geneva II talks had failed, just as the truce that was negotiated in Geneva had failed to hold.

Nevertheless, Mukhtar Al-Rahabi, the presidential press secretary, stressed that the government was still committed to the agenda for talks, the next session of which is scheduled for the middle of this month.

He added that while the presidency expected that forthcoming rounds would also fail, it was determined to continue with them in order to expose the other side to the international community for its lack of commitment to what was decided at the talks.

In this context, Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi announced that he has formed a technical committee to prepare the agenda for discussion with the Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in talks that are due to be held as part of implementation of the UN Security Council

resolution on the resumption of negotiations and the completion of the national reconciliation processes.

The committee has held two meetings in Riyadh with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ould Cheikh Ahmed to discuss preparations for the talks.

In the opinion of Al-Majidi, it is unlikely that the talks will have a tangible effect on the ground. Perhaps, however, the purpose is to expose the Houthi/Saleh mask and, simultaneously, to respond to Saleh’s insistence on talking directly with Saudi Arabia.

He added: “I do not think that the moment has come for the relief of Taiz, or for a breakthrough in the settlement process to the Yemeni crisis in general. On the contrary, things will grow more complicated.”

RUSSIA’S ENTRY: Perhaps the Yemeni question will take a new turn with the Russian entry at the request of Ali Abdullah Saleh, who appealed to Moscow to “demand a halt to the aggression against Yemen.” In the opinion of sources in Yemen, Russia wants to take advantage of this intervention for the purposes of negotiations on the Syrian question that are scheduled for 25 January.

This, they say, could complicate the crisis, especially in light of problems in the relationship between Moscow and Riyadh that have arisen due to developments on the ground in Syria after Russian intervention there.

Former President Saleh has hinted that he might not send a delegation to the forthcoming round of talks. “The next dialogue will be between us and the Saudis, face to face with Russia and the UN’s sponsorship,” he said.

In a similar vein, Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi, commander of the Houthi revolutionary committees, called for Russia’s intervention in the settlement process. The US hampers negotiations and creates obstacles, whereas the Russian presence could solve the crisis, he said.

Yemeni observers believe that there is an Iranian gambit being carried out by the Houthi/Saleh side to reproduce the Syrian scenario in Yemen by involving Russia not just in the political track, but militarily as well.

This is another sign that the current political and military setbacks in the Yemeni crisis are merely the latest turns in a long and winding road, with many unforeseeable twists ahead.

SPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:03AM ET

‘Panorama of the absurd’Erdogan’s machinations continue, with 2016 likely to see pressure spike on his foes in parliament, the ultimate goal being to change the constitution in his favour, writes Sayed Abdel-Meguid

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People’s faces lit up with smiles as heavy rains turned to snowfall that covered the Anatolian green in a sparkling white blanket. They were beginning preparations for what has become an integral

part of the winter season, despite the thundering bearded zealots who roam the streets railing against Christmas, the Christmas tree and all manifestations of the “crusader” holidays.

Millions of ordinary Turkish citizens celebrated New Year’s Eve, as always. Ironically, in those same streets where the fanatics thundered, veiled women were selling lottery tickets. The Milli Piyango, or National Lottery, is a governmental institution. Apparently, its officials thought that by adding a religious touch they would be able to attract more dreamers of instant wealth.

 In all events, once the celebrating had ended and people awoke the following day, frowns returned to people’s faces, generally mixed with a strong dose of bewilderment. Perhaps it is with strong reason that a Turkish wit called 1 January, an official holiday in Turkey, the day of the Turkish “panorama of the absurd.”

Naturally, the main reason is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who, in relatively frequent intervals, emits an utterance that raises eyebrows and stirs controversy. As 2015 segued into 2016 he may well have outdone himself.

Erdogan is driven by a single obsession: changing the system of government from a parliamentary one to a “Turkish-style” presidential system. He argues that the current system is holding Turkey back, even though it is the parliamentary system that enabled Turkey to shine in comparison to other countries in the Islamic world, at least before the rise of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (JDP).

In fact, were it not for this system, which was established in the late 1940s, the JDP and its leader would certainly not be where they are today. In addition, the current decline is not the fault of this system but rather the product of deviation away from the democracy that had been in place for several decades, apart from the periods of the three military coups which, in total, comes to about five years.

Still, Erdogan continues to push for the promulgation of a new constitution in order to replace that “non-democratic” system he claims was the work of the generals who engineered the coup in 1980. Many fear that the presidential system that would be created by the new constitution would be a dictatorial one in which all powers reside in the hands of the chief executive.

And Erdogan, himself, has just given further grounds for this fear. From aboard his luxurious presidential airplane on his way home from Saudi Arabia, the Turkish president issued a statement suggesting that what Turkey needed was a central authority similar to that Hitler had founded in Germany. Ironically, the man who once flew into a rage when a writer compared him to Hitler has suddenly cited the Nazi Führer as a model.

Not surprisingly, Erdogan’s slip, if that was what it was, precipitated a flood of analyses and commentaries. Perhaps the driving question of all this inquiry was: is there a method to this madness that has nothing to do with the democracy to which JDP officials pay lip service?

Sözcü, a leading opposition newspaper, addressed a list questions to the occupant of the sumptuous presidential palace, the Aksaray: If a presidential system is established will terrorism end? Will the price of the dollar go down against the lira? The lira is now worth less than half it was five years ago; the dollar stands at 2.92 Turkish lira while in 2010 it stood at 1.40.

Will per capita income increase? Will the government raise civil service salaries? Will a presidential system limit corruption, nepotism and bribery? Will the judiciary become autonomous and impartial? Will standards of education increase?

Will there be greater stability and security? Will Turkey’s relations with its neighbours revive? And last but not least: Will Turkey be the greatest nation in the region?

Sadly, the impartial observer senses the answers are all in the negative. The only prospects are deeper gloom, further regression and more bitterness and despair for the Turkish people.

Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, for his part, has offered few convincing justifications for changing the system. Still, he defends it, however weakly.

The presidential system is the most appropriate system for emergent Turkey, he says, despite the fact that, as prime minister, he is the man in charge — theoretically — under the current system.

In this regard, one might also ask, if the presidential system is so great why had Erdogan not

promoted it at the time he was prime minister? Here, too, the answer is obvious: he will tolerate no rivals. Which brings us back to his comment regarding the system of government under Hitler: slip or not, it betrays his intentions.

The “panorama of the absurd” reveals another facet of Erdogan’s authoritarian drive. This one targets political party plurality. The arguments have been ready to hand and only needed a pretext.

This was handed to Erdogan and the ruling party on a silver platter as the direction of the official glare honed in on the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and its leaders for ostensibly working to divide the country by advocating Kurdish self-rule in southeast Turkey.

Now here is where a couple of provisions of the current constitution (even if it is the work of “coup-makers”) come in handy. Will the government shut down the PDP? No, such a thought had never entered their heads. But it will work to lift immunity from PDP co-chairpersons first, its parliamentary deputies second, and PDP municipal chiefs third. The public prosecutor has already begun to launch extensive investigations.

LIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1278, 14 January, 2016      13-01-2016 03:21AM ET

Myth and reality of Iraqi mediationIraq cannot help broker Iranian-Saudi peace negotiations, writes Salah Nasrawi

Protest in Baghdad against the execution of Shia Muslim cleric Nimr Al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia (photo: Reuters)PrintEmail

When reports emerged last week that Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari wanted to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia in order to end the standoff over the execution of a Saudi Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia, many Iraqis were taken by surprise.Commentators and writers on social media received the reports with scepticism, and many even joked about the ability of Iraqi diplomacy to assume regional responsibilities in foreign affairs when the country remained deeply immersed in domestic ethnic and sectarian conflicts.

Still, the Iraqi government’s offer to broker a deal between the two regional rivals was not that funny, and many thought the suggestion raised some serious questions about the country’s fortunes in its neighbourhood’s newest conflict.

Al-Jaafari’s surprise initiative came after Riyadh’s execution of popular Saudi Shia cleric Nimr Al-Nimr led to a row with its regional nemesis, Iran. He also made an intense four-day trip in shuttle diplomacy that included Tehran, Muscat and Cairo in efforts to defuse the crisis.

But by the time Iraq launched its meditation initiative, tensions between the two Middle Eastern rivals had already erupted into a fully-fledged regional conflict with the potential for further flare-ups.

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that the oil-rich kingdom would face “divine revenge” for its execution of Al-Nimr, and a spokesman at Iran’s foreign ministry said Saudi Arabia would “pay a high price”.

Iranians protesting against Al-Nimr’s execution stormed the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, hurling rocks and Molotov cocktails at the building. Similar demonstrations were held at the offices of the Saudi consulate in the holy city of Mashhad

After its embassy in Tehran was sacked by angry Iranians, Riyadh severed diplomatic ties with the country and recalled its ambassador. Several Saudi allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in addition to Djibouti and Sudan, also cut or downgraded diplomatic ties with Iran in solidarity with Saudi Arabia.

But Saudi Arabia’s execution of Al-Nimr prompted uproar from Shias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan and infuriated other Shia communities across the world.

The rupture in diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia also raised fears among world capitals that it could worsen the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen and undercut the international campaign against the Islamic State (IS) terror group which now threatens to take over major cities in Libya.

Baghdad’s worries about escalation are well founded as the tensions could worsen the country’s sectarian conflict. Iraq fears that the new rift could threaten national reconciliation efforts, as the Shia-led government in Baghdad is urgently trying to reach out to Sunnis in the country as it seeks to retake territory controlled by IS and is particularly vulnerable to any upsurge in anger between the Muslim sects.

Yet, the question remains of whether a country that is embroiled in a bloody sectarian conflict with far-reaching consequences on its neighbours can help find some sort of a compromise in the most dangerous regional crisis since the Iraq-Iran War of 1980-1988.

Away from the headlines, there are number of reasons why Baghdad cannot mediate between an Arab kingdom which sees itself as the bulwark of the Sunni world and a Persian nation ruled by a Shia theocracy which aspires to lead the world of Muslim Shias.

Naturally, any mediation presupposes that the two sides are willing to accept the mediator. Yet, that willingness is nowhere to be seen. Moreover, the two powers are apparently set on pulling the entire region into a struggle between Islam’s two main sects of the Sunnis and the Shias.

It is no secret that Saudi Arabia does not trust the Shia-led government in Baghdad and considers its leaders to be the stooges of Iran. Since the ouster of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s predominantly Sunni regime, the kingdom has refused to reach out to the Shia government’s leaders, accusing them of opening the door to Iranian influence in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia reopened its embassy in Baghdad only a few days before Al-Nimr’s execution, having earlier rejected all calls to send a diplomatic mission to the country after the downfall of Saddam in 2003.

But the resumption of full diplomatic ties does not seem to indicate that Iraqi-Saudi relations are now out of the dark. Uncertainty, caused by a lack of mutual trust and divergent regional and domestic policy agendas, is expected to remain the norm in their bilateral relations.

Meanwhile, the Iranian-Saudi escalation is bound to change the rules of the game in the proxy wars in Iraq. The increased hostility will not only represent yet another hurdle for regional and international action to combat IS, but will also pit Iran and Saudi Arabia against each other in a direct confrontation in Iraq.

Only a few days before the eruption of the new crisis, Saudi Arabia unveiled plans to create a new Sunni-do

HERITAGEIssue No.1278, 14 January, 2016      13-01-2016 03:23AM ET

Turkey: Saudi Arabia or Iran?The sharp rise in tensions between Tehran and Riyadh has thrown into relief Turkish regional policy and its missteps, writes Sayed Abdel-Meguid

A terrorist attack hit Turkey’s Sultanahmet neighbourhood, home to Istanbul’s biggest concentration of monuments, leaving 10 killed and 15 wounded

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Was it another slip of the tongue from the quarters of the ruling Justice Development Party (JDP) and its founder? How could it have been when the statement had clearly been worded with extreme care?

With consummate diplomatic politesse, government spokesman Numan Kurtulmuş told a press conference that Turkey could not support Saudi Arabia’s execution of a senior Shia cleric because Ankara opposes the death penalty, having abolished it with no regrets a decade and a half ago.

When politically motivated, such actions can only pour further fuel on sectarian conflicts and were certainly not conducive to peace in a region already aflame in civil strife and warfare, Kurtulmuş added.

The remarks by Kurtulmuş, a key JDP figure who also serves as deputy prime minister, seemed to favour Turkey’s Persian neighbour. They also appeared to be intended to placate protestors from

Turkey’s Alevis, a Shia minority community, who had gathered in front of the Saudi Embassy in Ankara to protest the beheading of Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr.

Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, in a speech before the JDP bloc Tuesday a week ago, appealed to Riyadh and Tehran to exercise calm and restraint and said that Turkey would offer any possible assistance to help resolve the crisis in their relationship. His words were part of attempts to stem further Sunni-Shia polarisation that could erupt in a proxy war that would serve the interests of forces “who do not wish well for Islam and the Muslim people,” as the Islamist-oriented and staunchly pro-government newspaper Yeni Safak put it.

However, the occupant of the luxurious presidential palace, the Aksaray, has no time for emotions. Anyway, he had just returned from an important visit to the kingdom in late December that bore fruit in the form of closer cooperation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in all fields, such is the magnitude of his solicitude for the welfare of his people and their country.

Because of this, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hastened to repair his government’s shocking mistake. Taking advantage of one of his routine meetings with village mayors and muhtars, Erdogan said that death penalties are carried out in many countries, such as the US and Iran, so what was all the fuss about?

Also, the executions of 47 people, including the Shia cleric Ayatollah Nimr Baqir Al-Nimr, was a matter that concerned Saudi Arabia’s domestic affairs. Erdogan has thus emerged as more pro-Saudi in this crisis because, as people close to him observed, he is eager to promote closer relations with Riyadh as this is consistent with the public mood in Turkey.

The contradictory stances in Ankara cast into relief discrepancies between the Islamist trends that have asserted themselves in government and political life in Turkey. Meanwhile, many politicians and academics have stressed the need for Turkey to stay clear of what they call the Sunni-Shia conflict.

Ünal Çeviköz, director of the Policy Studies Centre in Ankara and Turkey’s ambassador to Baghdad from 2004-2007, emphasises the need for Turkey to remain impartial and to work to create solutions to prevent further aggravation of sectarian tendencies. He added that Ankara should not be a party to the deepening Sunni-Shia polarisation, and especially that between Riyadh and Tehran.

Rather, it should strive to resolve the crisis between these two regional powers. “It wasn’t right for

Turkey to take part in the military coalition established in Riyadh [by the young crown prince] because if it loses the Shia-Sunni balance in its foreign policy and sides with a particular front, it will make itself vulnerable to angry reactions from the Shia and it will be within their firing range,” he said.

“In addition, it could risk losing the remnants of its influence in the Middle East which has already suffered severe losses as a result of inflaming the civil war in neighbouring Syria.”

Çeviköz’s colleague in the diplomatic service, former foreign minister Yaşar Yakış, agrees. Yakış served as his country’s ambassador to Riyadh from 1988 to 1992 and was a cofounder of the ruling JDP. Fearful that Tehran and Riyadh will escalate the crisis as a means to divert attention from internal problems, he stressed that Turkey should not become a party to the problem in any way.

On the contrary, he said, Ankara should act as intermediary and take pains to demonstrate to both sides that it is neutral. By all means, Turkey should avoid any steps that might cause it to lose the support of either of these two countries.

Ismail Yasa writes that were it not for Iran’s “dirty” role in supporting the Syrian regime and the crimes of that regime, the Turkish people would have been more sympathetic with Iran. However, the majority of Turks today condemn the Iranian reaction and hold that the Iranian regime, which has executed dozens of ulema and clerics, should also be condemned for carrying out politically motivated executions.

At the same time, Yasa said that the Turkish people believe that their country should stay out of the Saudi-Iranian crisis and remain impartial.

So what now? This is the very crux of Turkey’s anxieties. Saudi Arabia and Iran are key players on antithetical sides with regard to the major crises in the region, from the Syrian crisis that has just finished its fifth year to the crises in Lebanon and Hizbullah, in Iraq and in Yemen.

In addition, the Iranian Islamic Republic recently signed a nuclear accord with the Western camp that had used intense pressure to restrain Tehran and the influence of its mullahs and revolutionary guard.

The sudden turn of events two weeks ago, however, has ushered in a new and intensely

complicated phase, especially given the dynamics in the region, pouring oil onto the fires and, as minated Islamic military alliance d

SPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1278, 14 January, 2016      13-01-2016 03:24AM ET

Finding peace in SyriaThe formation of a joint military council made up of the opposition and the regime is Syria’s best hope for the future, dissident officers tell Bassel Oudat in Damascus

A Syrian toddler suffering from malnutrition in MadayaPrintEmail

On 6 January, the Associated Press (AP) news agency leaked a US document detailing a timeline for ending the Syrian crisis. The timeline sets a date for the departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power and details further steps for restructuring power in the country.

According to AP, the document expects Al-Assad to “relinquish” his position in March 2016 and his “inner circle” to depart with him. If everything goes to plan, the Syrian people would vote into office a new president and parliament in August 2017.

 Among other things, the plan calls for the formation of a joint military council made up of members from the regime and the opposition in April 2016. A general amnesty is to be declared, leading to the release of detainees on both sides. An interim governing body would run the country until new authorities are elected and a new constitution would be voted on in a referendum in March 2017.

In March 2017, the timeline reads: “Al-Assad relinquishes presidency; inner circle departs,” AP reported.

The US has distanced itself from the document, calling it a “staff-level think piece.”

According to US State Department spokesman John Kirby, the document is “preliminary and pre-decisional” and not “an official position.”

 It is “not an accurate projection of plans by the international community to effect a political transition in Syria,” Kirby added.

The Russians have rejected the document outright, saying that such details are to be left to the negotiations between the regime and the opposition that are expected to start in Geneva on 25 January.

The Syrian regime has called the document “delusionary.” Even the opposition is not pleased with the timetable set out in the document, as it would allow Al-Assad to stay in power for over 15 more months.

However, the document dovetails with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which envisages a very close agenda for resolving the Syrian conflict.

Several Free Syrian Army (FSA) officers interviewed by Al-Ahram Weekly support the formation of a joint military council with the regime, arguing that this is not only feasible but would also stabilise the country during the interim period.

Abdel-Razeq Asil, a senior FSA commander, said that for the past two years high-ranking dissident

officers had been taking “substantive steps” towards forming such a council. According to Asil, the council would be led by “experienced dissident opposition officers and Syrian army officers whose hands are not tainted with blood.”

The task of the joint council would be “to restore control of all Syrian land, monitor the course of political change, and guarantee the implementation of any decisions reached through negotiations,” he said.

The 18-month transition period envisaged by the document is consistent with the plan endorsed by the Security Council last month.

Hassan Rajju, a former Republican Guard officer and current leader of the United Syrian Front, endorsed the idea of a regime-opposition joint military council. “We believe in a political solution. But having a joint military council is necessary for finding a political solution,” he said.

evoted to fighting gloSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1278, 14 January, 2016      13-01-2016 11:00AM ET

Assessing the WTOThe outcome of the WTO 10th Ministerial Conference in Nairobi was disappointing for Egypt, writes Magda Shahin

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The results of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 10th Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi last month were disappointing for Egypt, even though the conference was hailed as a success by negotiators and by Roberto Azevedo, the Brazilian director-general of the WTO.

The disappointment was due to the conjunction of the meagre results of the conference and the high expectations that the 20-year-old organisation would become stronger, completing the triangle of the Bretton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The poor outcome of the conference put many at a loss as to the role of the WTO and its future direction. Following the adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030 last year, and the successful adoption of a universal climate deal at the Paris Conference earlier in

December, the WTO Ministerial Conference, held from 15-19 December, bodes ill for the future of multilateral trade negotiations.

The conference lowered the bar of trade negotiations in the future and dampened the high hopes of developing countries to become a genuine part of global governance on trade. The WTO had been seen as the only channel emerging countries have for fair and democratic international trade governance, as the organisation’s voting system, relying on a one country, one vote system, is unlike that of the Bretton Woods institutions where it is more a case of one dollar, one-vote.

The declaration that concluded the conference did not attempt to hide the wide gap between the organisation’s members on a number of issues. It was transparent enough to bring them to the fore, leaving the WTO to continue to struggle with its future prospects.

Deep divergences remain on the ill-fated Doha Development Agenda, whose obituary was surely written at the conference. Furthermore, the role of the WTO as a negotiating forum, which so many countries had taken pride in, has been put into question as a result of the ongoing parallel negotiations on mega-regional trade deals.

The failure to come up with meaningful consensual resolutions in favour of development and developing countries, even by camouflaging them with so-called constructive ambiguity, has made emerging economies and countries like Egypt ask openly what the organisation now holds for them.

The conference took the easy way out by favouring the least-developed countries at the expense of the developing countries, not coming up with any tangible outcomes in support of the latter.

Much weight, however, was given by the conference to concepts the WTO had earlier tried hard to circumvent and avoid. The conference cemented what are known as plurilateral agreements, much criticised as being agreements encompassing a selected group of countries that are willing to join, while leaving others out in the cold.

bal terrSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1278, 14 January, 2016      13-01-2016 11:22AM ET

Press on trialThe upcoming trial of six journalists for alleged publishing offences puts the future of press freedom at risk, reports Mona El-Nahhas

An archival photo of a demonstration against the arrest of journalists in front of the Press SyndicatePrintEmail

The Press Syndicate Council is due to hold a meeting within the next few days to discuss the repercussions of a recent decree issued by an investigating judge referring six journalists to Criminal Court for publishing false news. The trial’s opening date has not been announced.

On 6 January, Judge Fathi Al-Bayoumi, assigned by the Justice Ministry to investigate the disputed purchase of a piece of land by the Port Said Judges Club, referred the journalists, including three chief editors, to Criminal Court for publishing false news defaming Justice Minister Ahmed Al-Zend.

In its first reaction to Al-Bayoumi’s decree, the Press Syndicate Freedoms Committee issued a statement condemning the attack against the press and the attempt to diminish the right of expression. “Using the right of litigation in such a way and by a senior official against journalists reflects anger at the press,” the statement said, adding that the latest practices targeting the profession indicate the state’s intolerance of criticism.

Khaled Al-Balshi, rapporteur of the Freedoms Committee, stressed that the syndicate will fully

support the six journalists. Sources at the syndicate revealed that the council will try to persuade the justice

When President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi appeared at Christmas mass for the second year running he was met with cheers from a congregation thrilled that the president’s support for Copts remains firm.

Salafists, who for years told Muslims they should not congratulate Christians on their feasts, were once again shown that their fanaticism has no future in Egypt.

Though the Church had invited the president, his appearance was not announced in advance.

Welcoming the president, Pope Tawadros II spoke of national unity. “Egypt is beginning a new era, with new thinking and a new spirit. We are building it together as Egyptians, for the future of our sons,” he said.

The pope reminded the congregation that with the election of a new parliament Al-Sisi has fulfilled his promises regarding the roadmap, and voiced the hope the new parliament will live up to the nation’s expectations.

Synod Secretary Father Raphael commented on the president’s mingling with the crowds. Al-Sisi felt “safe” among the congregation, he said. Raphael praised the president for embracing and talking to a child among the congregation. The gesture, he said, showed Al-Sisi’s compassion for all children.

In another gesture of support to the community, Al-Sisi appointed several Copts to parliament. His strong reaction to the massacre of Copts in Libya by the Islamic State group, and instructions to the army to rebuild churches vandalised after the dispersal of the Rabaa sit-in, had already ensured that he is supported by an overwhelming majority of Copts.

In a short speech at the Abbasiya Cathedral, Al-Sisi apologised for delays in the restoration of churches attacked by extremists following the dispersal of the Rabaa sit-in and promised all work will be completed by next Christmas.

Father Binyamin, chaLIVINGSPORTS

HERITAGEIssue No.1278, 14 January, 2016      13-01-2016 11:28AM ET

Sinai development: From the 1980s to 2000sPlanned development of Sinai has been in progress since the late 1970s, with local communities witnessing isolated rather than steady progress, writes Ahmed Shams

The planned settlement distribution by population in 2000 (“beyond one million” and 313,500 employment opportunities), as charted by the “Sinai Planning Studies” in 1979-1985 (source: Shams, Sinai Peninsula Research)

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Travelling through the Sinai Peninsula after the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel on 26 March 1979, one would cross temporary withdrawal lines. The land was changing hands. The Israeli-occupied Sinai was being handed back to Egypt.

Al-Arish, Abu Zeneima, Wadi Feiran/Abu Rudies, El-Tur and St Catherine are cities and towns across Sinai that saw the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the western half of the Peninsula over a period of nine months.

Back in Cairo, another agreement was in place. The Egyptian government, represented by the Ministry of Economy and Economic Cooperation (MEEC), signed an agreement with USAID for $5 million in 1979 to conduct the “Sinai Planning Studies” (known as the “National Plan for the Development of Sinai”).

The timing, development status and hoped-for quality were stressed in a letter directed by MEEC to the USAID on 16 June 1979: “The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, now being in a position to include the Sinai Peninsula in its national development efforts, is planning to initiate the investigation of proposed social and economic development projects and activities in this long neglected region. The studies of the proposed projects should be of professional quality to be considered for financing by international and bilateral financial institutions.”

 

ir of the Church’s Crisis ComSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1279, 21 January, 2016      20-01-2016 12:38AM ET

China in the Middle EastAs Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Egypt today as part of his three-legged regional tour, China is positioning itself for a new political role in the Middle East, reports Dina Ezzat

Saudi King Salman bin Abdel-Aziz escorting Xi Jinping upon his arrival in Riyadh on TuesdayPrintEmail

Chinese President Xi Jinping has arrived in Egypt today, the second leg of his Middle East tour that started on Tuesday in Saudi Arabia and should end in Iran on Saturday.

This is a significant tour as it sees a Chinese president making a first visit to Egypt in 12 years and a tour of three regional countries to offer mediation in order to resolve the political conflict between the two oil-rich states of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Beijing had officially offered its political mediation to both Riyadh, whose oil remains one of China’s top imports, and Tehran, which has offered itself as a huge terrain for ambitious Chinese investments after the lifting of the international sanctions against it earlier in the week.

China had sent a senior diplomatic envoy to both capitals earlier in the year. During the final weeks of 2015, it acted to host a meeting on developments in Syria, a top regional issue for both Saudi Arabia and Iran.

“The Chinese president is basically trying to rework the status and role of Beijing in the Middle East as part of a growing Chinese realisation that the economic interests of China, which have always been the focus of its attention away from its direct geographical neighbourhood, are being challenged by political developments in the Middle East as in Africa and elsewhere,” said a senior regional diplomat.

“The question, however, is whether or not this attempt will pick up in the future,” he added.

He argued that it was still too early to tell, but to judge by “the facts on the ground it seems very unlikely that China, despite its traditional good relations with Iran, will be able to deliver even the beginning of a political compromise between the two countries.”

The diplomat said he was seeing “no sign of any serious interest” either in Tehran or in Riyadh.

“I think it is too difficult, especially for the Saudis who have repeatedly criticised, at least in public, Chinese policies on Muslim minorities to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict with any country, especially Iran,” he said.

The same diplomat said that traditionally the Saudis had declined all attempts at mediation with Iran made by friendly countries and organisations.

“In any case, I think that the conflict between the two countries, which is being exercised in the military sense in five countries in the region, has now reached a zero-sum game, or almost, because the Saudis want to eliminate the Iranian influence in these five countries — Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain — while Iran will not let go of the regional influence that it has worked and invested in for years to gain,” the diplomat argued.

At the end of the day, regional diplomats who follow the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic row agree that there is no basis for a compromise, but that it is to be expected that several international powers, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, will offer their mediation.

mittee

Issue No.1279, 21 January, 2016      20-01-2016 12:31AM ET

More loans?The 25 January Revolution led to the drainage of Egypt’s foreign currency resources, pushing the country to rely more on foreign aid and loans, writes Sherine Abdel-Razek

Flashes from the 2011 18-day uprisingPrintEmail

Back in mid-2011, a few months after the toppling of former president Hosni Mubarak, it was clear that the political turmoil had driven tourists and investors away from Egypt and the country would need to find an alternative source of finance.

It was then that talk of acquiring a loan from the IMF first surfaced, but Samir Radwan, the then finance minister, said that after a dialogue between the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), political activists and members of civil society, it had been decided not to take out the loan in order not to increase the country’s debts.

This was followed by several rounds of negotiations to acquire a loan in the neighbourhood of $3.2 billion in 2011, increasing to $4.8 billion in 2012 and 2013, and speculation that said it would be around $6 billion at the middle of last year.

HERITAGEIssue No.1279, 21 January, 2016      20-01-2016 12:02AM ET

Still-frozen fundsHopes of retrieving funds embezzled by ousted president Hosni Mubarak and his family received a

further bloSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1279, 21 January, 2016      19-01-2016 11:55PM ET

Conflict over corruption claimsRather than focus on refuting accusations of corruption,  observers say the government should concentrate on solving the problem at its roots, writes Niveen Wahish

w this week, wLIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1279, 21 January, 2016      19-01-2016 11:08PM ET

Russia’s divisive plansThe Russians are trying to control the course of future talks on the Syrian crisis, either by naming participants or reinterpreting UN resolutions, reports Bassel Oudat in Damascus

A civil defence member calls for help at a site hit by what activists said were three consecutive air strikes carried out by the Russian air force in Maaret Al-Numan, Idlib

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Having turned themselves into the number one military force in Syria, the Russians are now trying to control the political process. With negotiations between the regime led by Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and the opposition slated for Geneva on 25 January, the Russians are not satisfied with the composition of the opposition’s delegation.

At first, Moscow tried to insert individuals of its own choice into the delegation, and then it started pushing for two independent opposition delegations to participate in the talks: one to be formed by the anti-regime opposition and one to be handpicked by the Russians.

On 18 December, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2254, which envisages talks leading to a transitional phase in Syria. The resolution clearly states that the Syrian opposition must freely choose its own representatives to the talks.

Even before the resolution was passed, the opposition had started talking about a unified delegation. Meeting on 10 December in Riyadh, opposition groups selected 45 members to participate in the upcoming talks.

One third of the members are to form the active team for the talks; one third is to act as a reserve for the active team; and one third is made up of technocrats and counsellors to support the negotiators with the information they need.

rites HayatSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1279, 21 January, 2016      19-01-2016 10:51PM ET

After the nuclear dealA huge amount of tension has been released as a result of the Iranian nuclear deal, but Iran’s relations with the US are unlikely to improve markedly in the short term, writesCamelia Entekhabifard

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From the day Iranian demonstrators took over the US Embassy in Tehran in 1978 and diplomatic relations ended between the two nations, many Iranians have dreamed of seeing relations between the two countries normalised.

When the nuclear deal was reached last July between Iran and the Western powers, and now with the accord being implemented on 16 January, the Iranian public cannot hide its desire for more improvements in relations with the US.

On the other hand, the regime in Iran is not interested in crossing the border from business to friendship with the US, no matter what the public is asking for. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, met President Hassan Rouhani on 19 January and congratulated the government on achieving the implementation of the nuclear deal. But he also made it clear that diplomacy has its limitations when it comes to relations with the US.

“It must be seen that other parties fulfill their commitments. US officials’ remarks in recent days have caused scepticism,” Khamenei tweeted on 19 January.

For millions of Iranians, the next step after the nuclear deal will be the warming of diplomatic relations with the US. The telephone conversations between Iranian Foreign Minister Mohamed Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry, now taking place quite often, are another reason for the public excitement.

But in reality nothing has changed, and the conversations have been approved by Khamenei for particular reasons. The chances are poor that relations will be further normalised with the US, though the reduction in tensions and the minimal contacts that have developed recently are good enough reasons to make many Iranians hopeful that things will get better once Khamenei disappears from the scene.

But there is a long way for Iran and America to go before the day is seen when the two countries open embassies once again in their respective countries. With the US presidential election coming, and with most candidates not sharing the views of current President Barack Obama, it is hard to say that relations will be normalised in the near future.

So far, for many Iranians Rouhani’s government represents their interests best, and this public satisfaction could guarantee his own re-election as president if his candidature is approved by the supreme leader. Not too reformist to cause clashes with the ultra-conservative system and not too controversial or hardline, Rouhani, the moderate president, suits everyone in the system.

However, to continue this path he needs the next parliament to support his diplomacy and back him in the next presidential elections, due in 2017. The next parliamentary elections in Iran are scheduled with another election, that of the Assembly of Experts, on 26 February. As most reformist candidates have been disqualified by the Guardians Council, it is hard to say if the president will succeed in gaining a majority in the next parliament.

For the sake of the economyA new book sets out a prescription for curing the ills of the Egyptian economy, writes Sayed MoawadREGION

Unemployment fuels unrest in Tunisia

The battle for the future of Iraq’s SunnisAs Ramadi is declared recaptured from the Islamic State group and the battle for Mosul looms, the future of the Sunni areas in Iraq remains uncertain, writes Salah NasrawiIsrael in Africa: Guns, but no developmentIsrael has traditionally seen Africa as a strategic field in which to gain influence to pressure the Arabs. This policy appears to be still in full swing, writes Haitham Nuri

Haftar in a hurry?How should observers interpret the theatre of contemporary Libyan politics and militia warfare, asksGamal NkrumahErdogan rounds on academicsTurkey’s Erdogan remains firmly committed to his imperial dreams, and is now turning his attention to academics who signed a simple statement calling for peace in southeast Anatolia, writes Sayed Abdel-Meguid

Which Syrian opposition?Moscow is taking charge of many things in Syria these days, including the choice of opposition negotiators, writes Bassel Oudat

SPORTS

Court in recessThe 22nd Africa Handball Cup of Nations being played in Cairo is drawing to a close with most teams earning what they got, Mohamed Abdel-Razek reports

LIVING

LIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 10:57PM ET

Improving Egypt-Turkey relations?The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit could give a boost to Egyptian-Turkish relations, writes Doaa El-Bey

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“In spite of the good diplomatic intentions, the rift between Cairo and Ankara is just too wide,” Al-Sayed Amin Shalaby, director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, told Al-Ahram Weekly recently.

“To be fair, Egypt did not play any role in causing this rift. [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan has prioritised his ideology over the interests of two states that were making genuine efforts to establish good bilateral relations.”

The issue of improving Egypt’s relations with Turkey has been in the limelight ahead of the 13th Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit meeting in Istanbul, due to be held from 10-15 April. As current OIC president, Egypt will be attending the summit to hand over the presidency of the group to Turkey. But it is the level of representation that is most important.

“Attending the OIC is a mere procedural matter. Whether it can give strained relations with Turkey a boost depends on Turkey and how far it is ready to change its support from the Muslim Brotherhood,” said one diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Should President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi attend the summit, it could see the first meeting of its kind between Al-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But Egypt has not decided yet on the level of its representation. “The Turkish stand in the few weeks ahead of the summit will have an effect on Egypt’s decision regarding the level of representation,” the diplomat added.

There have been reports of behind-the-scenes Saudi mediation efforts to ease the strained relations between Cairo and Ankara. Egypt has denied reports of these efforts, however, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ahmed Abu Zeid saying that Ankara “must change” its views concerning the situation in Egypt before relations improve.

At a meeting with foreign correspondents last week, he added that ties with Turkey are “going through a crisis” due to interference by Turkey in Egypt’s internal affairs. He emphasised that there will be no improvement in relations between Cairo and Ankara unless there is a “fundamental change” in Ankara’s views concerning the situation in Egypt.

Shalaby did not rule out the presence of mediation efforts on the part of Saudi Arabia, which is looking for a united stand within the coalition formed last week to combat terrorism. The coalition led by the Saudis includes both Egypt and Turkey, in addition to another 35 Arab and Islamic countries.

“I expect that Egypt’s diplomacy will respond by saying that it will react positively to any mediation if Erdogan changes his stand on Egypt,” Shalaby said.

The diplomat agreed, saying that Ankara’s stand on the post-30 June developments in Egypt is the main hurdle preventing any improvement in the strained relations. Other hurdles are Turkey’s stand on the Muslim Brotherhood, which has not seen any sign of change, as well as Erdogan’s repeated statements that reaffirm that support.

“Other factors include the rivalry between Egypt and Turkey for a leading role in the region and the different stands they have taken on important issues such as the Syrian issue,” added the diplomat.

While there are some factors that stand out against any easing of relations, there are other factors that work in favour of easing them, among them the Saudi will to patch up differences to make the coalition to combat terrorism more effective.

Last week, President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping, who visited Egypt for two days. The visit aimed at deepening the Chinese-Egyptian relationship and enhancing practical cooperation between the two nations. Xi’s trip to Egypt is the first by a Chinese president in 12 years.

During Xi’s stay in Egypt, he and Al-Sisi attended a ceremony launching the Egyptian-Chinese cultural year, marking the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Egyptian-Chinese ties. Egypt was the first Arab and African country to establish diplomatic relations with China.

“The Chinese government encourages and supports qualified enterprises to participate in large-scale projects in Egypt,” Xi said during a press conference.

“Bilateral relations between the two countries are at an important phase now,” Al-Sisi said.

Xi and Al-Sisi signed a five-year agreement under which the development efforts of the China-Egypt Zone of Economic and Trade Cooperation of Suez will be enhanced. Xi invited the president to attend the next summit of the Group of 20 (G-20), to be held in September in the Chinese city of Hangzhou.

Egyptian and Chinese authorities signed 21 other agreements in power generation and distribution, space technology, communication media, trade, finance, culture and climate change. Sahar Nasr, minister of international cooperation, said the total amount of the agreements had reached some $15 billion.

LIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 10:50PM ET

Press legislation: A war of draftsLaws regulating the media feature high on parliament’s agenda, Gamal Essam El-DinreportsGamal Essam El-Din

Abdel-AalPrintEmail

Parliamentary Speaker Ali Abdel-Aal received a delegation from the Egyptian Press Syndicate this week to discuss issues ranging from the issuing of new media laws to the problems facing parliamentary reporters.

The delegation was led by Press Syndicate Chairman Yehia Qalash and included seven members of

the syndicate’s board and two journalist MPs, Mohamed Badawi of Al-Ahram and Radwan Al-Zayati from Al-Gomhouria.

Qalash told reporters that while the delegation’s visit was to congratulate Abdel-Aal on his election as speaker of the House of Representatives, they would also bring up media laws that need to be amended to fall into line with the new constitution.

“We congratulated Professor Abdel-Aal on his election but also used the meeting to discuss draft laws that have been prepared by the Press Syndicate and other media experts,” said Qalash.

“We stressed that the drafts we presented reflected the wishes of a majority of journalists and warned that any alternative government-drafted laws would be a step in the wrong direction.”

Qalash said Abdel-Aal told the delegation that parliament has not received any legislation on the media from the government and promised that no media laws will be passed without first consulting with the syndicate.

Seven constitutional articles deal directly with media affairs, granting greater freedoms and independence to journalists and banning custodial sentences for publication offences.

Qalash said a 230-article Law on Regulating the Press and the Media and a four-article Law on Amending Articles Related to Publication Crimes in the Penal Code had been drafted by the Press Syndicate in coordination with a government-appointed legislative reform committee.

“Speaker Abdel-Aal was a member of the committee that played a positive role in drafting the two laws,” said Qalash.

In an interview with Al-Ahram published on 23 January, Minister of Justice Ahmed Al-Zend said three draft laws covering the media and press were being prepared.

“The cabinet has finalised drafting a law on the formation of a Higher Council for Media Regulation and details will be announced in ten days,” said Al-Zend.

“The law was prioritised because Article 211 of the constitution stipulates such a council take charge of regulating all forms of audio, visual, print and digital media.”

Article 211 also requires the council to guarantee the freedom, independence, neutrality and diversity of media outlets in Egypt, prevent monopolies, review the sources of funding of media and press organisations, and ensure that press and media outlets behave ethically and do not endanger national security.

Draft laws that conform to constitutional articles 212 and 213, which call for a National Council of Press Affairs and a National Council of Media Affairs to be established, are being prepared, said Al-Zend.

FEATURESLIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 10:39PM ET

Shifting centresThe Interior Ministry is on the move, reports Mai Samih

The Interior MinistryPrintEmail

The Interior Ministry began moving to its new headquarters in New Cairo’s Fifth Settlement, near the Police Academy, on 23 January. Planning for the move has taken five months and is expected to be completed by May, with the building fully operational by the end of April.

“We are moving the ministry sector by sector. We need to ensure nothing essential is missing from the new headquarters and the communications systems linking the various departments must be tested,” said a ministry source.

The Interior Ministry’s predecessor — Dewan Al-Wali (The Ruler’s Department) — was established in 1805 by Mohamed Ali Pasha. Its remit was to solve disputes between Egyptians and between Egyptians and foreigners. It was headed by four scholars, each an expert in one of the four branches of Islamic jurisprudence. On 25 February 1857, under the rule of Mohamed Saeed Pasha, it was re-named Nezaret Al-Dakheleya (the Interior Authority).

“The current headquarters, inaugurated in 1971 by Anwar Al-Sadat, have become overcrowded,”

said the source. “Work on new premises began more than five years ago, before the January 2011 Revolution, with the Ministry of Defence supervising the construction process.”

In November 2011, clashes between protesters and police forces in Mohamed Mahmoud Street, adjacent to the current building, left 47 dead and 3,000 injured. The first anniversary of the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes in 2012 saw clashes that claimed the life of one protestor and left 52 others injured.

Yet any suggestion that the ministry is moving to avoid a repeat of such violence is false, says General Fouad Allam, a former head of the State Security Department at the Interior Ministry.

“Work on the new building began before the January 2011 Revolution and as soon as the building was finished staff began the moving process,” he said.

The Interior Ministry’s headquarters deals with up to 30,000 visitors a day, placing tremendous pressure on local infrastructure.

Moving the Interior Ministry is a significant step, says political analyst Hassan Nafaa. “There is huge political significance in moving the headquarters of the Interior Ministry, and planning to move the Mugamma,” he said.

“There are many government officials working there who could be an easy target for terrorists. The relocation is a precautionary security measures,” said Nafaa, noting that it is part of an ongoing plan to shift government buildings outside central Cairo. “They started with the Interior Ministry because it has been regularly targeted by protestors. The government wants it an area that can be secured more effectively.”

The new headquarters is built on a 47-acre site and is equipped with the latest communication technology. The Interior Minister’s office lies at the heart of the building, alongside the public relations, media departments, police and human rights departments. There is a mosque that can accommodate 1,000 worshipers and a multi-story garage with space for 1,300 employees’ cars. The perimeter wall of the headquarters is seven metres high and 40 centimetres thick.

“I’d like to see all ministries move from the downtown area,” said Allam. “Government institutions

like Mogamma Al-Tahrir desperately need to be moved. They have been talking about relocating outside central Cairo for 50 years now. Al-Sadat city was specially built to house them but the plans were cancelled by Hosni Mubarak. The city is now deserted and rats have eaten the electricity cables.”

Allam suggested that half of the Interior Ministry’s old headquarters should be allocated to the Police Insurance Sector and the remaining portion offered for rent.

Downtown resident Noha Mohamed, 50, is all for the move. “Relocating ministries away from Downtown will save us a lot of headaches and ease traffic congestion, which has reached impossible levels. Al-Sadat Ci

PRESS REVIEWCULTUREFEATURESLIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 09:59PM ET

Finance for SMEsHayat Hussein looks at a new initiative to expand financing for Egypt’s small- and medium-sized enterprises

Lack of finance was one of the main challenges facing SMEsPrint

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In a move aiming at energising the economy, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has called on banks to increase their financing of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) nationwide.

The announcement followed a speech in which President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi said he had asked the CBE to expand credit to youth-run small- and medium-sized enterprises that are key contributors to the state’s investment and production sectors.

According to Al-Sisi’s plans, within four years 20 per cent of bank loans should be allocated to these businesses. The banks will offer around LE200 billion to finance 350,000 companies and thus create job opportunities for more than four million people.

Interest rates will be less than the five per cent on loans given to youth initiatives, as Al-Sisi said that in the past high rates have prevented many young people from starting their own businesses.

A press statement has appeared on the CBE website confirming these details and adding that a five per cent interest rate will be offered to firms generating between LE1 million and LE20 million a year in revenues.

The banks participating in the four-year programme will be able to deduct the loans from their required reserves at the CBE, according to the statement.

Ahmed Selim, a former manager at the International Arab African Bank, told Al-Ahram Weekly that the plan is a “major step forward” but there is a danger that the banks will not cooperate unless obliged to do so.

“The banks pay eight per cent on deposits. If they are expected to make loans to SMEs at five per cent there will be huge losses,” Selim said. One vice-chairman of an Egyptian bank, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said, “The losses will be huge as the eight per cent rate does not include the cost of procedures and operations, which may cost another six per cent.”

Both the Fitch and Moody’s rating agencies have reservations about the plan. Fitch said in a statement that regulations to boost SME lending could weaken the quality of loans extended by Egyptian banks in the medium term.

“Recent regulations are credit-positive for the country but credit-negative for the banks,” Moody’s said in a statement. Fitch criticised the low interest rate offered, saying that a five per cent interest rate on SME loans is well below both the current yield on local treasury bonds (around 13 per cent for a five-year bond) and normal commercial lending rates.

ty is alreadHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 10:38PM ET

Not swine fluDeaths from a viral infection are mounting but the Health Ministry says swine flu is not the killer, reports Reem Leila

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In January, 18 people were reported to have died from swine flu (H1N1) in the governorates of North Sinai, Al-Beheira and Assiut, in addition to more than 145 infections. Six of the dead were from Al-Beheira, whose hospitals declared a state of emergency.

But as news spread of several viral deaths over the past few days in a number of governorates, the Health Ministry said no cases of swine flu had been detected. Khaled Megahed, the ministry’s official spokesman, said claims that the deaths were due to swine flu were inaccurate.

“There is no longer what is called the H1N1 virus. Since 2010 the World Health Organisation has defined the virus as seasonal influenza. It is not the pandemic of 2009,” Megahed said.

The virus, according to Megahed, is rather a seasonal H1N1 influenza — not the so-called swine flu — currently common locally, regionally and internationally. “The virus is responsive to Tamiflu which is easily available in the market,” Megahed said.

Megahed said those infected are responding to medical treatment and that most will soon be discharged from hospital. “The 18 who died had other health complications such as liver, kidney

disease and cancer. Such patients usually have a low immunity system, and are vulnerable to any virus.”

Amr Qandil, head of the Health Ministry’s Preventive Medicine Department, urged people to avoid close contact with others who appear unwell. People including children must wash their hands with soap and water thoroughly and often, practice good health habits including getting adequate sleep, eating nutritious food and keeping physically active.

“For those who feel sick, they should seek immediate medical advice, stay at home and stay away from work, school or crowds, rest and take plenty of fluids, cover their mouth and nose with disposable masks or tissue, and wash their hands with soap and water, especially after sneezing or coughing. Inform people around you with the illness and avoid contact with them,” said Qandil.

Egypt’s current stockpile of Tamiflu exceeds five million bottles. “There are enough strategic supplies for all the public’s essential needs,” Qandil added.

Egypt has developed a vaccine to combat H1N1. A research team at the Egyptian National Research Centre (NRC) has developed a vaccine that it says is more effective in dealing with the strain of the virus found in Egypt.

y built. Why nHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 09:56PM ET

For the sake of the economyA new book sets out a prescription for curing the ills of the Egyptian economy, writesSayed Moawad

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Sherif Delawar’s new book, The Trilogy of Development, Justice and the Economy: How Not to Lose the Future, comes at a time when Egypt is reordering its priorities and correcting the mistakes of the past.

The title reflects the messages the author intends to deliver, which touch on the current challenges Egypt is facing and were the main causes of two revolutions, that of 25 January 2011 and 30 June 2013. Delawar is a visiting professor of management sciences at the Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport.

In his introduction, the author states that the main change needed is to accelerate the path of economic development such that the goals of the Egyptian revolutions — of freedom, social justice and human dignity — are achieved.

The correction of the economic path starts with a careful examination of the reasons behind the failure of the economic system before the two revolutions to meet the aspirations of young people.

It offers an honest analysis of means to achieve social justice and calls for widening the ownership of productive assets, designing an economic system that works in the interests of all, and government intervention to apply the rules of the markets for an efficient allocation of resources with a view to achieving social justice.

The book focusses on the role of central government, noting that it should be accompanied by a larger role for the local governorates in both financing and spending. Municipal councils and executive bodies should have the right to borrow to finance investment and service projects. These loans would be repaid by future earnings, lessening the burden on the public budget and generating new jobs and achieves local development.

It is necessary for Egypt to learn from global experiences of economic decentralisation to build local economies based on efficiency, equity, sustainability, accountability, solidarity and democracy.

The new economic system should work for all. Securing work opportunities and incomes for every citizen of working age is a human right. Egypt should set out strategies and detailed programmes for full employment, and no one can do this except the government. It should direct additional resources from the public budget to support social solidarity networks, training programmes for young people, and the social insurance system.

Combatting poverty and creating employment opportunities require reforming rural markets and creating real progress in the countryside and Upper Egypt, home to half the population. This should be done by raising productivity through careful guidance and the modernisation of agricultural cooperatives, together with a strategy for the selection of optimum crops, complying with irrigation capabilities and available water resources.

The increased resources will enable the public budget to finance the public investment expenditure required and service the domestic debt. Furthermore, the increased resources will enable the government to subsidise food, as no government will be able to reduce such subsidies unless the standard of living of the majority of the Egyptian people is being raised.

Most importantly, the country’s investment and production strategy will achieve economic development when the government uses a mixture of protective and liberal trade policies and balances between both, based on national needs and capabilities. This strategy should realise the importance of education, knowledge, human capital, diversification, innovation and technology, all of which should not be left to market forces alone.

The author of the book calls for a capitalist state, which does not mean a return to a centralised economy but instead refers to a managed engineering of capitalism according to domestic conditions.

The first decade of the 21st century witnessed an increase in public wealth, public investment, public ownership, and the control of the government over countries’ main economic activities in order to achieve sustainable development. Petroleum companies owned by the state, for example, now control nearly three-quarters of the world’s petroleum reserves.

Furthermore, governments are pushing public and private companies to enter the fields of aviation, maritime transportation, communications, energy generation, mining and petrochemicals. An example of the return of the capitalist state is the BRICS (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa) states that established 117 companies from 2004 to 2008.

The author poses the question of how Egypt can achieve high and sustained growth. The answer is that economic growth is a means and not a target per se, and it is not a mere economic issue but comes in parallel with good governance and modernising political, legislative and executive institutions.

The author specifies, based on the experience of some developing countries, a number of factors that can achieve sustainable growth, including, inter alia, the application of technology to production, the reliance on human capital in generating wealth, an investment rate of over 25 per cent annually, high national savings, whether private or public, openness to the international economy, an effective role for government in reducing red tape, and managing the national currency in a manner that avoids fluctuations.

For Egypt, two features here are of great importance: first, the rational usage of water and energy, as high rates of growth require more usage of these factors; and second, expanding the scope of growth to include all citizens and setting out a limit on the gap between incomes.

The author attributes the inability of the state to extend welfare further to Egypt’s institutional history. He says that Egyptian institutions have worked in the interests of a small segment of society from the time of Mohamed Ali in the 19th century to the 30 June Revolution.

Under Mohamed Ali’s style of authoritative management, despite some growth, the state was managed as a private ownership system and privileges were granted to loyalists. After the 1919 revolution, the institutions continued to work for a certain segment of society, and after the 1952 revolution privileges were taken from the elites and growth was achieved. Under the rule of former president Anwar Al-Sadat, this was reversed and another segment enjoyed both capital and power as a result of the Infitah (Open Door Policy).

Under then-president Hosni Mubarak, in the 1990s, another segment attained wealth and power through privatisation and the liberalisation of markets. As a result of corruption in governance and the government’s inability to secure public services and the lack of equal opportunities, young people took to the streets against a political and social system that negated their aspirations.

The Muslim Brotherhood tried to monopolise the country’s political and economic institutions during its one-year rule by replacing the political and financial elites with another profiteering group. As a result, the people went out onto the streets again, on 30 June 2013.The author says that nations fail because of the nature of institutions that enable a certain segment to accumulate wealth at the expense of the entire society.

Concerning social justice, this is defined as “empowering all citizens’ capabilities in a manner that enables them to attain opportunities on an equal footing”. Here, the capabilities concept of justice, as put forward by Indian economist Amartya Sen, is considered to be a condition for achieving justice.

The absence of justice is defined as a lack of capabilities in some segments of society and the relative levels of capabilities as the main cause of social differences in society. Policy-makers should raise the capabilities of citizens when designing programmes to combat poverty and unemployment and establish social justice.

The book refers to the connection between the new liberalism and development. The US writer Francis Fukuyama, in his book The End of History, once argued that liberalism was the sole way of progress. But the development expertise of East Asia has shown that development in emerging countries can be led by a “technocratic elite”.

At the same time, former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew has argued that “patriarchal power” has been the route that leaders of development in Asia have followed, and this approach is more powerful than Western liberalism in producing a more educated and principled society.

The book also touches on a sensitive point, which is the fate of domestic industry. The structure of this heavily depends on the imports of both inputs and equipment. In this regard, inputs and intermediaries constitute nearly 55 per cent of such imports, while capital equipment constitutes 72 per cent of investment costs.

This means that Egyptian industry’s payments in foreign currency equal approximately 60 per cent of such costs, which increases the balance of trade deficit and puts pressure on the exchange rate with each increase in production.

Domestic firms’ industrial competitiveness will not rise unless the government plays a leading role in raising the skills of human capital and in technological infrastructure. Furthermore, the government has an important role to play in dealing with the rules of the international economic order and their effect on Egyptian industry.

In conclusion, the state’s strength is made up of both hard and soft power. Hard power includes efficient and effective physical and human capital, technology, the quality of infrastructure, and military power. Soft power includes ideas, culture, values and national loyalty.

Egypt’s ability to play a key role in the world today through its capacity as a centralised state depends on factors including a coherent social fabric based on equity in distributing the national income, the prevalence of the rule of law, development of human capital (education, training, healthcare, and child and mother care), physical and monetary policies, business rules that lead to the sustainability of development, and protecting reserves of water, energy and natural resources.

Such a balanced social fabric is the guarantor of Egypt’s strength in the future.

Sherif Delawar, The Trilogy of Development, Justice and the Economy: How Not to Lose the Future.PrintEmail

ot use it? It will save the governmeSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 09:53PM ET

Unemployment fuels unrest in TunisiaPrintEmail

Tunisia is being swept by a wave of demonstrations reminiscent of the country’s experience five years ago, when protests triggered the first of the Arab Spring revolutions.

But the fifth anniversary of the Tunisian revolution is being commemorated against the backdrop of declining living standards and high unemployment rates. The government’s failure so far to remedy these problems, despite its many promises, has driven thousands of young Tunisians onto the streets of the country’s towns and cities.

Violent protests last week spread to 12 regions, where there were clashes with riot police and a number of security buildings were set on fire. Last Wednesday, a policeman died in clashes with protestors, according to a statement from the Tunisian Interior Ministry.

On 22 January, a state of emergency was declared throughout the country, along with a nighttime curfew and the sealing of the borders with neighbouring Libya.

This year’s protests did not originate in the town of Sidi Bouzid, as was the case in 2011 when Mohamed Bouazizi, a young vegetable-seller, immolated himself after police seized his cart and abused him.

This time the spark came from the central-western town of Kasserine, where two weeks ago Ridha Yahyaoui, a 28-year-old university graduate, climbed an electricity pylon to protest against his rejection from a public-sector job and was electrocuted.

The young man’s death triggered rapidly escalating protests in Kasserine, with demonstrators rallying in front of governorate offices, blocking the main roads, and many of them threatening to commit suicide if the government failed to respond to their demands.

The unemployment protests quickly built up momentum, spread to other parts of the country and soon reached the capital. As the demonstrations increased in scope and size, confrontations with the security forces grew fiercer and demonstrators stormed government buildings in Tunis and Kasserine.

In the first official response to the protests, Speaker of Parliament Mohamed Nacer formed a delegation of seven MPs to visit Kasserine, assess the situation of youth unemployment in the region, and submit a report to parliament on the eruption of tensions there.

nt lots of mSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 09:51PM ET

The battle for the future of Iraq’s SunnisAs Ramadi is declared recaptured from the Islamic State group and the battle for Mosul looms, the future of the Sunni areas in Iraq remains uncertain, writes Salah Nasrawi

Iraqi soldiers participate in a training exercise with American and Spanish trainers at Basmaya base, 40km southeast of Baghdad, Iraq (photo: AP)

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In a surprise move, the United States has announced that it will deploy a new force of special operations troops to Iraq to combat the Islamic State (IS) terror group which has seized swathes of the country and neighbouring Syria.

US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter wrote in the US publication Politico last week that soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division would soon deploy to Iraq to join the fight against IS “with a clear campaign plan to deliver the barbaric organisation a lasting defeat.”

Though Carter did not give details about the deployment, he said the troop mission was to destroy the IS “parent tumour in Iraq and Syria by collapsing its two power centres in Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria.”

“Our campaign is to deliver IS a lasting defeat,” Carter wrote.

US Secretary of State John Kerry said “the government of Iraq was of course briefed in advance of secretary Carter’s announcement” and the two sides would work out details about the new deployment.

Joseph F Dunford Jr, the US top military officer, also said discussions between Washington and Baghdad had begun on how American forces would “integrate” with Iraqi military units to take back Mosul.

The move is a sharp departure from US President Barack Obama’s previous strategy that the US would not deploy “boots on the ground” in Iraq and Syria and would continue instead its current air campaign and military assistance to the Iraqi government.

Baghdad has not yet made it clear if it had agreed to let the US troops into Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi has repeatedly said foreign ground combat troops are not needed in Iraq. Leaders of the country’s Shia groups have warned that they will consider such a presence a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty.

If the statements by top American officials are any indication, the United States is now gearing up for war with IS, including in the battle for Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city which was captured by the terror group in spring 2014.

Analysts believe that the US-led coalition against IS needs to take back Mosul, a sprawling city of more than two million people, and the US military shift signals Washington’s readiness to engage IS strongholds with ground combat operations.

According to US reports, one key element in the expected revamped US campaign is the severing of IS supply lines between Mosul and Raqqa in Syria.

The US has reportedly established a covert military base in Qamishli in Kurdish-controlled north-eastern Syria, allegedly to step up operations with Kurdish militants in the region. The installation lies within a few miles of Iraq.

Since November, when Kurdish fighters backed by US fire power and advisers retook Sinjar, a key strategic town between the two IS strongholds, Sinjar and the adjacent border area have been under the control of Kurdish fighters from Iraq, Syria and the Turkish Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).Oney

CULTUREFEATURESLIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1280, 28 January, 2016      26-01-2016 09:50PM ET

Israel in Africa: Guns, but no developmentIsrael has traditionally seen Africa as a strategic field in which to gain influence to pressure the Arabs. This policy appears to be still in full swing, writes Haitham Nuri

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The year had barely begun (14 January 2016) when Arab circles were surprised by statements by Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ghandour that his country is open to considering establishing relations with Israel.

The statement was in response to a question at a seminar about Washington asking Khartoum to improve relations with Tel Aviv. “The idea can be considered,” responded Ghandour, asserting that relations with the US are not linked to relations with any other country.

It was a shocking statement after more than 25 years of a steadfast position by the regime of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir in the Middle East’s abstaining camp, and its former special relations with Iran before a recent shutdown under pressure from Gulf funds, as many purport.

This was not, however, the only positive statement in Africa regarding Israel. Last year, Israel opened embassies in three African countries: Zambia (socialist and close to Nasserist Egypt in the 1960s), after a rupture since the 1973 war; Rwanda, which never had diplomatic representation in Israel; and South Sudan, the world’s newest country following its secession from Sudan in 2011.

Thus, Israel has 11 embassies in Africa and 45 missions (ambasadors, non-resident ambassadors, and charges d’affaires) on the 54-country continent. The majority of the remaining nine countries where

it does not have representation are Arab countries: Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros Islands, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Since Golda Meir became Israel’s foreign minister in the 1950s, Tel Aviv has followed a strategy of “encircling Arab states” by establishing special relations in their neighbourhood — Iran under Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi (before 1979), Turkey and African countries.

Meir’s job was not easy because of Egypt’s active role on the continent in the 1950s and 1960s, with the support of independence movements by the regime of late President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. At the same time, it was not an absolute victory for Egypt. Meir was able to establish important ties with Ghana (the first Israeli embassy in Africa after independence in Accra in 1958), then Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Kenya.

Since the late 1950s until 1976, when the UN General Assembly passed a resolution labelling Zionism a form of racism, Africa was a battleground for a cold war between Egypt and Israel, similar to the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union, according to Joel Peters in his book Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship.

The website of Israel’s Foreign Ministry posted a photo of Meir with the leader of Kenyan independence, Jomo Kenyatta (father of incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta), without indicating if the late leader was visiting Israel or vice versa. The website claims that Tel Aviv was transferring its experience in “liberation from colonialism” to Africa between 1957-1960.

Kenya was not the only Nile Basin country. Emperor Haile Selassie was known as the Lion of Judah. Official propaganda at the time said he was the descendent of a historic marriage between King Solomon and Balqees, queen of Sheba, and that this “sacred” bloodline was passed down from one king to the next until Rastafari (the name of the late emperor of Ethiopia).

HERITAGEIssue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:35AM ET

Egypt’s UN term beginsEgypt has started participating in UN Security Council meetings as a new non-permanent member, writes Doaa El-Bey

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“The resolution of conflicts on the African continent to strengthen peace and security tops Egypt’s agenda at the UN Security Council,” Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ahmed Abu Zeid told the media last Friday.

He was speaking after Egypt’s permanent representative, Amr Abu Atta, started participating in all UN Security Council sessions after Egypt received its non-permanent seat for the 2016-2017 term.

The seat puts Egypt closer to international decision-makers and will help it play a wider role at the African, Arab and Islamic levels.

Some diplomats have noted that Egypt’s job will not be easy because the appointment has come at a time of major crises in the Arab region. Conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Libya, in addition to the Palestinian issue, are all on the table, putting further pressure on Egyptian diplomacy.

Egypt’s presence on the Security Council also allows Cairo to push for greater international efforts to confront extremism and terrorism in the region, an issue that is having an impact on the wider world.

Reforming the United Nations and expanding the Security Council to make it more democratic and more representative of developing countries were additional reasons for Egypt’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the Council, Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukri said during a visit to New York last year.

Egypt’s presence on the Security Council will give Cairo a greater chance to push for reform. It has called for more permanent seats on the council, saying that it is important to see fairer representation of all geographical regions on it.

Egypt also wants to see greater influence for the African Group on the Security Council, to which it belongs, and it has called for it to have two permanent and five non-permanent seats.

Should that formula be accepted, winning a non-permanent seat will place Egypt in the front rank of contenders seeking a permanent place on the Security Council. Egypt’s presence on the council may also give further backing to its bid to create a region free from weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Egypt won a landslide victory in mid-October’s voting for non-permanent seats on the council, garnering 179 out of 193 votes from UN member states.

Previously, Egypt held a non-permanent Security Council seat four times: in 1996-1997, 1984-1985, 1960-1961 and 1949-1950. Non-permanent members take part in drafting resolutions and help decide on their presentation.

FEATURESLIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:32AM ET

Full House

The appointment of 28 MPs by President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi finalises the membership of the House of Representatives. Gamal Essam El-Din provides a breakdown of who’s who

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The inaugural session of House of Representatives’ five-year term will be held on 10 January. It follows the appointment of 28 parliamentarians.

The appointments were made in a decree by President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, issued on 31 December 2015, in accordance with Article 102 of the constitution and Article 27 of the House of Representatives Law.

The House of Representatives will now comprise 596 MPs, the largest number in Egypt’s 150-year parliamentary history.

The presidential appointees include 14 women and public figures from the worlds of politics, the law, religion, economics and sports. Among them are Sayed Abdel-Al, chairman of the Tagammu Party; Bahaaeddin Abu Shuka, secretary-general of the Wafd Party; Sirri Siam, a former chairman of the

Court of Cassation and the Higher Council of Judges; and Osama Al-Azhari, a cleric affiliated with Al-Azhar and a presidential advisor on religious affairs.

Ahmed Saadeddin, secretary-general of the House of Representatives, has announced that all parliamentary seats are now filled.

The official parliamentary report on elections, held between 17 October and 16 December 2015, says 351 MPs were elected as independents and 245 as party representatives. The latter are drawn from 19 political parties. The Free Egyptians won 65 seats, followed by the Future of Homeland Party with 53, and the Wafd Party with 36.

The three leading parties are all funded by businessmen. The Free Egyptians Party was founded by tycoon Naguib Sawiris and the Future of Homeland, headed by 24-year-old Mohamed Badran, is bankrolled by steel tycoon Ahmed Abu Hashima and Alexandrian industrialist Mohamed Farag Amer.

The Wafd Party, led by tycoon Al-Sayed Al-Badawi, financed its election campaign with donations made by party members from the business community.

The three political parties that emerged with the lion’s share of party seats support neo-liberal economic policies. They have made it clear that as the poll’s biggest winners they expect their members to occupy leading roles on parliamentary committees.

The official report also records that three political parties contesting the polls for the first time won 43 seats between them. The Guardians of the Nation took 18 seats, while the People’s Republican Party took 13 and the Congress Party 12.

Six political parties led by officials linked to ousted president Hosni Mubarak’s now-defunct ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) won 25 seats between them. The Conservatives Party took six, Democratic Peace Party five, Egyptian National Movement four, Modern Egypt Party four, Freedom Party three, and Misr Baladi (Egypt My Homeland) three.

The Reform and Development Party, led by politician Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat, won three seats.

The majority of political parties now represented in the House of Representatives support the policies of President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, especially when it comes to balancing the long-time strategic relationship with the US by opening up to other international powers.

The Salafist Nour Party, the only Islamist party to run in the elections, won a meagre 11 seats, down from the 112 seats it secured in the 2012 parliament.

Leftist political parties also saw their support crumble. Five leftist factions managed to win just nine seats between them. The Egyptian Social Democratic Party won four and Tagammu two, while the Arab Nasserists, Free Egyptian Edifice and Guardians of the Revolution managed just one seat each. In 2012, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party won 17 seats and the Socialist Popular Alliance seven.

Women and Copts won more seats than in previous elections. Of the 87 women MPs, 73 were elected and 14 appointed. The House of Representatives’ 39 Coptic members include three appointees and 36 elected MPs. In the 2012 parliament, 11 women and the same number of Copts won seats.

Fifty-nine new MPs are lawyers, 50 are former police officers and 40 are businessmen. Forty MPs are affiliated with the health sector, having worked either as doctors or pharmacists, 18 MPs are journalists and there are three TV anchors.

The new intake also includes 22 teachers, 22 engineers, 14 retired army officers, 13 sportsmen, 12 accountants, eight village mayors, 27 farmers and three Mazzouns, sheikhs who register marriages.

Three newly elected MPs have cabinet experience: Ibrahim Al-Orabi, a former minister of foreign affairs; Osama Heikal, a former minister of information; and Ali Al-Moselhi, a former minister of social solidarity. There is also one former provincial governor, Kamal Amer, who served as governor of Aswan.

More than 200 current MPs previously occupied seats in either the People’s Assembly or the Shura Council.

The new House of Representatives will include 455 MPs with higher education degrees (30 of them with PhDs and ten with master’s), 82 MPs with secondary or vocational certificates, and 31 MPs with non-secondary educations.

It is also a more youthful parliament than usual. Seven MPs are aged between 25 and 29, 54 between 25 and 35, and 122 MPs are between 36 and 45.

LIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1277, 7 January, 2016      06-01-2016 02:23AM ET

New year economic line-upThe new parliament has an ambitious economic legislative agenda, writes Niveen Wahish

Various economic laws await to be looked into by the new parliamentPrintEmail

One had almost forgotten how things work in the presence of a parliament. Laws are presented by the government or put forward by parliamentary committees and are then discussed in specialised committees and the debating chamber before being voted on. This procedure should be the norm once again when the newly elected parliament convenes on Sunday.

For the past two and a half years and in the absence of a parliament — the last parliament was dissolved in June 2012 — all laws have been issued by the president. This in itself is now the focus of debate.

According to the constitution, the new parliament must review all the laws passed in its absence within 15 days of convening, a task deemed impossible given the amount of legislation.

Close to 350 laws were issued during the rule of interim president Adli Mansour and since President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi took office in 2014, according to “Egypt’s Regulatory Assessment,” a guide issued by N Gage Consulting, an Egypt-based consulting firm.

All the laws issued in the absence of a parliament now have to be reviewed by the new parliament, said Gamal Abu Ali of the Hassouna & Abou Ali law firm in Cairo. However, he added that some think that the laws would only need to be reviewed had the parliament been in recess rather than entirely absent.

But he believes that at least for the sake of formality and to avoid claims of unconstitutionality in the future, the new parliament might need to quickly run through the past laws before it gets down to considering new legislation.

Abu Ali pointed to three laws that need to be reviewed, whether through a government initiative or the parliamentary committees. They include the investment law, the labour law and laws regulating imports and customs.

Amendments to the investment law were introduced last March, ahead of the Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC). Although they were viewed as a good step forward at the time they may require further changes. The law does not offer enough incentives, tax or otherwise, for investors compared to those offered by neighbouring countries, Abu Ali said.

Such incentives do not necessarily have to be across the board, or in the form of 100 per cent tax exemptions, he said. They could be for specific sectors that the government wants to support or in

certain areas, such as Upper Egypt, where incentives are needed to attract investors, he suggested.

The incentives in the amended law include the government paying the cost of social insurance for workers. While this is a good move, it will not make a difference for investors, Abu Ali said. The amendments introduced in March also stipulate that the government could take on the training of workers, but “there is no precedent of the government excelling in training to fall back on for that to be an incentive,” he added.

The government is also offering to share in the cost of infrastructure that the investor requires but this falls short of incentives in neighbouring countries that are offering land along with infrastructure. “The least we can do is offer similar incentives to neighbouring countries,” Abu Ali said.

Egypt’s balance of payments registered an overall deficit of $3.65 billion in the first quarter of 2015-2016, compared to a surplus of $410 million in the same quarter a year earlier.

Reflecting Egypt’s transactions with the rest of the world through trade and investments during the three-month period, the figures are worrisome for the government.

The main reason behind the decline is the 144 per cent increase in the deficit in the current account, part of the balance of payments that includes the trade balance and transfers.

The trade deficit, which is the difference between what Egypt exports and what it imports, came in at the same level of the corresponding quarter of 2014-2015, at $10 billion, due to the decline in world prices of oil and other commodities, which in turn affect the balance.

While imports declined by 10 per cent on the back of the fall in international oil and food prices, saving around 30 per cent of the value of Egypt’s oil imports, the same reasons stripped export receipts by almost a quarter

FEATURESLIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1281, 4 February, 2016      03-02-2016 12:00AM ET

Beyond summit diplomacy

Cairo is working hard to build ties across Africa, writes Dina Ezzat

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Preparations are well underway for Egypt to host a conference on investment in Africa later this month. Scheduled to open in Sharm El-Sheikh on 20 February, the conference is expected to attract high-level delegations to discuss intra-African investment and foreign investment in the continent.

Official press statements say Egypt is eyeing mega-projects in several African states, and government and business-sector sources say they are discussing potential “common interest” projects that, if pursued, will enhance Egypt’s position in Africa.

East Africa in general, and Nile Basin countries in particular, are expected to receive the greatest attention from Egyptian investors, working either independently or in partnership with other foreign investors.

Though the conference will be opened by President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, it will be the private, rather than state, sector that takes the lead, said Minister of Investment Ashraf Salman.

At a time when water security has become a priority and Cairo is spearheading the battle against Islamists, the conference is part of a wider strategy to consolidate Egypt’s influence in Africa.

The conference will convene less than four weeks after Egypt began a three-year term as a member of the African Union Peace and Security Council. It is being held against the backdrop of growing concern in Cairo on the impact of the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam on Egypt’s share of Nile water.

Egyptian diplomats argue that rebuilding Egyptian influence in Africa Cairo will promote a “win-win” solution not only to the water problem but a host of issues that hamper development across the continent.

“Pursuing development is a crucial step in Egypt rebuilding its position in Africa,” said political commentator Hassan Abu Taleb.

“In Africa today, development is as crucial as liberation from colonization was in the 1950s. Back then Egypt supported liberation movements across the continent, and gained much leverage in Africa as a result.”

Abu Taleb was in Addis Ababa for last year’s African Union summit. The two things he recalls most strongly about the event was the way African officials paused to take selfies next to a large picture of Nasser hanging in the AU’s Ethiopian headquarters, and complaints voiced by African diplomats that Cairo ignored continental development in favour of pursuing its own development goals.

During the last 12 months government officials say that, despite severe financial challenges, Cairo has worked hard to free up funds for development projects in Africa.

“We are sending more medical missions, more teachers and preachers than before, and we have been trying to help with infrastructure schemes. But the simple fact is that we are facing serious economic challenges and our means are limited,” said a government source.

He believes more needs to be done by the private sector to access “what is a large and attractive market”, and complains that civil society is contributing little to the building of bridges across Africa.

Abu Taleb believes Cairo has been sending positive messages about its engagement with Africa since the removal of Hosni Mubarak, not least by ending the decade-long non-attendance at African summits by Egypt’s president.

Diplomats who were part of the Egyptian delegation to the African Summit held earlier this week in Addis Ababa say the attendance of Al-Sisi sent a clear message that Egypt is keen to improve its relationships across the continent.

“The president’s leading of the Egyptian delegation has ended the dismay we would always encounter at summits when Mubarak failed to attend,” said one diplomat.

Following an attempted assassination in Addis Ababa in 1995, Mubarak accepted the recommendations of his security officials and generally refrained from visiting African states.

African diplomats in Cairo have taken note of the renewed Egyptian interest in reaching out to Africa.

“We just hope it is for real and not just about the Nile,” commented a West African diplomat.

Abu Taleb argues it will take time and effort to convince African states that Cairo’s interest extends beyond securing its share of Nile water.

“This is why we need more than presidential visits. We must encourage Egyptian businessmen to invest in Africa and at the same time pursue closer coordination with African countries under the umbrellas of regional, sub-regional and international organisations.”

He continued, “We can no longer afford to act on the bases of limited agendas. We need to expand, and we need to expand fast, because the field is quickly filling with competitors.” Among the states Cairo needs to watch are Turkey, Iran and Israel, said Abu Taleb.

But to really consolidate its influence in Africa, Abu Taleb warns, Egypt will first have to resolve tensions with a number of African capitals over what boils down to a struggle to lead the continent.

“We have to realise that the days of uncontested leadership are long gone. Now we need to work in close partnership with states such as South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria. True, there are outstanding issues that have to be settled, and these need to be urgently works on.”

Said Abu Taleb, “We cannot be expected to work closely with Nigeria on the file of radical Muslim groups, for example, if we are not able to overcome earlier disagreements on who should contest the Security Council seat on behalf of Africa once the Security Council is reformed.”

Egyptian diplomats say bilateral cooperation is being pursued with as many African states as possible in an attempt to cultivate more positive engagement.

Cairo was particularly happy when the AU reversed its suspension of Egypt following the removal of Mohamed Morsi in the summer of 2013. Today, though, it is facing attempts to re-open the file.

“We are not putting everything on hold pending a resolution of this matter,” said a senior Egyptian diplomatic source. “We know that the best way to resolve the issue is to build our economic interests with as many African countries as possible.”

It is now up to parliament, said Abu Taleb, to project a more positive image of Egypt across Africa through the newly established House of Representatives Africa Committee, headed by Sayed Felifal, an expert on African affairs. Felifal was among the MPs appointed by the president.

“I think we still have some explaining to do, especially over the three-year suspension of parliament, but I don’t think it will be too difficult a mission,” said Abu Taleb.

. International oilPolicing parliamentOverhauling parliamentary bylaws will dominate this week’s House of Representatives debates, reports Gamal Essam El-Din

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Following a two-week holiday, Egypt’s new parliament — the House of Representatives — begins grappling with a host of controversial issues on Sunday.

Amending internal bylaws is likely to be allocated the lion’s share of debates now that the 25-member ad hoc committee formed to amend parliament’s internal regulations and code of conduct has finished its work.

Bahaaeddin Abu Shukka, head of the committee and secretary-general of the Wafd party, told reporters on Monday that the committee’s recommendations will be discussed next Sunday.

“This committee’s report will take priority in Sunday’s debates for the simple reason that parliament will only be able to exercise its legislative and supervisory roles once there are bylaws in place that conform with the new constitution,” said Abu Shukka.

Once endorsed by parliament, any new bylaws will have to be referred to the State Council for revision.

Abu Shukka revealed that in its report the committee recommended the number of parliamentary committees be increased from 19 to 26. Some MPs had demanded the total number of parliamentary committees be increased to 30.

“The US Congress (435 MPs) has 19 committees, the British House of Commons (650 MPs) has 20, the French National Assembly (577 MPs) just eight and the Italian House of Representatives (630 MPs) 14,” pointed out Abu Shukka.

Free Egyptians Party spokesperson Ayman Abul-Ela says four new committees will be created and three subcommittees upgraded. “New committees will cover African affairs, small and micro-scale enterprises, anti-corruption practices and the problems facing the physically challenged, and the Higher Education and Scientific Research, Culture and Media and Religious and Family Affairs subcommittees will become independent,” he said.

Veteran leftist MP Kamal Ahmed told Al-Ahram Weekly that the creation of an independent African affairs committee was a step forward.

“Parliament needs to play a greater role in foreign policy and the introduction of a separate committee on African affairs, and the retention of existing committees on foreign and Arab affairs will reinforce parliament’s role in an area that has for too long been a presidential monopoly,” said Ahmed.

Ahmed also praised the creation of an anti-corruption committee. “The role of this committee will not be confined to fighting corruption. It will also review complaints raised by ordinary citizens.”

An Internet service, launched by the House on 27 January, will help build contacts with citizens, allow them have a say in legislative and supervisory affairs, and bolster parliamentary transparency, claimed House of Representatives Secretary-General Ahmed Saadeddin.

“Ordinary citizens will now be able to use the parliamentary website to send Whatsapp messages

containing suggestions and grievances to parliament,” said Saadeddin. The House has also opened a dedicated phone line on which citizens can forward their own recommendations to parliament.

“In the first two days of the service being launched the House received 3,629 messages addressing legislative and supervisory issues and social grievances,” said Saadeddin.

He further said that the new Whatsapp service will help gauge public opinion about parliament’s performance and opens a channel for citizens inform the House about corruption.

Deputy Speaker Al-Sayed Al-Sherif says a major task of the parliamentary anti-corruption committee will be to ensure Egypt implements the 2005 UN Convention on Anti-Corruption. “The committee will also help oversee the implementation of the constitutional requirement to create a national anti-corruption commission.”

In addition, Membership of the House’s internal bureau, which oversees the running of parliamentary affair, will be increased from three to seven.

“Current regulations limit membership of the bureau to the speaker and his two deputies. The report recommends that the bureau be expanded to include the spokespersons of the four political parties with the largest number of seats,” said Abu Shukka.

Many MPs believe that the heads of parliamentary committees should be able to summon cabinet ministers and provincial governors for questioning without prior approval from the speaker.

“They argue that allowing committee heads direct access to state officials will be a democratic step,” noted Abu Shukka.

“New articles relating to the withdrawal of confidence in the president and prime minister, and in the speaker and his two deputies, are also necessary for the bylaws to conform to the constitution,” said Abul-Ela. He revealed that “new articles about the House’s budget have also drafted”.

The ongoing dispute between the government and parliament over the new Civil Service Law is also

expected to figure prominently in next week’s parliamentary debates. On 20 January parliament voted down the law, only to be asked by President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi to reconsider its position.

Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Magdi Al-Agati told parliamentary reporters this week that a report detailing the reasons why MPs had rejected the Civil Service Law will be forwarded to the president’s office.

“The Parliamentary Committee on Labour, which orchestrated the campaign against the law and urged MPs to reject it, is playing a leading role in preparing the report, in consultation with the government,” said Al-Agati.

The law, which was ratified in March by Al-Sisi in the absence of a parliament and ahead of Egypt’s International Economic Conference, aims to reform Egypt’s administrative apparatus in order to lessen the wage burden on state finances and encourage private investment.

“MPs objected to less than 10 per cent of the new law’s articles, most of them related to the penalties

that can be imposed on government employees,” said Al-Agati prices declined by almost 50 per cent

over the three DamUS alarm over the possible collapse of the Mosul Dam has been played down by Iraqi officials who insist it is not a big deal, writes Salah Nasrawi

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Of all its multiple problems and daunting challenges, Iraq is probably now facing its most serious existential threat, a catastrophe that could cause more damage and deaths than all Iraq’s communal conflicts, political chaos and economic hardships put together.

The only problem is that the warning is coming from top American officials, and too many Iraqis, including in the government, are taking it with a pinch of salt.

Conspiracy theories abound, with a plot to partition Iraq, a secret plan to outmanoeuvre Islamist militants in Mosul, and corruption charges topping the list.

For months US officials have been warning of the possibility that Iraq’s Mosul Dam, the country’s largest water reservoir, is at risk of bursting, triggering prophesies of doom in a country already beset by a war against brutal terror groups and threats of secession by its Kurdish minority.

Last week, the top US general in Iraq, lieutenant-general Sean MacFarland, said the potential collapse of the Mosul Dam in northern Iraq could send a surge of water down the heavily populated Tigris River valley, sweeping away all before it.

“The likelihood of the dam collapsing is something we are trying to determine right now... All we know is when it goes, it’s going to go fast, and that’s bad,” MacFarland told reporters in Baghdad.

US state department officials have warned that up to 500,000 people could be killed and more than a million left homeless should Iraq’s Mosul Dam burst due to insufficient maintenance.

Even US President Barack Obama has intervened to highlight the need to make emergency repairs to avoid a tragedy. In a telephone call to Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, Obama reportedly told the Iraqi leader that he was having nightmares caused by fears of the Mosul Dam collapsing.

According to American officials, rising water levels in April, the annual rainy season which is also characterised by melting snow, could lead to a breach of the dam. Another scenario suggests that the dam could burst in the summer or autumn when the water level is lower.

The 32-year-old dam is the Middle East’s fourth-largest in reservoir capacity. Inaugurated in 1984 during the rule of former president Saddam Hussein, the 3.6-km long dam was designed to reinvigorate agriculture and energy in vast areas of the Tigris River valley.

It was named the Saddam Da Issue No.1281, 4 February, 2016      03-02-2016 12:01AM ET

‘Setting priorities’If you cannot do without imported fruits and nuts, or your pet will only eat dried food, then expect to pay more at the cashier next time you visit the supermarket, writes Niveen Wahish

“We have a problem reaching out to the young and communicating with them,” President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi told a satellite television show on Monday. The president’s words signalled that bridging the divide between young people who feel their hopes were dashed in the wake of the 25 January Revolution, and who now complain of being sidelined in the decision-making process, has become a priority.

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This week a presidential decree went into effect raising customs tariffs on hundreds of finished goods. Items targeted by the new decree have either a local alternative or are considered unnecessary, says a Ministry of Finance press release. Tariffs on raw materials, capital goods and production inputs remain unchanged.

The list includes everything from refrigerators and kitchen appliances to cosmetics and pet food, and tariffs will be raised on average by 10 per cent.

Customs duties, which used to be levied on such goods at a rate of between 10 and 30 per cent, will now impose charges at between 20 to 40 per cent.

m before the name was Issue No.1281, 4 February, 2016      02-02-2016 11:11PM ET

Baby steps for IranIran is taking baby steps, not giant leaps, to enter a world it has been disconnected from since the Islamic Revolution, writes Camelia Entekhabifard in Paris

French President Hollande greets his Iranian counterpart Rouhani at the Élysée Palace in Paris on Thursday (photo: AP)PrintEmail

Last week’s trips by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to Italy and France and the restoration of economic ties after the implementation of the Iranian nuclear deal were very significant.

Among the deals signed during the trip, Airbus is to sell 118 planes to Iran, the French oil company Total is to sign a deal to pump 150,000 to 200,000 barrels of oil a day, and French President François Hollande mentioned other deals during a press conference with Rouhani in Paris.

At the joint press conference on 28 January, Hollande said the two men had talked about trade and the crises in the Middle East, including the absence of a president in Lebanon.

changed to

SPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1281, 4 February, 2016      02-02-2016 11:58PM ET

Closer economic tiesEgypt and Russia have signed new agreements to increase bilateral trade and make agreements much easier and quicker to reach, reports Ahmed Kotb

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An agreement was signed on Tuesday between Egypt and Russia to establish a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal area near the coastal city of Port Said.

A memorandum of understanding was also signed between the Russian Direct Investment Fund and several Egyptian banks under which a mechanism for financing upcoming Russian investments in the industrial zone was agreed. The details of the agreement have yet to be disclosed.

The Russian industrial zone is to be built on a two-square-kilometre site and is to house projects in several fields, including pharmaceutical industries, shipbuilding, energy, petrochemicals, furniture making, land reclamation and the manufacture of agricultural and construction equipment.

The agreements were signed by Egypt’s Minister of Industry and Trade Tarek Kabil and his Russian counterpart, Denis Manturov, following meetings of the Egyptian-Russian Joint Economic Committee (ERJEC), which began on Monday and included representatives from around 100 Russian companies and over 60 Egyptian businesses.

“We can reach $5.7 billion in annual bilateral trade,” said Shamel Orlov, head of the Russian side in the Egyptian-Russian Business Council. “This is what we aim to achieve through doing more business and having more investments such as in the industrial zone in the Suez Canal area.”

Bilateral trade between Egypt and Russia reached $4.5 billion in 2014, with Egyptian exports increasing by 22.3 per cent and expected to reach higher numbers this year.

Orlov said administrative matters are a big challenge against growth of bilateral trade, and called on both governments to facilitate procedures that will enable expanding trade relations.

Orlov and Ahmed Darwish, head of the General Authority for the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCEZ), signed a memorandum of understanding on Tuesday to prepare Russian businessmen for the new investments in the Russian industrial zone.

“The SCEZ currently offers a wide array of competitive advantages for investors,” Darwish said at the ERJEC conference. He added that any company looking to do business in the SCEZ can do so in about three hours as a result of “a great deal of flexibility in the organisational and legislative framework”.

He also noted that the SCEZ is a free zone that enjoys a lack of custom tariffs and offers a high level of security, including devices to detect both drugs and explosives. “The infrastructure of the zone is also ready for new investments,” Darwish said.

Speaking at the ERJEC conference, Kabil said that structural reforms in financial and tax policies, as well as carrying out major economic projects, have all helped increase foreign investments in Egypt, which reached $6.4 billion in the 2014-2015 fiscal year.

The Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal area will be able to export about 70 per cent of its production to African nations, according to Darwish, while 30 per cent is expected to serve the local market.

Ahmed Al-Wakil, chairman of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, said the free trade agreements between Egypt and African countries encourage Russian companies to seek more investments in Cairo because it will give them access to over 1.6 billion consumers in the African and Arab markets through bilateral trade agreements.

“Several meetings between Egyptian and Russian companies and businessmen will be held following the ERJEC forum,” Al-Wakil said. He added that the business communities in both countries want to expand cooperation, especially since there are similar articles in the constitutions of Egypt and Russian that guarantee the free movement of trade and capital.

LIVINGSPORTSHERITAGE

Issue No.1281, 4 February, 2016      02-02-2016 11:59PM ET

A step forward?

President Al-Sisi’s meeting with Ethiopia’s prime minister, together with the imminent start of studies on the Renaissance Dam, might ease tension and bring the parties closer to a settlement, reports Doaa El-Bey

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Positive statements were issued after President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. But, as a diplomat, who asked to remain anonymous, said, “It is the outcome on the ground that counts.”

The experimental operation of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will start by July this year at the earliest, the diplomat said. The two consultative firms who are to conduct studies on the dam are likely to start even earlier, this month or next. Their studies will take up to 12 months. The diplomat questioned the value of the studies if the results are disclosed after the dam is up and running.

“Ethiopians and Egyptians are two people that do not necessarily like each other. However, cooperation was imposed on us. That is, we do not have another option than to cooperate,” Maghawri Shehata, an expert on water issues, told Al-Ahram Weekly.

The dam is a reality, Shehata said, “so at least we have to cooperate on two main issues needed for the initial filling of the reservoir and the yearly running of the dam”.

The last few days of January saw two important developments concerning the dam: Al-Sisi’s meeting with Desalegn in Addis Ababa, and the handing out of the initial reports of the two French firms responsible for conducting the studies to Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.

The Renaissance Dam and coordination between the two countries topped the talks of Al-Sisi and Desalegn. Presidential spokesman Alaa Youssef said Al-Sisi underlined Egypt’s commitment to bilateral relations between the two countries.

The president also affirmed that all countries that signed the co-operation convention in Khartoum in December should take serious procedures to fulfill their part of the agreement, taking into account Egypt’s share of the Nile’s water, Youssef added.

At the meeting, Deselegn reiterated that the dam will not harm Egypt and that he will not allow any harm to Egypt either in regards to water or in anything else. The two leaders met on the sidelines of the African Union summit in Addis Ababa on Saturday.

Diaaeddin Al-Kousi, an international water expert, said the negotiations ceiling needs to be lifted “so that we can achieve a better outcome.”

Said Al-Kousi, “We are left with two options: either lift the ceiling of negotiations by holding it on the level of state leaders, or resort to legal action. Now Egypt is trying the first option.

 He continued, “The other important development is that the two French consultancy firms BRL and Artelia handed in their technical offers to start studies on the dam.”

But Al-Kousi said this second set is a waste of time. “We have been working with the consultancy firms ever since August 2014. They do not need to submit more offers. They just need to work and finish the studies as soon as possible,” he said.

It is the job of the ministers to push to sign the contracts and finish the studies as quickly as possible, he added.

The two firms gave experts in Cairo, Khartoum and Addis Ababa a week to study the technical offer at a national level.

The offer will then be evaluated by experts from the three countries at a four-day meeting in Khartoum. According to the road map drawn up as part of the Khartoum document signed in December, the two consultancy firms will attend the meeting.

The firms will conduct two studies: one on the effects of the dam on the water flow to Egypt and Sudan, and the other on the environmental, economic and social impact of the dam.

The dam has long been a cause of friction between Cairo and Addis Ababa. Egypt has repeatedly expressed concerns over the dam’s possible effect on Egypt’s Nile water supply, while Ethiopia insists the dam is mainly for generating electricity and will not affect Egypt’s share of Nile water.

In an attempt to reduce the possible impact on the dam on Egypt, Cairo suggested an increase in the number of gates from two to four, to allow more water to flow to downstream countries.

Addis Ababa rejected the suggestion, saying that building two openings for the dam had come following “intensive studies” and that it could not redesign the project.

“It was not a surprise that Addis Ababa rejected the Egyptian suggestion. How would the latter ask for a change in the design after building half the dam?” asked the diplomat.

During a meeting late last year, the Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian foreign and irrigation ministers signed the Khartoum Agreement, described as “historic” by Sudan’s foreign minister. The document prevents Addis Ababa from starting to fill the dam’s reservoir until technical studies are finished in October this year, Hossam Moghazi, Egypt’s minister of irrigation, said after the signing.

The other advantage of the agreement, according to Moghazi, is that it allows field visits to the dam by Egyptian and Sudanese experts.

The three countries also agreed to replace the Dutch consultancy firm Deltares, after it withdrew from the studies in September, with the French firm Artelia which is to conduct studies on the dam’s impact alongside the already selected firm BRL.

Several technical meetings were held last year in the hope of resolving disagreements about the firm that was to conduct the studies on the dam’s impact. The last technical meeting was held in Khartoum in December.

A French and Dutch firm were chosen in April last year by the National Tripartite Committee (NTC) overseeing the dam, but the Dutch firm, which was assigned 30 per cent of the work, withdrew in September, saying the conditions imposed by the NTC and the French firm “did not guarantee” independent and good-quality studies.

The NTC is composed of technical experts from the three states and are in charge of studying the possible impact of the dam.

Dispute over the dam goes back to before the 2011 Revolution in Egypt. Egypt attempted several times to prevent its construction because of concerns over its effect on the amount of water reaching the country. Egypt depends on the Nile for 95 per cent of its water needs. Most of this water comes from the Blue Nile.

The differences took a sharp turn when Ethiopia diverted the course of the Blue Nile to start the building of the dam in May 2013. Negotiations failed to resolve the differences until the two countries decided to open a new page of cooperation after Al-Sisi met Desalegn for the first time on the margins of the African Union summit in Equatorial Guinea in June 2014.

The two leaders agreed that they would form a joint committee in the following three months to enhance bilateral relations between the two countries. The foreign ministers of both nations issued a statement after the meeting in which they stressed that Ethiopia understood the importance of the Nile to Egypt and Egypt understood the Ethiopian plans and needs for development. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan then formed the NTC to look into the effects of the dam.

In another confidence-building measure in March last year, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan met in Sudan to sign a declaration of principles on the dam that included cooperation among the three countries regarding their water needs, with the aim of improving sustainable development and regional economic integration. The three also agreed not to cause harm or damage any of the signatories.

After signing the declaration of principles, the three countries agreed to sign contracts with the French and Dutch consultancy firms to carry out studies of the dam’s possible effects on the accessing of water by downstream countries.