Villasis Notes in Civil Procedure (Suprema Legis).pdf

* www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com / [email protected] / [email protected] 1

2014 BAR REVIEWER ONCIVIL PROCEDURE

BY: PROF. CHRISTIAN KIT VILLASIS


SUPREMA LEGIS REVIEWSAND SEMINARS

UPDATES ON CRITICAL AREAS INCIVIL PROCEDURE

ATTY. CHRISTIAN KIT VILLASIS *

GENERAL PRINCIPLES1. THE SUPREME COURT NOW HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO

PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE INALL COURTS. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS. HEIRS OFFERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. NOS. 158090, OCTOBER 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

2. PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY OF COURTS: A becomingregard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for theissuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed withthe Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. Adirect invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writsshould be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearlyand specifically set out in the petition. (CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA ANDSANGGUNIANG BARANGAY OF BALATASAN, BULALACAO, ORIENTAL MINDORO VS.MAYOR ENRILO VILLAS ET AL., G.R. NO. 187256, FEB. 23, 2011, VELASCO, JR., J.)

__________________________________________________________* Holder, Justice Arsenio Dizon Award in Remedial Law* Chairman, 2012 and 2013 Committee of Experts in Remedial Law* Member, Committee for Revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure* MCLE Lecturer* Professor and BAR Reviewer in Remedial Law

- University of the Philippines Law Center (UPLC), Manuel L. Quezon University (MLQU), New EraUniversity (NEU), University of Manila (UM), Jose Rizal University (JRU), University of Santo Tomas ReviewCenter, Adamson University BAR Review, University of Cebu BAR Review, University of San Carlos BARReview, UM Bar Review Program, MLQU BAR Review, National Bar Review Center (NBRC), Lex Reviews andSeminars, Inc. (LEX), Philippine Social Justice Foundation (PHILJUST), Magnificus Juris BAR Review Center,Powerhaus Law Review Center, Inc., Center for Professional Reviews and Seminars (CPRS), Suprema LegisReviews and Seminars, I-Secure On-line BAR Review, Chan Robles BAR Review, Great Minds BAR Review,Primus BAR Review, Sed Lex MCLE Provider, Inc., ACLEX MCLE Provider, Inc., Center for Global Best Practices(CGBP), etc.


3. DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY: NO COURT CAN INTERFERE BYINJUNCTION WITH THE JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS OF ANOTHER COURT OFCONCURRENT JURISDICTION HAVING THE POWER TO GRANT THE RELIEFSOUGHT BY THE INJUNCTION. (ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI VS. JUDGE RASAD G.BALINDONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2225, SEPTEMBER 6, 2011, PER CURIAM)

4. RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF THE FRESH PERIOD OF 15 DAYS: Tostandardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal theircases, the Supreme Court ruled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that litigants must begiven a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal, counted from receipt of theorder dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration under Rules 40,41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of Court. In Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, the Supreme Court held that thei principle retroactively applies even tocases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, there beingno vested rights in the rules of procedure (ELENA JANE DUARTE VS. MIGUEL SAMUEL,A.E. DURAN, G.R. NO. 173038, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

JURISDICTION1. JURISDICTION OVER THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AND ITS

SUBJECT MATTER THEREOF DOES NOT DEPEND UPON THE DEFENSES SETFORTH IN AN ANSWER OR A MOTION TO DISMISS. THE SAME RATIONALEAPPLIES TO AN ANSWER WITH A MOTION TO DISMISS (MONTAER VS. SHARIADISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975, JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

2. LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER MAY BERAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. JURISDICTION OVER THESUBJECT MATTER IS CONFERRED ONLY BY THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW.IT CANNOT BE ACQUIRED THROUGH A WAIVER OR ENLARGED BY THEOMISSION OF THE PARTIES OR CONFERRED BY THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THECOURT. CONSEQUENTLY, QUESTIONS OF JURISDICTION MAY BE COGNIZABLEEVEN IF RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. (KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 192289, JANUARY 08, 2013, REYES, J.)

2.1. DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL OR ESTOPPEL BY LACHES:In TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY (131 Phil. 556 (1968), the party-litigant activelyparticipated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from theappellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction.Considering the unique facts in that case, the Supreme Court held that estoppel bylaches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack ofjurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, 14 July 2008, 558SCRA 63, the Supreme Court cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exceptionto the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose factual milieuis similar to that in the latter case (REPUBLIC VS. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENTCORPORATION, G. R. NO. 162322, MARCH 14, 2012, SERENO, J.).


2.2. LACHES SHOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENT FOR THE SIBONGHANOYDOCTRINE TO APPLY BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN TIJAM VS.SIBONGHANOY IS MERELY AN EXCEPTION RATHER THAN THE RULE. (CELIAVDA. DE HERRERA VS. EMELITA AND CRISANTO BERNARDO, G.R. NO. 170251, JUNE1, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

2.3. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS CONFERRED BYLAW. R.A. NO. 879945 CONFERRED JURISDICTION OVER INTRA-CORPORATECONTROVERSIES ON COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION OR RTCS, TO BEDESIGNATED BY THE SUPREME COURT. (VITALIANO N. AGUIRRE II VS. FQB+7,INC., G.R. NO. 170770, JANUARY 9, 2013, DEL CASTILLO, J.)

3. IN CIVIL CASES, JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THEDEFENDANT MAY BE ACQUIRED EITHER BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS OR BY THEDEFENDANTS VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN COURT AND SUBMISSION TO ITSAUTHORITY. (OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION VS. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS,INC., G. R. NO. 183035, JANUARY 9, 2013, SERENO, CJ.)

3.1. THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED ASUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT: (ALLAN C. GO, VS.MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

3.2. A DEFENDANT WHO FILES A MOTION TO DISMISS, ASSAILING THEJURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER HIS PERSON, TOGETHER WITH OTHERGROUNDS RAISED THEREIN, IS NOT DEEMED TO HAVE APPEAREDVOLUNTARILY BEFORE THE COURT. (EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. BRITISHAIRWAYS, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.)

3.3. WHEN A DEFENDANTS APPEARANCE IS MADE PRECISELY TOOBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OVER HIS PERSON, IT CANNOTBE CONSIDERED AS APPEARANCE IN COURT. IN THIS CASE, WHILE LIMSONAND AROLLADO GLOSSED OVER THE ALLEGED LACK OF SERVICE OFSUMMONS, HOWEVER, THEY PROCEEDED TO EXHAUSTIVELY DISCUSS WHYSBCS COMPLAINT COULD NOT PROSPER AGAINST THEM AS SURETIES. ERGO,THEY THEREBY VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO THEJURISDICTION OF THE MAKATI RTC (JAPRL DEVELOPMENT CORP., VS. SECURITYBANK CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 190107, JUNE 6, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.)

3.4 A DEFENDANTS VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION ISEQUIVALENT TO SERVICE OF SUMMONS. AS HELD PREVIOUSLY, THE FILINGOF MOTIONS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF, SUCH AS, TO ADMIT ANSWER,FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO FILE ANSWER, FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ADEFAULT JUDGMENT, AND TO LIFT ORDER OF DEFAULT WITH MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION, ARE CONSIDERED VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO THEJURISDICTION OF THE COURT. (DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HON. REINATO G.QUILALA, G.R. NO. 168723, JULY 9, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.)


3.5. GENERAL RULE: FILING PLEADINGS SEEKING AFFIRMATIVERELIEF CONSTITUTES VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE, AND THE CONSEQUENTSUBMISSION OF ONES PERSON TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.

EXCEPTIONS: This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for theavoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance.These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds fordismissal are included; (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on theground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quasha warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file themwould constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. Thethird is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcingthe submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion toquash a warrant of arrest. (JOSE C. MIRANDA VS. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, G.R. NO.158763, MARCH 31, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)

3.6. THE RTC HAD INDEED ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THEPERSON OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN THE LATTER'S COUNSEL ENTEREDHIS APPEARANCE ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S BEHALF, WITHOUTQUALIFICATION AND WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF THESERVICE OF SUMMONS, AND EVEN FILED TWO MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OFTIME TO FILE ANSWER. (LEAH PALMA VS. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, G.R. NO.165273, MARCH 10, 2010, PERALTA, J.)

3.7 DEFENDANTS FILING OF A MOTION FOR RE-SETTING OF THEHEARING EFFECTIVELY CURED THE DEFECT OF THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICEOF SUMMONS. (VIRGILIO P. CEZAR VS. HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA, G.R. NO.136415, OCTOBER 31, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)

4. THE EXCLUSION OF THE TERM DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND INDETERMINING THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 19 (8) ANDSECTION 33 (1) OF B.P. BLG. 129, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 7691, APPLIES TOCASES WHERE THE DAMAGES ARE MERELY INCIDENTAL TO OR ACONSEQUENCE OF THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION. HOWEVER, IN CASES WHERETHE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION, OR ONE OF THECAUSES OF ACTION, THE AMOUNT OF SUCH CLAIM SHALL BE CONSIDERED INDETERMINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT (Administrative Circular No. 09-94) (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. NO.173915, FEBRUARY 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

5. THE PAYMENT IN FULL OF THE DOCKET FEES WITHIN THEPRESCRIBED PERIOD IS MANDATORY. (THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO,SR., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 116121, JULY 18, 2011, MENDOZA, J.).

5.1. THE DOCKET FEES ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT SHOULDBE PAID AT THE TIME OF THE FILING THEREOF. HENCE THE SUPPLEMENTALCOMPLAINT SHOULD BE EXPUNGED IF THE DOCKET FEES THEREON WERE


NOT PAID. THE TRIAL COURT NONETHELESS DOES NOT LOSE THEJURISDICTION IT HAD ACQUIRED OVER THE CASE WITH THE FILING OF THEORIGINAL COMPLAINT. (DO-ALL METAL INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SECURITY BANKCORP., JANUARY 10, 2011, ABAD., J.)

5.2. DUE TO THE NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES ON PETITIONER'SPERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM, THE TRIAL COURT NEVER ACQUIREDJURISDICTION OVER IT. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS.HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. NOS. 158090, OCTOBER 4, 2010,PERALTA, J.).

6. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER ORDERS,DIRECTIVES AND DECISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN INADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES ONLY. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS.HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA, G.R. NO. 151800, NOVEMBER 5, 2009,THIRD DIVISION, PERALTA, J.).

7. EFFECT OF A PARTYS RELIANCE ON THE CLERK OF COURTSINSUFFICIENT ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCKET FEES: IF THE PARTY FILINGTHE CASE PAID LESS THAN THE CORRECT AMOUNT FOR THE DOCKET FEESBECAUSE THAT WAS THE AMOUNT ASSESSED BY THE CLERK OF COURT, THERESPONSIBILITY OF MAKING A DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT LIES WITH THESAME CLERK OF COURT. IN SUCH A CASE, THE LOWER COURT CONCERNEDWILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY LOSE JURISDICTION, BECAUSE OF A PARTYSRELIANCE ON THE CLERK OF COURTS INSUFFICIENT ASSESSMENT OF THEDOCKET FEES. HOWEVER, THE PARTY CONCERNED WILL BE REQUIRED TOPAY THE DEFICIENCY (MONTAER VS. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, G.R. NO. 174975,JANUARY 20, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, PUNO, C.J.).

8. A PUBLIC OFFICIALS RESIGNATION DOES NOT RENDER MOOT ANADMINISTRATIVE CASE THAT WAS FILED PRIOR TO THE OFFICIALSRESIGNATION. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.,G.R. NO. 16467, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.).

9. THE METC CAN NOW ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER ACCIONPUBLICIANA CASES. (BF CITILAND CORPORATION VS. MARILYN B. OTAKE, G.R. NO.173351, JULY 29, 2010, CARPIO, J.).

RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE1. IF THE EXTENSION FOR THE FILING OF PLEADINGS CANNOT BE

ALLOWED, IT IS ILLOGICAL AND INCONGRUOUS TO ADMIT A PLEADING THATIS ALREADY FILED LATE. TO ADMIT A LATE ANSWER IS TO PUT A PREMIUM ONDILATORY MEASURES, THE VERY MISCHIEF THAT THE RULES SEEK TOREDRESS. (TERAA VS. DESAGUN, G.R. NO. 152131, APRIL 29, 2009, SECONDDIVISION, BRION, J.).


1.1. THE FAILURE OF ONE PARTY TO SUBMIT HIS POSITION PAPERDOES NOT BAR AT ALL THE MTC FROM ISSUING A JUDGMENT ON THEEJECTMENT COMPLAINT. (TERAA VS. DESAGUN, G.R. NO. 152131, APRIL 29,2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.).

2. THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF A JUDGMENTPROHIBITED UNDER SEC. 19(C) OF THE RSP IS THAT WHICH SEEKSRECONSIDERATION OF A JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE COURT AFTER TRIALON THE MERITS. THE DISMISSAL ORDER FOR PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TOAPPEAR IN THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE IS NOT A JUDGMENT ON THEMERITS AFTER TRIAL OF THE CASE. (LUCAS V. FABROS, 324 SCRA 1).

CIVIL PROCEDUREACTIONS

1. PERSONAL ACTION AND REAL ACTIONS: In a personal action, theplaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or therecovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to orpossession of real property, or interest therein (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA VS. COURTOF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, 2ND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.).

1.1. AN ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WOULD STILL BECONSIDERED A REAL ACTION WHERE IT SEEKS THE CONVEYANCE ORTRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY, OR ULTIMATELY, THE EXECUTION OF DEEDSOF CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY. (GOCHAN V. GOCHAN, 423 PHIL. 491, 501(2001); COPIOSO VS. COPIOSO, 391 SCRA 325 (2002).

2. IN PERSONAM, IN REM AND QUASI IN REM ACTIONS: An action inpersonam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem isdirected against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in remnames a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in aproperty to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing"itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action inrem. (JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710, SECOND DIVISION, June6, 2011 NACHURA, J.)

2.1. ACTION IN PERSONAM: THE PROCEEDINGS TO ENFORCEPERSONAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AND IN WHICH PERSONAL JUDGMENTSARE RENDERED ADJUSTING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THEAFFECTED PARTIES IS IN PERSONAM. HENCE, ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY OFREAL PROPERTY ARE IN PERSONAM. (EMERITA MUNOZ VS. ATTY. VICTORIANO R.YABUT, JR. AND SAMUEL GO CHAN, G.R. NO. 142676, JUNE 6, 2011, LEONARDO-DECASTRO, J.).


2.1.1. ACTION IN PERSONAM: THE ACTION FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF AFOREIGN JUDGMENT IS AN ACTION IN PERSONAM BECAUSE PRIVATERESPONDENTS ARE SUING TO ENFORCE THEIR PERSONAL RIGHTS UNDERSAID JUDGMENT. (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON. PABLO R.CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, TINGA, J.).

2.2. ACTION IN REM: A PETITION DIRECTED AGAINST THE "THING"ITSELF OR THE RES, WHICH CONCERNS THE STATUS OF A PERSON, LIKE APETITION FOR ADOPTION, ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, OR CORRECTION OFENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS AN ACTION IN REM. (JESSE U. LUCASVS. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. NO. 190710, 2ND DIVISION, JUNE 6, 2011, NACHURA, J.).

CAUSE OF ACTION1. CAUSE OF ACTION: A cause of action is the act or omission by which a

party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it containsthree essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means andwhatever law it arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect suchright; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. Ifany of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motionto dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action (DEVELOPMENTBANK OF THE PHILS. VS. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO & CRISTINA TRINIDAD ZARATEROMERO, G.R. NO. 163827, AUGUST 17, 2011, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

2. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION VS. LACK OF CAUSE OFACTION: Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of thepleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On theother hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where the evidence does notprove the cause of action alleged in the pleading. x x x If the allegations of thecomplaint do not aver the concurrence of the elements of cause of action, thecomplaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure tostate a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of actionthat is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaintstates no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at theearliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of actionmay be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis ofthe stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented (DOLORES ADORA MACASLANGVS. RENATO & MELBA ZAMORA, G.R. NO. 156375, MAY 30, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

3. AN AMENDED COMPLAINT THAT CHANGES THE PLAINTIFFSCAUSE OF ACTION IS TECHNICALLY A NEW COMPLAINT. CONSEQUENTLY, THEACTION IS DEEMED FILED ON THE DATE OF THE FILING OF SUCH AMENDEDPLEADING, NOT ON THE DATE OF THE FILING OF ITS ORIGINAL VERSION.THUS, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION RESUMES ITS RUN UNTIL IT ISARRESTED BY THE FILING OF THE AMENDED PLEADING. (SPOUSES VICENTEDIONISIO AT ANITA DIONISIO VS. WILFREDO LINSANGAN, G.R. NO. 178159, MARCH 2,2011, ABAD, J.).


4. SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION is the act of dividing a single orindivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or moreactions upon them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be splitup or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions(CATALINA CHU ET AL. VS. SPS. FERNANDO CUNANAN & TRINIDAD CUNANAN, G.R.NO. 156185, SEPTEMBER 12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

5. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION: THE RULE ON JOINDER OFACTIONS UNDER SECTION 5, RULE 2 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVILPROCEDURE, REQUIRES THAT THE JOINDER SHALL NOT INCLUDE SPECIALCIVIL ACTIONS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL RULES. (ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOPOF SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA VS. FERNANDO SORIANO JR., ET AL., G.R. NO.153829, AUGUST 17, 2011,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

PARTIES1. REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST: EVERY ACTION MUST BE

PROSECUTED OR DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST: A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that theplaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause ofaction (ALLAN C. GO, VS. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. NO. 164703, MAY 4, 2010,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

1.1. IN A DERIVATIVE SUIT, THE CORPORATION IS THE REAL PARTY ININTEREST WHILE THE STOCKHOLDER FILING SUIT FOR THE CORPORATIONSBEHALF IS ONLY A NOMINAL PARTY. THE CORPORATION SHOULD THEREFOREBE INCLUDED AS A PARTY IN THE SUIT. (SANTIAGO CUA, JR., ET. AL. VS. MIGUELOCAMPO TAN ET. AL., G.R. NO. 181455-56, DECEMBER 4, 2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

1.2. IN PROCEEDINGS TO SET ASIDE AN EXECUTION SALE, THE REALPARTY IN INTEREST IS THE PERSON WHO HAS AN INTEREST EITHER IN THEPROPERTY SOLD OR THE PROCEEDS THEREOF. (PANTRANCO EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION [PEA-PTGWO] VS. NLRC, G.R. NO. 170689, MARCH 17, 2009, THIRDDIVISION, NACHURA, J.).

2. LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE DISTINGISHED FROM THELACK OF PERSONALITY TO SUE. Lack of legal capacity to sue means that theplaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessaryqualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation heclaims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue uponproof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure tostate a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confusedwith the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffsgeneral disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lackof juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latterrefers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly,the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal


capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismissbased on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause ofaction. (NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA VS. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 157447,APRIL 29, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)

3. THE GENERAL RULE WITH REFERENCE TO THE MAKING OFPARTIES IN A CIVIL ACTION REQUIRES, OF COURSE, THE JOINDER OF ALLNECESSARY PARTIES WHERE POSSIBLE, AND THE JOINDER OF ALLINDISPENSABLE PARTIES UNDER ANY AND ALL CONDITIONS, THEIR PRESENCEBEING A SINE QUA NON FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER. (MAXIMINA A.BULAWAN VS. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, G.R. NO. 182819, JUNE 22, 2011, CARPIO, J.).

4. NON-JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FORTHE DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. PARTIES MAY BE ADDED BY ORDER OF THECOURT ON MOTION OF THE PARTY OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE AT ANY STAGEOF THE ACTION AND/OR SUCH TIMES AS ARE JUST. IF THE PETITIONER ORPLAINTIFF REFUSES TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY DESPITE THEORDER OF THE COURT, THE LATTER MAY DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ORPETITION FOR THE PETITIONER OR PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TO COMPLYTHEREFOR. THE REMEDY IS TO IMPLEAD THE NON-PARTY CLAIMED TO BEINDISPENSABLE. (NOCOM VS. CAMERINO, G.R. NO. 182984, FEBRUARY 10, 2009,FIRST DIVISION, AZCUNA, J.).

4.1. INDISPENSABLE PARTIES: WHERE THE EJECTMENT SUIT ISBROUGHT BY A CO-OWNER, WITHOUT REPUDIATING THE CO-OWNERSHIP,THEN THE SUIT IS PRESUMED TO BE FILED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE OTHERCO-OWNERS AND MAY PROCEED WITHOUT IMPLEADING THE OTHER CO-OWNERS. THE OTHER CO-OWNERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS INDISPENSABLEPARTIES TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE. On the other hand, where the co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the propertyor where the suit is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensableparties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights andinterests of these other co-owners. (MARMO VS. ANACAY, G.R. NO. 182585,NOVEMBER 27, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.).

5. JOINDER OF PARTIES: WHERE THE OBLIGATION OF THE PARTIESIS SOLIDARY, EITHER OF THE PARTIES IS INDISPENSABLE, AND THE OTHER ISNOT EVEN A NECESSARY PARTY BECAUSE COMPLETE RELIEF IS AVAILABLEFROM EITHER. (HERMANA R. CEREZO VS. DAVID TUAZON, G.R. NO. 141538, MARCH23, 2004, CARPIO, J.)

5.1. WHENEVER IT APPEARS TO THE COURT IN THE COURSE OF APROCEEDING THAT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY HAS NOT BEEN JOINED, IT ISTHE DUTY OF THE COURT TO STOP THE TRIAL AND TO ORDER THEINCLUSION OF SUCH PARTY. (ELPIDIO S. UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.157065, JULY 11, 2006, QUISUMBING, J.)


6. AN UNLICENSED FOREIGN CORPORATION NOT DOING BUSINESS INTHE PHILIPPINES CAN SUE BEFORE PHILIPPINE COURTS. AN EXPORTER ISNOT DEEMED TO BE DOING BUSINESS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY BY THE SIMPLEFACT OF EXPORTING PRODUCTS TO SUCH FOREIGN COUNTRY. (B. VAN ZUIDENBROS., LTD., V. GTVL MFG. INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. NO. 147905, 28 MAY 2007).

7. THERE IS NO LAW WHICH VEST JURIDICAL OR LEGALPERSONALITY UPON A SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP NOR EMPOWER IT TO FILE ORDEFEND AN ACTION IN COURT. (ROGER V. NAVARRO, VS. HON. JOSE L.ESCOBIDO, G.R. NO. 153788, NOVEMBER 27, 2009, BRION, J.).

8. IN A CASE INVOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, STANDING ORLOCUS STANDI MEANS PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE CASE SUCH THAT THEPARTY HAS SUSTAINED OR WILL SUSTAIN DIRECT INJURY AS A RESULT OFTHE GOVERNMENT ACTION BEING CHALLENGED. TO HAVE LEGAL STANDING,THE PETITIONER MUST HAVE DIRECT, PERRSONAL AND SUBSTANTIALINTEREST TO PROTECT. (EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO VS. HON. GUILLERMO N.CARAGUE, G.R. NO. 161065, APRIL 15, 2005, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.)

8.1. ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE ARE CONSIDEREDEXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE ON STANDING: The Court, through Associate JusticeFlorentino P. Feliciano (now retired), provided the following instructive guides asdeterminants in determining whether a matter is of transcendental importance:(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of aclear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the publicrespondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any otherparty with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.(CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) VS.ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) AND MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY(MERALCO), G.R. NO. 174697, JULY 8, 2010, BRION, J.).

9. A CLASS SUIT IS NOT PROPER WHERE THERE IS A CLEARINDICATION THAT THERE IS A DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS AND VIEWS AMONGTHE MEMBERS OF THE CLASS SOUGHT TO BE REPRESENTED, AND NOT ALLARE IN FAVOR OF FILING THE PRESENT SUIT. In Ibanes v. Roman CatholicChurch, 413 Phil. 281 (2001), the Supreme Court held that where the interests of theplaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametricallyopposed, the class suit will not prosper. (ATTY. SILVIA BANDA, ET.AL., V. EXECUTIVESECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. NO. 166620, APRIL 20, 2010, LEONARDO-DECASTRO, J.).

10. SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL: SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL SHOULDNOT BE PRESUMED FROM THE MERE FILING OF A NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OFA NEW LAWYER. (SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. ANGEL C. PONTILLAS, G.R. NO.155178, MAY 7, 2008, CARPIO, J.)

VENUE


1. VENUE: WHERE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO EITHER FILE AMOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE OR INCLUDE THESAME AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE, HE IS DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED HISRIGHT TO OBJECT TO IMPROPER VENUE (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS.COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION,VELASCO, JR., J.).

1.1. VENUE OF PERSONAL ACTIONS INVOLVING SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS:WHEN THERE IS MORE THAN ONE PLAINTIFF IN A PERSONAL ACTION CASE,THE RESIDENCES OF THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES SHOULD BE THE BASIS FORDETERMINING PROPER VENUE. (IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OFAPPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO,JR., J.).

2. VENUE OF REAL ACTIONS: REAL ACTIONS SHALL BE COMMENCEDAND TRIED IN THE COURT THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE AREA WHERETHE PROPERTY IS SITUATED. HOWEVER, THE RULES PROVIDE ANEXCEPTION, IN THAT REAL ACTIONS CAN BE COMMENCED AND TRIED IN ACOURT OTHER THAN WHERE THE PROPERTY IS SITUATED IN INSTANCESWHERE THE PARTIES HAVE PREVIOUSLY AND VALIDLY AGREED IN WRITINGON THE EXCLUSIVE VENUE THEREOF. (PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT &DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETING TECHNOLOGIES, INC. VS. UNIONBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO. 179018, JUNE 18, 2012, SERENO, J.).

3. STIPULATIONS ON VENUE: THE GENERAL RULES ON VENUE OFACTIONS SHALL NOT APPLY WHERE THE PARTIES, BEFORE THE FILING OFTHE ACTION, HAVE VALIDLY AGREED IN WRITING ON AN EXCLUSIVE VENUE.(PAGLAUM MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND HEALTH MARKETINGTECHNOLOGIES, INC. VS. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL., G.R. NO.179018, JUNE 18, 2012, SERENO, J.).

3.1. WRITTEN STIPULATIONS AS TO VENUE MAY BE RESTRICTIVE INTHE SENSE THAT THE SUIT MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE PLACE AGREED UPON,OR MERELY PERMISSIVE IN THAT THE PARTIES MAY FILE THEIR SUIT NOTONLY IN THE PLACE AGREED UPON BUT ALSO IN THE PLACES FIXED BY LAW.(JESUSITO D. LEGASPI VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 160653, JULY23, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.).

3.2. UNDER THE COMPLEMENTARY-CONTRACTS-CONSTRUED-TOGETHER DOCTRINE, AN ACCESSORY CONTRACT MUST BE READ IN ITSENTIRETY AND TOGETHER WITH THE PRINCIPAL AGREEMENT. THUS, THESURETYSHIP AGREEMENT CAN ONLY BE ENFORCED IN CONJUNCTION WITHTHE PROMISSORY NOTE. ERGO, THE VENUE STIPULATION IN THEPROMISSORY NOTE ALSO APPLIES TO THE SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT AS ANANCILLARY CONTRACT OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE. (PHIL. BANK OFCOMMUNICATIONS V. LIM, ET.AL., G.R. 158138, APRIL 12, 2005, PANGANIBAN, J.)


3.3. STIPULATION ON VENUE: THE EXCLUSIVE VENUE OF MAKATICITY, AS STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES AND SANCTIONED BY SECTION 4, RULE4 OF THE RULES OF COURT, CANNOT BE MADE TO APPLY TO THE PETITIONFOR EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE FILED BY RESPONDENT BANK BECAUSETHE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 PERTAIN TO VENUE OF ACTIONS, WHICH ANEXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE IS NOT. (SPOUSES HERMES P. OCHOA ANDARACELI D. OCHOA CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 192877, MARCH 23,2011, NACHURA, J.).

4. THE VENUE OF REAL ACTIONS AFFECTING PROPERTIES FOUND INDIFFERENT PROVINCES IS DETERMINED BY THE SINGULARITY OR PLURALITYOF THE TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING SAID PARCELS OF LAND. (UNITEDOVERSEAS BANK PHILS. (FORMERLY WESTMONT BANK) VS. ROSEMOORE MINING &DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NOS. 159669 & 163521, MARCH 12, 2007, TINGA, J.)

PLEADINGS1. THE REQUIREMENTS OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING ARE NOT JURISDICTIONAL. (SPOUSES EUGENE L.LIM VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 192615, JANUARY 30, 2013, BRION,J.)

2. WAYS OF COMMITTING FORUM SHOPPING: Forum shopping can becommitted in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of actionand with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where theground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the samecause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based onthe same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action,where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). x x x Ifthe forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shallbe dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata.However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are morethan two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. (CHUA VS. METROPOLITANBANK & TRUST CO. G.R. NO. 182311, AUGUST 19, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

2.1. THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING IS REQUIREDONLY IN A COMPLAINT OR OTHER INITIATORY PLEADING. THE EXPARTE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IS NOT ANINITIATORY PLEADING AND THEREFORE NO CERTIFICATION ISREQUIRED. (SPOUSES GODOFREDO AND REMEDIOS ARQUIZA VS. COURT OFAPPEALS, G.R. NO. 160479, JUNE 8, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.)

2.1.1. ANSWER IS NOT AN INITIATORY PLEADING WHICH REQUIRES ACERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING. (KOREA TECHNOLOGIES CO., LTD.VS. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, G.R. NO. 143581, JANUARY 7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.)


2.2. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS ORPLAINTIFFS IN A CASE SHOULD SIGN THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUMSHOPPING. However, the signature of any of the principal petitioners or principalparties,, would constitute a substantial compliance with the rule on verification andcertification of non-forum shopping should there exist a commonality of interestamong the parties, or where the parties filed the case as a collective, raising only onecommon cause of action or presenting a common defense, then the signature of one ofthe petitioners or complainants, acting as representative, is sufficient compliance.(IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096,AUGUST 22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.).

2.3. EXECUTION OF THE CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPINGBY THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE REQUIREMENT THATTHE PARTIES MUST PERSONALLY SIGN THE SAME: (ANITA MONASTERIO-PE ETAL. VS. JOSE JUAN TONG, G.R. NO. 151369, MARCH 23, 2011, PERALTA, J.).

2.4. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE NOT APPLICABLE WHERE APARTY COMMITTED AN ACT OF DISHONESTY IN FILING THE CERTIFICATEAGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING, AS BY MAKING IT APPEAR THAT A PERSON HADSIGNED THE SAME WHEN HE WAS ALREADY DEAD. (HEIRS OF RETUYA V. CA,APRIL 6, 2011).

2.5. A CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING SIGNED BY COUNSELAND NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTY HIMSELF IS NO CERTIFICATION ATALL. (WILSON GO VS. ANITA RICO, G.R. NO. 140862, APRIL 25, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.)

2.6. A DEFECTIVE CERTIFICATION IS GENERALLY NOT CURABLE BYITS SUBSEQUENT CORRECTION. (BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. COURTOF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 168313, OCTOBER 6, 2010)

2.7. WHEN A COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AT THEINSTANCE OF THE PLAINTIFF, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1, RULE 17 OF THE1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THERE IS NO NEED TO STATE IN THECERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN A SUBSEQUENT RE-FILEDCOMPLAINT THE FACT OF THE PRIOR FILING AND DISMISSAL OF THE FORMERCOMPLAINT. (BENEDICTO VS. LACSON ET AL., G.R. NO. 141508, MAY 5, 2010,PERALTA, J.).

2.8. A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING IS NOT APPLICABLETO A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION. (SAMAHAN NG MGAMANGGAGGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS V. SAMMA CORP., MARCH 3, 2009).

2.9. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPINGOF A CORPORATION: GENERAL RULE: ONLY INDIVIDUALS VESTED WITHAUTHORITY BY A VALID BOARD RESOLUTION MAY SIGN THE CERTIFICATE OFNON-FORUM SHOPPING IN BEHALF OF A CORPORATION. IN ADDITION, THECOURT HAS REQUIRED THAT PROOF OF SAID AUTHORITY MUST BE


ATTACHED. (PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. VS. FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDSASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP), G.R. NO. 143088, JANUARY 24, 2006,AZCUNA, J.)

EXCEPTION: IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THE PETITIONERSUBSEQUENTLY ATTACHED A BOARD RESOLUTION STATING THAT THESIGNATORY OF THE CERTIFICATION HAD BEEN DULY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.(VICAR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. FEB LEASING AND FINANCECORPORATION, G.R. NO. 157195, APRIL 22, 2005, PANGANIBAN, J.)

2.9.1. CORPORATE OFFICERS WHO CAN SIGN THE VERIFICATION ANDCERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING WITHOUT NEED OF ANAUTHORIZING BOARD RESOLUTION: (1) Chairperson of the board of directors, (2)President, (3) General Manager or acting general manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and(5) Employment Specialists in a labor case. (MID-PASIG LAND DEVT CORP. V.TABLANTE, G.R. NO. 162924, FEBRUARY 4, 2010, NACHURA, J.).

2.9.2. BEING A RESIDENT AGENT DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE ISAUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE THE REQUISITE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM-SHOPPING BECAUSE WHILE HE MAY BE AWARE OF ACTIONS FILED AGAINSTHIS PRINCIPAL, HE MAY NOT BE AWARE OF ACTIONS INITIATED BY HISPRINCIPAL WHETHER IN THE PHILIPPINES OR IN THE COUNTRY WHERE SUCHFOREIGN CORP. IS ORGANIZED. (EXPERTRAVEL AND TOURS INC. VS. COURT OFAPPEALS AND KOREAN LINES, G.R. NO. 152392, MAY 26, 2005, CALLEJO, SR. J.)

3. NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS: A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS, ONCE DULYREGISTERED, MAY BE CANCELLED BY THE TRIAL COURT BEFORE WHICH THEACTION INVOLVING THE PROPERTY IS PENDING. SECTION 14, RULE 13 OFTHE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AUTHORIZES THE TRIAL COURT TOCANCEL A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS WHERE IT IS PROPERLY SHOWN THAT THEPURPOSE OF ITS ANNOTATION IS FOR MOLESTING THE ADVERSE PARTY, ORTHAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTY WHOCAUSED IT TO BE ANNOTATED. (LU VS. LU YM, SR. G.R. NO. 153690, AUGUST 4,2009, SPECIAL 3RD DIVISION, NACHURA, J.).

4. COMPULSARY COUNTERCLAIM: UNDER SECTION 7, RULE 6 OFTHE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, A COUNTERCLAIM IS COMPULSORYWHEN ITS OBJECT "ARISES OUT OF OR IS NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITHTHE TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE CONSTITUTING THE SUBJECT MATTEROF THE OPPOSING PARTYS CLAIM AND DOES NOT REQUIRE FOR ITSADJUDICATION THE PRESENCE OF THIRD PARTIES OF WHOM THE COURTCANNOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION". (PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK VS. ALFREDOC. FLORES, G.R. NO. 175339, DECEMBER 16, 2008, TINGA, J.).

4.1. A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM DOES NOT REQUIRE ACERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING BECAUSE IT IS NOT ANINITIATORY PLEADING. (SPOUSES RODOLFO AND REMEDIOS CARPIO VS. RURALBANK OF STO. TOMAS (BATANGAS), INC., G.R. NO. 153171, MAY 4, 2006)


5. THE RULE IN PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS IS THAT FOR THETRIAL COURT TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION, THE COUNTERCLAIMANT IS BOUNDTO PAY THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES.. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM (GSIS) VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, G.R. NOS. 158090, OCT. 4,2010, PERALTA, J.).

5.1. EFFECTIVE AUGUST 16, 2004, UNDER SEC. 7, RULE 141, ASAMENDED BY A.M. NO. 04-2-04-SC, DOCKET FEES ARE NOW REQUIRED TO BEPAID IN COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS-CLAIMS. (KOREATECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD. VS. HON. ALBERTO A. LERMA, G.R. NO. 143581, JANUARY7, 2008, VELASCO, JR., J.)

5.2. PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS REQUIRE A CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING. (KOREA EXCHANGE BANK VS. HON. ROGELIO C. GONZALES,G.R. NOS. 142286-87, APRIL 15, 2005, CALLEJO, SR., J.)

SUMMONS1. AS A RULE, IF DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT BEEN VALIDLY

SUMMONED, THE COURT ACQUIRES NO JURISDICTION OVER THEIR PERSON,AND A JUDGMENT RENDERED AGAINST THEM IS NULL AND VOID. (SAGANA VS.FRANCISCO, G.R. NO. 161952, OCTOBER, 2, 2009, 2ND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

2. PERSONAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS: SERVICE OF SUMMONS ANDTHE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT BY THE PROCESS SERVER UPON THEDEFENDANTS WHILE THEY WERE IN THE COURTROOM IS VALID. THERE IS NOREQUIREMENT THAT PERSONAL SERVICE SHOULD BE IN THE DEFENDANTSRESIDENCE. (SANSIO PHILIPPINES VS. SPOUSES MOGOL, G.R. NO. 177007, JULY 14,2009, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

3. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS: IT IS ONLY WHEN THEDEFENDANT CANNOT BE SERVED PERSONALLY WITHIN A REASONABLE TIMETHAT A SUBSTITUTED SERVICE MAY BE MADE. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPTSERVICE SHOULD BE SHOWN BY STATING THE EFFORTS MADE TO FIND THEDEFENDANT PERSONALLY AND THE FACT THAT SUCH EFFORTS FAILED. THISSTATEMENT SHOULD BE MADE IN THE PROOF OF SERVICE. The requisites of avalid substituted service: (1) service of summons within a reasonable time isimpossible; (2) the person serving the summons exerted efforts to locate the defendant;(3) the person to whom the summons is served is of sufficient age and discretion; (4)the person to whom the summons is served resides at the defendants place ofresidence; and (5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances are stated inthe return of service. (GALURA VS. MATH-AGRO CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 167230,AUGUST 14, 2009, 1ST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.).

3.1. EXCEPTION: THERE WAS PROPER SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OFSUMMONS WHERE SERVICE WAS MADE UPON DEFENDANTS BROTHER AT THE


DEFENDANTS LAST KNOWN ADDRESS. (SAGANA VS. FRANCISCO, G.R. NO.161952, OCTOBER, 2, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

3.2. IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THEDEFENDANTS REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS BE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZEDTO RECEIVE THE SUMMONS. IT IS ENOUGH THAT HE APPEARS TO BE INCHARGE. (GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, G.R.NO. 183182, SEPTEMBER 1, 2010, ABAD, J.).

3.3. SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON THE SUBDIVISION SECURITY GUARDUPON THE STRICT INSTRUCTION OF THE DEFENDANT IS CONSIDERED A VALIDSUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS. (REMELITA M. ROBINSON VS. CELITA B.MIRALLES, G.R. NO. 163584, DECEMBER 12, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.).

3.4. SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS: THE PHRASE AT THEDEFENDANTS OFFICE OR REGULAR PLACE OF BUSINESS DOES NOT INCLUDEA CORPORATION WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS A CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OFDIRECTORS (PHILTEL) WHICH IS NOT EVEN A PARTY TO THE SUIT.DEFENDANT DOES NOT REGULARLY HOLD OFFICE OR CONDUCT BUSINESSTHEREIN AND HE IS LIKEWISE SUED MERELY ON HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY ASA SURETY. BESIDES, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER RESPONDENT COULD BEPERSONALLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AS HE HAD TRANSFERRED RESIDENCETO HONGKONG. (UCPB V. ROBERTO ONGPIN, G.R. 146593, G.R. NO. 146593,OCTOBER 26, 2001, MENDOZA, J.).

3.5. IN CASE OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE, THERE SHOULD BE A REPORTINDICATING THAT THE PERSON WHO RECEIVED THE SUMMONS IN THEDEFENDANTS BEHALF WAS ONE WITH WHOM THE DEFENDANT HAD ARELATION OF CONFIDENCE ENSURING THAT THE LATTER WOULD ACTUALLYRECEIVE THE SUMMONS. (ORION SECURITY CORPORATION VS. KALFAMENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. NO. 163287, APRIL 27, 2007, QUISUMBING, J.)

4. SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO A DOMESTIC PRIVATE JURIDICALENTITY: THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS MUST BE MADE UPON AN OFFICER WHOIS NAMED IN THE STATUTE (I.E., THE PRESIDENT, MANAGING PARTNER,GENERAL MANAGER, CORPORATE SECRETARY, TREASURER, OR IN-HOUSECOUNSEL), OTHERWISE, THE SERVICE IS INSUFFICIENT. (B.D. LONGSPANBUILDERS, INC. VS. R.S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. G.R. NO. 169919,SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.).

4.1. THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON BPIS BRANCH MANAGER DID NOTBIND THE CORPORATION FOR THE BRANCH MANAGER IS NOT INCLUDED INTHE ENUMERATION IN THE STATUTE OF THE PERSONS UPON WHOM SERVICEOF SUMMONS CAN BE VALIDLY MADE IN BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION.(BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. SPOUSES SANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 169116, 26MARCH 2007).


5. SUMMONS UPON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: WHERE THEDEFENDANT IS THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SERVICE OF SUMMONSMUST BE MADE ON THE SOLICITOR GENERAL. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS.ALFREDO DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 175299. SEPTEMBER 14, 2011, LEONARDO DECASTRO, J.).

6. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURTON SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY: Whenthe defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transactedbusiness in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated inaccordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the governmentofficial designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within thePhilippines. x x x If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in thePhilippines or has no resident agent, service may, with leave of court, beeffected out of the Philippines through any of thefollowing means: (a) By personal servicecoursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of theDepartment of Foreign Affairs; (b) by publication once in a newspaper of generalcirculation in the country where the defendant may be found and by serving a copy ofthe summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of thedefendant; (c) by facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proofof service; or (d) by such other means as may be warranted in the discretion of thecourt (AM. NO. 11-3-6-SC OR NEW RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON FOREIGNJURIDICAL ENTITIES: MARCH 15, 2011).

7. RULES ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN RELATION TO THE NATUREOF AN ACTION IN PERSONAM, IN REM OR QUASI IN REM: In an action inpersonam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court tovalidly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendantwho does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service ofsummons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot bepersonally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may bemade in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of thecountry, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substitutedservice set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave ofcourt; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner thecourt may deem sufficient. However, in an action in personam wherein thedefendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to theauthority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential tothe acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible ifsuch defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, thecourt cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try anddecide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenkerwherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was aresident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in aprior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the firstcase. On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction overthe person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the courtprovided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must


be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdictionbut merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is anon-resident who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects thepersonal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of whichis property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest;(3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the propertylocated in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached inthe Philippines service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of thecountry, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any othermanner the court may deem sufficient (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS.HON. PABLO R. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECONDDIVISION, TINGA, J.).

7.1. IN A PROCEEDING IN REM OR QUASI IN REM, JURISDICTION OVERTHE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO CONFERJURISDICTION ON THE COURT, PROVIDED THAT THE LATTER HASJURISDICTION OVER THE RES. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by theseizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custodyof the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the powerof the court is recognized and made effective. The petition to establish illegitimatefiliation is an action in rem. (JESSE U. LUCAS VS. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. NO.190710, SECOND DIVISION, JUNE 6, 2011 NACHURA, J.).

7.2. THE PRESENT RULE EXPRESSLY STATES THAT THE SUMMONS BYPUBLICATION APPLIES "[I]N ANY ACTION WHERE THE DEFENDANT ISDESIGNATED AS AN UNKNOWN OWNER, OR THE LIKE, OR WHENEVER HISWHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN AND CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED BY DILIGENTINQUIRY." THUS, IT NOW APPLIES TO ANY ACTION, WHETHER IN PERSONAM,IN REM OR QUASI IN REM. (PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., VS PNOC EXPLORATIONCORPORATION, G.R. NO. 170943, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008, CORONA, J.).

7.3. IF THE DEFENDANT IS TEMPORARILY OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY,ANY OF THE FOLLOWING MODES OF SERVICE MAY BE RESORTED TO: (1)substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, withleave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any othermanner the court may deem sufficient. (SPS. DOMINGO M. BELEN VS. HON. PABLO R.CHAVEZ, G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, TINGA, J.)

7.4. SECTION 16 OF RULE 14 REGARDING SERVICE OF SUMMONS ONRESIDENTS TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE PHILIPPINES, USES THE WORDS "MAY"AND "ALSO,". THUS, EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS NOTMANDATORY. OTHER METHODS OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS ALLOWED UNDERTHE RULES MAY ALSO BE AVAILED OF BY THE SERVING OFFICER ON ADEFENDANT-SEAMAN. (DOLORES MONTEFALCON VS. RONNIE S. VASQUEZ, G.R. NO.165016, JUNE 17, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.)

7.5. EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO A NON-RESIDENTDEFENDANT NOT FOUND IN THE COUNTRY APPLIES ONLY WHERE THE ACTION


IS IN REM OR QUASI IN REM, BUT NOT IF AN ACTION IS IN PERSONAM. (PERKINELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 172242,AUGUST 14, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

7.6. SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION IS PROVED BY THEAFFIDAVIT OF THE PRINTER, HIS FOREMAN OR PRINCIPAL CLERK, OR OF THEEDITOR, BUSINESS OR ADVERTISING MANAGER OF THE NEWSPAPER WHICHPUBLISHED THE SUMMONS. THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION ISCOMPLEMENTED BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY REGISTERED MAIL TO THEDEFENDANTS LAST KNOWN ADDRESS. (PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., VS. PNOCEXPLORATION CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 170943, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008, CORONA, J.).

DEFAULT1. EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF DEFAULT: THE MERE FACT THAT A

DEFENDANT IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY RESULT INTHE GRANT OF THE PRAYERS OF THE PLAINTIFF. (ERLINDA GAJUDO VS.TRADERS ROYAL BANK, G.R. NO. 151098, MARCH 21, 2006, PANGANIBAN, CJ.)

2. A DEFENDANT PARTY DECLARED IN DEFAULT RETAINS THERIGHT TO APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ON THE GROUND THATTHE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THECOMPLAINT, OR THAT THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW, EVEN WITHOUTNEED OF THE PRIOR FILING OF A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OFDEFAULT. (JOSE R. MARTINEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. NO. 160895,OCTOBER 30, 2006, TINGA, J.)

3. REMEDIES WHEN A PARTY IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT: It is well-settled that a defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies,to wit: he may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, filea motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure toanswer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has ameritorious defense; if judgment has already been rendered when he discoveredthe default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file amotion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; if he discovered the default afterthe judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief underSection 2 of Rule 38; and he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against himas contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order ofdefault has been presented by him. Thus, respondent, which had been declared indefault, may file a notice of appeal and question the validity of the trial courtsjudgment without being considered to have submitted to the trial courts authority(B.D. LONGSPAN BUILDERS, INC. VS. R.S. AMPELOQUIO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC.G.R. NO. 169919, SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, CARPIO, J.). NOTE: Thefollowing are the additional remedies in cases of default: Motion for Reconsideration(Rule 37), Annulment of judgment (Rule 47) and Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65).

4. WHERE THE ANSWER IS FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARYPERIOD BUT BEFORE THE DEFENDANT IS DECLARED IN DEFAULT AND THERE


IS NO SHOWING THAT DEFENDANT INTENDS TO DELAY THE CASE, THEANSWER SHOULD BE ADMITTED (SAN PEDRO CINEPLEX PROPERTIES VS. HEIRSOF MANUEL HUMADA ENAO, G.R. NO. 190754, NOVEMBER 17, 2010, CARPIOMORALES, J.).

ALLEGATIONS AND DENIALS IN THE PLEADINGS1. THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF DENYING ALLEGED FACTS: ONE IS BY

GENERAL DENIAL, AND THE OTHER, BY SPECIFIC DENIAL. In this jurisdiction,only a specific denial shall be sufficient to place into contention an alleged fact.Under Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, a specific denial of an allegation of thecomplaint may be made in any of three ways, namely: (a) a defendant specifies eachmaterial allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, wheneverpracticable, sets forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to supporthis denial; (b) a defendant who desires to deny only a part of an averment specifies somuch of it as is true and material and denies only the remainder; and (c) a defendantwho is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of amaterial averment made in the complaint states so, which has the effect of a denial. xx x (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 166859, APRIL12, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

1.1. A PERSONS DENIAL FOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THATBY THEIR NATURE HE OUGHT TO KNOW IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE DENIAL.(EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC. VS. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO, G.R. NO.180157, FEB. 8, 2012, ABAD, J.).

2. ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT: WHERE THE DEFENSE IN THE ANSWERIS BASED ON AN ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT, A REPLY SPECIFICALLYDENYING IT UNDER OATH MUST BE MADE; OTHERWISE, THE GENUINENESSAND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DOCUMENT WILL BE DEEMED ADMITTED.(CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. PHILBANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO.150731, SEPTEMBER 14, 2007, VELASCO, JR., J.)

2.1. IMPLIED ADMISSION RULE UNDER SECTION 8 OF RULE 8 DOESNOT APPLY TO A PLAINTIFF WHO FILES A REPLY NOT UNDER OATH IF THEVERIFIED COMPLAINT ALREADY TRAVERSES THE ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTATTACHED TO THE ANSWER. (TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORP. V. DAVID, G.R. NO.169548, MARCH 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

3. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS NOT PLEADED EITHER IN A MOTIONTO DISMISS OR IN THE ANSWER ARE DEEMED WAIVED. (CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, ELEUTERIO MABANAG VS. THE REGISTEROF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, AND RAMONA PATRICIAALCARAZ, G.R. NO. 153142, MARCH 29, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.).

3.1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT ALLEGATIONS NOTSPECIFICALLY DENIED ARE DEEMED ADMITTED ARE IMMATERIALALLEGATIONS AND INCORRECT CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM FACTS SET OUT


IN THE COMPLAINT. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) VS.DINNAH VILLAVIZA ET. AL., G.R. NO. 180291, JULY 27, 2010, MENDOZA, J.).

AMENDMENTS1. AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS IS FAVORED AND SHOULD BE

LIBERALLY ALLOWED IN THE FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE IN ORDER TODETERMINE EVERY CASE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE ON ITS MERITS WITHOUTREGARD TO TECHNICALITIES. (CHARLES LIMBAUAN VS. FAUSTINO ACOSTA, G.R.NO. 148606, JUNE 30, 2008, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)

2. THE PLAINTIFF MAY AMEND HIS COMPLAINT ONCE AS A MATTEROF RIGHT BEFORE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING IS FILED OR SERVED. (IRENEMARCOS-ARANETA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL. G.R. NO. 154096, AUGUST22, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, VELASCO, JR., J.).

3. AMENDMENTS AFTER THE FILING OF A RESPONSIVE PLEADING:The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to thesound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to thelimitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of actionor alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 (2001)even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, suchamendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest ofsubstantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensivedisposition of actions and proceedings. (HENRY CHING TIU VS.PHILIPPINE BANK OFCOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. NO. 151932, AUGUST 19, 2009, PERALTA, J.).

4. AMENDMENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO THE COURT MAY BEALLOWED IF AMENDMENT IS A MATTER OF RIGHT. (IRENE SANTE ANDREYNALDOSANTE VS. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. NO. 173915, FEBRUARY22, 2010, VLLARAMA, JR., J.).

FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS1. AS A GENERAL RULE, WHEN A PARTY IS REPRESENTED BY

COUNSEL OF RECORD, SERVICE OF ORDERS AND NOTICES MUST BE MADEUPON SAID ATTORNEY AND NOTICE TO THE CLIENT AND TO ANY OTHERLAWYER, NOT THE COUNSEL OF RECORD, IS NOT NOTICE IN LAW. THEEXCEPTION TO THIS RULE IS WHEN SERVICE UPON THE PARTY HIMSELF HASBEEN ORDERED BY THE COURT. (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON.PABLO R. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION,TINGA, J.).


2. MODES OF SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, NOTICES, ORDERS,JUDGMENTS, AND OTHER PAPERS: The modes of service of pleadings, motions,notices, orders, judgments, and other papers, are: (1) personal service; (2) service bymail; and (3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personallyor by mail. (ROGELIO ABERCA ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER ET AL. G.R. NO.166216, MARCH 14, 2012, MENDOZA, J.).

3. AS A RULE, JUDGMENTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY SERVED WHEN THEYARE DELIVERED PERSONALLY, OR THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL TO THECOUNSEL OF RECORD, OR BY LEAVING THEM IN HIS OFFICE WITH HIS CLERKOR WITH A PERSON HAVING CHARGE THEREOF. (SPOUSES ERNESTO ANDVICENTA TOPACIO VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, G.R.NO. 157644, NOVEMBER 17, 2010, BRION J.).

3.1. WHEN THE SERVICE OF THE JUDGMENT IS QUESTIONED, THEREIS A NEED TO PRESENT BOTH THE REGISTRY RECEIPT ISSUED BY THEMAILING OFFICE AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE PERSON MAILING. (REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES VS. RESINS INC. G.R. NO. 175891, 12 JANUARY 2010, CARPIO, J.).

3.2. COMPLETENESS OF SERVICE: THE RULE ON SERVICE BYREGISTERED MAIL CONTEMPLATES TWO SITUATIONS: (1) actual service thecompleteness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registeredmail; and (2) constructive service the completeness of which is determined uponexpiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first notice of thepostmaster. Insofar as constructive service is concerned, there must be conclusiveproof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. Not only isit required that notice of the registered mail be issued but that it should also bedelivered to and received by the addressee. (JOSE MEL BERNARTE VS. PHIL.BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION (PBA) ET AL., G.R. NO. 192084, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011,CARPIO, J.).

3.3. THE FAILURE TO ATTACH THE REQUIRED AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICEIS NOT FATAL IF THE REGISTRY RECEIPT ATTACHED TO THE PETITIONCLEARLY SHOWS SERVICE TO THE OTHER PARTY (PHIL. NATIONAL BANK VS.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. NO. 172458, DECEMBER 14, 2011,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.).

4. WHERE IT IS CLEAR THAT PERSONAL SERVICE IS NOTPRACTICABLE, AS IN THIS CASE, A WRITTEN EXPLANATION MIGHT EVEN BESUPERFLUOUS. THE RIGID APPLICATION OF S11 R13 MAY BE RELAXED INTHIS CASE IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. (SHEKER V. ESTATE OFSHEKER, G.R. NO. 157912, DECEMBER 13, 2007).

5. THE SUPREME COURT HAS STRICTLY CONSTRUED THEREQUIREMENTS OF THE PROPER SERVICE OF PAPERS AND JUDGMENTS. Bothin Heirs of Delos Santos v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 139167, 29 June 2005, 462 SCRA98 and Tuazon v. Molina, No. L-55697, 26 February 1981, 103 SCRA 365, the serviceof the trial courts decision at an adjacent office and the receipt thereof by a person


not authorized by the counsel of record was held ineffective. Likewise, the service ofthe decision made at the ground floor instead of at the 9th floor of a building in theaddress on record of petitioners counsel, was held invalid in PLDT v. NLRC, No. L-60050, 213 Phil. 362 (1984). (SPOUSES DOMINGO M. BELEN, ET. AL., VS. HON. PABLOR. CHAVEZ, ET AL. G.R. NO. 175334, MARCH 26, 2008, SECOND DIVISION, TINGA, J.).

6. NOTHING IN THE RULES AUTHORIZES PUBLICATION OF A NOTICEOF HEARING TO FILE ANSWER. (ROGELIO ABERCA ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. FABIANVER, ET AL., G.R. NO. 166216, MARCH 14, 2012, MENDOZA, J.).

MOTIONS1. THE REQUIREMENTS IN SECTIONS 4, 5, AND 6, RULE 15 OF THE

RULES OF COURT THAT THE NOTICE OF HEARING SHALL BE DIRECTED TOTHE PARTIES CONCERNED, AND SHALL STATE THE TIME AND PLACE FOR THEHEARING OF THE MOTION, ARE MANDATORY. IF NOT RELIGIOUSLY COMPLIEDWITH, THEY RENDER THE MOTION PRO FORMA. AS SUCH, THE MOTION IS AUSELESS PIECE OF PAPER THAT WILL NOT TOLL THE RUNNING OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD. (CITY OF DUMAGUETE VS. PHIL. PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R.NO. 168973, AUGUST 24, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.).

1.1. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RULE: These exceptions are:(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justiceespecially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned finaland executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals containedtherein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where theresolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of thecourt; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with thedegree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed (KKKFOUNDATION, INS. VS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS, ET AL. G.R. NO. 163785,DECEMBER 27, 2007, SECOND DIVISION, QUISUMBING, J.).

2. HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION RULE: WHEN A MOTION TO DISMISS ISFILED, THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ARE DEEMED TO BEHYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTED. THIS HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION, EXTENDSNOT ONLY TO THE RELEVANT AND MATERIAL FACTS WELL PLEADED IN THECOMPLAINT, BUT ALSO TO INFERENCES THAT MAY BE FAIRLY DEDUCEDFROM THEM. (THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, ET AL. VS. HON.SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., ET. AL., G.R. NO. 168289, MARCH 22, 2010, PERALTA, J.)

3. THERE IS NO RULE PROHIBITING THE FILING OF A PRO FORMAMOTION AGAINST AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER AS THE PROHIBITION APPLIESONLY TO A FINAL RESOLUTION OR ORDER OF THE COURT. THE COURT HELD,NONETHELESS, THAT A SECOND MOTION CAN BE DENIED ON THE GROUNDTHAT IT IS MERELY A REHASH OR A MERE REITERATION OF THE GROUNDSAND ARGUMENTS ALREADY PASSED UPON AND RESOLVED BY THE COURT(PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DEGUZMAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 182507, JUNE 16, 2010, SECOND DIVISION, NACHURA, J.).


4. MOTION OF EXTENSION: A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TOFILE A PLEADING MUST BE FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIODSOUGHT TO BE EXTENDED. (REYNALDO POSIQUIT VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 193943,JAN. 16, 2012, REYES, J.).

DISMISSALS1. NOTICE OF DISMISSAL: THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO DISCRETION OR

OPTION TO DENY A NOTICE OF DISMISSAL SINCE DISMISSAL BY THEPLAINTIFF UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 17 IS A MATTER OF RIGHT. (O.B. JOVENIRCONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. MACAMIR REALTY ANDDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 135803, MARCH 28, 2006, TINGA, J.)

2. INSTANCES OF DISMISSAL DUE TO THE FAULT OF THE PLAINTIFF:(1) IF HE FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE FOR THE PRESENTATION OF HISEVIDENCE IN CHIEF ON THE COMPLAINT; (2) IF HE FAILS TO PROSECUTE HISACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME; OR (3) IF HE FAILS TOCOMPLY WITH THE RULES OR ANY ORDER OF THE COURT. (GOMEZ VS.ALCANTARA, G.R.NO. 179556, FEBRUARY 13, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHINO-NAZARIO, J.).

2.1. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF THECOURT SHALL HAVE THE EFFECT OF ADJUDICATION UPON THE MERITS.UNLESS THE COURT STATES THAT THE DISMISSAL IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE,THE DISMISSAL SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITSAND IS WITH PREJUDICE (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. THE INTESTATE ESTATEOF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ET AL. G.R. NO. 182507, JUNE 16, 2010, SECONDDIVISION, NACHURA, J.).

2.2. UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 17 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVILPROCEDURE, THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT DUE TO THE FAULT OFPLAINTIFF DOES NOT NECESSARILY CARRY WITH IT THE DISMISSAL OF THECOUNTERCLAIM, COMPULSORY OR OTHERWISE. IN FACT, THE DISMISSAL OFTHE COMPLAINT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF DEFENDANTS TOPROSECUTE THE COUNTERCLAIM. (EDGARDO PINGA VS. THE HEIRS OF GERMANSANTIAGO, G.R. NO. 170354, JUNE 30, 2006, TINGA, J.)

2.3. PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENT FORDAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES ARISING FROM THE UNFOUNDED SUITSURVIVES NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE. HENCE, THECAUSE OF ACTION OF PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT ELIMINATED BYTHE MERE DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT. (PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS.DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 172242, AUGUST 14, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)

2.4. SINCE AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTEHAS THE EFFECT OF AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS, PETITIONERS


COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE APPELLATECOURT WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. INSTEAD OF FILING A PETITIONUNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE PROPER RECOURSE WAS ANORDINARY APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 41. (LULLETE S.KO VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R. NOS. 169131-32, JANUARY 20, 2006,YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.)

3. WHEN IT APPEARS FROM THE PLEADINGS OR THE EVIDENCE ONRECORD THAT THE ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY THE STATUTE OFLIMITATIONS, THE COURT SHALL DISMISS THE CLAIM. (PHILIPPINE NATIONALBANK VS. MERELO V. AZNAR ET AL, G.R. NO. 171805 MAY 30, 2011, LEONARDO-DECASTRO, J.).

4. AN UNQUALIFIED ORDER IS DEEMED TO BE A DISMISSAL WITHPREJUDICE. IN OTHER WORDS, DISMISSALS OF ACTIONS (UNDER SECTION 3,RULE 17 OF THE RULES OF COURT) WHICH DO NOT EXPRESSLY STATEWHETHER THEY ARE WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE ARE HELD TO BE WITHPREJUDICE. (SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., VS.MRS. LETICIA B.MAGSALIN ET AL., G.R. NO. 170026, JUNE 20, 2012, BRION, J.).

5. LITIS PENDENTIA AND RES JUDICATA ARE NOT PRESENTBETWEEN A PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION AND ACTION FORANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE. (SPOUSES VICENTE AND DEMETRIA YU VS.PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 147902, MARCH 17, 2006,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)

5.1. RES JUDICATA: THE PREVIOUS FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING APETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE ON THE GROUNDOF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BARS A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FORDECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF LACK OFMARRIAGE LICENSE. BOTH PETITIONS ACTUALLY HAVE THE SAME CAUSE OFACTION ALTHOUGH FOUNDED MERELY ON DIFFERENT GROUNDS. HENCE, APARTY CANNOT EVADE OR AVOID THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA BYSIMPLY VARYING THE FORM OF HIS ACTION OR ADOPTING A DIFFERENTMETHOD OF PRESENTING HIS CASE. (OSCAR MALLION V. ALCANTARA G.R. NO.141528, OCTOBER 31, 2006, AZCUNA, J.).

6. THE DEFENDANT MAY REITERATE ANY OF THE GROUNDS FORDISMISSAL PROVIDED UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT ASAFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN HIS ANSWER. BUT, A PRELIMINARY HEARING MAYNO LONGER BE HAD THEREON IF A MOTION TO DISMISS HAD ALREADY BEENPREVIOUSLY DENIED, EXCEPT ONLY WHERE THERE WERE SEVERALDEFENDANTS BUT ONLY ONE OF THEM FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS. (SPS.THELMA AND GREGORIO ABRAJANO VS. HEIRS OF AUGUSTO F. SALAS, JR., G.R. NO.158895, FEBRUARY 16, 2006, TINGA, J.)

7. GENERAL RULE: THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION, IF THEREARE NO PENDING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND THERE EXISTS IN THE


FORMER AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE PREEMPTIVELY RESOLVED BEFORE THECRIMINAL ACTION MAY PROCEED.

EXCEPTION: THE PENDENCY OF A CASE BEFORE THE SECURITIES ANDEXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) MAY BE INVOKED AS PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONTO A CIVIL CASE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. (ANTONIO ABACAN, JR.VS. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., G.R. NO. 140777, APRIL 8, 2005, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)

INTERVENTION1. INTERVENTION IS A PROCEDURE BY WHICH THIRD PERSONS, NOT

ORIGINALLY PARTIES TO THE SUIT BUT CLAIMING AN INTEREST IN THESUBJECT MATTER, COME INTO THE CASE IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIRRIGHT OR INTERPOSE THEIR CLAIM. Its main purpose is to settle in one actionand by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, thepersons involved. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, tworequisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation;and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rightsof the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properlydecided in a separate proceeding. The interest,' which entitles one to intervene, mustinvolve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that theintervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of thejudgment. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simplycontingent and expectant. (BUKLOD NA NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPANG RAMOS, INC.VS. E.M. RAMOS & SONS INC., G.R. NO. 131481, MARCH 16, 2011, LEONARDO-DECASTRO, J.).

2. A MOTION TO INTERVENE MAY BE FILED AT ANY TIME BEFORERENDITION OF JUDGMENT BY THE TRIAL COURT. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANVS. SISON, G.R. NO. 185954, FEBRUARY 16, 2010, VELASCO JR., J.).

PRE-TRIAL1. PRE-TRIAL IS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE INTENDED TO CLARIFY AND

LIMIT THE BASIC ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES AND TO TAKE THE TRIALOF CASES OUT OF THE REALM OF SURPRISE AND MANEUVERING. IT IS ANANSWER TO THE CLARION CALL FOR THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES.(ANSON TRADE CENTER, INC. VS. PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 179999,MARCH 17, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

2. THE HOLDING OF A PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE IS MANDATORY ANDFAILURE TO DO SO IS INEXCUSABLE. (NPC VS. ADIONG, A.M. NO. RTJ-07-2060,JULY 27, 2011, VILLARAMA, J.)

3. PRE-TRIAL: Under Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure, as amended, it is the duty of the plaintiff, after the last pleading has been


served and filed, to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. OnAugust 16, 2004, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to beObserved by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial andUse of Deposition-Discovery Measures) took effect, which provides that: Within five (5)days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must promptly move ex parte that thecase be set for pre-trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within thegiven period, the Branch COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial. (ELOISAMERCHANDISING, INC. AND TREBEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., VS. BANCO DE OROUNIVERSAL BANK AND ENGRACIO M. ESCASINAS, G.R. NO. 192716, JUNE 13, 2012,VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

3.1. IF THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO FILE A MOTION TO SET CASE FORPRE-TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT CAN NO LONGER DISMISS THE CASE FORFAILURE TO PROSECUTE. (SC Guidelines on Pre-trial and Discovery, effective August16, 2004; ESPIRITU V. LAZARO, G.R. NO. 181020, NOV. 25, 2009, NACHURA, J.).

4. THE ABSENCE OF THE NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL CONSTITUTES AVIOLATION OF A PERSONS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS: (PNBVS. SPS. ANGELITO PEREZ AND JOCELYN PEREZ, G.R. NO. 187640, JUNE 15,2011,VELASCO, JR., J.).

5. THE NON-APPEARANCE BY THE PLAINTIFF IN THE PRE-TRIALSHALL BE CAUSE FOR DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION. HOWEVER, THE NON-APPEARANCE OF A PARTY MAY BE EXCUSED IF A VALID CAUSE IS SHOWNTHEREFORE. (ANSON TRADE CENTER, INC. VS. PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION,G.R. NO. 179999, MARCH 17, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

5.1. IF THE PLAINTIFF FAILS TO APPEAR AT THE PRE-TRIAL, THECOURT MAY UPON MOTION, DISMISS THE COMPLAINT AND ALLOW THEDEFENDANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM. (PERKIN ELMERSINGAPORE V. DAKILA TRADING, AUGUST 14, 2007).

6. PRE-TRIAL ORDER: THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED BETWEEN THEPARTIES IN A CASE SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN THE PRE-TRIALORDER. HOWEVER, A PRE-TRIAL ORDER IS NOT INTENDED TO BE A DETAILEDCATALOGUE OF EACH AND EVERY ISSUE THAT IS TO BE TAKEN DURING THETRIAL, FOR IT IS UNAVOIDABLE THAT THERE ARE ISSUES THAT AREIMPLIEDLY INCLUDED AMONG THOSE LISTED OR THAT MAY BE INFERABLEFROM THOSE LISTED BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION WHICH ARE AS MUCHINTEGRAL PARTS OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS THOSE EXPRESSLY LISTED(PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORP. VS. AMALGAMATEDMANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 177729, SEPT. 28, 2011,BERSAMIN, J.).

COMPUTATION OF TIME1. ANY EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE REQUIRED PLEADING

SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM THE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD REGARDLESS


OF THE FACT THAT SAID DUE DATE IS A SATURDAY, SUNDAY OR LEGALHOLIDAY. (DANTE D. DELA CRUZ VS. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC., G.R. NO.172038, APRIL 14, 2008, CORONA, J.)

MODES OF DISCOVERY1. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES: TRIAL COURTS ARE DIRECTED TO

ISSUE ORDERS REQUIRING PARTIES TO AVAIL OF DISCOVERY PROCEDURES.(A.M. No. 03-1-09-Sc, Pars. I.A. 1.2; 2(E)) (HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP.VS. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 147143, MARCH 10,2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)

2. DEPOSITIONS SERVE AS A DEVICE FOR ASCERTAINING THE FACTSRELATIVE TO THE ISSUES OF THE CASE. THE EVIDENT PURPOSE IS TOENABLE THE PARTIES, CONSISTENT WITH RECOGNIZED PRIVILEGES, TOOBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ISSUES AND FACTSBEFORE CIVIL TRIALS AND THUS PREVENT THE SAID TRIALS FROM BEINGCARRIED OUT IN THE DARK. (RAMON GERARDO B. SAN LUIS VS. HON. PABLITO M.ROJAS, G.R. NO. 159127, MARCH 3, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.).

2.1. THE RULE DOES NOT MAKE ANY DISTINCTION OR RESTRICTIONAS TO WHO CAN AVAIL OF DEPOSITION. THE FACT THAT PRIVATERESPONDENT IS A NON-RESIDENT FOREIGN CORPORATION IS IMMATERIAL.THE RULE CLEARLY PROVIDES THAT THE TESTIMONY OF ANY PERSON MAYBE TAKEN BY DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OR WRITTENINTERROGATORIES, AT THE INSTANCE OF ANY PARTY. (RAMON GERARDO B.SAN LUIS VS. HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS, G.R. NO. 159127, MARCH 3, 2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.).

2.2. DEPOSITION: THERE IS REALLY NOTHING OBJECTIONABLE, PERSE, WITH PETITIONER AVAILING OF THIS DISCOVERY MEASURE AFTERPRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS RESTED HIS CASE AND PRIOR TO PETITIONERSPRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. TO REITERATE, DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKENAT ANY TIME AFTER THE INSTITUTION OF ANY ACTION, WHENEVERNECESSARY OR CONVENIENT. (ISIDRO T. PAJARILLAGA VS. COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. NO. 163515, OCTOBER 31, 2008, QUISUMBING, ACTING C.J.).

3. A MOTION FOR PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS ORTHINGS UNDER RULE 27 IS SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEDOCUMENTS OR THINGS SHOULD NOT BE PRIVILEGED. (AIR PHILIPPINESCORPORATION VS. PENNSWELL, INC., G.R. 172835, DECEMBER 13, 2007,CHICO-NAZARIO, J.).

TRIAL


1. THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AFFIRMED BY THECOURT OF APPEALS, ARE FINAL AND CONCLUSIVE AND MAY NOT BEREVIEWED ON APPEAL. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inferencemade is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse ofdiscretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises orconjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, wentbeyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of bothappellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation ofspecific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlookedcertain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA arepremised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record(FILIPINAS FIBER SYNTHETIC CORPORATION vs. WILFREDO DELOS SANTOS ET AL.,G.R. No. 152033, MARCH 16, 2011, PERALTA, J.)

2. SUBPOENA: A SUBPOENA IS A PROCESS DIRECTED TO A PERSONREQUIRING HIM TO ATTEND AND TO TESTIFY AT THE HEARING OR TRIAL OFAN ACTION OR AT ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED UNDER THE LAWS OF THEPHILIPPINES, OR FOR THE TAKING OF HIS DEPOSITION. In this jurisdiction,there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoenaduces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is usedto compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. Ascharacterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: Thesubpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandumwith the exception that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bringwith him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things describedin the subpoena. Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum mayissue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present:(1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevantto the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must bereasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).(RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA ET AL. VS. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO ETAL., G.R. NOS. 184379-80, APRIL 24, 2012, SERENO, J.).

3. QUAHAL OF SUBPOENA: THE GROUNDS UNREASONABLE ANDOPPRESSIVE ARE PROPER FOR SUBPOENA AD DUCES TECUM OR FOR THEPRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS IN THE POSSESSION OF THEWITNESS, A COMMAND THAT HAS A TENDENCY TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTAGAINST INVASION OF PRIVACY BUT NOT FOR QUASHING A SUBPOENA ASTESTIFICANDUM. (EMMA K. LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 177861, JULY 13,2010, ABAD, J.)

4. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION MAY BE CURED BYEVIDENCE DURING THE TRIAL AND AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCEPRESENTED. (SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL, INC. VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,G.R. NO. 161135, APRIL 8, 2005, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.)


5. DEMURRER OF EVIDENCE: WHEN THE DUE EXECUTION ANDGENUINENESS OF AN INSTRUMENT ARE DEEMED ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THEADVERSE PARTYS FAILURE TO MAKE A SPECIFIC VERIFIED DENIAL THEREOF,THE INSTRUMENT NEED NOT BE PRESENTED AND MUST BE CONSIDERED BYTHE COURT IN RESOLVING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. (CASENT REALTYDEVELOPMENT CORP. VS. PHILBANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 150731,SEPTEMBER 14, 2007, VELASCO, JR., J.)

6. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT UPON THE DISMISSAL OF THEDEMURRER IN THE APPELLATE COURT, THE DEFENDANT LOSES THE RIGHTTO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE AND THE APPELLATE COURT SHALL THENPROCEED TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS ON THE BASIS OFPLAINTIFFS EVIDENCE. (REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUAN C. TUVERA, G.R.NO. 148246, FEBRUARY 16, 2007, TINGA, J.)

JUDGMENT1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN FINAL AND INTERLOCUTORY ORDER: The

first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particularproceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by executionwhat the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the casebut leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals withpreliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgmentrendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment isinterlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in thetrial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment isinterlocutory; otherwise, it is final. (ANGELA-PAHILA-GARRIDO VS. ELIZA M. TORTOGOET AL, G.R. NO. 156358, AUGUST 17, 2011, BERSAMIN, J.).

1.1. A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT, NO MATTER HOWERRONEOUS, CANNOT BE CHANGED EVEN BY THIS COURT (PHILIPPINENATIONAL BANK VS. RINA PARAYNO LIM, G.R. NO. 171677, JANUARY 30, 2013,REYES, J.)

1.2. THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ANORDER OF DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT IS NOT AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER,BUT A FINAL ORDER. (SILVERIO, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 178933,SEPTEMBER 16, 2009, THIRD DIVISION, VELASCO, J.).

2. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS: AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TODISMISS IS INTERLOCUTORY. (MARMO VS. ANACAY, G.R. NO.182585,NOVEMBER 27, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, BRION, J.).

2.1. ORDERS GRANTING EXECUTION ARE INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.(SPOUSES RICARDO AND ELENA GOLEZ VS. SPOUSES CARLOS AND AMELITANAVARRO, G.R. NO. 192532, JANUARY 30, 2013, REYES, J.)


2.2. THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, AS AN INTERLOCUTORYORDER, CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL UNTIL A FINAL JUDGMENTOR ORDER IS RENDERED IN THE MAIN CASE. (SPOUSES EUGENE L. LIM VS.THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 192615, JANUARY 30, 2013, BRION, J.)

3. WHEN THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DISPOSITIVEPORTION OR FALLO OF A DECISION AND THE OPINION OF THE COURTCONTAINED IN THE TEXT OR BODY OF THE JUDGMENT, THE FORMERPREVAILS OVER THE LATTER. THE EXCEPTION IS WHERE THE INEVITABLECONCLUSION FROM THE BODY OF THE DECISION IS SO CLEAR AS TO SHOWTHAT THERE WAS A MISTAKE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION, THE BODY OFTHE DECISION WILL PREVAIL. (THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT VS.COURT OF APPEALS & BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC., G. R. NO. 154559,OCT. 5, 2011, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.).

4. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT: A COMPROMISE AGREEMENTINTENDED TO RESOLVE A MATTER ALREADY UNDER LITIGATION IS AJUDICIAL COMPROMISE. HAVING JUDICIAL MANDATE AND ENTERED AS ITSDETERMINATION OF THE CONTROVERSY, SUCH JUDICIAL COMPROMISE HASTHE FORCE AND EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT. (RAOLA V. RAOLA, G.R. NO.185095, JULY 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 788, 794).

5. MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE: A MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE ISONE THAT CEASES TO PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY BY VIRTUE OFSUPERVENING EVENTS, SO THAT A DECLARATION THEREON WOULD BE OF NOPRACTICAL USE OR VALUE. (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS VS. ORIENTCOMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 148483, JUNE 29, 2011, VILLARAMA,JR., J.).

5.1 A CASE BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC ONLY WHEN THERE IS NOMORE ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR NO USEFULPURPOSE CAN BE SERVED IN PASSING UPON THE MERITS OF THE CASE.(PAGANO V. NAZARRO, JR., OMBUDSMAN VS. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., G.R.NO. 16467, JULY 27, 2011, BRION, J.).

6. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS: WHERE AN ANSWER FAILS TOTENDER AN ISSUE, OR OTHERWISE ADMITS THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OFTHE ADVERSE PARTYS PLEADING, THE COURT MAY, ON MOTION OF THATPARTY, DIRECT JUDGMENT ON SUCH PLEADING. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANKVS. MERELO V. AZNAR ET AL, G.R. NO. 171805 MAY 30, 2011, LEONARDO-DECASTRO, J.).

6.1. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS: A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGSMAY BE SOUGHT ONLY BY A CLAIMANT, WHO IS THE PARTY SEEKING TORECOVER UPON A CLAIM, COUNTERCLAIM OR CROSS-CLAIM; OR TO OBTAIN ADECLARATORY RELIEF. (ANACLETO R. MENESES VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIANREFORM, G.R. NO. 156304, OCTOBER 23, 2006, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.)


6.2. BOTH THE RULES ON JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ANDSUMMARY JUDGMENTS HAVE NO PLACE IN CASES OF DECLARATION OFABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, LEGAL SEPARATION AND EVEN INANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE. (JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL,also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS orFELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, G.R. No. 179922,December 16, 2008, REYES, R.T., J.)

7. SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR ACCELERATEDJUDGMENT, IS A PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUE TO PROMPTLY DISPOSE OF CASESWHERE THE FACTS APPEAR UNDISPUTED AND CERTAIN FROM THEPLEADINGS, DEPOSITIONS, ADMISSIONS AND AFFIDAVITS ON RECORD, ORFOR WEEDING OUT SHAM CLAIMS OR DEFENSES AT AN EARLY STAGE OF THELITIGATION TO AVOID THE EXPENSE AND LOSS OF TIME INVOLVED IN ATRIAL. (PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK VS. FELIPE CHUA, G.R. NO. 178899,NOVEMBER 15, 2010, BRION, J.).

7.1. SUMMARY JUDGMENTS ARE PROPER WHEN, UPON MOTION OF THEPLAINTIFF OR THE DEFENDANT, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE ANSWER FILED BYTHE DEFENDANT DOES NOT TENDER A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACTAND THAT ONE PARTY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.(ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, ET AL. VS. REPUBLIC, G.R. NO. 170658, JUNE 22, 2011, DELCASTILLO, J.)

7.2. WHEN THE FACTS AS PLEADED APPEAR UNCONTESTED ORUNDISPUTED, THEN THERE IS NO REAL OR GENUINE ISSUE OR QUESTION ASTO THE FACTS, AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS CALLED FOR. (ASIANCONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIALINTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 153827, APRIL 25, 2006, GARCIA, J.).

7.3. THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DECIDE THATSUMMARY JUDGMENT ON AN ACTION IS IN ORDER. UNDER RULE 35, THEDEFENDING PARTY OR THE CLAIMANT, MUST INVOKE THE RULE ON SUMMARYJUDGMENT BY FILING A MOTION. (FLORENTINO PINEDA VS. HEIRS OF ELISEOGUEVARA, G.R. NO. 143188, FEBRUARY 14, 2007, TINGA, J.)

7.4. PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTIS NOT APPEALABLE SEPARATELY FROM THE JUDGMENT IN THE ENTIRECASE, UNLESS ALLOWED BY THE COURT UNDER SECTION 1 (G), RULE 41.HENCE THE FAILURE TO APPEAL SEPARATELY FROM A PARTIAL SUMMARYJUDGMENT OR TO CHALLENGE IT BY A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FORCERTIORARI DOES NOT MAKE THE SAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. (PHILIPPINEBUSINESS BANK V. CHUA, NOVEMBER 15, 2010).

7.4.1. A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NEVER INTENDED TO BECONSIDERED A "FINAL JUDGMENT," AS IT DOES NOT "[PUT] AN END TO ANACTION AT LAW BY DECLARING THAT THE PLAINTIFF EITHER HAS OR HASNOT ENTITLED HIMSELF TO RECOVER THE REMEDY HE SUES FOR.


(PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK VS. FELIPE CHUA, G.R. NO. 178899, NOVEMBER15, 2010, BRION, J.).

8. DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ANDSUMMARY JUDGMENT: Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings froma summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When theAnswer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in thecomplaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by admitting thetruthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadingsis appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material avermentsof the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summaryjudgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. A genuine issue means anissue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue whichis fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial. (EUGENIOBASBAS ET AL.. VS. BEATA SAYSON, G.R. NO. 172660, AUGUST 24, 2011, DEL CASTILLO, J.).

9. DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF JUDGMENT OR IMMUTABILITY OFJUDGMENT: A DECISION THAT HAS ACQUIRED FINALITY BECOMESIMMUTABLE AND UNALTERABLE, AND MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANYRESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT ERRONEOUSCONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND LAW, AND WHETHER IT BE MADE BY THE COURTTHAT RENDERED IT OR BY THE HIGHEST COURT OF THE LAND. (RAUL B.ESCALANTE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 192727, JANUARY 9, 2013,REYES, J.)

9.1. EXCEPTIONS: THE SO-CALLED NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRIES WHICHCAUSE NO PREJUDICE TO ANY PARTY, VOID JUDGMENTS, AND WHENEVERCIRCUMSTANCE

Documents

Villasis Notes in Civil Procedure (Suprema Legis).pdf