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VOX - The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy iSSue Xii - Summer 2010

WHAT IS THE PLACE OF SELF-CON-TROL IN ARIISTOTLE’S ETHICAL

system? It is tempting to assume that all theories of morality must award their highest honours to the show-ing of self-restraint – especially those theories of the ancient world, where the character traits of self-control and toleration were rarely displayed. As we shall see however, the highest form of moral character in Aristotle’s virtue ethics is that which no longer has any need of self-control. Aristotle divides the virtues into those relating to the part of the soul which reasons (intellectual virtue) and those relating to the part which is guided by reason (moral virtue). Our discussion is confined to moral virtue. Aristotle defines moral virtue as nei-ther a pathos (passion or emotion) nor a faculty (the capacity to feel emotions), but rather a hexis (state or disposition). The genus of moral virtue, then, is a state of character – that is, a disposi-tion to experience emotion in a certain way. Aristotle explicates this in the dif-ferentia of moral virtue: it is a state of character in which emotions are expe-rienced according to an intermediate or mean. That is, a mean which rests between an excess and a deficiency. We stand well with reference to our

emotions, he claims, if we feel them moderately (p.35) . Likewise, we stand badly if we feel them “violently or too weakly” (p.35). Aristotle is not, however, say-ing that we should experience our emo-tions to an intermediate degree in all situations, but to a degree which is ap-propriate given the particular circum-stances. For example, it is inappropri-ate to experience the same amount of anger towards a trivial slight and an act of murder. Rather, the mean amount of emotion is that which it is appropri-ate for the agent to feel in the particu-lar situation – neither always becoming enraged, for instance, nor always being a placid and indifferent observer. Moral virtue is not only concerned with how an agent feels emotions however, but also with which actions he performs, and how he performs them. As with virtuously felt emotions, virtuous acts

VIRTUE AND ENKRATEIA

By James Hodgson

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VOX - The STudenT JOurnal Of POliTicS, ecOnOmicS and PhilOSOPhy iSSue Xii - Summer 2010

are those which correspond to a mean; instead of acting in a cowardly or rash manner, for example, the appropriate act is that which corresponds to an in-termediate of courage. With regard to the relationship between virtuous feeling and virtuous action, and to what is needed for an act to be virtuous, it is useful to consider Aristotle’s account of how a person becomes morally virtuous. People are not born morally virtuous, as “none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature” (p.28). Rather, they arise as a result of habit. Just as one becomes a musician only by practising the playing of music, one who wishes to acquire moral virtue does so by a process of habituation – a result of practising acts displaying a mean. However, it is not enough for an act to display a mean for it to be considered virtuous. Aristotle gives three conditions for the perfor-mance of a virtuous act: the agent must have knowledge of the virtuous act, that is, he must know what it is that he is doing; he must “choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes” (p.34), that is, not as a means to some other end; and the act must arise from a “firm and unchangeable char-acter” (p.34), so that the disposition to act virtuously was not merely a passing inclination. With regards to virtuous ac-tions, consider the following passage from EN II.4: “Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate

man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temper-ate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them” (p.35).

What Aristotle claims, then, is that ac-tions can only be virtuous when they are done by a virtuous person – that is, acts arising from a settled disposition to act virtuously. The acts by which we become virtuous, therefore, may appear to an external observer to be acts of virtue as they correspond to a mean. However, they are only approxi-mations to virtuous acts, as they are not yet done in a manner which meets the three set conditions. The virtuous act is the one which is performed just as the virtuous person would perform it – that is, emanating from a virtuous state of character. Therefore, acting virtuously is conditional upon experi-encing the corresponding emotions in a virtuous way – that is, to perform a virtuous act the agent must actualise his virtuously felt emotions. We see Aristotle’s virtuous person more clearly if we examine the contrast between the virtuous and the continent, self-controlled person (enkrates). The virtuous agent knows which actions are appropriate,

Acting virtuously is conditional upon experiencing the correspond-ing emotions in a virtuous way.

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experiences emotions with respect to a mean, and so chooses the action which corresponds to virtue. The continent man also knows which actions are proper, and acts in accordance with that knowledge; that is, he outwardly acts in the same manner as the virtu-ous person. He does not, however, en-joy doing so. He does not experience emotion as the virtuous person does, and so he does not act virtuously. His actions are self-enforced, as he knows the proper course of action but would like to act differently – he experiences inner conflict and must exert control over himself if he is to act according to an outwardly virtuous standard. The virtuous person, however, is without such friction. The act dis-playing the mean which he performs is virtuous because it is in harmony with his virtuously felt emotions; indeed, it is an actualisation of his emotions. Moreover, the virtuous person likes and desires to act in this way without reservation. The difference between the virtuous and the self-controlled person, then, is that the virtuous per-son performs acts corresponding to a virtuous mean because he feels emo-tions which also correspond to a virtu-ous mean, and so wants to perform the act and enjoys it; the continent person, however, performs the same acts, but only because he disciplines himself to do so – not from any established dis-position to do so. For example, in a situation which calls for courage, the continent

man may be tempted to act in a cow-ardly or rash manner, but does not be-cause he knows which act is appropri-ate and so forces himself to perform it, even though he would like to do something else because his emotions are not habituated to a mean. The vir-tuous man would feel no such tempta-tion, as it would not occur to him to act rashly; he performs the appropriate act of courage because he desires to do so. It is not that he would not expe-rience fear – to do so would be insen-sible. Rather, he would experience the correct amount of the emotion of fear – an amount which cautions but does not overpower. In conclusion, for Aristotle, to feel the temptation to cowardice or rashness, even if one acts appropri-ately, is to expose a defect of charac-ter because one’s emotions are not felt virtuously, however praiseworthy one’s actions may be. For Aristotle, there-fore, the superior moral character will have risen above the need for self-con-trol.

All references refer to Aristotle (1998) The Nicomachean Ethics Translated by W.D. Ross (Oxford World’s Classics Edition, Oxford University Press)._____________________________

James Hodgson is a graduate student reading Political Philosophy (The Idea of Toleration) at the University of York.