Watching Software Run

Brian Chess Nov 18, 2009

Success is foreseeing failure. – Henry Petroski

Static Analysis

Misconceptions PrevailHigh priorityint main(int argc, char** argv) {

char buffer[10]; strcpy(buffer, argv[1]);}

Low priorityint main(int argc, char** argv) {

char buffer[10]; strcpy(buffer, “test”);}

Trace potentially tainted data through the programReport locations where an attacker could take advantage of a vulnerable function or construct

Many other approaches, no one right answer

Taint propagation

= getInputFroNetwork();

copyBuffer( , );

exec( );

buff

buffnewBuff

newBuff (command injection)

A never-ending battle against bad code

• Format String attacks: known for 10+ yearsprintf(input);

• SQL Injection attacks: known for ? yearsstatement.execute(input);

The Stereotypes

• Static analysis– Good: thorough– Bad: too many results

• Testing– Good: concrete results – Bad: misses too many things

Security in the Development Lifecycle

A Lesson from Cryptography

Security is hard to measure– Enemy has unknown capabilities– Small mistakes can have big consequences

So how many of those static analysis results do we have to fix?

9

Risk Management vs. Compliance

Risk Management• Probabilistic framework for

allocating resources

Compliance• Fulfill somebody else's

requirements

10

Compliance wins

Why isn't everyone a risk manager? • Risks not widely understood• People manage their own risk, not risk to the public

Compliance wins

What to comply with?

• Building Security In Maturity Model

• Real data from real initiatives

• McGraw, Chess, & Migues

• http://bsi-mm.com

Breaking new ground

The nine

Two more unnamed financial services firms

• Four domains• Twelve practices• An “archeology grid”

A Software Security Framework

Ten things everybody does• Activities that ALL do

– evangelist role– policy– awareness training– history in training– security features– SSG does ARA– code review tools– black box tools– external pen testing– good network security

SMCP

T

AM

SFD

SRAA

CR

ST

PT

SE

CMVM

0

2

4

Average maturity over the nine

Average maturity over the nine

Terminator

Success is foreseeing failure. – Henry Petroski

Reactive Revisited

• A good idea: build security in• Problem: software will still be vulnerable• Solution: must compensate at runtime

20

Risk in a new endeavor

Time

Ris

k

Market Risk

Security Risk

Reactive Technology Today

• Protecting hosts and networks– Firewalls– Anti-virus– Intrusion detection

• Protecting software– Patching– Web Application Firewall– Language Level: Java Security Model

Patching

• Reaction time matters• DON’T BREAK STUFF• Microsoft has patched on Patch Tuesday for 30

months straight• Patch flood means no one is ever fully patched

Web Application Firewalls (WAF)

• Sits on network, watches web requests• Context problem– What will the program do with this input?

• Good for collecting attacks• Scaling problem– Does go easily into the cloud

Java Security Model

• General access control mechanism– Domains / domain change– Privileges / privilege enforcement

• Built to– Protect good Java from bad Java– Protect a good computer from bad Java

• Nobody uses it

Return of the Reference Monitor

• Inline reference monitors (IRM)• Aspect-oriented programming• Watch interfaces between major components– Report important events– Enforce policy

Interface monitor architecture<Rule>

Monitor

Event

Event Handlers

Action

ProgramPoint

Target Program

VM

<EventHandler>

SyslogLog

VM sees extensions as aprofiler or a debugger

Federation

Fortify 360 Server

VM

Controller

VM VM

Static Analysis vs. Interface Monitors

Static Analysis• Part of construction• Must anticipate all

problems• Locality important• Performance not

important

Interface Monitors• Part of deployment• Must anticipate all

symptoms• Locality not important• Performance critically

important

DEMO

Better protection: SQL Injection

Target Program

Source of mal input

Database

WAF protectshere

We'll protecthere

Patching a privilege escalation vulnerability

Target Program

Source of mal input

Unauthorizedrequest

User Role

We'll make the connection

Watching Software Run

Brian Chess Nov 18, 2009