Conference Report for the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies

and other Harvard supporting organizations

Debating Japan’s Constitution: On the Streets, In Parliament, and In the Region

Constitutional Revision Conference 3Friday, November 3, 2017

12:30 pm – 6:45 pm

Executive Summary

This conference was the third and culminating event for joint research on constitutional revision conducted under an agreement linking the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University and the Faculty of Law at Keiō University. The agreement was signed in 2015, and two conferences were held at Keiō in 2015 and 2016. This third conference held at Harvard was generously supported by the Reischauer Institute, the Harvard Asia Center, the Harvard-Yenching Institute, the Program on US-Japan Relations, and Keiō University’s Faculty of Law. Conference planning began in late 2016, with assistance from the Advisors to the Reischauer Institute Research Project on Constitutional Revision (Alexis Dudden, Timothy George, Keigo Komamura, and Franziska Seraphim) and the project research assistant, Makiko Ueda. The conference was held on the seventieth anniversary of the promulgation of the Constitution of Japan (November 3, 1947).

The goal of this culminating conference was to assemble a group of participants who collectively could address the issue of constitutional revision in three distinct but overlapping perspectives: constitutional revision as a focus of Japanese civic activism, as a legislative goal of the administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, and as an issue of Japan’s foreign relations with neighboring Asian nations. During the planning stage, a group of scholars meeting this criterion was identified and invited to participate.

The first panel featured a single presentation by Professor Yoshihide Soeya of Keiō University.1 His presentation provided an historical discussion of the evolution of constitutional revision over the years 1945 to the present. He identified the adoption of article 9 in the 1946 draft for a new constitution as appropriate to Japan’s situation at the time, in which it had previously ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which all signatories renounced war as an instrument of foreign policy. By 1950, however, the Cold War had begun, and other nations had abandoned Kellogg-Briand, leaving Japan both alone in retaining its substance and under pressure to support the US militarily. As time went on, article 9 enabled Japan to resist US pressure, and its political usefulness in that regard was well understood, even as the LDP vowed to revise it. Over the

1 Professor Yuan Yao of Nanjing University had been expected to participate in this panel, but a family emergency prevented his attendance; nevertheless, he submitted a presentation.

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decades since then, the scope of activity permitted under article 9 was broadened by changing interpretations, culminating with the 2015 new security legislation, which permits Japan to adopt the policy of collective self-defense. Soeya said that this provision, in fact, satisfied the policy goals sought by conservatives, and that the only remaining “need” for revision in their perspective is for a repudiation of the postwar regime that revision would symbolize. Soeya’s presentation was referred to repeatedly during the following discussion as a viable framework for the subsequent presentations.

In the second panel, Professor Sungmoon Kim identified the legacy of Confucian values and the practices of authoritarian regimes as suggesting historical points of origin as well as contemporary mechanisms that affect constitutional issues in East Asia. Kim’s discussion of the impeachment of former Korean President Park Geun-Hye demonstrated that the Korean supreme court’s decision to impeach her relied in large part on extra-legal judgments of personal moral lapses, rather than the substance of the actions with which she was actually charged.

A Japanese manifestation of the issues addressed by Kim was illustrated in the second panel by Professor Komamura’s analysis of the Sunagawa Case, which ended in the Supreme Court’s decision not to rule on constitutional questions, deferring to the Cabinet. That case became a precedent establishing a strong tendency for Japanese courts to refrain wherever possible from making pronouncements about the constitution, producing a compliant judiciary.

Professor Kōichi Nakano discussed the nature of contemporary Japanese civic activism resisting constitutional revision. The movement is characterized by an evolving repertoire of protest techniques stemming from the 1960s; participants who take up a changing list of issues; and a newer development of ties between Japanese activists and other progressives in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the US. The shifting roles of media will be key to understanding this development in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia. Major media outlets, subject to varying degrees of pressure from state regulators, sway public opinion on constitutional revision, stimulate activists, and inspire them to create independent media to facilitate communications free of state interference. Likewise, the internet is a prominent vehicle for activists’ communications, democratizing access to news even as it creates possibilities for manipulation and misrepresentation.

In the third panel, Professor Weitseng Chen discussed how rule of law operates in authoritarian regimes. He showed how authoritarian regimes can use democratic aspects of the rule of law to suppress progressive civic activism, concluding that when we consider constitutionality in the region we must understand the mechanisms through which it is enacted. He identified the tradition of courts’ deference to political power centers as stemming from the region’s legacy of Confucianism, which tempers the manner in which each country enacts constitutionalism.

Professor Christian Winkler showed in detail how Japanese public opinion regarding constitutional revision reacts to television and newspaper reporting. Based on a survey that he had recently carried out, he showed that there is great variation among the opinions represented in Japan, and that a simple pro or con question does not begin to get at the nuances of popular opinion about revision. A trend pervading his data was a popular lack of interest in those points proposed for revision by the LDP. He presented his findings against a sober assessment of the hurdles faced by the LDP in enacting revision, suggesting that the Abe administration’s date of 2020 is unrealistic.

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Conference Participants

Presenters

Weitseng CHEN, Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore

Sungmoon KIM, Professor of Political Theory, Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong

Keigo KOMAMURA, Professor of Law, Vice President, Keio University

Kōichi NAKANO, Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Sophia University

Yoshihide SOEYA, Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law, Keio University

Christian WINKLER, Lecturer, Modern Japanese Studies Program, Hokkaido University

Discussants

Ingu HWANG, Korea Foundation Visiting Assistant Professor of International Studies, History Department, Boston College

Mari MIURA, Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law, Sophia University

Sheila SMITH, Senior Fellow for Japanese Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Moderators

Alexis DUDDEN, Professor of History, Department of History, University of Connecticut

Timothy GEORGE, Professor of History, Department of History, University of Rhode Island

Helen HARDACRE, Reischauer Institute Professor of Japanese Religions and Society, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University

Franziska SERAPHIM, Associate Professor of History, History Department, Boston College

Project Research Assistant

Makiko UEDA

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Full Report

Panel 1: Regional Perspectives on Japan’s Constitutional Debates

Moderator: Franziska SERAPHIM

Presenter: Yoshihide SOEYA, “Constitutional Revision and Article Nine: Implications for Japan’s Security Policy and Foreign Relations”

Discussant: Sheila SMITH

Professor Soeya

The rapidly shifting political drama in Japan has led to a significant reconfiguration of the political landscape, not only in Japan but in the East Asian region. Soeya’s presentation gave us a perspective on the historical origins of article 9 that significantly clarifies the present state of the debate. Soeya noted that the new language in the first provision of the 2015 security legislation includes the limitation to situations where Japan’s existence is threatened (i.e., does not require altering article 9). Here we see an expansion of the scope of that which is permitted under article 9, signifying a continuation of the trend to expand the scope of the article by interpretation. Soeya noted that those who want to revise article 9 may be content with this, although it is actually only half of the full right to collective self defense as defined in the UN charter. Those in favor of revising article 9 may not really want to get involved in US wars outside of disputes where Japan’s survival is threatened. They are less interested in, or even reject, the full implications of collective self defense, which would mean taking responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security beyond the area under Japanese territorial administration.

The nexus linking Article 9 with the “Alliance Regime” functions as an Invisible Hand in Japanese security considerations. Strengthening the alliance is the end result of the drive to make Japan more autonomous. Abe’s ideology exists beyond these parameters. His agenda is drifting and in confusion. War history and constitutional revision are two sides of the same coin. The basic parameters of Japan’s defense and security have become a source of divsion. Changing article 9 would require a common sense concept of history, but we do not seem to be able to arrive at a consensus on that. Now it seems that if you change article 9, you are rejecting the whole postwar regime. Open and continuing discussion of these issues would be natural in any “normal” country, Soeya noted, but if he were to say this in Japan, he would be positioned even to the right of the prime minister.

Discussant: Dr. Smith

Although in the role of Discussant, Smith kindly gave full and thorough remarks equal to any of the longer presentations. The way Smith framed article 9’s emergence in terms of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact made extremely clear how article 9 means one thing if Japan’s neighbors are also adopting policies of demilitarization, but means quite another if Japan is doing so unilaterally. Smith pinpointed the question what kind of military capability is sufficient for Japan, now that there are real questions about how Japan could defend itself against China and the DPRK. Switching the perspective to Washington, Smith noted that while the Pentagon is

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questioning what Japan can and cannot do under article 9, and while military cooperation between Japan and the US is deepening, the calculus changes now that a contingency might arise within Japan itself. Korean anxiety over any prospect of a Japanese military force within its territory is another area of sensitivity that must stymie US planners at times. If a real strike were to occur and Japanese forces were called upon to respond, could they maintain the current tiptoeing around the border areas? Smith described a dangerous lack of understanding of Japan’s situation in the White House. One can entirely understand why the LDP now thinks it must consider strike capability, and one wonders, who could seriously hold that Tokyo should first suffer a nuclear attack before defending itself?

Questions from the audience:

Thomas Berger: (to Soeya) Isn’t article 9 useful to Japan to hedge the US? (to Smith): What about Japan’s strike capability? What Japan seeks now is retaliatory capability.

SOEYA: I don’t see article 9 as useless, but perhaps there is no need to revise it. The politicians have achieved what they wanted. I see article 9 as detached from real questions of Japanese defense.

SMITH: There will be a debate next year on the next five-year defense budget [guidelines]. Regarding the DPRK, we’ll see a strengthened missile defense system. The LDP reports that the time has come to consider strike capability. Maehara and Ishiba have discussed it. Japan should acquire retaliatory capability; this is Onodera’s idea, and he is Minister of Defense now. It’s designed to change the calculus for the DPRK.

NAKANO: Regarding your [Soeya’s] Invisible Hand argument, a regime isn’t a marketplace. I don’t share your faith that the Invisible Hand will continue to keep the balance.

SOEYA: That is a critical point. I see the same pattern repeating, but will it lead to the outbreak of an authoritarian regime? If so, we have to resist. Analytically, I think the pattern is likely to recur, and that it will continue to constrain Japan.

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Panel 2: Popular Sovereignty and Civic Activism

Moderator: Alexis DUDDEN

Presenters:

Keigo KOMAMURA, “The Fate of Article 9 — Political Strategy, Civic Activism, and the Promise of Constitutionalism”

Kōichi NAKANO, “Crisis of Constitutional Democracy and the New Civil Society Activism in Japan: From SEALDs to Civil Alliance

Sungmoon KIM, “Good Government and Constitutional Jurisprudence in South Korea: The Recent Case of the President’s Impeachment”

Discussant: Ingu HWANG

Professor Komamura

The fate of article 9 was greatly affected by the Sunagawa case in 1955, providing a framework for civic activism. This case was based on the expansion of the Tachikawa air base into local towns, including Sunagawa, because longer runways were needed. This struggle drew one of the largest protests in the history of postwar Japan, taking in farmers, students, and unions. Some protesters broke into the base and were charged with trespassing, as a crime defined under the Anpo treaty. Judge Akio Date, of Tokyo District Court found the accused not guilty, based on his finding that the base was unconstitutional, because it amounted to keeping “war potential” on Japanese soil (prohibited by paragraph 2), by stationing troops there.

The Supreme Court ruled that the clause referred only to war potential under Japanese control, so the Tachikawa base is not unconstitutional. The court went on to comment on the Security treaty and said that it is so important to the Cabinet that the treaty falls outside the court’s power of judicial review. This means that the court refrains from working on article 9, putting article 9 on an unstable basis, because the court will not back it up.

Kōmura Masahiko, Vice-President of the LDP, stated in June 2014 that the Sunagawa decision implicitly recognized collective self defense, because it did not disallow it. The Sunagawa case determined that the question of constitutionality should be left to the Cabinet and the Diet (i.e., not to constitutional jurists and scholars), and ultimately to the people.

Article 9 had, however, been accepted within the framework of the UN as a world peacekeeping organization, not in terms of the US-Japan Security Treaty. Komamura quoted Tanaka Kōtaro, Chief Justice of Supreme Court in the Sunagawa case. Tanaka was exceptionally brilliant, a Catholic, and a passionate anti-Communist. One of the accused tried to get him recused because of his remarks on the case. However, he admired and welcomed statements by constitutional lawyers, and he seemed to regard negatively those activists who used force.

It has become clear, however, that Tanaka exchanged documents with Douglas MacArthur, who was then ambassador to Japan. Tanaka disclosed the trial schedule, the probable range of opinions, and his own effort to shorten the trial. When this news came out, a Sunagawa survivor sued for a retrial of the Sunagawa case in 2016, but the suit was dismissed.

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It was very problematic that Tanaka held these exchanges with US officials, as in doing so, he played the role of an informant. The important role of civic activism can be seen in this case; it should play a decisive role in the determination of constitutional cases.

Professor Nakano

Nakano spoke of himself as a kind of “accidental activist,” but he presented a sharp, astute analysis of contemporary civic action. Nakano placed the new Civil Alliance for Peace and Constitutionalism 市民連合 in historical context that could be said to start with the Arab Spring, moving on to encampment movements in Europe, Occupy Wall Street, the Sunflower Movement, the Umbrella Movement, and the Women’s March in the US. Moreover, Nakano identified a unifying thread among several of these movements: their basis in issues of legality rather than economic issues. He noted that the Koike-Maehara coalition was a backlash against the alliance of the opposition with citizens, revealing a sinister side of neoliberal populism, especially as exemplified by Koike. Nakano explained how ex-SEALDs members are flowing into the new civil society activism, and the continuities of contact and techniques among many activist movements.

Professor Kim

Given the courts’ Confucian heritage, the recent rise of judicial activism in Korea and Taiwan was quite unexpected, since the courts have usually shown great deference to those in political authority. In the recent impeachment trial of President Park Geun-hye, rather than adhering to the letter of the relevant statutes, the courts adopted a position of “remonstrating” with the Korean president, appearing to base their decision as much on society’s reaction to her seven-hour absence without explanation following the disastrous 2014 ferry sinking, as on the actions with which she was formally charged. The courts made an issue of the sincerity of her public apologies but did not show how that in itself rose to a level proportionate to impeachment, to say nothing of the fact that the charge of “insincerity” had no legal basis. The result was a paradox: the court protected Korea’s constitution, which is liberal in its formal character, but did so through an extralegal invocation of Confucian values. While there was a measure of justice in the outcome in this case, Kim’s presentation exposed the dangers of judicial activism, because while the judges in this case showed an allegiance to liberal values, if only indirectly, other judges taking matters into their own hands might make decisions that would take a country in a very illiberal direction.

Discussant: Professor Hwang

Hwang raised two general points: first, the importance of historical context, and second, the significance of taking a holistic view on the events related to popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, that is, between or across the street protests, representative politics, and court adjudication. Taking the example of Korea, if representative politics had worked well, the monumental protests and the following action for the impeachment would not have taken place. In 1960 when college students toppled down Syngman Rhee’s regime, protestors and their voices were alienated from the post-uprising process of the Constitutional Amendment, as “the same old faces” (namely, the political elites of the old regime) conducted the amending constitution. By

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1987 when a similar uprising took place against the authoritarian rule, but with more comprehensive (namely, socioeconomic) agendas beyond procedural democracy, a similar pattern followed. So, the question of how, or whether, to translate popular protests and voices into institutional/representative politics, as well as their discussion of the constitution, without losing their meaning and momentum is quite relevant to our discussion.

Questions from the audience:

Shunya Yoshimi: (to Nakano) The conservative aspects of activism suggest that activists want to protect the postwar regime, while Abe seeks to depart from the postwar regime. In this case, the meaning of the postwar in connection with the constitution is a central issue in understanding contemporary activism.

NAKANO: Koike’s idea of “resetting” the postwar is scary—it means the screen will go dark, and then she’ll decide what should happen. We were trying to discuss the meaning of the postwar through democratic means rather than having social values imposed by political leaders.

Thomas Berger: (to Nakano) The opposition always splinters; isn’t this an echo of the 1960s? Many of the world protest movements pick up economic issues, but aren’t there enough economic issues to bring in people by appealing to those concerns? Many of the powerful protest movements around the world are right wing, not left. Why don’t we see more of that in Japan?

NAKANO: You’re right about the economic issues. Abe is lying; he said free education, but now it turns out that students will have to pay back the tuition after their graduation. We have to highlight the philosophical issues.

Sheila Smith (to Nakano): Do you see civic activism existing when the system fails to translate popular will into electoral politics for a true expression of popular sovereignty?

NAKANO: People took to the streets out of the belief that popular sovereignty was not getting expressed. It’s easier to do that than campaign for some of these recycled old political hacks.

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Panel 3: Legality and Legitimacy in East Asian Constitutionalism

Moderator: Timothy GEORGE

Presenters:

Weitseng CHEN, “Authoritarian Legality and Its Transition in Asia”

Christian WINKLER, “The Amendment Debate Through Public Eyes”

Discussant: Mari MIURA

Professor Chen

Chen’s presentation provided a comparative perspective on constitutional revision in Japan through the lens of authoritarian regimes. Chen noted that while there is a tendency to assume that instituting rule of law eventually produces a democracy, in fact there is no empirical evidence to substantiate the assumption. Pointing to the examples of Singapore and China, Chen showed how the existence of the constitutional principle of rule of law alone determines only that both liberals and conservatives are provided with a new vocabulary to use in competing with each other. Chen also showed how in Hong Kong conservatives and pro-Beijing figures call for the adoption of US legal institutions, because they require political review, thus ensuring that the Communist Party maintains control. These examples show, Chen pointed out, that we should look at the ways in which different constitutional provisions institutionalize power, noticing that authoritarian regimes make a commitment to selected legal rights, but only at the point that the regime has secured sufficient assets that it is willing to open the remainder to competition among other actors. Thus, rule of law is neutral in terms of value, and any associated value emerges only in the course of its actual implementation. One key, Chen seemed to say, is the nature of the courts in any country. In Japan we find compliant courts that are sycophantic toward politicians (a situation stemming from the Sunagawa case discussed by Professor Komamura), while in Taiwan the courts have actually acted as a trigger of democratization but with judges suffering political retaliation, and while in Singapore, as in Japan, the courts have carved politically sensitive issues out of their scope of responsibility, leaving constitutional questions to politicians. This inquiry suggests many possible lines of further comparative study and sets the issue of constitutional revision in Japan in a regional context, in which each country’s constitution, politicians, and judiciary form different constellations of power and authority for competition to enact distinctive ideals of nation.

Professor Winkler

Winkler spoke from his research-in-progress that is based on an online survey of 2,000 informants who responded about their views on constitutional revision. The survey divided the respondents into two groups: one group was told that the text they were to consider had been compiled by the LDP as its draft of a new constitution, while a control group was told only that the text had been compiled by “experts” (yūshikisha). The results (too numerous to present in full detail in this report) showed that the issues particularly desired by the current administration have the lowest levels of popular support. Winkler alerted us to the importance of the stimulation of media coverage to turn attention to constitutional revision at critical moments, even as the overall trajectory was a story of “fickle popular support.” He presented the wide range of

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support, rejection, and ambivalence surrounding proposals for different aspects of the constitution that might be revised against a realistic assessment of the legislative hurdles standing between the Abe administration and its goal of enacting a revision. This assessment suggests that having achieved a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet is no guarantee that revision will be enacted. For one thing, the party has not yet compiled its draft for a new constitution, but it has said that it will do so, and that it will not resubmit its draft of 2012. These circumstances and Winkler’s findings suggest why, even in the wake of his electoral victory in October 2017, the Prime Minister is backing away from his promise to revise the constitution by 2020.

Discussant: Professor Miura

Regarding Chen’s presentation, Karl Polanyi famously said that the market has always been created by the power of the state. The market cannot function without some measure of rule of law, and thus we should perhaps not be surprised that authoritarian regimes adopt some aspects of rule of law. Perhaps what we see in Chen’s presentation is a twist on Polanyi’s position, that states adopt rule of law in order to ensure the functioning of the market. It may be the case that rule of law even becomes a source of economic development in some Asian countries. If this is the case, the question arises how long this can continue, given the emergence of new forms of civic activism even in authoritarian regimes. T.H. Marshall’s theory of rights states that rights have developed in the West in three stages: starting with civil rights, then political rights, and finally social rights. Civil rights have been well protected, but political rights have been quite limited under authoritarian regimes. This is why we see tensions between authoritarian regimes that have adopted rule of law and their emerging civic activism. While we cannot apply Marshall’s theory, much less the whole modernization paradigm, naively to East Asia, there is an element of truth here. We can perceive in Japan today a moral decay at the elite level. The Japanese elite want to respect the rule of law, but there is a serious failure to comply with basic labor laws, as we see in the appearance of so-called “black companies” and the deaths from overwork of employees pressured to work excessive hours. Examples such as these show that rule of law is not functioning well. The poor performance of the Japanese economy may be partly explained by this failure, since the success of the market depends upon the rule of law.

Regarding Winkler’s presentation, these data are very interesting, and we can see that responses differ significantly depending on whether the respondent knows that a particular revision proposal originated with the LDP. Previously, people recognized that proposals to revise the constitution aimed at a denial of basic democratic values, though more recently they tend to focus on particular points proposed for revision. That change may account for the sharp rise in the proportion expressing agreement with constitutional revision. Now, however, it has become clear, especially under the second Abe administration, that constitutional revision is a repudiation of the postwar regime. The result is an increase of those who reject revision. How should we analyze this chronological trend? If you were an advisor to the prime minister, what would you recommend to him as a likely scenario for achieving constitutional revision?

A final question concerns the relation between knowledge and attitudes toward constitutional revision, and it relates to Soeya’s proposal that constitutional revision and historical memory are two sides of the same coin. It was originally understood that article 9 was Japan’s apology for war crimes, but nowadays people are not aware of that meaning of the clause. Students today are

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very surprised to learn about the earlier understanding of article 9. I wonder whether respondents might have reacted differently if they had been encouraged to consider article 9’s implications for international relations and world history.

Chen responds to Miura:

We know that authoritarian legality prevails in East Asia, but its mechanisms are unclear, whether in terms of institutional design or methods of implementing policy. China has replicated the Asian Tigers model for economic success, by selectively embracing some Western ideas. The question is how to make a developmental state possible. A sequenced implementation may be adopted with respect to property rights, labor unions, and corporate governance. Frank Upham has proposed that if China had instituted secure property rights protections on “Day One,” its economic success might not have succeeded, because property rights can become a major obstacle preventing the Party from reallocating resources to those who can use them in the most efficient way. He argues that the sequence in which rights are implemented is crucial.

Winkler responds to Miura:

There may be some exceptions to the rule that scholars do not make good politicians, such as Mr. Kabashima of Kumamoto, but I don’t think I can advise the prime minister what to do about the constitution.

In the 1950s and 1960s, and again in the 1990s, revision proposals have been longer and more detailed, discussing many more issues than article 9. The LDP drafts are two examples of the trend. But while revision proposals address increasing numbers of issues, institutions are for the most part left untouched. Comparing the Japanese constitutions with others, one feature that stands out is its weak institutions, and this is one factor that has enabled the LDP to remain in power for so long. They have been able, for example, to manipulate election laws without altering the text of the constitution. Even the LDP’s 2012 draft doesn’t introduce major institutional changes, but merely adds ideological elements that conservatives felt were missing.

Questions from the audience:

Thomas Berger (to Winkler): One reason that we see intensified debate about the constitution, I believe, is because Japanese have more confidence in their own democracy. Since the 1990s in particular, and especially since the DPJ government and the weakening of the bureaucracy, people are more open to debating the constitution. But while the general proposition finds increasing acceptance, there is great resistance when specific issues for revision are proposed. I wonder whether your data supports this general observation. And as a parting shot, I would suggest that the best way to push constitutional reform is to have someone other than the prime minister promote it.

WINKLER: I agree that there is no consensus on institutional reform, and even those favoring reform disagree on this point. Neoliberals such as Hashimoto Tōru tend to favor sweeping institutional reform, but the LDP does not, and views Hashimoto as representing only regional interests. I seriously doubt whether the LDP’s two-thirds majority can easily be translated into constitutional revision.

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Andrew Gordon (to Winkler): I was so struck by your data and the stupidity of any simple question asking people to respond to constitutional revision with a simple yes or no. Beyond that, however, I have some reservations about online surveys, in that respondents tend to be people who are at the farthest ends of a spectrum of opinion. Against that, your results are all the more impressive for having uncovered such a range of views.

WINKLER: Our sample may not be fully representative, but it is close. That there are certain biases is true, but we are still discussing how to adjust for that. However, given the widespread resistance to opinion polls, and in spite of the prevalence of LDP supporters in the population as a whole, we controlled for partisanship, region of origin, and education. This has enabled us to smoothe out skewing.

Turning to Miura’s question, if I am asked whether constitutional revision means going in the direction of neoliberalism, as with Hashimoto, or back to the 1930s, as with the LDP, constitutional revision definitely carries the latter meaning for conservatives. Their idea is not only to change the constitution, but also to repudiate the postwar regime inasfar as they interpret it as excessive liberalism and American reforms that went too far. For them, to change the constitution is to change the entire basis of the country.

I cannot say whether the general public sees constitutional revision in this way, but we did ask questions that might bear on their larger conceptualization of the issue. We asked whether respondents thought that the constitution should be a philosophical compendium or something simpler, a basic charter of rules and regulations setting out what the rulers and the ruled can and cannot do. Full analysis of these results has yet to be carried out.

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Wrap-up Session

Professor Hardacre

Three themes stand out among the many issues addressed today. The first is the continuing salience of Confucian tradition. It was startling to learn the reasoning of the Korean Supreme Court in the recent impeachment proceedings, in which the justices reportedly “remonstrated” with President Park for her failure, in entirely extralegal terms, to be a “good leader.” The second is the legacy of the values of prior eras, even in authoritarian regimes, which emerged with striking resonance between deference of the courts to political power in both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Third, the nature of the activism we see in Japan today was greatly illuminated by our discussion and brought to light the importance of parallel research on activism from the right. To know that the movements in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were all in touch with each other suggests the importance for us to understand activists’ use of media. We must understand how activists’ media adaptations change in response to activists’ perception of state manipulations of media. Media coverage of public opinion regarding constitutional revision seems to be much influenced by contemporaneous media coverage of unrelated issues, stimulating dramatic rises and falls in sentiment. To pierce the aggregate statistics in order to find out what drives them, we must remain focused on not only umbrella questions (constitutional revision—pro or con?) but also more specific issues beyond the general question.

Professor Komamura

Due to the single seat electoral system, landslide victories are quite probable, and this has fuelled Prime Minister Abe’s concentration of power. Abe needs authority as well as power, and he seems to be searching for it through constitutional revision. If he could achieve revision, that would be the key, so it seems certain that he will continue the attempt. But I was reassurred by Prof. Soeya’s presentation and others suggesting that many hurdles remain. Nevertheless, I must thank Abe and Koike for prolonging the relevance of constitutional revision and hence our joint research for at least a few more years.

Professor Soeya

A new observation if I may: Japanese conservatives sound progressive in their calls to reject the postwar regime, while activists sound conservative in their calls to protect that regime. The reason for this is that the reference point for the debate up to now is the war. Progressives are trying to prevent conservatives from abandoning the postwar regime and going backwards. But this framework is gradually being transformed by youthful activists, for whom the war is not the reference point. The debate itself will change as a result, and our research must prepare to respond to this change.

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From left to right: Weitseng Chen, Ingu Hwang, Kōichi Nakano, Mari Miura, Alexis Dudden, Franziska Seraphim, Christian Winkler, Yoshihide Soeya, Timothy George, Sungmoon Kim, Sheila Smith, Makiko Ueda (research project assistant), Keigo Komamura, Helen Hardacre

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