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2.0Z A P P R E C I A T I N G REPRESEN T AT I O N Son eo ffearof the slime, wou ld be ra dica lly to reconceive the notion offear . Fear emasculated by subt ract ing t s distinctive motivationalforc isnot fear a t all .The issue is not j us tone of fidelity to a deeply ingrained pretheore-tical conception of fear. The perspicuity of our understanding ofhuman na ture is at stake. The "fear" experienced by Charles, whosemunching of popcorn is interrupted by a wave of quasi-fear sensa-tions, and that experienced by Francs, who flees from Fido, orAaron, who, with h is teeth gritted in determinat ion, manages to goth rough with a n a i rplane flight, a re an imi s of different kinds. Toassimilate them would be to emphasze superficial similarit ies a t theexpense of fu ndam ental di fferences. A creditor might as wel lacceptpaym ent in fool'sgold.13W ewill do better to assimilate genuine fearand genuineemotionsgenerallyt obelief-desire complexes. (This doesno t imply that emot ions are not "feelings.") If fear does not consistpart ly in abelief tha tone is indanger, it isnevertheless similartosucha belief (combined with a desire not to be harmed) in its motivationalforc, and perhaps in other ways as well.M y claim is not that Charles experences no genuine fear. He doesno t fear th e sime, but the movie might induce in him fear of some-thing else. IfCha r l esi s a child, he may wonder whether there mightnot be real slimes or other exotic horrors like the one in the movie,even though he fully realizesthatthe movie slime itself is not real. Hemay genuinely fear these suspected actual dangers; he may havenightmares ab out them for days afterwa rds. And he may take steps toavoid them. Jaws caused a lot of people to fear sharks , ones theythought might rea l lyexist, and to avoid swimming in the ocean. Butthis does not mean they were afraid of the fictional sharks in themovie. I f Charles is an older moviegoer with a heart condition, hemay be a f ra id of the movie itself or of experienctng it . Perhapshe knows that excitement could trigger ahea r t at tack and fears t ha tthe movie will cause excitementby depicting the slime as beingespecially aggressive or threatening. This is real fear. But it is fear ofth e depiction of the slime, not of the slime depcted.Several commentators wi l l ing to agree that Charles does no t fear

13.Lamarque, "HowCan We Fear andPity Fictions?" pointsou tthat a condition likethat Charlesis inmay bemotivatingincertainways.Some viewers burytheir faces in the i rhands orevenflee the theaterratherthan f ace thehorrorson screen.Butthis behavioriseasilyexplainedby a fe a rof the depiction or ofexperiencingit, or me re ly by apredictionthatonewill f indthe experience unpleasant.I nanycase,t is clearthatviewers often do notbehave inthese waysorhaveany inclination to, even when theyaresa idto be " a f r a i dof theslime."

Puzzles and Problems 2.03the slime have tried to understand his experience as one of actual fearwith a different object . Peter Lam arque takes him to fear th e thoughtof the slime {or th e "sense" of a description of i t ) .14That he mightfear this thought, or the experience of thinking it , is evident; theCharles with a heart condition does.B ut Lamarque does no t haveinmind such specialcrcumstances.Wha t wecali "fear of the slime" byordinary apprecia tors fully awa reof its fictitiousness is ingeneral, hethinks, fear of the thought. I see no advantage in this suggestion. Thereasons for denyingthat Charles fears the sl imeapply equally to thethought . Apart from specia l ci rcumstances, as when he has a heartcondition, he does no t consider th e thought dangerous or t rea t it assuch, o r does he experience even an inclination to escape from it .Moreover ,hi s experience simplydoes no t feel like fear of a thought ;character iz ing tas suchflies in the face of itsphenomenology. And itisth eslime, not a thought, thatCharles so inevi tably and unabashedlydescribes himself as afraid of. The original intuition, for what it 'sworth, isthat th e slime is the object of Charles's fear . Lamarque 'sproposal abandons that intuition and also fails to recognize our rea-sons for denying it . In 7.1we wi l l understand Charles 's experiencein a way that does full justic e to its phenomenology and accomm o-dates easilyt he normal ways ofdescribing it, yet does no t have hi m(literally) fearingt he slime or , necessarily, anythinga t all .IfI am right about Charles, skepticism concerning other psycholog-icalaltitudespurporte dly aimed a t fictit ious objects is in order as w ell.We should be wary of the idea that people literally pity Willy Lomanor grieve fo r Anna Karenina or admire Superman whi le being fullyawa rethatthese characters and their sufferings orexploits a repure lyfictit ious.I tis not im plausible tha t pity involves abelief (o r judgment ,or atti tude) that what one pties actually suffers misfor tune , andadmiration a belief that the admired object i s admirable, but thenormal apprecia tor does no t think it is actually th e case that Willysuffers orthatSu perman is admirable. Perha ps i t is more reasonableto think of these emotions as merelyakin to such beh'efs (togetherwi th appropria te desi res) , in part icular in thei r mot ivat ional forc.Bu t th e spectator who "pities" Willy, especially, would seem not tofeel the mot ivat ional forc in quest ion; she feels no inclination tocommiserate with him or to try to help him. It is less clear what onemust believe about someone in order to grieve for him or what moti-

14. Ibid.Of coursethe thought maywell be a causeofone's fe a r , even if it is not itsobjec t . Seealso C l a r k , "Fictional Entities"; Mannison, "On Being Moved by Fiction";N ov i t z , "Fiction, Inui ^ i i i i Hi on , and Emocin"; S k u l s k y , "On Be ing Moved by Fiction."

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204 A P P R E C I A T I N G REP RE S ENT ATI O N Svational forc m a y beintrinsicto grief. But grief, a swell a spity andadmiration, w o u l d seemto requireat theveryleast awarenessof theexistence of their objects. It is arguable that fo r thisreason aloneappreciatorscannotbesaid actuallytopityWil lyorgrieveforAnnaoradmire Superman.15

Like the slime movie, Death of aSalesman, nna Karenina, andSu p e rm ancomicsm a yinduceinappreciators genuine emotionsof thekind in question. Anna Karenina fosters genuine sy m p a thy fo r realpeople inunfortunate situations like Anna's; this ispart of what isimportantaboutTolstoy'snovel.But toconsidertheexperiencecom-monly characterized a s pity fo r Anna to be merely pity fo r realpeople "like"her (or a determinationorinclination conditionalytofeelpity toward peoplei nlike s ituations) does not do itjustice.16 It isno accident that w espeak ofsympathizing with orgr ievingf orAnna,A cali for skepticism is noplacetostop.W eneedapositive accountof appreciators' experiences, a well-ar t iculated alternativet o literal-minded acceptance ofordinary claims that they pity Willy, grievefor Anna, "fear th e slime, and so on.This Iwillprovide in 7.1.Th e successof the alternative will bolster th egrounds fo r skepticism.But it ismore than evident already that th elegitimacyofsuch literalmindedness is not to betakenforgranted.5.3 . F I C T I O N A L I T Y A N D O T H E RI N T E N T I O N A L P R O P E R T I E S

I prefer to exist in comic strip form ra ther than in real life,because my chances fo rhappiness ar e greater. Woody AlienOur difficulties intryingtosortout thewaysinwhichfictionalworldsandthereal worldare and are not connected demnstrate theinade-qu ac y of the theoretical tools Ihave utilized so far. Ihave broughtinto p lay th e notion of fictionality, distinguishing the question ofwhether it is fictionalthat Henry savestheheroine or Charles fearsth e slime from that of whether it istrue. But Ihave considered onlyfictionality inwork worlds, not fictionality ingameso f make-believe.And Ihave no t made use of the account of fictionality developed in

15. Peopledo seemtofearthings of whose existencetheyaredoubtful,such as atornadothatmightoccur. Whatiscalled fearof a(possble) tornadomightbetterbethoughtof asfear that therewill be a tornado,that is, asdedictorather thande refear,togetherwithimagined de re fear.16.SeeCharlton, "Feeling for the Fictitious";Clark, Fictional Knt i t ie s . "

Puzzles a nd Problems 2 0 5Chapteri. So far in this chapter fictionality has been thought ofs imply a s aproperty ofpropositions, a sanalogous to being believedordesired orhopedfor or denied.The comparison of fictionality with suchother intentional proper-tiesaccords nicely with ou r feelingofphysical isolation from fictionalworlds.We cannot kissor kickorsave somethingthat isbelievedorwishedorsaidordeniedtoexistbutdoesnot; neithercan weinteractin any of these ways with something that exists only fictionally. Thecomparisonalsobearsout mycontention thatwe do not fearorenvyor worryabout characters whom w eknow to bemerelyfictional.I f itisbelieved by someone that an assassin is after me, and Iknow fo rsure thatnothing of the sort istrue, we do not suppose that Imightnevertheless be a f r a i d of thebelieved-to-exist assassin. I can hardlyenvy awished-for rich nele, realizing that he isonly wished for.If itisasserted, ordenied, that there issomeone on top ofMount Everestwith acute appendicitis and I know that there isnot, Iwill not andcannot worry about this nonactualperson o r feel sorry fo r him.

But the comparisonof fictionalitywith being believedordesiredorclaimed fai ls entirely to bring out the disconcerting difference thatseemstoobtain between physical relations across worldsandpsycho-logical ones, th e impression wehave, even if it islusory ,that thingsknown to be merely f ic t ional are objects of our psychological atti-tudes. Why isn't it even tempting to think that we might pity aclaimed-to-exist mountaineer with appendicitis without believinginhi mourselves?W hydon'twe f indourselvesinstates that a re a tleastverylike pity, ordescribe ourselvesa s feeling sympathy when w econtmplate such claims? (Perhaps occasionally we dowhen w eimagine with a certain vivacity the claimsto be true. This takes usbackto fictionality.)It isc lear that there issomething special about fictionality, ascon-trasted with other intentional properties. The observation, madein 1.5 and 3.8, that we have a strong inclination to thinkof fic-t ional i ty as aspecieso ftruth even thoughw eknow better, sumsit up.We somehow regard what onlyfictionally exists as being real andwhat only fictionally occurs as actually taking place, whereas wecomfortablytakewhatismerely believedordesiredorsaidtoexistoroccur to be j us tthat.Thepsychological bond we feelto fictions is adramatic symptomofthis inclination, bu t there a reothers. One is thesimple propensityto speak of fictional worlds. The notion that fictions belong towor lds differcnt f rom ours does, to be sure, reflect aconception of

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IOS A P P R E C I A T I N G R E P R E S E N T A T I O N Stion for the strangely persistent inclination to think of fctions assharing realitywi th uswhichi sreflected incolloquialspeech.And ourfeelings ofintimacy toward themmust somehow besquared with th eo bv io u sphysical isolationof fictionalworlds from therealworld.Theobservation that beingfictional is insome wayslikebeing believed ordesiredorclaimedto be thecaseisinadequateonbothcounts.Itonlyheightens themystery.The notions of fiction and reality are a rich source of witticisms,m a n y of them deriving from th e seemingly schizophrenic attitudetoward fictionality we have been examining. Woody Allen's statedpreference for fictionalexistenceisone.18 Thejoke trades on adelib-rate conflat ion of the notions of fictionality and truth. Altered a sfo l lows: "Iprefertoexist in(the world o f ) someone's desires (beliefs,denia ls )ratherthaninrealife, . . .becausemychancesforhappinessa re greater," it falls fat . Deliberatelyconf la t ing beingtruewith beingdesired or believed or denied is j u s t silly.It istimetobringto thetable moreof theresultsofPartOne and todevelop them fu r t h e r . A proposition is fictional in the world of awork, w e recall, j us t in case there is a prescription that it is to beima g ined by appreciators. This brings us, as appreciators, into thepicture in a way inwhich we are not in the case of(other people's)beliefs a nd wishes a n d c laims. W e are to imaginethat Wil ly Lomanlosth isjob, that Superman rescues people from ta l lbuildings,and soon . Such imaginingsa re part of our games of make-bel ieve, gamesthat have theirown fictional worlds distinct from work worlds.Andthese imaginingsgowith imaginings about ourselves.Whenweimag-in eWilly losinghis job,we also imagine knowing about it. It is amistake to think of appreciators a s mere spectators ofwork worlds,observers f ro m th e outside of what is fictional in them.That leavesout our participation ingamesi nwhich representations a re props. Acise look at the nature of this participation wil l go a long waytoward extricating usfrom ou r difficulties.

18.InFlannO'Brien'sAtSwim-Tu>o-Birds awriter createsch aracters for anovel,inc lu d -ing one soravishingly b e a u t i f u l thathe cannot resist ravishing her. Shebecomespregnambyhim andproducesa son, apersonof the "quasi-illusory sort." Resenting the author'sdictatorial control,the bastard son (who inherited his father's l i t e r a r y talents), with helpfrom theother characters, turnsth e tables on the author by writing astory abouthim inwhichhe isarrested,tortured, charged withvarious crimes,and put on trial.

Participation[The actor] on a stage p l ays a t beinga n o t h e r be fore a g a th e r in gof people w h o p l ay a t taking h im for that other person.Jorge Lu isBorges, Everythtng and Nothing

6.1. P A R T I C I P A T I O N I N C H I L D R E N S G A M E SPar t ic ipants ingameso f make-bel ieveneed to bedistin-guished from mere onlookers. Aminimal condition fo rparticipation

in a game isconsidering oneself constrained to imaginethe proposi-tionsthatare fictional in it.Participants consider therulesorprinci-piesof generation to a pp ly tothemselves. Onlookers, observing thegame fromwithout,do not thinkofthemselvesass ub j ec t to itsrules;the fictionality of aproposition is nottakento be areasonforthem toimagine i t .(Theym a ytake great interestin thegame, however. Theym a y study it and its props thoroughly, learning what is fictional,which f ic t ionaltruths implywhich others, what principiesofgenera-tion a re operative, and inmany ways analyzinga n d explainingth egame a nd assessing it s significance.)The roles children playi ntheir games usuallygo farbeyond satis-fac t ion ofthis minimal condition fo rparticipation. Typically theya rethemselves props, reflexiveones: they genratef ic t ionaltruths aboutthemselves . This is an immensely significant feature of children'sgames,and one wewilldo welltobearin mindwhenwe think aboutrepresentat ionalworks of ar t and thegames peoplep l a y with them.C hi ld r en a realmost invariably characters intheir games ofmake-believe; th e imaginings they engage in arepartly about themselves.I tis fictional of achildplayingdolls orhouse that hebathes ababy ormakes a bed or cooks spaghetti. In agameo fcowboysa nd Indiansitis fictional of some of the participating children that they a re cow-boys, of others that they a re Indians,of a l lthatthey r idearoundonhorsesa nd p e r fo rmassorted heroic deeds. Evenwhena chi ldpushesato y truckt oo s ma l l a c tua l ly to ride inacross th e f loor , it isp r o b a b l yt c t ional t h a t l u - is d i i v i n g it .

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ZIO AP P RE CI AT I NG RE P RE S ENT AT I O N SSuch fictional t ru ths about th e part cipants a re typically generatedby the part cipants themselves. It is because Chris actually places adol in a plstic bread box that, fictionally, he bathes a baby. It is byvir tue of the fac t that chi ldren "gallop" around the house that,fic-t ionally ,they ride horses n theWildWest.The part icipants a re propsas well asobjects.They are in these respects like stumps which make it fictional ofthemselves that they are bears. In fact the mere presence of partici-pants in the vicinity of stumps or dolls or other such reflexve p ropsmakes it likely that they will func tion sm ilarly . Props, especiallyreflexive ones, have a strong propensty to reproduce thei r kind. IfGregory and Eric declare a stump to be a"bear,"i t i s natur a l , indeedal l but inevi table, that they wi l l understand things around i t to beprops also.If thestump's existence makesit fictional t ha t it is a bear,w e a lmost au toma t i ca l l y t ake it s possession of various propert ies toma ke it fictional tha t i t is a bear of a certainsor ta largeor ferociousone, one that is rearing up or sit t ing on its haunches. This holds for

rela t ional aswellas nonrela t ional propert ies. The factthat the stumpis on a hill makes it fictional that the bear is on ahill. If the stump issur rounded by poison ivy, it isp r o b a b l y fictional t ha t th e bea r is inth e midst of a poison iv y patch. These relational facts are as m u c hfacts about t he hill and the poison ivy as they are facts about t hes tump. The hilland the poison ivy genra te fictional t ruths; they areprops. The hil,b y vi rtu e ofhaving the stump on it , makes it fictionalthat the bear is on a hill . In this way props beget props.Props thus begotten a rea lmost a lwaysreflexive. It is fictional of theac tua l hill that the bear i s on it . I t is the actual patch of poison ivy inwhich, fict ional ly, the bear cavorts. Much of the rest of the stump'ssur roundings a res imilar ly drawn nto the game: hawks or a i rplanesflying overhead, th e clouds in the sky,even a squi rrel that l andsmomentari ly on the s tumpa nd quickly ("frantically") scurries away.There are limits, of course. Termites in the stump or skyscrapers andfreeways nea rby m a y be ignored. I t may be too disrupt ive to allowtha t fict ional ly the bear i s termita infested, or has an urban habi ta t .People, too,even mere onlookers, a r e dra wn into the gam e andenlisted as reflexiveprops. If the s t u m p is ten y a r d s in f ront of Gre-gory, this fact about Gregory makes i t f ict ional that the bear i s tenyards in f ronto fh im; likewiseif it is not Gregory but hismother w hostrays dangerously cise to the bear.Compa r ing pa r t i c ipant sto thes t u m p a ndotherreflexivep r o p st h a tit recrui ts such as the hill and the poison ivy is fine as far as it gocs.

Participaron 2,11Bu t the comparison ignores much of what i s important about part ici -pants' roles in their games. There is the obvious point that actionsEric and Gregory perform vis--vist he s t u m p m a k e it fictionalthatthey perfor m act ions vis--visthe bear (often but not necessarilyt hesame ones) . I f Eric comes across th e s tump suddenly , fictionally hecomes suddenly across the bear. Other of his act ions may make i tfictional that he catches sight of the bear through the trees, orfeeds it ,or j u m p s on its back . He may yell "Watchout " t herebyfictionallywa rning Gregory of the danger.A part icipant differs from th e s tump an d m a n yof itsprogeny a lsoin being a prim ary focus of interest . I tdoes not especially mat terthatthe part icular stump and poison ivy patch inEric's and Gregory'sgame are the ones theyare.Di fferent ones (with similar properties)would serve jus t as well. But that it is Gregory and Er i c who arereflexive props does mat ter notably to Gregory and E ric. Reflexiveprops can be m ere inst ruments in a game of m ake-bel ieve, or they canbe objects of interest in their ow n right. Pa rticipant s fal l into the lattercategory. I suggested that self-illumination is a keyfunct ionof gamesof make-bel ievean d other im aginat ive act ivi t ies.Th e role of part ici -pants asreflexive props has alot to do with the effectivenessof gamesof make-believe in this regard. Imaginings about oneself plausiblycont ribute to sel f-understand ing; henee the valu of fict ional t ruthsabout th e pa r t i c ipant s , ofthei r being given prescript ions to imagineabout themselves. But it isa l so impor t an t , as we shal l see, that suchfict ional t ruth s be generated by the part icipants themselves,that th epart icipants beprops.Part icipants a re in some ways bet ter l ikened to a ctors playing them-selves in theatricalevents than to the stump, th e hill,and the poisonivy patch. A game of make-bel ieve bears comparison to a p lay ormovie about Ronald Reagan inwhicht hep a r t of Reagan ist akenb yReagan himself. Reagan is a reflexive representa t ion, generat ing byhi s actions as well as his presence fictional truths about himself. Nodoubt he will be a focus of interest as well.Bu t this compa rison too is severely limited. Onstage actors performfo r audiences, but chi ldren playing make-bel ieve gamesusual ly donot.Onlookers,i f there are any, may be ignored; the chi ldren are notstaging a spectacle. They playthe g a m e for the sakeo f p lay ing it, forthemselves. The point of an ordinary playabout R eagan, no m a t te rwho does the acting, is to entertain or edify or Iluminarespecta tors.The poin tof Eric 'sa nd Gregory's game is to enterta inor e d i f y t h e m -selves or to p r v ido t hemselves wi th ins igh tins igh t p n r t ly abo u i

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ZI Z A P P R E C I A T I N G R E P RE S E N T ATI O N Sthemselves. Eric and Gregory are the interested parties as well as theobjects of interest.The mea ns by which Reagan isreferredto and thus madea nobjectof representation are very different from those by which Eric andGregoryare. T he charac ter R eagan p laysbear shis ame; thetheatri-ca l event corresponds substantiallytoh im (it may be fictionaltha t th echaracter was a Hollywood movieactorw hocont inued hi scareer asth e fortieth president of the United States) ; the author may haveinserted a n explanatory footnotein thescript.Thesea re j u s t th esortsof circumstances which in other cases establish that an actor portraysan actual person other than himself . In our example i t happensthatth e person to whom they point is the actor himself . The fact thatReagan is the actor ha s little ifany th ing to do with m a k i n g him theobject of representation. A n understudy who takes over hi s rolewould po r t r ay Reagan j u s t as surely as Reagan himselfdid.But it isbecause Gregory is aplayer in the gameo fma ke-believe thathe isalsoits object . If Sam should take hi s place in the game, it would befictional tha t Sam,n ot Gregory, confronts abear in thewoods.SinceGregory's representing role in hisgame isw h a t makes him the objectof representation, one can hardly fail to realize the identity of objectand p rop as one might in the case of the p lay about Reagan.Part icipants in gamesof ma ke-believe are thus props, objects , andimaginers al l three, intimately combined in one neat package. Theyprescribe imaginingsimaginingsthata reabout themselvesb yvir tueof th e fact that they themselves do the p rescr ib ingand it is to them -selves that they issue th e prescriptions.Not onlyis thepar t icipant to imagine about himself ;he is to do soin a first-personmanner , in thesense illustratedin 1.4.Eric does no tjus t imag ine of someone whom he knows to be himself that thatperson confronts abear and stands hi sg round , or flees, or whatever .H e imagines confronting th ebear an d s tanding hi sground or fleeing.And he imagines this from th e iude. (W emight sa y tha t he "imag-inatively confronts abea r . " ) In general , pa r t icipation involves imagin-ing, from th e inside,doing and experiencing things: imagining bath-in gba bies, r iding horses, dr iving trucks.Even this does no t fully cap tu re th e par t icipant 's experience,how-ever. It omits the place of his actual activities in the conten of hisimaginings.H iscoming upon as tump,h isdunk ingadol,h is"gal lop-ing" astr ide a stick a re themselves reflexive p rops in the g a m e andobjectsof his imaginings.He imaginesof hiss ight inga s t u m p t h a titisan instanceof hiss ight inga bear ,of hisd u n k i n gth edol tha ti ndoingthis he isb a t h i n g a b a b y , and so u n .

Participation 2.13Suppose Reagan watches from th e audience as an unde rs tudy ,tak-in gh ispa r t , po r t r ayst he president makingaspeech. Reagan im aginestha t Reagan is giving a speech, and he realizes, probably, that th eperson he isimag in ingisnone other than himself .Heim agines, more-over, of the actor's pe r fo rmance that it is an instance of hisReagan ' sspeak ing . But this self-imagining is not done in a first-

person manner; he isprobably no t imagining giving aspeech, and beis certainly not imagining from the inside doing so. He might, ofcourse, retreat into a revetie , prompted by the pe r fo rmance , andimagine thus. But this im agining, though from the inside,will not bean imag in ing of the actor's actions that they are an instance of hisgiving a speech. Participants in games ofm ake-believe , being at oncereflexive props and imaginers, ima g ine of the actual tepresentingactions thatthey a reinstanceso f their doing things, and they imaginethis f rom the inside.6.Z. A P P R E C I A T O R S AS P A R T I C I P A N T SWe shou ld expect viewets of paintings and f i lms, spectators of plays,readers of novis and stories to pa r t ic pa tein the gam es in whic h theseworks ar eprops much as children par t ic pate in games of cops androbbers, cowboys and Indians, dolls , and mudp ies . They do. Therea re differences, to be su reimpor tan t ones . Bu t they must not beallowed to obscure the underlying similarities.App reciation of repre-sentational w orks of ar t is pr ima rily a ma tter of par t icipation.It is not only as par t icipants that we are interested in representa-tions, however. Critics and historians of the arts, insolar as they areno t appreciators also, m a y be more onlookers than part icipants .A ndeven appreciation does no t always involve part icipation, as we shal lsee. My suggestion is that the primary or central instances of appre-ciat ion do, andthat those which do not a reneverthelessto beunde r -stood largely in terms of part icipation.Givenm y earl ier conclusinthat representa tions have the funct ionof servingaspropsi ngamesof make-believe,it can ha rd ly becontro-vers ia l that appreciators normally par t ic pate in the m in im a lsense ofconsidering themselves subject to the "rules" ofm ake-believe,con-strained to imag ine as the works prescribe. What is not so obvious,but of very considerable importance, isthat viewers and readers arereflexive props in these games, that they genrate f ict ional t r u t h sabout themselves.M a n y of their actions, like those of p a r t i c i p a n *i nchildren 's games, are reflexive p rops a s wel l . And as in th e case ofp ar t i c i p an t s i n ch i M rrn ' s ga mes , i t i s in a f i rs t -person manner t l i a t

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114 A P P R E C I A T I NG RE P RE S ENT AT I O N Sapprecia tors are to, and do, imagineabou t themselves; they imagine,f rom th e inside, doing things and undergoing experiences.Support fo r thinkingo f apprecia t ion in this way wil l come gradu-ally. In the present section Ipresent some preliminary considerationsin its favor. But its strongest confirmation will consist not in directa rgumentsbut in i t s cont ribut ion to a systemat ic and sa t isfying over-al l pictu re of representa t ion, and i t s capacity to unr avel puzzles,resolve p aradoxes, and pent ra te mysteries.In 1.4 Iobservedthat imag ining something (in the sense we areinterested in) seems to involve, perhaps necessarily, imagining (one-self) believingor knowing it . So an apprecia tor who particpales in agam e in the minim al sense of ima gining wh at is fictional will engagein self-imaginings a swell. It should not be surp risingthat,when t heapprecia tor recognizes that p is fictional and imagines bel ievingorknowing that p, as well as p itself, i t is fictional that he believes orknowsthat p.Thisfictionalt r u t h can beunders tood to begenerated

6.1 WillemV anderVeldet he Y o u n g e r ,T he ShoreatScheveningen.R e p r o -duced by cour tesy of the Trus tees , The Nat iona l Ga l le ry ,London.

Participation 115by h isreal iza t ion tha tp is fictional (orpossiblyby hisimag iningas hedoes) . Thus the apprecia tor i s a reflexive prop in his game.Bu tappreciators'roles asreflexivep rops go muchfur ther than this,al though in different w a y s fo r works of different kinds. Gulliver'sTravels makes it fictional of itself that it is the Journal of a certainship's physician, Lem uel Gul liver. I t i s a lmost inevi tablethat in read-ing it, one should understandit to be fictionalt h a tone isreading sucha Journal .The novel,itself areflexive representa t ion, thus draw s peo-pl einto games of m ake-bel ieve in much the w aythat Eric 's and Gre-gory's s lumps do .Th e museum goer who looks a tW illemVan der Velde's landscapeShore at Scheveningen (figure 6.1) in the normal manner makes i tfictional of himself ihal he is looking a l a group of sailing shipsapproach ingabeacho nwhichiherei s ahorse-drawn ca r t .T hepa in t -ing is not areflexive prop l ike Gulliver's Travels,but i t too draw s theapprecia lor into a game. Here is a quick considera t ion in suppor t ofthis cla im: The viewerlet 's ca l i him Stephenmighl wel l remark,on exa mining the paint ing, "I see severa l sa i lingships," and in muchthe same spiril as ihat in which he might say, "There are severa lsailing ships offshore." If , as seems likely, th e latter is to be under -stood as prefaced implicitly by something like "It is fictionalthat,"probably t he former i s to be understood similarly, as the assert ionthat fictionally he sees several sailing ships. It would seem that inmaking either of these remarks Stephen is expressing atrulh. So ilseems lo be ficlional nol only that there a re several sailing shipsoffshore but alsoihal Slephen sees them. H is looking a tihe picluremakesihis ficlional of himself.1Slephen does no l belong to the fictional world of the paint ing,ofcourse, as the ships do, and a reader of Gulliver's Travels is not acha rac t e r in the novel asNapolen is a character in War an d Peace.We need to recall ihe dist inct ion between work worlds and gameworlds, between the worlds of novis, pictures, and plays and theworlds of games of make-bel ieve in which these works ar e props.Appreciators belong only to the latter. It is fictional in the g a m e th ereader pla ys wi th Gulliver's Travels, not in Gulliver's Travels itself,tha t she reads the Journa l of aship'sphysician, and it is fictional in theviewer 's game withShore at Scheveningen that he sees ships offshore.The world of an apprecia tor 's game includesficlional I ru rhs gener-

i.Wewill later discoverthat"Isee several sailingships"maynot bebestunderstood asshortfor "It is t i t tmn.i l thatI seeseveral sa i l ing ships."But our reasons wi l l reinforce theidea thatfictionally the speakerseesseveral sa i l ing ships.

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li A P P R E C I A T I N G RE P RE S EN T ATI O N Satedby all of itsprops,by theappreciatoraswellas by thework,andby relations among them. The work wor ld includes only fictionalt ruths generated by the work a lone. It is Shore at Scheveningen-fictionalthat there are ships offshore, that there is a horse cart on thebeach and a dog swimming in the surf. When Stephencontemplaresthe painting, it is fictional in his game th at a ll this is so and in additionthat heseesships offshore and a dog in the surf. His game world is anexpansin of the work world.There is nothing unu sua l about h avin g dist inct fict ional worlds, oneincludedwithin th eother.Il lust ra t ionsinnovisa ndper formancesofplays, like apprecia tors, add to one fict ional world to form a la rgerone. A picture of Raskolnikov i l lust ra t ing Dostoevski 's Crime andPunishment combines wi tht hetext to establish aworld inwhich no tonly is it fictional that Raskolnikov ki l led an od lady a nd otherwiseacted as thenovelhas him acting,b ut alsoit is fictionalt ha the has theappearance the picture port rays him as having.W h a tneeds to be shown in order to estab l ish that apprecia tors a rereflexivepropsinthei r gamesofmake-believe?Thatcerta in principiesof make-bel ieve are in forc, ones whereby a person's reading ofGulliver's Travels, fo r instance, makes it fictional t ha t she isreadingth e Journa lof a ship's physician,a nd wherebyin looking a tShore atScheveningen, Stephen makes it fictional that he sees ships. Whatprincipies are in forc is a mat ter of what principies part icipantsrecognize or accept or take to be in forc. This recognition or accep-tance ca n be implicit , as we have seen; principies need not be stated orfo rmula ted . Games launched by st ipula t ion ("Let 's say that s lumpsa re bears") include principies that a re unthinkingly, automat ical lyassumed to be in forc (that la rger stumps"countas" la rger bears, forinstance). B utthereneednot beeven aninitialstipulation;children donot begin by saying,"Let's letthis be a baby," each t ime they playdolls. Th e reader of Gulliver's Travels and the viewer of Shore atScheveningen do not start thei r games wi th st ipula t ions, and thei runderstandings about th e relevant principies of make-believe a realmost entirely implicit .Let us recall , also, that games of make-bel ieve need not be socialaffa i rs . A pprec i a tors 'gamesa reusual ly ra ther per sonal . Al thoughthew o r kthat servesa s a p rop is publ icly recognizeda nd apprec i a t edbymany ,eachappreciatorordinarily plays his own game with it.Therea reexceptions tothis,butw h a t isimpor t an tnow iss implyt h a t gamesof make-bel ievecan bepersonal ; they can be played and even recog-nized byonlya single person.S om \ propos a l doesn ot re qu i rean y o n e

Participationother thantheappreciatorhimselftorecognizetherelevantprincipiesof make-believe.What needs to be shown, then, i s that the reader of Gulliver'sTravels, for example, recognizes or accepts, at least implicitly, a prin-cipiewherebyh erreadingof thenov el makesit fictionalt ha ts hereadsa ship's physician's Journal ,aprincipie according to which, givenherac tua l reading, she is to imagine herself reading such a Journa l .W eneed to establish that Stephen accepts a principie whereby, given hisobservation ofShore at Scheveningen, he is to imagineh imsel f look-ing atships,a horse cart on the beach, and so on. Isuspectthat th epaint ing causes more q ua lms t han Gulliver's Travels does, so I willconcntrate now on it.Not only is Stephen likely to remark t ha t he sees ships offshorewhen he views Van der Velde's beachscape, but he m a y also m a k ecomments such as: "I think Idetect a t raceof joy in the expressionofthe man on the cart , but he is too far aw ay to seeclear ly"; "A seventhand an eighth ship are barely visible on the ho r i zon" ; a nd "Look,there 'sa dog s w i m m i n gin the surf." I tseems undeniablet ha t Stephenthinks of himself, imagines himself,to belookinga t a beach, shipsi nthe ocean, and so on. And there is good reason to suppose that heunderstands this imaginingto b eca l led for , prescribed,by hisexperi -ence oflooking at thepa in t ing .His act ofimaginat ionis not adel ibr-ate orreflective one, but ist r iggered m oreor less automat ical lyby hisperception of the painting. He issimply disposed to thinko f h imsel fas seeing ships, without deciding to do so, when he sees the painting.This isj us t th e sort of disposition which suggestsimplici t recognitionof a principie of make-bel ieve. I f a child who comes across ftrst asmall stump and later a large one, both of which are "bears" in hisgame, is disposed automatically toima gine that hecarneacrossfirst asmall bear and then a larger one, it will probably be reasonable toregard him as recognizing, implicitly, ap r inc ip i ecorre lat ing th e sizeof "fict ional bears" wi th that of thecor responding stumps. Stephen'stendency to imagine himself seeing ships when he looks at the pictureis g rounds fo r a t t r ibut ing to him acceptanceo f a principie whereb yhi s seeing th e picture makes i t f ic t ional t ha t he sees ships.Suppor t of a different kind can be derived from other remarlespeople make when looking a t depictions, ones involving demonst ra-tives:Stephen says,"Thatis aship,"pointingtowardaship-depicticnon the canvas. A person viewing a paint ing, film, or t h e a t r i c a le-veatm ay remark, whi le gesturing appropria tely: "That child looks dis-t ressed"; "This is the king 's armor"; "Someone is hidden in the

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2.18 A P P R E C I A T I N G R E P RE S EN T AT I O N Sshadows over there." It is not easy to see how such comments can beunderstood except on the hypothesis that the viewer is a reflexivaprop in a gam e ofmake-believe,thathe pa r t i c ipa t esverbal lyin such agame.(This a rgu ment , unl ike the preceding one, has no obvious ana-loguesa ppl icable to l i terary representa t ions. )Consider Stephen's "That is a ship ." This is clearly a perfectlyappropria tc thing for a viewer ofSbore at Scbeveningen to say, pro-vided that he points in the right direction. Stephenwould be open tocorrect ionh a dhe said,"Thatis not aship,"whileindicat ing the samespoton thecanvas.The most obvious explanation of thisappropri-ateness would bethat Stepheni sassert ing someth ing true.Assume forth e momentthathe is.W h a t t r u t his heassert ing?Before looking fo ran answer, we should note that i t would not be appropria te for areader of a novel about a ship to make an analogous comment . Thereader of Moby Dick will not in a s imilar spi ri t remark "That is aship" w hi le point ing toward the fol lowing passa ge or some pa rt of i t :"She was a ship of the od school, rather small if anything; wi th anold-fashioned claw-footed look about her. Long seasoned andweather-stained in the t yphoons and calm s ofa ll four oceans,h er odhul l 's complexin was darkened l ike a French grenadier 's, w ho ha salike fought in Egypt and Siberia . Her venerable bows lookedbea rded .Hermas t s. .."2What does Stephen m e a n ? Certainly he is not pointing out anactual ship; h is words requi rea less s t r a igh t forwa rd in te rpre t a t ion .Shouldwe regard themas preceded implicitly by "It is fictionalthat,"or more col loquia l ly"It ist ruein the picturethat"?IsStephenc laim-ing that the proposition his words express is fictional?Butwhatproposi t ion isthis?His words appear to express a p ropo-si tion abou t a p art icu lar thing, about something he indicates by point -in g and saying"that." The suggestion isthat he is assert ing of thisthing that fict ional ly i t i s a ship. But what thing? The pa int ing, or theportion of it at which his finger is a imed? Is he cla iming i t to befictional that this is a ship? If so, his claim is false. No part of thecanvasi ssuch that fictionally it is aship.Pictures,as weha ve seen, donot ordinarily represent themselves. This suggestion clashes with ourassumpt ion that Stephen is expressing a t ruth.Does th e demonst ra t ive refer to a fictitious entity (assuming t ha tthere are such), one of the "ships in the picture"? Pointing to there levantm a r k son the c a n v a smight be aconvenientway o findi ca t ingwhich fictitious thing one has in mind. IsS t ephen say ingei ther t h a t

M e l v i l l e , Mohy Dick chap. t t ( Thc S h i p " ) .

Part icipat ionthis thingis fictionally aship,or t ha ti treallyisone?Bu tthenw hyis itno t appropr i a t e to point to the text ofMoby Dick and declare"Thatis a sh ip"? Ifthere is an "object in the picture" which fictionally (oractually) is a ship, there is an "object in the novel" w hich is suchalso.Why shouldn't the reader specify this fictional object by pointing toan appropr i a t e pa r tof thetext and assertthatfictionally (oractual ly)it is aship?There seems no other reasonable candidate for the referent of"that." If Stephen is a t t r ibut ing fict ional ity to a proposi t ion, i t mu stnot be aproposition about something picked out by hisdemonst ra -tive.Is he claimingit to be fictionalmerelythat there existsaship?B utthen why did he use the dem onst ra t ive? (This proposal i s inadequate,in any case, for reasons that are clear from 3 .8 . )Maybe Stephen is not a t t r ibut ing fict ional i ty to anything.Could itbe t ha t "that" refers to the paint ing or pa rt of i t , and that Stephen isclaimingthis to b e aship-representation? I s"That is a ship" short for"That is a ship-representation"?This again leaves us in the d a r kabout why a reader does no t point to Moby Dick and say"That is aship." Moby Dick i s a ship-representa t ion too, to which one can referby point ing. Granted, th e p i c tureand the novela re different kindsofrepresentations. "Thati s a ship" m ight conceivably mean"That is apicture of aship( aship-pcture) ."Bu tthen weneeda n explanat ionofw hy "ship" should somet imes abbrevia te "picture of a ship" b u tnever "novel about a ship."It is time for a more radicalproposal. Perhaps Stephen is neitherreferring to anything or a t t r ibut ing fict ional i ty to anything. We mayeven have been too hasty in assuming that he is asserting somethingtrue, or anything at all . Things fallneatly into place if we suppos e tha tStephen is merelypretending to refer to something and to claim it tobe a ship. This frees us from th e supposi t ion that hi s demonst ra t iveactuallypicks any thing out , or even that there is anything to w hich hepretends to refer.H e onlypretends t ha tthere issom ething which herefers to and calis a ship. Yet his use of"that" is easiiy explained . Inpretending,one copies the behavior one pretends to be engagingin. I npretending to refer, one natura l ly uses words and gestures demon-stratives and pointings, for instancethat are ordinarily used inreferring.W eare freedalso fromthe obligation to find a truththatStephenasserts, or for that mat ter a falsehood, or even a proposition, true orfalse, t ha t he pretends to assert . "That is a ship" does no t express apropos i t ion ; Stephen only pretendsthat it does.Stephen is not i r y i n ^ ; to fool anyone ,o f course,w h c n he p re te n d .

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12.0 A P P R E C I A T I N G RE P R E S E N T AT I O N SThesenseof"pretense"relevan here is to be explained in terms ofmake-believe. In saying"That is a ship," Stephen makes it fictionalthat he isrefer r ing to something and claiming it to be a ship.Thisis afict ional t ruth abou t Stephen, one that belongs to the game he p layswith the picture. He is a relexive prop inthat game. To pretend, inth e sense in question, is to par t ic pa te verbally in a game of make-believe.We do have to make sense of the appropria teness of Stephen'sremark and the corresponding inappropria teness of "That isnot aship"saidwhileindicating thesamepartof the canvas. It was inorderto expla in this that we provisiona l ly accepted the idea that Stephenw a ssaying something t rue.But it can beexpla inedby the fact t ha tit isfictional thatStephen expresses a t ruth, whereas to say"Thatis not aship" wouldbe, fictionally, to express afalsehood.It isusual ly appro-pr ia te to act so as fictionally to speak th e t ruth. Granted, on e mightrespond, "That's true," to Stephen's ut terance; or "Not so" if heshould say, "That is not a ship." Butthese responses may be acts ofpretense themselves; it may be fictional that one pronounces Stephento have spoken th e t ru th , or to have spoken falsely.It i spossible that Stephenis really asserting something, in addi t ionto pretending to do so, and wha t he really asserts may betrue. In 10.3 we shall consider what it isthat he might really be asserting.Answering this question will be much easier than it seemed earlier.W e no w real ize that there is no reason to expect h is assertion to beabout something he refers to by"that." Stephen's pretense alreadysufficiently expla ins his use of the demonst ra t ive.Why is it inappropria te for the reader of Moby Dick, point ingtoward certa in parts of thetext, t o remark ,"Thati s a ship"? Becausethe games weplaywith novis are of a different kind f rom those weplay with pictures. It is not fictional of the reader that he seesa ship,or that there is one before him. (Pro bably it is fictional, instead, thathe hears told of a ship.) So pointing to the text does no t make itfictional that one points to a ship.6 . 3 . V E R B A L P A R T I C I P A T I O NThere is no denying the pervasiveness of verbal participation in chil-dren'sgames."Stick'emup "says a childpretendingto rob a bank .His getaway isfoiled when another child shouts, "Stop, thief " andfictionally carts him off to ja i l . "Careful There's a bea rin the t h i ckc tbehindyou,"E ric excla ims, f ict ional ly warningSu san of : \ d an g e ro u sbear.

Participation 2.2.1We should expect appreciators to par t ic pate verbally in theirgames with representational works of art as well. Nothing is morenatura l than for Stephen to pretend to point out a ship by rema rking,"That is a ship," and we should not be surprised if, in saying thingslike"There a resevera l shipsoffshore," "Gulliver was captured by theLil l iput ians," a nd " Ivan w as fur ious wi th Smerdyakov," i t is some-

times fictional t h a t one isrecou nt ing eventso r report ing on stateso faffa i rs . W e shal lsee in Chapter 10 that this mode ofpa r t i c ipa t ionismore common than on e might suppose, a nd t ha t th e possibi l i tyofpart icipat ing ve r ba l ly underl ies much of our discourse concerningrepresentations even when we are not actually doing so. Le t us notenow that insofar as such discourse const i tutes verbal part icipat ion,insofar asw h a t issaid issaid inpr etense (however"serious" itmighta lso be) , on e puzz lebroached in 5.3 evaprales.Why do we sooftens a ysimply, "There a re severa l ships offshore,"or "A society of six-inch-tall people w as living in a st range land,"when wha t w e seemto mean ismerely that this is so in the worldofShore at Scheveningen or inGuiver's Travels? We may be pretend-in gto assert seriously what we say. O ne wouldh a r d l yexpect a personpretending to cla im that there real ly are severa l shipsoffshore to say,"There a re ships of fshore in tbe world of thepicture Aga in , pre-tenders copy th e behavior they pretend to be engaging in, and theytend to avoid bla tant ly displayingthe fact that they a re j us t pretend-ing. "There are ships offshore" is exact lywhat we should expect aperson to say if he is playing a g a m eof make-be l i evein which, fic-t ional ly, he remarks on the presence of ships offshore. If a Germnspeaker, in ut tering "Robinson Crusoe ha t einen Schi ffbruch ber -lebt," isp re t endingto assertthat a certain Robinson Crusoe surviveda shipwreck, naturally he uses the indicative mood, the mood ofassertion. H e speaks as he would if he were actua l ly asserting this.Not all discourse about representa t ional works o art is pretense(even in part ) , however. Surely critics deliveringdr y lectures of aca-demic commentary and esoteric analysis a re not usual ly engaging inmake-believe. Yet f ict ionali ty opera tors a re commonly omitted eventhen. "That is a ship" might wel l be sa id in even th e mos t sobercriticism, when the speaker cannot easi ly be const rued as pretend ingto point out an actua l ship. This should be taken as a hint that make-believe is somehow in thebackground incritica] discourseaboutrepresenta t ions even when th e speaker is not actually engaging in it;what the cri t icisan a ly z in gor comm enting on, after all, issomethingwho se func tion is to se rvea s a p rop n games of make-bel ieve. W cs l i a l l sce in I O . L how l i l i s isso.

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12.2 AP P RE CI AT I NG R E P RE S ENT ATI O N SFictionality opera tors a re not the onlyones that are sometimes leftimplicit , although they a re omit ted more commonly than most.

On Ik i I s land . . . the fishermen are killing the dolphins annuallynow . . . [The] fish catch of the regin is declining, and so thefishermen,cursing theirluck,blame the dolphins. Itdoesn't ma t te rthat th e rea isover-fished, orthatpollutants dumped b y indus t ryh a v edestroyed breeding grounds, orthatwor ldwidefishca tchesaredowna s a consequence ofm a n ' srapaciousness.O n Iki,a s elsewherethroughout thew o r ld , thedolphins are to b l a m e a n dso are put todeath.3

Obvious ly we are not to understand the wri ter herself to be claimingtha t th e dolphins are to b l a m e or t ha t th e overfishing and pol lut iondon'tm at ter . She is saying or suggest ing that the fishermen cla im orbelieve this (or perhaps that they act as though they do) . But th eomission of "They believe (claim) that" is not amere abbrevi a t ion .The paragraph loses i t s heavy irony w h e n such phrases are inserted.("Itdoesn't mat ter that thereais over-fished, they believe[claim],o rthat pol lutants dumped byindust ry have dest royed breeding grounds. . . The dolphinsare to blame, they think [ say ]andso are put todeath.") The wri ter of the original versin is not j us t using an eco-n o m ic a l form of words to describe the fishermen's beliefs or asser-tions; sh e i s describing them by pretend ing to endorse the ideas sheattributes to them(no doubt with exaggeration).This suggests ageneral account of irony (onevar iety ofi rony any-way ) in terms of pretense. To speak ironically is to mimic or mockthose on e disagrees wi th, fictionally to assert what they do or mightassert . Irony is sarcasm. O ne shows what it is like to make certainc la ims , hop ing the r eby to demnst ra te how absurd or r idiculous i t i stodoso.4

Cal i thisa govment why, j u s tlookat i t and seewhat it's like.Here'sth e law a - s tand ing ready to t a k e aman's so naway f r o m h i m aman's ownson . . . Oh, yes, thisis a wonder fu l govment , wonder -fu l . s

3. F u nd r a i s ing letter for Greenpeace USA, signed "SusinFoimtaia, For the men andwomen of Greenpeace" (undated).4.ClarkandGenigproposeanaccountoirony a l o n gthese l inesin PretenseTheoryofIrony."5. Pap , inTwam,Huckleberry Fmn,chap. 6, p. 49.

Part icipat ion 2 2 3Pa p is mimicking, mocking, sneering at those who do seriously cali i ta government and awond erful one, a l though hedoes no t specify w hothey are.In Ga rc a Marquez ' s story "The Incredible and SadTale of Inno-cent Erendira and Her Heart less Grandmothe r ,"E rendira escapes inthe middle of the night from th e tent where her tyrannical grand-mother kept her.B ut

[she]hadn't taken fivesteps ou ts ide th e tent when sh e carne acrossthe photographer,who was la shinghis equ ipment to thecarrierofhi s bicycle. Hisaccomplice's smile calmed her down."Idon'tknow anything," the photog raphe r sa id ,"I haven't seena n y th in g and Iwon't pay fo r themusic."6Ra ther than cla iming seriously that he did not see the escape or k nowabout i t , the photograph er i s indicat ing, demonst ra t ing, what he wi l lsa y la ter to thegrandmother . H e might beunderstood to bemimick-in g the assert ion he intends to make, pretending (or pretending topre tend?) to claim that he did not witness the escape, as a meanso fassuring Erendira th at he wi l l say this to the grandm other. Henee theomission of "I will tell he r that."One might indcate that those who postulated the existence of aplanet "Vulcan" believed it to have mass Mby sayings imply, "Vul-can had mass M." Here too there m a y be a hint or more of mimicry .It is not easyto findcasesi nwh ich phrases like "Jones wishesthat"and "It isdoubtedthat" a reomi t t edb ut m i g h tplaus iblyb esaidto beunderstood. O ne does not say"Goldwil l ra in from t he sky" a s a wayof asserting that Jones wishes gold would ra in from th e sky. Thism a ybe because there is no actual or envisioned serious u t te r ance of thatsentence for the speaker to mimic. H is point is not one that couldnatu ra l ly be made by pretending to assert that gold will rain f rom th esky, thereby showing what Jones does or might actuallyassert.Although the propensity to omit certa in opera tors is often ex -plained by the fact that th e speaker pretendsseriously toassert w h a the says, such pretense can occur even when the operators are present.This is so in some instances of reported speech. In cases of directquota t ion ("He sa id, * . . . '") the quoter indicates wliat woids th equoted person used byut tering them himself. B u t h e m a yliso show,demns t r a te , w h a t th eother person claimed (seriously) by m e a n sofhis words and the at t i tudes heexpressed,b y pretending to m a k e t ha t

d."Innocnit l;, rcmi i r i , "pp.40-41.

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2.Z4 A P P R E C I A T I N G RE P RE S E N T AT I O N Sclaim o r express thosea t t i tudeshimself. Thiswillb eevident when th equoter mimics or mocks the quoted person's tone of voice, inflection,emphases. In quot inga person indirectly ("Hesa id tha t . . . ")onedoes not use the verywords hedid.Bu t it m a y be fictional t ha t on eendorses acerta in thought , thereby indicat ing that th equoted person,usinghis own words, endorsed it .Suchpart icipat ion m ayoccupy lesst han whole sentences, even a single word or phrase. In saying,"Tomproposed that President X , 'the greatest president of the century,'should have h is image carved in Mount Rushmore ," one may bepretending to tout X as the greatest president of the century, thuspor t ray ing th e quoted person as doing so. The scare quotes or anobviously exaggerated, sarcastic tone of voice serveboth to make itclear t ha t th e speaker isengagingi nthis pretense and to bet ray it, toindcatethat one isonly pretending. (Seen.i.)"H e saidthat" and "he said" a re also devices of bet rayal , whenthere ispretenseto bet ray. Butsomet imesth epretenseis notbetrayedin this way; one may say merely, "Vulcan has mass M , or "X wasthe greatest president of the century," p erhaps p retending to assert itseriously, as a way of indicat ing what someone else asserted orbelieves.The games of make-believe in which on e part icipates verbal ly,inthese last cases, are ones that ha ve no connection with representa-tional works of art or works of fiction. They illustrate the pervasive-ness of our propensi ty to engage in make-believe, an d theypointtoward the account ofexistence claims Iwill propose inChaptern,many o f which have nothing to do wi th such works. But more needsto be sa id about the ways in which apprecia tors part icpate in thei rgameswi th pictures, novis, plays, and fi lmsand the way s in whichthey donot.6.4. R E S T R I C T I O N S ON P A R T I C I P A T I O NSo far wehave readersa ndspecta tors ofreprescnta t ional works of artpa r t ic ipa t ing in activities analogous to children's games of make-believe. Some may still beu n c o m fo r t ab le with th e analogy. An adu l tcurled up in an a rmcha i r with a novel or standingt ransf ixed before apaint ing seems hardly to be pa r t i c ipa t ing in a game in th e w ay chil-dren do when they p lay dolls or gal lop a round the house st raddl ingsticks. Apprecia tors a re passive, reflective, a nd "distanced," i t mayseem,whilechildren ar eactive, physical,and involved.W e have seen a l ready that in a dd i t ion to pa r t i c ipa t ing mgntncso f

Part icipat ion 2 2 5make-believe, apprecia tors observefictionalworlds to which theyd onot belong, the worlds of the works they appreciate. Children areusually concerned only with th e worlds of their games. If props likedollsa ndsticks have worldstoo,ones analogoust oworkworlds, theyare not often very interesting.But beyond this there a re significant differences in the n a t u r e a ndextent of chi ldren's and apprecia tors ' part icipat ion. The part icipat ionof apprecia tors is restricted in ways in which tha t of children isnot.We need to look carefully at these restrictions, bothbecause they areimportan in themselves and to counteract their tendency to obscureth e just iceof theba sic analogy between appr ecia t ion and thep l ay ingof children's games. It isessential to see thedifferences as differencesof degree.It may be fictional of Lau re n , when sh eplays wi th dol ls, tha t sh ebathes or feedsor dresses a b aby . No one fictionallybathesor feeds ordresses a child whi le viewing Rubens' Helene Fourment and HerChildren. It may be fictional in agame ofdollstha t a babyi shuggedor carried or pra ised or reproved, or left a t home whi le Lauren goesshopping, or discovered under a sof, and so on and on, depending onwha t Laureno r other children actuallyd owithor to thedolls.Noth-ing aviewer does withor to ap i c turewill,ord ina r i l y , mak eit fictionalt ha t he treats a child in any of these ways. By carrying a dol to herfriend's house, Laurenf ict ionallyt akes ababy there. Moving A ntoineGros's Napolen at Eylau from the Louvre to the M etropol i tanMuseum would not count as fict ional ly t ransp ort ing Napolen and an u m b e rof his troops (not to mention thebui ld ingandfieldsshowni nth ebackground)acrossth eAt lant ic.It is fictional in anynorma l gameplayed with th e paintingthat Napolen is a t Eylau,n o ma t t e rw h e r cth e paint ingis .Games played byspecta tors ofpain t ings a re restrictedin tw o ways, compared wi th chi ldren's games: There a re fewetr sor tsof act ions such that it can be fictionalthat th espect a tor p e r fo rm sthem.A nd fewer actionswhich the spectator might actua l ly p e r fo rma re easily interpretable as contr ibutions to the game, as generat ingfictional t ruths . Games played by apprecia tors ofplays, poems,nov-is, and other works a re restricted in similar ways, althoiigh th edctails vary from case to case.Some restrictions are due to the n a t u r e of the props. Pickingu p adol by itsa rms isna tura l l y unders tood a sfictionally lift inga b a b yb yits arms. But Rubens' paint ing does not har similarly gt raspable"arms."Other restrictionsmay be moreconvenional.Itis,Isuppose,a convention of t r a d i t i on a l theater that specta torsare not to jum p

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226 A P P R E C I A T I N G RE P RE S EN T AT I O N Sontoth estage, andtha t if oneshoulddo so, he is not to b eunderstoodas fictionallysaving anyoneor a s fictionallydoinganything a t a l l .W ecould easily unders t and having a principie of generation wherebytalking in a certain tone of voice in f ront of a painting counts asfictionally talking to a baby, or a principie on which by kissing acerta in spot on acanvason emakesit fictionalt ha t on e kissesababy .But it is not the funct ion of works l ike Rubens' paint ing to serve asprops in games of this kind. {Such part icipat ion may be expected ingames with religious icons, however.)Chi ldren's games have l imi ta t ions also, t hough usual ly less exten-siveones. It is not easy,in agame of stump bears, fo rEricto a r rangefo r it to befictionalthat abear chasesh imhome orthath escares on ea w a y by banging on pots. The stump just wll no t cooperate. (O fcourse he could abandon the prop and merely imagine such occur-rences.)Lauren might ,fictionally,hold achild whilei tpracticesw a l k -ing, but wi thout a fancy mechanical dol, she cannot very conven-iently m a k e it fictional t ha t a child learns to wa lk on itsown.

Th e limitations on apprecia tors ' games do not prevent them frombeingimmenselyricha nd varied.Thepart icipat ionof the specta torofVermeer 's GirlReading Letter by Open Window (figure8.8) goes fa rbeyond h is fictionally observing a girl reading a let ter . I t may befictionalt ha t henoticesh er reflection in thewindow, or failst o noticeit; that he glances in passing at thefruits in the foreground, or studiesthem intent ly; that he identifes them or counts them; that he exam-ines the expression on the girl 'sface for clues about the content of theletter. H e m a y ,fictionally,point to the drape hangingover th ewin-dow or to ornaments on the chai r in the crner. It may be fict ionalt ha t he remarks on wha t heknows, or discusses with someone whatmight be in the letter or w h e r e tlie f rui t might have grown. It isfictionalo f the reader of Gulliver's Travels no t onlythat she reads thejournal of a ship's physician about a series of adventures in st rangelands,but a lso tha tsh e reads qu ickly or slowly, withrapt attention orindifference, that sheskims over details or commits them tomemory .In both cases there will be psychological participation: it will befict ionalthat th e appreciatoi ha s thoughts a nd feelings, opinions a ndaltitudes of one or another sort concerning wha t he or she sees orreads about .We have noted sharp contrasts between the activity of appreciatingGirl Reading Lettero r Gulliver's Travels in normal ways and that ofchildren playing dolls a nd simi lar gamesof m ake-believe.There a remany in termedia te cases, ho we v e rg am e s wi th some but no t a ll of

Part icipat ion 2 2 7the restrictions imposed on the former activities. Some of them aregames of standard, establ ished, t radi t ional kinds; others a re irnpro-vised and adhoc.Consideration of these interm ediat e cases and of theease with which restrictions on part icipat ion in appreciators ' gamescan be relaxed will encourage regarding th e differences a s differencesof degree.

Sculptures often allowf orgames that are insome wa ys less restrict-cd than the ones we play wi th pictures. To walk behind a port ra i t i sp robab ly not to m a k eit fictionalthato new a l k sbehindaperson.B utthis is fictional, probably,whenone walks behind( a ro u n d ) Michelan-gelo'sDavid.Caressing a sculpture of a person or even a paint ingca n easily be understood as fictionally caressing a person, even ifconvention does no tsanct ion this understanding a ndsnippy museumguards discourage th e behavior. It is almost impossible not to rega rdth rowing darts a t a port ra i t or sticking pins into it as fictionallyattacking the person portrayed. (It is not easy to b r in goneself to stickpinsintot heportraitof a loved one.) TheRichard}.D a ley exhibitionat the Feigen Gallery in Chicago in1968includedTattered Image byJames Rosenquist , a pink-and-whi te plstic picture of Daleyslitver-tically into ribbons. Spectators shoved theirfistst h rought he picture,of course, fictionally punching Daley. Chi ldren somet imes t rea tpic-tu res like dolls or teddy bears ,feedingpicture t igers and ta king themto bed wi th them, forexample,or sit t ing on pictures of fire engines inorder to r ide on them. These a reunconvent ional gamest o play wi thpictures, but they a re easilyunderstood.Several of these examples a re altered versions of games ordinari lyplayed with representations; they a re like those normal ones exceptfor the addition of certain sorts of overt physical participation. Itwould be ha rd to account for the natura lness of the variants if then o r m a l games did not themselves involve some participation of thekind that occurs L n games ofdolls and other such. children's games.H ow could it be so obvious that to put one's fist through TatteredImage is fictionally to punch Daley ifitwereno t already fictional, justby vi rtueof the fac t ha t th epersoni sstanding infront of the picturethat she is standing in front of D a ley , if she were no t a l readypar-t ic ipating in a game of make-believe? The activities o apprecia t ingrepresentations in norma l waysa re bestscen as t runcated variants ofchildren 's games ofma ke-bel ieve,W hy do we put up with th e rest r ict ions?W ecould, afterall,b ed o w n on the floor playingdolb instead of looking at pictures andr ea d ingnovis. I t must not be assumed that rest r ict ionson apprecia-

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2Z8 A P P R E C I A T I N G R E P R E S E NT ATI O N Stors'games are disadvantages, th at i t i s a lways or evenusual lybetterto p l ay games that a l low for more extensive part icipa t ion. There arebenefits in the l imi ta t ions.Appreciators ' games are typical lyless physical than chi dren's bu tmore reflective,m ore contemplat ive. The rest r ict ions on physical par-ticipation shift th e emphas isto p sychological part icipat ion. The con-vent ion that prevens Harry (Henry's more sophist ica ted brot her)f rom leaping to the defenseof a damseli n distress m ay resul t in hisreflecting more deeplyon her predi cament ;h e does no t in te r rup t hi sreflections to intervene,or do worries abou twhether he should ( f i c -t ional ly) intervene int rude. Since th e g a m e is such that it cannot befictional that he intervenes, i t islikelyto involve a r icher collection offict ional t ruths about his thoughts and feel ings. He also has ampieoppor tun i ty fo r ac tua l l yreflecting onw ha t ,f ict ionally , het h inksa ndfeels.A second advantage that l imi ta t ions on apprecia tors ' part icipat ionm ay have is that of expanding the cont ribut ions the art i st makes totheirgames. Much of wh at i sfictional inappreciators 'games is deter-minedby the work apprecia tedand by thear t i st responsiblefor it . Butthe artist 's role can conlict with participation.I f by wri t ing or paint-ing in a certain way an artist is to arrange for it to be fctional inappreciators 'gamesthat an accused murderer stands ramrod st ra ight ,defiantly, beforeaj udge t h roughouthi strial,t hegamesca nha rd lybeones in which a n app recia tor can m ake i t fict ional that he bad gers theaccused into confessing, orhelpshim toescape, ordisrupts th e court -room. Art ists mak e valuab le cont ribut ions to our games; we benefitf rom their experience,w isdom,and insight . But wem u s t accept corre-sponding rest r ict ions on our own part icipat ion.

The adva ntages are not al lon one side. Playing a game in which thepart icipants themselves, no t artists or p rop makers , a re responsiblefo r the principal fict ional t ruths i s l ike exploring or experiment ing onone's own. In some ways and in some si tuat ions this i s bet ter thanrelying on a wise teacher .To allowthat restrictions on part icipat ion a re sometimes desirableis not to diminish the role of the participation that does occur. Whatisimpor t an tis not simplythe fact t ha tfictionally an accused murderercomports himself in a certa in manner a t his t r ia l , for exampleafictional t ru th fo r which tlie art i st is responsiblebut the fact t ha tfictionally the apprecia tor sees him comport himself t ha t way orknows that hedoes, and has thoughts or feelings of one or another

Part icipat ion 2.2.9sort about his doing so. Tbese fict ional t ruths are generated by thenppreciator and the art i st in col laborat ion, by the apprecia tor 's par-r icipa t ing in a game in which the artist's work is a prop.One common kind of l imi ta t ion onappr ec i a tors' part icipat ion hasno t yet been mentioned. When i t i s viola ted or suspended or j us tabsent, we have wha t Iwil l cali an "aside to the audience."6 A S I D E S TO THE A U D I E N C EIt is fictionalthat th e viewero f La GrandeJatte sees people strollingin a p a r k . But it is not fictional that they se eh i m .T he specta tor of aperformance of Ibsen'sHedda Gablerfictionally hears Hedda speak,bu t it is not fictionalthats headdresseshim or speakstoh i m .It is notcommonly fict ional , in our games wi th representa t ional works, thatcharacters not ice or respond to us, or t ha t w eexchange glances wi ththem orhold conversat ions wi th them.Bu t there are exceptions. "Idon't know i f you happen to take O dDoctor Gordon's Bile Magnesia , which when th e liver isdisorderedgives instant relief, acting like magic a nd impa r t ing an inwa rdglow?" 7 Thus does th e na r ra tor of P. G. Wodehouse's How RightYou Are, Jeeves, speak to the reader. If the actor playing Bal thasarlooks toward th e spectators in del iveringthe following Unes, it isfict ionalthatB a i t ha sa r addresses t hem:Romeo: Soshal t thou show m e friendship.Take thou that .Live and be prosperous, and farewell good fellow.tialthasar [aside]: For all this same, l'll hideme hereabout .

His looks Ifear , and his intents Idoubt.8Caravaggio ' s Bacchus offers a d r inkto the viewer. The fi rst Western,Th e Great Train Robbery (figure 6.z), ends with a shot in which ahand i ta ims a r evolver a t the camera and fi res. There areoccasionsi nf i l m and theater when a character suddenlytu rnst o t he spec t a tor toask advice or appea l fo r sympa thy .9 There is the FirstWorld Warrecrui tment poster captioned "nele Sam Needs You " Let us speak7.Wodehouse, How Right Yow Are, jeeves p 85.8. Shakespeare, Romeo andJiliet,a ct5, se. j.9. For example in TomJones (Tony Richardson, 1 9 6 3 ) a nd The Magic Flut ( I n g m a r

liergman, 1976).

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2.3 A P P R E C I A T I N G REP RE S ENT AT I O N Sof "asides to the audience" (or just "asides")10 in cases like these{alteringsomewhat theusualapplication of this phrase).Asides are not always easy to diagnose, The presence of second-person pronouns or "Dear reader" in a literary work is no sureindication. (or is itnecessarywitnesstheRomeoandjuliet exam-

6.2. Edwin S. Porter, Th e Great Train Robbery, still (1903) . Museum ofModern Art / Film StillsArchive,n W. 53rd Street, Ne w York City.pe.)The aut f iorcanactuallyaddress the reader, as Apuleiusdoes inThe GoldenAs$:"InthisMilesianTale, reader, Ishalls tring togethera medley ofstories, and titillate your agreeable earswith amerrilywhisperednarrative,if youwillnot refuseto seanthisEg y p t i anpaperwritten with a subtle pen of Nilotic reeds,"11 and as Thackerayio.Therear e w h a tare calledasides which are notlotheaudience,as w h e n B a l t h a s a rspeaks his Unes gazingat the sky, but theywon't concern usnow.uApuleius,The Golden AS,p.31.

Participation Z3 1appears to do in Vanity Fair.12Groucho Marx stops in the middle ofAnimal Crackers to retnark (approximately):"Well, thejokescan'ta llbe funny. Yougotta expect that once in awhile."If the readerisactually being addressed, occurrencesof "you" in the text need notindcate that it is fictional that he is.But in instances like these wemightattribute the words to a fic-tional storyteller. We might understand it to be fictional in thegameplayed by the readerof Vanity Fair thathe isaddressedby a story-teller, who then proceeds to tell his tale of harrowingvillainy andcomplicated crime. This gives us an aside af ter all.13In epistolary novis second-person pronouns are likely to "refer"not to theactual readerof thenovelbut to thecharactertowhomtheletter is written; it may not be fictional that the novel reader isaddressed, But perhaps the reader ofLord Jimis to imaginehimself tobe among the f r iends to whom Marlow recounts his experiences.John Barth gives us an especially intriguing example in the fol-lowing paragraph:

The reader You,dogged, uninsultable, print-orientedbastard ,it'syo u I 'm addressing, who else, from inside this monstrous fiction.You 've read methis far,then? E ven this far? Fo rw h a t discreditablemotive? How is it youdon't go to a movie, watch TV, stare at awall, play tennis with a friend, ma k e amorous advances to theper-son who comes to your mind when I speak of amorous advances?C an nothing surfeit, sa t ra te you,tu rn yo u o f f ? Where ' s yourshame? 14The actual readerofBarth 's storymay well feel himself the targetofthistirade.If it is " f ro m insidea fiction" thathe is being addressed,thispresumablymeansthatit is fictionalihathe is addressed, and wehave an aside. (We will j us t haveto swallow the paradox thatfic-tionally the speaker recognizes the fictionwithinwhich he speaks.)But this paragraph is to beunderstood asoccurring withinquota-tions, forBarth contines: "Havingl etgothis barrageofrhetoricaLorat least unanswered questions and observing himsel f neverthelessinmi d s tof yetanothersentenceheconcluded... 15So it is not fic-tionalinm ygame with "LifeStory"thatthe words "The reader Tou,

rz. See thepassagequotedin 7.6.13 .See 9.6. It may ofcoursebebotbfictional andtruethatthe reader isaddr*ssed.Anditmay be the actual authorwho fictonilly addresseshim.14 . "Li fe Story,"p. 113.

i s - Ibid., p. i i

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232. A P P R E C I A T I N G RE P R E S EN T ATI O N Sdogged, uninsultable, print-oriented bas t a rd" a r edirected to me, butr a the r ,appa rent ly , t h a t they are pa r t of a story. It ismerelyfictionalt h a t there is an aside. It is"Life Story"fictional that there is a storysuch t h a t it would be fictional in games played by its readersthattheya re addressed.There a re other possibilit ies, however. I t m a y be t h a t (t o speakintuitively) it is the actual reader of Bar th's story, you or I, who isaddressed from inside the storywi th in the story. Here are a couple ofstabs a twhatthis migh t mean: (a) It is fictional in my game with "LifeStory" that I read a paragraph quoted from a story andthat in doingso Iplay a game inwhich fictionally I am addressed. Again,it isonlyfictional tha t there is an aside,but it is fictional that there is an asidedirected to me. (b) In reading "Thereader You, dogged, uninsul t -able, . . ."I am really playingagame,onedistinct from the gameIplay with th e story a s a whole, in which it is fictional t ha t I amaddressed. So the paragraph taken a lone real ly does contain an asidedirected to me. But it is "Life Story"-fictional that this paragraph,together with its aside, occurs in astory and is directed to whoevershould read that story.We do not encounter qui te the same difficulties in identifying asidesto the audience in the visual arts. It ish a r d to imagine a viewer of apain t ing confusing it s beingfictionalthat Bacchuso r a bandit noticeshim or offers him a drink or a ims a gun a t him with the painter ' sactual ly doing so. There are otherdifficulties, however ; wewill comeupon on e short ly. But let 's focus on rela t ively unproblemat ic casesfirst.Asides can bes ingul a ror p lura l .It is fictional in thegam e played bya viewer of Th e Great TrainRobbery that a ba ndi t a ims a gun a t himalone. But Bal thasar may speak to the a udience as awhole .We mightthink of thespecta tors ofRomeoand Juliet aspart icipat ingin asinglejointg a m eof make-believe, one inwhichit is fictionalt ha t Ba l t ha sa raddresses them al l collectively. But it is usual ly best to unders t andeach indiv idual specta tor of a movie asengaging in his own p r va t egame. (The darkness o the theater encourages this also.) It is fictionalin th e game each specta tor of The Great Train Robbery p lays t h a tagun is aimed directly a t h im, but it is not fictional in any game tha ta gun is aimed directly at all of the spectators at once.This highl ightsa significant difference between f i lm and theater: A n actor on stagccannot a im a gun a t or establ ish eye contact wi th each specta tors imultaneously ; a n actor in filmcan.Asides can be p lu r a leveni ft h egames of make-believe are i n d i v i d -

Participation 2.33ual.When Dostoevski 's UndergroundM a n says, "And so, in the end,ladies and gent lemen,it'sbest to do nothing a tall "16 it is not fic-t ional in any norma l game t h a t he is addressing all of the ac tua lreaders of Notes from the Underground collectively. It is fictional ineach reader 's game t h a t headdresses ag r o u pof people to which th ereader belongs.

Asides are not ra re, but in manycontexts they a re specia l . O ne istaken aback by Bacchus' offer of a drink. It isdisconcerting, ifpleas-antly so, to go to a movie and be recognizedfrom the screen. There issomething surprising, striking about many asides. They m a r k a ni m p o r t a n t shift in one's relation to the fiction.Some will saythat asides "bring the apprecia tor into the fiction,"tha t w esuddenly feel ourselves includedin a fictionalworld in a wayinwhich norm a l ly we a renot.Asides do involve apprecia tors in theworlds of thei r games: it is fictional t ha t th e reader or spec t a tor isnoticed or addressed or offered a drink or threatened. But apprecia-tors belong to thei r game worlds anyway, even wi thout any suchdevice. The natura lness of as idesour readiness to understand thatfictionally someone notices or speaks to us, even if we aresurpr i sedthat th is should be f ict ionalsupports this claim.Whenit is fictionalthat someone looks in a certain direction or uses second-personpro-nouns, why do we so readi ly understand i t to be fict ional that henoticesor addresses usunless it i s f ict ional a l ready that w e are there tobe noticed oraddressed?Bu t i f we do belong to our gam e worlds any wa y, why should therebe anything specia l or remarkab le about asides? Pa r t of the answerlies simply in the fact that b eing recognized or addressed in real lifem a r k s a significant change inone's social si tuat ion. (Think of a stu-dent suddenly cal led on inclass or a lecturer picking out someone inth eupper gal leryan d speaking specifically to h im. )O ne feels includedina manner one wasn'tpreviously.Anasidema kes i t f ict ionalthatt heapprecia tor i s includeds imilar ly . This change may be important , butit doesn't consist in the appreciator ' s suddenly being d r a w ninto aHctional world to which unt i l then he did not belong.The special poignancy of many asides is to be expla ined in p a r t ,however, by rest r ict ions against them. In m a n y contexts they a redeliberately avoided; sometimes they a re more or less. explicitly for-bidden. Henee, for example, the usual instructions to novice filmac to r s not to look a t the c a m e r a . Michae l Fried ha s documented

1 6 . Notes fnim ihe V t td t r f fVut td p.

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2 3 4 A P P R E C I A T I N G R E P R E S E N T A T IONSDiderot's condemnat ion of most asides (to the audience) in theaterand pa in t ing as inpoor taste, and the preference ofpainters such a sJean-Baptiste-Simon C h a r d i n and Jean-Baptiste Greuze for figuresabsorbed inwhat they a re doing and oblivious to everything else,notab ly refusing to acknowledge the beholder's presence.17 Asides areespecially striking when they are unexpected or forbidden, of course.The surpriseissometimes no tunlike that wh ich at tends th e violationof other conventions: a small patch of color in an otherwise black-and-whitesketch, fo r instance.(Diderot seems to think of the beholder asbelonging to a fictionalworld together with th e characters, even when theydo not recognizehim.In explaining why in apaintingofSusannahand the Elders noone is offended by Susannah ,w ho "covers herself wi th al lhe r veils"f rom th e Elders ' viewwhile exposing "herself entirely to the eyes ofthebeholder," he observes: "Itis the differencebetween awomanwho is seen and a woman who exhibits herself . "18 A lthough, as Friednotes, the woma n in Greuze 'sJeuneFilieQuiPicureSon Oiseau Moris"whollyabsorbed in [an] extremestate andobliviousto allelse,"D idero t remarks tha t "soon on e catches oneself conversing with thischild and consoling her" a nd reports wh at he remem bers having saidto her on variousoccasions:"There,there, m ychild,open upyourhear t to m e . " )19Not all asides are equally special or equally disconcerting. Subjectsofportraitscan"lookat the viewer"wthoutraisingeyebrows. Thereis nothing especiallynoteworthy about the fact that the gentlemen inHans Holbein 's painting The Ambassadors appear to be looking ou tat us. Themost obvious explanation isthatinportrai ture , or portrai-ture of certain kinds, there is no restriction against asides; they mayeven be more or lessobl igaory.2 0Henee the u n re m ark able n e ssof thefactthatfictionally the ambassadors notice us. But The Ambassadorscan be understood not to involve asides at all. It may be expected inportraits ofcertain kinds that th esitter willb ema d et o"look st ra ightahead,"to focus,a s itwere,on thespotwhere viewerswlls tand.A nd

17. Fried,Absorption an d Tbeatcality. [The leading actors j arr ive with carefu l , me a -su red steps; theyseek applause, theydepart from th eaction; they address themselvesto theaudience; theytalkto it and becomedulland false"{Diderot,Discours,quoted andtrans-lated in Fried, p. 95).18. Quoted and t ranslated in Fried, Absorption an d Theatcality, p . 97; my i talics.19 . Fried,Absorption an dTheatcality, pp .58-59.10 . "Morenakedlyand as it were categorically than th econventions of any other genre,those of the por tra tcali for exhibi t ing a subject, the si t ter , to the publ ic gaze; put anotherw ay , the basic action depicted in a portrat is the sitter's presentation ofh imselfo rherselftobe beheld" ( ibid. p. 109) .

Participaron 2 3 5becausethisi s expected, i t mayno tbeunderstood to be fictionaltha tth e sitter notices th e viewer. He looks in the direction he does no tbecause he has caught sight of the viewer (so to speak), but simplybecause that i s the way portrai ts of that kind a re painted. (I do notthink there is a definitive answer as to which of these two construalsof works l ike Th e Ambassadors is correct.)

Asides m a k e for moments of interaction, within the appreciator 'sgameworld,betweenhim and one or moreof the work 's characters .Bu t only moments. The interaction remains severely limited. It israre ly fictionalthat th e appreciator carr ieson an extended conversa-tionwith a character , or that he and a character make eyes a t eachother or exchange more than a glance ortwo.21 There is an obviouspractical reason fo r these limits. When th e artist constructs her work,sh e determines, once and for all, what fictionally her characters sayand do. But different appreciators will behave differently in front ofth e work ; what fictionally they say and do , what they choose toattend to and how, what they mutter under their breath will varygreatly, and some will behave in ways the artist did not foresee. So theart is t cannot f i t her characters ' responses to what , fictionally, theappreciator saysordoes.Shecannot customizet hework for thegameany par t icular appreciator mightplaywithit.22 If fictionally Papa-geno,inBergman's rendition ofMozart'sopera, a ppealstothe appre-ciator for sym pathy, i t ma y be f ict ional that the appreciator willinglycomplies,orthathe brushesoff therequest withdisdain,orthatheignores it . What should th e ar t is t (Mozart or B e rgman) have Papa-geno donow? Shouldhem a k eit fictionalthat Papagenob reaksdownin tearsof gratitude, or thathe spits in thespectator's eye?Ratherthan r isk an inapp rop r ia te reaction (or an appropriate one, if thear t is t prefers it to be fictional tha t th e character responds inap-propriately),theinteractioniscut off.Cutt ing of finteraction after anasidecan be a w k w a r d .Ifc a r eis not

zi . talo Calvno 's If on a Wititer's Night a Travele is a long, extended aside; it isfictional in the reader 's game thatheis addressedconstantl ydur ing his reading.B ut therestill is Httle interaction. It is not oftea fictioial that the reader andnarratorrespond verymu ch to eachothero rthat they converse together.Even whenit is fictionalthat tkereaderspeaks and thenarratorreplies,itisthewordsofthetext,raot what thereader actiullysays,that determine whatfictionally hesays. W htnCaKinowri tes:"'Iprefernovis,' she adds,'that bringm eimmedia te ly into aworldwhre everything isprecise, concrete, specific.. .'D oy ou agree? Then sayso . 'A.h,fes,thatsortof b-ook isieal lyworthwhile*"(p .jo),he isputtingwordsinto thereader'smouth, Contrastchildren'sgarnes:ltisbecauseGregoryactual ly says, "Watch out for thehear " that fictionally he says this.2.2. This can be done inimprov isat ionaltheater Itisno accidentthatimprovisaron an daudicnce pa r t i c ipa t ion cifren go together.There is ais in te rac t ive fiction for computers.

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2 3 6 A P P R E C I A T I N G REPR ES EN TATIONSt aken to do it cleanly, t may beunclear when th e aside ends.W em a ybe unce r ta in ,f or example, whetherit is fictional that Papageno delib-eratelyignores whatever responsew em a k e to his request, or whetherit merely fails to be fictional that he acknowledges it. t may seembetter , s impler , to have no interaction a t all, not to allow it to befictionaltha t th eapp rec ia to r isnoticed or addressedin the firstplace.Henee, th e restriction against asides.O ne effect of this restriction and of limitations on participationgenerally is to give th e app rec ia to r a kind of objective, "distanced"perspective on the wor ld of his game. Questions about what fic-t ional ly othersth inkof him, how they do orm ig ht react to him, w h a tmight be demanded of him recede into th e background, as do ques-t ions about how fict ional ly hemigh to r should t ry to influence events.Indeterminacy concerning certain aspects of his place in the g a m eworld typical ly goes with th erestrictions. Noth ing muchis to besaidabout why the strollers inLa G rande Jatte fail to notice m e (assumingitto be fictionalthattheydo notnoticem e n o tj us tnot fictionaltha tthey do) . It is not fictional that they delibera tely ignore me, or tha tthey absentmindedly overlook me. We will not comfortably affirmthat, fictionally,they are too preoccupied with other th ingst o noticeme, or tha t th e explanation isnoneof the above. Some such answersmay be less artificial t h a nothers.2 Even so, the question is out ofplace, silly.T he appreciator doesnot ask why fict ionally no one paysany at tention to h im. And it is not fictional tha t hewonders why noon e does or tha t he tries to come up with a n exp lana t ion .Since convention forbids Harry to come to the assistance of theu n fo r tu n a te heroine (prevents it from being fict ional tha t he does),there isp robab ly no sayingwhat,fictionally, hisreason for not doingso was; neither, I think, is it fictional that the t hought of interveningsimply did not occur to h im. (After all, it is fictionaltha the isdesper-ately concerned about her pl ight a nd feels deeply for her.) There islittleroom fo r questions about whether he ought to get involved orhow he might do so or what peoplewouldthin k of him if he d id or ifhe didn ' t . I twon'tbe fictionalt h a the kickshimself a f t e r wa r ds for nothelping, or makes excuses for his inact ion, or feels guilty or justified.(Har ry may relect onwhether, inreal life, hewould or sliould go tothe aid of a w o m a n in s imila r s trai ts . But this is different.)

z3 -Not all such questions dissolve in mdeterminacy. Why don't the tnen in PieterB r u e g h e PsParableofthe Blindnotice theviewtr? Because theyat e h l i n d ,o h v i o u s l y .It maybe fictional in aviewer's game withUne JeuneFiliethatthegitl doesnot scehim h c c a u s cshe isabsorbed inhe rgnef . ( B u titprobablyisnot fictional tha t the v iewerwould l i avehenoticed f th emenweren't b l i n d or the g i r lweren'tabsorbed in f in t f , o r (or t l i a t m u t t r rth.ithe w o u l d no t have been noticed even m thosc c i rc i in i s tnnccs . )

Participation 2.37The appreciator is thus encouraged to concntrate on fictionalt ru th s abou t what th echaracters are up to, thepredicam ents theyfindthemselves in, and what they think and feel. It is impor tan t , also,w h a tfictionally he th inks and feels about them, but ina bs t r ac t ion , toa certain extent, f rom how they do or might affect him. (Charles 'sconfrontation with th e slime, involvinga n aside as i t does, isu n u s u a linthis respect.) Thisallows theappreciatora kindof empathy withth e characters, a n abil i ty to look a t th ings more purely from theirpoints of view, f rom a perspective relat ively uncontaminated by hisow n personal concerns.The "objectivity" ofth is perspective contr ibutes, no doubt, to theimpression somem ayhave tha t app rec ia to r sdo notordina rily belongto fictional worlds a t all, t ha tin t he absence of as ides anywaytheymerely observe fromwithout. Thisimpressionis mistaken, butwe can think of the appreciator as