VESSELTRIAGE...VTT Technical Research Centre of Fin-land Ltd served as an external expert in the project. In addition to the aforementioned parties, representatives from close to 40

VESSELTRIAGEA method for assessing and communicating the safety status of vessels

in maritime accidents and incidents

USER MANUAL

Vessel TRIAGE User Manual 2nd ed., February 2016

ISBN 978-952-324-037-7 (pbk.)

ISBN 978-952-324-038-4 (PDF)

www.raja.fi/vesseltriage

This document was prepared by the Vessel TRIAGE project personnel in cooperation with VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland.

Vessel TRIAGE is a method proposal, drafted in international cooperation, for the assessment of the safety status of vessels in maritime accidents and incidents. The method is intended to facilitate and enhance effective communications concerning the safety status of vessels. The Finnish Border Guard, Finnish Transport Safety Agency, Finnish Transport Agency and VTT Technical Research Center of Finland Ltd shall not be held liable for the functionality of the Vessel TRIAGE method and outcomes of accident situations in which it is used. The use of the Vessel TRIAGE method does not absolve those participating in accident response from their responsibilities. The use of the Vessel TRIAGE method must not delay the assessment of the vessel’s status, decision-making and communications in maritime accidents and incidents.

CONTENTS

Foreword 2

Vessel TRIAGE “in a nutshell” 6

1. Basic information 8

1.1 Purpose and target group of the manual 8

1.2 Scope of application 8

1.3 Threat factors 9

1.4 Vessel TRIAGE categories 10

1.5 Operational focuses in different categories 12

2. Method content and usage 14

2.1 Identifying materialised threat factors (Stage 1) 14

2.2 Assessment of the severity of threat factors (Stage 2) 16

2.2.1 Flooding 19

2.2.2 Listing, decrease of stability 21

2.2.3 Decrease of manoeuvrability 23

2.2.4 Black-out 24

2.2.5 Fire, explosion 25

2.2.6 Danger posed by hazardous substances 26

2.3 Assessing the effects of crew capabilities and weather conditions (Stage 3) 28

2.4 Determining the Vessel TRIAGE category (Stage 4) 30

2.5 Observations on the application of the method 32

3. An example of the application of the Vessel TRIAGE method 34

Appendix A, Glossary 39

Appendix B, Vessel TRIAGE categories, their definitions, descriptions and related SAR operational focus 42

Appendix C Detailed descriptions of the Vessel TRIAGE threat factors 43

Quick guide to the Vessel TRIAGE method 46

VESSEL TRIAGE FORM 47

THREAT FACTOR MATRIX 48

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ForewordVessel TRIAGE is a method for assessing and communicating the safety status of vessels in maritime accidents and incidents. This manual is in-tended for the users of the Vessel TRIAGE method, that is, vessels and mar-itime emergency responders.

The Vessel TRIAGE method was developed in the project of the same name, which was coordinated by the Finnish Border Guard, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency and the Finnish Transport Agency in 2014–2015 (http://www.raja.fi/vesseltriage). VTT Technical Research Centre of Fin-land Ltd served as an external expert in the project. In addition to the aforementioned parties, representatives from close to 40 organisations from about 15 countries took part in the project, including maritime SAR responders, shipping companies, salvage companies, classification so-cieties, shipping industries, universities/research institutions and other maritime agencies. The project was financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland from the fund for cooperation in the Baltic Sea, Barents and Arctic region.

The Vessel TRIAGE method supports vessels and maritime emergency re-sponders in maritime accident situations, including those participating in the events on shore. In the following the advantages of the method for the shipping companies, SAR services, shore-side authorities, and place of refuge authorities are assessed. A summary of the method follows in the section “Vessel TRIAGE ‘in a nutshell’”.

Advantages for shipping companies

In an emergency, there is no time for sharing detailed explanations or for misunderstandings. It is crucial that all parties involved can form a common situational awareness regarding the vessel’s safety from the be-ginning. Vessel TRIAGE is a simple but effective tool for identifying how serious the emergency is, and it is designed to allow for easy updating when the situation changes. The Vessel TRIAGE method will also enable efficient communication when there might be language barriers. When the vessel, the Maritime Rescue Services and the Shipping Company have a shared understanding, the vessel can be confident that the measures taken to support it are appropriate.

In an emergency, some will exaggerate and some underestimate the seri-ousness of the situation. It might be hard to admit that the vessel is in dis-

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tress. At a Shipping Company level, a uniform language in emergencies and accidents can be supported by integrating the Vessel Triage method into the Safety Management System.

As the Vessel TRIAGE method supports communication and speeds up decision making in an emergency, it should be implemented as a mar-itime standard.

Advantages for SAR services

In order to provide appropriate assistance to a vessel either in distress or otherwise in need of assistance, there must be a way to evaluate the ves-sel’s safety level as objectively as possible. Although maritime search and rescue currently employs internationally recognised alert phases, they in no way describe the distress vessel’s safety level. Instead, they largely in-dicate the urgency of the operation.

There are numerous unfortunate examples from around the world in which a distress vessel’s safety level was in reality far weaker than the res-cue authorities thought on the basis of radio discussions during the early phases of the incident. A deficient risk assessment of the distress vessel’s status is a common denominator in many of these incidents.

The Vessel TRIAGE method provides maritime search and rescue author-ities, the distress vessel’s crew and other involved parties with a stand-ardised classification system for determining the vessel’s safety level. This standardised classification facilitates both communication and the for-mation of shared situational awareness. Having a proper understanding of the situation enables the appropriate rescue measures to be launched using the available resources without delay.

The Vessel TRIAGE method does not itself rescue people, but it does en-able the development of more effective national, and even internation-al, operating models. The method enables the introduction of operating models for different safety levels. If the Vessel TRIAGE safety level classifi-cation were internationally approved, it would benefit not only those in distress but also all other parties involved in maritime search and rescue operations.

Advantages for shore-side authorities

In many countries, shore-side authorities also participate in rescue oper-ations for serious maritime incidents. They may find it very challenging

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to grasp nautical terminology and both assess and understand maritime situations. In such cases, the Vessel TRIAGE method facilitates situational awareness and communication for all parties.

The Vessel TRIAGE method plays a particularly important role in, for ex-ample, incidents involving ship fires, when maritime search and rescue authorities coordinate the allocation of various resources while simulta-neously working with the crew to extinguish the fire from on board the vessel. External responders arriving at the vessel, such as MIRG teams and shore-side authorities, must be kept continually aware of the situation and the progress of the operation. This is vital for occupational safety. With the Vessel TRIAGE method, it is easy to make all parties aware of the seriousness of the situation and to forward details of the tactics being em-ployed and any special technical considerations relating to the operation. Shared situational awareness also helps evacuation centres to outline the ‘patient profiles’ of those being evacuated to shore and to determine the need for immediate first aid.

The Vessel TRIAGE method brings much-needed clarity to the inter-au-thority communications required to manage maritime incidents, and also provides tools for rescue authorities to coordinate their own maritime op-erations.

Advantages for place of refuge authorities

It is recognised that when a ship has suffered an incident, the best way of preventing damage or pollution from its progressive deterioration is to transfer its cargo and bunkers, and to repair the damage. Such an opera-tion is best carried out in a place of refuge (POR), that is, according to the IMO, a place where a ship in need of assistance can take action to stabilise its condition, reduce the hazards to navigation, protect human life, and minimise the impact on the environment and the vessel itself.

Although the Vessel Triage method is primarily a risk assessment tool, it is also a great tool for assessing and facilitating decisions concerning places of refuge for vessels requiring assistance.

Having a categorisation system that can be used for making place of ref-uge decisions is a revolutionary advantage. The lack of a proper categori-sation system(s) has been recognised by many stakeholders involved in a variety of Places of Refuge situations in the past. At the moment, there is no internationally recognised system that can provide information on an

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incident and how the situation may escalate. Some countries may have their own risk assessment tool, but there is no categorisation system that could also be used as a risk assessment tool and is trustworthy enough for common use.

As all place of refuge cases differ from one another, assessing the situa-tion will always be challenging. However, decision making should not be made so difficult that decisions cannot be made in time to minimise the impact. The Vessel TRIAGE method provides a tool for assessing situations quickly.

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Vessel TRIAGE “in a nutshell”Vessel TRIAGE is a method for assessing and communicating the safe-ty status of vessels in maritime accidents and incidents. The method is intended for use by both vessels and maritime emergency responders to assess whether the subject vessel can provide a safe environment for the people aboard.

The method is used to form a rough understanding of the nature of the incident or accident and thereby determine the safety status of the ves-sel. The method is applied on a ship-by-ship basis. That is, when several vessels are involved in an accident, the safety status of each is evaluated separately. The primary purpose of the method is to enhance effective communications between the vessel(s) involved and maritime emer-gency responders as well as support related situational assessment and decision-making.

The method expresses the safety status of the vessel in terms of a Vessel TRIAGE category. There are four categories: GREEN, YELLOW, RED and BLACK (see Figure 1).

The safety status of a vessel is least compromised when its Vessel TRIAGE category is green. Black represents the most unsafe conditions. Between them are the yellow and red categories.

The application of the method has four stages. In the first stage, the vessel status is examined in terms of the threat factors defined in the method (e.g. flooding, decrease of manoeuvrability). The next steps are to assess the severity of the materialised threat factors (stage 2) and the effects of crew capabilities and weather conditions (stage 3). Finally, the Vessel TRIAGE category describing the safety status of the vessel is de-termined (stage 4).

These stages may be repeated as necessary during the accident, de-pending on the duration of the situation. Changes in the threat factors and their severity and in the Vessel TRIAGE category indicate how the situation is evolving and thus provide important information for all par-ticipants.

Vessel’s safety status worsens

GREEN

YELLOW

RED

BLACK

Figure 1. Vessel TRIAGE categories.

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Vessel TRIAGE is a method for assessing and communicating the safe-ty status of vessels in maritime accidents and incidents. The method is intended for use by both vessels and maritime emergency responders to assess whether the subject vessel can provide a safe environment for the people aboard.

The method is used to form a rough understanding of the nature of the incident or accident and thereby determine the safety status of the ves-sel. The method is applied on a ship-by-ship basis. That is, when several vessels are involved in an accident, the safety status of each is evaluated separately. The primary purpose of the method is to enhance effective communications between the vessel(s) involved and maritime emer-gency responders as well as support related situational assessment and decision-making.

The method expresses the safety status of the vessel in terms of a Vessel TRIAGE category. There are four categories: GREEN, YELLOW, RED and BLACK (see Figure 1).

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1. Basic information1.1 Purpose and target group of the manualThis document is a manual for users of the Vessel TRIAGE method. The method is intended for use by both vessels and maritime emergency responders. On vessels, the users of the method are the master of the ship and other deck officers. Among emergency responders, the users of the method are those participating in communications with the subject vessel, those responsible for coordinating the response, and those taking part in the response. Emergency responders include naturally also those participating in the events on shore, for example in the preparation of place of refuge decisions and at evacuation centres. It is useful for all who may become involved in a maritime emergency to be aware of the exist-ence of the Vessel TRIAGE method and the key content of its categories.

1.2 Scope of applicationThe Vessel TRIAGE method is intended for use in the event of maritime ac-cidents and incidents, such as black-outs, fire, running aground, collisions, ship listing, etc. The main aim of the Vessel TRIAGE method is to assess the vessel’s safety status in order to safeguard lives.

Incidents that do not involve an accident or in which no other kind of harm has come to the vessel itself are not included in the scope of the method. One example is an incident in which a large number of ship passengers have fallen ill due to food poisoning. Factors such as the type of vessel (e.g. pure cargo ship vs. passenger ship) or the number of passengers do not in themselves affect the Vessel TRIAGE categorisation.

In addition, the method is not applied to:

• Incidents that result only in environmental damage (e.g. vessel oil leak).

• Ship hijackings, bomb threats and other such situations if no harm has come to the ship itself. However, if this situation impacts on the safety status of the vessel, such as if a bomb explodes, the safety status can be described using Vessel TRIAGE categories.

Vessel TRIAGE categorisation should not be confused with the maritime emergency phase classification (uncertainty, alert and distress), which largely describes the urgency of response and the reliability of the infor-mation on which emergency response is based (IAMSAR Vol. II, Section 3.3.1).

The Vessel TRIAGE method is intended to supplement emergency phase classification and verbal descriptions of the situation in order to improve situational awareness among those in distress and those leading and par-ticipating in rescue operations. The four categories of the Vessel TRIAGE method are meant to provide a rapid description of the vessel’s safety sta-tus and need for external assistance in the same way as medical triage of accident victims classifies their condition and need for medical treatment.

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1.3 Threat factorsThe Vessel TRIAGE method determines the vessel’s safety status on the basis of the evaluated severity of materialised threat factors.

The Vessel TRIAGE method defines a “threat factor” as an event/conse-quence caused by an incident or accident to a vessel that might ad-versely affect vessel’s safety. The threat factors included in the method are:

• Flooding

• Listing, decrease of stability

• Decrease of manoeuvrability

• Black-out

• Fire, explosion

• Danger posed by hazardous substances

The first three threat factors concern the decrease or loss of fundamen-tal safety characteristics – buoyancy, stability and manoeuvrability. The fourth factor concerns the loss of technical/operational functionalities aboard the vessel. The last two threat factors are more linked to the po-tential consequences of any substances or materials carried on the ves-sel (e.g. cargo, goods, etc.).

These threat factors are not necessarily independent of each other. In other words, the existence of one threat factor may lead to the mate-rialisation of another. For instance, flooding can result in the decrease of vessel stability, and a black-out can compromise manoeuvrability. However, the factors are not always interlinked. For instance, listing/de-crease of stability is not always related to flooding, but could instead be the outcome of ice formation on ship superstructures or the shifting of cargo.

The content of the threat factors is described in more detail in Section 2.2 (Assessment of the severity of threat factors).

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1.4 Vessel TRIAGE categoriesThe use of the Vessel TRIAGE method provides an understanding of the vessel’s safety status, which is expressed in terms of a Vessel TRIAGE cate-gory. The Vessel TRIAGE category indicates the level of safety for persons aboard a vessel, taking into account the prevailing and anticipated con-ditions on the vessel and in its environment.

The categories and their definitions are presented in Table 1. The table also provides descriptions of the general situation aboard the vessel in different categories.

The safety status of a vessel is least compromised when its Vessel TRIAGE category is green. Black represents the most unsafe conditions.

Of the adjacent categories, in principle the most significant difference in vessel’s safety status is between the yellow and red categories: In the yellow category (as in the green, of course), it is still safe for people to remain aboard the vessel, whereas in the red category, their safety is se-verely threatened, either immediately or in the foreseeable future. In the black category, the vessel no longer provides any safety. For instance, it is probable that not everyone aboard can abandon the vessel, such as due to heavy listing or sinking. The main difference between the yellow and red categories is summarised in their definitions: “there is a risk that the situation will get worse” (yellow) and “level of safety has significantly worsened or will worsen” (red). In the yellow category, the worsening of the situation is considered to be a risk, while in the red category it is either expected or almost certain that the situation will worsen, if it has not already. In the red category, the worsening of the situation is signif-icant.

The Vessel TRIAGE method is intended for vessels in accidents or inci-dents (see Section 1.2 Scope of application). In other words, the safety status of any vessel under normal operating conditions that has not suf-fered an accident or incident should not be described using the green or any other Vessel TRIAGE category.

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GREEN YELLOW RED BLACK

Vessel is safe and can be assumed to remain so

Vessel is currently safe, but there is a risk that the

situation will get worse

Level of safety has significantly worsened or will worsen and external actions are required to ensure the safety of the

people aboard

Vessel is no longer safe and has been lost

GENERAL SITUATION

- The situation aboard is stable. Although the vessel may have been damaged by the accident, this damage does not threaten its seaworthiness or the people aboard.

- The damage to the vessel has been assessed. It is highly unlikely that the damage will spread or get worse.

- The vessel still protects the people aboard against the prevailing conditions.

GENERAL SITUATION

- Damage to the vessel might affect its seaworthiness or the full extent of the damage has not as yet been determined.

- Internal damage control measures and rescue operations have not been completed. Damage control is possible with reasonable resources available to carry out the proper measures.

- Damage to the vessel may pose a direct or indirect threat to the people aboard.

GENERAL SITUATION

- The vessel is significantly damaged, affecting its seaworthiness, and there is a threat to the people aboard.

- A fire, leak or other damages to the vessel are not under control and escalation is highly likely.

- The vessel no longer protects the people aboard against the prevailing conditions.

- Major external resources are required.

GENERAL SITUATION

- The vessel is capsized, broken, sunk, burnt or otherwise damaged so badly that it no longer provides protection to the people aboard against the prevailing conditions (that is, the vessel has totally lost its seaworthiness).

- Even if the vessel is still completely or partly afloat, it is no longer safe to work aboard, even to save human lives.

Table 1. Vessel TRIAGE categories with their definitions and general situation descriptions.

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1.5. Operational focuses in different categoriesIn addition to the Vessel TRIAGE categories and general situational de-scriptions presented above, the method includes general descriptions of operational focuses for each Vessel TRIAGE category (see Table 2). These operational focuses describe what kind of measures the vessel and maritime responders typically need to take to manage situations in each Vessel TRIAGE category.

As the Vessel TRIAGE method is intended above all for assessing and communicating the safety status of the subject vessel, the descriptions of operational focuses in Table 2 are informative in nature, and have no bearing on, for instance, the determination of the actual Vessel TRIAGE category of the subject vessel. These descriptions are mainly intended to shed light on the differences between Vessel TRIAGE categories.

From the operational focus perspective, the green category differs from the other categories in that that damage control measures are either not required or have already been completed. If there are injured people aboard, the operational focus is on emergency care. Those in need of urgent care can be evacuated.

In the yellow category, the operational focus is on damage control measures and stabilising the situation. Both the vessel’s own crew and external responders can participate in damage control. If the success of damage control measures is uncertain, evacuation must be started, or preparations must be made to do so. This does not however mean that steps cannot be taken to evacuate certain people even if the situation does not escalate (those in need of urgent care, for example).

In the red category, the operational focus is on evacuating/abandon-ing the vessel, as the vessel no longer provides safety to those aboard. Considering the situation as a whole, it is vital to make decisions on categorising the ship status as red and initiating evacuation/abandon-ing measures soon enough when this seems to be inevitable, even if sea conditions are difficult for saving people from survival craft, etc. In certain cases, emergency towing to shallows could be an alternative to evacuation, or at least a means of gaining time for actual evacuation.

Even when the Vessel TRIAGE category has been designated as red and evacuation measures have been initiated, this does not mean that in certain cases the Vessel TRIAGE category cannot be successfully lowered to yellow. To this end, the vessel must have resources on board, wheth-er those of the vessel itself or those provided by external emergency responders, to carry out damage control measures in addition to the ongoing evacuation measures, and to succeed in these efforts (such as extinguishing fires).

In the black category, the operational focus is on rescuing people on the hull and those in the water, as the vessel is no longer safe or has been lost. In addition, when the vessel category is black, SAR personnel are as a rule no longer sent into the vessel. Operations involving diving or res-cue by means of hull penetration are decided on separately. If the Vessel

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TRIAGE category of a vessel has been designated as black, it is no longer practically possible to recategorise it in a lower category.

Even though the method provides general descriptions of operational focuses for different Vessel TRIAGE categories, the method is not intend-ed to replace the existing accident management procedures used by vessels and maritime SAR authorities. Vessel TRIAGE supplements these procedures by introducing a new dimension to accident management in order to support situational assessment, decision-making and communi-cations.

Table 2. The operational focuses for each Vessel TRIAGE category



Vessel is currently safe, but there is a risk that the

situation will get worse

Level of safety has significantly worsened or will worsen and external actions are required to ensure the safety of the

people aboard


OPERATIONALFOCUS

- Damage control or firefighting operations are not or are no longer required.

- If there are injured people aboard, the operational focus is on emergency care.

- Only patients in need of urgent care are evacuated from the vessel.

- Active monitoring of the situation aboard is important.

OPERATIONALFOCUS

The operational focus is on limiting damage / damage control and preparations for possible evacuation from the vessel.

- In addition to carrying out damage control measures and rescue operations, it is important to determine the actual condition of the vessel.

- At the discretion of the master of the vessel, non-essential persons can be evacuated from the vessel.

- Proactive measures are taken to stabilise the situation aboard so that its condition becomes “green” or alternatively to allocate more time to evacuation and other rescue opera-tions.

- Continuous monitoring of the situation aboard is important (risk of the situa-tion turning “red”).

OPERATIONALFOCUS

- The operational focus is on evacuation of the vessel.

- All non-essential persons will be evacuated from the vessel.

- Patient classification may not be able to be carried out aboard the vessel.

- If enough resources are available, damage control/firefighting will be carried out to provide extra time for evacuation.

- Emergency towing to shallows could be an alternative to evacuation, or a means of gaining time for actual evacuation.

- Continuous monitoring of the situation aboard becomes more important (damage usually spreads progressively = significant risk of the situation turning “black”).

OPERATIONALFOCUS

- The operational focus is on rescuing people on the hull as well as searching for and rescuing those in the water.

- Patient classification cannot be carried out aboard the vessel.

- Operations involving diving or rescue by means of hull penetration are special operations that are planned and decided on separately.

- As a rule, additional personnel are not dispatched from land into the vessel.

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2. Method content and usage

The method has four stages. These are:

1) identifying the threat factors that have materialised

2) evaluating the severity of materialised threat factors

3) evaluating the effects of crew capabilities and weather conditions

4) determining the Vessel TRIAGE category

Stages 1, 2 and 4 are of key importance in assessing the safety status of a vessel. Stage 3 is different in nature, but serves to facilitate accurate situational awareness.

Major elements of the method are the Vessel TRIAGE threat factor matrix and Vessel TRIAGE form. The threat factor matrix is used in evaluating the severity of materialised threat factors. It is presented in Section 2.2. The Vessel TRIAGE form is a template for recording the results from the different stages of the method. The form is presented in Figure 2.

The form shown below highlights the fields in which the basic accident information is to be filled in (Vessel name, Vessel type, Number of crew members, Number of passengers) and when the safety status of the vessel has been determined (Date and time). Entries on reviews of the different Vessel TRIAGE stages are recorded in the fields below the “Date and time” field.

Larger versions of the threat factor matrix and form are presented on the back cover of this manual. The back cover also includes a quick guide to the method.

2.1 Identifying materialised threat factors (Stage 1)This stage involves assessing which of the threat factors included in the method have materialised during the accident or incident.

The threat factors are reviewed one by one. On the basis of the available information, the following question is answered: “Has this threat factor materialised in this accident or incident?”

If the threat factor in question (e.g. fire) has materialised, the answer is “Yes”, and if not, “No”. If the answer is unknown at the time of assessment, the answer is “Not known”.

The method includes the option of answering “Not known” to enable the user to continue with the evaluation even if the status of a certain threat factor is unknown at that time. Depending on the case, a thor-ough assessment of the consequences of an accident aboard the vessel

can be a time-consuming task. Thus, choosing “Not known” serves as a reminder that there is as yet not enough information about the threat factor in question and that it should be further evaluated.

Figure 3 highlights the fields in which the results of the identification of materialised threat factors should be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form.

No. of crew members:

Vessel name: Vessel type:

No. of passengers:

Date and time:

Threat factors Threat factorrealised

Severity of threat factor Remarks

Flooding

Listing, decreaseof stability

Decrease ofmanoeuvrability

Black-out

Fire, explosion

Danger posedby hazardoussubstances

Are crew capabilities impaired in a waythat affects the vessel's safety statusnegatively?

Are weather conditions affecting orwill they affect the vessel's safetystatus negatively?

Vessel's Vessel TRIAGE category

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNo

YesNo



Vessel is currently safe, but there is a risk thatthe situation will get worse

Level of safety has significantly worsened or will worsenand external actions are required to ensure the safety ofthe people aboard

GREEN

BLACK

RED

YELLOW

Figure 2. The basic information fields of the Vessel TRIAGE form are highlighted.

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No. of passengers:

Date and time:



Flooding



Black-out

Fire, explosion





YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNo

YesNo





GREEN

BLACK

RED

YELLOW

Figure 3. The fields in which the results of the identification of materialised threat factors should be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form are highlighted.

2.2 Assessment of the severity of threat factors (Stage 2)This stage involves assessing the severity of the materialised threat fac-tors.

This is done by comparing the available information on the situation aboard with the severity descriptions included in the method, and choosing the alternative that best describes the situation.

Threat factor severity descriptions are provided in the threat factor matrix, as shown in Figure 4. A larger version is presented on the back cover. More detailed descriptions of the threat factors are provided in Appendix C.

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Figure 4. Vessel TRIAGE threat factor matrix.

The threat factor matrix provides either three or four descriptions of dif-ferent degrees of threat factor severity. The “headings” of the descriptions (GREEN, YELLOW, etc.) are consistent with the Vessel TRIAGE categories for the description of overall vessel’s safety status (see Section 1.4).

A different number of “severity of threat” options are provided for some of the threats because not all threat factors are considered to pose the pos-sibility of worst-case consequences. For instance, the threat factor “black-out” (on its own) is considered to lead to redlevel consequences at worst, whereas the threat factor “fire, explosion”, for instance, may also lead to worst-case consequences (black).

If the severity of a certain threat is assessed to fall between two severity categories, it is important to be cautious; that is, the higher severity cat-egory should be selected, so that the severity of the threat factor is not underestimated.

When assessing the severity of materialised threat factors, the user should try to account for all the possible factors that influence – or might influ-ence – the severity of the situation aboard the vessel.

With respect to the threat factor matrix, it should be noted that the de-scriptions of situations representing different severity levels are intended as examples of possible situations. In other words, the descriptions pro-vided in the threat factor matrix do not perfectly cover all actual situations that might be encountered1. The user of the method should thus be able

1 One of the reasons why the Vessel TRIAGE method opted for its current threat factor matrix format is that this made it possible to keep the amount of textual information at a reasonable level. If the threat factor matrix were to include significantly more textual descriptions, the use of the method would be difficult (and thus slower) in actual situations.

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to use the descriptions creatively and decide which severity description most closely matches the situation at hand, keeping in mind the neces-sity to be cautious not to underestimate the threat.

Figure 5 highlights the fields in which the results of the assessment of the severity of threat factors should be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form. The results are recorded with checkmarks in the “severity of threat” col-umn. Additional information can be recorded in the “remarks” column.

The content of each threat factor is described in greater detail below in Sections 2.2.1-2.2.6.



No. of passengers:

Date and time:



Flooding



Black-out

Fire, explosion





YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNo

YesNo





GREEN

BLACK

RED

YELLOW

Figure 5. The fields in which the results of the assessment of the severity of threat factors should be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form are highlighted.

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2.2.1 Flooding

This threat factor refers to an unwanted flow of water into the vessel due to any reason.

In the case of flooding on the vessel, the threat factor “Listing, decrease of stability” often also needs to be assessed.

Descriptions of the different degrees of severity are presented in the table below.

GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKFlooding affects a limited or contained space and has no effect on the ves-sel’s stability and seawor-thiness.

Flooding can be kept under control with pumps and watertight compart-ments, but the seawor-thiness of the vessel is restricted.

Extensive flooding or progressive flooding to undamaged watertight compartments. Flooding cannot be kept under control and poses a direct danger on the entire vessel.

Flooding is so severe that evacuation operations are no longer possible.

OR Vessel has capsized or sunk.

Below are general issues/questions to be kept in mind when assessing the severity of flooding:

• What is the cause of flooding?

• What is the extent of flooding? How many compartments are affected by flooding?

• What is the location of flooding?

• Can the flooding be kept under control?

• Influence of the prevailing circumstances on the severity of the situation.

• Measures taken to control the situation and success in them.

• Ongoing measures to control the situation.

• Control measures still available.

• Assistance required by the vessel and its urgency.

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EXAMPLES OF APPLIED CRITERIA FOR THREAT FACTOR FLOODING 2

Below are some practical applications and norms for the above men-tioned generic guidelines, which can be considered when assessing the severity of the flooding. These should not be considered as exact limit values.

Background to selected threshold values:

1. SOLAS II-1 Regulation 7 gives the “s-factor” for survivability level of the ship. In the final stage of flooding the s-factor equals 1.0 only if the heel angle is smaller than 7°. If heel exceeds 15° the s-factor equals zero since SOLAS requires that lifesaving equipment (e.g. life boats) must be func-tional up to this limit.

a. For cargo ships the limit angles are 25° and 30° in SO-LAS II-1 Reg. 7. The limit angle for green categorisation could be larger than 7° (as for passenger ships) but must definitely be smaller than 25°.

2. SOLAS II-1 Regulation 8-1.2 sets requirements for one compartment flooding cases to passenger ships. This reg-ulation is also referred to in the Safe Return to Port (SRtP) provisions. Based on this, a green categorisation is justified only if flooding is limited to one watertight compartment.

3. Based on the old SOLAS 90, passenger ships were to be designed to survive damage to two watertight compart-ments. The probabilistic damage stability regulations (SO-LAS 2009) were developed to harmonise previous regu-lations. In general the survivability level has increased, and modern passenger ships will very likely survive two compartment damage. Thus this old requirement is still considered to be reasonable for the threshold value of the yellow categorisation for passenger ships.

2 Pennanen, P., Ruponen, P., Ramm-Schmidt, H. 2015. Integrated Decision Support System for Increased Passenger Ship Safety, Damaged Ship III, Royal Institute of Naval Architects, 25-26 March 2015, London, UK.Ruponen, P., Lindroth, D., Pennanen, P. 2015. Prediction of Survivability for Decision Sup-port in Ship Flooding Emergency, 12th International Conference on the Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 14-19 June 2015, Glasgow, UK.

THREAT GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKFlooding Flooding is limited to

one watertight com-partment.

[2]

Flooding is limited to two watertight compartments.

[3]

Extensive flooding, or possibly pro-gressive flooding to undamaged compartments, or water is on bulk-head deck.

Vessel has extensive listing or sunk; for passenger ships the limit heel angle can be 15° and for cargo ships e.g. 30°.

[1]

21

2.2.2 Listing, decrease of stability

This threat factor refers to the listing of the vessel to either side, poten-tially resulting in a decrease of stability, or the decrease of stability due to some other reason.


Below are general issues/questions to be kept in mind when assessing the severity of listing, decrease of stability:

• Extent of listing.

• Cause of listing.

• Is the angle of listing increasing?

• Impact of the listing on other activities on the vessel, particularly safety-critical functions.






GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKListing or decrease of sta-bility does not affect the seaworthiness of the ves-sel.

Seaworthiness of the vessel is restricted due to a decrease of stability or a notable list.

Large heel angles. The sea-worthiness of the vessel is significantly impaired, its stability is threatened and there is an imminent need to evacuate.

Stability is decreased to such an extent that evac-uation operations are no longer possible. OR

Vessel has capsized or sunk.

THREAT GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKFlooding Flooding is limited to

one watertight com-partment.

[2]

Flooding is limited to two watertight compartments.

[3]

Extensive flooding, or possibly pro-gressive flooding to undamaged compartments, or water is on bulk-head deck.

Vessel has extensive listing or sunk; for passenger ships the limit heel angle can be 15° and for cargo ships e.g. 30°.

[1]

22

EXAMPLES OF APPLIED CRITERIA FOR THREAT FACTOR LISTING, DECREASE OF STABILITY 3 Below are some practical applications and norms for the above men-tioned generic guidelines, which can be considered when assessing the severity of the listing or decrease of stability. These should not be con-sidered as exact limit values for general use.

Background to selected threshold values:

1. SOLAS II-1 Regulation 7 gives the “s-factor” for survivability level of the ship. In the final stage of flooding the s-factor equals 1.0 only if the heel angle is smaller than 7°. If heel exceeds 15° the s-factor equals zero since SOLAS requires that lifesaving equipment (e.g. life boats) must be func-tional up to this limit.

a. The “s-final” is used instead of “s-intermediate” since the flooding can be slow.

b. For cargo ships the limit angles are 25° and 30° in SOLAS II-1 Reg. 7. The limit angle for green categorisation could be larger than 7° (as for passenger ships) but must defi-nitely be smaller than 25°.

2. Especially in the case of passenger ships, time is required for orderly evacuation and abandonment. IMO MSC.1/Circ.1238 “Guidelines for Evacuation Analysis for New and Existing Passenger Ships” sets the requirement of 90 min-utes evacuation time for passenger ships. For RoPax ships or small cruise ships the limit is 80 minutes. It should be noted that extensive listing will significantly increase the required time for evacuation.

THREAT GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKListing, loss of stability

Listing is small (less than 7° for passenger ships), and stability is good.[1]

Notable listing but sufficient stability. There is still enough time for orderly evacuation and abandonment of the vessel.

Listing exceeds 10° for passenger ships and/or stability has decreased, high risk of capsizing.[1]

The vessel is likely to capsize within a shorter time than required for orderly evacuation and abandonment. [2]

Vessel has capsized (extensive listing) or sunk; for passenger ships the limit heel angle can be 15° and for cargo ships e.g. 30°. [1]

3 Pennanen, P., Ruponen, P., Ramm-Schmidt, H. 2015. Integrated Decision Support System for Increased Passenger Ship Safety, Damaged Ship III, Royal Institute of Naval Architects, 25-26 March 2015, London, UK.Ruponen, P., Lindroth, D., Pennanen, P. 2015. Prediction of Survivability for Decision Sup-port in Ship Flooding Emergency, 12th International Conference on the Stability of Ships and Ocean Vehicles, 14-19 June 2015, Glasgow, UK.

23

2.2.3 Decrease of manoeuvrability

This threat factor refers to decrease of manoeuvrability. In extreme cas-es, the vessel might suffer complete loss of control.


Below are general issues/questions to be kept in mind when assessing the severity of the decrease of manoeuvrability:

• Are the propulsion system, rudder and steering propellers of the vessel functioning normally?

• Has a suitable steering method been correctly selected and is it usable?

• Has the malfunction been caused by an internal or external cause?

• Is the vessel using its backup steering system? If so, how does this limit operations?

• Assessment of whether the malfunction can be repaired using the vessel’s own resources.






GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKVessel’s manoeuvrability is hampered, but the ves-sel can still proceed on its course.

Vessel has lost its ma-noeuvrability, but is still capable of emergency an-choring or drifting safely.

Vessel has lost its ma-noeuvrability and is not capable of emergency an-choring or drifting safely.

(Not applicable)

THREAT GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKListing, loss of stability

Listing is small (less than 7° for passenger ships), and stability is good.[1]

Notable listing but sufficient stability. There is still enough time for orderly evacuation and abandonment of the vessel.

Listing exceeds 10° for passenger ships and/or stability has decreased, high risk of capsizing.[1]

The vessel is likely to capsize within a shorter time than required for orderly evacuation and abandonment. [2]

Vessel has capsized (extensive listing) or sunk; for passenger ships the limit heel angle can be 15° and for cargo ships e.g. 30°. [1]

24

2.2.4 Black-out

This threat factor refers to a malfunction of the vessel electrical system, causing the interruption of electricity supply either in certain sections of the vessel or throughout the vessel, which in the worst cases jeopard-ises critical functions.


Below are general issues/questions to be kept in mind when assessing the severity of the black-out:

• Extent of the black-out – does it affect only certain sections/systems or the entire vessel?

• Are the critical systems operational?

• Reason for the malfunction?

• Has the emergency generator been switched on in the network?

• If the vessel is running on backup power, how long can it continue to operate?

• Assessment of whether the malfunction can be repaired using the vessel’s own resources.






GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKFunctions important for ship operations are kept running by backup sys-tems while the fault is re-paired.

Operational capability of the vessel is limited: Back-up systems do not work as planned OR functions important for ship operations are kept running by backup sys-tems, but the fault cannot be repaired at sea.

A full black-out of long duration that cannot be repaired at sea poses a di-rect danger on the entire vessel.

(Not applicable)

25

2.2.5 Fire, explosion

This threat factor refers to a situation in which there is a fire or explosion aboard the vessel. The fire may be preceded or followed by an explo-sion. An explosion may also occur without a fire. The method can be used to assess the threat posed by a fire and/or explosion regardless of its location, extent, flammable materials or cause.

If the fire involves hazardous substances, the severity of the threat factor Danger posed by hazardous substances also needs to be assessed.

If a physical explosion of a pressurised system occurs on board (for in-stance, a pressurised tank blows.) without a fire, the severity of such a situation can also be assessed using other threat factors. The main con-cerns in such cases might be whether the explosion has consequences that compromise manoeuvrability or cause flooding.


GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKFire has been extinguished and there is no danger of reignition AND/OR the consequences of an explo-sion do not affect the ves-sel’s safety.

Fire or explosion affects only a limited area and can be brought under control with the vessel’s own or external dam-age control/firefighting resources.

Fire cannot be kept under control OR the conse-quences of an explosion pose a direct danger on the entire vessel.

Conditions on board the vessel are not survivable. The consequences of the fire or explosion pose a direct danger to persons aboard.

OR

Vessel has been destroyed.

Below are general issues/questions to be kept in mind when assessing the severity of the fire and/or explosion:

• What is on fire? What has exploded?

• Where is the fire? Where has the explosion occurred?

• How extensive is the fire? How extensive are the damages?

• Toxicity of the smoke. Are hazardous substances involved? If yes, the amount and nature of these substances?

• Behaviour of the fire – has it spread beyond the section where it broke out?

• The vessel’s opportunities to contain/extinguish the fire?

26

• Can a burning compartment be cooled from outside?

• Have persons suffered injuries?

• Impact of the fire on other activities on the vessel, particularly safe-ty-critical functions.



• Ongoing measures to control the fire.



2.2.6 Danger posed by hazardous substances

This threat refers to a dangerous situation caused by the release of a hazardous substance on board (and potential reactions). The released substance may be carried on board as cargo or contained in one of the technical systems of the vessel, such as cooling equipment. When ships collide, hazardous substances released on one vessel may also pose a danger to the other vessel.


GREEN YELLOW RED BLACKRelease of hazardous sub-stances on board does not pose any danger on the vessel.

Release of hazardous sub-stances on board poses a danger in certain sections of the vessel, but the release can be contained to these sections.

Release of hazardous sub-stances on board poses a direct danger on the entire vessel.

(Not applicable)

Below are general issues/questions to be kept in mind when assessing the severity of the situation involving the release of hazardous substanc-es:

• Identification of the released substances(s) and their hazardous characteristics, form, etc.

• In which section of the vessel are the hazardous substances re-leased?

• Amount of these substances on board.

• Can the hazardous substances be removed from the vessel?

27

• Is there a possibility of a chain reaction?

• Have persons suffered injuries?

• Impact of the situation on other activities on the vessel, particularly safety-critical functions.






28

2.3 Assessing the effects of crew capabilities and weather conditions (Stage 3)At this stage, it is assessed whether any impairment in crew capabili-ties or the weather conditions affect the vessel’s safety status negatively. Weather conditions and impaired crew capabilities worsen safety when they hinder the performance of any measures that could, under ordi-nary circumstances, be taken to stabilise the safety status of the vessel, for instance.

Impairment in crew capabilities could be the result of, for example, un-dermanning or the lack of expertise in preventing the dangerous situ-ation at hand. Weather conditions impact on vessel safety in situations such as when the vessel has lost its manoeuvrability in a storm and is drifting without emergency anchoring capabilities in a rocky area.

Impaired crew capabilities and weather conditions may already affect situational assessment when determining the severity of the material-ised risk factors (see Section 2.2). However, as impaired crew capabilities and weather conditions can have a negative effect on vessel safety on their own, and not just through the factors, the method pays particular attention to these aspects. The user of the Vessel TRIAGE method thus assesses them separately.

In practice, this stage means answering the questions highlighted in Figure 6. If crew capabilities or weather conditions have a negative ef-fect on vessel safety, “Yes” should be selected. Otherwise, the answer should be “No”. “Yes” should also be selected when the issue in question (crew capabilities, weather conditions) is assessed to have even a slight-ly negative effect on the situation.

The assessment of crew capabilities and weather conditions does not have a direct bearing on the Vessel TRIAGE category, but facilitates a better overview of the situation. If necessary, the Vessel TRIAGE category can be increased in severity to reflect the situation.

29



No. of passengers:

Date and time:



Flooding



Black-out

Fire, explosion





YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNo

YesNo





GREEN

BLACK

RED

YELLOW

Figure 6. The fields in which the results of assessment of the effects of crew capabilities and weather conditions are to be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form are highlighted.

30

2.4 Determining the Vessel TRIAGE category (Stage 4)In this stage, the Vessel TRIAGE category describing the safety status of the vessel is determined. The category is determined based on the as-sessed severity of the materialised threat factors.

The basic rule in determining the Vessel TRIAGE category is that it shall correspond to the category of the most severe threat factor. For instance, if an accident results in the materialisation of two threats, one of which is assessed as being green in severity and the other as yellow, according to this basic rule the Vessel TRIAGE category of the vessel is set at yellow.

Likewise, in a situation in which the severity of all the identified threat factors is green, the Vessel TRIAGE category is green.

According to an evaluation by the method user, the Vessel TRIAGE cate-gory can be set to be higher than the severity of the most severe threat factor. This may be the case when crew capabilities and/or weather con-ditions worsen vessel’s safety or if there are other reasonable grounds for doing so.

In situations where it remains uncertain whether one or several threat factors have materialised, the Vessel TRIAGE category should be set at one’s own discretion. The main issue is the severity of the threat factors that have already been assessed. For instance, if the most severe threat factor is yellow, and it remains unclear whether one or more threat fac-tors have materialised, the Vessel TRIAGE category is yellow until more information becomes available.

Figure 7 highlights the field in which the Vessel TRIAGE category is to be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form.

31



No. of passengers:

Date and time:



Flooding



Black-out

Fire, explosion





YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNo

YesNo





GREEN

BLACK

RED

YELLOW

Figure 7. The field in which the Vessel TRIAGE category is to be recorded on the Vessel TRIAGE form is highlighted.

32

2.5 Observations on the application of the method The first two stages of the method – the identification of materialised threat factors and the assessment of their severity – can be performed either separately or in parallel, depending on the situation at hand.

If the stages are kept separate, in practice this means that all the threat factors are first assessed systematically to determine which of them are materialised in the accident or incident. Then the severity of each mate-rialised threat factor is evaluated. If the stages are carried out in parallel, this means that the identification of materialised threat factors and the assessment of their severity alternate. Thus, when it is determined that a certain threat factor included in the method is materialised in the ac-cident, the severity of this threat factor is assessed before moving on to evaluating the next threat factor.

The Vessel TRIAGE category may – and typically does – change as the situation evolves. In some cases a yellow situation can be stabilised to green, and the ship and its passengers can continue on their route or to the nearest harbour, for instance.

It is important to monitor the materialised threat factors. If the situation on board the vessel changes, the Vessel TRIAGE categorisation must be carried out again and any changes must be reported immediately. The rule of thumb is that in less critical situations, the update frequency can be longer than in more critical situations.

The vessel is subject to Vessel TRIAGE categorisation for as long as it re-quires or may require external assistance. In other words, Vessel TRIAGE categorisation ends when, for instance, a vessel that has suffered minor damage due to grounding can proceed to the nearest harbour with its passengers.

33

34

3. An example of the application of the Vessel TRIAGE method

13.3.2015On 13 March 2015, RoRo M/S Sunset Dreamer is en route from England to Finland on the southern Baltic Sea, carrying 38 crewmembers and 58 passengers, when it is caught in a storm caused by a strong low-pres-sure front. At 03:15, as the crew checks to see that the cargo is properly secured, one man falls off a container and is seriously injured (1).

M/S Sunset Dreamer requests that the injured man be evacuated imme-diately and taken to a hospital (2).

JRCC Denmark responds to the call for assistance and designates the evacuation as a distress phase (3).

Vessel TRIAGE categorisation is not required, as the safety of the vessel is not in danger. JRCC Denmark dispatches a maritime SAR helicopter (4), which evacuates the injured man an hour later (5) and transports him to a hospital in Copenhagen, where they arrive an hour and a half after the accident. The maritime SAR operation is then concluded (6).

35

(1) A crew member seriously injured on M/S Sunset Dreamer

2) Evacuation of the injured requested

(3) JRCC Denmark designates the evacuation as an distress phase

3:15 4:30 6:00 11:30 15:30 16:00

Distress phase

(4) Maritime SAR helicopter dispatched

(5) Evacuation completed

(7) Listing of 5° on M/S Sunset Dreamer

(8) JRCC Gothenburg notified of the situation

(9) JRCC Gothenburg declares an uncertainty phase

Uncertainty phase

(10) Vessel TRIAGE category designated as YELLOW

Vessel TRIAGE category YELLOW

(11) M/S Sunset Dreamer reports an increased listing by 2–3°

(12) JRCC Gothenburg declares an alert phase

Alert phase

(13) Vessel TRIAGE category maintained at YELLOW

(14) JRCC Gothenburg forwards information on the event to MRCC Turku

4:20 5:30 7:40 8:15 9:30 12:10

Alert phase


Distress phase

(15) Cargo shifts strongly, listing increases to 13°

(16) M/S Sunset Dreamer notifies MRCC Turku

(17) Evacuation of the 58 passengers requested

(18) Maritime SAR helicopters alerted to evacuate the passengers and OPV Turva sent to M/S Sunset Dreamer

(19) Urgency of the task maintained in the alert phase


(21) OPV Turva prepares for evacuation and emergency towing

(22) Evacuation of the passengers completed

(23) M/S Sunset Dreamer requests confirmation on the closest port of refuge

(24) M/S Sunset Dreamer requests external assistance due to recurring black-outs and further listing

(25) 30 crewmembers are decided to evacuate onto OPV Turva

(26) MRCC Turku declares a distress phase

(27) Vessel TRIAGE category is changed to RED

Vessel TRIAGE category RED

(28) Evacuation of 30 crewmembers onto OPV Turva completed

(29) M/S Sunset Dreamer taken into emergency towing

(30) M/S Sunset Dreamer anchors in the port of refuge

(34) M/S Sunset Dreamer reaches its port of destination and the SAR operation is concluded

(6) SAR operation concluded

7:00 13:00


(31) M/S Sunset Dreamer has been righted and permission is given to continue towards its port of destination

(32) Severity of the situation is lowered to an uncertainty phase

(33) Vessel TRIAGE category is lowered to yellow

15.3.

14.3.

13.3.

Uncertainty phase

time

time

time

During the next four hours, the wind rises. To avoid the worst of the storm, M/S Sunset Dreamer diverts from its course to take a more shel-tered route closer to the Swedish coast. At 11:30, the vessel notices that some of the cargo lashings have failed. Part of the cargo has shifted, causing the vessel to list about five degrees to the left (7).

Ten minutes later, the vessel notifies JRCC Gothenburg of the situation (8) and continues north in the shelter of the coast. JRCC Gothenburg declares an uncertainty phase (9) and designates M/S Sunset Dreamer’s Vessel TRIAGE category as “yellow” (10)1.

JRCC Gothenburg requests the vessel to immediately inform it of any changes in safety level. At 15:30, M/S Sunset Dreamer reports that its listing has increased by about 2-3 degrees during the past four hours, but that it expects to be able to continue sailing to its planned destina-tion (11).

JRCC declares an alert phase (12), but maintains the Vessel TRIAGE cate-gory at “yellow” (13)2.

On the basis of a risk evaluation performed with the master of the ship, there is no need to evacuate people. JRCC Gothenburg forwards infor-mation on the event to MRCC Turku (14), as M/S Sunset Dreamer will enter the Finnish maritime SAR area during the night.

1 The Vessel TRIAGE category is set at yellow, because the seaworthiness of the vessel has worsened due to listing and the shifting of cargo. The vessel is safe at this point, but there is a risk that its safety status might worsen due to the (further) shifting of cargo. In addition, listing impacts on its behaviour in the waves and decreases its manoeuvrability.

2 In this case, the Vessel TRIAGE category is kept at yellow, as the listing of the ship has not worsened significantly over a period of several hours, and the master of the ship estimates that the vessel can remain on course to its original destina-tion. Furthermore, there is no need for immediate evacuation.

36

14.3.2015At 04:20 on 14 March 2015, after the ship has entered the Finnish SAR area in the northern Baltic Sea, it is hit by several very powerful waves. Cargo shifts strongly, causing the ship to list further to about 13 degrees, where it stabilises (15).

The ship notifies MRCC Turku of its situation (16).

As its listing significantly compromises the operational ability of the ship and complicates ordinary operations on board, the master of the vessel asks whether Finnish SAR can evacuate part of the people on board, for example all of the 58 passengers (17).

MRCC Turku answers affirmatively and alerts several maritime SAR helicopters from different Baltic rim countries to carry out the task. It also dispatches the offshore patrol vessel “Turva”, which is patrolling in the area and is capable of emergency towing, to head to M/S Sunset Dreamer (18).

The urgency of the task remains in the alert phase (19) and the Vessel TRIAGE category is kept at “yellow” (20)3.

The basic goal of the rescue operation is defined as the evacuation of all 58 passengers from M/S Sunset Dreamer to Finland using maritime SAR helicopters. In addition, the offshore patrol vessel “Turva” stays with M/S Sunset Dreamer and prepares for emergency evacuation and towing in order to ensure the safety of the crew during the remainder of the journey (21).

The crew of M/S Sunset Dreamer, 38 people, all remain on the vessel. At 07:40, M/S Sunset Dreamer informs MRCC Turku that all passengers have been evacuated on the helicopters (22).

Half an hour later, the last group of evacuated passengers reaches Turku by SAR helicopter. The vessel continues towards Finland and requests confirmation from MRCC Turku on the closest possible port of refuge, where an attempt can be made to right the vessel (23). MRCC Turku reports that the closest such port is on the northern side of the island of Utö in the Archipelago Sea.

In the morning, at 08:15, M/S Sunset Dreamer requests external assis-tance due to recurring black-outs and further listing (24).

On the basis of a conversation between the master of the vessel and MRCC Turku, a decision is made to evacuate 30 of the crewmembers onto the offshore patrol vessel “Turva”. A crew of eight people remain on board the vessel to start preparations for emergency towing (25).

3 The Vessel TRIAGE category is kept at yellow, even though a decision has been made to evacuate part of the people on board. In this case, however, the situation is close to the red threshold. Although there is as yet no immediate need to evacuate all those on board the vessel, passengers will be evacuated in case the situation escalates. The vessel can still in-dependently continue on its way in spite of the worsening of its safety status. The vessel status must be monitored very actively so that there will be enough time to evacuate the remaining people, if necessary.

37




3:15 4:30 6:00 11:30 15:30 16:00

Distress phase






Uncertainty phase





Alert phase



4:20 5:30 7:40 8:15 9:30 12:10

Alert phase


Distress phase




















7:00 13:00





15.3.

14.3.

13.3.

Uncertainty phase

time

time

time

MRCC Turku declares a distress phase (26) and changes the Vessel TRI-AGE category to red (27)4.

At 09:30, the offshore patrol vessel “Turva” reports that 30 of the crew-members of M/S Sunset Dreamer have been transferred safely on board (28).

At 09:55, M/S Sunset Dreamer is taken into emergency towing by a commercial tugboat that has arrived on the location (29)

and the vessels head towards the port of refuge. At 12:10, M/S Sunset Dreamer anchors in the port of refuge and the rest of its crew are re-turned on board to help with righting the ship (30).

4 In this case, the Vessel TRIAGE category is set at red, as the safety status of the vessel has worsened significantly and it can no longer continue without external assistance. A minimum number of crewmembers remain behind on the subject vessel to help with preparations for emer-gency towing and to maintain control of the vessel.

38




3:15 4:30 6:00 11:30 15:30 16:00

Distress phase






Uncertainty phase





Alert phase



4:20 5:30 7:40 8:15 9:30 12:10

Alert phase


Distress phase




















7:00 13:00





15.3.

14.3.

13.3.

Uncertainty phase

time

time

time

15.3.2015The next morning, the master of the vessel notifies MRCC Turku that it has been successfully righted and that it has been given permission by a marine surveyor to continue towards its port of destination, Hanko (31).

MRCC Turku lowers the severity of the situation to an uncertainty phase (32) and the Vessel TRIAGE category to yellow (33)5.

Once the vessel reaches Hanko, MRCC Turku concludes the maritime SAR operation (34).

The master of the vessel calls MRCC Turku from the harbour and thanks for the assistance. Together they review the different stages of the res-cue operation and are grateful that the safety status of the vessel did not deteriorate to the black Vessel TRIAGE category.6

5 Thanks to successful damage control measures, the vessel is now seaworthy again. In spite of this, the safety status of the vessel can be considered to be worse than normal due to the incidents that have occurred and the resulting uncertainties. For this reason, its Vessel TRIAGE category is set at yellow. The ship can continue on its way inde-pendently. After more extensive inspections at the destination – or an intermediate port – the Vessel TRIAGE categorisation can be ended. Categorisation can also be ended when it is certain that the safety status of the vessel is back to normal in all respects.

6 Although the vessel required the assistance of external units, it remained under control of its crew at all times and was not destroyed.

39

Appendix A Glossary

Vessel TRIAGE method A method for assessing and communicat-ing the safety status of vessels in maritime accidents and incidents.

Vessel TRIAGE Synonymous with Vessel TRIAGE method.

Vessel TRIAGE category A description of the safety status of the subject vessel in accordance with the Ves-sel TRIAGE method. Indicates the level of safety aboard the subject vessel for per-sons aboard, taking into account the pre-vailing and anticipated conditions on the ship and in its environment.

Green The vessel is safe and can be assumed to(Vessel TRIAGE category) remain so.

Yellow The vessel is currently safe, but there is a risk that the situation will get worse.

Red Level of safety has significantly worsened or will worsen and external actions are re-quired to ensure the safety of the people aboard

Black The vessel is no longer safe and has been lost.

Subject vessel A vessel that has suffered an accident or incident.

Vessel’s safety status The ability of the vessel to provide a safe environment for those on board.

Threat factor A consequence/event caused by an ac-cident or incident that might adversely affect vessel’s safety. The Vessel TRIAGE method includes the following threat fac-tors: Flooding; Listing, decrease of stabili-ty; Decrease of manoeuvrability; Blackout; Fire, explosion; and Danger posed by haz-ardous substances.

Flooding One of the threat factors included in the method. Refers to an unwanted/uncon-trollable flow of water into the vessel due to any reason.

(Vessel TRIAGE category)



40

Listing, decrease of One of the threat factors included in the method. Refers to the listing of the vessel to either side, potentially resulting in a de-crease of stability, or the decrease of stabil-ity due to some other reason.

Decrease of One of the threat factors included in the method. Refers to decrease of manoeuvra-bility. In extreme cases, the vessel might suffer complete loss of control.

Blackout One of the threat factors included in the method. Refers to a malfunction of the vessel electrical system, causing the inter-ruption of electricity supply, either in cer-tain sections of the vessel or throughout the vessel, which in the worst cases jeop-ardises critical functions.

Fire, explosion One of the threat factors included in the method. Refers to a situation in which there is a fire aboard the vessel. The fire may be preceded or followed by an explo-sion. An explosion may also occur without a fire.

Danger posed by One of the threat factors included in the method. Refers to a dangerous situation caused by the release of a hazardous sub-stance on board (and potential reactions). The released substance may be carried on board as cargo or contained in one of the technical systems of the vessel, such as cooling equipment. When ships collide, hazardous substances released on one vessel may also pose a danger to the other vessel.

Materialised threat factor A materialised threat factor that has been identified in the accident being assessed.

Identification of First stage of the Vessel TRIAGE method (see Section 2.1).

Assessing the severity Second stage of the Vessel TRIAGE method (see Section 2.2).

Determining crew Third stage of the Vessel TRIAGE method (see Section 2.3).

stability

manoeuvrability

hazardous substances

threat factors

capabilities and weather conditions

of threat factors

Appendix A

41

Determining the Fourth stage of the Vessel TRIAGE method (see Section 2.4).

Threat factor matrix The matrix presents threat factor severity descriptions that are to be compared with available information on the vessel status when using the Vessel TRIAGE method.

Vessel TRIAGE form Template for recording the results from the different stages of the method.

Emergency phase A generic term meaning, as the case may be, uncertainty phase, alert phase, or dis-tress phase (ref. IAM-SAR Vol. II)

Uncertainty Phase A situation wherein doubt exists as to the safety of an aircraft or a marine vessel, and of the persons on board.

Alert Phase A situation wherein apprehension exists as to the safety of an aircraft or marine vessel, and of the persons on board.

Distress Phase A situation wherein there is reasonable certainty that a vessel or other craft, in-cluding an aircraft or a person, is threat-ened by grave and imminent danger and requires immediate assistance.

MOB Man overboard

MRCC Maritime Search and Rescue Co-ordina-tion Centre

JRCC Joint Search and Rescue Co-ordination Centre

Triage (medical) The process of sorting survivors according to medical condition and assigning them priorities for emergency care, treatment, and evacuation (ref. IAMSAR Vol. II)

Port of refuge Port or place of refuge is a shelter for a ship in a damaged condition endangering life, health and/or environment

Vessel TRIAGE categoryAppendix A

42

Appendix B Vessel TRIAGE categories, their definitions, descriptions and related SAR operational focus



Vessel is currently safe, but there is a risk that the situa-

tion will get worse

Level of safety has significant-ly worsened or will worsen

and external actions are required to ensure the safety

of the people aboard


GENERAL SITUATION- The situation aboard is stable. Although the vessel may have been damaged by the accident, this damage does not threaten its seaworthiness or the people aboard.



GENERAL SITUATION- Damage to the vessel might affect its seaworthiness or the full extent of the damage has not as yet been determined.


- Damage to the vessel may pose a direct or indirect threat

GENERAL SITUATION- The vessel is significantly damaged, affecting its seaworthiness, and there is a threat to the people aboard.




GENERAL SITUATION- The vessel is capsized, broken, sunk, burnt or otherwise damaged so badly that it no longer provides protection to the people aboard against the prevailing conditions (that is, the vessel has totally lost its seaworthiness).


OPERATIONALFOCUS





OPERATIONALFOCUS

- The operational focus is on limiting damage /damage control and preparations for possible evacuation from the vessel.



- Proactive measures are taken to stabilise the situation aboard so that its condition becomes “green” or alternatively to allocate more time to evacuation and other rescue operations.

- Continuous monitoring of the situation aboard is important (risk of the situation turning “red”).

OPERATIONALFOCUS







OPERATIONALFOCUS





43

Appendix C Detailed descriptions of the Vessel TRIAGE threat factors

FLOODINGFlooding may result when the vessel runs aground, or when it collides with another vessel. The ship hull or other technical structure might also fail. For instance, a leak in the cooling water inflow pipes might result in uncontrollable flooding. Likewise, open cargo hold hatches, for in-stance, could result in uncontrollable flooding while at sea.

Extreme flooding – for instance, due to a long breach in the hull caused by grounding – might cause the vessel to lose its most important safety characteristic, that is, its buoyancy. In the worst-case scenario, this will cause the ship to sink. In addition to buoyancy, flooding often impacts on the listing of the ship and thereby potentially also on stability.

The consequences of flooding – and thereby the severity of the situ-ation – depend on numerous factors, including the cause, extent and location of flooding, the structure of the vessel/number of watertight compartments and available pump capacity.

LISTINGListing can be caused by reasons such as flooding, the shifting of cargo or running aground. Loss of stability might not necessarily be preceded by prolonged listing, such as in the case of ice formation on above-wa-ter ship structures.

The consequences of listing can vary considerably. Minor listing due to uneven cargo placement, for instance, might not necessarily have a sig-nificant effect on ship motion or stability. In other words, the vessel can still withstand listing moments without impact on its functions.

When a vessel lists at a steeper angle, especially due to flooding, the situation is much more severe. The greater the angle of listing, the more difficult it is for people to move about on the ship. Listing beyond a certain point causes the ship to lose its stability; the ship can no longer withstand listing moments and capsizes. The situation becomes par-ticularly dangerous when free fluids accumulate in cargo spaces, such as on the car deck.

In addition to hindering the ability of people to move about the ship, excessive listing makes it impossible to deploy lifeboats. Likewise, listing can have an impact on the functioning of the vessel engines and there-by on the electricity supply, for instance.



Vessel is currently safe, but there is a risk that the situa-

tion will get worse

Level of safety has significant-ly worsened or will worsen

and external actions are required to ensure the safety

of the people aboard


GENERAL SITUATION- The situation aboard is stable. Although the vessel may have been damaged by the accident, this damage does not threaten its seaworthiness or the people aboard.



GENERAL SITUATION- Damage to the vessel might affect its seaworthiness or the full extent of the damage has not as yet been determined.


- Damage to the vessel may pose a direct or indirect threat

GENERAL SITUATION- The vessel is significantly damaged, affecting its seaworthiness, and there is a threat to the people aboard.




GENERAL SITUATION- The vessel is capsized, broken, sunk, burnt or otherwise damaged so badly that it no longer provides protection to the people aboard against the prevailing conditions (that is, the vessel has totally lost its seaworthiness).


OPERATIONALFOCUS





OPERATIONALFOCUS

- The operational focus is on limiting damage /damage control and preparations for possible evacuation from the vessel.



- Proactive measures are taken to stabilise the situation aboard so that its condition becomes “green” or alternatively to allocate more time to evacuation and other rescue operations.

- Continuous monitoring of the situation aboard is important (risk of the situation turning “red”).

OPERATIONALFOCUS







OPERATIONALFOCUS





44

DECREASE OF MANOEUVRABILITY A decrease or loss of control over motion may result from the partial or total loss of manoeuvrability and/or propulsion. Disruptions in vessel manoeuvrability or propulsion may be caused by many reasons, such as a technical malfunction or damage to the propeller and/or rudder due to grounding. Major factors impacting on safety when a ship loses con-trol over its motion include anchoring/emergency anchoring capabili-ties, weather conditions, underwater rocks in the surrounding sea and other traffic in the area. The ship’s state of motion prior to the decrease of manoeuvrability and/or propulsion also affect the nature of the situ-ation.

BLACK-OUTA black-out may be caused by many different reasons and may be relat-ed to problems with either the generation or distribution of electricity. A ship typically has multiple generator units, but it is not impossible for several of them to malfunction simultaneously. The worst-case scenar-io is when the emergency generator of the ship also ceases to func-tion as planned. Possible reasons for a black-out on a ship include an equipment breakdown in its electricity generation system, a fire in the machine rooms, cable fire, a malfunction in the safety systems of the electrical system, etc. Flooding or listing can also cause a black-out.

The immediate severity of the situation depends above all on how the electrical system malfunction impacts on the functioning of ship critical functions, such as manoeuvrability, navigation, etc.

FIREA fire may break out in areas such as the machine or other technical rooms, cargo spaces, crew and passenger areas or the outer deck. On the car deck, a fire might start from a vehicle or its cargo.

The severity of a fire depends on factors such as the material that is burning (e.g. are hazardous substances involved), the extent and loca-tion of the fire, how soon the fire is detected, the amount of flammable materials, how well the vessel is equipped for controlling fires (e.g. au-tomatic fire detection, extinguishing and smothering systems, fire com-partments), the effects of the fire on important technical systems on board, and the firefighting expertise/abilities and opportunities of the crew.

Furthermore, a fire may become more severe if, for instance, it exposes pressurised tanks to the risk of explosion due to heat.

Appendix C

45

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCESA substance may be hazardous because it is poisonous, radioactive, cor-rosive or oxidising. It may also be explosive, flammable, easily ignited or even self-igniting, or create burning gases when exposed to water.

The substance may be a solid, liquid or gas. Gases may be lighter or heavier than air. Hazardous substances might be stored in the vessel cargo spaces or chemical tanks, in barrels packed in ordinary intermodal containers, or in tank containers, for instance.

There are many reasons why such substances might become dangerous. For instance, it is possible that the wrong type of container was used for packaging the substances at the point of origin; the containers used for the substances – such as barrels – may have been incorrectly loaded into a larger container; and intermodal and tank containers containing hazardous substances have been handled too roughly in earlier stages of the logistics chain and their ability to withstand the stresses of sea transport have been compromised. Substances might be released from cargo spaces, chemical tanks, etc. due to failures in these spaces or their monitoring systems. Other accidents, such as flooding, collision or fire, may also cause a dangerous situation involving hazardous substances. It is also possible that hazardous substances are being carried on board without permission, such as inside a vehicle on the car deck, and that these substances are released during the voyage for some reason.

The consequences might vary greatly. Some incidents might result in no harm to the vessel and the people on board. For instance, in the event of a gas leak that cannot be stopped, the crew might decide to simply discharge the gas into the air. The air dilutes the gas and, depending on the substance in question, it might not even pose a threat to the envi-ronment. However, in some cases, the release of hazardous substances and possibly a related explosion/fire will in itself have serious conse-quences, requiring the almost immediate evacuation of the ship. The consequences of the release of a hazardous substance depend above all on its characteristics, the amount released and its behaviour when released, that is, whether the situation involves an explosion or fire.

Appendix C

Quick guide to the Vessel TRIAGE method

1. Fill out the required basic informationAt least vessel name and date and time.

2. Assess materialised threat factorsReview the threat factors and answer the question: “Has this threat materialised in this accident or incident?” Yes / No / Not known

(For more detailed information on the threat factors, see Section 2.1. of the manual.)

3. Assess the severity of the materialised threat factors3.1 Compare information on the situation aboard the vessel with

descriptions of situations of different severity presented in the threat factor matrix.

3.2 Select the alternative that best matches the situation aboard.

If the assessed severity of the threat factor lies between the yellow and red descriptions, for example, select the more severe option.

(For more detailed information on the threat factors, see Section 2.2 of the manual.)

4. Assess the effects of crew capabilities and weather conditionsAre crew capabilities or adverse weather conditions affecting the vessel’s safety status negatively?

5. Determine the Vessel TRIAGE category- As a minimum, the Vessel TRIAGE category must be equal to the

severity of the most severe identified threat factor.

- According to the evaluation of the method user, the Vessel TRIAGE category can be set to be higher than the severity of the most severe identified threat factor. This may be the case when crew capabilities or weather conditions worsen vessel’s safety or if there are other reasonable grounds for doing so.

6. RemarksAdditional information about threat factors or weather conditions, for instance, can be recorded in the “remarks” column.

7. Repeat the evaluation when neededRemember to feed in the date and time.

VESSEL TRIAGE FORM



No. of passengers:

Date and time:



Flooding



Black-out

Fire, explosion





YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNoNot known

YesNo

YesNo





GREEN

BLACK

RED

YELLOW

1

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4

5

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www.raja.fi/vesseltriage

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VESSELTRIAGE...VTT Technical Research Centre of Fin-land Ltd served as an external expert in the project. In addition to the aforementioned parties, representatives from close to 40