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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 2, D.C.
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FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR; PLANS:
APPROVED FOR RELEASE2 0 JUN 19S2
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27 DEC i.:361
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile Armamentand Some Principles of Military Doctrine",by Major-General of the Engineering-Technical%Service M. Goryainov
. 1. Enclosed is a verbatiin translation of an article whichappeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the •Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya mysin ) published by theMinistry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level ofArmy Commander.
2. In the interests of protecting our source, this materialshould be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization ofany part of this document in any other form should be addressedto the originating office. .
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RICHARD.HELMS
Enclosure
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UNCLASSIFIED
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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director for IntelligenceThe Joint Staff
Assistant Chief oi Staff, IntelligenceHeadquarters, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff for IntelligenceDepartment of the Army
Director of Naval IntelligenceDepartment of the Navy
Director, National Security Agency
The Director of Intelligence and ResearchDebartment of State
Director, Division of IntelligenceAtomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for NatiOnal Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
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COUNTRY : USSR
SUBJECT LITARY THOUGHT: "Nuclear/Missile Armamentand Some Principles of Military Doctrine",by Major-General of the Engineering-TechnicalService M. Goryainov
DATE OF INFO: 1960 •
APPRAISAL OF •CONTENT : Documentary
SOURCE : A reliable sourCe (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled"Nuclear/Missile Armament and Some Principles of MilitaryDoctrine", written by • :Major-Dezieral of the Engineering-Technical Service M. Goryainov.
This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special
Th_9ught) . ..T11144ourn ; published irre ar y .version of the Soviet militari journal Ioyez.:,:yt:Militar1:yclassified:TOP.J5ECRET'by:tha'.'So iiiets. •
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Nuclear/missile Armament and Some Principles
of
Military Doctrine
by
• Major-General of the Engineering-Technical Service
M. Goryainov
Universal recognition of the enormous and evendecisive significance of nuclear/missile armament,as experience shows, does not exclude various opinionsnor even radical divergencies in the evaluation ofits influence on armed combat. Divergence of viewson the principles of preparing for and conductingmodern war, as well as on the structure of the armedforces naturally follows from this.
In the history of the development of armed forcesthere are many known instances when new equipment(telchnikOf‘'4410006..its.,41110.-reOihiit.04i'ciiniinued•to be -WiderestiMated for'elOrtetimeVind:did'iWfindits true place in the army. In additiont obsolesiientequipment was over-evaluated for a prolonged period oftime, thus holding back Understanding of the new •'equipment. .
Something of the sort is taking plaCe . iight now inthe introduction of the newest types of armament andin the clarification of their role in warfare. Agreat number of works and Official and non-officialstudies have been published in many countries, inwhich the new weapons are evaluated and conjecturesare made on their use and on the necessary reorganiza-tion of armies.
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In this literature it is quite clearly shownthat the agonizing process. of reorganization is. still
. far from,being completed even in rough form, and thatthere,is still insufficient clarity regarding thedecisive problems.
Judging by the special literature, everythingwhich is being accomplished in the area of restructur-ing and reorganization of forces, particularly ofground troops, thus far conforms well with existing,old military doctrines, principles and views onthe conduct of battles, of operations and of the waras a whole. Questions regarding the duration of war,its sweep, the enlistment of human masses into thearmed forces and the role of the economic potential . .are all examined in the light of old military theories.
In specific terms, this is expressed in the factthat.the new'weaponry is for the most part consideredas a means of considerably increasing the firepowerof the army; therefore, there is basically nothingnew from the organizational point of view. A newtechnical means of combat has Appeared 7 a new arm oftroops is created, as was the case with aircraft,tanks, and still earlier, with artillery. The oldarms of troops are modernized as much as Possible_and,."assimilate" nuclear.charges.an4MiliSiliiiMAriiiiiiicontinue to consist of the USUil'aris-iWirOOpS(modernized, of course) - plus missile trOops::-- .
In other words, the process of assimilating thenew means of armament which is now taking place can.be characterized as follows: proceeding from theexperience of the past and taking into considerationthe achievements of the present, armies are adaptingnuclear/missile armament to the established viewson the preparation and conduct of war.
This is a natural process - blessed by the ages -of an empirical approach to the solution of little-explored problems. Such an approach, which is the
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NOMI1111only possible and normal one for the military scienceof capitalist countries, is completely unacceptableto the armies of the socialist countries, themilitary science of which is built on Marxist-Leninistteachings on war. Obviously, we must go faster andfurther both in the theory of using nuclear/missileweapons and in their production.
However, as is known, there are substantial gapsin our military-theoretical thought - "...in a numberof problems we have not shown the necessary Creativity,...scientific.boldness and daring, and we have longmarked time".J.
What, in our view, are the reasons why our military—.theoretical thought lags behind the practical problemof organizing the army?
The first reason, an organizational-methodologicalone, lies in the fact that the indispensable minimumof tactical-technical information about the new means -not only ours but also the Americans' - reaches theorganizations which carry on military-technical workin extremely scanty amounts. This leads to insufficientunderstanding of and under-evaluation of nuclear/missileweapons. Together with this, certain ,:teqPNIAcaA ,Wfq9titonisand modernizations of old, typeC0f7weap6ns'ierelift -
. widely known and lead to" their'ove'r:-evilliatioiniider'contemporary conditions.
The next reason is more complex. We received ourinitial information on nuclear means of warfareLfromAmerican sources. These broadly showed the piiipertiesof low-yield nuclear weapons. As far as theirpotentialities in a full-scale war are concerned, low-yield nuclear weapons (and medium-yield bombs as well)
I. From the speech by R. Ya. Malinovskiy at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary PartyOrganizations.
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are primarily operational and operational-tactical \N
weapons. In our view, they are legitimatelyconsidered as a means of increasing troop firepower,and the use of them conforms well with previousprinciples of conducting war. Our own military thoughthas also lingered more than was necessary on theanalysis of the potentialities of low-yield nuclearbombs and, in fact, has not approached the study of .the potentialities of powerful, multi-megaton nuclearbombs.
It is clear to all that even 20 kt nuclear chargeswith missiles call for tremendous changes in theconduct of war and for fundamental changes in theconduct of battles and operations. But the question ofwhat changes follow from the use of intercontinental .missiles with charges of 2-5 mgt and even more,remains little-explored to the present time. Thefirst widely published positions on these questionswere expressed by N.A. Khrushchev and R. Ya. Malinovskiyin speeches at the January session of the Supreme Sovietof the, USSR and later in an address by R.-Ia. Mtlinovskiyto the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Local PartyOrganizations. In the light of these widely knownstatements, we consider it necessary to dwell on some
.0e.:;:91494149:t,e,17.1,0#*.„91..,A419.,y,....pcIfer114-,:41Y9e*A119100...with:TNT':eqUivilentsMillibhs Ot stOniAiiitY.' •
•
We know from publications of the existence ofbombs with a force in TNT equivalents of 1,2;3,5,10and 20 million tons. ' •
Calculations can be found in American referencebooks of the combat effects of bombs of 40,50, and100 million t. In order to be able to imagine themilitary significance of such means of destruction,we will touch in passing on the potentialities ofdestruction and annihilation of megaton bombs, aboutwhich some materials have been published.
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Below is Table 1, which shows the combat effectiveness ofmegaton bombs in relation to their yield (area is in sq. km .).
TABLE 1,Characteristics
,Structures People Size of
radio-active
Yield in TNT Shock wave Radioactive contamination cloudequiv. (thousandtons)
partiallydestr.
of terrain (sq• km.
up to 500r up to 300x up app.100r
1,000 300 c.1,000 c.2,000 10,000 c.4,000
2,000 - c.2,000 c.41000 20,000 c.12,000
5,000 9,0005ig c.5,000 c.10,000 30,000 c.22,000
10,000 1,300 c.10,000 c.20,000 100,000 c.45,000
20,000 3,200 c.20,000 c.40,000 200,000 c.80,000
Note: 1. The table was compiled on the basis of foreignmaterials.
2. Exposure to a dose:pf 500r causes death in morethan 50 percent of cases; radiation of up to300r - death of up to 15 percent; the rest lo0combat effectiveness for a number of months;dopes of 100r cause nausea and vomiting in upto 10 percent of the cases and partial loss ofcombat effectiveness in the rest.
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It can be seen from the Table that megaton bombsraise thousands and tens of thousands of cubickilometers of radioactive dust into the atmosphere.This dust settles back to earth quite quickly,contaminating thousands, and tens of thousands ofsquare kilometers with 'a lethal concentration andhundreds of thousands of square kilometers with acombat concentration (boyevayi kontsentratsiya).The flash..(svetovoye izlucheniye) and the shockwave are devastating only at the moment of action,but the radiological factor of megaton bombs ishundreds of times more important.
As is well known, various shelters protect well \against the shock wave and the flash. No shelterscan - in practical terms - protect troops from theradioactive substances of megaton bombs, the actionof which lasts for many days and weeks, and extendsover tremendous areas.
Table 1 shows convincingly that radioactive contamination of terrain by megaton bombs can become'the principal factor of combat.
Let us examine more fully the radiologicalaction of a 20 mgt bomb on the basis, of_ testingcarried out bythe Americans.
In March 1954, on the atoll of Bikini, in thePacific Ocean, a bomb was exploded with a TNTequivalent of about 15-20 million t. During theexplosion, from 30 million t. to 100.million t. ofvarious radioactive particles of earth were throwninto the atmosphere (for 1 t of conventionallyexploded TNT, 1.5 - 5 t of earth is not so very much).
As was reported in publications, as a result ofradioactive fallout as early as 36 hours after theblast, the cumulative dosage of radioactive contamina-tion in an area of 15 thousand sq. km . reache 900 r,and in an area of approximately 26 thousand sq. km.it reached 670 r.
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In an operational situation, 26 thousand sq. km .can be considered as the territory occupied by a•front (an area 250-300 km. wide and 80-100 km. deep).We imagine that with the correct exploitation ofmeteorological conditions, the covering of theterritory of a front with the radioactive productsof the explosion of one 20 mgt bomb would not onlylower the combat effectiveness of the troops ofthe front, but would also necessitate theirabandoning a significant portion of, if not the wholeof that territory.
If, as a result of meteorological conditions, theradioactive products of the explosion have the possibilityof spreading to an even greater area, then it turns outthat in an area of 120-130 thousand sq. km . the levelof radiation will be about 200 r, and in an area of200 thousand sq. km . about 100 r.1
Perhaps the figures cited here are only theproduct of theoretical calculations not based onactual testing. Unfortunately not. Preparing forthe testing of thermonuclear bombs, the Americansdeclared a danger zone in the Pacific Ocean of130 thousand sq. km . before 1 March 1954. But as isknown, Japanese fishermen :of theyessel .Krukupju ma!rut!,which was 145 kiSfio'S'!**Viidiht of -,40cialqiitpieinhabitants of the "MiFshairIè lands andAI,icanhillitarypersonnel on the atoll of Ringelap, atadistance of-250 miles (about 400 km.) ,from the epicenter allsuffered as a result of the explosion of.1,Milrch 1954.
These facts forced the Americans during the repeattests on 19 March and 22 May to extend the danger zoneto 780 thousand sq. km ., that is, by six times. Japan-ese expeditionary vessels which were at sea from Mayto July established that contamination of water tookplace in an area bounded by 10° to 18° North Latitude
1. These figures were taken from the book, "NuclearWeapons and Foreign Policy".
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and 1500 to 175° East Longitude, that is, an areaof 1,560 thousand sq. km . Two months after thelast explosion, the radioactivity of the water ata distance of 1,920 km. from the island of Bikinistill exceeded by 20 times the maximum permissibledose for drinking water.
If one takes into consideration the fact thatsuch, countries as West Germany and England are aboutY250 thousand sq. km , in area, the meaning of theresidual radiation of one 20 mgt bomb blast becomesclear from all points of view.
In our view, it. should be absolutely clear fromthe above that nuclear bombs.of great yield are above all a means of radiological contamination of vast areas with all the resulting consequences.
As was already stated, however, a bomb of 20 mgtis not maximal. If it is found to be advisable,50 and 100 mgt bombs may be employed.
'Before proceeding to further discussion it shouldbe pointed out that usually the characteristics ofshock wave and flash are given for optimum_conditions.This ..,c0not; be . :1001::,f.pre„rwojogicai. :coto.**..patio4 oftetk*lekacOgt4Wd40.10100§100001004'radiOliigiCal7Pâtefitiii'it0S7017bbmbdrihiWiiibiiriti -decrease . them. Nevertheless, test studiertiOdicatethat usually 25 to 50: percent of the high-Energyparticles fall out in the areas of the burst, and therest, penetrating the high layers of the atmosphere,fall out during the course: of many yea*Ol'aiid-Cannothave any significance for military purpoies:
This means that from the military point:of-viewmegaton bombs can be even more effective (by 2-3 times)if optimum conditions for the burst are establishedfrom the radiological point of view. In order to dothis, it is necessary first of all to know the mostadvisable heights for bursts. Apparently contactbursts of megaton bombs with a certain digging-in to
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the earth will permit the raising into the air ofmore radioactive particles, and in such a casemore of these will fall out in the area of the burstand fewer will escape into the stratosphere. Besidesthis, the chemical composition of the ground andsoils of the blast areas can also exert a greatinfluence on increasing the effectiveness of the blastproducts. Such elements as sodium, iron, silicon,and others can substantially increase the radioactivemass of particles which are raised into the air.A firm knowledge of local meteorological conditions inpossible strike areas becomes of enormous significanceto the proper use of powerful bombs. These conditionsshould be studied well in advance, and materials shouldbe systematically amassed in such amounts that theywould permit a good prediction of the meteorologicalconditions at any given time.
Let us examine the problem of employing powerfulnuclear wea ns in operational-tactical situations.
What does radioactive contamination of areas meanto combat formations of troops? As an example, letus examine the effect of bomb strikes in areas whichare occupied by combat formations . of troops on the
, defense (Table. 2)..'
- Table 2 shows 'that nuclear bursts willdeath by radioactive contamination for large masses ofpeople dispersed over tremendous areas in the course ofa few hours after the bursts. A division which occupies200 sq. ku..is liquidated with one 1-mgt bomb;',4 -5divisions, occupying an area of up to 2,400 sq. km ., willlose their combat significance with the strike of twoor three 1-mgt bombs or of one or two 2-mgt bombs, duringwhich a large percentage of the personnel may die andthe rest will have to be immediately evacuated; a fieldarmy (in the USA - up to 350 thousand men) can beliquidated as a military organism with two l0-mgt bombs.At the same time, in addition to contamination, from4 to 10 percent of the territory (hundreds and thousandsof square kilometers) would be devastated by the shockwaves and by fires from the flash.
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Quantity of bombs naided to create radioactive contamination of fatal and critical concentrations in areas occupied bycombat formations of troops in defense.
TABLE 2
BOMBS REOUIRED
Military Occupied Number NumberUnit Area of 20 NT 100 IT 300 KT 1 MT 2 Mr 10 MGT 20 MT
in KW Personnel 'thorised(Authorized
PeoPli '..ei
Vs. Cli0 1.>
- 0•10
.-4a0 c
TO)Ai
....1/
:I.1
0•0
.0.0.0044. -
0.001440
0000410
000f-440
000- at
....4.1„ 4.64 k
•OS4. I.0 44.4 k0 •
,...1.• Z! 4Z
Division 200 14,000 - 75 .., 80 20 . 2 6.7. 1 3-4 1. 1 -. 1 - 1 - I. -.1,4,000 .
Corps -2,400 70,000 - 30 - 35 240 10-15 60 4-5 25 2-3 2-3 1 1-2 1 1 - 1 -• 90,000
Army 23,000 up to 20 - 25 2,300 100- 930 20-30 250 10-11 20 2 10 1 2 - 3. -350,000 110
• - .
NOTES* 1) As can be seen from the table, tbo use of bombs with an equivalent of more than 1-2 MT is not required against. formations of troops.• -
2) The table is constructed from foreign source materials.
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Approximately the same results would be obtainedif the combat formations of troops on the offensewere examined.
Analysis of the data in 'the Table from the pointof view of effective use of nuclear bombs shows thatbombs of lar e ield are more advanta eous than
s,economic_point of view.
Let us examine an example. In order to forcethe enemy troops to abandon an area of 2,400 sq. kmit is necessary to carry out 240 strikes , with bombsof 20 kt yield in the course Of a few hours. Tolaunch such a number of missiles in a few hours, .it would be necessary to use Up to ten troop missileorganizations each with 1,500-2,000 men and with .300-400 vehicles of all types. Working under combatconditions, everything else being equal, such atroop organization will suffer losses proportionalto the amount of its personnel and equipment.
• The same area can be destroyed with only 2 or3 bombs of 1 mgt or with 1 bomb of 2 mgt. This willbe carried out /Fie or two, words missi47 times fasterand, under.equiVElent:cOliditions, , wit47Ibsses.,smallerto the .degreefewer' and tO 'ihe "--ts. they Werepositions for less
It must also be noted that the production of 240bombs of 20 kt is apparently considerably moreexpensive than 2 or 3 bombs of 1 mgt.
Does this mean that small-yield bbmbs are completelyunnecessary? No. If bombs of megaton yield, correctlyused, are capable of deciding the fates of nationsand the over-all outcome of the war, then kilotonbombs will be completely effective for.the destructionand elimination of individual targets, for the most partthe delivery vehicles (nositel) 'of nucleartmissile
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rom a com a an rom an
weapons, individual bases, and launching pads.Kiloton bombs will also be needed in operations withstrategic goals, particularly when it is necessaryto avoid unnecessary victims.
The existing concept that the primary form ofusing nuclear/missile weapons is the operational-tactical form arose in the army from earlierdoctrine on warfare. This,form narrows the technical'possibilities of nuclear weapons, leads to an in-efficient decrease in the yield of nuclear weaponsand ultimately makes it necessary to have massquantities of small-yield nuclear weapons, and hencea large number of ground troop missile units, theeffective use of which becomes in itself problematical.
Even today there is a widespread opinion that anuclear/missile weapon is fabulbusly expensive, that \the basic raw materials used in its construction areobtained with great difficulty and in small quantities.This leads to the conclusion that the economic factordoes not permit giving this weapon a sufficiently masscharacter. In this connection we will briefly examinethe following two questions: the understanding•ol_mass.quanttty—(msesovost) as applied to nuclear/missile .armaments and the cost nuclear bombs.
• • •••,:2:•P?.7. vziff•••
What do we mean by 'Maio itaiituiiity as concerns •
miSsiles and nuclear • equipment? This question hasfundamental significance in the evaluation'of . the roleof new means of *aitari-incl . in the understanding ofthe nature and:peculiarities'Of . nuclear/missiie war-fare. Nuclear means of warfare ire. so immensely power-ful that a comparatively small number of them canalready be considered mass.
If 100-200 atomic bombs can create a turning pointin a battle and assure victory, then this number canbe considered as mass for a specific goal. If, inorder to win a World war, 300-400 thermonuclear bombsare sufficient, then this quantity will also beconsidered sufficiently mass.
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Therefore, "mass quantity" should be understoodnot as just any large quantity, but as that quantitywhich satisfies the requirement or need for it toa definite degree. From this point of view asregards nuclear/missile armaments the concept"mass quantity" will mean that quantity which permits the quality of individual means of armament to be manifested in a decisive manner.
In light of this, the numbers of bombs mentionedabove may be considered as "mass" for all practical
, purposes.
From the speech of Marshal of the Soviet UnionComrade R. Ya. Malinovskiy it follows that 1002-mgt bombs will turn a territory of up to 500,000.sq. km . into a desert. To inflict utter defeat ona state or states, it is, of course, unnecessary tocompletely destroy everything. It is important todestroy the important residential centers whose areascomprise not even ten but only a few percentage pointsof the over-all territory. It follows that theaforementioned 100 bombs are capable of demoralizingthe resistance of a state which occupies not 500,000sq. km . but a great deal more, for example, all the
,West European"NATO'alliesi. In this sense,%1002-mgtbombs is a sufficiently mass quantity, since 'tbe:'1.problem of defeating the enemy in Western Europe' is
. solved with this number.
•
As a result of exercises in the USA during whichstrikes were delivered against 50 out of 170 typicalcity areas it was calculated that these strikes bypowerful bombs threatened to liquidate 25 percent -of the entire population, up to 50 :percent of themeans of transportation and up to 60 :percent ofAmerican industrial enterprises. By analogy withthese figures, it follows that 100-120 20-mgt bombscan incapacitate no less than three-fourths of theindustry and more than 50 • ercent of the populationof the USA.
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Therefore, 100-120 20-mgt or 100-150 2-mgt bombsare the quantity which, if used correctly, willdecide the outcome of the war •L With this figure we.exhaust the understanding of mass quantity for bombsof given yields. To use this quantity of powerfulbombs we evidently need a small number of strategicmissile troop units.
The situation is different as concerns low-yield.,bombs.. In-'radiological effect, the above-mentioned 'number of powerful bombs is equivalent to 100-135 thousand20-kt bombs. It follows that in the case of suchbombs, if the principal aims of the war are to begained primarily by the use of low-yield bombs, the conceptof. mass quantity will be defined in many tens ofthousands.
Now, regarding the cost of nuclear bombs. In1954-1955 the production of One kilogram of basicnuclear material (uranium 235) cost about 20 thousanddollars. The total cost of a kilogram of naturaluranium was about 100 dollars and a kilogram of heavywater, 65 dollars. - Based on these prices of rawmaterials and on the special features of the productionof the first nuclear bombs, it was established:that-one20-mgt bomb cost about 100 million dollars •.,- :: In recent
. years, important research was conductekii#1*ACO,Lnatural uranium togetherWith'itó isOfo004CO.P!EigL4.fissionable materials in nuclear bombi,•Whichwiluidpermit lowering the cost of the bomb to 2-10 million .dollars. • . •
In technical literature for the years '.1950-1959there is information to the' effect that the.COst'ofnuclear materials, and along with them, the Cbdt ofthe Weapons themselves had significantly decreased.
1. It appears that the liquidation of nuclear/missilebases requires a certain number of kiloton bombs ofcomparatively_weak yield /Tie or three words missiai7...atmosphere..T7
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This gives a basis for supposing that by 1960 thecost of nuclear bombs is within the limits offrom several hundred thousand dollars for low-yieldbombs to several million dollars for megaton bombs.In 1959 it was reported that a nuclear charge of3-mgt yield for the Atlas missile is valued at2-3 million dollars.
ThiS cost is large, in itself, but in comparisonwith tanks which come to hundreds of thousand and•airplanes which cost millions, some of them eventens of millions of dollars, nuclear weapons arecomparatively cheap, particularly if the militaryeffectiveness of the two is compared.
From the above it follows that the budgetarycapabilities of the largest countries permit theaccumulation of nuclear weapons in mass quantities.As concerns missiles there is obviously no doubt thatat the present time' the status of industry, theavailability of processed special materials, theconstruction-technical level of missiles and guidanceinstruments permit the organization of maSs:productionof all types of missiles, including intercontinental.
•.
.Judging by the foreign i*esi; the'.*4_5440040$1.0.11.. _ . .
in series . production UCptaced at 2 . 4.5Iiii.1.14300.11arefor intercontinental ., 1.2-1.5-Million' ded.Wif*Ot. -
strategic, and several hundred : thousand dollars. for.operational-tactical missiles. .
. • '
All that has been said above about the4.feCiiof megaton bombs, about edOnomic and productive : -capabilities, permits us to come to the*comaCluaionthat the nuclear/missile weapon has become (or canbecome) a mass weapon, and its destructive, and inparticular its radiological characteristics,' are actually capable of creating conditions in whichthe fundamental object of the war - the destruction of the enemy - can be accomplished technically in a short period of time and without overtaxing the economy of powerful industrial countries'.
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We believe that a view of contemporary warfare,of prevailing military doctrine and of the principlesof organization of the armed forces must differradically from views of war, not only of the pre-atomic period, but also of a war in which the operational-tactical use of low-yield nuclear/missile weapons playsthe leading role. Proceeding from this, we willexamine the following questions:
- the time limits (limit of duration) of a nuclear/missile war;
- the nature of the course of the initial period ofwar and the tasks of the armed forces in a nuclear/missile war;
- the principles of the organization of the armedforces.
The time limits of - a nuclear/missile war. Thehistory of mankind recalls wars of various durations,up to hundred-year wars. The duration of warsdepends principally on the sharpness of the contradictionsand the economic and technical capabilities of thewarring sides. The question of the permissible timelimits of a war had no decisive significance in thepast' IP° mPans. - .!/441a17, k' Pult,;AOA, 4e10.;:R.94ionwere es:OntiillirA0410,040*11.00#T*4W:PleVtr'creative -cipabiliiieti'df -mnikind ineof4isitnritat,the thought of the possibility of monstrous destructionand mass annihilation of people never arose.
The question is posed differently today. It isclear from the above-mentioned . considerations that ifthe number of nuclear weapons sufficient to liquidatehuman life on earth has not yet been created, it canbe created in the immediate future. In this connection,the most destructive factor is radioactive contamination.
However, the process of radioactive poisoning ofthe atmosphere and the earth's surface cannot be
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instantaneous. This process can take place in acertain span of time. Consequently, the time span
, from the moment of the beginning of a nuclear world war to the-moment of the poisoning of the atmosphere of the globe (or a i iven zowof it) with a concentra-on o ra oac ye su s ances • ngerous o .uman
on earth can be called the time limits of a war.
The ultimate limit of a war depends on a series ;of factors, namely:
- the scientifically determined limit of concentrationor radioactive substances in the atmosphere;
- the quantity and quality of the nuclear devicesdetonated;
- the intensity of the nuclear bursts;
- the height of the bursts and their distribution overthe surface of the globe, and on certain other factors.
We will not examine the above-mentioned factors indetail. For the goals of this work it is important toshow that the scientific solution of the question of the time limits of war is an absolute necessity.,
Obviously, the basiesöllition of thii questiOn -depends on the definition of the maximum permissibledose of atmospheric contamination. Kissinger ts book,_"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", states that a,doubling of the natural dose is required to eliminate'all life, which can be achieved in the northernhemisphere by 300-800 50-Egt bombs or 750-2,00020-mgt bombs. This number of bombs can evidently bebuilt by even one state.
What conclusion should be drawn from the argumentson the time limits of a nuclear/missile war, if such awar is thrust on us? There can be only one. The maindecisive phase of the war, defined as the complete
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paralyzation of the enemy's nuclear strength, mustbe achieved in the shortest possible time; this mustbe much shorter than the time necessary to .create adangerous radioactive concentration. The technicalpossibilities for such a solution are evidentlyavailable.
'A protracted nuclear/missile war with a decisionin favor of one side is excluded because such a waron the strength of military logic, as past experience teaches, must be waged with increasing severity and 7with the use of ever more powerful and ever more numerous destructive nuclear weapons. The result ofsuch a course of war would be equally disastrous forall warring sides.
A decision in favor of One side depends on readiness and ability to finish the war in the shortest possible time. A great deal has been saidin our press recently concerning the fact that eventhe bourgeois military ideologists reject the theoryof a short-term nuclear-missile war. Such statements have,in fact, been made in the West. But this cannotserve as a serious argument in favor of a prolongednuclear/missile war.
Prior to the appearance of nuclear armaments,representatives of Western:.mi4talry,...thpUghreltted::,a large number Of0theOriek:hbihhOrt4eim:.w0815Z,about blitzkrieg. It is well known, that Hitler.s
. military doctrine was based on this. Such blitzkriegswere particularly alluring against countries withinadequately developed industry or with comparativelysmall territory. Capitalism was deeply interested in
such an approach to war because an extended •
accompanied by arming of the Masses in our time wouldvery probably lead to revolutions. The experienceof two world wars has already" shown that both warsImmo. prolonged and protracted. The principal reasonfor this phenomenon could be formulated thus: comparativeequality of forces, means and potential capabilities ofthe warring sides in the course of a certain segment oftime under conditions of comparatively weak means ofwarfare (destruction).
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Is there anything new in this question of nuclear/missile weapons? Evidently, yes. The material base for a war lasting for years may not even exist,considering contemporary means of destruction, whichsubstantially (by a large factor) exceed the means of creation.
How are these new conditions reflected in theinterests and the ideology of the warring classes?
First of all, one must keep in mind that nonormal man can be interested in the destruction ofmankind. The matter is different, however, fromthe point of view of the ruling classes who aredisappearing from the scene of history.
History has shown more than once that a dyingclass, a dying social order, gives birth to theories'and dogmas of human destruction characterized bythe phrases "apres moi le deluge" and "better beatomized than communized". For reactionary forces,doomed to perish by dint of historical hopelessness,a long war (like any other war) is not contraindicated,the more so since preparation for such a war iseconomically advantageous for certain monopolisticcircles.
Preparation for an extended anntiMeamore costly than for a' short war 'and'-the - ."(kiU"iocapitalists many times higher in , Preparationfor an extended war is conducted on the - baais of thetheory of maximum application of the country's economyto the needs of war and requires expenditures on allother forms of armament and other requisites of a longwar as well as on nuclear/missile weapons .-Thisfacilitates an increase in the concentration of capitaland in the monopolistic power of certain groups. Butfrom the., pOint of view of the cost of the militarymachine and its combat effectiveness, the nuclear/missileweapon is the cheapest and a short nuclear/missile waris relatively the most economical in expenditures onthe forces of destruction. And if the nuclear/missile
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weapon, in reducing the duration of war, reduces theincomes of the monopolies, then the pertinent groupsof monopolists will, of course, be for a long war..
Therefore, as a result of economic reasons andpartly because of the aspirations of groups connectedwith military production to preserve the commandingposition which they hold in the economy of a countrylike the USA, the theory of an extended war receiveswide, circulation. This theory ties in well with the 7*
necessity of keeping colonial and economically weaklydeveloped countries under the threat of war and evento thrust Wars upon them.
The interests of the progressive forces of the -\world dictate a different approach. The Material •prerequisties for the victory of the socialist world %.over the capitalist world by peaceful Means have \already been created. Consequently the progressiveforces are keenly interested in avoiding.war. Butif war becomes inevitable, the new world, naturally,must strive to keep war losses to a minimum andconsequently should do all possible to keep thewar short and, in any case, to finish the decisive
/phase of the war prior to substantial atmosphericcontamination over large areas;
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he -mature'TOfthe-.course•of the- initiarlperiod -of a war and the.tasks-of.thWarmeCforceev-in nuclear/missile war.::'.:.in examining thesequestionswe start from the_propositiOnthat the 1ëáding'capitalist states 'are preparing for a n*lear;yOrldwar, in . which:they:will . strive for a decisive resultat all costs. 'I'i:technical timed, sUch'sCdecisionmeans the inevitable use of" themost 'powerful nuclearand other weapons against which the other side mustuse no less powerful destructive weapons withincertain time limits to gain the victory. •
Before the age of nuclear/missile armaments itwas considered that the direct manifestation of warwas armed conflict between two opposing armies of
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peoples, of states, or of social classes. Contemporarytechnical means of warfare, as N. S. Khrushchev pointedout, dictate a different concept of thr"fffilcalprocess of war itself. For a number of economicallypowerful and heavily populated states which are,however, small in territorial size, the war can endin their complete defeat and even destruction beforethe main part of the armed forces of these countriescan enter into action. For the USA, the situation is \somewhat different. The disruptiairbf their potentialiesfor resistance will require more time and weapons and,obviously, it will be difficult to avoid some strikesfrom their side. In these circumstances, strikes \in the enemy's industrial rear, and on his political '.and administrative centers acquire an overwhelming •significance. Powerful strikes, capable of disrupting.(or liquidating) the economy and the organized controlof the country and the army, will naturally underminethe base of military activity and the existence of thearmed forces.
Concurrently, strikes must be made on the necessarynumber of strategically active (or potentially active)targets (bases, launching pads, naval vessels) fromwhich the enemy can launch nuclear weapons at oureconomic and politicaI-c6HIers. In these case's thestrikes'could . be made_with .bOmbs, of 10 çjields.Giventhe440.44-tiOii:'44:00"*PprOpriatii2b7oWii1aild -fheiiierchniCiffy correct Use, it' ie./364E41AS' -to indicate tentatively the quantity of nuclearweapons required. We 'realize that defining our viewson just this point in concrete terMs can'beitotit •vulnerable for a number of reasons. But,Hthe".....importanceof the problem demands this concrete definition, itrequires a point of departure. In our opinion, evena mistake of 2-3 times in this case should not beembarrassing; it is important to show the possiblenature of the process based on actual material.
Analysis of data published in foreign literatureindicates that for a world war about 200 bombs from1-2 mgt to 15-20 mgt and about 600-900 bombs from
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10 to 30 kt (for strikes on nuclear weapons targets,if there are 300 as is reported in the press) areneeded,.‘ -
It would seem that a total of 1,000-1,100 nuclearstrikes are not many for a world war and all these'deliberations may appear to be unfounded. However,it should be remembered that a similar number ofstrikes (chiefly by hydrogen bombs of the typedetonated at Bikini) is capable of creating radio-active contamination (higher than 600 r) of an areaof about 2 million sq. km . and contamination of over50 r of an area of about 20 million sq. km . (Thisdoes not allow for the enemy's detonations of .nuclear weapons.) Moreover, hundreds of thousandsof kilometers will be devastated by shock waves andflash radiation. This fact necessitates a verycareful approach to the use of megaton bombs ingeneral, and particularly in Europe, where populationdensity is extraordinarily high.
Apparently, however, the use of nuclear/missile . \weapons under technically optimum conditions may notrequire such a quantity of megaton bombs fordestruction of the NATO bloc.
. Therefore; it appears that just ,a fe#Aiiin -powerful nuclear bursts will be the primary dç,decisive factors affecting . the Outcome Oetheviar- -and that they will be made in the first hoUriOinddays of the war. It follows that the initii1:periOdof a war becomes its decisive period, the period inwhich the armed forces solve the primary technicalproblem of the war - to liquidate the enemy's--.capability to use nuclear/missile weapons, toundermine his will to fight and to weaken decisively his forces and means.
1. If enemy atomic targets are greater in number, orif these targets are specially concealed, then thenumber of small-yield bombs can be increased somewhat.Such an increase on the radiational situation in theworld .../Tio or three words missink:7.
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The second period of war, undoubtedly protractedin time, will evidently consist of liquidating theresistance of military organisms still extant, ofrendering immediate all-round aid to victims and ofreconstructing the economies and state systems ofthe appropriate countries.
In this period, considering the scale of destruction,reconstruction work will require extended and enormousefforts by the socialist countries and the enlistment .of-large masses of peoples, possibly numbering in themillions.
It appears that during this period, the principal.role will be played by the ground trOops,-aviation,.and navy.
One can proceed from a different concept, accordingto which the primary tasks of a future world war will -be resolved by ground armies on fronts in coordinationwith strategic missile troops, aviation, and the navy;to achieve victory it is necessary to destroy theenemy's armies and to occupy his territory; strikes.by the strategic missile troops deep in the enemy rearwill play an important but subsidiary role. This wouldmean that we underestimate the potential of powerfulmulti-megaton nuclear bombs and of long-range missiles;that we will have.tocreatejen.q.,0,th9.4dartd000.91..„yield nUclear'bOM.bOOKCaj*rgSli4Mbe.0400rstApnal-,'tactical missile' Units;'0SiiitSiO'Varii4i0-040'0POSIf:'troops and a multi-Million man'armylind:000- - -on an extended war with the inherent consequenceseconomic overstresi'Snd Of losses Many.tiMesgre*terthan the losses of World War II.
•
A third concept is also possible. Keeping aside,in a technical and practical sense, the principaland decisive role of strategic missile troops, tomaintain powerful ground and interacting and inter-dependent air and naval forces, which, like the groundtroops would be saturated with operational-tacticalmissile units and constantly perfecting (by type oftroops) their combat and auxiliary equipment.
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This is a cautious concept calculated to finishthe war in the shortest possible time, but ifunsuccessful in this, to be prepared to wage anextended war with the maximuil efforts of all theforces and means of the country and of coalitionsof countries.
Past experience teaches us that at the beginningof all great wars, the opponents seriously over-estimated their own strength and underestimated theenemy's strength. Moreover, not a single war everwent the way it was planned.
It is possible that in the course of a war asituation can arise in which the strategic missiletroops of both sides will turn out, for varioustechnical reasons, to be not entirely reliable, .that they will only partially fulfill their tasks,and that the decisive effect will not be achieved.In this instance, during the time period necessary forthe restoration of the combat capability of the strategicmissile troops for the Eurasian war sector, the role ofthe ground troops and of aviation will become decisive.The role of the navy will also increase, particularlythat of ubmarines. From this point of view, thethird concep a are to be the most acceptable,despite the fact that it leads to a substantial
burden ofbeginning Of War and4reihpiiesei an eVenliharberincrease with the initiation - of war.
At the same time, if war is thrust upOU us, wemust be so prepared that the strategic missile troopscan send sufficiently powerful strikes in the firstminutes to paralyze the enemy countries and armiesand to deprive him of his nuclear/missile weapons.The operations of the other types of troopis duringthe initial period of war must be coordinated with theoperations of the strategic missile troops and besubordinate to them. -
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From all that has been said it is obvious thatthe nuclear/missile weapon is primary and decisivein the present period fo time; for this reason thestrategic missile troops have become the primaryand decisive type of troops, with all the consequencesensuing from this fact. The situation is somewhatdifferent as concerns the quantitative side of the •question. The primary and decisive type of troopsneed not be and indeed will not be the most numerousi'The ground troops and the pyg_troops will be morenumerous
The new means of warfare, as was said earlier,bring upon the scene other-types of troop formations -medical-sanitation and reconstruction_formations - . ./whrarlmVe-every reason to be mass formations, and -to be formed and undergo training on territorial //principles. In our opinion this question requires /very profound investigation.
Until the recent past, ground troops werelegitimately considered as the primary type of armedforces, since they carried out the principal tasksof war, which amounted to the total defeat of theenemy's armed forces and the taking Of his territory.Now, when the forms of war, are changingind,its
• , principal tasks will evidently not be deadeiOnfronti in direct engagements of Opposineiraei, butrather in the interiors of countries, the- giound troopscannot carry out the principal task of war independently.
In addition to the usval resources of 'combat materiel,the ground troops have missile equipment with a limitedradius of operation. With these means of armament, theground troops can neither withstand the strikes ofstrategic missile troops nor protect the country fromthese strikes. At the same time, the ground troopsmust be regarded as forces which, together with theair forces are capable of assuring victory in allcircumstances.
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Taking into account the possibility that megatonbombs may be used on the battlefield, it is necessaryto make an all-round evaluation of the existingorganization and the current combat formations ofground troops and of their suitability for nuclear/missile war.
As history teaches, the combat formations oftroops and the corresponding organization of troopschange form depending on the means of combat, andprimarily on the decisive means, firepower. Themore effective the fire means of war, the more profoundthe changes. Right up to the appearance Of nuclear/missile weapons, to the degi*ee of the strength offire, combat formations have grown more and moredeeply.../No or three words missiUi7.
The tendency to thin out military formations N.has increased in the "pitutrThe years under theinfluence of nuclear/missile Operational-tacticalweapons, but contemporary organization of troops(preserved from the pre-atomic period) and under- /-evaluation of the new conditions of conducting war'fetter and retard this tendency.
It appears that combat formations of ground troopscan become sufficiently vital and combat :ready through'fulfillment of the following conditiois:41.
- increasing the combat independence (autonomy) ofall organizational levels (zveno) of troops, andparticularly of the low41. .r the tactical ones;
- increasing the firepower of tactical elements ofunits and large units;
- substantial increase in the speed of moving oftroops;
- a sharp thinning out of personnel and equipmentin combat formations.
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Increasing the combat independence of all levels(zveno) of the troop organism is possible byweakening or eliminating the mutual dependence incombat (but not cooperation) between organizationalelements (yedinitsa) of troops. The principles ofstandardization of the means of combat and auxiliaryequipment, of organizational autonomy and of abroad independence in carrying out combat missions,must underlie army structure from the primary cells(yacheyka) through all succeeding levels.
Organizationally, it appears advisable to createunits (chast) composed of interchangeable, uniform,primary-tactical e/ements-(yedinitsa). The creationof regiments of ground troops composed of elements whichhave high firepower, arecompletely mobile, tactically.independent, and low in pereonnel composition, andwhich in case of loss can be easily replaced by similarones, must have a positive effect on the viability ofcombat formations.
An increase in speed of movement can be achievedby full mechanization of troops, which would increasethis speed by several times in cross-country, as wellas in road, movements. Movements of large combatgroups of ground troops by aircraft must become commonand be applied in the , very broadest dimeneions,
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Existing military doctrines are built on the follow-ing basic principles:
- a country's entire economy and the country as awhole prepare for war beforehand;
- calculations are based on a protracted war andon mass armies which will enlist the greatest possiblenumber of the healthy male and female population;
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- victory or defeat in war is decided on fronts ofopposing armies; the strength of armies is determinedin the final analysis by the viability and power ofthe rear;
- the theaters of military operations are studied fromthe standpoint of the decisive significance of frontalcombat of armies and in this 'connection, plans forachieving war aims are worked out which take intoaccount the factors of time, space, forces and means;7.the capabilities of enemies and allies are studiedin this same manner;
- . military operations are based on principles ofseizure of the initiative, concentration'Of maximumforces and weapons on the main axis, on the' selectionof the most advantageous time for initiation of - -
operations and for delivery of the main strike;
- the achievement of the basic goals of war absolutelypresupposes the total defeat or destruction of armiesand the seizure of the most important parts or all of .the enemy's territory.
In light of the new quality of nuclearkmissilearmament it can be said that the above-listed principlesof contemporary military doctrine are subject to . •
_ radical'reviewome.of:tke'principle*WilLlosesignificance entirely, others Will take:O00afferent •content. • -•_ . .
_New doctrines must be built on the basis of the
potentialities of mass .nucleartmissile, andlr4dio7.electronic means of warfare.. Their pririciples mustreflect a new approach, a new :understanding of thedimensions of time, space, destructive forces, andforces of resistance.
The new military doctrines must proceed primarilyfrom the principal and decisive role of nucleartmissile strategic weapons in war, and, consequently,from the principal and decisive role of the type oftroops armed with these means of combat;
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Basic principles of the new doctrine could includethe following propositions:
- the contemporary power of the forces of destructionis immeasurably greater than that of the forces ofcreation;
- the nuclear/missile weapon is a mass type of \weapon, is relatively economical, and, from thecombat point of view, it is the most effective; !
- the range of nuclearmuissile weapons ensurestheir reaching any point on the globe; in thisconnection, their accuracy satisfies practicalrequirements;
- the theater of military operations is the entireglobe;
- the primary task of the armed forces in war (fromour point of view) should not be the seizure ofterritories, but of depriving the enemy of thepossibility of using nuclear/missile weapons; incase of necessity, temporary occupation is permissible;
/- a nuclear/missile war must be short-lived; its/ active phase can be measured in days or weeks;
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the time amiii of i war must be determined bythe power .of the nuclear weapons, and the intensityand number of bursts which will not cause a dangeroussaturation of the atmosphere and of the surface of
•the globe or the expanse of our country, or alliedand noncombatant countries, with radioactive substances
In our opinion, investigation of the questionsconnected with the elaboration of military doctrinesand a discussion of them within definite limits mustbe considered the most vital necessity for contemporarymilitary thought. It is in this light that thepresent article offers itself as a means of posing thequestion. Moreover, it seems to us that the time hascome not only to exchange views on these, questionsthrough articles in journals, but also to cooperate inevery way in the creation of fuller works.
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