Venezuela Economic Dialogue Negative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors

8/13/2019 Venezuela Economic Dialogue Negative - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/venezuela-economic-dialogue-negative-northwestern-2013-6weekseniors 1/84



NDI 2013 – 6WS – Venezuela Economic

Dialogue Negative



Iran CP



Notes

Aff causes engagement and dialouge in Venezuela, cp does that in Iran and removes

restrictions on oil development and sector. The removal of the restrictions should

solve any Oil drilling based internal links, while the engagement with Iran should solvethe internal links about engaging with credibility.



1NC Shell

Text: The United States federal government should begin bilateral economic

engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States federal government

should remove any relevant sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s oil sector.

Solves the aff --- increases Obama’s Credibility and Legitimacy.

Buchanan, 7/30 (Pat, Washington Post Columnist and US Politician “Obama's Moment -- A Deal With Iran!”

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/07/30/obamas_moment_--_a_deal_with_iran__119410.html)

Obama's second-term scandals -- IRS, Benghazi, wiretapping The Associated Press and Fox -- are in the low-kiloton range compared to the resignation of N ixon or

the impeachment of Clinton. And as Obama is going to get nada from a Republican House on guns, amnesty, c ap-and-trade or a second stimulus,

he should look for his legacy -- as Nixon, Reagan and Clinton did -- to foreign policy. Two opportunities beckon. First, the mirage -- a Middle East

peace. Essential to any treaty, however, is a withdrawal of Israeli "settlers" from the West Bank, a sharing of Jerusalem, Palestinian acceptance of Israel as a "Jewishstate" and Arab repudiation of the "right of return."¶ Good luck. Bibi Netanyahu, who calls Jerusalem our "eternal capital" and Judea and Samaria our ancient lands,is not going to divide Jerusalem or uproot Jewish set tlers from the West Bank -- not when he opposed their removal from Gaza by Ariel Sharon.¶ Bibi will not do it ,cannot, if he wants his Likudnik coalition to survive. And Obama lacks the clou t in Congress or this capital city to force Bibi to do anything he does not wish to do.

Hence Obama's legacy hopes lie not in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in Washington this week, but in what is happening in Iran -- the

inauguration of the president who replaces Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Hasan Rouhani was elected with 51 percent of the vote by the const ituency that

voted against Ahmadinejad in 2009. His triumph was due to his endorsement by former presidents Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani a nd Mohammad Khatami. Bothhad been kept off the ballot by Ayatollah Khamenei.¶ Rouhani is a founding father of the Islamic Republic and was a close ally o f Ayatollah Khomeini. But he was

elected on a pledge to revive the economy, get sanctions lifted, and re-engage with the West .¶ He won on a

promise of better times for the Iranian people and an end to Iran's isolation. ¶ Yet the only way he can achieve these goals is to come to terms with Obama on Iran's

nuclear program. And as he was once Iran's lead negotiator on that program, Rouhani knows exactly what is required.¶ Despite the decades

of acrimony between us, the basic elements of a Washington-Tehran deal are there .¶ Iran wants its rights under the Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- to peaceful nuclear research and nuclear power -- recognized by the United States. And it wants U.S.-UN sanctions lifted.¶ The UnitedStates wants more than verbal assurances that Iran is not building a bomb. We need intrusive inspections of Iran's nuclear fa cilities to assure us that she is notbuilding an atom bomb.¶ As Reagan said, trust but verify.¶ Yet this seems not beyond the realm of possibility. ¶ Despite the hysteria about Iran's "mad dash" to anatom bomb, Tehran has never tested a bomb and never produced the 90-percent-enriched uranium needed for a bomb, and does not have sufficient 20-percenturanium to further enrich for a bomb test. ¶ Netanyahu's initial prediction that Iran was "three to five" years away from a bomb came -- in 1992. Since then we havebeen getting monthly updates on the imminence of the Iranian bomb, but no bomb.¶ Moreover, Khamenei has declared nuclear weapons anti-Islamic, and U.Sintelligence agencies have never retracted their declarations of 2007 and 2011 that Iran has made no decision to build a bomb.¶ Rouhani's political future, thecontinued allegiance of his Iranian followers who want to re-engage with the West and the world, hangs on whether he can get a deal on Iran's nuclear program anda lifting of sanctions.¶ He knows this.¶ What Rouhani cannot do is surrender Iran's rights to nuclear power and research. On this h is nation is united. But he may be

able to give the West what it requires, intrusive inspections, to prove that what Iran claims to be true is t rue -- that it has no nuclear weapons program.¶ If we

can get that, we should be able to get a deal, and America can lift her sanctions , their objective having been achieved.¶ That

would be the crown jewel of Obama's second term .

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/07/30/obamas_moment_--_a_deal_with_iran__119410.html

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/07/30/obamas_moment_--_a_deal_with_iran__119410.html



2NC Solvency --- Legitimacy

Engaging with Iran is crucial to geopolitical stability --- solves US legitimacy

No Author, 2013 (“Making Peace With Iran” http://americamagazine.org/making-peace-iran)

The United States maintains a number of important strategic relationships —Israel, China and Russia come immediately to mind—that have the potential to make a

significant impact on the current geopolitical landscape. But perhaps the most important relationship the United States maintains,

the one likeliest to have the greatest short- and long-term impact on global peace, is with Iran . That is not to say that

it is a positive relationship—yet. But even a “relationship” based on animus and suspicion can be important. A Venn diagram of the

geopolitical world seen through American and Iranian eyes would show overlapping cultural, political and military

interests in Syria, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and multilateral concerns such as nuclear proliferation, reducing tensions with the world’s Sunni

Muslims and converging economic and trade interests and conflicts. ¶ Iran and the United States have been at odds s ince the Islamic revolution deposed the C.I.A.-backed shah, and the ensuing hostage crisis wrecked the Carter presidency and any chance for the nor malization of relations for decades. The United States andIran have been at loggerheads over Israel and the plight of Palestinians, nuclear weapons development and military and industrial espionage. A historic low wasreached during the Iraq-Iran war, when the United States began what would become its disastrous “enemy of my enemy is my friend” alliance with Saddam Hussein. Now the two powers once again find themselves on different sides in Syria. The United States is backing Syrian rebels, many of whom hold near genocidalambitions for the Iranian-supported Alawites and not much more regard for Syria’s significant Christian minority, and Iran is supporting the tyrant Bas har al-Assad.¶

A détente between Iran and the United States would offer welcome global breathing space on a va riety of tense standoffs, but a respectful

engagement with Iran could mean significant progress on a gamut of issues that have troubled the region and

beyond. With Iranian cooperation, the United States could see a breakthrough on peace in the Middle East and

moderation among Iranian surrogates in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Iran could also contribute to reducing the violence in Iraq and

tension at flashpoints like the Persian Gulf, where the U.S. Navy and the Iranian Revol utionary Guards play regular games of speed-boat chicken. Instead of usingSyria as a proxy battleground, by working together the two powers could pressure both sides in this v icious civil war to a ne gotiating table. But before they can get

Syria’s warring factions to talk, Iran and the United States need to figure out how to speak together themselves.



2NC Solvency --- Bilateral Issues

The CP Results in increased negotiations on US-Iran Relations

Luers, Pickering, and Walsh, 5/30 (William, e director of The Iran Project and an adjunct Professor at The School of International and

Public Affairs at Columbia University, Thomas, retired United States ambassador. Among his many diplomatic appointments, Jim, expert in international securityand a Research Associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Security Studies Program (SSP). “For a New Approach to Iran”

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/new-approach-iran/?pagination=false)

With innovative and assertive diplomacy, the Obama administration can, in our view, still help change the direction of US –Iran

relations , reach an interim nuclear agreement, and possibly open the door to discussions on other regional and

bilateral issues .12¶ The United States is the dominant world power and, “negotiating from strength,” should take

the initiative and communicate directly with the new leadership . The administration should

demonstrate carefully that it seriously seeks a change in the relationship, not a change in the regime .

That approach with the new Iranian president should begin soon, even before Rouhani is sworn in on August 3. The administration should take into account theAyatollah Khamenei’s known conviction that the US wants regime change, while his main objective is to preserve his regime.

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/new-approach-iran/?pagination=false






2NC Say Yes --- Top Level/We Should Engage

They’ll engage and agree --- desires of engagement

Amanpour, 6/16 (Christiane, CNN's Chief International Correspondent citing polls within Iran and statements made by Iran’s newest

president “New Day for Iran and the United States? http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/16/new-day-for-iran-and-the-united-states/)

This time too, heading for the polls, the Iranian people said they wanted their next president to improve the dire economy

that has plunged approximately half the country into poverty. But they also say they want better relations with the rest of the

world, including the United States. They are tired of sanctions , isolation, and lurching from crisis to

international crisis. Dr. Hassan Rouhani's election platform called for more moderate policies inside Iran,

and for constructive engagement abroad. He is a close ally of former Iranian Presidents Khatami and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Both swung

their support behind Rouhani, after the system banned Rafsanjani from r unning. Before he was disqualified, sources told me internal polling had shown Rafsanjaniwould have won by a landslide too.¶ Why is this important? Because Rafsanjani is known as a pragmatic conservative and in an exclusive interview with me the last

time he ran for the presidency in 2005, he said he wanted to close the U.S. file and establish a relationship with the United States but

only if it were mutually beneficial, and based on mutual interests and respect.

They’ll engage and it’ll be successful --- Iranian Cabinet, new president and sanctions

The Daily Star, 7/30 (Lebanon News Source “Iran nominee seen as olive branch to United States” http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-

East/2013/Jul-30/225655-iran-nominee-seen-as-olive-branch-to-united-states.ashx#axzz2aw0HSyLm)

DUBAI/PARIS: If Iranian President-elect Hassan Rouhani wanted to signal his determination to rebuild relations with the United States and strike a "grand bargain,"

he could hardly do better than pick Mohammad Javad Zarif as his foreign minister.¶ ¶ Iranian news agencies reported on Monday that Zarif, a

former ambassador to the United Nations and Tehran's leading connoisseur of the U.S. political elite ,

is set to be in the cabinet Rouhani will announce after taking office on Sunday. A source close to Rouhani confirmed Zarif will be nominated as

foreign minister.¶ ¶ A fluent English speaker who earned his doctorate at the University o f Denver, Zarif has been at the centre of several

secret negotiations to try to overcome 35 years of estrangement between Washington and Tehran, diplomats

said.¶ Those talks failed because of deep mistrust on a range of disputes from I ran's secretive nuclear programme and support for anti-Is raeli

militants to U.S. sanctions and hopes of engineering "regime change" in Tehran.¶ Zarif's elevation, however,

suggests the moderate new president is keen to make another try at break ing the deadlock .

Talks will be successful --- Iran is willing to negotiate

Mousavian, 3/1 (Hossein, Iranian policymaker and scholar who served on Iran’s nuclear diplomacy team in negotiations with the EU and Interna tional

Atomic Energy Agency,research scholar at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and a former spokesman for Iran’s nucl ear negotiators. “Bullying Iran into talks is a

bad idea” http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/bullying-iran-into-talks-is-a-bad-idea-1.1152608)

First, US President Barack Obama cannot succeed in his engagement policy without direct talks with Tehran. Second,

this administration is willing to talk ; the next might not embrace peaceful diplomacy as readily. Third, harsh rhetoric will only s trengthen the

hands of warmongers in the US and Israel. Finally, missing this window of opportunity for engagement would ensure

hostilities continue , with a possibility of all-out confrontation.¶ Since the onset of his leadership in 1989, Ayatollah Khamenei has told all Iranian

administrations that he does not rule out negotiations or normal relations with the US. Public statements in 2008 and 2009

indicated he did not believe relations should be severed for ever, and that he would approve moving on to better terms when it

http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2013/06/16/new-day-for-iran-and-the-united-states/





became in Iran’s interest to do so. But Washington needs a correct reading of his mindset on direct

talks. There are two significant points.

The CP changes the reasons they’ll say no --- it changes perceptions

Oswald, 2/26/13 (Rachel, Reporter for Global Security Newswire and the NTI quoting Hossein Mousavian the former Iranian AtomicEnvy to the US “Former Diplomats Call for Bilateral U.S.-Iran Talks to Resolve Nuclear Dispute” http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/former-diplomats-call-bilateral-us-iran-talks-resolve-nuclear-dispute/)

Washington “has sought one-on-one bilaterals on the sidelines of these [P-5+1] meetings. Except for the meeting in Geneva in October of 2009, there

haven’t been any . The Iranians have actually run away from them,” Limbert said at a press conference held by the National Iranian American Council

and other groups pushing for diplomacy to play a greater role in U.S. efforts to resolve the Iran nuclear problem. ¶ Mousavian said successful bilateral

talks cannot take place until the United States alters the language it uses with regards to Iran. “As long

as the U.S. is talking to Iran with the language of threat and humiliation, the Iranians will not come to

any talks .”¶ The Obama administration has regularly said all options, including military intervention, remain on the table for ensuring Iran does not acquire a

nuclear weapon.¶ The absence of any diplomatic relationship fuels the decades-long hostility between Tehran and Washington,

making it difficult to gain insight and understanding of the other side’s thinking, issue experts said on Monday.¶ “It’s difficult because

we’re not there *in Iran+. That’s one of the problems. We should have a relationship of some kind. We have zilch,” said former chargé

d'affaires to Iran Bruce Laingen, who was a hostage along with Limbert for 444 days.¶ “At some point … Iranian officials and American

officials have to talk to each other , maybe quietly, maybe privately, maybe out of the public eye to find things that they can

say ‘yes’ too ,” Limbert said.¶

They’ll engage --- Recent Elections

Luers, Pickering, and Walsh, 5/30 (William, e director of The Iran Project and an adjunct Professor at The School of International and



Given the more than three decades of mutual mistrust between the US and Iran, the relationship cannot be quickly transformed. Yet there are at least two factors that offer the possibility for

shifting the attitudes and behavior of both countries: Iran’s recent elections and changing circumstances in the Middle East.¶ The election of Hassan Rouhani as

president of Iran offers an opening for some change in US –Iran relations. First, it means not having to deal

with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Holocaust denier. That by itself opens more political space for

negotiation . The president-elect is a knowledgeable former nuclear negotiator and has a good relationship with Supreme Leader

Khamenei, the ultimate arbiter on Iran’s nuclear program and relations with the United States.¶ The elections demonstrated the moderate

disposition of Iran’s public when permitted to make a choice even from among the candidates offered to them by the g overnment. Over 70 percent of the voting

population cast a ballot and over 50 percent of those voted for Rouhani. The turnout, including many young people, certainly reflected broad support from the

reformists including many who participated in the Green Movement, which opposed the disputed 2009 elections. The reformist vote also showed strength in local elections. The SupremeLeader and Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard stayed largely apart from the elections. The strength of support for Rouhani has brought both relief a nd optimism from a population whose

standard of living has been declining in a weak economy.¶ Rouhani’s election victory surprised analysts both in and outside of Iran. In the campaign, he represented the so-called

“pragmatist-centrist” camp and was endorsed by former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. During the campaign, R ouhani called

for the release of those under house arrest and greater engagement with the international community over the nuclear issue. He supports the civilian nuclear program, as do most Iranians,and he said that “we are ready to increase transparency” of the program.7 The subject of nuclear weapons, however, did not come up in the campaign. In 2011, a Rand survey found that mostrespondents favored the nuclear program for civilian use and a 2008 PIPA survey found that 58 percent of respondents thought that “producing nuclear weapons is against the principles of

Islam.”8¶ In the US, advocates of a more confrontational policy suggest either that Rouhani is disingenuous or, alternatively, that he is sincere but irrelevant in the face of an all-controllingSupreme Leader. Those favoring engagement with Iran express cautious optimism but worry that the new president will be rebuffed by a distrustful international community, or that he willbecome the target of attacks from the most conservative elements in Iranian politics. The president-elect is a cleric, a regime insider, and the dea l-maker who agreed to a freeze on enrichmentin 2004 and to observe the IAEA Additional Protocol on inspections in 2003. He also, according to some hostile reports, while serving as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council,

http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/former-diplomats-call-bilateral-us-iran-talks-resolve-nuclear-dispute/







approved in 1999 a crackdown on students engaging in pro-democracy demonstrations.¶ Following the election, Rouhani’s public remarks have been

encouraging , for example in saying that “I’ll pursue a policy of reconciliation and peace, we will also reconcile with the world,” although he has also called on the United States to

stop interfering with Iran’s internal affairs and cease its oppressive actions—presumably the sanctions regime. At this stage, no one can say for sure what Rouhani will try to accomplish orwhether he will be successful. A prudent course would be one that tests the possibility of progress and tries to create conditions for success. We outline such a course of action later in thisarticle.

Middle East turmoil and shared interestsLuers, Pickering, and Walsh, 5/30 (William, e director of The Iran Project and an adjunct Professor at The School of International and



A second factor is the turmoil in the Midd le East, beginning with the overthrow of the government in Tunis and continuing with devastating violence in

Syria. Some of us heard that Iran’s leaders had hoped their position would be strengthened by the uprisings, while US influen ce would decline.¶ Time has proven those expectations to be

questionable.The Syrian civil war has exploded the fantasy that the rise of A rab Islamic populism was somehow a net gain for Iran. Instead, Iran finds itself t he unpopular

defender of Assad, its lone ally in the region. By sending Revolutionary Guard troops to fight a Sunni rebellion and defend the Alawite (an offshoot of Shiism) ruling elite in Syria, Shiite Iran and

Hezbollah have introduced an increasingly dangerous, sectarian dimension to a civil war.¶ For Iran, the conflict in Syria is an added drain on the country’s

already limited military, economic, and political resources. At its worst, the debacle in Syria—regardless of who “wins”—is inflaming a

sectarian struggle throughout the region, and the continuing opposition of rebel Syrians (mainly Sunnis) supported by Qatars and Saudis, among others, could pose a direct threat to Iran and

its interests. At the same time, Iran’s preoccupation with the Sunni conflict might reduce its concentration on Israel. Ahmadinejad’s bellicose language against Israel was intended to appeal toArabs who were more hostile toward Israel than toward Iran. The conflict between Sunnis and Shias has further reduced Iran’s ability to i nfluence such populations. Israel meanwhile can standapart from the internecine Muslim fighting. Even though the mounting violence around it threatens Israel’s security, there could be some diminution of regional attention on Israel as theprincipal enemy. By fighting in Syria, Hezbollah lessened both its intense focus on Israel and its support in Lebanon. Hamas now risks losing backing from Iran because of its support of the

Sunni opposition in Syria.¶ For the US, there are no allies in Syria, or in the broader sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shias. The turmoil in Syria is already causing instability along Turkey’s

southern border, as well as in Lebanon and Jordan, fragile friends of the US in the region. An emboldened Sunni opposition has renewed the violent insurgency against the Maliki governmentin Iraq, where the US finds itself, for a change, on the Shiite side of the sectarian divide. Like the US, although for different reasons, Iran wants a Shiite government with a stable majority in

Iraq. Should the Sunni opposition in Iraq become more violent, Iran and the US might well share common interests in preserving Iraq’s

stability.¶ In Afghanistan, the US and Iran also have interests in common.After September 11, Washington and Tehran cooperated to

defeat the Taliban and to establish the newly formed Karzai government. Now, a decade later, as Washington is winding down its presence in Afghanistan, both the US and Iran share aconcern that the Taliban, perhaps with al-Qaeda, will return to power. For several years the US and the Islamic Republic have unsuccessfully attempted bilateral talks to explore common

ground on Afghanistan. With an Afghanistan presidential election and the US troop withdrawal looming, the need to talk has become greater.¶ These multiple regional

changes challenge the zero-sum thinking of Iran and the United States about each other. Both countries must consider the possibility of a resurgent

al-Qaeda, a reconstituted Taliban, and the prospect of a continuing multistate sectarian war stretching from Syria to Iraq and from Turkey to Gaza. Taken together with the election of a newpresident in Tehran, these serious and threatening shifts underscore the need for both countries to put relations on a new course.





2NC Oil Companies will Go to Iran

US Oil companies aren’t in Iran

Waddell, 3/17 (Eric, Global Research Centre for Research on Globalization “The Battle for Oil” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-battle-for-oil/311)

The U.S. contains only 2.8% of total proven world oil reserves. Two-thirds of the world’s proven oil and natural gas reserves are in the

Middle East (notably Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Iran and Iraq). Very substantial oil and natural gas reserves are

located in the overlapping region of the Caspian Sea basin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Iran). Tentative

estimates provided by the Energy Information Administration, place total (proven and possible) oil reserves at 243 billion barrels,

or in excess of 25% of present global reserves),1 Iraq currently produces 11% of the world’s o il and it ranks only second to Saudi Arabia in the size of its reserves(112 billion barrels). Exploitation costs are less than half those of deep sea drilling. Direct access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean ensures s trategically

secure oil supply routes. The Anglo- American oil giants (BP, Chevron-Texaco, Shell, Exxon) are all absent from

Iran and Iraq, which have signed oil contracts and production sharing agreements with French, Russian and C hinese oil companies. Because of the UN sa nctions

on Iraq, the agreements signed by Baghdad are not (“officially”) operational.

That’s only because of US sanctions against Iran --- The CP reverses that and ensures

that they’ll invest in Iran.

Mirsaeedi-Glossner, 7/15/13 (Shabnam, a research fellow at the Berlin Center for Caspian Region Studies and PhD student in the Caspian

Region Energy and Environment Studies Department at the Freie Universität Berlin. “Iran’s Flourishing Regional Influence”

http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2013/irans-flourishing-regional-influence)

The growth in electricity exports is largely attributed to the capacities of Iran’s South Pars field at the Persian Gulf, whi ch have been developed as high-priorityprojects since the mid-1990s. According to the f ifth development plan (2010 –2014), the country seeks to increase its natural gas export capacities within the nextthree years to 100 million cubic meters a day, almost four times as much as today.15 To meet export as well as domestic demands, the country seeks to increase itscapabilities from 540 million cubic meters a day (2012) to more than 1 billion cubic meters by 2015. Today, most of the gas from South Pars is used for domestic

consumption. However, with the newest Western sanctions against the gas and oil sector, foreign investments

no longer come to the area, which underlines a fundamental challenge to meeting Iran’s gas export

objectives.16 In light of the difficulties of exporting natural gas to neighboring countries, the electricity capacity of South Pars has been stepped up. A first projectwas completed in 2009, and by 2010 the c onstruction of six gas turbines with a nominal capacity of 1,000 MW was awarded to MAPNA (Power Plant ProjectsManagement Company), a leading Iranian industrial group.17 The power plants are connected to the trans-Iranian network and will contribute substantially in thelong term to electricity generation in the country—as well as electricity export.

http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2013/irans-flourishing-regional-influence




2NC Say Yes --- Economic Incentives

They’ll agree to the talks --- economic incentives to open up oil dialogue

Heydarian, 2012 (Richard, Manila-based foreign affairs analyst, focusing on international and development issues in the MENA and Asia-Pacific

regions; His under-graduate and graduate research background was focused on the Iranian nuclear program, economic integration, and globalization. He haspresented academic papers in numerous conferences across the Asia-Pacific and beyond, namely on the economics of the Arab spring, regional integration, andenergy security issues. “Iran Shows Signs of Resilience Ahead of Potential Bilateral Talks” http://www.lobelog.com/iran-shows-signs-of-resilience-ahead-of-potential-bilateral-talks/ 12/5/13)

A key foreign policy consequence of President Barak Obama’s reelection is the growing possibility of face-to-face

talks between the United States. and Iran. Both the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali

Akbar Salehi have expressed, albeit conditionally, their respective governments’ openness to engage in comprehensive

bilateral talks — for the first time in almost three decades — to primarily resolve the ongoing nuclear standoff.¶ Beyond the issue of

urgently resolving the Iranian nuclear question, purportedly to prevent an Israeli pre-emptive strike and an Iranian nuclear bomb, the Obamaadministration’s growing interest in directly engaging Iran may have something to do with t iming, opportunity, and leverage.¶ There is a feeling

in Washington that the recent transatlantic sanctions may have created enough pressure — and damage to

Iran’s economy — to potentiallyextract major unilateral concessions from the Iranian regime. Namely, a “stop-shut-shipscenario”, whereby Iran would curb its enrichment capacity, open up all aspects of its nuclear program, shut down its heavily-fortified nuclearfacilities, and ship out its stockpile of above 3-5 percent enriched uranium in exchange for some nominal — yet to be clarified — incentives

from the West.¶ Since the imposition of Western sanctions against Iran, beginning in late-2011 and intensifying by mid-2012, the Iranian

economy has begun whimpering on an unprecedented scale . Iran’s oil output is at its lowest in more

than two decades, while oil exports have been halved; the inflation rate has surpassed the 25 percent barrier, while the

budget-deficit is reaching its highest level in the last decade; and, the Iranian currency (rial) has lost about 80 percent of its value in less than a year. The sanctions

against Iran’s ports, shipping industry, financial sectors, and central bank, Bank-e-Markazi, have also made it increasingly difficult to conduct even the most benign kind of internationaltransactions, from the import of medicines, to food, diapers and medical equipments. However, there are some recent indications that Iran’s economy is not exactly in a desperate shape, or at

least not as frail and fragile as the Obama administrations hopes it to be.¶ According to the Paris-based International Energy Agency’s (IEA) most recent report, Iran’s oil exports have

rebounded sharply – by around 30 percent – after seven months of steady decline, thanks to new contracts with giant Asian customers, China and South Korea. With oil exports constitutingmore than three-quarters of export earnings, Tehran is now in a relatively better position to defend its falling currency. In fact, the rial has indeed experienced some recovery in recent weeks,appreciating from the record-low of 37,000 rials against 1 dollar in early October to around 27,000 rials against 1 dollar today. Of course, the most rece nt financial and hydrocarbon sanctionsby the European Union will further complicate the process by which Iran intends to translate its rising exports into a stronger local currency.¶ Another surprising development is in the tourismsector, which has also experienced an unexpected spike. “Although most sectors of Iran’s economy are struggling and oil revenue has steeply declined, foreign purchasing power is at an all-time high in Iran due to a plunge in the value of the Iranian currency, the rial,” reported Jason Rezaian of the Washington Post.¶ The Iranian government has circumvented transatlantic

sanctions by an ingenious mixture of manifold countermeasures. It has negotiated sovereign insurance deals with major customers such as China, India, Japan, and South Korea, whileconsidering barter deals (sweetened by heavy discounts and flexible payment arrangements) to woo major customers and continue large-scale oil trade. Iran has also expanded its tankerstorage capacity by purchasing/building new oil-transporting vessels, smuggled oil through neighboring countries like Iraq, and stealthily transported oil — with off-the-radar and/or or ‘foreign

flagged’ ships — from its ports to major destinations in East Asia. This explains Iran’s ability to increase oil exports by almost 30 percent in November, compared to previous months.¶ Moreover, the government has instituted some draconian measures to stave -off the impact of sanctions. It has further slashed imports, postponed its subsidy cuts, reduced money supply,raised interest rates, and jailed so-called ‘currency manipulators’. It has also encouraged domestic manufacturing. Aside from the government’s recent ban on imports of around 77 luxury

products, atop reductions in 52 other non-essential goods, the fall of the Iranian currency — especially in the black market – has a lso eroded the competitiveness of imported capital goods,which have hammered local producers in recent y ears.¶ It’s important to note that the Iranian government has considerable foreign exchange reserves, estimated at between $80-100 billion,

giving it significant ability to sustain imports for an extended period and defend its currency amid growing international restrictions. With a multi-tiered foreign exchange system, the

government has an ability to cushion the most vulnerable sectors — incidentally, the backbone of the

regime – against major disruptions in the import of basic commodities. After all, Iran’s structurally high inflation more the product

of a loose monetary policy and major subsidy cuts that begun in 2010.¶ In some ways, it is Iran’s relative resilience — and ability to

avoid a total collapse — that may explain its willingness to explore direct talks with Washington. Tehran feels

that it has enough wiggle room to avoid total unilateral concessions and negotiate a more mutually-

favorable, face-saving outcome — perhaps, before it’s too late.



2NC --- CP Resolves Sanctions

Iran would be open to removing negotiations over restrictions

Mirsaeedi-Glossner, 7/15/13 (Shabnam, a research fellow at the Berlin Center for Caspian Region Studies and PhD student in the Caspian

Region Energy and Environment Studies Department at the Freie Universität Berlin. “Iran’s Flourishing Regional Influence”

http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2013/irans-flourishing-regional-influence)

Europe and the United States are thus forced to recognize that they have to face an Iran that is prominently

pursuing a strategy of regional integration to increase its influence. Despite its successes, Iran is struggling to maintain its

regional influence as countries are caught between their support for the West o r Iran, giving the West an opportunity t o cross Iran’s “game” but also making

sanctions more expensive as the West has to actively “woo” regional allies. Iran’s foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, made remarks during a

presentation at the German Foreign Council in Berlin in February of 2013 that once again indicated Iran’s openness to bilateral

negotiations with the United States but stress that these talks have to be conducted on the same “eye

level.”





2NC AT: Appeasment of Iran

Not true --- doesn’t necessitate appeasement

Maller, 2013 (Tara, a research fellow at the New America Foundation and a former CIA military analyst. She holds a PhD in political

science from MIT “ Diplomatic impunity: Why the US should reach out to Iran”

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/201383171959230981.html)

Unfortunately, when mutual suspicions and hostilities are present, leaders tend to resist diplomatic

outreach. Critics of diplomatic engagement with states like Iran and North Korea sometimes invoke the "Munich analogy" - referencing to the deal struck by

Great Britain, France and Italy with Adolf Hitler in September 1938, permitting Germany to annex western Czechoslovakia - and argue that engaging

enemies is tantamount to appeasement , particularly if the enemy is the one asking for or demanding

the talks in the first place. However, such an analogy is misguided since diplomacy and appeasement are

not the same thing. In fact, diplomacy can also be used in conjunction with ramping up pressure on a regime and more forcefully articulating and

clarifying demands.



Asia Pivot DA



1NC Shell

Status squo US is slowly beginning independence but will still be reliant on the middle

east

Ball, 2013 (Jeffrey, The Wall Street Journal's environment editor and a longtime energy reporter at the paper, is scholar-in-residence at StanfordUniversity's Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, a joint initiative of Stanford's law and business schools “The Experts: How the U.S. Oil Boom WillChange the Markets and Geopolitics” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.html)

The bonanza of U.S. production of shale oil and shale gas changes the U.S. energy picture fundamentally—and the global

energy scene significantly. In a striking turn of events unforeseen just a few years ago, the U.S. could surpass Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest oil producer in2017, and it could eclipse Russia as the world's largest natural- gas producer in 2015, the International Energy Agency says. It's worth noting an important caveat

here: Despite euphoric projections of an impending American "energy independence," the U.S. isn't likely to be energy-independent in

an absolute sense. It still will need to import certain grades of oil even if it exports even larger quantities of other

petroleum grades. That distinction carries with it an important reality check: It means the U.S. can't suddenly

go it alone on energy

--- This card would only be sufficient in the 1NC shell if the aff defends a form of oil

spill over in the 1AC --- otherwise insert the Edwards card into the 1NC Shell ---

Plan causes the US to be regionally independent --- we’ll no longer need to be in the

Middle East

Weafer 13 (Chris Weafer is chief strategist at Sberbank Investment Research, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, “No business as usual for

Russia in Venezuela – paper,” 3-12-13, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring)

The Venezuelan constitution mandates that a new election must take place within 30 days. As it stands today, the current v ice president, Nicolas Maduro, isexpected to be elected to replace Chavez. Maduro said he intends to stick with the economic and political policies and ideologies of his former boss, but sinceMaduro is no Chavez, this will be virtually impossible to achieve. Chavez was a hugely charismatic, larger-than-life leader who managed to maintain unity of purposeamong the many vested interests in the country. At the same time, he stayed popular with the people even as the economy slid further into trouble. With oil

averaging over 110 dollars per barrel last year, the Venezuelan state budget ran a deficit of close to 20 per cent of gross d omestic product. Now that Chavez is gone,the soon-to-be-elected president Maduro will come under increasing pressure to take actions to start improving

the economy. No different from President Vladimir Putin's situation when he took over an ailing economy in Russia in 2000, the only place that

the new Venezuelan president can get revenue is from the oil sector. But after Chavez practically destroyed PDVSA when he fired 20,000

skilled engineers and other workers in 2002, PDVSA will need a huge boost to capital spending and joint-venture partnerships. Although politically

risky, Maduro may have no other choice than to ask ExxonMobil and Chevron , two of the US majors that had their

local projects nationalized by Chavez, to come back. Venezuela is certainly an attractive option for the world's big oil

majors. Recoverable reserves are now put at just under 300 billion barrels, compared to about 265 billion in Saudi Arabia and less than 100 billion in Russia.

Most of Venezuelan oil is heavy and more expensive to refine, but it lies only a few hundred mete rs below the Orinoco Belt. That makes it a lot more attractive than,for example, speculatively drilling in the hostile Russian Arctic while dodging icebergs. The Orinoco Belt is an extremely important natural environment, and theinevitable objections from domestic, regional and international environmentalists will slow any development. But as has happened in similar situations elsewhere,the quest for the prize will almost certainly prevail. Venezuela needs the money. Venezuela has also very likely moved to near the top of the US government's list ofgeopolitical priorities. The US is set on a course to become energy independent, and the International Energy Agency calculates this may take two to three decadesbased on current trends and with optimistic a ssumptions for US shale oil production. Such assumptions have always been speculative when i t comes to the oil

industry. But a more achievable target for the US is to become regionally oil independent -that is, to only

source its oil requirements domestically and from Canada, Mexico and now perhaps from Venezuela . That would allow

the US to become completely independent of Middle East oil within 10 years or so. A change in Venezuela's political and

economic priorities would also weaken the Cuban economy since Chavez supplied Cuba with almost f ree oil. That would hasten the inevitable regime change there

as well, an extra bonus for Washington. But while such an outcome would be very favourable for the US economy, it would accelerate the game

change already started in the global oil industry with the rapid growth in shale oil volume s. No matter how you work the

assumptions, the world is heading for a lot more oil supply over the balance of this decade. New major oil production will come from North Ame rica, Iraq and the

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.html





Caspian Sea, where Kazakhstan's giant Kashagan field starts to produce from this year, almost certainly from Venezuela if a new administration takes concrete stepsto increase foreign investment and production in the oil sector. This may be the real reason Russian officials shed a few tears at Chavez's funeral on Friday.

Middle East Pull out bad



1NC Plan spills over to Energy Investment

Economic engagement with Venezuela solves for energy cooperation –

Nathaniel T. Edwards, 08 (double-major in International Affairs and Political Science, major in Japanese, student research intern in the Roosevelt

Institution and Center for International Trade and Security, faculty advisor – Dr. Christopher Allen, JURO, University of Georgia, “Increasing Trade Security: United

States-Venezuelan Trade Incentives,” http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf)

Economic globalization has both positive and negative effects on trade security. Globalization will erode funding sources for dissident

and terrorist organizations by creating international pressure on countries in areas such as export controls and transactional transparency, bolstering nationalsecurity.xxi Conversely, because terrorist organizations often depend on smuggling or money laundering and private donations as their main funding sources,

globalization increases access to sources from which an organization might potentially acquire funds. Strengthening the economic ties

between Venezuela and the United States causes Venezuela to become more invested in preventing

terrorist attacks on either trading partner. Although terrorism may seem to thrive in a globalized economy, increased trade

creates strong incentives for each state to prevent attacks—leading to the enactment of security

measures that weaken rogue organizations. The United States also benefits from strong, stable trade

relations with Venezuela in the area of energy cooperation. Energy cooperation includes assistance in developing and

modernizing the technology to efficiently extract and utilize energy resources. Previous efforts to support modernization and bilateral investment, especiallythroughout the 1990s, have failed as technology and information exchanges have become less frequent with the deterioration of the political relationship between

the United States and Venezuela.xxii Stabilizing the Venezuelan economy and establishing a normalized traderelationship would help to reverse declining energy cooperation. Bilateral energy cooperation translates

into a stable energy infrastructure for Venezuela and the United States. A historical example of a successful trade

expansion occurred between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, illustrating the level of stability and security that trade can achieve. During the ColdWar, when diplomatic tensions were at their highest levels, trade between the two st ates neither promoted arms production nor detracted from each state’s

national security.xxiii Rather, as each state perceived itself to be threatened by the other, trade policy i ncreased non-threatening trade and decreased threateningtrade of goods between them. The trade relationship between the United States a nd the Soviet Union provided an economic incentive to limit aggress ion and

promote cooperation as the states become increasingly economically interdependent. In fact, Gift suggests that increased trade encouraged

each state to comprehensively examine its trade deals and consequently, to increase its security by

dictating what entered and exited each state.xxiv The U.S.-Soviet analogy provides an important illustration of the potential security

benefits of tying the Venezuelan economy to that of the United States. In 2006, the United States and Russia si gned a bilateral trade agreement. The agreementdetails what measures the United States would require Russia to adopt before supporting its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and serves as a modelfor a Russian draft of a Protocol of Accession. If Russia meets these requirements and joins the WTO, trade between the Unite d States and Russia will be expandedgreatly. Therefore, Russia’s entry into the WTO would provide multiple economic and economic and security benefits for the United States: expanded access to non -

agricultural goods markets, new service markets (such as banking, securities, insurance, telecommunications, energy, and audio-visual services), transparent andpredictable tariff treatments for agricultural products, reduced non-tariff barriers, and improved Russian enforcement of intellectual property rights.xxv Existingbilateral trade between the United States and Russia has grown by 15 percent annually, valued at around $19 billion in 2005.xxvi Es tablishing far-reaching economic

relationships yields significant benefits. Venezuela is already a member of the World Trade Organization and is thus

primed for significant trade growth with the United States, as far as prerequisites for that trade. Trade

with Venezuela may not return as large financial returns as trade with Russia, simply because of less

capital and material trade available, but it would provide similar benefits to both the economy and

national security.



2NC AT: Alternative Causes

No alt causes and domestic production doesn’t solve

SWP’ 13 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Institute for International and Security Affairs, “The U.S.

Energy Revolution: Retreat from the Middle East?”, 2/26/13, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/kurz-gesagt/point-of-view-the-us-energy-revolution-retreat-from-the-middle-east.html)The shale gas boom and decline in prices that has occurred in the past few years will not continue

linearly, nor can the same scenario be expected to occur in the oil market. With regard to oil, the path

to import independence is longer, if it can be reached at all. In 2011, U.S. domestic oil production

accounted for a 55 percent share of consumption, while 45 percent was imported. The productionchain of oil is simply another matter than on gas. Oil refineries are specialized in the specific oil grades

of their imports, which means that the adjustment process for the U.S. to become independent from

oil imports will be long and expensive.



2NC Brink

We’re still dependent on oil now- but not with Venezuela-the plan reverses that

AEI 12 (American Enterprise Institute, “Venezuela and our energy policy”, 12/13/12, http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/12/venezuela-and-our-energy-policy/

Securing a reliable energy supply has always been a national security priority for the United States, and low fuel prices have political, economic,and social consequences. Until 2012, at least, the popularity of American presidents has been c losely linked to the price at the pump.¶

Currently, the United States relies on energy imports from Canada (24% of oil imports), Mexico (11%), Saudi Arabia (9.8%),

Venezuela (8.9%), and Nigeria (8%). Venezuela has gone from being one of the most important and strategic

energy partners for the United States to a source of dwindling significance. The ideology of Venezuelan

strongman Hugo Chavez has a lot to do with this trend, and it is fair to ask if his impending death might change things dramatically.¶ As

reported today by the Financial Times, “the US dependence on Venezuelan net crude and oil product exports has

dropped to levels last seen nearly 30 years ago.” Given the political uncertainty in Venezuela due to Chavez’s terminal

condition and the dysfunctional petroleum industry he will leave behind, this trend will likely continue.¶ We’ve already been edged out by

Chavez’s new alliances. One of the fastest growing destinations of Venezuelan crude oil exports has been China. In 2011, China imported400,000 bbl/d of crude oil from Venezuela, up from only 40,000 bbl/d in 2005. Likewise, US imports from Venezuela have declined from 2.2million bbl/d to 30-year lows.¶ Venezuela’s allies: China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba have a vested interest in Venezuela’s resources as collateral for

billions in loans that Chavez has taken to maintain social programs and his political machinery. Taking this into consideration, policymakers inthe US should realize that Venezuela does not perceive its exports to the United States as a priority, even though such sales could generate vastadditional revenue to jump start their fragile economy.¶ Furthermore, Chavez’s regime has done such a poor job of investing in infrastructure

that two of his most important refineries, Amuay and El Palito, have had severe outages due to negligence and poor maintenance. Theseoutages have contributed to Venezuela’s shortage of oil exports and its ability to contain a severe shortage of basic goods.¶ US energy supplyshould no longer rely on regimes like Venezuela to cover its demand. North America has enough resources to be energy independent. Mexico’s

future energy reform could increase its oil supply by allowing private investments. Likewise, the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline could

carry up to 35 million gallons of oil every day from Canada to US refineries.¶ Regardless of how a post-Chavez era unfolds, Venezuela’s oil

output is not likely to change in the near term. Our energy strategy, on the other hand, should: We

must focus on securing a safer hemisphere without contributing to regimes that support terrorism and drug trafficking.



2NC AT: Plan Doesn’t Cause Independence

We don’t need to win that the plan causes complete Energy Independence --- solely

enough to switch dependence out of the Middle East into Latin America.

Still causes perception of pullout --- triggers our internal links

Levi, 2013 (Michael, the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment and director of the program on energy security and climate

change at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The Experts: How the U.S. Oil Boom Will Change the Markets and Geopolitics”

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.html)

Rising U.S. oil production will help restrain global prices and provide some limited economic insulation from price spikes. But, contrary to somepopular claims, it will fall far short of making the U.S. independent of events overseas. As I argued in Foreign Policy magazine last year, U.S.vulnerabilities stem mainly from how much the country spends on oil, not where that money is shipped to. Rising U.S. production won't

fundamentally change that.¶ The biggest consequences to watch out for may stem from how countries' leaders

respond to the changing U.S. position . My colleague Blake Clayton and I led a research effort last year that made clear that

whatever economists say (correctly) about flexible global markets making the finer details of who buys oil from whom largely inconsequential

economically, leaders of many powerful countries believe otherwise— and act accordingly . If , for example,

Chinese leaders worry that the U.S. will stop defending sea lanes, or Middle Eastern leaders worry that the U.S. will

withdraw from the region, they'll take steps with real geopolitical consequences —even if their

original suspicions, as is highly likely, turn out to have been wrong.





2NC Link

Plan causes oil companies to return to the western hemisphere

CNBC’ 13 (“Oil Industry Mulls Next Steps for Venezuela”, 3/5/13,

http://www.cnbc.com/id/100525262)Analysts and attendees at the Houston energy conference said it was unclear what would happen after the country holds an election for a new

president. For now, Venezuela's Vice President Nicolas Maduro is in charge and the country's army chiefs are reported

to be supporting him.¶ "Without (Chavez's) charisma and force of character, it is not all clear how his successors will maintain the

system he created," Yergin said.¶ (Read More: Traders React: What Chavez Death Means for Oil Market)¶ Among the major integrated

oil companies, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil could stand to benefit greatly from regime change in Venezuela,

if the new leadership allows overseas oil companies to return, analysts said.¶ The nationalization of Venezuela's

oil industry in 2007 resulted in the exit of those two companies who were unable to reach a new agreement with the state-owned oil companyPDVSA.¶ Too Early to Tell¶ "It's too early to tell how the new leader will handle it, but ConocoPhillips could benefit the most," said Fadel Gheit,senior oil analyst at Oppenheimer & Co.¶ ConocoPhillips was the biggest foreign stakeholder in Venezuela at the time of nationalization andcould benefit greatly from regaining its former assets, Gheit said, adding: "The book value of assets that were confiscated was $4.5 billion (atthe time.) The market value is now $20 to $30 billion... ConocoPhillips could eventually see a net gain of $10 billion."¶ But that assumesConocoPhillips would want to return to the country. Venezuela's economic problems extend beyond the oil business. "It really much depends

on what kind of government will follow Chavez," said Enrique Sira, IHS senior research director for Latin America.¶ "The only thing for sure isthe fact that the industry is in very poor condition -- upstream, downstream, power, and distribution. Electricity has to be rationed. It has a gasdeficit that's been running for years and the country doesn't produce anywhere near what it could produce," Sira said.¶ (Read More: VenezuelaVote, Post-Chavez, Next Risk for Oil)¶ ConocoPhillips CEO Ryan Lance, who spoke Tuesday morning at the Houston energy conference prior to

news of Chavez's death, noted how the global energy landscape has changed dramatically.¶ "The new landscape is like someone

picked up the energy world and tilted it," he said, as countries with great demand for energy and

those with ample supplies has changed. The U.S. is now exporting more of its natural resources than ever before, he said.

Those exports include shipping record supplies of US gasoline to Venezuela. Meanwhile Venezuela oil exports to the U.S. are on

the decline.¶ Sira said Venezuela could produce as much as 6 to 9 million barrels of oil a day but now it's

probably less than 2.5 million barrels. He said oil production peaked in the early year at 3.3 million barrels.¶ (Read More: Why Venezuela'sWorld-Beating Oil Reserves Are 'Irrelevant')¶ Venezuela ranked fourth in oil imports to the U.S. last year at 906,000 barrels per day, accordingto the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). But crude oil imports from Venezuela have been declining steadily since 2004, when theypeaked at 1.3 million barrels per day.¶ Venezuela's refineries are also in such poor shape that it has to import gasoline and diesel from the U.S.In December, Venezuela imported a record 197,000 barrels per day of petroleum products from the U.S., according to EIA data.¶ In the short-

run, oil prices may not be greatly impacted by regime change in Venezuela since for now the flow of oil from Venezuela to theU.S. and domestic fuel imports to the South American country are likely to continue current trends, said Houston-based energy

analyst Andy Lipow. "We both need each other."



2NC AT: Energy Independence Inevitable

Policymakers overestimate shale resources --- they’re far smaller and more expensive

than assumed --- proves production doesn’t boost the industry

Berman and Pittinger 11 Arthur - petroleum geologist with thirty-four years of oil and gas industry experience. He has done expert wit ness andresearch work on several oil and gas trial and utility commission hearings, Lynn - consultant in petroleum engineering with 30 years of industry experience..ThinkProgress. "Analysis: U.S. Shale Gas Industry Reserves Are Over Stated at Least 100 Percent,"thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/08/05/289389/stunning-analysis-u-s-shale-gas-reserves-may-be-over-stated-at-least-100-percent/

There are, however, two major concerns at the center of the shale gas revolution:¶ • Despite impressive

production growth, it is not yet clear that these plays are commercial at current prices because of the high capital costs of land and drilling and

completion.¶ • Reserves and economics depend on estimated ultimate recoveries based on hyperbolic , or increasingly

flattening, decline profiles that predict decades of commercial production. With only a few years of production h istory in most of these plays, this

model has not been shown to be correct, and may be overly optimistic .¶ These are not purely technical

topics for debate among petroleum professionals. The marketing of the shale gas phenomenon has been so effective

that important policy and strategic decisions are being made based on as yet unproven assumptions

about the abundance and low cost of these plays . The “Pickens Plan” seeks to get congressional approval for natural gas subsidies that

might eventually lead to conversion of large parts of our vehicle fleet to run on natural gas. This might commit the U.S. to decades of

natural gas exports at fixed prices in the face of scarcity and increasing prices in the domestic market. Similarly,

companies have gotten permits from the government to transform liquefied natural gas import terminals into export facilities that would commit the U.S. to

decades of large, fixed export volumes. If reserves are less and cost is more than many assume, these could be disastrous decisions.

Status squo wells aren’t accessible --- we won’t be independent absent the plan.

Nelder 11 Chris - co-author of Profit From the Peak and Investing in Renewable Energy, is an energy analyst and journalist. Slate December 29, 2011, "Is

there really 100 years’ worth of natural gas beneath the United

States?," www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2011/12/is_there_really_100_years_worth_of_natural_gas_beneath_the_united_states_.html

The recent press about the potential of shale gas would have you believe that America is now sitting on a

100-year supply of natural gas. It's a "game-changer." A "golden age of gas" awaits, one in which the

United States will be energy independent, even exporting gas to the rest of the world, upending our current energy-

importing situation.¶ The data, however, tell a very different story . Between the demonstrable gas reserves, and the

potential resources blared in the headlines, lies an enormous gulf of uncertainty .¶ The claim of a 100-year supply originated

with a report released in April 2011 by the Potential Gas Committee, an orga nization of petroleum engineers and geoscientists. President and Chairman Larry Gringworks with Third Day Energy LLC, a company based in Austin, Texas, that is engaged in acquiring and exploiting oil and gas properties along the Texas Gulf Coast.*Chairman of the Board Darrell Pierce is a vice president of DCP Midstream LLC, a natural-gas production, processing, and marketing company based in Denver. Thereport's contributors are from the industry-supported Colorado School of Mines. In short, the Potential Gas Committee report is not an impartial assessment ofresources.¶ Its website consists of a single press release announcing the April report , with a link to a brief summary s lide deck. A more detailed slide deck issued by

the committee presents some optimistic estimates of potential resources, including a "future gas supply" estimate of 2,170 trillion cubic feet (tcf). At the

2010 rate of American consumption—about 24 tcf per year—that would be a 95-year supply of gas, which apparently has been rounded up to 100 years. ¶ But whatis that estimate based upon? Those details haven’t been made freely available to the public, but their summary breaks it down as follows here and in the graphbelow: 273 tcf are "proved reserves," meaning that it is believed to exist, and to be commercially producible at a 10 percent discount rate. That conforms with the

data of the U.S. Energy Information Administration. An additional 536.6 tcf are classified as "probable" from existing fields, meaning that they have

some expectation that the gas exists in known formations, but it has not been proven to exist and is not certain to be

technically recoverable . An additional 687.7 tcf is "possible" from new fields, meaning that the gas might exist in new fields

that have not yet been discovered. A further 518.3 tcf are "speculative," which means exactly that. A final 176 tcf are

claimed for coalbed gas, which is gas trapped in coal formations. (Note: The PGC reports the total for probable, possible, and speculative coalbed gas as 158.6 tcf,but adding up their numbers for each category, we find the correct total is 157.7 tcf. We haven't been able to reach the PGC to discuss the discrepancy. Adding the18.6 tcf of proved coalbed gas reserves reported by the EIA in 2009—the most recent data it offers—to the 157.7 gives a total of 176.3 tcf for all categories ofcoalbed gas.

http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2011/12/is_there_really_100_years_worth_of_natural_gas_beneath_the_united_states_.html

http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2011/12/is_there_really_100_years_worth_of_natural_gas_beneath_the_united_states_.html



Shale amounts are smaller and more inaccessible

NYT 11 Ian Urbina, August 24, 2011, "Geologists Sharply Cut Estima te of Shale Gas www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/us/25gas.html?_r=1

Not enough gas

Cobb 10/15 Kurt- founding member of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas—USA and currently serves on its board. He also

serves on the board of the Arthur Morgan Institute for Community Solutions. October 15, 2012, "Oil And Gas Industry Pushing U.S.Exports," www.forexpros.com/analysis/oil-and-gas-industry-pushing-u.s.-exports-139764

http://www.forexpros.com/analysis/oil-and-gas-industry-pushing-u.s.-exports-139764

http://www.forexpros.com/analysis/oil-and-gas-industry-pushing-u.s.-exports-139764



2NC Energy Independence = No Middle East

Lack of dependence means the U.S. will not feel the need to stay in the Middle East-

U.S Presence is key to Middle East Stability

McCracken 4/26/13 (Ross, “The shale boom and international energy security”- Platts; http://www.platts.com/news-feature/2013/oil/shale-boom/index)Crucially, those imports that remain will come not from extended global supply chains, but from the United States’ neighbors, Canada and

Mexico. US self-sufficiency in oil is being defined as a reduction in non-North American crude imports rather than in terms of US output alone.

The argument runs that the US will no longer have the same interest in stability in the Middle East. Security

guarantees in the region would in effect be subsidizing Chinese and Indian energy security. Both countries

are forecast to have rapidly expanding import dependencies in both oil and gas, and with no market in the US, Middle Eastern oil

increasingly flows east rather than west. Middle America will see little reason to support the energy

security of other countries.

US presence key to Middle Eastern stability

Secretary of Defense’ 12 (“Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense”,1/5/12, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf)

The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this ¶ dynamic

region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and ¶ presence. Over the long term,

ChinaLs emergence as a regional power will have the ¶ potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two ¶ countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a ¶ cooperative bilateral relationship. However, thegrowth of ChinaLs military power must be ¶ accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in ¶ the

region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that ¶ we maintain regional

access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty ¶ obligations and with international

law. Working closely with our network of allies and ¶ partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international

order that ensures ¶ underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic

dynamism, ¶ and constructive defense cooperation. ¶ In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents

both strategic opportunities and ¶ challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure

to ¶ reform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that, ¶ over the long term, are more

responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and are ¶ more stable and reliable partners of the United States. ¶ Our defense

efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and ¶ destabilizing threats, as

well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Of ¶ particular concern are the

proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction ¶ (WMD). U.S. policy will emphasize

Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation ¶ Council countries when appropriate, to prevent IranLs development

of a nuclear weapon ¶ capability and counter its destabilizing policies. The United States will do this while ¶ standing up for

IsraelLs security and a comprehensive Middle East peace. To support these ¶ objectives, the United States will continue to place a

premium on U.S. and allied military ¶ presence in A and support of A partner nations in and around this region.¶Europe is home to some ofAmericaLs most stalwart allies and partners, many of whom have ¶ sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Europe

is our principal ¶ partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:Priorities for 21st Century Defense 3 ¶ future. At the same time, security challenges and unresolved conflicts persist in parts of ¶ Europe andEurasia, where the United States must continue to promote regional security and ¶ Euro-Atlantic integration. The United States has enduringinterests in supporting peace and ¶ prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is ¶ critical to the securityof Europe and beyond. Most European countries are now producers ¶ of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown inIraq and ¶ Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military ¶ investment in Europe, moving from a focus oncurrent conflicts toward a focus on future ¶ capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must ¶ alsoevolve. As this occurs, the United States will maintain our Article 5 commitments to ¶ allied security and promote enhanced capacity andinteroperability for coalition operations. ¶ In this resource-constrained era, we will also work with NATO allies to develop a _Smart ¶ Defense`approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st century ¶ challenges. In addition, our engagement with Russiaremains important, and we will ¶ continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a ¶ contributor across



a broad range of issues. ¶ Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the ¶ costs andresponsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the ¶ security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with agrowing number of nations a ¶ including those in Africa and Latin America a whose interests and viewpoints are merging ¶ into a common visionof freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will ¶ develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve oursecurity ¶ objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities. ¶ To enable economic growth and commerce, America,working in conjunction with allies and ¶ partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global ¶ commons athose areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective ¶ tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperityare increasingly dependent ¶ on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential ¶ threats to access in the

global commons, whether through opposition to existing norms or ¶ other anti-access approaches. Both state and non-stateactors possess the capability and ¶ intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks

on the United States, with ¶ possible severe effects on both our military operations and our homeland.

Growth in the ¶ number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested ¶ space environment, threateningsafety and security. The United States will continue to lead ¶ global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of theglobal ¶ commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by ¶ maintaining relevant and interoperable military

capabilities.¶ The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential ¶

to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors , giving them more freedom of action to ¶ challenge U.S. interests.

Terrorist access to even simple nuclear devices poses the prospect ¶ of devastating consequences for

the United States. Accordingly, the Department of Defense ¶ will continue to enhance its capabilities, acting with an array of domestic

and foreign ¶ partners, to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD.

Plan Causes draw out from the Mid-East - that causes regional instability and SCS war

Thompson 12/3/12 (Loren, writer/contributor for national security; “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle

East Oil?”- Forbes Magazine;

http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-needs-middle-east-oil/)

If you trace your finger on a globe northward over the pole from the U.S. Navy’s main naval base on the West Coast, you’ll discover that theentrance to the Persian Gulf is roughly on the opposite side of the world. The Gulf is so far away that prior to World War Two, few Americansthought there was any reason to visit the sparsely populated region, much less establish a permanent military presence there. But after the warended, world demand for oil surged while America gradually exhausted most of its easily-tapped domestic reserves. As U.S. oil companies joined the global search for new sources, geologists came to believe that two-thirds of the world’s exploitable oil reserves and one-third of itsnatural gas lay under a handful of states bordering on the Persian Gulf. As a result, the security of Gulf oil states became of paramount concern

to U.S. military planners. Now, that could be changing. The latest edition of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook says

America will surpass Saudi Arabia as the biggest oil producer in 2020 and become self-sufficient in

energy by 2030 as new drilling technologies, alternative fuels and declining consumption reduce the

need to import oil. The U.S. may continue to use oil from Canada, Venezuela and other nearby countries if prices are competitive, but

the IEA predicts Asian nations will end up consuming 90% of the oil produced in the Persian Gulf. That’s good news for America,

however it could have ramifications that are not good for the rest of the world. If the United States no

longer needs access to Middle East oil under any foreseeable circumstances, then the priority Washington

assigns to the region will plummet . Many analysts believe that a unified global pricing structure for

fossil fuels will keep America engaged, but with U.S. spot prices for natural gas currently running at a

fraction of what the fuel costs in Europe and East Asia, it appears global pricing isn’t so integrated

after all. Even if it were, Washington’s options for insulating U.S. energy markets f rom global price swings are multiplying as domestic

production grows. If you know the history of global oil in the years before World War Two, then you realize there is nothing new about America

enjoying energy independence as Asia worries about its own needs. What definitely is new, though, is that in the near future there

might be no western nation capable of or willing to police the Persian Gulf. Britain carried that burden from the

late 1700s until World War Two, but its circumstances were so diminished in the war’s aftermath that it soon exited all of its military bases

“East of Suez.” As Britain receded in the Middle East, America’s role there grew — especially after successive energy crises

engineered by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries alerted Washington to its growing

dependence on foreign oil. So the Pentagon became accustomed to assuring the security of oil passing

through the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining a continuous naval presence in and around the Gulf while

periodically deploying ground forces to protect fragile oil-producing states. Nothing lasts forever, though, and

now a combination of energy independence and economic necessity may lead Washington to become more insular in its outlook, the same wayLondon did after the war. With less need for foreign oil and an increasingly urgent requirement to rein in federal borrowing, it doesn’t take a



genius to figure out where the political system will be inclined to cut spending. It will be in distant places that have ceased having an impact onhow elections turn out. With the prospect of OPEC-induced energy shortages off the table, at least in America, political leaders are sure tobegin asking why the U.S. Navy is carrying the burden of making sure China has secure sources of oil. The answers they get from Pentagonstrategists aren’t likely to be well received in a nation where economic growth has slowed to a crawl due in no small part to Chinesemercantilism. So there’s a real possibility that Washington will go through the same East-of-Suez debate that London did in the 1960s. TheObama Administration’s new Asia-Pacific military posture may be the first, tentative sign that America is losing its enthusiasm for securingMiddle East oil supplies. Of course, everyone in the administration will vigorously reject any such interpretation. But just for fun, let’s ask the

question of who wins and who loses if America decides it’s had enough of being the policeman on the beat in the Persian Gulf. The biggest

losers would be the Arab oil states grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council, most of which are

monarchies kept in power by a combination oil dollars and American military power. Despite their oil

revenues, none of these countries except Saudi Arabia has the wherewithal to defend itself against military

pressure from Iran if America leaves the stage – or for that matter from Iraq, which has repeatedly laid claim

to oil fields in Kuwait and other nearby states. The vacuum created by an American departure would

force nations like Bahrain and Qatar to seek new military protectors, either by submitting to the

influence of bigger regional powers or by reaching out to China. The second category of losers would be the

economies of East Asia, which the International Energy Agency says will be the main consumers of Persian Gulf oil in the years ahead. China,Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are heavily dependent on the flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and yet do little to assure that

flow is not disrupted by local tensions. If America pulls out of the Gulf, the nations of East Asia will either have to

play a bigger military role in the Middle East, or find other sources of oil. America might have sufficient new-found reserves of

fossil fuel to supply Japan and South Korea in an emergency, but concern about access to Persian Gulf oil wouldundoubtedly exacerbate tensions over who owns contested oil reserves in the South China Sea and

elsewhere. Israel too would likely be a big loser. Washington spends billions of dollars each year subsidizing the security of

the Jewish state. The reason that isn’t controversial even though Americans usually want to cut foreign aid ahead of every other type of federal

spending is because it is hard to separate securing Israel from securing Middle East oil. The same U.S. military forces and

programs that help protect Israel from Iranian missiles and Islamist terror groups also protect Arab oil-

producing states. But if America’s role in securing the oil were to wane, it would be harder to ignore

the cost of defending Israel, and that might force Jerusalem to become more self-sufficient.



2NC Middle East impact --- Instability

Increase in oil prices creates political strife in the Middle East and escalate- U.S. would

get drawn in

Lhota 2/19/13 (John, Blogs at Duquesne University School of Law; “The Effects of Energy Independence”;http://www.duqlawblogs.org/energy/2013/02/19/the-effects-of-energy-independence/) In 2011, the U.S. imported roughly 40 percent of its 11.4 million daily barrels of oil from OPEC. This is a

market that OPEC may not be able to afford to lose. Demand from developing economies such as China and Japan will

alleviate some economic pressure, but North America’s energy resurgence will likely reduce the price of oil. Thus,

OPEC, as well as other foreign producers such as Russia and West Africa, will undoubtedly struggle . In

a region as unstable as the Middle East, any economic challenges, will surely create political strife. As

former deputy national security adviser in the George W. Bush administration Meghan O’Sullivan explains, the U.S. may “transmit

less of their income abroad in the case of a surge in oil prices, but a major increase in global prices

caused by instability in the Middle East would be almost as destabilizing to the U.S. as it was when Uncle Sam

secured much of its oil from Saudi Arabia.”

Middle East war goes nuclear and escalates --- structural factors don’t check.

Primakov 9 (Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Russian Federation, Member

of Russian Academy of Science, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations,” Russia in

Global Affairs, July-September 2009, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593)

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally . During the Cold War,

amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Unionsupported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that timeobjectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and theUnited States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of bothsuperpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt(which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various

countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for thecessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world

and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global

dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington

urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not

intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. OnJuly 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of theSoviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which laterclaimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S.Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeateditself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. militaryinvolvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the MiddleEast. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor ofinterference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In aprivate conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been doneamidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting inMoscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt inresponse to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and

Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by

the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global

confrontation . After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of

the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion



no longer conforms to the reality . The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The

disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a

direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already

made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level

that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear

weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens

a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region , which would have catastrophic

consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened

the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the

latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them . This refers, above all, to the Middle

East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike

against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such astrike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s

position does not completely rule out such a possibility.



2NC Middle East Impact --- SCS War

Plan Causes draw out from the Mid-East - that causes regional instability and SCS warThompson 12/3/12 (Loren, writer/contributor for national security; “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle

East Oil?”- Forbes Magazine;

http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-needs-middle-east-oil/)

If you trace your finger on a globe northward over the pole from the U.S. Navy’s main naval base on the West Coast, you’ll discover that theentrance to the Persian Gulf is roughly on the opposite side of the world. The Gulf is so far away that prior to World War Two, few Americansthought there was any reason to visit the sparsely populated region, much less establish a permanent military presence there. But after the warended, world demand for oil surged while America gradually exhausted most of its easily-tapped domestic reserves. As U.S. oil companies joined the global search for new sources, geologists came to believe that two-thirds of the world’s exploitable oil reserves and one-third of itsnatural gas lay under a handful of states bordering on the Persian Gulf. As a result, the security of Gulf oil states became of paramount concern

to U.S. military planners. Now, that could be changing. The latest edition of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook says

America will surpass Saudi Arabia as the biggest oil producer in 2020 and become self-sufficient in

energy by 2030 as new drilling technologies, alternative fuels and declining consumption reduce the

need to import oil. The U.S. may continue to use oil from Canada, Venezuela and other nearby countries if prices are competitive, but

the IEA predicts Asian nations will end up consuming 90% of the oil produced in the Persian Gulf. That’s good news for America,

however it could have ramifications that are not good for the rest of the world. If the United States no

longer needs access to Middle East oil under any foreseeable circumstances, then the priority Washington

assigns to the region will plummet . Many analysts believe that a unified global pricing structure for

fossil fuels will keep America engaged, but with U.S. spot prices for natural gas currently running at a

fraction of what the fuel costs in Europe and East Asia, it appears global pricing isn’t so integrated

after all. Even if it were, Washington’s options for insulating U.S. energy markets from global price swings are multiplying as domestic

production grows. If you know the history of global oil in the years before World War Two, then you realize there is nothing new about America

enjoying energy independence as Asia worries about its own needs. What definitely is new, though, is that in the near future there

might be no western nation capable of or willing to police the Persian Gulf. Britain carried that burden from the

late 1700s until World War Two, but its circumstances were so diminished in the war’s aftermath that it soon exited all of its military bases“East of Suez.” As Britain receded in the Middle East, America’s role there grew — especially after successive energy crises

engineered by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries alerted Washington to its growing

dependence on foreign oil. So the Pentagon became accustomed to assuring the security of oil passing

through the Strait of Hormuz, maintaining a continuous naval presence in and around the Gulf while

periodically deploying ground forces to protect fragile oil-producing states. Nothing lasts forever, though, and

now a combination of energy independence and economic necessity may lead Washington to become more insular in its outlook, the same wayLondon did after the war. With less need for foreign oil and an increasingly urgent requirement to rein in federal borrowing, it doesn’t take a

genius to figure out where the political system will be inclined to cut spending. It will be in distant places that have ceased having an impact onhow elections turn out. With the prospect of OPEC-induced energy shortages off the table, at least in America, political leaders are sure tobegin asking why the U.S. Navy is carrying the burden of making sure China has secure sources of oil. The answers they get from Pentagonstrategists aren’t likely to be well received in a nation where economic growth has slowed to a crawl due in no small part to Chinesemercantilism. So there’s a real possibility that Washington will go through the same East-of-Suez debate that London did in the 1960s. TheObama Administration’s new Asia-Pacific military posture may be the first, tentative sign that America is losing its enthusiasm for securingMiddle East oil supplies. Of course, everyone in the administration will vigorously reject any such interpretation. But just for fun, let’s ask the

question of who wins and who loses if America decides it’s had enough of being the policeman on the beat in the Persian Gulf. The biggest

losers would be the Arab oil states grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council, most of which are

monarchies kept in power by a combination oil dollars and American military power. Despite their oil

revenues, none of these countries except Saudi Arabia has the wherewithal to defend itself against military

pressure from Iran if America leaves the stage – or for that matter from Iraq, which has repeatedly laid claim

to oil fields in Kuwait and other nearby states. The vacuum created by an American departure would

force nations like Bahrain and Qatar to seek new military protectors, either by submitting to the



influence of bigger regional powers or by reaching out to China. The second category of losers would be the

economies of East Asia, which the International Energy Agency says will be the main consumers of Persian Gulf oil in the years ahead. China,Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are heavily dependent on the flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and yet do little to assure that

flow is not disrupted by local tensions. If America pulls out of the Gulf, the nations of East Asia will either have to

play a bigger military role in the Middle East, or find other sources of oil. America might have sufficient new-found reserves of

fossil fuel to supply Japan and South Korea in an emergency, but concern about access to Persian Gulf oil would

undoubtedly exacerbate tensions over who owns contested oil reserves in the South China Sea andelsewhere. Israel too would likely be a big loser. Washington spends billions of dollars each year subsidizing the security of

the Jewish state. The reason that isn’t controversial even though Americans usually want to cut foreign aid ahead of every other type of federal

spending is because it is hard to separate securing Israel from securing Middle East oil. The same U.S. military forces and

programs that help protect Israel from Iranian missiles and Islamist terror groups also protect Arab oil-

producing states. But if America’s role in securing the oil were to wane, it would be harder to ignore

the cost of defending Israel, and that might force Jerusalem to become more self-sufficient.

South China Sea conflicts cause extinction

Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of

eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, heedited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for centuries

national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The currentdeterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another

example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is

clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s

claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military

ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own

position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it

could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The

U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later,

during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latterconfrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet oranything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But theloose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the

military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between

nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between

nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case,

the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to

use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles

for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO

leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet

conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the

nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear

deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national

missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other

nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those

Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be

that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government

possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. M oreover, only about forty of these

Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A

nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and

fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far



higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive

debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear

winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos

and destruction.



Venezuela Overheating DA



1NC Shell --- Insert Impact Scenario

Post-Chavez oil and gas industry are wary of investing in Venezuela- contingent on PDVSA

Landers 13 (Jim, Death of Venezuela’s Chavez adds uncertainty to oil market,

http://bizbeatblog.dallasnews.com/2013/03/death-of-venezuelas-chavez-adds-uncertainty-to-oil-market.html/, 3/5/13)

News of the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez quickly swept through IHS CERAWeek, the oil and gas

industry’s premiere global conference, but there were far more questions than answers about what it would

mean to the global oil market. “Venezuela is one of the countries with the largest hydrocarbon [oil and

gas] endowments in the world,” said Enrique Sira, IHS’s director of Latin American energy research. “Maybe because of that it is so

hard to understand why today there is electric power rationing in some parts of the country, a deficit of natural gas supply across the wholecountry, and a productive oil capacity that is way below the actual potential that the country has.” Sira put those woes on Chavez’ doorstep,

along with refinery explosions and fires and interruptions in production. “The set of policies implemented by the Chavez

government was not conducive to an industry that needs to be investing continuously to keep

growing and achieving a high level of efficiency,” he said. Chavez tried to compel international oil majors

like Exxon Mobil Corp. to give his government more control and revenue from big projects in the country’smassive Orinoco heavy oil belt. Instead, the companies left the country. What happens now, however – even

whether the Venezuelan oil workers go out on strike to demand a better government, as they did once in Chavez’ time in office – remains

unknown. “It’s too early,” Sira said. Dan Yergin, vice chairman of IHS CERA and author of the energy history The Quest, said

Chavez left behind a sorry economic legacy for his successors. He leaves behind an economy greatly

weakened by spending, intervention, inflation, capital flight, and shortages,” Yergin said. “And, beyond Cuba, his effort to create an

alliance against what he called ‘the U.S. empire’ managed only to enlist a few countries. Without his charisma and force of character, it is not

all clear how his successors will maintain the system he created.”

Liberalized oil framework causes companies to invest

Mani 13 (writes in-depth analysis on companies and various sectors. Prior to joining Wall Street Tools,he worked as senior correspondence for International Business Times, Correspondent at ThomsonReuters and Sub-Editor with RTT News, Venezuela After Chavez: Regime Change Could Be Positive ForConocophillips, Exxonmobil, http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6335360/venezuela-after-chavez-regime-change-could-be-positive-for-conocophillips-exxonmobil, 3/7/13)

The nation seized the assets of ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips after they refused to give majority

control of their Venezuelan holdings to Petroleum of Venezuela (PdVSA), the state-owned oil and natural gas company. Total, Chevron,

Statoil and BP agreed and retain minority interests in their Venezuelan projects. However, the country is yet to arrive at a

settlement with ExxonMobil, which is seeking more than $10 billion. The issue along with the claims of ConocoPhillips remains

before the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Companies with current production in Venezuela include

supermajors like Repsol with 12 percent of total production. Oil giants Chevron Corporation (NYSE: CVX : 124.95, -1.36) has 2.6 percent,

Statoil (NYSE: STO : 21.44, 0.12) has 2.5 percent, Total (NYSE: TOT : 53.75, 0.23) has 2.3 percent and BP Plc (NYSE: BP : 41.93, 0.205)has 0.5 percent of its production in Venezuela. "A more liberalized oil framework in the country could see

these companies expand investment and accelerate production growth," Gheit noted.

Insert Impact Scenario

http://bizbeatblog.dallasnews.com/2013/03/death-of-venezuelas-chavez-adds-uncertainty-to-oil-market.html/


http://www.istockanalyst.com/finance/story/6335360/venezuela-after-chavez-regime-change-could-be-positive-for-conocophillips-exxonmobil








2NC Uniqueness --- No FDI now

Investors aren’t investing now- question of oil management

Sanchez 13 (Fabiola, reporter for the Associated Press, Outlook Grim in Venezuela's Essential Oil

Industry, http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=19108842, 5/4/13)

"We're in a process of trying to attract investment in dollars other than ours ," Ramirez said, assuring

reporters that PDVSA would work with private investors to not take on more debt to make new

investment. Outside experts, however, are deeply skeptical. They say PDVSA is badly mismanaged and that

even a radical overhaul would take years to show results. Rather than reinvesting enough profits in exploration and maintenance, Chavez

dedicated oil revenues to social spending such as building hundreds of thousands of homes and free medical clinics for the

poor, they say. Last year PDVSA said it spent $28.83 billion, nearly a quarter of its income, on various state programs. PDVSA also loses billionssubsidizing gasoline for Venezuelan drivers, who pay less to fill up their tanks than people anywhere else in the world. "The government ofVenezuela today uses PDVSA as its petty cash box to lead populist social programs," said Jorge R. Pinon, associate director of the Latin America

and Caribbean Program at the University of Texas, Austin. "Whatever capital is left in PDVSA is being mismanaged,

mismanaged because they're just not focused on running the company . ... They're focused on building hospitals

and schools."

http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=19108842





Venezuela undercuts Middle East

Venezuela has structural advantages- investors will choose them if structural problems are addressed

Tétreault No Date (Mary Ann, Cox distinguished professor of International Affairs at Trinity

University, San Antonio TX, The Political Economy of Middle Eastern Oil,http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol177/Tetreault.pdf)

Coordination between the oil exporting governments was not easy to accomplish because of

structural differences among national industries and because all oil exporting countries competed

against one another for investment and production shares. The Venezuelan industry was organized

in a multiple operating company concession pattern instead of the one company-one country pattern common in the

Middle East. The age of its industry meant that less efficient equipment, oil depletion, and political leverage gained through experience, also

increased the cost of producing oil in Venezuela as compared to the Middle East. Venezuela's geographic position gave it a

cost advantage in transportation to the United States, its most important customer, but as tanker sizes

increased and the center of gravity of the industry as a whole moved from the western to the eastern

hemisphere, this advantage became much less significant.



2NC Links

Oil is key- Chavez proves

The Economist 11 (Could one of the world’s top petroleum producers really go bankrupt?,

http://www.economist.com/node/18233412, 2/24/11)

EVER since Greece plunged into a sovereign-debt crisis in 2009, investors have focused on which European country might be

next. According to Capital Economics, a research firm in London, however, the next trouble spot could be Venezuela. “There is a

growing risk that the government will default on its obligations in 2012,” its analysts wrote on February 17th. Some in

the markets have taken fright, too: the country's credit-default swaps imply a 50% chance of default

by 2015. That may be overblown. Even so, Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's leftist president, seems to be pulling off a dubious achievement by

causing the bond markets to fear for the solvency of the world's eighth-largest oil producer. The chief

cause of Venezuela's travails has been Mr Chávez's pillaging of PDVSA, the state oil firm. He has packed it with

loyalists, starved it of investment and used it for social spending, cutting its output from 3.3m barrels

per day (b/d) in 1998 to around 2.25m b/d, according to industry estimates . Of that, some 1m b/d is sold at

subsidised prices at home or to regional allies, leaving just 1.25m b/d for full-price exports. Meanwhile, the president's hostility to business has

devastated the rest of the economy. He has nationalised hundreds of companies and trumped up charges against their owners, causing much ofVenezuela's private sector to shut up shop and flee. As a result, the country has seen vast capital flight, and must import

many goods that it used to produce. Non-oil exports have ground to a halt: petroleum now accounts for 92% of

its dollar intake.

http://www.economist.com/node/18233412

http://www.economist.com/node/18233412



2NC They Won’t go to the Middle East

Venezuela has structural advantages- investors will choose them if structural problems are addressed

Tétreault No Date (Mary Ann, Cox distinguished professor of International Affairs at Trinity

University, San Antonio TX, The Political Economy of Middle Eastern Oil,http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/Pol177/Tetreault.pdf)

Coordination between the oil exporting governments was not easy to accomplish because of

structural differences among national industries and because all oil exporting countries competed

against one another for investment and production shares. The Venezuelan industry was organized

in a multiple operating company concession pattern instead of the one company-one country pattern common in the

Middle East. The age of its industry meant that less efficient equipment, oil depletion, and political leverage gained through experience, also

increased the cost of producing oil in Venezuela as compared to the Middle East. Venezuela's geographic position gave it a

cost advantage in transportation to the United States, its most important customer, but as tanker sizes

increased and the center of gravity of the industry as a whole moved from the western to the eastern

hemisphere, this advantage became much less significant.



2NC Oil Investment is Zero Sum

Oil investment is zero sum between OPEC countries- incentives for investment in

Venezuela undercuts market position elsewhere and lock up capital

McArdle 13 (Megan, special correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast covering business,economics, and public policy. A former senior editor at The Atlantic and writer for The Economist,Fracking is Pitting OPEC Members Against Each Other. It Couldn't Happen to a Nicer Bunch of CartelMembers., http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/29/opec-fracturing-under-pressure-from-fracking.html, 5/29/13)

OPEC meets in Vienna on Friday, a meeting that will, according to the Wall Street Journal, be a mite testy. The last few

years have been flush for the cartel, with oil prices well above their historical average. Now fracking is

changing all that--and hammering open fissures in the cartel that been temporarily plugged with huge

wads of petrodollars. On one side are members like Saudi Arabia, who you can think of as OPEC's central banker. Saudi Arabia sits on

top of a vast reservoir of high quality oil that is cheap to pump and cheap to refine. It's not literally true that you can just stick a pipe down inthe desert and have oil come-a-gushing, but it might as well be. Because they have such a huge quantity of cheap, good oil, Saudi Arabia is the

low-cost producer. They also manage their production very intelligently--Aramco, the state-owned oil company, is very well run, and the Saudigovernment hasn't pumped every spare petrodollar into their economy. Which means that when the price falls, Saudi Arabia can afford to cut

back production a bit. Here's the thing about cartels: without legal enforcement, they pretty much never

work. The incentive to cheat, and take extra profits by producing a little more than your quota, is too

high . . . so pretty soon everyone is cheating, and your cartel doesn't really exist any more. OPEC has

managed to flagrantly violate this general economic truism for a few decades now. Saudi Arabia is one of the main reasons that it's been able tohold together for so long, even after the price crash of the mid 1980s. Until the Chinese economic boom drove global oil demand right upagainst the limits of the industry's pumping capacity, causing prices to spike, Saudi Arabia's excess capacity kept prices roughly stable, in theneighborhood of $25-$35 a barrel. Which, probably not coincidentally, is well under the break-even price for shale oil projects. Saudi Arabia is

one reason that the cartel has held together. The other is countries like Venezuela and Iran, which are pumping much

less than they theoretically could. Thanks to Iranian sanctions, and Venezuela's terrible oil

management policies, production in those countries is well under its theoretical maximum . . . which

acts as a sort of implicit subsidy to the other members of OPEC. As long as prices were high, all of this was fine; Saudi

and everyone else were pumping a lot and taking in a lot of money. But fracking threatens to change that happyequilibrium. The supply of oil will once again start rising to meet demand. And that means that the

price is likely to fall. It probably isn't headed back to $20 a barrel any time soon; at that price, shale oil projects wouldn't be economic.

But Venezuela and others cannot afford any sustained decrease in the price of oil. They have spent

every petrodollar they got, neglecting investment in favor of other projects. With production declining

they are absolutely dependent on the scarcity pricing that has prevailed over the last 5-8 years. They will

be pressing for production cuts to maintain price. But the Journal suggests that lower-cost producers with sounder finances, like Saudi

Arabia, are unlikely to be accomodating. They face no threat from fracking--they will always have cheaper, more plentiful oil than

North Dakota or Alberta. And from the perspective of the cartel as a whole, it is probably better if price comes down. The higher the price, themore investment there will be in fracking projects. And the more investment there is in a new technology, the greater the risk that some

combination of practice and breakthroughs will bring down the production costs of fracked oil. Better for the cartel for prices to

fall to the point where current fracking projects are just barely economic. But this will not be better

for Venezuela, et al. Venezuela is experiencing ongoing shortages of basic goods like toilet paperbecause of its economic mismanagement. Algeria reportedly needs an oil price of $121 a barrel to cover planned spending--

and has already experienced riots over food and housing. Iran is experiencing runaway inflation thanks to sanctions; falling oil prices will onlymake this worse. That's why they so desperately want the cartel to keep prices over $100 a barrel.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/29/opec-fracturing-under-pressure-from-fracking.html






International oil investment is zero sum- investment in Venezuela trades off with

other options

Ladislaw and Verrastro 13 (Sarah O. Ladislaw is co-director and senior fellow with the Energy andNational Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,D.C., Frank Verrastro is senior vice president and James R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at

CSIS, Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production, http://csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-production, 3/6/13)

Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to emerge. The damage that has

been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state and civil society could take years to rehabilitate. A few key reasons for

this include: revenue from the oil and gas sector that is diverted for political purposes and not

reinvested in a way that will drive new production will be hard to direct back to useful investment in

the sector, much of the private sector has been driven away from investment in Venezuela and may

be reluctant to return, or for the companies in country to re-invest in the short-term given their

experience in the 2000s, oil field mismanagement and damage may have likely occurred over the last

decade and it will take time and investment to revitalize , many of Venezuela’s core assets are in technologically

complex and capital-intensive heavy oil projects that take time and resources to develop and must now be viewed in light of theglobal array of upstream options that are now on the table for international oil investors as compared

to a decade ago, some of Venezuela’s current commercial relationships on the upstream or export

side may have to be revisited in light of a more commercially-based hydrocarbon policy, Venezuela’s energy

sector is dominated by the state’s decisions and management and it will take time to replace the managerial competency that once existed,highly subsidized oil is a key feature of Venezuelan society and the political will to reform the entire energy sector into one that is more market-based and open to private investment will necessarily have to feed into the domestic demand-side of that equation.

http://csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-production






Inflation on the brink

Venezuela’s inflation is on the brink now- plan pushes them into hyperinflation

Dolan 13 (Ed, member of the Roubini Global Economics Project, Venezuela on the Brink of

Hyperinflation, http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2013/06/14/venezuela-on-the-brink-of-hyperinflation/, 6/14/13)

It is too early to call Venezuela a truly hyperinflationary economy, but it looks to be on the brink. We

can see early signs of all of the feedback pathways that make hyperinflation potentially so explosive. Itis true that something could yet defuse the process. For example, a sharp increase in global oil prices could provide an unexpected increase inrevenue for the budget. Alternatively, although it seems unlikely, the government of Nicolas Maduro could turn away from the populist policies

of Hugo Chavez and impose stringent austerity measures. Doing so would be hard on the real economy, but it could bring

inflation down. It is more likely, however, that the Venezuelan government will continue its

dysfunctional blend of free spending, socialist mismanagement, and administrative restrictions on foreign

exchange and retail prices. If so, the near future could see the first real outbreak of hyperinflation in

Latin America since the 1980s. As blogger Billy Mitchell once wrote in reference to hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, “Bad Governments

will wreck any economy if they want to.”

FDI and capital influx causes inflation in Venezuela –

Bhargava 2008 (Director at Fazlani Altius Business School (FABS), Director at People EdgeManagement Private Limited, August 7, "Oil exporters struggle to beat inflation",http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-08-07/news/28423328_1_oil-exporters-oil-prices-oil-importing-countries)

One would tend to associate inflation rates of 10.4%, 15.1, 26.4% and 32.2% with India, Brazil, China and Pakistan,

respectively. But these are figures for Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iran and Venezuela, respectively, four of the

five largest oil exporters in the world.While oil-importing countries are yet to figure out appropriate measures to tackle, with

the energy crisis figures suggesting that exporting nations are as clueless as importing ones. SaudiArabia, the largest source of oil to the world, is battling an inflation rate of 10.1%, the highest in

almost three decades. Flush with record sums of inflows, management of money supply has become

an issue rarely encountered by its central bank. Worse, the Saudi central bank is constrained in its fight against

surging prices due to the Riyal's peg to the dollar. This becomes a critical issue in today's scenario,

when the economies of Saudi Arabia and the US are inversely related. In March this year, it was forced to cut

interest rates by three-quarters of a percentage point in tandem with the US. Fed despite inflationary pressures. Monetary policy being

rendered hapless, the government has had to resort to subsidies and wage hikes in order to cushion the impact of inflation. The Russian

economy is no different. High oil prices have enabled the country register a growth rate of 8.5%. That

would have thrilled investors if it were not accompanied with 15.1% inflation, far higher than the 7.8%

registered a year ago. Energy prices have made possible $13 billion of extra government spending on items like pensions and state wages

boosting domestic demand. Since, Russia doesn't have a developed consumer-credit market, monetary policy to

tame inflation is ineffectual. The Central Bank of Russia's dilemma is a policy that targets both the exchange rate and inflation. Ituses the reserves to manage the rouble, pumping money into the economy to weaken the currency and stoking inflation. Battling inflation, The

Bank of Russia has allowed the rouble to strengthen twice with indications of further measures. Capital inflows, domestic demand,

surging food and housing costs have pushed inflation in Iran to 26.4%. Massive inflows have provided the

leverage to the Iranian government to plough record sums of money in the economy to fund local

infrastructure projects.This supply of funds in the economy has stoked inflation to record levels.

Excessive inflation has reduced growth prospects for the nation, with the IMF suggesting that economic growth in the

oil-rich nation would be 5.7% in 2008-09 from 6.6% last year. Oil politics may take a backseat for Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, as it battles thehighest official inflation figures in Latin America.

http://www.economonitor.com/dolanecon/2013/06/14/venezuela-on-the-brink-of-hyperinflation/






FDI causes inflation and adverse economic effects –

Sukar et al 11 (Abdulhamid Sukar is a professor of economics at Cameron University. He received a

Ph.D. in economics from Texas Tech University, Cameron University Syed Ahmed, Cameron University

Seid Hassan, Murray State Universityhttp://www.cis.wtamu.edu/home/index.php/swer/article/viewFile/54/48

Despite some of the evidence presented in recent studies, there are several theoretical arguments why developing

countries may not gain from FDI. Krugman [21] argues that the transfer of control from domestic to foreign

firms may not always be beneficial to the host countries because of the adverse selection problem. FDI

undertaken within a crisis situation under “Fire Sale” may transfer ownership of firms from domestic

to foreign firms that are less efficient. This concern is particularly important to the developing countries

including the SSA countries, where, as part of privatization, state owned enterprises are sold to

foreign firms simply because foreign firms have more available funds than domestic ones. As pointed out

by Salz [29], Agosin and Mayer [2], FDI may also “crowd out” domestic firms through unfair competition. There is

also a concern that the enclave nature of many foreign owned firms and their minimal linkage to the

rest of the economy could reduce the potential spillover contribution to the national economy.Moreover, the potential subsequent outflow of foreign firms' subsidiary earnings to their parent companies could also cause

deterioration in the balance of payments. It is also argued that foreign corporations tend to produce

inappropriate goods that are tailored to satisfy the wealthy portion of the host country’s consumers,

thereby increasing inequality and engaging in transfer pricing. Empirical evidence on the link between FDI

and economic growth is also inconclusive. Bosworth and Collins [12], Blomstrom et al. [10], Borensztein et al. [11], Zhang [36],

DeMello [14], Balasubramanyam et al. [6], and Obwona [26] provide evidence on the positive effects of FDI on economic growth.



2NC Inflation Link

Capital inflows increase inflation

Rigobon 12 (Roberto Rigobon is the Society of Sloan Fellows Professor of Applied Economics at the Sloan School of Management, MIT, a research

associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, a member of the Shadow Committee for Financial Regulation in Latin A merica, and a visiting professor atIESA, Inflation: The Challenge for Latin America Investors,http://www.statestreet.com/wps/portal/internet/corporate/home/aboutstatestreet/newsmedia/newsarticles/newsarticledetail/!ut/p/c4/fY5Na8JAFEV_zayymJdPx-4saKm1ahVBsxleJi_JYDKRmanaf9_YuiillLu4Fw5cDs_5EINnXaPXvcGW73meyeVuA-IxnIBYPwE8vwiYpW-zGF5DfuD56AdfrcTAo-k2nO8igIzPeV63fTE8Hfih8f70wIDBgrAk65Z0cQx4fms5sV6rlpxco2_4nsFFda0uZHf0UhtP1pCXqh-W8QxU33W9YUDXG8E2MMNH4JCBc3X3NWCEQpUCEgwLkQgoooyKisponEaxitP_jKZXUu9en0newV9WrkFL5W-noLelNmg_gjsInPbEoNB9bfHUaPr2xCyFkRr0xpCl4xIxSaqK0iyGNClUGPEtGbnb8tNx054X1eQTUd7ngQ!!/, 9/2/12)

The main impact has been the generation of “reinforcing loops”. First, rapid recovery leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate. All things

being equal, this increases the real return of Latin American yields, which stimulates inflows that lead to further appreciation. The recovery

creates a positive feedback loop that moves through real appreciation and inflows. There is a second positive feedback loop

between inflation and the monetary policy response. High inflation usually leads to a tightening of

monetary policy, which results in higher interest rates. These high yields lead to capital inflows that

expand domestic demand, producing further inflation. There are two forces that can lower inflation: tight monetary policy

and an appreciation of the currency. But there are also two forces that can increase inflation: capital inflows and

demand recovery. Monetary tightening and currency appreciation typically work very slowly.Therefore, the forces of capital inflows and demand recovery tend to dominate . My belief is that some

investors see high inflation as an opportunity to seek short-term yields and that inflation does not

discourage capital flows.

http://www.statestreet.com/wps/portal/internet/corporate/home/aboutstatestreet/newsmedia/newsarticles/newsarticledetail/!ut/p/c4/fY5Na8JAFEV_zayymJdPx-4saKm1ahVBsxleJi_JYDKRmanaf9_YuiillLu4Fw5cDs_5EINnXaPXvcGW73meyeVuA-IxnIBYPwE8vwiYpW-zGF5DfuD56AdfrcTAo-k2nO8igIzPeV63fTE8Hfih8f70wIDBgrAk65Z0cQx4fms5sV6rlpxco2_4nsFFda0uZHf0UhtP1pCXqh-W8QxU33W9YUDXG8E2MMNH4JCBc3X3NWCEQpUCEgwLkQgoooyKisponEaxitP_jKZXUu9en0newV9WrkFL5W-noLelNmg_gjsInPbEoNB9bfHUaPr2xCyFkRr0xpCl4xIxSaqK0iyGNClUGPEtGbnb8tNx054X1eQTUd7ngQ!!/












2NC Inflation Impact

Now is key – inflation causes Venezuelan state collapse and instability – oil is keyCorales 3-7-13 (Javier Corrales, a professor of political science at Amherst College, is the author of U.S.-

Venezuela Relations since the 1990s: Coping with Midlevel Security Threats, “The House that Chavez Built”,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/07/the_house_that_chavez_built) The second, more negative, is inflation. In Venezuela, the inflation rate at the end of 2012 surpassed 25

percent, possibly the third-highest in the world (even loftier than that of Zimbabwe and Turkey, to mention just two of the worst inflation-offenders in recent memory).

This inflation rate is all the more unusual given the high levels of i mports, which tend to put downward pressure on prices. Venezuelan Disease involves more than just

fiscal profligacy. It also involves misguided responses to inflation. Populist governments tend to

make their worst mistakes in dealing with inflation. Governments today, unlike in the 1960s, have learned to worry about inflati on because it is one of the quickest

ways to expand poverty. Inflation acts as a form of consumption tax that falls heavily on low-income, salaried groups, lowering their purchasing power dramatically. Populist governments in particular panic about inflation precisely

because it hurts the very same group they want to court -- namely, low-income workers. But rather than cutting back on spending and introducing

productivity-boosting reforms (in order to increase the number of goods that currency units are chasing), populist governments respond toinflation by imposing microeconomic controls. They tend to favor three types. Foreign exchange controls try to l ower the demand for dollars by restricting access to them.

Retail price controls make raising prices illegal. And labor market controls, which aim to protect low-income salaried workers, can range from r aising the minimum wage to making it harder for employers to fire employees.

Venezuela under Chávez saw all three forms of controls. The problem is that these controls end up exacerbating the very same

problems they are meant to address. For instance, exchange rate controls accentuate rather than

alleviate the demand for dollars; those who hold increasingly undervalued bolívars, the Venezuelancurrency, become desperate to get rid of them. Price controls, in turn, precipitate a supply crisis. Producers facing price controls for their products, in a country with

galloping inflation, soon discover that their costs exceed their allowable retail prices. At this point, production is no longer profitable. Producers must either discontinue that product (which yields scarcity) or switch to importing(which stimulates the demand for dollars, offsetting the government's effort). And l abor controls produce more inflation and labor scarcity. By imposing an excessive increase in minimum wages, the government is actually increasing

rather than decreasing the inflationary pressures on the private sector. And by creating restrictions on fir ing labor, the government creates labor scarcity. This is a vital point . When workers cannot get fired

easily based on job performance, they begin to underperform. In Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, the government increasingly restricted the ability of the pri vate sector to fire workers. The latest labor code, for instance, makes it

virtually illegal to fire workers for missing work. Venezuela is unusual in that fir ms need permission from the state to fir e workers. Consequently, absenteeism in the workplace is booming. In February, El Nacional, a Caracas daily,

reported from various business chambers that absenteeism is on the rise, currently ranging from 5 to 46 percent depending on sector and firm. The key point is that the excessively

populist approach of relying on controls results in a microeconomic collapse. The entire economy,

whether public or private, experiences a productivity crisis. In the Venezuelan public sector, the

most embarrassing example is the oil industry, the government's most important source of cash . The

Venezuelan oil industry is in the midst of a schizophrenic episode. On the one hand, levels of proven

oil reserves and export prices are at historical highs. But productivity has plummeted . So dismal is

the oil sector's situation that Venezuela now needs to import gasoline , and has a hard time finding

creditors for its oil company (again, a remarkable thing for a petro-state). If oil, the regime's most

important milk cow, is in trouble, the rest of the less vital state-owned enterprise is approaching a

state of collapse . Ricardo Obuchi and colleagues at the Institute for Advanced Studies in

Administration (IESA) in Caracas have been tracking the performance of state-owned companies,with alarming reports. For instance, cement production, whose sector was nationalized in 2008, is producing scarcity levels of up to 70 percent. Ten states thus far have r eported severe electricity

blackouts this year. In the private sector, the most conspicuous sign of microeconomic ailments is consumer goods scarcity. This problem is so acute that the Central Bank even keeps tabs on the issue by publishing a scarcity index. InJanuary 2013, the index indicated the highest level of scarcity in four years, with "critical scarcity" in eight basic food products, such as sugar and sunflower oil, and "serious scarcity" in nine others. Declining productivity and rising

scarcity in consumer goods seem to have taken many chavistas by surprise. But they have nonetheless been quick to name a culprit: the pri vate sector. For them, this productivity slump is a sign that the pri vate sector is conspiring

against a popular government. This analysis prompts the government to become more belligerent toward the private sector, which in turn, leads to the worst effect of all: capital flight. According to Barclay's, Venezuela hasexperienced capital flight ranging from 15 to 40 percent of exports every year since 2004, also unusual for petro-states which are, if anything, trying to cope with capital inflows. Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's foreign minister underChávez's previous term and caretaker of the government during Chávez's last medical leave, has pursued a similar approach. In January he lambasted the private sector for the economic crisis, denouncing "the hate that they have for

the Venezuelan people." In the few months that Maduro has been in charge, he has increased price controls on 50 items, and threatened firms and "hoarders" with more audits, more sanctions, more jail terms, and more

nationalizations. A reader might ask: Given all these ailments, why doesn't the Venezuelan government ease up on populism rather than going for a "deepening" of the model, as Maduro has promised? Many factors account for the persistence of the status quo, but it is worth emphasizing both the economic and political factors sustaining the current policies. The economic factor is the combination of large oil export revenues, which provides the cash, and the prospects of occasional devaluations, which can expand the government's revenues. With each devaluation, the government has discovered that, when things get rough financially, there is always a chance of respite, with the stroke of

a pen. The government can simply decree a change in the value of th e bolívar, and fiscal problems ease for a while. For instance, Venezuela's latest devaluation of 31 percent in February (from 4.30 to 6.30 bolívars to a dollar) is likelyto give the government between 3 and 6 percent of GDP in bolívars that it didn't have before. The devaluation will increase inflation significantly, no doubt, but it will ease (though not solve) the state's financing needs, and this helps

the government stay its course -- even while deepening the economy's weaknesses and hurting the poor over the medium term.

Instability spills over to rest of the region

Shifter, 3 --- vice president for policy at the Inter-American Dialogue (7/16/2003, Michael, “Why

Venezuela Matters,” http://nationalinterest.org/article/why-venezuela-matters-2388?page=1)

http://nationalinterest.org/article/why-venezuela-matters-2388?page=1





For the United States, Venezuela is not just another Latin American country in turmoil. It is, after all, the fourth

largest oil supplier to the U nited S tates, accounting for 15 percent of its oil imports. Senior US officials point to

oil as the overriding interest in Venezuela. In the wake of US military action in Iraq, and the tremendous uncertainty in the Middle East, onewould think that Venezuela would acquire even greater urgency for the United States. Oil works both ways, however. Shrewdly, the Chavez

government allows the oil to flow precisely to avoid antagonizing foreign operations and, especially, the United States. Oil aside, there are

other key U.S. interests at play in Venezuela, though these are less widely recognized. Regional stability and

security top the list. The five countries that make up the Andean region of South America areparticularly convulsed. Continued chaos and escalating violence in Venezuela would not only inflict

damage on the country itself, but could well undermine the ability of neighboring countries to achieve

and maintain social peace. In this regard, Colombia deserves special mention. The United States has long sought to

bolster the Colombian government's efforts to extend state authority and control. Since 1999, Colombia has received some $2.5 billion insecurity aid from the United States, making it the largest beneficiary outside of the Middle East. Yet, there has been increasing violence on the

Colombia/Venezuela border involving Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary forces - and even Venezuela's armed forces. Should the

Venezuelan crisis become a military conflagration , the resulting instability would be detrimental to

longstanding US policy objectives. The conditions are combustible, and the risks are growing.

Latin America instability causes extinction

Manwaring 5 (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics atDickinson College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October

2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security

challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the

breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions

breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they

involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as

Bolivarianismo.More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping,

corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further

human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in

women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide,

ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfinedand spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls

violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the

Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be

steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American

socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational

objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in

terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary

attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to

govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility

limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its

government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and

the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not goaway. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization

on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue

states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies,

one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given

opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s

democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace,

and prosperity.65



Inflation low

Cadivi is working

EBRV 13 (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, President Maduro Guarantees Efficient

Currency Administration System, http://venezuela-us.org/2013/07/16/president-maduro-guarantees-efficient-currency-administration-system/, 7/16/13)

Nicolás Maduro, President of the Bolivarian Republic of Veneuzela, guaranteed that the Currency Administration

System (Cadivi, in Spanish), which is being supplemented by the Complementary Currency System (Sicad), will work as planned.

“In upcoming years, Cadivi will be perfected and we guarantee the economy will receive the necessary

[currency] flows, as well as the mechanism for [currency] control,” the President added during a meeting with state

governors in Miraflores Palace. He also noted that 95% of the foreign currency needed by the country, which is used

for the economy to function, “goes through Cadivi.” President Maduro asked every sector of the economy to work jointly

with the government for the Venezuelan economy to progress and to respond to the country’s well-being. “We will implement the

revolution’s economic policies to guarantee the social rights of the people,” he said. On July 11, the Central Bank

of Venezuela (BCV) auctioned $200 million through Sicad for citizens to obtain dollars. “We have been improving Cad ivi, regulating the

necessary currency flows for the economy, ridding different import mechanisms of corruption,” Maduro emphasized. He highlighted that Sicadhas created confidence and reiterated that the mechanism is used “to complement, and necessarily so, the importation system, and the correct

and optimal use of foreign currency in the country.” Venezuela has had currency controls in place since 2003. Cadivi

is the mechanism through which foreign currency is sold, whether to individuals or businesses. The

majority of Venezuela’s foreign currency comes from oil exports. Once Cadivi authorizes the sale of

foreign currency, the BCV completes the transaction.

Dollar auctions

Vyas 13 (KEJAL, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, Venezuela to Auction $200 Million of Dollars,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382850414760228.html, 3/25/13)

Venezuela will auction $200 million of dollars to private importers this week, the first test of a new

currency mechanism designed to pump more dollars into the country's financial system to prop up thenation's currency and alleviate widespread shortages of food and consumer goods. Venezuelan authorities disclosed the

creation of the dollar-distributing system last week as importers complained there aren't enough

dollars to do overseas business. The hard currency shortage in this oil-rich nation is among the top

economic challenges facing interim President Nicolás Maduro, who is running against opposition leader Henrique Capriles in April

14 elections to succeed the late Hugo Chávez.

Capital flight is increasing

Salmeron 12 (VÍCTOR SALMERÓN, reporter at EL UNIVERSAL, Venezuela's capital outflow climbs toUSD 33 billion in 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/120315/venezuelas-capital-outflow-climbs-to-usd-33-billion-in-2011, 3/15/12)

President Hugo Chávez said in May 2005 that foreign exchange control would not be a circumstantial policy,

but a permanent economic measure, because "the Venezuelan oligarchy takes them (US dollars) out

of the country to deposit them in banks worldwide." However, official data show that while exchange control policies are

in place, the private sector has substantially increased the amount of US dollars transferred abroad.

Economic research firm Ecoanalítica examined the Central Bank of Venezuela's balance of payments and prepared a

report claiming that "the private sector, which draws capital from the country as a means of

protecting their assets, transferred USD 18.91 billion" from Venezuela to foreign banks last year . How

can capital flight be skyrocketing amidst such stringent exchange controls?

http://venezuela-us.org/2013/07/16/president-maduro-guarantees-efficient-currency-administration-system/



http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/120315/venezuelas-capital-outflow-climbs-to-usd-33-billion-in-2011









Bond sales

Salmeron 12 (VÍCTOR SALMERÓN, reporter at EL UNIVERSAL, Venezuela's capital outflow climbs toUSD 33 billion in 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/120315/venezuelas-capital-outflow-climbs-to-usd-33-billion-in-2011, 3/15/12)

Paradoxically,the government is the main factor driving such a huge capital flight. In order to prevent

inflation from getting out of control and to get funds, Hugo Chávez's administration sells US dollar-

denominated bonds that are paid in Venezuelan bolivars by companies and individuals. Only in 2011, state-

run oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa) and the Ministry of Finance sold USD 10.2 billion in bonds to the

private sector through this financial mechanism.

Bolivar financing mechanisms

Salmeron 12 (VÍCTOR SALMERÓN, reporter at EL UNIVERSAL, Venezuela's capital outflow climbs toUSD 33 billion in 2011, http://www.eluniversal.com/economia/120315/venezuelas-capital-outflow-

climbs-to-usd-33-billion-in-2011, 3/15/12)

Concomitantly,government authorities have used the Transaction System for Foreign-Currency Denominated Securities

(Sitme), a system through which companies buy US dollar-denominated bonds with bolivars and then

resell them abroad to obtain US dollars. These bonds are issued by the Venezuelan State. In addition

to private capital outflow, the government holds deposits abroad, Ecoanalítica stressed. "Venezuela's public

sector took USD 14.17 billion out of the country, that is a 1,053.3% surge compared to the previous

year, when the amount was USD 1.23 billion," the report added.











Orinoco Belt Environment DA



1NC Shell

Venezuelan oil production decreasing –lack of foreign investment

Ladislaw and Verrastro 3-6-13 [Sarah O. Ladislaw, Co-Director and Senior Fellow, Energy and

National Security Program at CSIS (Center for Strategic International Studies), Senior Vice President andJames R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS, Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan OilProduction, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oil-production //Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

The winds of change are once again blowing in Venezuela. The recent announcement of Hugo Chavez’s passing

has opened up a host of questions about the future leadership of Venezuela and the potential impact

this leadership transition could have on Venezuelan oil production and global oil markets. Venezuela is

one of the largest oil and natural gas resource holders in the world. It is among the world’s largest oil producers

(13th) and exporters (10th) and has historically been one of the United States’ largest sources of oil imports (4th behind Canada, Saudi Arabiaand Mexico). Ever since the failed coup and the subsequent strike that brought about a short collapse in oil production in 2002, followed bynationalization of the oil sector, onlookers have been waiting for indications that the regime’s approach to energy production would either failonce and for all or that some political change would bring about reform and rejuvenation of the energy sector. A political transition in

Venezuela is now upon us but how it evolves could mean a lot for the energy sector and global energy markets.Despite its enormous oil resources, Venezuela's oil production (regardless of whose figures you use) has long

been in steady decline. In 2011 liquids production was 2.47 million barrels per day (mmbd) , down a million

barrels per day since 1999. Some of this is reflects the changing cost and economics of Venezuelan oil

production but field decline is significant and expertise and reinvestment are questionable and

looking harder to come by. The internal technical and managerial capabilities of state run oil and gas

company PDVSA have deteriorated since the 2002 strike and aftermath. Increasingly, PDVSA relies on contractors,

as well as other private company partners, to keep the fields in production but reports state that contractors have not been paid in months and

that the political uncertainty in the country has even driven routine decision making to a halt. The sustained political uncertainty

has also slowed investment; Russian and Indian companies were planning to invest in Venezuela's oil

fields but so far have withheld incremental new money. China has not announced a new line of credit

or extensions on its development-linked financing since last April. At the same time that production is

dropping, highly subsidized domestic consumption of oil is increasing while revenue from exports is

also declining. The United States remains the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil exports at 950,000 barrels per day in 2011, roughly 40

percent, plus another 185,000 barrels per day from the Caribbean that was Venezuelan sourced but those volumes area down as U.S. demandhas declined and other crudes have become available. Venezuela's next largest export destinations are the Caribbean (31 percent) and then

China (around 10 percent). Venezuela sells to many of its Caribbean neighbors at below market rates due to

extremely preferential financing relationships, including additional heavy subsidies for Cuban exports.

All of this culminates in an outlook for continued decline in oil production and a worsening economic outlook for

Venezuela during a politically difficult time.

Plan causes Oil Drilling in Venezuela

Nathaniel T. Edwards, 08 (double-major in International Affairs and Political Science, major in Japanese, student research intern in the Roosevelt

Institution and Center for International Trade and Security, faculty advisor – Dr. Christopher Allen, JURO, University of Georgia, “Increasing Trade Security: United

States-Venezuelan Trade Incentives,” http://juro.uga.edu/2008/2008papers/Edwards2008.pdf)

Economic globalization has both positive and negative effects on trade security. Globalization will erode funding sources for dissident

and terrorist organizations by creating international pressure on countries in areas such as export controls and transactional transparency, bolstering nationalsecurity.xxi Conversely, because terrorist organizations often depend on smugg ling or money laundering and private donations as their main funding sources,

globalization increases access to sources from which an organization might potentially acquire funds. Strengthening the economic ties

between Venezuela and the United States causes Venezuela to become more invested in preventing

terrorist attacks on either trading partner. Although terrorism may seem to thrive in a globalized economy, increased trade

creates strong incentives for each state to prevent attacks—leading to the enactment of security



measures that weaken rogue organizations. The United States also benefits from strong, stable trade

relations with Venezuela in the area of energy cooperation. Energy cooperation includes assistance in developing and

modernizing the technology to efficiently extract and utilize energy resources. Previous efforts to support modernization and bilateral investment, especiallythroughout the 1990s, have failed as technology and information exchanges have become less frequent with the deterioration of the political relationship between

the United States and Venezuela.xxii Stabilizing the Venezuelan economy and establishing a normalized trade

relationship would help to reverse declining energy cooperation. Bilateral energy cooperation translates

into a stable energy infrastructure for Venezuela and the United States. A historical example of a successful tradeexpansion occurred between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, illustrating the level of stability and security that trade can achieve. During the ColdWar, when diplomatic tensions were at their highest levels, trade between the two states neither promoted arms production nor detracted from each state’s

national security.xxiii Rather, as each state perceived itself to be threatened by the other, trade policy increased non-threatening trade and decreased threateningtrade of goods between them. The trade relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union provided an economic incentive to limit aggression and

promote cooperation as the states become increasingly economically interdependent. In fact, Gift suggests that increased trade encouraged

each state to comprehensively examine its trade deals and consequently, to increase its security by

dictating what entered and exited each state.xxiv The U.S.-Soviet analogy provides an important illustration of the potential security

benefits of tying the Venezuelan economy to that of the United States. In 2006, the United States and Russia si gned a bilateral trade agreement. The agreementdetails what measures the United States would require Russia to adopt before supporting its entry into the World Trade Organi zation (WTO) and serves as a modelfor a Russian draft of a Protocol of Accession. If Russia meets these requirements and joins the WTO, trade between the United States and Russia will be expandedgreatly. Therefore, Russia’s entry into the WTO would provide multiple economic and economic and security benefits for the Un ited States: expanded access to non-agricultural goods markets, new service markets (such as banking, securities, insurance, telecommunications, energy, and audio-visual services), transparent andpredictable tariff treatments for agricultural products, reduced non-tariff barriers, and improved Russian enforcement of intellectual property rights.xxv Existingbilateral trade between the United States and Russia has grown by 15 percent annually, valued at around $19 billion in 2005.xxvi Establishing far-reaching economic

relationships yields significant benefits. Venezuela is already a member of the World Trade Organization and is thus

primed for significant trade growth with the United States, as far as prerequisites for that trade . Trade

with Venezuela may not return as large financial returns as trade with Russia, simply because of less

capital and material trade available, but it would provide similar benefits to both the economy and

national security.

Venezuela is a biodiversity hotspot –threatened by oil production

Márquez 11 [Humberto Márquez, Biodiverse Venezuela Flunking Basic Conservation, Global Issues, June 13th

2011

http://www.globalissues.org/news/2011/06/13/10071 // Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

Threats to biodiversity, spreading pollution, degraded river basins and disappearing forests are

problems in oil-rich, megadiverse Venezuela, where climate change is knocking on the door. The ARA

network, a coalition of 20 environmental organisations, recently launched its report 'Aportes para un diagnóstico

de la problemática ambiental de Venezuela' (Contributions to a Diagnosis of Environmental Problems in Venezuela), which contains interviews with 34 experts and

calls attention to shortcomings in the state and society's management of seven environmental issues. The

assessment is in line with the results of an annual survey of more than 130 academics and professionals that has been carried out for the last decade by Vitalis, a

local environmental organisation. Alejandro Álvarez of Ecojuegos, a member organisation of the AR A network, told IPS: 'Poor management is

shown by the fact that in this country, where over 40 percent of the territory of 900,000 square

kilometres is protected, only one percent of the government budget is allocated to the Environment

Ministry.' Venezuela has 43 national parks, 30 natural monuments and eight wildlife reserves, he said. On May 26 Álvarez presented the ARA report, which

deals with areas where biodiversity is diminishing; pollution; solid waste management; the impact of oil extraction; water

resource management; protected area management; and global climate change. Diego Díaz, the head of Vitalis, told IPS that 'year after year the same problems

crop up, showing the lack of efficient management strategies and the accumulation of environmental

liabilities, such as forests that are lost, water sources that are degraded, soils that are notregenerated, materials that are not recycled, and increasing pollution.' The Environment Ministry recognises that

'environmental services like the supply of drinking water, production of hydroelectric energy, food and

pharmaceutical products, the tourism industry and protection against natural disasters' depend on

'adequate conservation' of biodiversity. Venezuela is ranked the ninth country in the world for

biodiversity, as it is home to 650 types of vegetation, 15,820 species of vascular plants, 27 climate

zones, 23 types of relief and over 137,000 animal species.



Amazon key to regulating regional and global climate- ocean currents

WWF no date [World Wildlife Fund, Why is the Amazon rainforest important?,http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/where_we_work/amazon/about_the_amazon/why_amazon_important/// Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

The vital links between the Amazon rainforest, global warming and you The Amazon rainforest has long

been recognized as a repository of ecological services not only for local tribes and communities, but

also for the rest of the world. It is also the only rainforest that we have left in terms of size and diversity.

But as forests burn and global warming worsens, the impact of Amazon deforestation continues to

gradually undo the fragile ecological processes that have been refined over millions of years. Ironically,

as rainforest continues to disappear, scientific work from the last two decades has shed light on the critical ties that link the health

of rainforests to the rest of the world. Filtering and reprocessing the world’s harmful carbon dioxide output Trees have

hidden attributes that play a key role in reducing pollutant levels. Take carbon dioxide (CO2) for example, a gas

emitted from both natural and human sources. Over the last 150 years, humans have been pumping massive amounts of

CO2 into the air by burning fossil fuels, coal, oil and natural gas - this is a major driver for global

climate change. Carbon dioxide in, oxygen out Under natural conditions, plants remove CO2 from the

atmosphere and absorb it for photosynthesis, an energy-creating process that yields: Oxygen, which is

released back into the air and…… Carbon, which allows the plant to grow. So, without tropical

rainforests the greenhouse effect would likely be even more pronounced, and climate change may

possibly get even worse in the future.1 Amazon rainforests and carbon dioxide What forests take from the air, they

can also give back. When forests burn, tree carbon matter is released in the form of CO2, which

pollutes the atmosphere, and of which there are already excessive quantities. Where rainforest and savanna

once stood, pastures for cattle-ranching are now appearing. Pastures teem with termites and cattle, whose metabolic activities also releaseCO2, although their contribution to atmospheric pollution is under much debate. With the forests gone, CO2 is no longer transformed throughphotosynthesis, and the crops that replace forests only absorb a fraction of CO2 compared to rainforests. Along with industrial pollution,

rampant deforestation in South America and elsewhere has significantly increased the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere.2 The

importance of the Amazon rainforest for local and global climate Tropical forests and woodlands (e.g. savannas)

exchange vast amounts of water and energy with the atmosphere and are thought to be important in controlling local and regional

climates3. Water released by plants into the atmosphere through evapotranspiration (evaporationand plant transpiration) and to the ocean by the rivers, influences world climate and the circulation of

ocean currents. This works as a feedback mechanism, as the process also sustains the regional climate

on which it depends.

ExtinctionO’Neal 97 (Martin, “Rain Forest Depletion,” 5-5,http://www.northern.wvnet.edu/~tdanford/bio1/RAINFO.htm)

There are some really amazing facts about the Amazon rain forest. The Amazon alone covers 54% of all the

world’s rain forests, thus making it literally the lungs of the Earth.We can say this because trees produce

oxygen while they use carbon dioxide to maintain their respiration. Rain forests cover about 7% of the Earth’s surface, but

host about 50-90% of the plant and animal population of the entire world. The Amazon River has more species

of fish than the entire Atlantic Ocean does. In less than 25 acres of rain forest there are more species of trees than the entirecontinent of North America. A tree found in Peru was found to be the host to 43 different species of ants. There are morespecies of birds on a Peru reserve than the entire United States has. A fact that is very highly regarded about the Amazon rainforest is that of the 3000 species of plants that have been discovered there, 70% of these plants have anti-cancerous properties.

Also, 25% of these plants are now used to combat cancer. So as humankind continues to harvest the Amazon rain forest

which covers 1.2 million acres and 9 countries, they should also try to consider the devastating effects that it is





2NC UniquenessVenezuela extra-heavy oil investment decreasing in the Orinoco Belt

Padgett 12 *Tom Padgett, Venezuela’s Refinery Explosion: Has Chávez Made Petroleum Too Political?,

8-28-12, http://world.time.com/2012/08/28/venezuelas-refinery-explosion-will-it-affect-hugo-chavezs-

re-election-chances/ // Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

But Chávez’s subsequent firing of 19,000 PDVSA employees, half the company’s workforce, was just as

rash – and sparked a slide in the industry’s productivity and infrastructural health. In those days, PDVSA

had been pumping 3.2 million barrels of crude each day; today it produces 2.7 million. (More than 40% of

that is exported to the U.S.; Venezuela represents about 10% of U.S. oil imports.) Meanwhile, PDVSA has become as much a social welfareagency as an oil firm, administering as well as funding tens of billions of dollars in anti-poverty programs as part of “our right to set

globalization’s terms in our people’s favor for once,” Ramírez once told me. Which, as I mentioned, is admirable – as long as you’re also

adequately attending to the business of oil production and refinement, which most analysts agree is a big problem at PDVSA. Venezuela,

where inflation is the world’s highest, needs especially heavy capital layouts to extract and process

the especially heavy crude in its southern Orinoco Belt. But PDVSA invests only 1% of its revenues – that is, when

investment projects aren’t on hold – while most large oil firms invest about 3%. At the same time, foreign investment has been

alienated if not outright expelled. Charges of corruption are mounting, as is PDVSA’s debt. Refining capacity hasdropped so sharply that Venezuela now imports gasoline; and because Chávez so lavishly subsidizes gas prices at home

(a gallon costs less than 15 cents) smugglers are trafficking it right back out of the country to snare big profits.

http://world.time.com/2012/08/28/venezuelas-refinery-explosion-will-it-affect-hugo-chavezs-re-election-chances/






2NC Venezuela Oil Unstable

Venezeualan oil refineries dangerous –PDVSA not investing in safeguards

Padgett 12 *Tom Padgett, Venezuela’s Refinery Explosion: Has Chávez Made Petroleum Too Political?,

8-28-12, http://world.time.com/2012/08/28/venezuelas-refinery-explosion-will-it-affect-hugo-chavezs-re-election-chances/ // Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

When I visited Venezuela’s Paraguaná oil refinery complex, the world’s second largest, in 2007, anxieties

seemed to flare like its burn-off pipes. Employees warned of the plant’s “precarious” state; a major

equipment upgrade was a year behind schedule and the refineries were operating well below

capacity. Paraguaná “isn’t living up to its original design,” one supervisor told me, because the state-run oil monopoly, Petróleos de

Venezuela (PDVSA) “doesn’t want to cover the costs.” Critics called the refineries, on Venezuela’s western Paraguaná

Peninsula, an example of how PDVSA was failing to make meaningful investments under Venezuela’s left-wing President

Hugo Chávez, even as he ladled more and more of the company’s revenues (which were $128 billion in 2011) into social projects. Paraguaná

was also a safety concern. A year before, three workers had been killed in accidents, part of a string of mishaps during the 2000s, many of themfatal.







2NC BioDiversity Internal Links

Increased oil extraction threatens Venezuela’s rainforests and biodiversityMongaBay no date [MongaBay, environmental news and information,

http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20venezuela.htm // Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

Venezuela, one of the ten most biodiverse countries on Earth, is home to extensive rainforests that

are increasingly threatened by development. Each year, roughly 287,600 hectares of forest are permanently destroyed, while

other areas are degraded by logging, mining, and oil extraction. Between 1990 and 2005, Venezuela officially lost 8.3 percent of its forest

cover, or around 4,313,000 hectares. Energy is Venezuela's most important export and President Hugo Chavez has used oil

as a political tool to extend his influence to other parts of Latin America. In 2006, Chavez announced

plans to build a massive gas pipeline that would carry natural gas from the oil-rich state 5,000 miles

south. Environmentalists fear that the project could damage the Amazon rainforest by polluting

waterways and creating roads that would attract developers and poor farmers. Analysts also question

the wisdom and viability of the plan, which may cost $20-50 billion depending on who makes the estimate. Venezuela also

continues to expand the construction of an electricity transmission line towards Brazil. When completed, the transmission line will carry power

from the massive Guri hydroelectric project—it in itself considered an ecological disaster for the amount of land it flooded in the early 1980s—through sensitive forest areas to Roraima state in Brazil. Environmentalists are concerned that the lines will give colonists and developersaccess to remote forest areas.

Oil extraction will result in deforestation and environmental devastation

MongaBay no date [MongaBay, environmental news and information,http://rainforests.mongabay.com/0806.htm // Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

The extraction of oil is responsible for the deforestation, degradation, and environmental devastation

of lands across the globe. The oil extraction process results in the release of toxic drilling by-products

into local rivers, while broken pipelines and leakage result in persistent oil spillage. In addition, the

construction of roads for accessing remote oil sites opens remote lands to colonists and land developers. Some of the world's most

promising oil and gas deposits lie deep in tropical rainforests, especially in the Western Amazon. With oilat historically high prices, the incentive to develop oil resources has never been greater. While hydrocarbons can be extracted at a relatively

low direct cost to tropical rainforests, governments and oil companies have traditionally opted for expediency

over consideration for the environment or the interests of local people most affected by production.

One of the most egregious examples of this comes from eastern Ecuador, where U.S. oil giant Texaco (owned by Chevron since 2001) laid wasteto an area of rainforest renowned for its wildlife. The firm's operations also affected the lives of thousands of indigenous people and settlers.

Oil extraction destroys aquatic biodiversity and harm indigenous people

MongaBay no date [MongaBay, environmental news and information,http://rainforests.mongabay.com/0806.htm // Accessed: August 3rd 2013]

The oil extraction process can be messy and destructive. Spills result from burst pipelines and toxic

drilling by-products may be dumped directly into local creeks and rivers. Some of the more toxicchemicals are stored in open waste pits and may pollute the surrounding lands and waterways. Oil spills

can wreak havoc on rivers and aquatic ecosystems, while clean-up efforts are complicated by the

complexity of tropical river systems, which may include floating meadows, swamp forest, oxbow

lakes, flooded forest, and sand bars. Indigenous and local people have historically failed to see many

benefits from oil extraction, but have borne many of the costs in the form of pollution and

displacement. Conflict may be exacerbated by the presence of security forces, either private or linked to the

military. Lacking what they consider fair compensation, local people may resort to sabotage of oil installations to collect oil-spill compensation.In fact the current chaos in the Niger river delta in Nigeria has roots in opposition to Shell's drilling operations.





PoliticsMore links are in the politics links file.



1NC Link

Venezuelan diplomatic engagement costs capitalBoudin 9 (Chesa, Rhodes Scholar with degrees from Yale and Oxford Universities. Currently attending

Yale Law School, he is coauthor of The Venezuelan Revolution: 100 Questions—100 Answers andcoeditor of Letters from Young Activists, Why Obama Should Meet With Hugo Chavez,http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/1671-why-obama-should-meet-with-hugo-chavez, 1/18/9)

Finally, there is a fourth point that should appeal to Chávez's harshest critics. A bilateral meeting

would be the most significant thing a US President could do to temper his power. Chávez , like hisfriend Fidel Castro before him, benefits from the specter of a hostile US. Rhetoric about US imperialismand interventionism appeals to Venezuelans' pride in their sovereignty, and unifies Chávez's baseagainst a perceived enemy; it also distracts them from real problems in their country and politicalprocess. The Bush Administration's disgraceful complicity with the plot to overthrow Chávez'sdemocratic government in 2002, and its subsequent funneling of money and political support to an

isolated, fragmented opposition in Venezuela played right into Chávez's hands. If Obama demonstratedthat the US government is not Venezuela's enemy, he would accomplish far more than the millions ofdollars the Bush Administration has invested in destabilizing Venezuela's government. Venezuela, like alldemocracies, benefits from free and open public debate but the political process is derailed, civil society

distracted by the threat—real or exaggerated—of US intervention. Obama has the political capital and

the credibility to singlehandedly restore the world's faith in the goodwill of the US; Venezuela is aperfect place to start. To be sure, an Obama offer to meet with Chávez, a twice-elected president

widely portrayed in the US as undemocratic and anti-American, carries certain risks and the right-wing

is bound to attack Obama for his efforts. But one of Obama's gifts as a politician is taking the high

road, even in the face of counterparts who refuse to do the same; here, too, whether with Chávez's

fiery rhetoric or the right-wing media's assault , he would surely come out on top. Moreover Chávezhas already indicated a desire to work with Obama, issuing a congratulatory press release after theelection, extraditing two Colombian drug traffickers to the US days later, and now continuing a generouscharity program even as Venezuela suffers from the global economic slowdown. All are signsreminiscent of the Chávez of Mets games and stock market gavels: he wants to play ball. Conservatives

may see Obama offering to meet with Chávez as a sign of weakness but it should be perceived as a

sign of confidence and strength just as when President Nixon visited China in 1972, or when PresidentReagan met with Gorbachev in 1985 in the midst of the Cold War. In fact, numerous Americanpoliticians from both parties have met with Chávez over the years, often with tangible results; the Citgocharity program that last week Chávez announced he would continue, for example, emerged frommeetings with Representative Delahunt (D-MA) and other congressmen.

http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/1671-why-obama-should-meet-with-hugo-chavez






1NR Links

Engagement stops isolation- kills support

Bernardo Álvarez Herrera, 12-07-2010, Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, degree in

political science from the Universidad Central de Venezuela, master’s degree in development studiesfrom the University of Sussex in England, “The Tea Party’s Vendetta,” http://venezuela-us.org/2010/12/08/the-tea-partys-vendetta/

But if certain members of Congress think they can drive a wedge among the countries of the region, they

are mistaken. Latin American countries have been expanding their ties with one another — including a recent rapprochement between Venezuela and Colombia — and there is a deepening consensus that their differences should be worked out in an atmosphere of mutual respect. (The inaugural co-chairs of the Community ofLatin American and Caribbean States, a regional organization set to be founded in 2011, are Chile and Venezuela, two countries that don’t see eye to eye on

everything, but are willing to cooperate.) For instance, even though the United States opposed Cuba’s entry to the Organization of American States, the group lastyear approved its readmittance. If Washington, instead of accepting this new reality, relies on antagonist ic foreign-policy dogma to placate local constituencies, itwill only lose in regional and global influence. Now is an especially inopportune time for the United States to alienate its southern neighbors. Latin Americancountries are gaining in confidence and increasing their political and economic connections with the rest of the world, both regionally through organizations likeUNASUR and bilaterally with countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. It’s not just Latin America that needs the United States anymore; increasingly,

the United States needs Latin America. Unfortunately, Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are hard-line ideologues. Given that she once called for

Fidel Castro’s assassination, it’s no surprise that Ros-Lehtinen is an anti-Cuba hawk. But she has in recent years also become more

aggressive toward Venezuela. This year, for example, she made unsubstantiated accusations against Venezuela for serving as a conduit between

the rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and al Qaeda. In a March 11 interview with the Council of the Americas, Gen. Douglas Fraser, chiefof U.S. Southern Command, debunked those claims in no uncertain terms: “I don’t see any evidence of terrorist activity within Latin America or the Caribbean from

outside of the region.” Even more disturbing was Ros -Lehtinen’s meeting with Venezuelan terrorist Raúl Díaz in Miami several months ago. Día z had just arrived inthe United States after escaping prison in Venezuela, where he was serving a sentence for participating in the 2003 bombings of the Spanish and Colombianconsulates in Caracas. It is troubling that Ros-Lehtinen would think it appropriate to use the powers of her office to extend legitimacy to a violent criminal simplybecause he opposes Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. (Venezuela has yet to receive any answers on how Díaz could have been granted a visa to enter the UnitedStates in the first place.) Ros-Lehtinen has also remained conspicuously quiet on Luis Posada Carriles, a Venezuelan-Cuban dual national wanted in Venezuela for the1973 bombing of a Cuban civilian airliner that left 73 innocent people dead. Posada snuck into the United States in 2005 after years of clandestine operations inCentral America and Cuba, many for the CIA. He now lives in South Florida awaiting the start of a postponed trial on immigrat ion-related charges. Venezuela’s

repeated requests for extradition have remained unanswered. But in terms of anti -Venezuelan enmity, Ros-Lehtinen is outdone by Mack, who, though newer to

the House, has quickly established himself as the Republicans’ go-to hard liner on Chávez. He has called Chávez a “sworn

enemy of the United States” and more recently called on Obama to deal with the “inherent threat that Chávez poses to our nat ion and the region.” More

shockingly, though, Mack has twice introduced resolutions to have Venezuela added to the U.S. State

Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, a move supported by Ros-Lehtinen. Just recently, I received letters from a number of

the 37 right-wing congressmen supporting Mack’s most recent attempt. Seeing as most have never shown any interest in Venezuela, it is clea r that extremistswithin the Republican caucus have made my country a political priority. If Venezuela does indeed end up on the terrorism list , it would amount to the imposition ofa Cuba-like embargo on the country. Commerce and oil would be disrupted, and even c ursory financial and economic transactions would be made prohibitivelyexpensive. It would also put the large U.S.-Venezuelan commercial relationship — the countries’ trade with one another from January through September of this

year totaled nearly $31 billion — in jeopardy. And it would serve as more evidence that some policymakers in Washington use the “terrorist” label as a cudgel

against their political foes. It should come as no surprise that a 2008 report prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Commi ttee adamantly warned againstmanipulating the terrorism list in that way, stating that “policymakers must be wary of the implications of poorly thought -out sanctions which might isolate the

United States.” Ros-Lehtinen and Mack are not alone in advocating for a Cold War-era stance toward Latin

America. In fact, they’re being educated and enabled by a chorus of similarly hard-line former Bush

administration officials. Chief among them are Otto Reich and Roger Noriega, both of whom served as assistant

secretaries of state for Western Hemisphere affairs under Bush. Reich has a long track record of using the battle over Cuba to deter mine U.S. policy toward theentire region, while Noriega honed his skills as a foreign-policy aide to late Sen. Jesse Helms (R -N.C.) and currently works at the right-wing American Enterprise

Institute. Most recently — on this very website — Noriega has been claiming that Venezuela is working with Iran on a

nuclear-weapons program, a claim so outlandish that the only prominent public figures who repeated it were John Bolton (another hard-line Bush

administration official) in an op-ed in the Los Angeles Times and Jackson Diehl, the deputy editor of the Washington Post‘s editorial pages and a crusader againstanything that has to do with Chávez. (Recently released cables from U.S. embassies in Latin America admit that these charges are “likely baseless,” as a Post article

put it.) In a recent op-ed, Noriega also called Chávez the “deadly kingpin of a criminal regime.” It might be easy to call Noriega and Reich out-of-touch

extremists, but their views now hold great er sway on Capitol Hill and at many Washington think tanks. For example, a Nov. 17 conference in

Washington, organized by the Interamerican Institute for Democracy and called “Danger in the Andes,” was a forum for outlandish views to be exchanged by

ostensibly serious policy analysts. The guests of honor at the conference? Ros-Lehtinen and Mack, of course. Now that the Republicans are no longer

marginalized in Congress, dogma threatens to totally trump the greater U.S. national interest. That

would be terrible for Americans, and their neighbors to the south. The remaining pragmatists in Washington should do

everything in their power to prevent it.



No support for the plan -- strain from post Iraq war

CSI, 2013 (The Center for American Progress and the Center for Strategic and I nternational Studies, “Democracy, Democratic Governance, and Transparent

Institutions in the American Interest” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/progressive-movement/report/2013/01/18/50085/democracy-democratic-governance-and-transparent-institutions-in-the-american-interest/ 1/18)

A freer and more democratic world helps create a virtuous circle of improved security, stronger economic growth, and durable alliances—all of which better servethe long-term interests of the United States. Accountable, effective, and democratic governments make better and more reliable trading partners and provide the

cornerstones of international stability. Given their modest scale and numerous benefits, America’s official investments in

promoting democracy and governance abroad deserve to be sustained even as we deal with very real budget challenges in this current era of

fiscal austerity. Because of their benefits to and strong reflection of America’s longest-standing values, international democracy and governance programs have

historically enjoyed bipartisan support. In the past decade, however, this support has undergone strain in

the wake of the war in Iraq. Given the recent democratic openings in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, however, we are again reminded

of the value of people-driven programs to assist civil society and accountable governance. Assistance from the United States and others in the internationalcommunity is an important tool in helping countries to achieve their own aspirations for more representative governance.

Maduro is seen as a Castro puppet- sparks backlash

Sullivan 4-9 (Mark P. Sullivan - Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implicationsfor Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, April 9th, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf)

Some observers have criticized the Obama Administration for making overtures to engage with Maduro,

contending that U.S. policy should focus on attempting to ensure that the upcoming election is free and fair. A Washington Post editorial from early March 2013 contended that “ further

wooing of Mr. Maduro should wait until he survives the scrum in his own party, wins a free vote and

demonstrates that he is more than a Castro puppet .”19 While it is likely that any improvement in relations will

remain on hold during the election process, some analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakers to remember that taking sides in Venezuela’s

internal politics can be counter-productive. According to Cynthia Arnson of the Woodrow Wilson Center: “Supporting broad principles such as internal dialogue to overcome polarization for

the rule of law is not the same as promoting a particular political outcome, an approach that is destined to only backfire.”20 Other analysts maintain that it is important for U.S. policymakersto recognize the level of popular support in Venezuela for President Chávez. While there was considerable controversy over past elections in which Chávez’s campaign unfairly utilized state

resources and broadcast media, the margins of his electoral v ictories in four elections over the years left no doubt that he had won tho se elections. His death, at least in the short to medium

term, could deepen popular support for the PSUV. I n the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan

relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on

anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters. With Chávez’s death and an upcoming

presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of

human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the

extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.

Congress opposes aid to Venezuela – seen as supporting Chavez’s governemnt

PolitiFact 11 (“The U.S. gives foreign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our

enemies”, February 9th, 2011, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-venezuela-cuba/)

In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require

separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid that we send to countriesthroughout the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attention in conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, … and we give

foreign aid to over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where many Americans might be uncomfortable sending

taxpayer money, including Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and China. But two of the nation’s in Poe’s speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and Cuba. Critics of Venezuela’s

leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed

rankings, the group Freedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as

"partly free," while Cuba sits at the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with the United States. So Poe suggested these as

two examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf

http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-venezuela-cuba/








Venezuela? He hates the United States. He defies our president, makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20

million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off -limits. It’s a communist country. But we’re dumping money over there." We looked at budgetdocuments for foreign aid and talked to experts in the field, and here’s what we found. Poe is correct that U.S. foreign aid flows into both countries. In fiscal y ear 2010, the Ve nezuela accountshowed $6 million, while the Cuba account showed $20 million. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has requested a little less for V enezuela -- $5 million -- and the same $20 millionamount for Cuba. To give a sense of context, the 2010 funds allocated for Venezuela am ounted to less than 1/100th of 1 percent of the total U.S. foreign-aid budget, and the figure for Cubawas about 4/100 of 1 percent of the U.S. foreign aid budget. The percentage of the entire federal budget is even more minuscule. Still, even i f the amount is small, taxpayer money is taxpayermoney, so Poe has a point. However, Poe also said in plain language that "we give money to Chavez." And while he didn’t say i t in as explicit a fashion, Poe implied that the U.S. sends aid to theCuban regime. This is where it gets more complicated. The funding for both nations comes from the Economic Support Fund, which, according to the State Department, "supports U.S. foreignpolicy objectives by providing economic assistance to allies and countries in transition to democracy. Programs funded through this account promote stability and U.S. security interests instrategic regions of the world." Let’s take Cuba first. A spokesman for the U.S. Agency for International Development confirmed that no U.S. aid g oes to the Cuban government. In an

explanation of its proposed budget, the administration writes that "Cuba is the only non-democratically elected government in the Western Hemisphere and one of the most politicallyrepressed countries in the world. In view of these challenges, U.S. assistance for Cuba aims to empower Cuban civil society to advocate for greater democratic freedoms and respect for humandignity." The $20 million designated for Cuba "focuses on strengthening independent Cuban civil society organizations, including associations and labor groups. … To advance the cause of

human rights in Cuba, U.S. assistance provides humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their families … The United States supports nascent pro-democracy groups, the use oftechnology, and new information-sharing opportunities." A 2006 review by the Government Accountability Office noted that the aid is such a threat to the regi me that it has to be kept undertight wraps on the island. "Given the Cuban government’s repressive policies and opposition to U.S. democracy assistance, grantees employed a range of discreet delivery methods," GAOreported. In other words, the money being sent to Cuba is designed to foster democracy in what is currently an undemocratic country -- not to support the government. Poe’s failure to note

that distinction as he attacks aid to "Cuba" strikes us as misleading. Now let’s look at Venezuela. In its $5 million budget request for 2012, the

administration said it wants to "strengthen and support a Venezuelan civil society that will protect Democratic space

and seek to serve the interests and needs of the Venezuelan people. Funding will enhance citizens’ access to objective information, facilitate peaceful debate on key issues, provide support todemocratic institutions and processes, promote citizen participation and encourage democratic leadership." Another administration document says aid helps "strengthen the capacity of non-governmental organizations to monitor and report on government performance" -- in other w ords, to be a watchdog of the government, not a supporter. The U.S. AID spokesman confirmedthat no money goes to the Venezuelan government. So far, this sounds a lot like the situation with aid to Cuba. But there’s a difference. The same administration document goes on to say thatthis civil-society funding "will involve both government and opposition supporters and will be open to all regardless of political perspectives," providing some support for Poe’s statement. Still,

most observers see the State Department’s openness to funding representatives of Chavez’s government as more of a diplomatic nicety, since foreign efforts to bolster democracy in a countrywith democratic shortcomings are typically framed with great rhetorical care. I ndeed, there are strong signals that Chavez himself has no use for U.S. funding. A 2010 study by FRIDE and theWorld Movement for Democracy, a pair of non-governmental organizations, noted that members of a local group called Súmate who had received U.S. aid for a project on electoral observance"were accused of conspiracy and betrayal. The trial against them, which was initiated in 2003, is still pending." In a 2006 a rticle based on Freedom of Information Act requests, the AssociatedPress reported that Chavez accused his opponents of taking "gringo money" to undermine his regime. So, while it’s possible that some U.S. aid has flowed to allies of Chavez, the bulk of U.S.

aid goes to independent groups whose existence is more likely to undermine his authority than strengthen it. Where does this leave us? The one clai m for which Poe may have a point is that

some U.S. aid could make its way to supporters of Chavez (though not the government per se), given how the U.S. wrote the ground rules.

However, Chavez has made his opposition to U.S. aid clear, and has ev en gone so far as to prosecute some opponents who have taken it. Meanwhile, the a id sent to Cuba is certainly not goinginto the government’s coffers, and it, like the Venezuela aid, is considered far likelier to undercut the government than support it.

Strong opposition to Venezuelan trade – Congress demands embargo

Mares 12 (David R. Mares - Institute of the Americas Chair for InterAmerican Affairs, University of

California, San Diego, “The United States-Venezuela Relationship”, January 19-20, 2012)

The current political relationship decreases bilateral trade because Chávez seeks to build counter-

balancing relations with US rivals and only has oil to attract them. The relationship with China in

particular is important because the Chinese are also willing to provide tens of billions of dollars in creditto the Chávez government to spend as it sees fit, with Venezuelan oil in payment. In addition, Chávezdiverts a small quantity of oil to subsidized sales to the Caribbean and Central America to gain allies.These diversions for political reasons result in a lower quantity available for market driven purchases, asare those of the US. The US Congress does have a small group of anti-Chavista legislators who demand

that the US embargo Venezuelan oil, and emphasize the undemocratic nature of the Chávezgovernment and its Chinese, Russian and Iranian ties as threats to US national securit y. A few thinktanks (e.g., the Inter-American Security Watch) and interest groups are promoting these views. But sofar they do not have a large following in the Legislative and the Executive branches, where a lowerprofile in opposing Chávez is perceived to be more effective, or at least less damaging to overall USinterests.

Ted Poe hates foreign aid to VenezuelaPolitifact 11 (Pulitzer Price website which analyzes political statements and situations, The U.S. givesforeign aid to Cuba and Venezuela, even though those countries are our enemies., 2/9/11,http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/mar/23/ted-poe/ted-poe-decries-us-aid-venezuela-cuba/)



In a House floor speech on Feb. 9, 2011, Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, took aim at American aid to foreign

countries. Poe has introduced a bill to require separate votes on aiding specific countries, thus ending

the practice of bundling foreign aid into a single bill. "Maybe it’s time to reconsider our foreign aid that

we send to countries throughout the world," Poe said in the floor speech, which has attracted attentionin conservative circles on the Internet. "There are about 192 foreign countries in the world, … and we

give foreign aid to over 150 of them." Poe proceeded to name some examples of countries where

many Americans might be uncomfortable sending taxpayer money, including Egypt, Pakistan, Russiaand China. But two of the nation’s in Poe’s speech caught our eye -- Venezuela and Cuba. Critics ofVenezuela’s leader, Hugo Chavez, call him a dictator. Meanwhile, Cuba has been a communist country

for decades, led by Fidel Castro and now his brother Raul. In its widely followed rankings, the groupFreedom House rates Venezuela toward the bottom of the nations it classifies as "partly free," whileCuba sits at the lower end of its "not free" scale. And both nations have strained relations with theUnited States. So Poe suggested these as two examples of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign aid. "We give

money to Venezuela. Why do we give money to Chavez and Venezuela? He hates the United States. Hedefies our president, makes fun of our nation. We don’t need to give him any foreign aid. We give $20

million to Cuba. Why do we give money to Cuba? Americans can’t even go to Cuba. It’s off -limits. It’s a

communist country. But we’re dumping money over there."

Poe is key to getting other Republicans to sign onto immigration reformLlorente 4/11 (Elizabeth, Senior GOP Congressman Ted Poe, Once An Immigration Hardliner, SoftensStance, 4/11/13, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/11/senior-gop-congressman-ted-poe-once-immigration-hardliner-softens-stance/)

A leading conservative Republican in Congress who held hard-line views on immigration, including ardent

opposition to legalizing undocumented immigrants, now supports measures that would include a path to legal status. U.S.

Rep. Ted Poe, who is vice chairman of the House immigration subcommittee, said that like many of his conservative

colleagues, he used to be loath to even discuss other aspects of immigration reform until the border was absolutely secure. B ut that, said Poe in an interview with

Fox News Latino, is both unrealistic and counterproductive. “I’ve changed,” said Poe, who was first elected to Congress in 2004. “I used to think we had to do bordersecurity before we ever talk about other immigration issues. But we have to do them in tandem, because *otherwise+ we’ll never get to those other issues. The

border is really not secure because of the drug cartels.” Now, Poe not only will discuss other immigration issues, but is going head-on against

many of his fellow conservatives in his decision to support a path to legal status for the more than 11 million

undocumented immigrants in the country. Poe’s softened stance is becoming more common among Republicans,

notably among those who once were hawkish on immigration. Many of them point to the role that immigration – specifically

the sometimes hard-line tone that underpinned discussions of the issue by Republicans – played in the bruising defeat of Republicans presidential candidate MittRomney in the 2012 election. Latinos turned out to vote at a record rate, 10 percent, with 71 percent of them choosing President Obama and 27 percent vot ing forRomney. Latino population growth also upended many congressional districts – including Poe’s. His district was about 10 percent Latino, but redistricting after the2010 Census swelled his Latino constituency to 41 percent. Poe, 64, maintains that his change of heart regarding some emotion ally charged immigration issuescomes from a realization that his former views are not in sync with reality or truly fixing the broken system. And, he said, he’s not advocating rewarding illegal

behavior. “They’re not leaving,” Poe said of the millions of undocumented immigrants. “They’re not going to go back to their countries, and what purpose would itserve for them to leave?” “It’s not automatic pathway to citizenship,” Poe said. “I don’t think that’s right, I agree that we shouldn’t reward people for being here

illegally. But if you’re in the country without permission, you should register, we have to know who’s in the country. Then you would have legal status for a period of

time, and you can stay here and work here during that time.” He envisions a system of “tiered sanctions,” depending on the ci rcumstances of a person’s illegal

presence, and if they meet a strict set of criteria, such as staying out of trouble with the law and paying taxes, among other things. He also supports givingundocumented immigrants brought to the United States as minors an opportunity to apply for legal status. “The kids that are here and getting older, who are herethrough no fault of their own, we have to make sure they have the opportunity to get legal status,” Poe said. He added, howev er, that he did not agree withObama’s decision last year to suspend deportation for such immigrants for two years, and allow them to obtain work permits. “The president basically waved the

big wand and violated the constitution,” he said. “It is the responsibility of Congress to deal with immigration.” Poe said that he knows many of his fellowconservatives, as well as some more moderate Republicans, see a pathway to legal status as “amnesty.” That, he said, is a misperception. Noting that he served for22 years as a criminal court judge in Houston before serving in Congress, Poe said: “I know what amnesty means.” “Amnesty is when there is no punishment or

sanction for certain conduct,” he said. “There are sanctions if you’re here and want legal status, whether it’s temporary or permanent and you want to getcitizenship.” Those who support a hard line on immigration are watching the conversions on immigration in the Republican Party with concern. Many have criticize dU.S. Sen. Marco Rubio, a Florida Republican, for instance, for supporting a pathway to legalization, though the junior senato r stresses that he is not compromisingon border security. “They say they’re having a change of heart,” said Bob Dane, spokesman for the Federation for American Immigration Reform, or FAIR, one of thenation’s leading groups advocating for strict immigration policies. “But Washington is turning a deaf ear to the millions of Americans who are scratching their heads

saying ‘What’s in *immigration reform+ for me?’” “The amnesty b ill is splitting the Republican party right down the middle.” Poe believes that



Congress will pass an immigration reform bill this year. He has misgivings about the Senate approach to dealing with a massive

immigration bill, and thinks a better way is to have several smaller measures addressing different aspects. He expects the House to deal with

the matter in smaller, separate bills. “When you have one big massive bill, it’s a lot easier to vote against it,” he said. The road to a bill will be

hard, Poe said. “The debates in the party are pretty strong,” he said. “We have major differences in the conservative group.” But Poe, known for not mincing

words, vowed to keep trying to persuade his conservative colleagues.

Poe is key to unityHouse.gov 13 (POE NAMED CHAIRMAN OF IMMIGRATION REFORM CAUCUS; HOLDS KICKOFF MEETING,http://poe.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8963)

WASHINGTON, D.C. — This week, Congressman Ted Poe (TX-02), the new Chairman of the Immigration

Reform Caucus (IRC), held the IRC Executive Committee’s first meeting of the 113th Congress withReps. Diane Black (TN-6), Bill Flores (TX-17), Phil Gingrey (GA-11), and Lamar Smith (TX-21). In themeeting, the Executive Committee agreed that the IRC’s role this Congress will be to serve as an active

forum to facilitate Member discussion, education and debate on immigration reform and border

protection legislation. “Our immigration system has been broken for decades,” said Poe. “Now is the

time for Congress to take the lead and work together to craft a permanent solution. Politics must not

continue to trump people. The IRC will serve as a vehicle to bring people together to discuss whatimmigration reform should look like and how it can be accomplished.”

http://poe.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8963

http://poe.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8963



Jrs Links --- Compiled for Convenience

House Republicans support current efforts to push Venezuela out of oil markets – the

plan reverses this trend.

Robert Campbell, 3-07-2013, a Reuters Oil Market Analyst and Columnist, education @ McMasterUniversity and McGill University, “COLUMN-Shale, Iran sanctions push Venezuelan oil to Asia: Campbell,” http://en-

maktoob.news.yahoo.com/column-shale-iran-sanctions-push-venezuelan-oil-asia-152812475.html

Texas wildcatters and Iran hawks in the U.S. Congress are helping Venezuela get out of the U.S. oil

market, one of the most cherished dreams of its late President Hugo Chavez. While there is a certain irony to the fact that these two

groups of people, most of whom it is safe to say are not friendly to Chavez's left-wing ideals, it underscores the

true nature of the shifts in the U.S. oil market due to the shale revolution. Ignoring the impact of an anti-

government strike that shut down the Venezuelan oil industry in early 2003, U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude fell to a more

than 20-year low in February as American refineries only bought the heaviest, most difficult to process Venezuelan oil, forgoing lighter

grades. A superabundance of light and very light crude oil has forced the complex refineries of the U.S. Gulf Coast to scour the globe for heavycrude to keep their cokers running. Thus imports of heavy Kuwaiti oil have risen sharply even as armchair policy theorists predict

"energy independence" will end U.S. purchases of Middle Eastern crude.

NEG – Investment in Venezuelan oil is unpopular in Congress – GOP mistrust.

Jose de Córdoba1 and Sara Muñoz2, 1-11-2013, Latin American Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst,Massachusetts, School of Journalism @ Columbia University, NY, reporter at the Wall Street Journal1,reporter at the Wall Street Journal, no I refuse to make a Linkedin account to find this person’s quals,

sorry2, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html

Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to

forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential

successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro'spragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing toopen diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open

up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-

trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't

going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With

Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more

willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of

the oil sector. Another stumbling block to improved relations could be U.S. allegations of high-level

involvement by the Chávez government in drug trafficking. The U.S. has put seven top current and former Venezuelan officials on a

Treasury blacklist for their alleged drug and arms dealing links to Colombian guerrillas based in Venezuela. Those links were exposed in2008 after the Colombian military captured computers used by a guerrilla leader killed on a cross

border raid in Ecuador.

NEG – Republicans don’t like the plan – they see Venezuela as a security threat.



Dane Bryant, 9-28-2012, management consultant and freelance writer with an interest in geopoliticalstrategy, writer for World Politics Review, “Chávez or Not, It's Time to Rethink the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship,”

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12380/chavez-or-not-its-time-to-rethink-the-u-s-venezuela-relationship

Nonetheless, the White House has remained consistent when it comes to Venezuela, stating publicly that it

does not consider Chávez’s regime a threat to vital U.S. national security interests and identifying bilateral

cooperation on issues of mutual interest as the goal of current policy. The Republican establishment has identified

the lack of engagement with Latin America as a weak spot in Obama’s foreign policy record, in particular criticizing the

president for allowing Chávez, an outspoken opponent of American interests, to strengthen his foothold in the region at the expense of the

United States. Conservative think tanks repeatedly point to Chávez’s anti-American worldview, Venezuela’s

alliances with Iran, Syria and Cuba, and the provision of safe havens for documented terrorist

organizations, such as Colombia’s FARC guerrillas, as examples of the grave security risks associated with the status

quo. There is some merit to both sides’ views. The Obama administration’s stated policy of working with Venezuela on

pragmatic issues, such as counternarcotics and trade, has been viable in the short term. But GOP leaders are right

to note that deeper involvement is needed to address the legitimate security risks and democratic

challenges posed by the current government’s policies. In fact, it will take an approach based on elements of both thesearguments to bolster U.S. influence in South America’s largest oil-producing country.

NEG – The plan attracts backlash from both Democrats and Republicans – Congress

empirically pushes for isolation of Venezuelan oil, not engagement.

Eva Golinger, 7-04-2011, writer for Geopolitical Weekly, “ANALYSIS: US to Act Against Venezuela?”

http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/analysis-us-to-act-against-venezuela-4405/

The US government has been increasing aggressive actions against the Chavez administration in an attempt to

isolate the major petroleum producing nation and aid in ousting the Venezuelan President. During a hearing last Friday,

June 24, in the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives regarding “Sanctionable Activities in Venezuela”, democrats

and republicans requested the Obama administration take more aggressive actions against the government of Hugo

Chavez. The head of the Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs for the Western Hemisphere, Connie Mack, a Florida Republican, branded

the Venezuelan government “ terrorist ”, saying “it’s time to act to contain the dangerous influence of

Hugo Chavez and his relations with Iran”. Mack is known for his rabid anti-Chavez stance. But however “obsessed” he may seem

with the Venezuelan President, the republican congressman does have influence in the legislature due to his high

ranking in the Foreign Relations Committee. His efforts, along with those of the head of the Foreign Relations Committee,

Florida republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, convinced the White House to impose sanctions against

Venezuela’s state oil company, P etroleos d e V enezuela SA (PDVSA) last May 24. Mack has said that his only objective this

year is “get Hugo Chavez”.

NEG – Congress hates Venezuela – Snowden scandal.

Aglaia Berlutti, 7-09-2013, witch by birth (no srsly doe), writer for the website Spanish Global Voices,

“Venezuela's President Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden,” http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/07/09/venezuelas-president-offers-asylum-to-edward-snowden-and-controversy-erupts/



The president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, offered humanitarian asylum to Edward Snowden, former contractor at the U.S.

National Security Agency (NSA) who leaked classified information about mass surveillance programs in the

U nited S tates and the Great Britain. Snowden, charged with espionage and property theft by the United States government, is currently on

Russian territory, where he is attempting to avoid extradition to American soil. Maduro's offer comes at a complicated

diplomatic moment: UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) demanded an apology from Europe due to the incident suffered by

Evo Morales, during which various countries closed their airspace to the Bolivian leader based on suspicions that he was transporting Snowden.In events leading up to the military parade that celebrated 202 years since the signing of the Venezuelan declaration of independence onFriday, July 5, President Maduro stated *es+ that, “As leader of the State and Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, I have

decided to offer humanitarian asylum to the American young man, Snowden.” Maduro explained that Venezuela is offering the

measure to Snowden to “protect him from the persecution that has been unleashed from the most

powerful empire in the world against a young man who has told the truth”. A day later, the Venezuelan

president confirmed his intention via Twitter (@NicolasMaduro) [es]: @NicolasMaduro: Ratifico el espíritu humanitario de conceder el asilo al joven estadounidense Snowden para protegerlo de la persecución mundial del imperio. @NicolasMaduro: I confirm the humanitarian spirit ofgranting asylum to Snowden, the young American, to protect him from the empire's global persecution. President Maduro had mentioned thepossibility of welcoming Snowden on various occasions, but this is the first time he has done it openly and directly. Despite the controversy, theUnited States government declined to make comments regarding the Venezuelan president's offer. According to Reuters [es], the White house

has not released an opinion on the issue and referred questions to the country's Department of Justice. Nevertheless, on Sunday, July 7, a

group of U.S. Congress members established their position on Snowden's possible political asylum,

stating that: “Whatever country offers asylum to Edward Snowden, who leaked data from the National Security

Agency's (NSA) surveillance program, will set itself against the U nited S tates.” The announcement [es] appears to be a

direct response to statements made by Venezuela and Bolivia to grant the humanitarian measure to the

former U.S. contractor.



Secretary of State doesn't shield

Obama gets blamed for Secretary of State affairs –

Pecquet 04/23/13 (Julian Pecquet, Foreign affairs reporter, The Hill/Global Affairs, "GOP BENGHAZIreport blames Clinton", http://www.politicalnewsnow.com/2013/04/23/gop-benghazi-report-blames-clinton-the-hills-global-affairs-2/)

“Evidence rebuts Administration claims that the talking points were modified to protect classifiedinformation or to protect an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Email exchangesduring the interagency process do not reveal any concern with protecting classified information.Additionally, the Bureau itself approved a version of the talking points with significantly moreinformation about the attacks and previous threats than the version that the State Departmentrequested. Thus, the claim that the State Department’s edits were made solely to protect that

investigation is not credible.” President Obama also comes in for some criticism. “The President, as

Commander-in-Chief, failed to proactively anticipate the significance of September 11 and provide theDepartment of Defense with the authority to launch offensive operations beyond self-defense. DefenseDepartment assets were correctly positioned for the general threat across the region, but the assetswere not authorized at an alert posture to launch offensive.” The report also takes the administration

to task for failing to bring anyone to justice more than seven months after the attack. “The failure to

respond more assertively to the attacks and to impose meaningful consequences on those who

planned and perpetrated them has contributed to a perception of U.S. weakness and retreat,” the

report concludes.

Obama is Velcro – all agency action sticks to himPeter Nicholas and Janet Hook, 7-30-2010, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times,

http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro. Through two terms,

Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than twoyears, Obama has become ensnared in blame. Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have

sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are alsocrafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public. But Obama remains the

colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fixGreece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired asa result of a misleading fragment of videotape What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record

that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a

financial regulatory bill have been fleeting. Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a moreimmediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll onObama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% whodisapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll. "I think the accomplishments are verysignificant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " saidSen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, butit hasn't translated into dinner table conversations." Reagan was able to glide past controversies with his

popularity largely intact. He maintained his affable persona as a small-government advocate whileseeming above the fray in his own administration. Reagan was untarnished by such calamities as the

http://www.politicalnewsnow.com/2013/04/23/gop-benghazi-report-blames-clinton-the-hills-global-affairs-2/






1983 terrorist bombing of the Marines stationed in Beirut and scandals involving members of hisadministration. In the 1986 Iran-Contra affair, most of the blame fell on lieutenants. Obama lately has

tried to rip off the Velcro veneer. In a revealing moment during the oil spill crisis, he remindedAmericans that his powers aren't "limitless." He told residents in Grand Isle, La., that he is a flesh-and-blood president, not a comic-book superhero able to dive to the bottom of the sea and plug thehole."I can't suck it up with a straw," he said. But as a candidate in 2008, he set sky-high expectationsabout what he could achieve and what government could accomplish. Clinching the Democraticnomination two years ago, Obama described the moment as an epic breakthrough when "we beganto provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless" and "when the rise of the oceans began toslow and our planet began to heal." Those towering goals remain a long way off. And most peoplewould have preferred to see Obama focus more narrowly on the "good jobs" part of the promise. Arecent Gallup poll showed that 53% of the population rated unemployment and the economy as thenation's most important problem. By contrast, only 7% cited healthcare — a single-minded focus ofthe White House for a full year. At every turn, Obama makes the argument that he has improvedlives in concrete ways. Without the steps he took, he says, the economy would be in worse shapeand more people would be out of work. There's evidence to support that. Two economists, MarkZandi and Alan Blinder, reported recently that without the stimulus and other measures, gross

domestic product would be about 6.5% lower. Yet, Americans aren't apt to cheer when somethingbad doesn't materialize. Unemployment has been rising — from 7.7% when Obama took office, to9.5%. Last month, more than 2 million homes in the U.S. were in various stages of foreclosure — upfrom 1.7 million when Obama was sworn in. "Folks just aren't in a mood to hand out gold stars whenunemployment is hovering around 10%," said Paul Begala, a Democratic pundit.Insulating the president from bad news has proved impossible. Other White Houses have tried doing so with

more success. Reagan's Cabinet officials often took the blame, shielding the boss. But the Obama

administration is about one man. Obama is the White House's chief spokesman, policy pitchman, fundraiser

and negotiator. No Cabinet secretary has emerged as an adequate surrogate . Treasury Secretary TimothyF. Geithner is seen as a tepid public speaker; Energy Secretary Steven Chu is prone to long, wonkydigressions and has rarely gone before the cameras during an oil spill crisis that he is working to end.

So, more falls to Obama, reinforcing the Velcro effect: Everything sticks to him. He has opined on virtuallyeverything in the hundreds of public statements he has made: nuclear arms treaties, basketball starLeBron James' career plans; Chelsea Clinton's wedding. Few audiences are off-limits. On Wednesday,he taped a spot on ABC's "The View," drawing a rebuke from Democratic Pennsylvania Gov. EdwardG. Rendell, who deemed the appearance unworthy of the presidency during tough times."Stylistically he creates some of those problems," Eddie Mahe, a Republican political strategist, said inan interview. "His favorite pronoun is 'I.' When you position yourself as being all things to all people,the ultimate controller and decision maker with the capacity to fix anything, you set yourself up to beblamed when it doesn't get fixed or things happen." A new White House strategy is to forgo talk ofbig policy changes that are easy to ridicule. Instead, aides want to market policies as more digestiblepieces. So, rather than tout the healthcare package as a whole, advisors will talk about smaller partsthat may be more appealing and understandable — such as barring insurers from denying coverage

based on preexisting conditions. But at this stage, it may be late in the game to downsize either thepresident or his agenda.



Link Uniqueness

Kerry is a taking a hard line towards Venezuela now –

RT 07/19/13 (Russia Today is an international news organization, "Kerry vows to put the screws to

Venezuela over Snowden – report", http://rt.com/news/kerry-threatens-venezuela-snowden-308/)

Kerry reportedly threatened to ground any Venezuelan aircraft in America’s or any NATO country’s airspace if there is the

slightest suspicion that Snowden is using the flight to get to Caracas. The media outlet's source said that the US’ top diplomat

sent a clear signal that Venezuela’s Air Force One is not immune and President Nicolas Maduro could

easily face the same fate as his Bolivian counterpart Evo Morales, whose plane was grounded for inspection in Austria earlier

this month in violation of all international diplomatic agreements. “Immunity is for the president, not the plane,” the ABC source cites

Kerry’s personal message to President Maduro as saying. Closing all NATO member countries’ aerospace to Venezuelan flights

means avoiding 26 countries in Europe and two in North America. Under this scenario, it would be safer for S nowden to fly across the Pacific from Russia’s Far

Eastern city of Vladivostok instead of crossing the Atlantic. Kerry also reportedly promised to intensify the ongoing process

of revoking US entry visas to Venezuelan officials and businessmen associated with the deceased

President Hugo Chavez. Washington will also begin prosecuting prominent Venezuelan politicians on

allegations of drug trafficking, money laundering and other criminal actions, Kerry allegedly said, and specifically

mentioned some names in his conversation with the Venezuelan FM. He reportedly also said that Washington is well aware of

Venezuela’s dependence on the US when it comes to refined oil products. Despite being one of the world’s largest oil

producers, Venezuela requires more petrol and oil products than it can produce, buying around 500,000 barrels of gasoline eve ry month, roughly another half

million barrels of fuel for power plants, and some 350,000 barrels of MTBE (Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether) – the additive used for to increase octane in gasoline. The

source added that the US Secretary of State bluntly warned that fuel supplies would be halted if

President Maduro continues to reach out to the fugitive NSA contractor.

http://rt.com/news/kerry-threatens-venezuela-snowden-308/

http://rt.com/news/kerry-threatens-venezuela-snowden-308/



Case



Artic War Defense

Talks about arctic conflict are all media hype- economic cooperation deters any

conflicts of interest in the Arctic. Military presence is solely for patrol

ALEXEEV 2/20/13 (Igor; “Economic Cooperation Prevents Conflict of Interests in the Arctic”- Strategic Culture; 2/20/2013;http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/02/20/economic-cooperation-prevents-conflict-interests-in-arctic.html)

New technologies and climate change have significantly raised the profile of Arctic resources for the global economy. According to theEconomist, the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the planet. Many experts quoting Alfred T. Mahan’s work «The In fluence of SeaPower Upon History» agree that seaborne commerce in the High North will become an important geopolitical factor over the next several

decades . Prospects of political dominance in the Arctic provoke heated debates sometimes over

dramatized by the media. But realpolitik dictates that all states concerned should rely on existing legal and institutional framework

enabling peaceful cooperation.¶ ¶ Looking beyond the media hype we should admit that political tension in the

Arctic is low today. Nevertheless, business competition may create challenges in the future. Luckily the Arcitc Council has

already established all necessary mechanisms to deliver credible and balanced regional management.

If we want to understand the Arctic better, the situation analysis should cover three important areas: military aspects, legal environment andenergy policy.¶ ¶ Speaking about power politics the U.S. military planners currently consider the Arctic to be «an area

of low conflict». Swedish experts agree with American conclusions. Background paper «Military

Capabilities in the Arctic» (SIPRI, 2012) says, that power projection into the Arctic in 2010-2011 was very

limited . The Arctic states maintain military presence in the region only to patrol and protect

sovereign territories. There is no sign of military standoff along the borders - the situation is stable

and predictable. Therefore any extension of NATO’s engagement in the Arctic is counterproductive, because it could renew tensions

nonexistant since the end of the Cold War. As the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put it in 2011, «there is no reason for drawing NATO

into Arctic affairs». The Arctic is a zone of peace now and should remain so.¶ ¶ From the legal point of view

the status of the Arctic is already specified in the provisions of the international law. The Arctic

Council and the Ilulissat Declaration (Greenland, 2008) provide a solid institutional and legal foundation for

responsible management of the Arctic by the five coastal states. Under the Ilulissat declaration anydemarcation issues in the Arctic should be resolved on a bilateral basis between contesting parties.

Besides, all members of the Arctic Council except the U.S. ratified an important treaty - the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Norway and Denmark also made an official submission

into the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Russia's final claim to a portion of the

Arctic shelf would be filed with the Comission by December 2013, according to Arthur Tchilingarov, the veteran

explorer who led the expedition to plant a Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole in 2007.¶ ¶ As to energy policy the

members of the Arctic «five» have preferential rights to tap its resources. It should be noted, that 97% of the

discovered and potential reserves of the Arctic are located under the sovereign jurisdiction of the

Arctic states. Concerned countries especially China and some members of the EU should consider that there is no «unclaimed» territory in

the region. However, third parties can freely apply for a mining claim through bilateral agreements. Most probably the Arctic sweet

spots will be developed on the basis of public –private partnership.¶ ¶ The latest example is the $500

billion offshore venture deal between Rosneft and Exxon Mobil . The contract will grant Exxon preference to develop

three vast untapped fields in the Russian Arctic Kara Sea, with hydrocarbon reserves estimated at 85 billion barrels of oil

equivalent. This high profile business initiative brings hope for productive cooperation, despite all

political differences. The common ground, although of purely economic nature, is a fine example of

civilized approach to energy policy in the Arctic. We cannot but hope it will set benchmarks for all players in the market –

both public and private.



Absolutely no risk of war in the Arctic – cooperation empirically checks – this card will

smoke them

Hong, 2011 – Nong, Postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, Deputy Director at the Research Centre for

Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies, ‘Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High

North?’, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375

While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still

reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts

relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote . The existing vehicles for dispute resolution

and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions. Joint

management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries involved in a

dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather than losing a

claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the

development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future. Another

example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between Russia and

Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where their borders

extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this

area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential benefits. Geopolitical issues

are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to dominate. They can also reflect cooperative,

multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures

are often considered desirable and even unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be

achieved unilaterally. At the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some

cases formally, in others less formally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build

trust. Recognizing and respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation

between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international

laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, whilenon-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation,

Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international law. Examples

between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China

National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement. The parties

agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet

serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in

developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination

in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, both for

delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China.

A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be

built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make

it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-

bowed oil tankers that are set to come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would throughopen water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on two 70,000-tonne ships and twomore 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on order.

http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375







1NC No Indo-Pak War Impact

No Indo-Pak war

Mutti 9— Master’s degree in International Studies with a focus on South Asia, U Washington. BA in

History, Knox College. over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editorto Demockracy journal (James, 1/5, Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent,http://demockracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/)Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indiansubcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.” As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war

will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy

over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-

Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist

attack was the American way – a war. Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war: 1. For both countries, a war would be adisaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world over the last decade. It has

occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory

authoritarian regimes. Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes. The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised

following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. Pakistan, on

the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government. The

military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali

Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in

Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the

unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so. 2. Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts

to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations. Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in

decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and

India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status. The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard

to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak

one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the

countries. 3. Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and

security than does the opposite country. If they are wise, the governments of both countries will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous externalones. The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India. The more significant threat toPakistan comes from within. While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant I slamic outfits have not. Groups based in the tribal regionsbordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex -Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in

2007. The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not against its traditional enemy India, but againstmilitants bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic,

inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicidebombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindufundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of I ndia as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies inKashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pak istan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally,Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflamingpublic opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out w ith no resolution, as many other such inquiries have. 4. Theinternational attention to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terroristattacks in places like India, Pa kistan, and Indonesia – is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope in terms of how they respond to theterrible events, it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without resorting to war. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, andothers not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan’s closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US hasbeen in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic

pressure on Pakistan.





Talks Uniqueness – Neg

Relations fail now – Snowden

RT 7-21 (Russia Times, “Venezuela ends Rapproachment Talks with Washington over US Meddling”,

7/21/13, http://rt.com/news/venezuela-ends-dialogue-us-relations-352/)

On the rocks¶ US-Venezuelan relations have been under strain since 2010 when both countries withdrew their

respective ambassadors. Moreover, tensions have been mounting recently over the case of NSA whistleblower

Edward Snowden, whom Venezuela has offered political asylum. ¶ The US is demanding his extraditionover the classified cables he released that blew the lid on Washington’s covert global surveillance programs. ¶ On Friday following Caracas’

decision to grant asylum to Snowden, US Foreign Minister John Kerry rang his Venezuelan counterpart and threatened

consequences should Snowden attempt to travel to Venezuela, reported Spanish ABC media outlet, citing a source

familiar with the conversation.

No chance of relations – multiple alt causes

PTV 7-20 (PressTV, “Venezuela ends Normalizing US Relations”, 7/20/13,

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/20/314678/venezuela-ends-normalizing-us-relations/)

Venezuela and the US have not exchanged ambassadors since 2010. However, in June US Secretary of State John Kerry

and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua agreed on the s idelines of a regional summit in Guatemala that officials would “soon” meet for talks

that could lead to an exchange of envoys. ¶ In March, Caracas expelled two US military attaches over allegations of

trying to foment instability in Venezuela. ¶ Washington also angered Caracas by supporting

Venezuelan opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who disputed the results of the April presidential

election, in which Maduro won the race with 50.7 percent of the vote against 49.1 percent for Capriles.



Squo Solves

Non-Unique- past engagements/engaging now/future engagement possibleFAS’ 13 (Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for

Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, 4/9/13, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf ) Despite tensions in relations, the Obama Administration maintains that it remains committed to ¶ seeking

constructive engagement with Venezuela, focusing on such areas as anti-drug and ¶ counterterrorism efforts. In the aftermath of

President Chávez’s reelection in October 2012, the ¶ White House, while acknowledging differences with President Chávez, congratulated the ¶

Venezuelan people on the high level of participation and the relatively peaceful election process. ¶ Subsequently, in November 2012, the

State Department’s Assistant Secretary of State for Western ¶ Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson, engaged in

a conversation with Vice President Maduro ¶ about improving bilateral relations, including greater cooperation on

counternarcotics issues. ¶ In early January 2013, the State Department reiterated that the United States

remained open to ¶ dialogue with Venezuela on a range of issues of mutual interest. In light of the setback in ¶ President

Chávez’s health, a State Department spokesman maintained on January 9, 2013, that ¶ “regardless of what

happens politically in Venezuela, if the Venezuelan government and if the ¶ Venezuelan people want to

move forward with us, we think there is a path that’s possible.”11






Brazil Key to Moderation --- Read with the Consult Brazil CP

Brazilian efforts are key --- ‘band wagon effect’ ensures effective moderation Shifter 13 --- Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service (3/11/2013, Michael, “The

Empire Makes Nice: Is it time for a Venezuela reset?”

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the_empire_makes_nice_venezuela_hugo_chavez,)A peace accord between the Colombian government and the FARC (which uses Venezuelan territory as a sanctuary and was supported by

Chávez) would reduce a key source of instability in the wider region. To anticipate potential turmoil in Venezuela in the

coming period, Washington should be consulting regularly and at the highest levels with South American

allies, especially Colombia and Brazil, who have the most at stake should the security situation

deteriorate. Although many commentators have drawn attention to Cuba's role in the Venezuelan transition, and have particularly

highlighted Cuba's huge dependence on Venezuelan oil and money, Brazil will probably end up being just as influential as

the situation unfolds. South America's undisputed superpower -- whose leverage on Venezuela stems

from key exports, especially food, and political backing -- is chiefly interested in maintaining social

peace within its own neighborhood. In keeping with Brazil's own governance and political evolution in

recent years, Brasilia will aim to keep the situation in Venezuela under control and to encouragemoderation, gradualism, and communication on both sides. It does not want trouble on its borders.

Venezuela's recent entry into the Brazil-led MERCOSUR trade group will makes this issue of even greater concern for President Dilma Rousseff's

government. In this respect, there is ample coincidence of interests between Washington and Brasília.

Absent Chávez, Venezuela will continue to be tricky in the second Obama administration. The administration will need to arrive

at a more accurate on-the-ground reading of what is happening in the country. It will need to engage in

quiet, steady, high-level diplomacy with key allies in the region not only to closely monitor the

security situation and guard against dire scenarios but to press for free and fair elections and

adherence to the rule of law.



A2 Venezuelan Instability

Short term instability is inevitable – long term stability will arise

Puchi ’13 [June 25, 2013. Leopoldo Puchi is an opposition political scientist and ex general secretary of the MAS.Article translated by Tamara Pearson. “Venezuelan Government: Stability in Instability” Venezuelanalysis.

http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9764]

Different signs indicate that the government of Nicolas Maduro is tending to stabilise itself and consolidate

itself, after the initial turbulence that followed the close electoral results and the lack of acceptance of the

numbers emitted by the National Electoral Council by part of the opposition. Of course, the points of tension are numerous in Venezuelansociety and without a doubt it will be like this for many years: social demands, like those of the university teachers; disagreements withColombia and the United States over geopolitical divergences; economic problems, due to the reduced productivity of Venezuelan companies;

grave deficiencies in public services; etc. Situations and conflicts that will exist for a long time, with the current

government or with a different one. For the rest, there is no defined social hegemony, but rather an

equilibrium of forces. The big picture is one of stability within instability . The push for power

continues to define the agenda, which is making different analysts think, regarding the government and the opposition, that we

could be facing an imminent collision. Important sectors of the opposition aren’t willing to accept this dead calm,that they consider exasperating, for long. There are disturbing facts that point in this direction, such as the presence of paramilitary groups, not just in border areas, but also in the country’s interior, as was shown in the recent arrests of various members in Portuguesa state, and the

serious indicators that show their presence in the areas around Caracas. At the same time, sectors close to Chavismo seem to be

impatient because they feel that the revolution could freeze, or dissolve into less rebellious forms. Now

then, when violent plans are talked about, it’s not acceptable to put all of the opposition into the same boat. Nobody images that, for

example, the candidates of the MUD in different regions, are actively committed to a strategy of this type. It’s what they are least

concerned with right now, when there is an electoral contest coming up, and their councillor candidates aren’t defined, nor is there

consensus around various mayoral candidates. Even then though, the Venezuelan opposition is complex and it’s not just

made up of this or that party, but rather there are important radicalised factors with a lot of influence

and decision making power as well. Everything indicates that these groups have taken our neighbour, Colombia, as a logistical

platform for acting on Venezuela, given the belligerence of ex-President Alvaro Uribe and the geopolitical differences between the two

countries, which would facilitate such actions, even if Juan Manuel Santos isn’t directly involved. Because of these circumstances, differentanalysts warn of the possibility that the country is on the point of a “conflict without remedy”. Maybe

they are exaggerating, maybe they are right. But without a doubt, we have to be on the alert.

http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/9764







A2 Farc: Capriles Supports

Both Maduro and Capriles will support FARC

Pardo 04/05/13(Rodrigo Pardo, a former foreign minister of Colombia, is the news director at RCNtelevision, Colombia, "Latin America Without Chávez", http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/post-ch-vez-venezuela-and-latin-american-diplomacy-by-rodrigo-pardo)

Indeed, Chávez was not the first Venezuelan head of state to use oil as an instrument of active foreignpolicy and personal visibility; one could cite Carlos Andrés Pérez, for example, in pre-Chávista Venezuela.And if , as predicted, Maduro wins the election, he will assume office after six years by Chávez’s side as

Foreign Minister – and determined to follow in his mentor’s footsteps. Maduro would, for example,maintain Venezuela’s support and participation in the negotiations between Colombia’s government

and the FARC guerrillas; but so would Capriles, because doing so serves Venezuela’s national interest

well. In other areas, diplomacy would be quieter and less ideological with Capriles as president, but it

would be no less ambitious.



Random



Iran Security K Link/AT: Irans Crazy--- SICK

Nope --- their impacts military hype, causes the problems they try to solve, and our

discourse matters.

Trafton, 2013 (Jordan, professor/PhD in IR from the Journal of International Relations 3/24 “Securitized Iran: Threat or Not?”http://www.sirjournal.org/2013/03/24/securitized-iran-threat-or-not/)

“ Nuclear Armageddon !” and “Kissinger Predicts z Nuclear war with Iran ” are just a few of the striking headlines a

quick Google search on Iran will lead to. The issue of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons has been a concern in the

international community for years. High military officials in the United States describe Iran as the greatest

challenge to national security. However, how much truth is behind such statements? The United States reigns dominant in the

international arena, disposing of foes at its whim. Is Iran a legitimate threat, or is the call to arms analogous to the invasion of Iraq

post 9/11: an empty danger used to justify consolidation of political will to give funding to the

military , which ultimately resulted in unnecessary violence ?¶ ¶ The logic of hegemony requires the construction

of threats. As the sole super power, the United States faces a world of uncertain threats to its absolute control

over the globe. Each new thorn is an existential crisis to the very identity of the hegemon . This

subsequently makes it impossible for the United States to distinguish between enemies that are truly in

opposition to U.S. interests and those that are not. When the United States takes action and intervenes , it

inevitably creates the very enemy it wished to destroy. This resistance should be predictable; take the

invasion of Afghanistan for example. Over 100,000 troops were mobilized in a counter-insurgency (dubbed “COIN”)

effort to eradicate militant Taliban influences in the country. However, most high-level members—those

associated with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda—had already fled to locations outside of the country. The

United States had this information, evident from its focused drone strikes against the Haqqani group, a labeled terrorist

organization with ethnic ties to the Afghani Pashtuns, in the tribal area North Waziristan just within the Pakistani border. Nevertheless,

the U.S. chose to engage in a brute-force effort to gain control of Afghanistan and “ liberate ” the

country with the same counter-insurgency surge methods used in Iraq. This strategy, which increased boots

on the ground by 60,000 between 2006-2009, ended up failing , of course, as the mountainous and diverse terrain, decentralized tribal

regions, and massively corrupt government of Afghanistan posed insurmountable challenges, to name just a few setbacks. The end result

was to breed more terrorist sentiment; in fact the same U.S. method used in Iraq increased terrorism worldwide sevenfold,

according to Peter Bergen, a research fellow at the Center on Law and Security. Unpopular drone strikes killed innocent

civilians, solidifying hatred against the United States. Insensitive and intrusive measures—middle-of-the-night searches, unjustified

imprisonment, and unnecessary beatings—only added to the growing negative sentiment.¶ ¶ The lesson learned in Afghanistan

can aid us in our understanding of the U.S. approach to Iran. In its efforts to justify its sole preeminence,

the United States often exaggerates threats to legitimate its rule.¶ ¶ What exactly is the magnitude or

probability of Iran posing a serious risk to the security of the United States? Michael Edwards, a Distinguished Fellow atDemos, gives some convincing common sense arguments in his article published last year. First and foremost, “all U.S. intelligence

agencies universally agree that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program.” Iran may be developing the

capabilities to build a nuclear warhead, though there is no conclusive evidence on when the red line will be

crossed . Just this week, on March 14th President Obama claimed that U.S. intelligence “thinks” Iran will develop nuclear weapons in a year.

“Right now, we think it would take over a year or so for Iran to actually develop a nuclear weapon.” In addition, Iran has never

attacked the United States or its interests overseas. In the last 270 years Iran has not even invaded or engaged

http://www.sirjournal.org/2013/03/24/securitized-iran-threat-or-not/

http://www.sirjournal.org/2013/03/24/securitized-iran-threat-or-not/



in military combat with another country, Edwards writes. Even if Iran were to possess a bomb, what logical

sense would it make to attack the United States? Any strike would guarantee their immediate

destruction . Though Iran’s political leaders enjoy dramatic statements, including President Ahmadinejad’s statement that Iran plans to

“wipe Israel off the face of the map,” much like North Korea’s leadership, self-preservation is always their top priority .

Additionally, Iran’s annual defense budget is only around $5 billion. For reference, the United States spends

110 times that amount and accounts for half the world’s defense spending combined. Nevertheless hyperbole dominates

military discourse , as the recent U.S. annual Threat Report puts Iran 3rd on the list behind cyberwarfare and organized terrorism.¶

Iran has been described as a hostile threat in popular discourse following the September 11th terror attacks. Marym

Jahedi analyzes the linguistic representations of Iran specifically by the New York Times in the International Journal of English Linguistics in

2012. The words we use matter in international relations ; by depicting Iran as a nation state committed

to violence and terror we limit our responses and proposed solutions to aggressive and militarized ones . Our

lexical choices separate our friends from foes, categorizing Iran as the “out-group ,” away from the allies of

the United States. Jahedi elaborates further:¶ The net effect of the discourse themes, strategies and associated linguistic means

of realization in the stereotypical construction of Iran in TNYT would be that of the negative Other, a

nation of people that formed part of George W. Bush’s contentious “axis of evil” thesis – malevolent, untrustworthy,

violent, and a threat to world peace despite the subsequent U.S. administration efforts at positive engagement for some

semblance of normalcy in bilateral relations.¶ ¶ Iran may or may not stand as a legitimate threat to the United States. However, we should be

aware that there is bias towards inflating the risk of a potential threat because there is a sole hegemon,

demonstrated by the Afghan invasion. Pervasive headlines in the U.S. media like “ Time to Attack I ran: Why a Strike is the Least

Bad Option,” should cause hesitation ; not only may such aggressively violent measures gain popularity but Iran also sees

how it’s being described in discussions within the United States, suggesting a resistant stance and complicating

peaceful solutions . The type of discourse surrounding U.S. engagement with Iran influences policy

decisions . Recently, the United States, China, France, Russia, Britain, and Germany have started “P51 talks” with Iran in a renewed effort

towards diplomacy. As the harsh international pressure and sanctions imposed on Iran last summer have not succeeded in halting its nucleardevelopment, a new approach is critical. If this strategy can be genuine and sincere, unnecessary bloodshed may be avoided. Nevertheless, it is

important to remember that historical depiction of Iran by the United States is one of violence and

fundamentalism —a representation couched in the language of dire security . Iran has expressed interest in allowing

access to the International Atomic Energy Agency for certain sites and classified data, though it hinges on the update of a comprehensive Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hopefully the United States will not give into its negatively discursive past and rather will attempt to understand the

perspective of the Iranians, avoiding the friend-enemy distinction that is ever present in international relations.¶

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