Historically, Venezuela's main foreign policy goal has been to reduce Latin American countries

dependence on western powers. One of the earliest examples was the founding of OPEC (Organization

of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1960. OPEC was formed (with Venezuela as a founding

member) in response to the domination of the petroleum market by 7 multi-national corporations with

the goal of unifying member countries and creating fair, profitable practices in regard to oil [1].

Venezuela's economy was, and still is, extremely dependent on oil production. Oil represents 80% of

the countries export product and contributes to 50% percent of the governments income [2].

Venezuela's participation in OPEC represents its desire to maintain autonomy over its main source of

income. Currently Venezuela is considered one of the most vulnerable nation of the twelve OPEC

members and is facing faces key deadlines for billions of dollars in foreign debt [3]. The current

President, Nicolas Maduro, believes that the US is purposefully manipulating oil prices (the very type

of behavior OPEC was created to protect against) in an effort to hurt Russia and to “try and destroy our

[Venezuala's] revolution and cause an economic collapse” [3]. Oil is Venezuela's most important tool

for negotiating foreign policy and helps to ensure limited autonomy from western powers, negotiate for

political support and votes at the UN, and determines relations with other oil producing countries such

as Iran and Russia [4]. Though Venezuela seeks independence from Western powers, its oil industry is

heavily reliant upon the United States economy. The US is Venezuela's largest customer and hosts a

major Venezuelan state-owned company, Citgo Petroleum Corporation, which runs refineries and a

large gasoline distribution network on U.S. Soil [4]; conversely, the US is dependent on Venezuela. It

imports 11% of its crude oil from Venezuela and a U.S. Government Accountability Office report states

that the loss of imports from Venezuela “would raise world oil prices and slow the economic growth of

the United States” [2]. This inter-dependence creates a strong incentive for the US to involve itself in

Venezuelan politics which will be discussed later. Beyond OPEC, Venezuela has involved itself in other

oil related projects to promote Latin American independence; primarily with the project “Petrocaribe”

based on directives within “ALBA” or the “Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America”. The

ALBA agreement, signed in 2004, was an alternative to the “Free Trade Area of the America's”. The

neoliberal free trade agreement was viewed by many Latin American countries as imperialistic and

counter to third world countries progress [5]. Venezuela created ALBA and Petrocaribe to foster energy

integration in Latin America. PetroCaribe provides 19 Central American and Caribbean states, in

particular Cuba, with up to 200,000 barrels a day of oil and petroleum products on preferential terms

[4]. On an even larger scale, Venezuela was instrumental in creating CELAC (Community of Latin

American and Caribbean States): a regional bloc of Latin American and Caribbean states (33 total)

excluding the US and Canada. CELAC's goal is to unite South America to “generate sustainable

models of production and consumption” and to promote “regional energy integration” with an

emphasis on rejecting North American intervention (7).

Cuba and Venezuela have an interdependent relationship. In return for subsidized oil supplies,

Cuba supplies doctors, teachers, sports trainers and military advisers to Venezuela (6). Cuba is

economically dependent on Venezuela (receives 20% of its GDP through trade with Venezuela) and

Venezuela is socially and politically dependent on Cuba for teachers and healthcare workers as well as

“for the intelligence and military advisers that train the Venezuelan security services and monitor

dissent and conspiracies against President Nicolás Maduro’s administration” (6). Venezuela's

subsidized oil trade with Cuba was expanded to CELAC member states through petrocaribe. Though

these programs help further Venezuela's political agenda of Latin American independence, they

threaten the countries financial security. Due to these agreements at least 42% of Venezuela’s oil

production is allocated via non-market arrangements (6). Venezuela's overall oil production is on the

decline due to loss of proper human capital to work in the industry and lack of new investment (8) yet

their non-profitable trade commitments continue to increase creating problems regarding repaying their

massive debt to foreign nations such as China (6). “They also fuel an immediate shortage of dollars

which translates directly into a scarcity of consumer products and a sustained rise in inflation in

Venezuela” (6). Anti-Maduro activists are highly critical of the current relations between Cuba and

Venezuela. Cuba's dependence on Venezuela's (and Venezeulan opposition parties stance on the

relation) “creates a strong temptation for the Cuban regime to use its influence in the government and

the armed forces to protect the Maduro status quo” (6).

Venezuela also has an interdependent relationship with Columbia because of “trade, migration,

drug-trafficking, trans-border smuggling and security issues” (4) but have almost polar opposite

ideologies (Columbia is closely aligned with US-interests). One issue, is the smuggling of gasoline

across the board. Venezuela runs a very expensive subsidy program that makes gasoline extremely

cheap domestically. This subsidy makes gasoline smuggling across the border a very profitable

business. These smuggling operations reduce government revenue that would normally be used to

support domestic infrastructure (8). Another area of specific tension is Venezuela’s suspected support

for leftist Colombian guerrilla groups such as FARC (8). Venezuela's 1,370-mile border with Colombia

“is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin destined for the United States” (8). Reports allege that

the Venezuelan army in alignment with FARC are heavily involved in drug smuggling causing major

problems with Colombian and US governments (8). The US government has imposed terrorism-related

sanctions against Venezuela based upon accusations of harboring FARC operatives (8).

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA/CHINA:

Venezuela has put a lot of effort into developing economic and political ties with China. One of

the primary reasons is so that Venezuela can secure a large buyer of its oil. By selling large amounts of

its oil to China it can reduce its dependency on the US and Europe (4). China has been instrumental in

providing financing to Venezuela: between 2007 and 2014 China provided around $56 billion to

Venezuela to finance infrastructure and other economic projects. In 2015, President Maduro announced

that China would provide an additional $20 billion in loans (8). Venezuela is relying on its oil to pay

back China; with problems in production and oil value Venezuela will have serious problems repaying

its debt.

Venezuela has also developed close ties with Russia. There are to main reasons for this: first,

Russia is the second largest oil producer in the world. By working with Russia, Venezuela can more

effectively control the prices of oil on the international market. And second, “Venezuela has been able

to “provoke” the U.S. by offering a bridgehead to Russia in the “American lake” (the Caribbean basin)

and by delinking the Venezuelan army from Washington through a dramatic increase of arms purchases

from Russia and the holding of joint naval exercises” (4). Between 2005 and 2007 Venezuela bought $4

billion worth of arms and military hardware from Russia and received a $2.2 billion loan to buy further

military equipment from Russia (9)

RELATIONS TO MIDDLE EAST:

As a part of his efforts to both undermine the United States agenda and to strengthen Venezula's

economic indepdence, Chavez built connections with Iran. Venezuela and Iran have signed numerous

agreements relating to infranstructure, banking, technology and energy initiatives. Venezuela has also

played a key role in helping Iran to build connections within South America. The United States has

imposed sanctions on three Venezuelan companies because of their alleged support for Iran (8).

RELATIONS WITH US:

The United States has a large influence over international politics and therefore its relationship

with Venezuela has an impact on the countries political and economic standing. Prior to Chavez the

United States had a good relationship with Venezuela but with the rise of Chavez and his leftist politics

relations have become strained. Though both Chavez and Maduro actively seek to harm the United

States agenda, an agenda that they describe as “imperialistic”, Venezuela is heavily dependent on the

US economy. “Venezuela’s oil sold in the United States is the most profitable segment of its exports”

(6). While, as stated above, there is an interdependent relationship between the two countries, the US it

much less dependent on Venezuela than the other way around. As the United States continues to replace

Venezuela's oil with domestic sources and Canadian and Mexican production, Venezuela's profits will

decrease. Venezuelan oil exports to North America have already dropped by fifty percent in the last

decade (6). Though Venezuela can partially replace those markets by selling to India and China (which

have the capacity to refine Venezuela's heavy crude) the profit margin in dealings with these countries

are significantly smaller (6). This declining profit has serious ramifications for Venezuela's economy.

Outside of the issue of oil, the US has been putting pressure on Venezuela in a number of other areas.

Our political relationships with Venezuela since the election of Chavez have been very rocky. In 2002,

there was a coup that momentarily removed Chavez from power. Chavez accused the Bush

administration of plotting to overthrow his government. Before the coup, a US entity overseen by the

State Department known as NED (National Endowment For Democracy) channeled hundreds of

thousands of dollars to opposition groups within Venezuela (11). On the day of the coup the White

House press secretary released a statement saying that the US government had no prior knowledge of a

coup against Chavez however since that time FOIA requests have revealed documents that show that

documents were circulated to as many as 200 Bush administration officials warning of the coup as

much as two weeks in advance (10). In 2001, an embassy cable sent to Washington from Venezuela

said “the right man, for the right time” refering to Pedro Camona, at the time the head of Venezuela’s

Chamber of Commerce. On the day of the coup, Predro Camona was sworn in as acting President (11).

U.S. officials repeatedly rejected charges that the United States was involved (8). Though there is no

evidence that the US was directly involved in the coup; the evidence of their foreknowledge and their

inherent interest in removing Chavez from office cemented the sense of distrust within Venezuelan/US

relations. This distrust has continued after Chavez's death into the current administration of Maduro.

Since that time there have been a number of political back and forth games between the US and

Venezula. In September 2008 Venezuela expelled the U.S. Ambassador of their country. The US

responded with the expulsion of the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States (8). In 2013

Venezuela expelled three U.S. diplomats in Venezuela on accusations that the diplomats were

attempting to destabilize their country. The State Department, “which rejected the allegations of any

type of conspiracy to destabilize the Venezuelan government”, responded by also expelling three

Venezuelan diplomats (8). Over the course of Chavez's rule up through the current Maduro

government “U.S. officials [have] expressed concerns about human rights, Venezuela’s military arms

purchases (largely from Russia), its relations with Cuba and Iran, its efforts to export its brand of

populism to other Latin American countries, and the use of Venezuelan territory by Colombian guerrilla

and paramilitary forces” (8). Further, since 2005, Venezuela has been designated annually (by both

Bush and Obama) as a country that has failed to adhere to its international anti-drug obligations” (8).

Due to these concerns Congress and the President passed “the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and

Civil Society Act of 2014” which imposed sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions) against

certain members of the Venezuelan government. On March 8, 2015, President Obama issued Executive

Order (EO) 13692 implementing the previous stated act and adding additional sanctions declaring a

state of emergency due to the threat Venezuela poses to Americas national security and foreign policy

(8).

Other than the NED funding mentioned above, the United States invests a considerable amount

of money in Venezuelan politics. According to a diplomatic cable released by wikilinks, a 2004 USAID

program spent $450,000 to “provide training to political parties on the design, planning, and execution

of electoral campaigns” (12). The USAID programs to provide funding for democracy assistance are in

effect today on a much larger scale: in 2011 $5 million was appropriated; 2012: $6 million; 2013: $5.8

million; 2014: $5.3 million; 2015: $5 million was requested but actual aid estimates are not available

yet; and for 2016 $5.5 million has been requested (8). These requests state a goal to “help strengthen

Venezuelan civil society and democratic institutions and support political competition-building efforts

that will protect democratic space and seek to serve the interests and needs of the Venezuelan people”

(14); but released democratic cables show that the US allocates this funding to purposefully undermine

Chavez's government (and therefore, its is likely that this funding is now being used to undermine

Maduro's leftist government). In 2006 a cable describing the policy goals of the USAID funding states

the goals of: “strengthening democratic institutions, penetrating Chavez's political base, dividing

chavismo, protecting vital US business, and isolating Chavez internationally” (13).

Citations:1. "Brief History of OPEC." OPEC. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

<http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm>.2. Alvarez, Cesar, and Stephanie Hanson. "Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy." Council on Foreign

Relations. 9 Feb. 2009. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. <http://www.cfr.org/world/venezuelas-oil-based-economy/p12089>.

3. Yousef, El-Din. "Venezuela Asks Fellow OPEC Members for Help." CNBC. 12 Jan. 2015. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. <http://www.cnbc.com/id/102328516>.

4. Marthoz, Jean-Paul. "Venezuela's Foreign Policy: A Mirage Based On A Curse." Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 1 Nov. 2014. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/5ac5220191adf69475fb57f9e303479c.pdf>.

5. "About Petrocaribe: ALBA." Petrocaribe. Web. 21 Apr. 2015. <http://www.petrocaribe.org/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/union/readmenu_acerca2.tpl.html≠wsid_obj_id=383≠wsid_temas=4>.

6. Piccone, Ted, and Harrold Trinkunas. "The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning Of An End?" Brookings Institute, 1 June 2014. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/06/16-cuba-venezuela-alliance-piccone-trinkunas/cubavenezuela-alliance-piccone-trinkunas.pdf>.

7. Boothroyd, Rachel. "US Further Isolated as CELAC Rejects Regional Intervention." Venezuela Analysis. 31 Jan. 2015. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. <http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11178>.

8. Sullivan, Marc. "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations." Federation Of American Scientists. Congressional Research Service, 1 Apr. 2015. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43239.pdf>.

9. "Russia Vows to Keep Arms Deals With Caracas After Chavez Death." Sputnik News. 3 June 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. <http://sputniknews.com/world/20130306/179842142.html>.

10.Forero, Juan. "Documents Show C.I.A. Knew of a Coup Plot in Venezuela." New York Times, 3 Dec. 2004. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/03/international/americas/03venezuela.html?_r=0>.

11. Golinger, Eva. "Venezuela: Coup and Countercoup, Revolution." Global Research. 12 Apr. 2010. Web. 25 Apr. 2015. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/venezuela-coup-and-countercoup-revolution/18618>.

12. MCFarland. "UPDATE ON THE USAID/OTI VENEZUELA PROGRAM." Public Library of US Diplomacy. Wikilinks, 13 July 2004. Web. 16 Apr. 2015. <https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04CARACAS2224_a.html>.

13. Brownfield. "USAID/OTI PROGRAMMATIC SUPPORT FOR COUNTRY TEAM 5 POINT STRATEGY." Public Library of US Diplomacy. Wikilinks, 9 Nov. 2006. Web. 26 Apr. 2015. <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06CARACAS3356_a.html>.

14. State Department. Foreign Operations - Congressional Budget Justification. Department Of State USA, 2014. Pg. 137. Web. 16 Apr. 2015. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208290.pdf>