Explaining Neo-Nazi and Skinhead Violence Within Russia: A Regional Analysis

Cynthia KolbasiukFaculty Advisor- Professor Bryon Moraski

Honors ThesisApril 2, 2013

Abstract

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there has been an astonishing rise in the amount of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence being carried out against ethnic minorities within Russia. The rise in ethnic xenophobia and, in turn, ethnic violence, can be mainly contributed to a culture of intolerance that has political, social, and economic, components. This paper attempts to explain why and how neo-Nazi and skinhead violence occurred during the year 2010 through a nested analysis approach, which combines multivariate analyses and case studies to understand these phenomena better than either method alone could accomplish. I attempt to widen current literature by looking at regional variation of this type of violence within Russia rather than focusing specifically on the country’s urban centers of Moscow and Saint Petersburg where the majority of such attacks take place. The results of these analyses indicate that neo-Nazi and skinhead violence may be adapting to regional differences, that diversity may help to quell such violence, and that local governments continue to play an important role in the existence of such violence.

Introduction

President Vladimir Putin was once quoted saying, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was

the greatest political catastrophe of the [twentieth] century” (Rose and Munro 2008, 51). This

emotionally charged statement had many implications for the future of the Russian Federation, as

well as its newly formed neighboring countries. A more significant development to understand,

however, is how its fall can be deemed a catastrophe or how this moment in time negatively

impacted the country. There are many different approaches to answering this question, as well as

many different lenses with which to perceive the fall of the Soviet Union. One particularly

striking lens is how the relationship between ethnic minorities and Russian majorities has

deteriorated. More specifically, there has been an astonishing rise in the amount of neo-Nazi and

skinhead violence being inflicted upon ethnic minorities by ethnic Russians.

It is evident that with the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise in such violence did not

happen on its own, and there must be other variables that are affecting such increases in ethnic

violence. The purpose of this paper is to empirically shed light on reasons behind the escalating

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occurrences of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence by comparing data across Russia’s regions in the

year 2010, which was almost two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union. With this purpose in

mind, I develop my explanation of neo-Nazi attacks by using a “nested” research design that

utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods (Lieberman 2005). By doing so, I hope to

provide a more valid and reliable explanation for regional variation than could be achieved with

either method alone so that the Russian Federation, and other nations as well, may understand

the presence of these types of violence and its implications for the future of Russian society.

The paper will proceed as follows. I will first begin by providing an overview of the role

of minorities before and after the fall of the Soviet Union, mapping the historical trends in the

legitimization of ethnic violence, characterizing ethnic violence within Russia, and providing

background information on the political, social, and economic reasons surrounding neo-Nazi

attacks. I then develop my hypotheses to show that lower average incomes, lower education

levels, higher population densities, and a higher percentage of non-Russians in Russia’s regions

may correlate with higher neo-Nazi attacks. Next, I run a regression analysis of Russia’s regions

with these variables and account for possible outliers that are skewing the data. I follow my

quantitative analyses with a comparative case analysis of two regions in Russia, the Republic of

Kalmykia and Khabarovsk Krai, to highlight some previously unconsidered variables in my

analysis that may be affecting neo-Nazi attacks in these regions. Incorporating both quantitative

and qualitative methods into a nested approach for my analysis will enable me to create a more

complete picture of the variation of neo-Nazi attacks across Russia’s regions, and also will help

to show what characterizes regional variation in neo-Nazi and skinhead violence.

Relevant Literature

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In order to understand the presence of Neo-Nazi and skinhead violence within Russia, it

is integral to understand the role that ethnic minorities played within Russia before the collapse

in 1991. The Soviet Union, under Communist rule, espoused the notion that they were a

“friendship of peoples” and even boasted that they had found a cure for racism (Roman 2002, 1).

People from around the world, especially Africans and Asians, were invited into the country to

study at universities; this helped the Communist government promote a multinational population,

yet reject Western values and ideas at the same time (Rose and Munro 2008). Throughout

General Secretary Gorbachev’s rule, the Soviet Union’s cure of racism began to wane as controls

on publications were loosened under his policy of glasnost (openness), which gave rise to

nationalist publications (Arnold 2009). Perestroika (rebuilding) also allowed for the revival of

ethnic identity politics due to the rapid pace of economic privatization, which fostered the

fragmentation of the Soviet Union as distinct populations carved out of a piece of the nation to

claim for their own (Khachaturian 2009). The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, along with a

subsequent economic recession, was the breaking point for the ideological ban on racism. By

rejecting Communist rule, the general public consequently rejected its band-aid cure of racism

and made a scapegoat of ethnic minorities for the country’s political, economic, and social

problems. Ethnic minorities such as Africans, Middle Easterners, Central Asians, peoples from

the Caucasus, Indians, and many others from the Asian subcontinent suddenly became the

objects of resentment as a result of latent racism (Roman 2002). Donald Horowitz (1985) points

out where societies are divided, ethnic conflict is at the center of politics (12) and that ethnic

conflict has become a worldwide phenomenon (3). Russia was not the only country negatively

affected by the unleashing crisis of racial prejudices exacerbated by economic recession;

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Hungary and the Czech Republic have developed their own extreme right-wing parties and

groups, which has led to a rise in ethnic violence (Land 2009).

Studies have been done since the collapse of Communist rule in order to map shifts in

Russian perceptions of national identity, and also to discern if these shifts have coincided with

the rise in violence towards ethnic minorities. Not surprisingly, many Russians still see the West

and United States as a threat, which hearkens back to Cold War tensions, and the strongest

national identities are those of ethnic Russians (Rose and Munro 2008; Khachaturian 2009).

Other studies have also shown that the older generation of Russians aligns itself with their Asian

neighbors, while younger generations are more aligned with Western Europe; this is more than

likely because the older generation, under Communist rule, had more contact with the East than

Europe (Diuk 2004). Despite these findings, there is an inherent contradiction in how the current

generation of Russian youth perceive themselves. On the one hand, Russian youth claim to be

more accepting of Europe and western ideas in comparison to pre-Soviet timesa. On the other

hand, nationalist ideologies and parties reject Western influence from countries such as the

United Kingdom and the United States, and these parties appeal mostly to younger Russians

(Khachaturian 2009). To add to these contradictions, the scapegoats of neo-Nazi and skinhead

violence include mostly Asians and Africans and other previously mentioned ethnic minorities

rather than Westernized Russians (Diuk 2004). These findings have been attributed to the

youths’ backlash against old Communist ideals, the rallying effect that leaders such as President

Putin have had on the youth (Diuk 2004), and the youth’s relative lack of education in

comparison to those who are older (Rose and Munro 2008). Lack of education is one variable

a According to Diuk (2004, 62) a study that was done shows that 49.9% of youth claim to be more accepting of Western European ideas.

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that might be impacting neo-Nazi and skinhead violence, which I will develop further in this

paper.

Overall, sixty to sixty-five thousand skinheads exist within all of Russia’s different

regions combined (Arnold 2009, 641), while thirty-three thousand groups that espouse ethnic

xenophobia exist as a whole (Herrera and Kraus 2013, 103). The legitimization of ethnic

violence can be traced back to the 1980s with the formation of nationalist Pamyat (Memory),

which espoused Orthodox monarchism, national Bolshevism, and anti-Semitism. In the 1990s

the Russian National Unity (RNU) founded by Alexander Barkashov came onto the scene, which

adopted ideas from fascism and Nazi-Germany to promote Russian supremacy. Although it has

split into six different groups, the RNU has penetrated respectable political parties and gained the

support of thousands of young Russian men (Umland 2008; Khachaturian 2009). Other major

ultranationalist groups include Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia,

Gennady Zyuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and Alexsandr Dugin’s

National Bolshevik Party, all of which have held influence in the State Duma (Umland 2002).

These Neo-Nazi groups, as well as others that have formed since then, are different from

skinhead groups; they have been deemed “quasi-political racist organizations” that have used

their close relationship to politics to their advantage (Arnold 2009, 649). The range of group

types consists of terrorist groups, gangs, paramilitary units, premeditated organizations, random

local conflicts, and ad hoc groups (Herrera and Kraus 2013). This wide range, thus, has had the

ability to permeate many different facets of Russian culture and has become both elusive and

politically acceptable.

Aside from knowing that mostly white, ethnic Russians are carrying out these attacks,

studies have helped to further explain what types of people commit these attacks and how they

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physically present themselves. Attacks are mostly planned and carried out by young,

unemployed, and uneducated men ranging from their late teens to twenties (Baranovsky 2000;

Arnold 2009; Khachaturian 2009; Umland 2008). Anonymous officials from Moscow’s Kremlin

are also said to be members of nationally recognized neo-Nazi groups (Verkhovsky 2007).

Within the past couple years, members of such groups have moved away from the skinhead style

of Western countries of the 1980s and 1990s, which blatantly displayed tattoos of Nazi symbols

and black clothing and boots, to follow current Western trends. Amy Cooter (2006) and Hilary

Pilkington (2010) argue that Western neo-Nazi groups are beginning to blend in more with the

general public to prove they are civilized, organized, and educated, and also to attract a broader

range of supporters. In Russia, neo-Nazi groups are slowly “normalizing” to give off these same

messages, which may account for the growth in members throughout the past decade (Cooter

2006, 153).

The rise in ethnic xenophobia and, in turn, ethnic violence, can be mainly contributed to a

culture of intolerance that has political, social, and economic, components. According to

Alexander Osipov (2010, 52), Russian federal laws do not “clarify the equality of rights or [what

constitutes] discrimination and the violation of equal rights”. As a result of this, xenophobia and

ethnic violence have become more and more politically permissible. Other studies show how

Russia’s political system is moving toward one party, namely United Russia, and one vision

adopted by this single party (Godzimirski 2008; Reuter and Remington 2008; Verkhovsky 2007;

Varga 2008). This party has been known to use “increasingly ethnocentric rhetoric” (Varga

2008, 570) and espouse similar beliefs to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to

mobilize broad support (Verkhovsky 2007, 131). The media has also played an important role in

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the rise of xenophobia and ethnic violence according to both Osipov (2010) and Panfilov (2006),

which the state and presidential officials have historically controlled.

A very small amount of Russian academic publications exist on the topic of neo-Nazi and

skinhead attacks, with the exception of Moscow’s SOVA Center for Information and Analysis,

because collecting data on ethnic violence requires contact with ethnic minorities and neo-Nazi

groups. This could potentially increase ethnic minority vulnerability by aiding neo-Nazi groups

in locating victims, and research gives the problem more publicity or media attention (Osipov

2010). If the state is ideologically supportive of Russian nationalism, it follows that there are

government leaders and parties that tacitly have allowed the rise in and intensification of political

nationalism (Paniflov 2006). It is also highly likely, however, that Vladimir Putin, parties such as

United Russia, and the ruling elite benefit from the idea that Russia needs a strong hand to keep

nationalities in check because it helps them to gain public support.

By merging civil society and politics with neo-Nazi and skinhead ideology, the outcomes

can be highly degrading and marginalizing. During the 1990s, for example, ethnocentric schools

were even beginning to form to indoctrinate the youth on “migrantophobia”, which made neo-

Nazi and skinhead groups culturally popular (Verkhovsky 2007, 128). One neo-Nazi group in

particular created a nationalist Russian essay contest with a swastika logo to motivate interest

(Varga 2008). Recently, in October 2012, a manual for migrants was published in the Kyrgyz,

Tajik, and Uzbek languages providing “social advice” and “legal information” on how they

should not spit in the street, should not squat, and should even leave the country if they have

AIDS (Voltskaya and Sharipzhan 2012). According to Alexander Verkhovsky (2007), the

director of the SOVA Center, these political and social components of neo-Nazism and skinhead

ideology play a more important role in the existence of ethnic violence than the economic

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recession that came as a result of the fall of the Soviet Union. I believe, however, that economic

factors play just as important of a role as the political and social factors, which I will soon

develop in my hypotheses on regional variation of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence. Social and

political factors are also much more difficult to test in a multivariate analysis, which is where the

importance of the case study following my quantitative analysis will become relevant.

Arnold (2010b) identifies different categories of ethnic violence and also attempts to

characterize the different ways neo-Nazi and skinhead violence can occur. He states that attacks

are not random acts of violence, but are instead goal-oriented. Different types include symbolic

violence to prove a point, lynching to inflict physical harm, pogroms for inflicting economic

hardship, and massacres for exterminating groups of people (38). Both formal neo-Nazi groups

and informal skinhead subcultures have the potential to use any of these types of ethnic violence,

and in fact, members of skinhead groups are often members of formal organizations as well

(Varga 2008). Aside from obtaining members through word of mouth and presence through

planned and goal-oriented violence, internet hate is becoming a tool that skinhead and neo-Nazi

groups use for recruiting and unifying. It is both difficult to track groups, and easy for those

sympathetic to neo-Nazi and skinhead causes to engage in ethnic violence via cyberspace (Perry

and Olsson 2009).

Up until now, much of the relevant literature on neo-Nazi and skinhead violence within

Russia stresses the importance of politics, and how the failure to formulate and enforce

discriminatory law coupled with state-sponsored nationalism has directly led to the increase in

violence (Umland 2002; Verkhovsky 2007; Godzimirski 2008; Reuter and Remington 2008;

Umland 2008; Arnold 2009; Khachaturian 2009; Osipov 2010). The body of literature that has

argued this point is both compelling and profound. This literature, however, has either failed to

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look at other possible causes behind such violence or has attempted to do so but falls short of

having concrete data to support certain arguments. For example, Varga (2008) claims that

extremist groups “appear within low classes” or consist of people who lack education, are

geographically isolated, and are economically insecure (565). Another study has claimed that

ethnic Russians are generally more hostile and less accepting of migrants and ethnic non-

Russians, which could mean that higher percentages of non-Russians within certain regions can

lead to higher rates of neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks. These assertions may or may not be true,

and they could have some weight to them if they were based on statistical analyses; they,

however, have not empirically been tested with data. Given these untested observations within

the literature, it would follow that hypotheses about the education levels, demographics, and

economic circumstances of Russia’s regions could reveal insight about neo-Nazi and skinhead

attacks, specifically during the year 2010 which I will be focusing on.

Justification of the Year 2010 and Hypotheses

Before beginning the analysis, it is essential to hone in specifically on the year 2010 in

Russia. Rather than creating a time-series design, I am focusing on one year to get a snapshot

across regions of their statistics on neo-Nazi attacks to see what might be causing more or less

attacks within these regions. My goal is to locate decisive variables that correlate with neo-Nazi

attacks, and then look specifically at two case studies to glean more insight that I could not

necessarily have gotten from a quantitative analysis. In this section, I develop my theoretical

argument, which focuses on average income rates, higher education rates, population densities,

and percentages of non-Russians within Russia’s regions. I specifically chose these variables

because much of the existing literature speculates that these variables correlate with a higher or

lower prevalence or attacks, which I will develop below. Completing this analysis will either add

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to or detract weight from their arguments and guide future research to focus on these variables or

others depending on my results. I will be testing these hypotheses empirically using data from

Moscow’s SOVA Center (Verkhovsky 2012).

Focusing on every minute detail in the year 2010 is beyond the scope of this paper. There

are, however, general aspects and basic trends of the year that may have had influences on the

presence of neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks across Russia’s regions. By delving into these details,

I will show that 2010 is a particularly interesting year to look at cross-regional variation in neo-

Nazi and skinhead attacks.

According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),

Russia’s Gross Domestic Product rose more than any other country until the year 2008. At this

point, Russia and dozens of other countries began to fall into a global recession with the

dropping of oil prices specifically and other commodities due to the decrease in international

demand. These economic problems, combined with a general lack on confidence of Russian

banks and currency, drastically hit the Russian economy (Barnard et. al. 2009). Growth in

unemployment, inflation, and decreases in salaries soon followed; economic woes, thus, became

a theme of the literature in subsequent years (Gontmakher and Radzikhovsky 2009). Russia had

also recently ended a war with neighboring Georgia in 2008 after Georgia continued to express

desire for NATO membership, and tensions among Russia, Georgia, and Western nations were

high throughout 2009 (Khachaturian 2009). By the time the year 2010 came, Russia was well

into an economic recession, which may have seriously impacted the amount of neo-Nazi and

skinhead violence that occurred.

The problems associated with Russia’s economic downturn have been equated with the

presence of neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks throughout its regions (Baranovsky 2000;

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Godzimirski 2008; Varga 2008; Land 2009; Khachaturian 2009; Arnold 2010b). Arnold (2010b)

mentions that a low-performing economy and diminished job prospects in a given region

heightens the perceived competition for resources among people, which may lead to such attacks

(39). This leads me to hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Regions with lower average income rates will yield higher rates of

neo-Nazi and skinhead violence during the year 2010.

Researchers have also linked lower education levels to the presence of neo-Nazi and

skinhead attacks (Umland 2008; Varga 2008). Nevertheless, Cooter (2006) highlights the

“normalization” of neo-Nazi groups by appealing to those who are more educated to increase

support groups (156). This contradiction within the literature leads in to my next hypothesis:

H2: Regions with lower education levels will yield higher rates of neo-Nazi and skinhead

violence during the year 2010.

Population density is also another important variable to consider for a couple different

reasons. It logically follows that regions with more numbers of people will yield higher rates of

neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks because there are more people to commit ethnic violence and

more people to be harmed. Population density, however, is also integral to understanding the role

that economic and cultural hubs play within neo-Nazi and skinhead cross-regional variation.

Upon taking a first glance at the SOVA Center’s database for such violence, Moscow, the

Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg all have the highest rates of attacks in comparison to other

regions. With such high population densities, these regions have the highest chances of such

attacks occurring. I would like to determine what role population density plays outside of these

regions as well, leading to my next hypothesis:

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H3: Regions with higher population densities will yield higher rates of neo-Nazi and

skinhead violence during the year 2010.

Another aspect of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence worth exploring is the role that ethnic

minorities play as targets of violence. Roman (2002) and Alexseev (2010) discuss how

xenophobic activists particularly target ethnic minorities or non-Russians. For example, the

Movement Against Illegal Immigration has become an ever-growing campaign against

supposedly illegal immigrants who are illegally taking jobs and opportunities from ethnic

Russians (Alexseev 2010, 90). Roman (2002) explains that such ethnic violence is perpetrated

against those who simply appear ethnically non-Russian, such as those who are dark-skinned,

even if they are legally Russian citizens (12). But how does this violence play out when there are

smaller versus larger populations of ethnic minorities across regions? Given the previously stated

hypotheses, regions with higher percentages of non-Russians might lead ethnic Russians to feel

more threatened by their presence. Therefore, the following hypothesis follows:

H4: Higher percentages of non-Russians will yield higher rates of neo-Nazi and skinhead

violence in the year 2010.

Other independent variables, such as Gross Regional Product, general crime rates,

unemployment rates, and the percentage of the population that is poor could also be useful

variables. I chose from among these different economic variables, however, in order to minimize

collinearity within my research design, thereby increasing the internal validity of my analysis. If

these hypotheses holds true, then it is possible that economic, social, and demographic variables

have just as much of an effect as politics and local government on the rates of neo-Nazi and

skinhead violence.

Data and Methodology

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In order to empirically test my hypotheses, I began exploring Moscow’s SOVA Center

website and database on racist and xenophobic acts of violence. This non-profit organization

observes human rights abuse and ethnic violence within Russia, and monitors national groups

such as the Movement Against Illegal Immigrants, Slavic Union, the National Bolshevik Party,

the Union of Eurasian Youth, and many others (Arnold 2010a). I was able to compile data on the

numbers of attacks throughout Russia’s regions from the year 2009 to 2012 in order to get a feel

of the general trend in the rate of attacks. Since the SOVA Center is based out of Moscow and it

is not a state-sponsored organization, successfully obtaining data from all of Russia’s regions is

difficult. In total, however, I utilized 81 different regions within Russia to run my analyses with,

which is a quality amount considering there are 83 regions in Russia today.

Data from the SOVA Center’s website began to be systematically compiled starting in

2010; therefore, I used this year rather than the years before it to ensure accurate estimations of

neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks. I also decided to utilize the number of attacks from the year 2010

only rather than all of the years available because both time and the context of one particular

year might affect the dependent variable differently; seeing the effects of these independent

variables over time would be beyond the scope of this particular analysis. The dataset also

included a minimum value and maximum value for each region and each year. I also utilized

only the minimum values from the year 2010 in my analysis. The minimum values allow me to

definitively say that a particular region had at least so many episodes of violence, while the

maximum values claim that a particular region could have had a maximum number of acts of

violence due to inaccurate estimates of the number of people involved.

As for the independent variables of average income, higher education levels, population

density, and percent non-Russian, I had access to a dataset on Russia’s eighty-nine regions

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compiled by Professor William Reisinger from the University of Iowa and Professor Bryon

Moraski from the University of Florida. Since the adoption of Russia’s constitution after the fall

of the Soviet Union, a few regions have consolidated; therefore, there are differences between

the actual numbers of regions that comprise Russia, which I have accounted for within this

analysis. I was, thus, able to run an ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis using

these four independent variables and the dependent variable of neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks.

Findings and Interpretation of the Results

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

The findings presented in Table 1 yield interesting results. The independent variables of

education level, percent non-Russian, and population density yielded p-values of 0.003, 0.015,

and 0.000 respectively; all were below the .05-mark, rendering them statistically significant. My

hypothesis that a higher population density would lead to higher rates of attacks was the only one

supported by the data, as seen by the negative correlation between both the independent and

dependent variable. On the other hand, the data suggest having higher education rates will lead to

higher rates of violence while having a higher percentage of non-Russians will yield lower rates

of violence. Both of these findings run contrary to what I initially hypothesized, which may

suggest that violence in regions with more educated populations is just as likely to occur

compared to less educated populations in different regions. Although the sign for the income

variable is positive, the p-value of 0.960 does not render this finding statistically significant and

there is no apparent relationship. Alexander Verkhovsky, thus, might have been right in asserting

how “economic problems never play a very important role for most of the nationalists” (126).

Population density seems to be a highly significant variable. For those regions where

ethnic Russians and ethnic non-Russians are living in close proximity to one another, neo-Nazi

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and skinhead attacks are more likely to occur. Higher population densities naturally would yield

higher rates of attacks because there are simply more people living in such areas. Having a

higher population density may also make it easier for such xenophobic groups to carry out ethnic

violence against minorities because it is easier to locate minority groups in large quantities since

they live closer together. The presence of the ethnic “other” may also be more apparent to ethnic

Russians in higher density locations. For example, perceived economic or social inequalities

could exacerbate ethnic tensions and increase Russian nationalism. In high population density

areas, ethnic Russians might find it easier to collaborate and plan attacks because they do not

have to travel as far. Therefore, the cause and message of nationalist groups and their subsequent

attacks could be more easily spread.

Space is also an issue of high importance; in high population density areas, it is more

readily apparent to residents that space must be shared, and yet it is also limited at the same time.

Space, which can be residential, recreational, or economic, becomes scarce and highly valuable

if there are excessive amounts of people living in a small space, which can aggravate tensions

between those who have more and those who do not. If people are forced to cope with problems

in these regions such as an economic recession, having a higher population density may,

therefore, intensify ethnic tensions and lead to higher rates of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence.

By carrying out attacks against ethnic non-Russians, ethnic Russians give off the message that

they do not want to share this limited amount of space with a migrant or unwelcome population.

Another interesting aspect of the table is that my r-square value is relatively high (0.934),

which led me to consider the robustness of my model. Even though I carefully chose these four

independent variables, I was not completely convinced that they were accounting for that much

variation within my data. I was able to conclude this because there were a few outliers within the

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dataset on neo-Nazi and skinhead acts of violence, namely Moscow, the Moscow region, and

Saint Petersburg, which might be accounting for most of the variation within the regression

model. Moscow is the capital and Saint Petersburg was the former capital of Russia, which could

mean that neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks are more prevalent there due to the large amounts of

people and their high population densities. Knowing that these three regions were outliers in my

data, I decided to run the model once again with the same variables but exclude Moscow, the

Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg from the analysis.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

After running the model without Moscow, the Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg, I

discovered that their existence within the first regression table highly skewed the results. My r-

square value decreased to 0.137, meaning that Saint Petersburg and the Moscow region were

accounting for more than half of the variation within my data. The independent variables of

percent non-Russian and percentage of higher education had significance values of 0.006 and

0.038 respectively. In this model, my original hypotheses were not supported by the data.

Instead, higher percentages of education levels correlate positively with neo-Nazi and skinhead

attacks, while higher percentages of non-Russians correlates negatively with such attacks. The p-

values for population density and average income were 0.321 and 0.983 respectively, which led

me to conclude that there was no relationship between them and the dependent variable. Further

research, however, could be done using population density, average income rates, and other

related variables to determine if there is a relationship among these and neo-Nazi and skinhead

violence.

It is very interesting that higher education levels correlate positively with ethnic violence

because of its implications for Russia’s regional education systems. Contrary to popular belief

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(Varga 2008), higher education levels might no longer mean a greater acceptance of ethnic

minorities and a decrease in ethnic violence. If this is true, it is possible that neo-Nazi ideals have

been infiltrating regional education systems over time. It is important to remember that Africans

and Asians were invited to study at Russia’s universities before the fall of the Soviet Union and

before ethnic violence against minorities was unleashed. Did the fall of the country’s political

and economic system trigger a two-decade-long backlash against ethnic minorities who were

specially invited by the government to attain a higher education?

If this relationship truly stems from problems in regional education systems, then the

correlation also suggests that aspects of civil society may be merging with neo-Nazi ideals. Since

the government-sponsored ban on racism took place in regional schools and universities, the fall

of the Soviet Union may have allowed for the birth of neo-Nazi ideals in the education system

itself. Over time, it might have become more socially and intellectually acceptable for such

ideals to spread and infiltrate schools and civil society. This, in turn, can lead to stereotypes

about ethnic minorities and non-Russians who are predominantly the targets of neo-Nazi

violence. If the attainment of higher education truly correlates positively with increased numbers

of attacks, then this relationship also may support Cooter’s (2006) conclusions about the

normalization of neo-Nazi ideals. Future research, however, could delve deeper into this

unexpected relationship between education and neo-Nazi violence because the root of neo-Nazi

violence may stem much deeper than previously thought.

On the other hand, having a higher percentage of non-Russians does not appear to yield a

higher amount of attacks according to Table 2. One reason for this relationship could be that

most cases involve ethnic Russians attacking ethnic minorities rather than minorities targeting

other minorities (Alexseev 2010, 91). Groups of ethnic non-Russians that live in the same areas

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might have a greater sense of shared unity against ethnic Russians sharing the same space, which

might prevent ethnic Russians from being able to carry out neo-Nazi or skinhead violence. It

might also be more difficult for ethnic Russians to collaborate and carry out acts of violence

when ethnic non-Russians outnumber them. Also, ethnic non-Russians might not espouse the

same nationalist ideals as ethnic Russians, especially if they are recent immigrants to the country.

It is extremely important to note, however, that many non-Russians have been living in Russia as

long as ethnic Russians. This notion further justifies my case studies because the qualitative part

of my research will help to explain the ethnic minority’s narrative for becoming the target

scapegoat of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence in certain regions.

Another possible reason behind this relationship between percent non-Russian and the

number of attacks could be that a higher percentage of non-Russians could lead to more of an

acceptance of the ethnic “other”. For example, the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia has one of the

largest Muslim populations despite the fact that the Eastern Orthodox religion is the traditional

religion of Russia (Malashenko 2009). As the number of ethnic non-Russians increases in a

particular area, they become a more formidable force against ethnic violence and they establish

themselves as a true part of the country due to their size. Neo-Nazi and skinhead groups may

choose not to carry out ethnic violence in such areas because they might not be able to get away

with it as easily, and the general population of that area could potentially retaliate.

Case Studies

After excluding Moscow, the Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg, my original

hypotheses were not supported by the results of the regression analysis. Contrary to what I

postulated, higher education is positively correlated with higher numbers of attacks and higher

percentages of non-Russians in a region correlates negatively with higher numbers of attacks.

19

Therefore, there should be other variables that are not as discernable from the multivariate

analysis that could explain neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks within certain regions. In his book

Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz (1985) argues for a comparative approach to studying

ethnic conflict because ethnic violence is often viewed in terms of episodes rather than ongoing

problems (13). Conducting a comparative case study is, thus, one way to further understand

ethnic violence in Russia.

With these quantitative results, I can now proceed to my next step in the research design,

which is to develop a better account of regional variation using case studies. According to

Lieberman (2005, 437), non-robust and non-satisfactory results should lead the researcher to

choose cases “off-the-line” from the quantitative study, better known as outliers, for the small-n

analysis portion of the design. Since none of my original hypotheses were supported, there must

be other factors affecting regional variation of neo-Nazi attacks in Russia. By focusing my

research on two outlying cases, Khabarovsk Krai in the Far Eastern Region and the Republic of

Kalmykia in the Southern Federal Region, I will have a better understanding of how regional

variation affects current data on ethnic violence in Russia.

SCATTERPLOT ABOUT HERE

My selection of cases was not completed at random. Khabarovsk Krai and the Republic

of Kalmykia lie above and below the linear average, respectively, of neo-Nazi and skinhead

attacks throughout Russia’s regions, which make them outliers. For the year 2010, Khabarovsk

Krai had seven reported accounts of ethnic violence while the Republic of Kalmykia had zero

(Verkhovsky 2010). Both regions are, geographically speaking, polar opposites: Khabarovsk

Krai borders with the People’s Republic of China while the Republic of Kalmykia is located

along the southwestern portion of the Caspian Sea. It is important to note that another significant

20

outlier, Nizhni Novgorod, was not chosen for the case study portion of this analysis. As shown

by my regression analysis including Moscow, the Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg, key

urban centers of Russia are hot spots of neo-Nazi activity and this region is also a major

population center. Therefore, I chose two comparable outliers that might not be as readily

explained. Throughout the case studies, I hope to shed more light on why Khabarovsk Krai is

experiencing more attacks than is expected while the Republic of Kalmykia is experiencing no

episodes of ethnic violence. I begin by examining aspects of Khabarovsk Krai’s history,

economy, and population in order to give background information of the region. I then discuss

key political players within the region and their influence on local government. Lastly, I suggest

possible reasons for why neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks are occurring more frequently in this

particular region. I follow my discussion on Khabarovsk Krai with a similar examination of the

Republic of Kalmykia, and conclude my case analysis with future avenues of research.

Khabarovsk Krai, part of the Far Eastern Federal Okrug (district), is home to

approximately 1.4 million people as of January 2009. The modern city was founded in 1858 as a

military outpost, and was later officially incorporated within Russia on September 20, 1938. Its

total area is 787, 633 square kilometers, with half of its land forested and three-quarters covered

with mountains or plateau (Heaney 2010, 295). Since its founding, it has been characterized as a

major industrial region of Russia, with mining, fisheries, timber processing, and oil refining as its

top resource sectors. Defense industries also play a large role, which hearkens back to its military

status in the mid-19th century (Wishnick 2004, 246). Two major railway systems that run through

the region, known as the Trans-Siberian and Far Eastern railways, have progressively helped the

region’s industrial economy grow; today, industry jobs comprise 25.3% of the region’s work

force (Heaney 2010, 297).

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After the fall of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin appointed a man named Viktor

Ishayev to share power in leading Khabarovsk Krai; it was not until 1996 that Ishayev was

elected popularly to be governor. Ishayev was reelected two more times until 2009, when he

became the Presidential Representative to the Far Eastern Federal Okrug. At the time, President

Dmitrii Medvedev was in charge of nominating the former State Duma deputy Vyachaslav

Shport to succeed Ishayev in 2009 (Heaney 2010, 296).

Before Ishayev became the Presidential Representative, however, a man named

Konstantin Pulikovskii held his position. The governors, including Ishayev, of the Far East

Federal Okrug did not particularly welcome him because the establishment of the Presidential

Representative system was seen as a federal encroachment on their regional autonomy.

According to Pulikovskii, Ishayev was especially difficult to work with in the region; his

antipathy stemmed from his belief that the establishment of the okrug office in Khabarovsk Krai

was an “attack on his own region” (Wishnick 2004, 248). Khabarovsk Krai’s distance from

central Russia has allowed for the continued growth of regional politics and culture; Ishayev,

therefore, was not prepared for this federal display of power. The theme of center-periphery

conflicts between these two geographic areas of Russia has been a source of contention over time

(245).

Aside from the region’s industrial success and core-periphery struggles, Khabarovsk Krai

and the Far Eastern Okrug as a whole are also known for their high corruption and crime rates.

Arguments have been made that these problems stem from the region’s inadequate regulation of

the Chinese border. Gangs operate near weapons depots and busy trade borders with China, and

the creation of fake identifications have become a growing problem (Wishnick 2004, 255).

Regional officials blame the Chinese government for the influx of illegal Chinese immigrants,

22

and yet corruption within the region as a whole has allowed illegal immigrants to obtain the

necessary documentation to live and work there whether or not the identifications are fake (256).

Up until 2005, Russia’s relations with China were also intensified by a border dispute that

President Putin was able to fortunately resolve (Heaney 2010, 297). Despite this, Khabarovsk

Krai’s close proximity with China has not made relations any better, and its local government

has not been fully successful in preventing illegal immigration.

The long years of Ishayev’s rule and the region’s strong military history could be argued

as reasons behind higher than expected numbers of neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks within the

region. The region has been categorized as a “delegative democracy”, meaning that Ishayev was

allowed to rule as he saw fit; this was clearly above party interests and showed a lack of

horizontal accountability within the region’s local government (Hahn 2002, 96). Khabarovsk

Krai also operates as a presidential system, where the legislature is subordinate to Ishayev; the

executive has the power to choose its own cabinet without prior legislative approval (105). This

lack of accountability in government and strong rule of the executive could be allowing neo-Nazi

and skinhead attacks to occur because it is not in the best interest of the executive to prevent such

attacks. It might also not be a top priority of the local government to take care of at this time

because the region is focused on maintaining the growth of its industries and keeping civil

relations with the federal government. Having a strong military history could also be prone to

more violent ways of dealing with problems such as crime, corruption, and illegal immigration.

It is possible that neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks are ways of addressing these problems, despite

its moral and legal implications.

Another reason that may be behind neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks within the region is its

problem of illegal immigration. Chinese immigrants or Russians of Asian descent have been

23

targets of ethnic violence since the fall of the Soviet Union (Roman 2002). The influx of Chinese

illegal immigrants and criminals looking to exploit the trade borders between Khabarovsk Krai

and China have consistently fuelled fears of uncontrolled migration into the region, and it is

possible these fears are being played out through ethnic violence (Wishnick 2004, 256). Ishayev

himself has been known to be particularly hard on illegal immigration from China, which could

signify a tacit agreement between local government and the perpetrators of ethnic violence on the

treatment of ethnic minorities or those who appear to be foreigners (Hahn 2002, 105). Those who

appear Asian or Chinese could be targets of such violence because they have been made

scapegoats out of illegal immigrants and criminals.

While illegal immigration, crime and corruption, and a strong presidential system with a

military history forms potential reasons underlying Khabarovsk Krai’s ethnic violence, the

Republic of Kalmykia presents a different story. This republic, which is part of the Southern

Federal Okrug, is located on the northwestern part of the Caspian Sea and is much closer to the

center of Russia. It holds a much smaller population than Khabarovsk Krai at around 284,000

people as of January 2009. It is also much smaller in comparison at just 74,731 square kilometers

with one half of the Republic covered in desert (Heaney 2010, 129). The history of the Kalmyks

can be traced to the time of the Mongols when they consisted of semi-nomadic groups originally

from parts of Turkestan that is now today parts of the People’s Republic of China. In the early

17th century, they were forced by the Han Chinese to leave their settlements and move westward,

eventually reaching the Volga basin. Although the Russians controlled the area, they formally

established the Kalmyk Khanate. In 1771 the Khanate was dissolved after long struggles with the

Russian government for autonomy, and the people attempted to migrate back to their original

homelands. Unfortunately, many were killed, families and groups were dispersed or forced to go

24

back, and many ethnic Russians and Germans began settling in the area. In 1920, the Kalmyk

Autonomous Oblast (region) was formally established. This autonomy would be short lived,

however, when in 1943 the Russian government dissolved the Oblast due to Kalmyk

collaboration with German enemy forces. As a result, many ethnic Kalmyks were deported to

Central Asia until the Oblast’s reconstitution under Stalin in 1957. On October 18, 1990 the

people adopted a declaration of sovereignty and today it operates as a region of the Russian

Federation (130).

Today Kalmykia’s ethnic makeup is comprised of 53.3% ethnic Kalmyks, 33.6% ethnic

Russians, and various smaller populations of ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note that

Tibetan Buddhism is the dominant religion of the region, and almost all of the indigenous

population speaks the Kalmyk language (129). This region has, therefore, successfully created a

place that is very different from the rest of the country where Russian Orthodoxy dominates,

which may stem from its tumultuous history. The region, however, still has its problems; the

standards of living in the entire Okrug are much lower compared to the rest of Russia, with more

than half of Kalmykia’s population living at the poverty line.

The Presidential Envoy for the entire federal region is Viktor Kazantsev, whose job

operates similarly to Ishayev’s. It has historically been difficult for these envoys to establish

positive regional relations and obtain control over regional governors because of core-periphery

struggles mentioned earlier (Zubarevich 2004, 114). From 1993 to 2010, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov

was the Republic of Kalmykia’s president, and on multiple times he has been linked to

government corruption. For example, in 2002 he ran unopposed in a presidential election and in

2003 he was linked to illegitimate vote counting (Heaney 2010, 130). It is possible that core-

periphery conflicts have been fueling corruption and the central government’s inability to control

25

outlying regions. Some have speculated that political and business interests are completely

merged within Kalmykia’s leadership; as long as stability is preserved, then the federal

government will pay little to no attention to what Kalmykia’s leaders do (Reddaway and Orttung

2004, 294). Ilyumzhinov has also been connected to funneling $70.2 million of government

money to support the Uralan soccer club, which shows that government priorities are not in line

with what the general public needs (124).

Given the region’s history of ethnic dispersal and corruption, this region experienced no

reported attacks by neo-Nazis or skinhead groups. One reason for this unexpected statistic could

be due to the ethnic makeup of the region. Since ethnic Russians do not form the dominant group

and they are usually the perpetrators of such violence, these groups have not been able to form a

formidable force in the region. As a result, ethnic conflicts may be more easily stopped before

they erupt into ethnic cleansing and violence because neo-Nazi and skinhead groups do not have

the social cohesion necessary to do so. It is also possible that the diverse ethnic makeup has

cultivated more of an acceptance of the ethnic other; since Kalmyks are the dominant group, they

may have established themselves to ethnic Russians as a true part of the Russian Federation and

they use their strength in numbers to keep neo-Nazi and skinhead groups from committing acts

of violence. My results of the multivariate analysis seem to support this aspect of my case study

in that higher percentages of non-Russians negatively correlates with lower numbers of neo-Nazi

and skinhead attacks.

Kalmykia also has lower crime rates and no visible conflicts between political and

economic elites. The region has managed to satisfy the requirements of Kasantsev and the

federal government, and their economic records appear to be free of significant federal violations

(Zubarevich 2004, 125). The local government and police forces might be strong enough to keep

26

ethnic tensions at a minimum, and it is also possible that civil society does not espouse the same

ideologies that neo-Nazis and skinheads do because of its ethnic makeup. Despite this, “relations

with […] Ilyumzhinov are completely hidden and kept to a minimum” and no in-depth

investigations of the president’s actions have been conducted (124). If relations are truly hidden,

that must mean that the president and the region’s officials have been hiding something from

either the federal government or the people. It is possible that the low numbers of attacks in

Kalmykia are because the numbers have not yet surfaced. If corruption is considered the norm

for this region and if the federal government has turned a blind eye to Kalmykia’s regional

government, then victims of ethnic violence might not obtain justice because regional or federal

officials cannot hear them. This lack of transparency between the federal and local government

of Kalmykia makes it difficult for non-profit organizations such as the SOVA Center to collect

data and reports on neo-Nazi and skinhead statistics. The Kremlin has also supposedly refused to

take action against Kalmykia’s leadership, despite media reports that highlight corruption within

local government (Demidov 2005, 332).

Conclusion

The existence of neo-Nazi and skinhead violence within Russia continues to remain a

problem, and it is possible this problem could continue to grow. By combining a multivariate

analysis with two case studies, I have hoped to shed more light on such violence than either

method could have accomplished alone. Using both quantitative and qualitative data has

provided a more complete picture of ethnic violence in Russia and specifically the two regions I

chose. My results have shown a positive correlation between higher education and numbers of

attacks as well as a negative correlation between percent non-Russian and numbers of attacks.

My case studies have also shown that different regions in Russia have specific reasons behind

27

the presence or lack of such attacks. In Khabarovsk Krai, neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks may be

attributed to illegal immigration, crime and corruption in local government, and a strong

presidential system with a military history. As for the Republic of Kalmykia, the lack of such

attacks could be a result of their ethnic makeup, with ethnic Russians as the minority, or lower

crime rates and civil relations among federal and local leaders. It is also possible that the hidden

relations between federal and local leaders have prevented the publicity of neo-Nazi and

skinhead attacks because local government is highly corrupt. All of these findings merit further

research, which will help to better explain ethnic violence within Russia.

My research design does suffer from external and internal validity in a couple of ways.

Khabarovsk Krai and the Republic of Kalmykia might not be applicable cases to the rest of

Russia because no two regions are exactly the same. Future research could benefit by choosing

different regions to analyze in order to discover other reasons for higher or lower numbers of

neo-Nazi and skinhead attacks. Not every region in Russia shares a border with China, and not

every region has a minority population of ethnic Russians. Therefore, the information I have

gathered about these two regions helps to explain such attacks in these two regions specifically,

and future research may or may not reveal similar correlations. On a larger scale, these data also

might not be extrapolated to other countries suffering from similar ethnic violence such as

Hungary or the Czech Republic because they have different histories with ethnic violence,

different ethnic compositions, and different types of governments.

Future research could make a point of incorporating cross-national statistics and case

studies to find trends in ethnic violence, which could help researchers to understand global

implications of ethnic violence and what can be done to stop it. I may have also failed to

incorporate certain variables into my initial multivariate analysis. Other variables that could be

28

used include a region’s distance from urban centers such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg,

regime types of local governments, or whether or not a region shares a border with a foreign

nation. Two other important variables future research could also consider are how many people

are at working age for a given region and how many pensioners are there in a given region.

Including these variables would help to see if young people are carrying out attacks more so than

older people. It could also show shifts in education for those born after the fall of the Soviet

Union and those born before, which would better explain the positive correlation between higher

education rates and neo-Nazi attacks. I did, however, choose my variables with care in order to

control for collinearity, which could have ultimately skewed the results of my analysis if I did

not do so. Future research could build upon this analysis by incorporating these variables, the

results of my case studies, and previously unconsidered variables into a new multivariate

analysis. Another way to expand on this research is to complete a time series design in order to

look beyond the year 2010. This will help researchers to understand neo-Nazi and skinhead

attacks throughout time and track changes and continuities in these groups. Since the data on the

SOVA Center’s website has been systematically collected since the year 2010, studying the years

2011 and 2012 could be beneficial to our understanding of ethnic violence.

The findings presented in this paper are valuable for a number of reasons. The

relationship between higher education and neo-Nazi and skinhead violence implies that this

violence is adapting to its environment by changing to meet the needs of a more intelligent

population. We cannot assume that highly educated regions are less likely to engage in such

violence. This signals that future research on the relationship between ethnic violence and

Russia’s education system could possibly help researchers to understand how education may

propagate stereotypes about ethnic minorities and breed the idea that violence against minorities

29

is acceptable. On the other hand, the relationship between percentages of non-Russians and this

type of violence shows that diversity within a region can be a formidable force to combat racial

stereotypes and violence. Local governments that promote cultural and ethnic diversity within

their regions could be specifically researched and compared to other regions that do not promote

ethnic diversity. By delving deeper into two geographically opposite regions of Russia, I have

shown that the problem of ethnic violence can be unique to different populations, and regions

might have different methods of coping with or expelling ethnic violence. One theme from the

existing literature and from my results is that local government does play an extremely important

role in the presence of ethnic violence. There are various research methods that can be used to

understand the role that local government plays in each particular region, but comparative case

studies might be the best method for understanding this problem.

As stated earlier, the collection of data on neo-Nazi and skinhead violence is a work in

progress. The SOVA Center is still a non-profit organization that can only expand through

donations from the national or international community. It also still remains an important tool for

gathering information on Russia’s human rights violations and understanding why and how such

violence occurs. The collection of these data can also be very dangerous because it draws

national and international attention to neo-Nazi and skinhead groups and their actions, which

generally commit crimes that are unacceptable and are considered crimes against humanity. The

SOVA Center is the best and most comprehensive data source at this time to complete studies on

this topic. However, a more comprehensive analysis of the rates of neo-Nazi and skinhead

violence must be left to further research as well as future collections of data by the SOVA

Center. The findings presented in this particular analysis suggest future avenues for research on

30

this particular topic, as well as a new lens with which to interpret the existence and persistence of

ethnic violence.

31

Table 1: Determinants of neo-Nazi and Skinhead Violence in the Russian Federation in 2010, Including Moscow, the Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg

Variables b Standard Error t p-value

Attainment of Higher Educationb 0.478 0.158 3.032 0.003**

Percent Non-Russian Population -0.058 0.023 -2.501 0.015*

Population Densityc 0.014 0.001 21.716 0.000***

Average Income 0.006 0.121 0.050 0.960

Number of Cases: 81

R2: 0.934

Source: William Reisinger and Bryon Moraski Data Set on Russia’s Regions.

b Percentage of the region’s 15-and-over population with at least some higher education as reported in the 2010 census.c Measured as people per square kilometer.

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Table 2: Determinants of neo-Nazi and Skinhead Violence in the Russian Federation in 2010, Excluding Moscow, the Moscow region, and Saint Petersburg

Variables b Standard Error t p-value

Attainment of Higher Education 0.276 0.131 2.110 0.038*

Percent Non-Russian Population -0.050 0.018 -2.801 0.006**

Population Density 0.022 0.022 1.000 0.321

Average Income 0.002 0.104 0.022 0.983

Number of Cases: 78

R2: 0.137

Source: William Reisinger and Bryon Moraski Data Set on Russia’s Regions.

33

34

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