NDI 2013 – 6WS – Topic Advantage Counterplans

**Negative**

Amazon

1NC

Text: the Federative Republic of Brazil should indefinitely extend and enforce the soy moratorium

Solves the Amazon – it is a necessary first step to stop degradationGreenpeace 9 – non-governmental environmental organization which takes action to stop environmental degradation (“Soya traders extend moratorium on Amazon destruction”, July 28 of 2009, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/soya-traders-extend-moratorium/)"This is the sort of industry initiative we need to stop the destruction of the Amazon and help to prevent runaway climate change. It was only possible because companies worldwide demanded it,

knowing that their customers would not want to buy products linked to Amazon rainforest destruction,"said Paulo Adario, Greenpeace Amazon Campaign director.¶ "Now all eyes are on President Lula to demonstrate his government’s leadership by increasing efforts to govern the Amazon and to stop deforestation across all sectors.” ¶ The soya moratorium extension was announced at a press conference in Brasília attended by

Brazil’s Environment Minister Carlos Minc and the Soya Working Group.¶ Soya cultivation in the Amazon increased dramatically about 15 years ago with the introduction of new cultivars that were suitable for the climate and soils. It can be argued that soy itself is not a major displacer of forest, but more it encourages infrastructure developments and forces cattle ranchers into the forest.¶ "Soya is no longer a significant force in the destruction of the

Amazon rainforest. However, we cannot say the same about cattle. The soya moratorium is a model for all relevant sectors,” said Brazil’s Environment Minister Carlos Minc.

2NC Solvency

Soybeans are uniquely worse for the Amazon than other causes – only a permanent ban resolves thatCasson 3 – writer for the World Wildlife Fund (Anne, “OIL PALM, SOYBEANS & CRITICAL HABITAT LOSS”, August of 2003, pdf)In Brazil, large monoculture soybean plantations15 have had a significant impact on biodiversity ,¶

particularly if these plantations replace Cerrado or tropical rain forest. Monoculture soybean¶ plantations are thought to have a larger impact on biodiversity and the general environment than oil ¶ palm plantations and cattle ranching because soybeans are an annual crop. Compared to perennial¶ crops, annual

cropping inefficiently utilizes water and nutrients resulting in degradation of soil and¶ water quality. Biodiversity loss is greatest in large-scale estates where native vegetation is cleared¶ using machinery and enormous quantities of pesticides and herbicides are used (Tengnäs & Nilsson¶ 2003). It is worth noting that the use of pesticides and herbicides do not only have an impact on¶ biodiversity in areas actually planted with soybeans. Evidence

suggests that wide-spread pesticide use¶ has been having an impact on biodiversity on the down-stream

Pantanal wetland area. This area is one¶ of the world’s largest most important wetlands and refuge to hundreds of bird species, including kites,¶ hawks, macaws and toucans; as well as jaguars, alligators, river otters, iguanas, anacondas, anteaters,¶ monkeys and capybaras—the world’s largest rodents (UNESCO 2001).¶ Concerns have also been raised about the impact of genetically-modified (GM) soybean varieties on¶ biodiversity16. This is because genetically modified plants may transfer genetic material and associated¶ traits to wild species. This process may alter ecosystem processes and thereby pose a threat to natural¶ plant species (La Vina 2003). The impact of GM soybean species is of special concern in countries rich¶ in biodiversity, such as Brazil and Bolivia. The Brazilian government banned the use of GM soybean¶ varieties in Brazil in 1999, however at least 10% of Brazilian soybean area is already thought to¶ genetically modified. This is primarily because seeds have been fraudulently imported from Argentina¶ where GM soybean varieties are planted on a wide scale (EU 2002).

Soybean production in the Amazon leads to other destructive habits – the moratorium solvesCasson 3 – writer for the World Wildlife Fund (Anne, “OIL PALM, SOYBEANS & CRITICAL HABITAT LOSS”, August of 2003, pdf)The relationship between soybean expansion, charcoal production and pasture development in Brazil¶ In Brazil, soybean expansion has been linked to cattle ranch expansion and charcoal production. In the¶ Cerrado region, for instance, soybean expansion has provided access to Cerrado trees, particularly those¶ found nearby rivers in gallery forests (RBGE 2002).

These trees are used by the Brazilian steel industry¶ for charcoal production18. It is estimated 80% of the

charcoal used in the Brazilian steel industry is¶ derived from native Cerrado trees. The removal of Cerrado trees for the Brazilian steel industry is¶ thought to be resulting in the loss of 200,000 ha of gallery forests per year

(ELC 2002). Soybean¶ farmers primarily clear gallery forests for charcoal producers because profits extracted from the clearing¶ of Cerrado tree vegetation on soybean farms can be used to further soybean expansion. The removal of¶ gallery forests has raised concern because these forests play an important ecological role in the area.¶ The forests provide corridors linking the Amazon and the coastal rainforests with the Cerrado on the¶ central plateau; and provide a critical habitat for bird fauna and a number of endemic

species (Tengnäs¶ & Nilsson 2003).¶ Soybean expansion can also be linked to the expansion of pasture development for cattle ranching—one¶ of the main causes of tropical deforestation in Brazilian

Amazon (Schneider et al. 2000). Satellite¶ imagery has shown how large-scale soy expansion in the southern state of Parana,

has inadvertently¶ resulted in the expansion of the agricultural frontier into the Amazon rainforest (Skole et

al. 1994). This¶ is because government policies, coupled with improved soybean technologies favoured the expansion of¶ large-scale mechanised soybean farms in Parana. This trend forced small-scale farmers to migrate19¶ into the Amazon area, where they cleared forest for agriculture or cattle ranching (Schneider et al. 1992;¶ Skole et al. 1994; Fearnside 2001; Kaimowitz & Smith 2001). These farmers were able to fund the¶ development of new pastures in the Amazon with the profits obtained from the sale of pastures to¶ soybean farmers in the south, and through tropical timber clearing in the Amazon. Concerns have been¶

raised about deforestation in the Amazon because the region contains 40% of the world’s remaining¶

tropical rainforest that plays a vital role in regional hydrology, climate and terrestrial carbon storage¶ (Laurence et al. 2001).According to USDA (2003b), cattle farmers have also sought to increase their net acreage in recent¶ years in order to achieve economies of scale and to cash in on strong soybean returns following a¶ substantial multi-year devaluation in the Brazilian currency. Access to new areas in the Amazon has¶ been made possible through the development of new roads.

Funds for new pasture development are¶ primarily obtained through forest clearing. In the long term, it is believed that pasture developed in the¶ Amazon will ultimately provide an extensive resource for soy expansion . In fact, the

USDA (2003b)¶ estimates that 70-90 million ha of Brazil’s existing pasture acreage can be converted to soybean¶ plantations in the future.

History shows that the transfer of land to soybeans from pasture will effectively push cattle farmers further into the Amazon frontier where they will clear forest to open up¶ new pastures.

Solves Amazon degradation – soy farming leads to direct deforestation and provides incentives for other actors to harm the environmentMangabay no date – Tropical rainforest conservation and environmental science news (“Amazon Destruction: Why is the rainforest being destroyed in Brazil?”, http://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/amazon_destruction.html#ag)Recently, soybeans have become one of the most important contributors to deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Thanks to a new variety of soybean developed by Brazilian scientists to flourish in rainforest climate, Brazil is on the verge of supplanting the United States as the world's leading exporter of soybeans. High soybean prices have also served as an impetus to expanding soybean cultivation. ¶

Philip Fearnside, co-author of a report in Science [21-May-04] and member of Brazil's National Institute for Amazonian Research in Manaus, explains, "Soybean farms cause some forest clearing directly. But they have a much greater impact on deforestation by consuming cleared land, savanna, and transitional forests, thereby pushing ranchers and slash-and-burn farmers ever deeper into the forest frontier. Soybean farming also provides a key economic and political impetus for new highways and infrastructure projects, which accelerate deforestation by other actors ." ¶ Satellite data from 2004 shows a marked increase in deforestation along the BR-163 road, a highway the government has been paving in an effort to help soy farmers from Mato Grosso get their crops to export markets. Typically, roads encourage settlement by rural poor who look to the rainforest as free land for subsistence agriculture.

Harlin 11 – writer about energy and consumption, CU graduate (Witt, “The Cerrado, Driving Factors Behind its Destruction, and Potential Solutions: A Market-Based Approach”, May 2 of 2011, http://www.academia.edu/2766489/Preserving_the_Cerrado_Policy_Reccomendation)Application potential. The Amazon Soy Moratorium has grown and developed since it was originally put in place in 2006, and has acted as an example for other markets and their cohorts, which have been identified as drivers behind Amazonian deforestation, such as the timber and cattle industries, to enact their own, similar

moratoriums on goods originating from that specific habitat. The success of these moratoriums is a result of the increasing levels of monitoring that are becoming available. Originally enforced through either on-ground surveys,or

aerial observations to check for compliance, each with varying degrees accuracy, the advent of high-resolution satellite imagery, and software capable of analyzing these images looking for unauthorized change in forested area, has made the enforcement much more efficient &accurate, by eliminating human-error, and most importantly economically-feasible by reducing both the number of people required for the monitoring, as well as the possibility for signatories to free-ride. Considering the effectiveness of ¶ the Amazon’s¶

moratoriums, the monitoringprocedures already in place, and their effectiveness in addressing the loss of habitat occurringthere, a similar approach in the¶ Cerrado¶ could be easily implemented, and would likely seesimilar results

Credibility

1NC

Text: The United States federal government should change their foreign policy in the Middle East by

-increasing support for the freedom aspirations of the Iranian people

-increasing diplomatic pressure to get Iran to compromise over their nuclear program

-promoting religious freedom throughout the Middle East

Inboden 13 (Will, Distinguished Scholar at the Strauss Center for International Security and Law and an Assistant Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin. He is a Non-Resident Fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and will also serve as Executive Director of the William P. Clements Jr. Center on History, Strategy and Statecraft at the University of Texas at Austin. Previously he served as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council at the White House, "The Middle East's 4 Strategic Contests", July 16 2013, shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/16/the_middle_easts_4_strategic_contests)These four contests are not discrete and exclusive, but are taking place simultaneously and often feeding on each other. In some cases the primary actor is the nation-state; in others it is a transnational religious community or political movement. In some cases the main instrument in the contest is force; in other cases it is diplomatic, economic, ideational, even spiritual. In some cases the stakes are a classical realpolitik question of which nation-state will emerge stronger; in other cases the stakes are an existential question of whether a particular nation-state can even survive -- and whether the nation-state model itself will continue to be the basic political unit in the region. In a few cases the outcomes will merely be local concerns; in most cases the outcomes will substantially implicate American interests.¶ The challenges in crafting a coherent strategy in this milieu are manifest. Setting priorities among the various contests is hard, as is finding levers of influence among a limited set of options. Sometimes advancing a strategic equity in one contest can diminish a strategic equity in another contest. Such is the case with Syria, where all four contests are in acute tension, most visibly in the mantra that intervening to curtail Russian and Iranian influence could also strengthen the hands of violent Islamists.¶ In the face of these challenges, the White House's approach to the region seems to have been a combination of "hands up and hands off" -- that is, throwing

its hands up in exasperation at the multiple conflicts and limited options, and consequently adopting a hands-off posture. Barack Obama's administration has relentlessly told itself about all the negatives of engagement in the region and in the process has created a set of self-fulfilling prophecies.¶ When considered in the aggregate, however,

the United States has substantial interests in the outcomes of these four contests, including preserving its influence as a stabilizing force in the region, encouraging pluralism as an antidote to radicalization, and preventing regional dominance by other malevolent actors, especially a nuclear Iran. Just as the several contests are linked to each other in their negative consequences, so could positive developments on one front lead to progress on other fronts.¶ Where to start? Addressing the four contests can begin with a focus on two countries, Egypt and Iran, and one issue, religious freedom. In Egypt, the erstwhile Muslim Brotherhood government's overreach and ineptitude significantly damaged the brand equity of Islamism. As Michael Singhand Robert Satloff have pointed out, the new Egyptian government provides an opportune moment for a needed reset to the U.S. relationship with Egypt and thus the region. In Iran, as John Hannah highlighted, the election of Hasan

Rouhani presents an opportunity for an invigorated dual-track approach that would reassert American leadership: increased support for the freedom aspirations of the Iranian people and increased pressure on the nuclear program in the form of a credible threat that arrests Tehran's dissemble-and-delay tactics. Such renewed initiative with Egypt and Iran, two historical leaders in the region, would also restore U.S. credibility with Saudi Arabia, a third regional leader. Meanwhile, promoting religious freedom across the region would help encourage authentic pluralism, ameliorate extremism, and allow space for Islamic political participation while guarding against intolerant Islamism.¶ Two and a half years after

Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation set an entire region ablaze, the contours of the multiple contests are now clear. And past rationales for American passivity now pale in comparison with the compelling American interests at stake in the outcomes of each contest.

That solves credibility—plan can’t solve without fixing Middle Eastern foreign policy Young 13 (Michael, opinion editor of The Daily Star, quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University, former director of policy planning at the US State department, and Vali Nasr, former adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the late US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is currently dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in DC, one of America's most authoritative commentators on international relations, "Ex-Obama officials lament US president's lack of Middle East policy", www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/books/ex-obama-officials-lament-us-presidents-lack-of-middle-east-policy)It is revealing that two former Obama administration officials have become critics of current US policy in the Middle East. Both are respected academics, have a high profile in media, and have argued that Washington is not using all the instruments at its disposal to advance its political interests in the region.¶ The first is Anne-Marie Slaughter of Princeton University, who has denounced the administration's policy in Syria. Slaughter, who served as director of policy planning at the US State Department between 2009 and 2011, has lamented President Barack Obama's lethargy. Theodore Roosevelt once said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick", she writes, but Obama's predisposition in Syria has been to "speak loudly and throw away your stick" .¶ Slaughter is no neoconservative

who opposes the president on ideological grounds. But like Vali Nasr, the second one-time official ill at ease with Obama's disinterest in the

Middle East, she is concerned that the US risks no longer standing for much in the world. Nasr, a former adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the late US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, came away disillusioned from his

experience, and has just published The Dispensable Nation, on the absence of a coherent US policy in the broader Middle East. Exiled from Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution, Nasr is currently dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC, and one of America's most authoritative commentators on international relations.¶ In his introduction, Nasr writes that he thought long and hard about writing his book, as he did not want it to become a "political bludgeon". Whatever his intentions, the book is a devastating broadside against Obama's approach to a region at the centre of his predecessor's preoccupations. What makes the book so effective is that it rises above the limiting neocon versus realist dichotomy prevailing during the George W Bush years, and addresses the topic squarely from the realist perspective favoured by the president.¶ Nasr argues, first, that the Obama administration has concentrated foreign policy decisions in the White House, giving undue authority to two groups of people with limited experience in the matter: the president's coterie of political advisers, who based their decisions on how foreign policy issues would play at home; and the military and intelligence agencies, who offered "swift and dynamic, as well as media-attracting, action …"¶ The loser in this context

was the foreign policy establishment, the experienced hands such as Holbrooke and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who time

and again found themselves rectifying administration errors. What they unsuccessfully sought to advance, Nasr writes, is a "patient, long-range, credible diplomacy that garners the respect of our allies and their support when we need it".¶ Nasr is calling for something that is indeed woefully lacking under Obama: a cohesive foreign policy strategy that integrates and gives meaning to American actions in the Middle East and South Asia.

Instead, Obama's administration has seemed without direction, avoiding decisive decisions in crises demanding urgent action, while expressing grand ambitions - such as working to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict -

that it makes no serious effort to fulfil l .¶ Instead, the administration's tendency has been to "lead from behind", which speaks volumes about Obama's desire to have his cake and eat it too. The president is a man who avoids taking political risks - a tendency Nasr has particularly seen in US policy towards Iran, Afghanistan and the

Arab world - his perennial caution suffocating his ability to exploit valuable political openings.¶

Solvency—Credibility

International diplomacy is failing now because Obama has refused to get involved—CP sends an exclusive signal of engagement that’s necessary for true international successYoung 13 (Michael, opinion editor of The Daily Star, quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University, former director of policy planning at the US State department, and Vali Nasr, former adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the late US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is currently dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in DC, one of America's most authoritative commentators on international relations, "Ex-Obama officials lament US president's lack of Middle East policy", www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/books/ex-obama-officials-lament-us-presidents-lack-of-middle-east-policy)This leads us to the second of Nasr's general arguments, namely that the US appears to be retreating from the Middle East, a direction Nasr considers potentially "disastrous". Obama is not the first president who has sought to refocus away from a foreign policy course or region that he believes has monopolised too much of America's time and money. Lyndon Johnson sought to concentrate on domestic American affairs after 1964, with his Great Society programme, as did Bill Clinton in 1992 and George W Bush in 2000. All three were blindsided by reality. Mr Johnson became a prisoner of the Vietnam war, Clinton involved himself deeply in the Bosnian conflict and Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, and Bush, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, embarked on military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the "global war on terrorism".¶ There has been hubris in Obama's behaviour that considers foreign policy pursuits only as important as the amount of attention the US devotes to them . And yet, as the conflict in Syria has shown, that proposition is nonsensical . Two years after the uprising began, Obama has sensed the dangerous implications of a conflict that may engulf the region. And yet for much of that time,

administration officials and their echo chambers in the media insisted there was no benefit in the US getting involved.¶ Nasr disagrees. He believes that the US will be judged by whether the so-called Arab Spring produces "better Arab states that do right by their people and live up to their responsibility to the international order and its institutions". Achieving this will bring American values and interests into alignment. In contrast, " Obama's disengaged attitude toward the Middle East has served neither American values nor its long-term interests".¶ The war in Syria has turned into a proxy war drawing in American allies and foes, creating a chaotic situation accompanied by terrible human suffering. Obama

cannot be bothered with human rights, we now know, but as Nasr advises, the US must bolster regional stability, regardless of whether it is less dependent on Arab oil than it once was. Oil markets will definitely be affected by conflict in the region, impacting on the global economy. And it seems ludicrous to have to defend the proposition that enhanced Iranian and Hezbollah influence in the region will negatively affect US interests, especially if it pushes Arabian Gulf states to take self-defensive actions that strengthen militant Islamists and heighten sectarian animosities.¶ Obama's withdrawal from the Middle East has, in its own way, been revolutionary, the product of a view that the US cannot behave as it once did in the region. Too often this outlook has been confused with American decline. It is something else: a result of a growing realisation that America's problems cannot be resolved militarily, an attitude that prevailed during the last decade when American military power was frequently deployed with

success. But this brings out a contradiction in Obama's stance. He has long been sceptical of America's engagement in overseas wars. One of

his first acts was to accelerate the pullout from Iraq. He is winding down American involvement in Afghanistan. Yet these processes were not accompanied by greater reliance on diplomacy. On most major issues in the Middle East, the president has refused to expend political capital or engage himself personally. Instead, he has resorted to the least costly of tactics, namely assassination, usually by relying on drones.¶

Solvency—Iran

Only diplomacy through compromise solves Iran prolif—plan failsEsfandiari 13 (Golnaz, correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, quoting Vali Nasr in an interview, "Vali Nasr: 'Starving Someboyd Won't Make Them Do What You Want', June 12 2013, www.rferl.org/content/iran-elections-interview-vali-nasr-/25015129.html)Vali Nasr: The U.S. is locked into its policy -- which is pressure and no real conversation. So, it's easy to keep escalating the pressure, although you're running out of things you could do. And yes, the pressure really has an impact on the Iranian economy -- it's kind of like trying to starve somebody. Yes, they do lose weight, and that only proves that starvation works. But it doesn't mean that starvation actually gets them to do what [you] want. I think the thinking in Iran is that

they're much more likely to survive sanctions than surrender, because there's no deal on the table. It's

possible that they may consider a deal , and even that would be difficult. So if they could go back home and s ay, "We're going to suspend the program, but look -- we got rid of the oil embargo, we got rid of the financial restrictions, the GDP is going to go up, it's going to relieve pressure, there's going to be more jobs." There's a scenario in which some Iranian leaders may see that as a positive. If what we're asking them is that you're not going to get anything, and we expect you to just come and sign off the program, they're not going to survive that. You know, you put billions of dollars, and decades, and go through all this hardship, you're not going to just hand it over. So I think the right incentive structure is not on the table. The pressure works, but pressure is not going to get them to change policy.

Iran wants to negotiate with the US—plan provides necessary discussionsGordon 13 (Michael R., correspondent for the New York Times about the Middle East, quoting Nuri kamal al-Maliki, Prime Minester of Iraq, and Patrick Ventrell, a State Department spokesman, and Gary Samore, senior aide on nonproliferation issues at the National Security Council, "Iran Is Said to Want Direct Talks With U.S. on Nuclear Program", July 26 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/world/middleeast/iran-is-said-to-want-direct-talks-with-us-on-nuclear-program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)WASHINGTON — Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki of Iraq told the Obama administration this month that Iran was interested in direct talks with the United States on Iran’s nuclear program , and said that Iraq was prepared to facilitate the negotiations, Western officials said Thursday.¶ In a meeting in early July with the American ambassador in Baghdad, Mr. Maliki suggested that he was relaying a message from Iranian officials and asserted that Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s incoming president, would be serious about any discussions with the United States, according to accounts of the meeting.¶ Although Mr. Maliki indicated that he had been in touch with confidants of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, he did not disclose precisely whom he was dealing with on the Iranian side. Some Western officials remain uncertain whether Iran’s leaders have sought to use Iraq as a conduit or whether the idea is mainly Mr. Maliki’s initiative.¶ State Department officials declined to comment on Mr. Maliki’s move or what steps the United States might have taken in response. American officials have said since the beginning of the Obama administration that they would be open to direct talks with Iran.¶ “Iraq is a partner of the United States and we are in regular conversations with Iraqi officials about a full range of issues of mutual interest, including Iran,” said Patrick Ventrell, a State Department spokesman. “As we have repeatedly said, we are open to direct talks with Iran in order to resolve the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.”¶ Gary Samore, who served as the senior aide on nonproliferation issues at the National Security Council during President Obama’s first term in office, said that it was plausible that Iran would use Iraq to send a message about its willingness to discuss nuclear issues.¶ “The Iranians see Maliki as somebody they have some trust in,” said Mr. Samore, who is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

at Harvard. “From Maliki’s standpoint, it would serve a number of different purposes. He does not want to be squeezed between Washington and Tehran.”

Solvency—SCS

Establishing US diplomatic presence in the Middle East is key to prevent SCS conflictNasr 13 (Vali, former adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the late US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is currently dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in DC, one of America's most authoritative commentators on international relations, "The U.S. Should Focus on Asia: All of Asia", April 11 2013, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/the-us-should-focus-on-asia-all-of-asia/274907/)Even as it develops overland alternatives, China is building a blue-water navy and has invested in the so-called "string of pearls" strategy of building bases in the Indian Ocean (in places such as Sri Lanka) to protect its sea routes to Africa and the Middle East. There is already a brisk competition between China and India over which country will dominate the Indian Ocean. The two Asian powers eye one another with suspicion even as they cooperate to address the menace of piracy. But China is also worried about U.S. control of the high seas. The Scarborough Shoal row, in which China asserted primacy over the South China Sea and met resistance from several Southeast Asian nations backed by the U.S., brought the problem into sharp relief. At that point, America had already announced that it would deploy 2,500 U.S. Marines to Australia and help the Philippines to upgrade its navy.¶ American retreat from the Middle East will be welcomed in China as a strategic boon.¶ But of equal importance is American naval domination of the Persian Gulf, the source of much of China's future energy supply. It is a critical strategic advantage in managing China's rise, a fact that Beijing is acutely aware of. The U.S., however, does not seem to be. America is focusing on the Straits of Malacca but proclaiming its goal of leaving the Persian Gulf. We will not need Persian Gulf oil and gas, American officials visiting the Gulf states tell their

hosts, so we will be shrinking our footprint here. We may not need Persian Gulf oil, but China will, and so will the countries we depend on to balance China in its backyard: Japan and South Korea. The administration has made it clear that we are now in the business of containing China. So should we not be doubling down on the Persian Gulf, a region we have already secured for 60 years, rather than abandoning it at the precise moment that it has achieved new strategic value?¶ American retreat from the Middle East will be welcomed in China as a strategic boon:

it will give China a free hand to shape its energy security in west Asia, which in turn will give Beijing greater leverage in resisting American pressure in the Asia-Pacific. This region is not only a source of valuable

energy to China, but is also a cultural and ethnic bridge to the Turkic Muslim minority living in China's western-most provinces, which gives China a security interest there as well. Until the pivot, China may have worried that American presence could encourage Central Asian states closest to China's western borders to resist Beijing's influence, as is happening in Southeast Asia. Beijing has sought to bolster that influence, integrating parts of the Middle East and Central Asia closest to its borders into its economic orbit, and founding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a rival to American power styled as a counterweight to NATO or the Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC). With Iran and Russia's backing, SCO is working to limit American diplomatic presence in the region.¶ America has got its Asia strategy wrong. It should start with a broader view of Asia, one that reflects the strategic interests that bind the eastern and western parts of that continent and drive China's role there. In that larger context American presence in the Middle East is an enormous asset that will become more valuable as America's rivalry with China intensifies in the years to come.

Internal NB—China

Middle-East diplomacy prevents a war with China over global power and energyYoung 13 (Michael, opinion editor of The Daily Star, quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, Princeton University, former director of policy planning at the US State department, and Vali Nasr, former adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the late US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is currently dean of John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in DC, one of America's most authoritative commentators on international relations, "Ex-Obama officials lament US president's lack of Middle East policy", www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/books/ex-obama-officials-lament-us-presidents-lack-of-middle-east-policy)Nasr reserves his last chapter for a stimulating discussion of what he views as the central role of the Middle East in the growing Chinese-American rivalry.¶ Commenting on the Obama administration's "pivot to Asia", much hailed by American officials

as a necessary move away from the Middle East to a more vital region of the world, Nasr writes: "A retreat from the Middle East will not free us to deal with China; it will constrain us in managing the competition."¶ The chapter is an effort to engage in strategic thinking of the kind Nasr did not see during his days in government. He presents an often fascinating rundown of the strategic interests of China, which, unlike the US, has approached the Middle East with a long-term game plan to serve its geopolitical ambitions and energy needs. The US-China competition is about "global power",

writes Nasr, before faulting the Obama administration for failing to quite understand what this means. What may emerge, he warns, is an all-powerful China that controls gas and oil supplies to Asia from the Gulf, and squeezes the energy lifeline of America's Asian allies.¶ But Obama has too often spoken of US limitations to be a decisive defender of America's

global pre-eminence. He has pursued the politics of neglect, convinced that this will make America stronger. But an American president doesn't have the luxury of aloofness. Whatever he does wrong, other countries will usually pay for.

Cuban Economy

1NC Shell

CP – The Executive Branch of the United States should;

- acknowledge that current reforms in Cuba are real and effective

- loosen restrictions on US citizens to travel to Cuba

- clarify remittance expansion rules

CP leads to investment in Cuba that solves their economyLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

U.S. sanctions are premised on the belief that strangling Cuba’s economy will lead the system to fail, motivating the Cuban people to rise up against their government and establish a multiparty liberal democracy. After five decades, it has failed to achieve its goal. Instead, it is inhumane and counter-productive. In addition to inflicting pain on the people we are ostensibly trying to help, the sanctions could even prompt a mass exodus out of Cuba, putting the stability of the Caribbean at risk. Twenty years ago, amidst the wreckage of the Special Period, U.S. Congress and the Executive Branch tightened sanctions with the hope of capitalizing on Cuba’s difficulties. American policy missed the chance to align itself with the humanitarian interests of Cubans and their leadership muddled through. As U.S. sanctions became more restrictive, we ceded the playing field to allies and competitors—Spain and Brazil, China and Venezuela—who are still in Cuba today, investing and trying to help its economy grow. While the fate of Cuba’s economic reforms rests primarily with the government and the Cuban people, actions taken by President Obama, however limited, are now playing an important supporting role. But the United States can do more. We have a new opportunity to be seen by Cuba’s people and

its future leaders supporting their efforts to build a new economy and to help the Cuban people lead more prosperous lives. The greatest contribution our country can make now is to demonstrate we want the reforms to succeed, because we want the Cuban people to succeed. If this were a core principle of our democratic policy, a series of logical steps could then follow. First, President Obama and other U.S. policy makers should acknowledge that Cuba’s reforms are real; that this program opens the way to a greater role for the market, and the changes are likely to exact great hardships on the Cuban people. They should also acknowledge that the reforms represent an important beginning. Until that all happens, our ambivalence plays into the hands of hardliners in Cuba who oppose reform or rapprochement with the United States. Second, Cubans lack cash and credit to make full use of their newly granted right to form businesses. The embargo and its byzantine sanctions prevent U.S. banks and developers from financing investments in Cuba. By loosening restrictions on travel and remittances, President Obama mobilized the financial capital and support of a good portion of the Cuban American community on behalf of Cuba’s economic revival. There are additional executive decisions the president can take to ease the flow of financing to Cuba and to spur demand for the activities the emerging private sector is performing. For example, the president could further loosen restrictions on U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba. Although repeal of the statutory bar against tourist travel to the island would require an Act of Congress, unlikely in this political climate, President Obama could use his executive authority to open and expand categories of opportunities for Americans to visit Cuba.128 As Stephen Propst, an expert on international trade and investment laws explained, “Although ‘tourist travel’ remains prohibited by statute, the President still has room under the current legal framework to significantly expand opportunities for legal travel to Cuba. For example, the existing category of travel for ‘professional meetings’ could be broadened to include a range of new authorizations for participation in meetings. … If combined with additional authorizations for the exchange of services with small private businesses in Cuba, the President could authorize travel for purposes of professional meetings with Cuban architects,

artists, musicians, consultants and others.”129 According to this analysis, President Obama can, for example, order general licenses provided to freelance journalists, professional researchers, athletes who want to attend international sports competitions in Cuba, persons engaged in humanitarian activities, private foundations doing research, and business-related travel for authorized activities such as telecommunications, informational materials, and some marketing. He could also broaden the licensing for advisors from firms who could assist the Cubans in safe drilling and environmental protection as Cuba explores for oil in the Gulf of Mexico (as CDA recommended in the 21st Century Report on energy). There is a broad consensus extending from the U.S. travel industry to the international human rights community that travel to Cuba should be expanded: travel is a constitutional right of U.S. citizens and has the added virtue of providing U.S. businesses broad opportunities. For

Cuba’s citizens, it provides a source of profits and jobs for small businesses. We also encourage the Executive Branch to clarify remittance expansion rules established in January 2011. President Obama has said any American is permitted to send remittances to an unlimited number of qualified Cubans of up to $2,000 per year each, but guidelines for sending remittances to non-family members are vague and need to be better defined. The regulation has no mechanism to open the door to Americans without family ties who wish to contribute remittances to Cubans they do not know and, if they could, no means for accountability exists for U.S. citizens to see if their donations were making a difference. Neither does the rule say whether the U.S. government allows Cuban recipients to seek or aggregate remittances from U.S. citizens. And answers are also needed from the Cuban government—it could identify recipient institutions which could distribute remittances to Cubans in need. A report released this year by the Cuba Study Group (CSG) suggests a number of additional steps that would allow Cuban goods to legally enter the U.S. market and advance the humanitarian goals of our policy. The CSG proposed allowing U.S. individuals and institutions to contract with Cuban scholars, musicians, and artists for their work and allowing independent farms and cooperatives to export agriculture products from Cuba (Obama granted a similar exception to sanctions on North Korea in 2010 for importation of North Korean beer.130) Their paper also called for a $50 million fund for rotating micro-loans and other measures.131

Investment in the economy is keyLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

Cuba needs foreign exchange to import capital goods from abroad. Without it, the island

cannot create wealth beyond the retail sector in ways that utilize Cubans and newly-legalized

small businesses . Today, no clear avenue to increased foreign exchange is open, and agriculture

reforms have yet to reduce Cuba’s import bill. Similarly, no clear direction exists for large businesses on questions such as production, investment, or how much latitude managers will have to make productivity decisions. Experts tell us this is not a question of private versus public—as reforms in China have demonstrated—but about whether the system, however it is constructed, will allow entrepreneurial and economically rational decisions to be made

Solvency

Investment is key to solving Cuba’s economyCSG ’11 [April/2011, The Cuba Study Group (CSG) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization comprised of business and community leaders of Cuban descent who share a common interest and vision of a free and prosperous Cuba. The CSG mission is to facilitate a peaceful reunification of the Cuban nation that would lead to a free and open society with respect for human rights, the rule of law and a market-based economy. “Supporting Small Business in Cuba: Recommendations for Private and Public Sector Leaders,” http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=0fbe7312-0bcc-4369-8c1e-b4f1680f1837]

Small businesses and self-employment are considered an invaluable component of economic growth and job creation in countries around the world. This holds true not only in traditionally market-driven economies, but also in Communist countries with economies long dominated by the state. In 1978—the first year of the Chinese “open-door policies” credited with fueling its unprecedented economic growth—there were only 140,000 businesses operated by self-employed entrepreneurs in China. By 2005, that number had surged to 24.6 million enterprises, employing 49 million Chinese. In fact, since the late 1980s, the average annual growth in the number of small businesses operating in China has exceeded 30 percent. With this growth, the contribution of private enterprise to China’s GDP has also increased. In 2000, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that the private sector accounted for about 42.8 percent of the national GDP. By 2005, that proportion had grown to nearly 65 percent. According to the most recent estimates, private enterprises (including companies in which the government holds a minority stake) contribute about 70 percent to China’s GDP. But, Cuba is not China. And the vast numbers of variables that drive growth in any economy make cross-country comparisons difficult. There are, however, some universally-accepted truths about small and microenterprise development: onerous bureaucratic hurdles to business formation or formalization, burdensome taxation, lack of capital and excessive government meddling in price determination all deter and hurt entrepreneurs. To overcome these problems, countries in transition like China, Vietnam or Singapore—and countries in crisis, like Bolivia in the 1980s—have taken important legal and regulatory steps to foster the creation and success of small and microenterprises. No single path of reform may be appropriate for Cuba. But there is ample precedent regarding both the timing and types of reforms needed to spur small and microenterprise creation and on the role that multilateral organizations, international aid organizations and international NGOs can play.

Removing these specific restriction on the economy solveCSG ’11 [April/2011, The Cuba Study Group (CSG) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization comprised of business and community leaders of Cuban descent who share a common interest and vision of a free and prosperous Cuba. The CSG mission is to facilitate a peaceful reunification of the Cuban nation that would lead to a free and open society with respect for human rights, the rule of law and a market-based economy. “Supporting Small Business in Cuba: Recommendations for Private and Public Sector Leaders,” http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=0fbe7312-0bcc-4369-8c1e-b4f1680f1837]

B y loosening restrictions on remittances and travel to Cuba, the Obama Administration acknowledged that U.S. policies could affect the economic reform process in Cuba. Within months, the true scope of authorized activities will become clear as individuals and organizations take advantage of the new provisions to support micro and small businesses in Cuba. However, more can be done by both the president and the Congress to further remove obstacles to the economic reform process. Modify Remittance and Export Limitations: Increase the $3,000 limit on family remittances that can be carried to Cuba by authorized travelers and/or expand the types of goods that families may legally take to Cuba to support micro entrepreneurs. Fewer limitations in these areas will make it easier for U.S. family members to provide seed capital

and in-kind contributions for start-ups. Authorize Travel by General License for NGOs and Allow Them to Open Cuban Bank Accounts: The January 28 regulations will allow U.S. full-and part-time university staff to travel to Cuba by general license. The regulations will also alow U.S.-based academic institutions to open accounts in Cuban banks with funds to support their educational programs in Cuba. A similar license for foundations and NGOs whose mission involves support for micro and small businesses would further remove obstacles. Establish New Licenses for the Provision of Services to Entrepreneurs: The president could build on existing authorizations that allow U.S. persons and institutions to pay individual Cuban scholars, musicians and artists for their works. New licenses could extend to additional groups, such as artisans or farmers, and authorize a greater scope of activities such as recording, publication, distribution, etc. Authorize Imports of Certain Goods and Services from Cuba: The president could authorize the importation of limited types of Cuban-origin goods under general or specific licenses, particularly when such authorizations could be justified as providing support for the Cuban people or democratic change in Cuba. For example, authorizing imports to the United States of agricultural products from independent farms and cooperatives in Cuba, would support those enterprises and make trade in such products more reciprocal.

Reforms in Cuba Fail

Reforms will inevitably failLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

There are game-changing events outside of Cuba’s control that can negatively affect the future success of the reforms. Cuba’s economic reforms cannot insulate the island from hurricanes, global fluctuations in food prices, nickel prices, and tourism flows, or the risk that Venezuela’s voters or their president’s poor health will sever the lifeline of petroleum that flows from Caracas to Havana. Within Cuba’s control, however, is whether the program can substantively achieve the ambitious goals set out by the Guidelines, and whether the leadership will see the process through, and bring the Cuban people along, during a period that is likely to be painful and uncertain. It is critically important that

Cuba is liberalizing the rules. But, the prospects for success should not be exaggerated . T he reforms

announced and implemented to date are unlikely to be sufficient to overcome all of Cuba’s

economic problems . Not every Cuban who is laid-off will be able to form his or her own business or find alternative employment. Not every Cuban has the skill to be self-employed or to work in an enterprise created and run by others.115 Most lack the capital or training required to start or manage such businesses. Many will continue to rely on support from relatives abroad and do jobs that are not a part of the formal economy to get by. Even though Cubans have historically learned entrepreneurial skills just to make ends meet, they still face problems—identified by observers including the Cuba Study Group,116 Dr. Archibald Ritter, Dr. Manuel Orozco and others—that make forming a business and running it profitably really difficult. Dr. Orozco explained, “The 178 [licensed] activities pertain predominantly to the service industry, yet these activities have severe limitations. For example, there are provisions to establish a paladar, but not a food manufacturing enterprise. If an entrepreneur wants to establish a manufacturing business in the food sector, such as building a food processing factory, she will need to hire cooking experts, health quality testers, marketing officials, a raw material food buyer, an accountant with legal skills to meet all regulations. The country still doesn’t have the incentives to motivate a [Cuban] national to invest $50,000 … to carry out such an enterprise, yet it will have a larger, multiplying effect than a paladar. Enterprises like this can be food suppliers to the paladars and motivate greater

competition.”117 Such findings have led Dr. Ritter among others to conclude that there is a low probability of sufficient job creation by the micro-enterprise and cooperative sectors to absorb

1,000,000 Cuban workers in the next few years, and that further liberalization will be necessary.118 More broadly, Adam Hersh, an economist at the Center for American Progress, and a scholar of economic transitions in China and Vietnam, told CDA: “The reforms proposed with respect to layoffs and self-employment and the end to the libreta are economically important … and likely to deliver general welfare benefits through improved access to goods and services. But so far the

reforms envisioned will do little to address Cuba’s fundamental economic problems in the

productive structure of the Cuban economy: inefficiency, low productivity, and antiquated

capital stock. Cuba’s challenge will be to tackle this next stage of reform while preserving its high level of development in health and education.”11

AT Links to Politics

Obama can do it unilaterally – no P/C usedPropst ’11 [2/15/11, Stephen Propst's practice focuses on U.S. export control laws, economic sanctions, and international trade policy issues. He provides firm clients with advice and representation before the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, as well as the International Trade Commission. Stephen also provides legal and policy advice with respect to legislative initiatives in the U.S. Congress that affect international trade matters. “Presidential Authority to Modify Economic Sanctions Against Cuba,” http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/57d34e80-51b8-4ee0-ae64-750f65ee7642/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55896b90-840a-42bf-8744-752a7a206333/Cuba%20Aritcle%20FINAL.pdf]

Through a complex series of federal statutes, Congress has codified the comprehensive U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba and restricted the President’s authority to suspend or terminate those sanctions

until a “transition government” is in power in Cuba. Notwithstanding these statutory requirements , the

President maintains broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of

the Cuba sanctions regime in support of particular U.S. foreign policy objectives recognized by Congress, including the provision of humanitarian support for the Cuban people and the promotion of democratic reforms. In fact, since Congress codified of the Cuba sanctions in 1996, Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama have each exercised this authority to ease the scope of restrictions applicable to Cuba, without action or approval by Congress. This executive authority to modify the Cuba sanctions is grounded in Constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions that empower the President and the responsible executive branch agencies to grant exceptions to the sanctions through executive actions, regulations and licenses. The authority is particularly broad in certain areas, such as telecommunications-related transactions and humanitarian donations, where Congress has explicitly granted discretion to the President under existing statutes. Consistent with the relevant statutory authorities and restrictions, as well as statutory statements of U.S. policy objectives, the President arguably has sufficient legal authority to make the following types of additional changes to the current U.S. sanctions against Cuba: • Establishing “general licenses” for existing categories of travel to Cuba that are currently authorized only by specific licenses; • Expanding existing categories of authorized travel to include new travel provisions (along the same lines as the new authorization announced on January 14, 2011 for travel related to non-academic clinics and workshops in Cuba); • Revising existing general and specific license provisions to ease or eliminate current limitations and conditions applicable to travel and remittances to Cuba; • Establishing a new general license for the provision of services to Cuba (along the same lines as the March 2010 revision that authorized services to facilitate Internet communications); • Establishing a general license for entry into U.S. ports of vessels engaged in trade with Cuba; • Permitting payment for authorized transactions with Cuba (except sales of agricultural commodities or products) to be financed through letters of credit or other financing arrangements issued, confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions (but subject to statutory restrictions on the extension of credit for transactions involving “confiscated property”); • Authorizing imports of certain goods and services from Cuba; Modifying current export control regulations to establish more favorable licensing policies for additional categories of items that may be exported under specific licenses; • Establishing additional license exceptions for exports of U.S.-origin goods to Cuba; and • Expanding the availability of existing license exceptions to cover additional categories of exports and easing conditions and limitations on the use of those exceptions.

Travel restrictions can specifically be done by the presidentPropst ’11 [2/15/11, Stephen Propst's practice focuses on U.S. export control laws, economic sanctions, and international trade policy issues. He provides firm clients with advice and representation before the U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce, as well as the International Trade Commission. Stephen also provides legal and policy advice with respect to legislative initiatives in the U.S. Congress that affect international trade matters. “Presidential Authority to Modify Economic Sanctions Against Cuba,” http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/57d34e80-51b8-4ee0-ae64-750f65ee7642/Preview/PublicationAttachment/55896b90-840a-42bf-8744-752a7a206333/Cuba%20Aritcle%20FINAL.pdf]

The CACR currently require specific licenses issued by OFAC in order to engage in a number of categories of non-tourist travel. The President has discretion to modify those provisions of the CACR to authorize those categories of travel pursuant to general licenses, such that travelers would not be required to obtain specific written authorization before traveling. President Obama made this type of change in 2009 and again in 2011, when his administration revised the CACR to authorize certain types of family, educational and religious travel by general licenses rather than by specific licenses. The categories of travelers that currently require specific licenses, but that could be changed to general licenses include: • Freelance journalists;88 • Professional researchers undertaking research or for professionals attending professional meetings and not qualifying for the general license;89 • Amateur and semi-professional athletes selected by U.S. sports federations to participate in competitions under the auspices of international sports federations, where the competition is open for attendance and, where relevant, participation by the Cuban public; for participation in public performances, athletic, and other competitions and exhibitions, which must be open for attendance and, in relevant situations, participation by the Cuban public and any profits must be donated to independent Cuban NGOs or U.S.-based charities;90 • Recognized human rights organizations; activities of independent organizations designed to promote the transition to democracy; and activities of individuals and NGOs that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in Cuba;91 • Persons engaged in humanitarian projects in, or related to, Cuba (and not otherwise covered by the CACR), such as medical and health-related projects, environmental projects, projects involving non-formal educational training, community-based grassroots projects, projects suitable for development of small-scale enterprise, projects related to agriculture and rural development, and projects to meet basic human needs;92 • Private foundations and research or educational institutes with established interest in international relations to collect information related to Cuba for noncommercial purposes;93 Persons engaged in travel-related transactions incident to the exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational materials;94 and • Persons involved in travel-related transactions in connection with the marketing, sales negotiation, accompanied delivery, or servicing of exports to Cuba authorized by the Commerce Department (beyond those travel-related transactions already authorized pursuant to general licenses).95

CP popular with CubaLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

Nevertheless, we believe that the political dynamic of the Cuban American community has already

shifted —many have moved from supporting isolation and aggression toward the island’s government to building on family ties and helping their relatives prosper and live more autonomous lives in Cuba’s new economic environment.

Drug Trafficking

1NC Solvency Advocate

Normative Solvency AdvocateDPA ‘13 [The Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) is the nation's leading organization promoting drug policies that are grounded in science, compassion, health and human rights. “Marijuana Legalization and Regulation,” http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana-legalization-and-regulation]

Marijuana should be removed from the criminal justice system and regulated in a manner similar to alcohol and tobacco. Legalizing and regulating marijuana will bring the nation's largest cash crop under the rule of law, creating jobs and economic opportunities in the formal economy instead of the illicit market. Scarce law enforcement resources that could be better used to protect public safety would be preserved while reducing corrections and court costs. State and local governments would acquire significant new sources of tax revenue from regulating marijuana sales. The criminalization of marijuana use disproportionately harms young people and people of color, sponsors massive levels of violence and corruption, and fails to curb youth access. The Drug Policy Alliance advocates marijuana legalization through a well-regulated market for marijuana production and distribution. We seek to enact change on the state and federal level through ongoing legislative efforts and through high-profile ballot initiatives in upcoming election cycles. DPA helped lead the historic campaign in 2010 to support Proposition 19 in California. In 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first U.S. states -- and the first political jurisdictions anywhere in the world -- to approve measures legalizing and regulating marijuana similar to alcohol. DPA worked closely with local and national allies to draft these initiatives, build coalitions and raise funds.

AT Latin American Demand

Latin American countries are in the process of legalization nowSiegel ’12 [3/27/12, Adam Siegel is a researcher in Eurasia Group's Latin America practice. “America’s drug war partners are speaking their minds,” http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/27/america_s_drug_war_partners_are_speaking_their_minds?wp_login_redirect=0]

Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos is likely to open the Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena next month with a standard welcome for Barack Obama and the 33 other leaders of the Western Hemisphere, but maybe there's a more fitting greeting for the U.S. president: "This is an intervention." After decades of partnering with the U.S. to pursue an aggressive, often controversial 'war on drugs,' a number of Latin American leaders say they're ready to discuss major shifts in regional anti-drug policy . Some of them have begun talk of

"decriminalization" -- and they want to do it at the Summit, where the United States will have no choice but to talk up the

merits of the prohibition policies it has long favored. The former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico generated headlines in 2009 by jointly declaring that "the war on drugs has failed" and calling for decriminalization of marijuana, but the commentary was dismissed in some quarters as an easy argument to make for men no longer politically accountable as heads of state. Since then, however, several sitting Latin American leaders (on both the left and right) have called for candid debate of current drug policy. Among them: Mexico's Felipe Calderon, Costa Rica's Laura Chinchilla, Argentina's Cristina Kirchner, Guatemala's Otto Perez Molina, and Colombia's Santos -- who told Britain's The Observer last year that "A new approach should try and take away the violent profit that comes with drug trafficking...

If that means legalizing, and the world thinks that's the solution, I will welcome it." Santos' caveat -- "[if] the world thinks that's the solution" -- nods to the global reach of Latin America's drug trafficking organizations, underscoring the desire for a debate that includes producers and consumers (who are concentrated in the U.S. and Europe). This distinction is important; indeed, personal consumption of drugs like marijuana and cocaine is already technically decriminalized in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia, while the total number of convictions for personal drug possession in Guatemala and Argentina combined was just 161 in 2009, according to the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. So when an ex-military general like Perez or a former defense minister like Santos talks about decriminalization, it's not because they care so much about personal liberties. Rather, they have one major goal in mind: choking off the resources that fuel drug cartels and the violence they practice. As Perez explained recently in advance of a Central American conference on alternative drug strategy sponsored by his administration in Antigua, "drugs are expensive precisely because they are prohibited...traffickers will lose if they cease to be profitable." While no detailed proposal is yet on the table, his idea of decriminalization is clear: create a legal framework to make the production and transport of cocaine legal, at least throughout Central America -- a region through which approximately 80 percent of the cocaine heading to the United States stops. Bringing the business of this $37 billion industry out into the open, it is assumed, would reduce the imperative of traffickers to corrupt public officials and their need to use violence against both governments and rivals for access to the best trafficking routes.

AT Mexico Reforms Solve

Nothing Meixco can do can solve – legalization in the US is the only solutionWakefield ’13 [1/12/13, mary Wakefield is a writer for the Spectator. “Stop the drugs war Legalisation is Mexico’s only hope,” http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/8813601/stop-the-drugs-war/]

There’s the question: for what? Felipe Calderon was once convinced he had the answer: to crack down on the kingpins; restore moral order. But Calderon’s war had a pretty clear outcome: the bad

guys won . Capos were shot, but their cartels just split and proliferated: more gang warfare, more severed heads dumped on

beaches; more corpses carved up and left on busy streets for kids to gawp at; extortion, kidnap, rape. It soon became clear even to Calderon that the ‘war on drugs’ was unwinnable, for the simple reason that the cause of the mayhem is not in Mexico, it’s in the States . For as long as there are American

junkies, Mexico will pay the blood price for their addiction. This has been the status quo for the past few decades, and as far as I could tell on my Mexican adventure last year, Maria was right: no one expected Peña Nieto to change much of anything. He belongs to the PRI — the Institutional Revolutionary Party, which ruled Mexico for most of the past century, and its approach to the cartels has been a blind eye. But late last year, there was a new twist: America, having spent billions on Calderon’s daft crusade, last month voted to legalise cannabis in some states (if the federal government gives them the OK). Colorado and Washington started it, California is keen to follow suit, and Oregon, Rhode Island, Maine and Vermont aren’t far behind. It creates an irony that the Mexican president is puzzling over: some 40 per cent of the cartels’ business is selling cannabis across the

border, so why should Mexico bust a gut keeping it from getting to America, if it’s legal there? This new legislation , said one

of Peña Nieto’s advisers cautiously, ‘ changes the rules of the game’. It does, and it also creates an opportunity, though one that Peña Nieto might not welcome. If the Mexican president is brave enough, he could not just follow the new rules, but perhaps change the game. He could follow the lead of President Otto Pérez Molina of Guatemala, who has asked the question: if fighting doesn’t work, why not legalise drugs instead? Molina is a former head of the intelligence services who has himself tried the iron-fist approach to gangs, but now he says the price paid in human lives is too high. ‘It’s time to end the myths, the taboos, and discuss legalisation.’ Perhaps it sounds like a dramatic step. It’s certainly one America would oppose with every star and stripe, because to legalise drugs in Mexico would be to push the fight alarmingly close to their border. But then, even as a tourist there, you can see Mexico requires a dramatic step. To say that the police aren’t effective is an almost comic understatement. It’s not just that there are good cops and bad cops; it’s that it’s impossible to tell the difference. Take this little tangle. Last year, in June, there was a shootout in the food court of Mexico City airport, Terminal 2. Three police officers who suspected another three of drug-smuggling went (they say) to make an arrest. The drug-running cops opened fire, killed the good cops, then skipped off scot-free, leaving clumps of traumatised Texan tourists shivering under canteen tables, vowing never to leave Dallas again. It later turned out that the runaway cops were in fact the good guys. They had been about to expose all the other cops as drug-smugglers, and had been shot at as a result. All 348 airport cops were later re-shuffled to other states. If you think perhaps the answer to Mexico’s troubles is a tougher army, then I’d like to introduce you to Los Zetas. They are often also described as the paramilitary wing of the older Gulf Cartel, but that hasn’t been true for a while. In 2010 they bit off the hand that fed them, formed their own gang, and began to show their rivals the true meaning of brutality. The Zetas specialise in the butchering of children. They have been phenomenally successful, just recently overtaking the famous Sinaloa cartel and dominating the country. How have they managed this? Because they came from the army, from Mexico’s equivalent of the SAS. They were trained by American and Israeli special forces in intimidation, ambushing and marksmanship, just to fight the drug gangs. Then they upped and formed one. The Zetas still recruit from Mexico’s special forces and from the Guatemalan equivalent, the Kaibiles. The more cash America puts into training the Mexican army, the happier the Zetas are, purring over all the potential new recruits. So there aren’t really many other alternatives. Why not legalise drugs? It wouldn’t be giving up, it would be winning without fighting — the best, cleverest way. The cartels would be forced above ground; the big money would be in legitimate

business. The psychos, like Rosario Reta (opposite), would no longer be required, and who knows, the police might once again become an effective force.

2NC – War on Drugs Fail

Prohibition fails – new drugs pop out everywhereMolina ’12 [4/7/12, Otto Perez Molina is the president of Guatamala. “We have to find new solutions to Latin America's drugs nightmareNarcotics should be legally available – in a highly regulated market, argues the president of Guatemala,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/07/latin-america-drugs-nightmare]

So, decades of big arrests and the seizure of tons of drugs and yet consumption and production of damaging substances are booming. The fall in the consumption of one drug is rapidly undermined by the rise in demand for another. In the same vein, the destruction of drug production in one territory is quickly replaced by the increase of drug production in another. The causes for drug

consumption seem to multiply over time, as do the incentives for drug production . This is not a frustrating

fact. It is just a fact.

The war on drugs have failed – prohibition will never workSorj [“Drugs and Democracy – toward a paradigm shift – Statement by the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy,” http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_ingles_site.pdf]

Violence and the organized crime associated with the narcotics trade are critical problems in Latin America today. Confronted with a situation that is growing worse by the day, it is imperative to rectify the “war on drugs” strategy pursued in the region over the past 30 years. Prohibitionist policies based on the eradication of production and on the disruption of drug flows as well as on the criminalization of consumption have not yielded the expected results . We are farther than ever from the announced goal of eradicating drugs. A realistic evaluation indicates that: Latin America remains the major global exporter of cocaine and cannabis, has become a growing producer of opium and heroin, and is developing the capacity to produce synthetic drugs; The levels of drug consumption continue to grow in Latin America while there is a tendency toward stabilization in North America and Europe. The in-depth revision of current drug policies is even more urgent in Latin America in light of their enormous human and social costs and threats to democratic institutions. Over the past decades we have witnessed: A rise in organized crime caused both by the international narcotics trade and by the growing control exercised by criminal groups over domestic markets and territories; A growth in unacceptable levels of drug-related violence affecting the whole of society and, in particular, the poor and the young; The criminalization of politics and the politicization of crime, as well as the proliferation of the linkages between them, as reflected in the infiltration of democratic institutions by organized crime; The corruption of public servants, the judicial system, governments, the political system and, especially the police forces in charge of enforcing law and order.

2NC AT No Model

Regulation isn’t that hardNORML ’10 [3/5/10, The National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws. “Real World Ramifications of Cannabis Legalization and Decriminalization,” http://norml.org/pdf_files/NORML_Real_World_Ramifications_Legalization.pdf]

Defining Marijuana Legalization/Regulation What would marijuana regulation look like? There are many models of regulation; depending on the substance being regulated these regulations can be very loose (apples, tomatoes) or very strict (alcohol, tobacco, prescription drugs) The alcohol model of regulation: Commercial production is limited to licensed producers (though non-retail, home production is also allowed) Quality control and potency is regulated by the state, and the potency of the product is made publicly available to the consumer Retail sale of the product is limited to state licensed distributors (liquor stores, restaurants, bars, package stores, etc.) The state imposes strict controls on who may obtain the product (no minors), where they may legally purchase it (package store, liquor store, etc.), when they may legally purchase it (sales limited to certain hours of the day), and how much they may purchase at one time (bars/restaurants may not legally service patrons who are visibly intoxicated, states like Pennsylvania limit how much alcohol a patron may purchase at a licensed store, etc.). The state imposes strict regulations prohibiting use in public (no open container in public parks, or beaches, or in an automobile) and/or furnishing the product to minors The state imposes strict regulations limiting the commercial advertising of the product (limits have been imposed on the type of marketing and where such marketing may appear) States and counties retain the right to revoke the retail sale of the product, or certain types of alcohol (grain alcohol, malt liquor, etc), altogether (dry counties)

2NC Solves Relations

CP solves Latin American relations – all leaders want thisSerrano ‘13 [1/7/13, Aflonso Serrano is a Senior Editor at Time.com. “U.S. Marijuana Laws Ricochet Through Latin America,” http://world.time.com/2013/01/07/u-s-marijuana-laws-ricochet-through-latin-america/]

President Obama has yet to deliver a clear response to the November decision by Colorado and Washington to legalize recreational marijuana use — asked whether the government would enforce federal laws that override the verdict of those states’ referendums, he answered simply that he has “bigger fish to fry.” But leaders from across Latin America responded within days of the Colorado and Washington vote, demanding a review of drug-war policies that have mired the region in violence. Latin American decisionmakers are now openly questioning why they should continue to sacrifice police and soldiers to enforce drug laws when legal markets for marijuana now exist in the U.S. “Everyone is asking, What sense does it make to keep up such an intense confrontation, which has cost Mexico so much, by trying to keep this substance from going to a country where it’s already regulated and permitted?” says Fernando Belaunzarán, a Congressman from Mexico’s opposition Democratic Revolutionary Party who introduced a marijuana-legalization measure in the legislature a week after the U.S. elections. The measure, Belaunzarán tells TIME, is modeled on the Washington State law and would put the federal government in charge of marijuana production, regulation and sales. The Congressman says he expects the lower house to convene public hearings on marijuana legalization by May 2013. Belaunzarán joins a growing list of Latin American leaders calling for a change in the drug-war paradigm — one that considers drug decriminalization and legalization as alternatives to the U.S.-led prohibitionist model, the enforcement of which has helped turn swathes of Latin America into the world’s most violent regions. Shortly after the U.S. elections, former Mexican President Felipe Calderón, along with leaders from Honduras, Belize and Costa Rica, said the U.N. General Assembly should hold a special session on drug prohibition by 2015. They also called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to study the impact of current drug policy in the region. That OAS review, well under way, is expected to be concluded in June.

AT Links to Ptx

Obama would not tie himself to the CPCalmes ’12 [4/14/12, Jackie Calmes is a writer for the New York Times. “Obama Says Legalization Is Not the Answer on Drugs,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/americas/obama-says-legalization-is-not-the-answer-on-drugs.html]

In his turn, Mr. Obama said, “I think it is entirely legitimate to have a conversation about whether the laws in place are ones that are doing more harm than good in certain places.” But, he added, “I personally, and my administration’s position, is that legalization is not the answer.” Drug operations could come to “dominate certain countries if they were allowed to operate legally without any constraint,” he said, and “could be just as corrupting if not more corrupting then the status quo.”

Mexican Economy

1NC

Text: Mexico should adopt secondary laws to enforce the enactment of the constitutional reform of telecommunications, radio broadcasting, and economic competition.

Solves Mexico’s economyO'Neill 13 (Shannon K., Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, "Economic Change on Mexico's Horizon", March 25 2013, www.cfr.org/mexico/economic-change-mexicos-horizon/p30311)President Peña Nieto's economic reforms are targeting the big empires of the country's telecommunications sector. Can you give some background on the industry? What is his goal in this sector?¶ For the last twenty plus years, Mexico's telecommunications industry has been basically in the hands of Carlos Slim. Whether it's Telmex, which is fixed line, or Telcel, which is mobile, his companies have controlled 70 to 80 percent of the market. By all independent accounts, this has had huge costs

for Mexico's economy , particularly for consumers and businesses , which pay much higher rates for

their telephone needs.¶ The other big cost is underinvestment in the telecoms sector . When you look at Mexico vis-à-vis other OECD countries, as well as its emerging market peers—China or Korea or Brazil—Mexico falls behind in telecom infrastructure investment. This includes new types of connections, such as Internet and broadband. Indeed, by some measures, the country even falls behind places likes Zimbabwe and Serbia. That lack of access to the digital age has real costs for businesses and innovation.¶ The Televisa broadcaster is another one of the empires being targeted by these reforms.

Bill won’t be successful until secondary laws are implemented—it actually hurts the economy nowEstevez 13 (Dolia, Senior Mexico Correspondent and foreign affairs analyst in DC, Senior Advisor for the U.S.-Mexico Journalism Initiative at the Woodrow Wilson Center, "Mexico's Congress Passes Monopoly-Busting Telecom Bill, Threatening Tycoon Carlos Slim's Business Empire", May 1 2013, www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2013/05/01/mexicos-congress-passes-monopoly-busting-telecom-bill-threatening-tycoon-carlos-slims-business-empire/)Mexico’s Congress on Tuesday overwhelming passed the final version of a far-reaching telecommunication reform bill designed to boost competition in Mexico’s phone and television industry, which is now controlled by the world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, and fellow billionaire Emilio Azcarraga Jean. The new law was approved almost unanimously, with 108 votes in favor and three against. It gives the Federal Institute of Telecommunications, a new regulatory autonomous body formed by seven regulators, the power to revoke operating licenses for monopolistic practices and to stop companies from controlling more than 50% of market share.¶ Slim’s America Movil (NYSE: AMX) controls 80% of Mexico’s landline phone market and 70 % of the wireless market, while billionaire Azcarraga Jean’s Televisa (SAB) captures close to 70% of Mexico’s television audience. Forced assets sales, however, will not be automatic if companies are declared dominant by the competition regulator. Companies that are fined or told to sell off assets by the new federal competition commission will have the right to lodge appeals to suspend these decisions, a tactic companies have used to fight competition rulings in the past.The new legislation “could materially affect the business of America Movil, ” the company said in a U.S. regulatory filing on April 30th, according to Reuters. On a call with analysts earlier in April, America Movil’s executives said the company would not make any strategic changes until it knows the details of the secondary laws to follow, added the news agency. America Movil expects

the reforms to take effect sometime in 2014, since it needs to be approved by legislatures in the majority of Mexico’s 31 states. The Mexican Congress also needs to draw up secondary legislation to implement the new rules. Some analysts believe that uncertainty over the bill has been a drag on the share prices of

America Movil and Televisa .

Solvency—Generic

CP means telecommunications are more efficient and competitiveBMO 13 (Business Mexico Online, "Mexico's Telecommunications reform 'is a reality today: Pena Nieto", June 11, 2013, business-mexico-online.com/mexico´s-telecommunications-reform-is-a-reality-today-pena-nieto/)President Enrique Peña Nieto yesterday signed a presidential decree enacting the constitutional reform of telecommunications, radio broadcasting and economic competition, opening the sector to foreign investment and paving the way for the legislature to pass secondary enabling legislation.¶ The constitutional reform will permit up to 100 percent foreign ownership of telecommunications and satellite communications companies in Mexico. It will also permit foreign investment up to 49 percent in radio broadcasting, in which foreign investment formerly was prohibited, provided there is reciprocity in the country where the foreign investor company is registered.¶ In announcing the reform, Peña Nieto said the reform is based on six principals:¶ 1) Increased rights of users of telecommunications and radio broadcast services by making the sector a “public service of general interest” for the country.¶ 2) Updating the legal framework of the telecommunications industry to provide better legal certainty with a single law covering services, networks and the spectrum through federal concessions.¶ 3) Two new autonomous constitutionally-ordained agencies will be created: The Federal Telecommunications Institute and the Federal Economic Competition Commission, the latter to replace the current Competition Commission.¶ 4) Foreign investment will be permitted up to 100 percent in telecommunications and satellite communications, and up to 49 percent in radio broadcasting.¶ 5) A federal policy of “universal digital inclusion” that will develop infrastructure, access and high-speed connectivity to permit broad use of digital technology throughout Mexico.¶ 6) Wider coverage nationally through fiber optic broadband infrastructure.¶ “Businesses win, because they can be more efficient, to be able to count on better products at lower costs,” said Peña Nieto.

“Mexico wins, because with a modern telecommunications sector and more competition in general, the entire economy will be more productive and more competitive internationally.”¶ Carlos Slim, the world´s second wealthiest person behind Microsoft´s Bill Gates, is widely seen as being the big loser in the telecommunications reform. Slim´s América Móvil cellular and fixed-line telephone carrier has long had a near monopoly on the Mexican market. With operations in 18 countries, more than 263 million mobile customers and more than 30 million fixed lines, according to the company website, América Móvil is the largest wireless service provider in Latin America and the third largest in the world.

Solvency—Telecom K2 MexEcon

The telecom sector is the backbone of a strong Mexican economy—spills-over to all sectorsMariscal 02(Judith, professor at CIDE, a Mexican research institution, “Unfinished Business: Telecommunications Reform in Mexico”)¶ Technological innovations occurred simultaneously with a new phase of internationalization of the world economy and the

increasing participation of information components in the production system (Wellenius, 1989). This contributed to a significant growth in the demand for telecommunications services. Thus, telecommunications deregulation is also a process of gaining comparative advantage in the information technology sector and increasing overall competitiveness in the world market. Telecommunications reform emerged as the pivotal exemplar of the broader modernization program given the awareness that telecommunications became the backbone of a strong economy. The vitality of important and social activities—such as banking, healthcare, information services, transportation, and education—are dependent on adequate telecom infrastructure and service.¶ Recognition of the pirvotal role played by telecommunications in the global economy was accompanied by initiatives to liberalize previously monopolistic telecommunications industries, and in some cases to privatize government-owned Public Telecommunications Organizations (PTOs). Through the privatization of PTOs, governments attained investment for this sector’s modernization and, in virtually all national cases, associated local capital with foreign investors that had the necessary expertise and experience in operating telecommunications networks. Moreover, privatization achieved benefits for the entire economy. Wellenius

(1993) summarizes some of the general motives behind privatization of PTOs: the need to attract private (especially foreign) capital, reduce public debt, and develop a domestic capital market.¶ All of these reasons were present,

with a varying degree of importance, in the Mexican case. Private, foreign capital, and technological expertise came into the telephone industry initially through the joint venture between the Mexican Grupo Carso, Southwestern Bell, and France Telecom that acquired Telmex, and later in other joint ventures entering the long distance market. Developing a domestic capital market was an important issue in the privatization process in Mexico. With the sale of Telmex the Mexican government was able to issue shares in the domestic market that were accessible to international investors either directly or through a country fund. Telmex’s privatization contributed in a significant way to the reduction of public debt. In fact, in the context of a fiscal crisis, maximizing the sale price of Telmex was an important government objective during the process of reform.

It’s a key sector—

a. CompetitionRoetter 13(Dr. Martyn, independent technology and management consultant has extensive experience in North and South America, Europe, and Asia. He assists public- and private-sector clients reach decisions regarding technology investments, spectrum management, business plans, and public policies., "Mexico's bold telecom reform offers lessons for north of the border", about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/mexicos-bold-telecom-reform-offers-lessons-for-north-of-the-border/)On March 11, 2013, Mexico’s new president announced a fundamental and sweeping set of reforms in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. The reforms are aimed at transforming the dynamics of and introducing effective competition into these key sectors of the economy . Until now, in Mexico these markets

have been dominated by a combination of a quasi-monopoly in telecommunications and a duopoly in broadcasting, although the sector ostensibly has been liberalized.¶ The reforms would not be possible without strong leadership from the president and broad agreement among all major political parties on the imperative for transformation. The proposed reforms are impressive in terms of their breadth and depth and the comprehensiveness and interlocking nature of the measures that are proposed. They provide an example of the kinds of changes—and the types of cooperation and will at the political level

—that are required to have an impact on powerful entrenched interests motivated to protect and perpetuate a status quo.¶ Today other countries, including the United States, need comparable pro-competitive initiatives in their telecommunications and media sectors. Otherwise they will not keep up with best-in-class nations that have been pursuing more productive public policies and creating regulatory environments for broadband that are more sensitive to the interests of customers than are the current market leaders on the supply side of network services.

b. Market emergence and GDPGuillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform¶ How vital is it for emerging economies to provide their citizens with mobile and Internet services at affordable prices? At first glance, the issue may seem secondary, perhaps even trivial,compared with developments in more traditional sectors such as automobiles, steel or financial

services. But Mexico’s emergence as a major economy will be determined, in no small measure, by its ability to provide mobile phone and Internet services at prices that its citizens can easily afford, experts say.¶ For Mexico, the second-largest economy in Latin America, there has been plenty of positive news during the past decade. From 2004 through 2012, the country experienced average annual GDP growth of 2.7%, achieving a record-high pace of 7.6% in June 2010 after sinking to a record low of -9.6% in June 2009. Buoyed by the economic recovery of the United States, by far its largest trading partner, Mexico enjoyed growth of 3.9% in 2012, and it is on pace to achieve about 3.5% this year.¶ And yet, times could have been much better for Mexico if only the country’s telecom sector weren’t so over-priced and inefficient, economists agree. Between 2005 and

2009, Mexico’s “dysfunctional” telecommunications sector deprived Mexico of an estimated $129.2 billion each year -- or 1.8% of its GDP -- according to a January 2012 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), of which Mexico is a member.

Solvency—International

CP allows Mexico to be internationally competitive Guillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", citing Barbara Kotschwar, research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)**OECD=Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentBarbara Kotschwar, research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, says that “Mexico is incredibly uncompetitive in telecom.” As Kotschwar points out, Mexico is the eighth-largest nation in the OECD, but it is

34th – dead last among OECD members – when it comes to fixed lines per 100 inhabitants. In the mobile sector, Mexico is the fifth-largest OECD member in total number of subscribers but when it comes to mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants, Mexico is 33rd of the 34 OECD members. Kotschwar adds, “These telecom reforms are necessary if Mexico is to compete” in this sector -- not just in fixed lines and mobile service, but also Internet broadband.¶ According to the 2012 OECD Review of

Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Mexico, “Mexico, in particular, needs the economic boost which high-capacity Internet access can provide. It has the lowest GDP per capita among OECD countries, equivalent to 31% of the GDP per capita of the United States, and has a very uneven distribution in regional GDP per capita. GDP per hour worked [labor productivity] is 2.5 times less than the OECD average and represents [with Chile] the lowest among OECD countries.… At the same time, 36% of the population is rural in Mexico, compared to the OECD average of 26%. Mexico is also characterized by relatively high inequality in income distribution.”

Solvency—Foreign Investment

Enforcing telecom reforms create more sustainable business relationships with foreign parties that resolve inefficiencies and competitionKraiem et al 13 (Ruben, Arturo Valenzuela, Gabriel Mesa, Cecile Zwlebach, all members of Covington and Burling, an international law firm that provides corporate, litigation, and regulatory expertise, "MEXICO ENACTS COMPREHENSIVE REFORM IN ITS TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST MEDIA SECTORS1", June 13 2013, www.cov.com/files/Publication/faf3bf2f-510f-4694-9ec4-090ff046bbec/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f9af95ce-95a6-4579-b845-0fe22533afd0/Mexico_Enacts_Comprehensive_Reform_in_its_Telecommunications_and_Broadcast_Media_Sectors.pdf)Permitting up to 100% foreign ownership of companies engaged in telecommunications services, ¶ including satellite communications. Up to 49% ownership will be allowed in radio and television ¶ broadcasting, subject to a requirement of reciprocity. ¶ The requirement that Mexican nationals own beneficially a majority of the voting shares in ¶ companies engaged in telecommunications services, including satellite communication, and ¶ otherwise have effective control of those companies, has been a deterrent to new investment, ¶ even though foreigners have been permitted to hold additional shares of capital stock to

reflect a ¶ larger economic participation. Breaking with that policy will eliminate important distortions and ¶

inefficiencies that have typified contractual and business relationships between Mexican and ¶ foreign parties in the sector. It will also open the door for new entrants to acquire and ¶ recapitalize existing market participants who have thus far been unable to compete effectively ¶ with the incumbents. This represents an important opportunity for prospective foreign investors¶ in these sectors to participate in these businesses on markedly different terms than those ¶ previously available and with full control over their own strategic direction, intellectual property,¶ and financial investment. The partial opening of the broadcast media sector is also a substantial ¶ step in the direction of greater competition.

Cheaper prices attract foreign investment—smaller firms are key to check monopoliesGuillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", citing Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)The Role of the Regulator¶ How will the reforms attempt to bridge the gap between Mexico and more productive OECD nations? “The telecoms reform is far-reaching and revolutionary,” notes Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow

Wilson Center, in part because it will create a new independent regulatory body that will have the power to restrain companies that have

more than 50% of the market. In addition, it will open markets to new, smaller firms. “At its most extreme, the regulator will

have the power to break up dominant firms, forcing them to sell assets,” Wood explains. “But the regulator will also possess the power to set maximum prices for interconnections, currently seen as being a severe obstacle to the emergence of rival firms in the fixed-line and wireless market.” Another significant dimension of the reform, Wood

adds, is that foreign ownership limits in the phone market will be eliminated, allowing 100% foreign-owned firms to enter the market.¶ During the late 1990s, several foreign firms attempted to challenge the market dominance of Slim’s Telmex and Telcel, only to discover that they were seriously hampered by foreign ownership restrictions and pricing issues. Under the new rules, the path will presumably be wide open for foreign competition to impel Slim’s companies to lower their prices. The new laws apply not only to the fixed-line and wireless sectors but also to television stations. The reform laws “represent an assault on the interests of the two dominant television companies in Mexico, Televisa and TV Azteca, both of which were heavily criticized during the election campaign for throwing their support behind Peña Nieto,” says Wood.¶ Amy Glover, senior advisor at McLarty Associates, a Washington-based international

strategic advisory firm, notes that “these issues have been studied thoroughly” at the OECD, and there is a consensus about “what needs to be done for the Mexican economy to grow stronger.”

Internal NB—US Model

CP is a wake-up call to US telecommunications policy—solves market competition and innovationRoetter 13(Dr. Martyn, independent technology and management consultant has extensive experience in North and South America, Europe, and Asia. He assists public- and private-sector clients reach decisions regarding technology investments, spectrum management, business plans, and public policies., "Mexico's bold telecom reform offers lessons for north of the border", about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/mexicos-bold-telecom-reform-offers-lessons-for-north-of-the-border/)Until now Mexico has not seemed to be a place to emulate in terms of its public policies with regard to economic sectors such as telecommunications or the prices and performance of its network services. However, if the policies for Telecommunications Reform outlined above are implemented and enforced effectively over the next few years then it may be time to

think seriously about what can and should be learned from Mexico and even applied to the United States, as

well as to developing economies.¶ Mexico’s bold attempt to break free of stultifying economic imbalances should serve as a wake-up call to U.S. telecommunications policy makers and analysts. They need to address much more directly the economic imbalances and retrograde economic ideology that are hobbling the U.S. telecommunications and media sectors, where support from the largest companies for “free markets” is in practice their endeavor to legalize unfettered corporate behavior. Their goal is camouflaged under the battle cry that “deregulation” is key to removing the allegedly inherently destructive and incompetent hand of Government from their legitimate and valuable business initiatives that deliver enormous value to the economy and to their customers. Their argument is that all Government regulations are inevitably bound to be burdensome and stifle innovation as well as entail higher and unnecessary costs that will have to be passed on to their customers. While some existing regulations are damaging economically with no compensating benefit for

consumers and inhibit entrepreneurial initiatives, not all of them are, and future ones need not be. There are notable instances where only regulatory action has enabled the flourishing of innovations that often originate as is inherent in their nature from unpredictable sources, and the emergence of new, value-creating business models. The opening of telecommunications markets in the United States in the last few decades of the last century and limiting

the power of the then AT&T is a most striking example of the benefits of and need for intelligent regulation. The flourishing of internet-based services and applications would have been severely inhibited if they had been left up to unrestricted and unchallengeable decisions and the tender mercies of the incumbent large network operators of that time.

That’s key to US economic competitivenessCarr 13 (David, Media & Advertising writer for the New York Times, quoting Susan Crawford, a professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York who specializes in the US telecom industry, "Telecom's Big Players Hold Back the Future", May 19 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/business/media/telecoms-big-players-hold-back-the-future.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0If you were going to look for ground zero in the fight against a rapidly consolidating telecom and cable industry, you might end up on the fifth floor of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York.¶ Susan Crawford, a professor at the school, has written a book, “Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age,” that offers a calm but chilling state-of-play on the information age in the United States. She is on a permanent campaign, speaking at schools, conferences and companies — she was at Google last week — and in front of Congress, asserting that the status quo has been great for providers but an expensive mess for everyone else.¶ Ms. Crawford argues that the airwaves, the cable systems and even access to the Internet have been overtaken by monopolists who resist innovation and chronically overcharge consumers.¶ The 1996

Telecommunications Act, which was meant to lay down track to foster competition in a new age, allowed cable companies and telecoms to simply divide markets and merge their way to monopoly. If you are looking for the answer to why much of the developed world has cheap, reliable connections to the Internet while America seems just one step ahead of the dial-up era, her office — or her book — would be a good place to find out.¶ In a recent conversation, she explained that wired and wireless connections, building blocks of modern life, are now essentially controlled by four companies. Comcast and Time Warner have a complete lock on broadband in the markets they control, covering some 50 million American homes, while Verizon and AT&T own 64 percent of cellphone service. Don’t get her started on the Comcast-NBCUniversal merger unless you have some time on your hands.¶ But don’t look for a jeremiad, either. A violist who plays in string quartets when she is not hammering telecom companies, Ms. Crawford is precise in her arguments and far from frantic in making them. The captains of industry who kidnapped telecoms and cable are not monsters, she says,

merely shrewd capitalists who used leverage to maximize returns, no different or worse than the railroad or electricity barons of times past.¶ “They have acted in parallel to exclude competitors and used every lever they had to gain control over their markets. My whole book is essentially an argument to buy stock in cable

companies,” she said with a laugh.¶ Her arguments don’t end there. High-capacity fiber connections to homes and businesses are not just a social good, but a business imperative, she says, and the lack of them will cripple American efforts to compete in a global economy.

Internal NB—PRI

CP is key to success of Nieto’s political agendaGuillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)A Pragmatic Consensus¶ At first glance, it may seem paradoxical that these telecom reforms – and upcoming reforms of

the financial, labor and education sectors – are the handiwork of the new administration of Pena Nieto, the first presidential candidate from the PRI (Party of Revolutionary Institutions) in 12 years. Long known for its left-leaning, authoritarian political style, the PRI ran Mexico for 71 years before losing power to the conservative PAN (National Action Party) in 2000. In part because of political opposition, neither Vicente Fox nor Felipe Calderon, the two presidents from the PAN, were as successful at pursuing a pro-market, anti-monopolistic approach as Pena Nieto already appears to have been during his short term in office. “Mexico has changed,”

notes Guillen, and the new PRI is clearly driven by pragmatism, not by ideology. “Pena Nieto needs to succeed or people might go back to the PAN. He feels pressure to succeed, like [ex-President] Lula did in Brazil,” when he steered that country toward the center of the political spectrum. “Lula changed his tune, and he was very successful.”¶ Kotschwar agrees that there is a strong consensus in Mexico about the series of pragmatic reforms that are needed in order to vault Mexico into the next stage of its economic development. “For at least a decade, people have been saying that there need to be reforms in the education, telecom and energy sectors,” as well as fiscal reforms that mean “people will have to pay more income taxes. All these reforms are absolutely necessary.”

Specifically energy reformsGuillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)Further down the road, the Pena Nieto government is expected to lay out reforms for the energy sector. “The hardest reforms will be in the oil sector , ” according to Guillen. There is strong political opposition to energy reform, given the iconic role of Pemex, the state-owned oil company, in modern Mexican history. “But telecom reform will be very popular,” and so the Pena Nieto government has moved decisively into that sector first.

Key to relations and the US economyHendricks 13 (David, business colmnist for MySA, quoting Shannon O'Neil, leading analyst of U.S.-Mexico relations and senior fellow for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Mexican energy reform would help S. Texas", April 2 2013, www.mysanantonio.com/business/business_columnists/david_hendricks/article/Mexican-energy-reform-would-help-S-Texas-4404200.phpIn the next few months, expect a proposed constitutional amendment — pushed by the Mexican president — to open the nation's energy sector to foreign participation.¶ The proposal, if it passes, would be full of historic sweep. President Enrique Peña Nieto's administration is

preparing an amendment that would apply to newer technologies and equipment than what already is employed by the

federally owned monopoly, Petróleos Mexicanos.¶ That means U.S. and other foreign drilling companies could invest in risk-sharing investments in Mexico for the first time since 1938, but only if the drilling involves shale and deep-water drilling sites.¶ So says Shannon O'Neil, a leading analyst of U.S.-Mexico relations and senior fellow for Latin America studies at the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations. Her groundbreaking book, “Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States and the Road Ahead,” is being published this week by Oxford University Press.¶ O'Neil will appear in San Antonio to discuss U.S.-Mexico relations April 16 during a World Affairs Council of San Antonio event.¶ Because the Eagle Ford Shale formation extends far into northern Mexico, the existing energy companies active in South Texas could, if the constitutional reform passes in Mexico's congress, expand their investment and drilling activity into Mexico, spreading additional economic benefits into South Texas.¶ But the Peña Nieto proposal will be “a complicated political process, a difficult fight,” O'Neil warned. Peña Nieto's party does not control a majority of Mexico's congress. Any proposal would require votes from other political parties.¶ Opening Mexico's energy sector would be only one way the U.S. and Mexico could improve formal relations to catch up to the profound economic integration that is under way, O'Neil said.¶ In fact, U.S. President Barack Obama's visit with Peña Nieto in Mexico the first week of May likely will focus more on economic issues than on the security

matters that have dominated news coverage, O'Neil predicted.¶ U.S.-Mexico trade volumes have tripled since 1994's North

American Free Trade Agreement. As Mexico's manufacturing production increases, so does manufacturing in the United States because about 40 percent of finished goods are U.S. content, O'Neil said.¶ Shared production makes U.S. corporations more competitive globally, which means employment rises in both countries, she explained.

AT: SQ Solves

Implementation is critical—initial passage of the bill won’t change the squo—CP is necessaryGuillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", citing Barbara Kotschwar, research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)Suspicions and Challenges¶ Despite the spirit of pragmatism, doubts remain about the ultimate outcome of the reforms. Kotschwar argued that the reformers “will be judged by the quality of their implementation,” rather than the popularity of their ideas. Wood noted that it will take time to develop the new institutional framework required for regulating the sector. As a result, the status quo will not likely be altered much in the next year or so. However, “The intent that has been signaled is intriguing and, if it comes to fruition, will profoundly change Mexico’s telecommunications sector.”¶ Kotschwar cautions that the multi-party Pact of Mexico behind the telecom reforms – which brought together not just the PRI and PAN, but also the PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) and the PVM (Mexican Green Party) -- could eventually fracture and Pena Nieto might find himself without enough support to get through the entire series of reforms. Regional politics could damage the coalition, since the parties in the Pact compete against one another for control of state and local governments.

Now is key—delay of secondary enactment laws means Slim can shape the proposal to his own benefitGuillen 13 (Mauro, Professor of International Management at Wharton University, Director, The Lauder Institute, "Tackling Mexico’s Dysfunctional Telecom Sector: The First Steps Toward Reform", May 29 2013, www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2360&language=english)As for Carlos Slim, some people are wondering why he has not opposed the reforms despite their impact on his vast billions in net worth. Guillen argues that Slim is “very smart” and realizes that the best way to react to the reform “is not to oppose it, but to try to shape it.” Slim, he adds, apparently realizes that the

reform is very popular, and that “if he opposes it, he loses face. He would prefer the status quo, but he knows that Pena Nieto is a moderate” and that the Mexican government is not going to take extreme measures that might seriously damage his personal wealth.

Mexico Relations

1NC

Text: the United States federal government should establish meetings with President Pena Nieto to discuss security and regional cooperation

Increased diplomatic relations allow cooperation over other aspects besides the economy – that solves and doesn’t link to politicsGoldfarb et al 13 – staff writer covering the White House, focusing on President Obama’s economic, financial and fiscal policy (Zachary, Nick Miroff overs Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean for the Washington Post, “Obama begins bilateral meeting with Peña Nieto”, May 2 of 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-begins-bilateral-meeting-with-pena-nieto/2013/05/02/07475caa-b368-11e2-9a98-4be1688d7d84_story.html)MEXICO CITY — President Obama acknowledged on Thursday that the relationship between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement and intelligence agencies is changing under new Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, who has been seeking to scale back the United States’ role in confronting drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico.¶ At the start of Obama’s three-day trip to Latin America, both leaders affirmed the depth of the relationship between the nations at a time when they are trying to forge closer economic ties and people in both countries are following immigration reform proposals in Congress.¶ But the security partnership between Mexico and the United States has been the biggest potential point of conflict between the two leaders

ahead of the meeting. With drug trafficking and the illegal transport of weapons over the border still major problems, U.S. officials are concerned that the new Mexican government seems less inclined to provide the same level of deep coordination with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies that was offered by the administration of Felipe Calderóno.¶

Peña Nieto has consolidated all law enforcement cooperation with the United States through Mexico’s Interior Ministry, reining in the wide-ranging and personal connections between U.S. and Mexican military and law enforcement officials.¶ Obama, who earlier this week reserved judgment on the new approach, said he accepts it at a news conference after a bilateral meeting.¶ “I agreed to continue our close cooperation on security even as the nature of that cooperation evolves,” he said. “It’s obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States.”¶

Mexican officials have described the changes as a common-sense streamlining of U.S. intelligence sharing, and Peña Nieto said Thursday that the hope is to be more “efficient.”

2NC Solves Relations

Diplomatic cooperation solves relations – allows both leaders to push their agendaGarza 13 – Served as U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from 2002-2009, now counsel in the Mexico City office of White & Case and Chairman of Vianovo Ventures (Antonio, “Obama Goes to Mexico: Time is Ripe to Advance Bilateral Relations”, April 29 0f 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/opinion/2013/04/29/obama-goes-to-mexico-time-is-ripe-to-advance-bilateral-relations/)This week’s meeting between Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto brings U.S.-Mexico relations to center stage. This second face-to-face between the two leaders occurs at a critical time in each presidency. Domestic reform efforts that have far-reaching implications for the bilateral agenda are underway in both countries. These include immigration reform in the U.S. and reforms to boost economic competitiveness in Mexico and though they inject

some short-term uncertainty into the relationship they also infuse it with a sense of new possibilities and opportunity.¶ Recent efforts to broaden the discourse on U.S.-Mexico relations have been largely successful—and overdue. Nevertheless,

security remains the focal point for many citizens of both countries and a primary challenge for Mexican leaders.¶ Peña Nieto campaigned on promises of a recalibrated strategy on security and the Mexican

public has been patient in granting his administration time to develop its approach. But there are risks in the pace his team seems to have adopted, including mounting skepticism —at home and to some extent in the U.S.— that the issue has not been given the priority it deserves. Mexican officials emphasize their commitment is strong and encompasses efforts to reduce violence, protect human rights and construct a rule of law that supports a more open and competitive economy.¶ Now near the 150-day mark of his six-year term, Peña Nieto has pushed through a number of long-awaited reforms —to labor, education and telecommunications— and is readying other, thornier ones for action. His efforts have been widely praised and his popularity is high, but passing the reforms is just the opening act. Implementation is crucial. And it’s this recognition that has prompted many observers, particularly Mexicans themselves, to be more circumspect in their praise of the administration’s accomplishments to date.¶ The foundation for the administration’s ambitious reform drive has been the Pact for Mexico, an historic agreement Peña Nieto and the leaders of the two main opposition parties signed the day after the new PRI president took office. A few days ago the administration was forced to temporarily suspend all activities related to the Pact, including a planned announcement of financial reforms.¶ The crisis was provoked by the opposition’s discovery that the PRI was using public funds to finance party-run programs —and thereby gain political advantage— ahead of local elections in July. The dispute has exposed the inherent political tensions and consequent limitations of the Pact.¶ Though the parties may be able to resolve the immediate controversy, many see signs that the alliance is fraying and expect negotiations for remaining initiatives on the 95-item reform agenda—including highly anticipated fiscal and energy reform packages—to be more problematic.¶ President Obama will be able to sympathize with his Mexican counterpart on this score.

Over four years and 100-days into his second term he has become well acquainted with difficult negotiations. Like other

two-term presidents, he may soon look to foreign affairs to burnish his legacy. His visit to Mexico offers a

rare opportunity to promote goals in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas .¶ President Obama will emphasize the need to continue to effect close security cooperation and coordination. He will also seek to positively frame the immigration reform debate, which is just getting underway in the U.S. Senate and is expected to continue for the remainder of the year. The visit to Mexico affords the chance to highlight the successful and interconnected economic partnership the countries share and to make the case for immigration reform as essential to North America’s economic security. And in many respects President Peña Nieto will have the opportunity to do the same.¶ The U.S.-Mexico economic partnership is thriving. Mexico is the U.S.’s second largest export market and third leading source of imports. Bilateral trade reached nearly one-half trillion dollars in 2012, roughly $1.4 billion each day. An estimated six million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Mexico. And strong regional supply chains mean that nearly 40 percent of every product the U.S. imports from Mexico is really “Made in America.” ¶ As strong as the bilateral relationship is now, however, it must deepen and evolve in order to ensure expanded opportunity and security for both countries going forward. Presidents Peña Nieto and Obama have both entered a post-honeymoon environment that demands hard work and successively heavier lifts on every policy goal.¶ With the stakes

potentially so high on so many issues fundamental to the relationship, only the highest-level commitment will advance

the agenda . There may never be a more opportune time.

Meetings solve relations – allows cooperation over all aspects of the partnership – only the counterplan allows for a deeper relationship Reyes 13 – Columnist for USA Today and Harvard grad (Raul, “Opinion: President Obama has the chance to improve US/Mexico relations”, April 29 of 2013, http://nbclatino.com/2013/04/29/opinion-president-obama-has-the-chance-to-improve-usmexico-relations/)The U.S. and Mexico are as tightly bound as siblings, and often just as dysfunctional. While both governments are concerned with immigration and drug violence, President Obama must forge a more positive, productive partnership. Mexico is enjoying remarkable economic growth, and Obama neglects our southern neighbor at his own peril.¶ Obama will arrive in Mexico with good and bad news. On the positive side, he can highlight the progress his administration has made towards overhauling our immigration system. The border is more secure than ever, and the Senate has unveiled a proposal that creates new pathways for legal immigration. On the negative side, Obama bears responsibility for his failure to reform U.S. gun laws. ThinkProgress reports that the expiration of the assault weapons ban has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Mexicans in cartel violence. Even worse, America’s demand for illegal drugs fuels the growth of these cartels. ¶ However, Obama would be wise to recognize that relations with Mexico should not center on these issues alone. As president-elect, Peña Nieto wrote in The Washington Post

that, “It is a mistake to limit our bilateral relationship to drugs and security concerns. Our mutual interests are too vast and complex to be restricted in this short-sighted way.” He wants a deeper

relationship , one that is defined by shared economic goals.¶ That’s the smart way forward . Since 2008,

Mexico has seen steady economic growth, which has been a net benefit to the U.S. The U.S. exports more to Mexico than to China and Japan combined, and U.S./Mexico trade hit almost $500 billion in 2012. Obama should build on these ties to create greater economic integration. If he and Peña Nieto were to collaborate on ways of matching Mexico’s young labor force with American technology and training, it would be a recipe for a regional economic boom. Greater U.S. investment in Mexico will make the country safer, as the cartels generally leave multinational operations alone.¶ Politically, Obama cannot afford to take Mexico for granted. Consider that Mexico has been fully engaged with Cuba since the revolution in 1959 (which was launched from Mexico). And although the U.S. has not recognized Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro as successor to Hugo Chavez, Mexico recognized his election on April 19. So Mexico is not an ally that automatically falls in lockstep with American interests. Perhaps with more attention from the Obama administration, Peña Nieto could be persuaded to be more supportive of U.S. policies for the region.¶ True, there are legitimate reasons why Mexico has been viewed warily by past administrations. Mexico has historically been the largest source of our undocumented population. Border towns have long feared spillover violence from the drug cartels. But illegal immigration is at net zero, and the fears of violence on the U.S. side of the border have proved largely unfounded.

Obama should take the lead in encouraging more communication and cooperation with Mexico . Already, Peña Nieto favors opening Mexico’s energy sector to private investment, and he may even allow foreign investment in its state oil company.¶ President Obama has the chance to turn a page in U.S./Mexico relations, and he should not miss it. It’s time for a foreign policy with Mexico based on its potential, not on its problems.

Meetings solve relations – they set up a new framework for cooperationTaylor 12 – Washington Times State Department correspondent (Guy, “Obama, Pena-Nieto greet an era of wider cooperation”, November 27 of 2012, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/27/obama-pena-nieto-greet-an-era-of-wider-cooperation/?page=all)Mexican President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto praised President Obama on Tuesday for pursuing a softer posture toward illegal immigrants in the United States and said he hopes to work with U.S. officials to reduce the number of Mexicans crossing the border illegally.¶ “We fully support your proposal,” Mr. Pena Nieto said. “We want to contribute; we want to be part of this.”¶ The remarks came as part of a ceremonial meeting between Mr. Obama, Vice President Joseph R. Biden and the new Mexican leader, whose inauguration festivities Mr. Biden

is to attend in Mexico next week.¶ The White House meeting set the stage for what foreign-policy insiders say

could be the start a new era of relations between the two nations. ¶ With immigration reform, U.S.-Mexican

drug-control policies and the possible opening of Mexico’s state-controlled energy sector to foreign investment all on the table, Mr. Obama sounded an optimistic tune on Tuesday.¶ He praised the work of outgoing Mexican President Felipe Calderon, who he said “established an excellent working relationship” with the United States, and said he hopes to establish a similar “close personal and professional relationship” with

Mr. Pena Nieto.¶ Mr. Obama said he looked forward to continuing to work with Mexican officials on “border issues” as well as “regional and global issues,” noting that Mexico has become an “important multilateral, multinational partner.”¶ “What happens in Mexico has an impact on our society,” he said.\

AT: Links to Politics

Popular with Congress – Merida provesSeelke 13 – Specialist in Latin American Affairs at the CRS (Clare Ribando, “Mexico’s New Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican Relations”, January 16 of 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42917.pdf)U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly as a result of the development and ¶

implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral security partnership announced in 2007 that ¶ involves U.S. assistance to

Mexico. From FY2008-FY2012, Congress appropriated $1.9 billion in ¶ Mérida assistance for Mexico, roughly $1.1 billion of which had been delivered as of November ¶ 2012. Whereas U.S. assistance initially focused on training and equipping Mexican counterdrug ¶ forces, it now places more emphasis on addressing the weak institutions and underlying societal ¶ problems that have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico. The Mérida strategy now ¶ focuses on four pillars: (1) disrupting organized criminal groups, (2) institutionalizing the rule of ¶ law, (3) building a 21st century border, and (4) building strong and resilient communities. While ¶ bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the weakness of Mexico’s criminal justice ¶ system has hindered the effectiveness of anti-crime efforts.

Terrorism

1NC

Text: The United States federal government should

-end signature strikes which target unidentified militants

-limit targeted killings to a limited number of specific terrorists with transnational ambitions

-improve congressional oversight of drone strikes

-work internationally to establish rules and norms governing the use of drones

Solvency AdvocateZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)Yet, as Micah Zenko writes in this Council Special Report, drones are not without their drawbacks, especially with regard to targeted killings. Like any tool, drones are only as useful as the information guiding them, and for this they are heavily reliant on local military and intelligence cooperation. More important, significant questions exist about who constitutes a legitimate target and under what circumstances it is acceptable to strike. There is also the question of net utility: To what extent are the specific benefits derived from drone strikes offset by the reality that the strikes often alienate the local government and population? And there is the reality that drones are proliferating but, as is often the case with new technologies, the international legal and regulatory framework is lagging behind.¶ Zenko puts forward a substantive agenda. He argues that the United States should end so-called signature strikes, which target unidentified militants based on their behavior patterns and personal networks, and limit targeted killings to a limited number of specific terrorists with transnational ambitions. He also calls Congress to improve its oversight of drone strikes and to continue restrictions on armed drone sales. Finally, he recommends that the United States work internationally to establish rules and norms governing the use of drones.

(Add Solvency, either Generic or Border Specific)

2NC Rollback

Successful counter-terror policies rely on drones—CP prevents an inevitable rollbackZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)Over the past decade, the use of unmanned aerial systems—commonly¶ referred to as drones—by the U.S. government has expanded exponentially¶ in scope, location, and frequency.1 From September 2001 to¶ April 2012, the U.S. military increased its

drone inventory from fifty¶ to seventy-five hundred—of which approximately 5 percent can be¶ armed.2 Yet despite the unprecedented escalation of its fleet and missions,¶ the U.S. government has not provided a clear explanation of how¶ drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings are coordinated with broader ¶ foreign policy objectives , the scope of legitimate targets, and the legal¶ framework . Drones are critical counterterrorism tools that advance¶ U.S.

interests around the globe, but this lack of transparency threatens¶ to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation of armed drone¶ technology without the requisite normative framework .¶ Existing practices carry two major risks for U.S. interests that are¶ likely to grow over time. The first comes from operational restrictions¶ on drones due to domestic and international pressure . In the United¶ States, the public and

policymakers are increasingly uneasy with limited¶ transparency for targeted killings.3 If the present trajectory continues,¶ drones may share the fate of Bush-era enhanced interrogation¶ techniques and warrantless wiretapping—the unpopularity and illegality¶ of which eventually caused the policy’s demise . Internationally,¶ objections from host states and other counterterrorism partners could¶ also severely circumscribe drones’ effectiveness. Host states have¶ grown frustrated with U.S. drone policy, while opposition by nonhost¶ partners could impose additional

restrictions on the use of drones.¶ Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay concerns¶

internationally by ensuring that targeted killings are defensible under¶ international legal regimes that the United States itself helped establish,¶ and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and¶ counter misinformation.

Solvency—Border Terror

Drones solve boarder terror—efficiency and resolving unpopularity is keyRozemberg 12 (Hernan, served as a Bureau Chief and senior correspondent for NPR's "Fronteras: The Changing America Desk," where he covered issues of immigration and border security, "Mixed Feelings On Border Drones: Boon To National Security, Threat To Privacy", July 5 2012, www.fronterasdesk.org/content/mixed-feelings-border-drones-boon-national-security-threat-privacy)¶ The Department of Homeland Security just launched its tenth Predator B Unmanned Aerial System, commonly known as a drone, and now

both northern and southern borders are covered.¶ Even though they cost $18 million apiece, many experts say they’re worth every penny.¶ "Homeland Security’s behind the times. It should have been doing this a decade ago," said Dan Gouré, a former high-ranking

Defense Department official and current vice president of The Lexington Institute, a military think tank in Virginia.¶ "We’ve done as much as we can do on the surface and so you have to go into the air. And we’re going to have to increasingly have to

go into the air in order to be effective," Gouré said.¶ Doug Davis has been working with drones for over two decades. He’s currently second in charge of the country’s largest drone development and testing center, at New Mexico State University. And he started the drone office at the Federal Aviation Administration.¶ "I don’t think there’s a whole lot of need to do this over Kansas, but for border surveillance, I believe we absolutely need that as a nation right now," Davis said. "What you have to balance is the safety of the airspace users and the people on the ground with the national security of the country."¶ Striking that balance is a thorny matter. Opponents of the drone program say the government can now spy into anyone’s backyard without their consent. That’s a scary thought, said Jay Stanley, who specializes in privacy issues at the American Civil Liberties Union.¶ "The government does have the right to protect its borders, but we haven’t sat down and gotten our policies straight about how we want to allow these technologies to be used, what kind of limits need to be placed on them in order to protect our privacy," Stanley said.¶ And then there’s also the question of the effectiveness of border drones. The Homeland Security Department's Office of Inspector General issued a scathing report in May on this issue. It questioned why drones are being put to use for fewer than 4,000 flight hours per year when they could be up in the air for more than 13,000 hours.¶ They’re just not being used efficiently, said Tom Barry, who researches drone issues at the Center for International Policy, a foreign policy think tank in Washington, D.C.

Solvency—Drones Fail

AT Drone’s don’t solve Terror—reject their snapshot evidenceZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal¶ capabilities of its drones . Although many

of its plans are classified, the¶ U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and ¶ Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)¶ sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early¶

stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost¶ certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and¶ navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense¶ environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability ¶ to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior¶ official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in¶ nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim¶ that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal¶ force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying¶ degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and¶ costly factor—the human being.70

CP solves terrorismZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)The U.S. use of armed drones has two unique advantages over manned¶ aircraft, distant missile strikes, and special operations raids when¶ it comes to destroying targets. First, drones allow for sustained persistence¶ over potential targets . The existing U.S. arsenal of armed¶ drones —primarily the Predator and Reaper—can remain aloft, fully¶ loaded with munitions, for over fourteen hours, compared to four¶ hours or less for F-16 fighter jets and A-10 ground attack aircraft.5 And¶

unlike manned aircraft or raids, drones fly directly over hostile territory¶ without placing pilots or ground troops at risk of injury, capture,¶ or death.¶ Second, drones provide a near-instantaneous responsiveness—¶

dramatically shrinking what U.S. military targeting experts call the¶ “find-fix-finish” loop —that most other platforms lack. For

example,¶ a drone-fired missile travels faster than the speed of sound, striking a¶ target within seconds —often before it is heard by people on the ground.¶ This ability stands in stark contrast to the August 1998 cruise missile¶ salvo targeting Osama bin Laden, which had to be programmed based¶ on projections of where he would be in four to six hours, to allow time¶ to analyze the intelligence, obtain presidential authorization, program¶ the missiles, and fly them to the target.6 Intercontinental ballistic missiles¶ (ICBMs) loaded with conventional munitions can reach distant¶ targets much faster than cruise missiles, but they carry the dire risk of¶ misattribution as a U.S. nuclear first strike against Russia or China, for¶ instance. Finally, drone-fired missiles can be—and have been—diverted¶ at the last moment if noncombatants enter the likely blast radius.7

Good Solvency cardZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)The combination of persistence and responsiveness, high-quality¶ intelligence infrastructures, and tacit host-state support have made¶ drones the preeminent tool for U.S. lethal operations against suspected¶ terrorists and militants where states are unable to singlehandedly¶ deal with the threat they pose. As a result, drones are

not just another¶ 8 Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies¶ weapons platform. Instead, they provide the United States with a distinct¶ capability that significantly reduces many of the inherent political,¶ diplomatic, and military risks of targeted killings.¶ Compared to other military tools, the advantages of using drones—¶ particularly, that they

avoid direct risks to U.S. servicemembers—¶ vastly outweigh the limited costs and consequences. Decision-makers¶ are now much more likely to use lethal force against a range of perceived¶ threats than in the past. Since 9/11, over 95 percent of all nonbattlefield¶ targeted killings have been conducted by drones—the remaining attacks¶ were JSOC raids and AC-130 gunships and offshore sea- or air-launched¶ cruise missiles. And the frequency of drone strikes is only increasing¶ over time. George W. Bush authorized more nonbattlefield targeted¶ killing strikes than any of his predecessors (50), and Barack Obama¶ has more than septupled that number since he entered office (350). Yet¶ without any meaningful checks—imposed by domestic or international¶ political pressure—or sustained oversight from other branches of government,¶ U.S. drone strikes create a moral hazard because of the negligible¶ risks from such strikes and the unprecedented disconnect between¶ American officials and personnel and the actual effects on the ground.14¶ However, targeted killings by other platforms would almost certainly¶ inflict greater collateral damage, and the effectiveness of drones makes¶ targeted killings the more likely policy option compared to capturing¶ suspected militants or other nonmilitary options.

Solvency—Drones Unpopular

CP alleviates international and domestic concernZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)Although reforming U.S. drone strike policies will be difficult and¶ will require sustained high-level attention to balance transparency with¶ the need to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods, it would¶ serve U.S. national interests by ¶ ■■ allowing policymakers and diplomats to paint a more accurate portrayal¶ of drones to counter the myths and

misperceptions that currently¶ remain unaddressed due to secrecy concerns;¶ ■■ placing the use of drones as a counterterrorism tactic on a more¶ legitimate and defensible footing with domestic and international¶

audiences;¶ Introduction 5¶ ■■ increasing the likelihood that the United States will sustain the international¶ tolerance and cooperation required to carry out future drone ¶ strikes , such as intelligence

support and host-state basing rights;¶ ■■ exerting a normative influence on the policies and actions of other¶ states; and¶ ■■ providing current and future U.S. administrations with the requisite¶ political leverage to shape and promote responsible use of drones by¶ other states and nonstate actors. ¶ As Obama administration officials have warned about the proliferation¶ of drones, “If we want other nations to use these technologies¶ responsibly, we must use them responsibly.”

AT: Drones Bad

CP fosters sustainable proliferation of drone technology—(solves drone bad turns?)Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)¶ The second major risk is that of proliferation. Over the next decade,¶ the U.S. near-monopoly on drone strikes will erode as more countries¶ develop and hone this capability . The advantages and effectiveness of¶ drones in attacking

hard-to-reach and time-sensitive targets are compelling¶ many countries to indigenously develop or explore purchasing¶

unmanned aerial systems. In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy provides¶ a powerful precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will¶ increasingly deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications.¶ Reforming its practices could allow the United States to regain moral¶ authority in dealings with other states and credibly engage with the¶ international community to shape norms for responsible drone use.¶ The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable.¶ Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated,¶ unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with impunity.¶ Consequently, the United States should more fully explain and reform¶ aspects of its policies on drone strikes in nonbattlefield settings by¶ ending the controversial practice of “signature strikes”; limiting targeted¶ killings to leaders of transnational terrorist organizations and¶ individuals with direct involvement

in past or ongoing plots against the¶ United States and its allies; and clarifying rules of the road for drone¶ strikes in nonbattlefield settings. Given that the United States is currently¶ the only country—other than the United Kingdom in

the traditional¶ battlefield of Afghanistan and perhaps Israel—to use drones¶ to attack the sovereign territory of another country, it has a unique¶ opportunity and responsibility to engage relevant international actors ¶ and shape development of a normative framework for acceptable use¶ of drones .

AT: Links to Nieto Cred

Drones utilize host-state permission—solves Nieto cred?Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)Second, U.S. drones have benefited from host-state support, which¶ the United States has helped to secure with extensive side payments¶ in foreign aid and security assistance. The few hundred Predator¶ and Reaper drones that currently conduct distant airstrikes leverage¶ a system-wide infrastructure that includes host-state permission to ¶ base drones and associated launch and recovery personnel, overflight¶ rights in transit countries, nearby search-and- rescue forces to recover¶ downed drones, satellites or assured access to commercial satellite ¶

bandwidth to transmit command-and-control data, and human intelligence¶ assets on the ground to help identify targets.12 To this end, the¶ United States takes advantage of relatively permissive environments,¶ largely unthreatened by antiaircraft guns or surface-to-air missiles,¶ in the countries where nonbattlefield targeted killings have occurred.¶ According to Lieutenant General David Deptula, former Air Force¶ deputy chief of staff for intelligence, “Some of the [drones] that we have¶ today, you put in a high-threat environment, and they’ll start falling¶ from the sky like rain.” In fact, in 1995, relatively unsophisticated Serbian¶ antiaircraft guns shot down two of the first three Predator drones¶ deployed outside of the United States, and Iraqi jet fighters shot down¶ a Predator in 2002.13 Although the next generation of armed drones¶ should be more resilient, current versions lack the speed, stealth, and¶ decoy capabilities to protect themselves against even relatively simple¶ air defense systems.

AT: Links to Ptx

Solves Ptx—covertZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)Drone strikes outside of defined battlefields are inherently difficult¶ to assess and analyze. Programs and missions are highly classified.¶ Unlike other controversial counterterrorism programs that expanded¶ in the wake of 9/11, the Bush

administration never openly discussed¶ any aspects of its targeted killing policies. In comparison, the Obama¶ administration has been much more transparent, beginning with its¶ first official acknowledgment of the practice of targeted killings by¶ drones in April 2012.

Nevertheless, strikes by the CIA remain covert,¶ defined by law as “an activity or activities . . . where it is intended that the¶ role of the U nited States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged¶ publicly ,” while drone strikes conducted by JSOC in Yemen or¶ Somalia are publicly reported to Congress as “direct actions,” albeit with¶ no specificity.15

Solves Ptx—popularBecker 13 (Andrew, covers border and national security issues for The Center for Investigative Reporting, fellow at the UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism, where he reported on human smuggling and corruption along the Southwest U.S.-Mexico border for a joint New York Times and PBS FRONTLINE/World production, "New Drone Radar Reveals Border Patroll 'Gotaways' In High Numbers", April 5 2013, www.fronterasdesk.org/content/new-drone-radar-reveals-border-patrol-gotaways-high-numbers)In 2009, the system was deployed along a 31-mile portion of the Arizona border with Mexico over five days using a Customs and

Border Protection unmanned aircraft, according to a 2011 National Research Council report. The demonstration was “a great success” as the system identified suspicious activities four out of five nights, the report states.¶ Mark Borkowski, a Customs and Border

Protection official, testified before a 2011 House panel of lawmakers that the system demonstrated “significant potential” for helping the agency.¶ Legislators, in turn, have supported the technology with public statements and budget earmarks totaling millions of dollars. Rep. Candice Miller, R-Mich., who

leads a House subcommittee on border and maritime security, said in a June hearing that she was “very encouraged” by VADER.¶ “This tool is extremely valuable as CBP seeks to identify and detect changing smuggling patterns,” she said.

Bipartisan support for drones—the public doesn’t care about legal issues in CongressDrake 13 (Bruce, senior editor at the Pew Research Center, "Obama and drone strikes: Support but questions at home, opposition abroad", May 24 2013, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/24/obama-and-drone-strikes-support-but-questions-at-home-opposition-abroad/)The U.S. public has consistently supported the use of drone strikes — and that support has been bipartisan. In a February survey, 56% of Americans approved of them while 26% disapproved. That included 68% of Republicans, 58% of Democrats and 50% of independents.¶ A significant number of Americans did have concerns about whether the strikes endangered civilian lives. More than half (53%) were “very” concerned.¶ But the survey found less concern about the legal issues that

dominated the debate in Congress, particularly over the targeted killing in Yemen of radical Muslim Cleric Anwar al-Alwaki who was a U.S. citizen. A day prior to Obama’s speech, the administration acknowledged for the first time, in a letter to Congress, that it had ordered that drone strike, and said past strikes had killed three other Americans.

Internal NB—International Model

Developing a drone framework solves terrorism better and is key to promoting human rightsZenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action, (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously,¶ he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington,¶

DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service,¶ and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, report sponsored by The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think¶ tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business executives,¶ journalists, educators and students, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are¶ becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and¶ autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could¶ possess armed drones within the next ten

years and leverage the technology¶ in unforeseen and harmful ways . It is the stated position of the¶ Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated¶ by other states and nonstate actors . In an interview, President Obama¶ revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight¶ checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for¶ me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology¶ may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71¶ History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities ¶ is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used¶ them in the past . Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring¶ new technologies .72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as¶ legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers¶ and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, ¶ bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation¶ and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not¶ hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize¶ already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would¶ be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S.¶ drones

furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept¶ norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative¶ framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve ¶

Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for¶ developing such a framework would be based in existing international¶ laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and ¶

distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone¶ strikes —and should be informed by

comparable efforts in the realms of¶ cyber and space.¶ In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed¶

drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine¶ core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting¶ human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes . It would¶ be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone¶ deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability¶ for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps¶ more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer¶ heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent ¶

advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors¶ would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States¶ and its allies. ¶

Human rights promotion solves a laundry list of impacts—environment, resource exploitation, rape, and diseaseMann et al 94 (Jonathan Mann is Frangois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights and Professor of Epidemiology and International Health at the Harvard School of Public Health. Lawrence Gostin is

Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center and Professor of Health Policy, Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. Sofia Gruskin is Research Associate at the Fran9ois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights.Troyen Brennan is Professor of Law and Public Health at the Harvard School of Public Health. Zita Lazzarini is a visiting lecturer in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School of Public Health. Harvey Fineberg is Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health, "Health and Human Rights", hhrjournalarchive.org/archives-pdf/4065260.pdf.bannered.pdf)Since the late 1940s, human rights advocacy and related ¶ challenges have gradually extended the boundaries of the human ¶ rights movement in four related ways. First, the initial advocacy focus on civil and political rights and certain economic and ¶ social rights is expanding to include concerns about the environment and global socioeconomic development. For example, although the right to a "social and international order in which ¶ (human rights) can be fully realized" (UDHR, Article 28) invokes ¶ broad political issues at the global level, attention to this core ¶ concept as a right has only grown in recent years. ¶ Second, while the grounding of human rights thinking ¶ and practice in law (at national and international levels) remains ¶ fundamental, wider social involvement and participation in human rights struggles is increasingly broadening the language and ¶ uses of human rights concepts. ¶ Third, while human rights law primarily focuses on the ¶ relationship between individuals and states, awareness is increasing that other societal institutions and systems, such as ¶ transnational business, may strongly influence the capacity for ¶ realization of rights , yet they may elude state control. For example,

exploitation of natural resources by business interests may ¶ seriously harm rights of local residents, yet the governmental ¶ capacity to protect human rights may be extremely limited , or ¶ at best indirect,

through regulation of business practices and laws ¶ which offer the opportunity for redress. In addition, certain individual acts, such as rape, have not been a traditional concern ¶ of human rights law , except when resulting from systematic state ¶ policy

(as alleged in Bosnia). However, it is increasingly evident ¶ that state policies impacting on the status and role of women ¶ may contribute importantly, even if indirectly, to a societal con- ¶ text which increases women's vulnerability to rape, even though ¶ the actual act may be individual, not state-sponsored. ¶ Finally, the twin challenges of human rights

promotion ¶ (hopefully preventing rights violations; analogous to health promotion to prevent disease) and protection

(emphasizing accountability and redress for violations; analogous to medical care once ¶ disease has occurred) have often been approached separately. ¶ Initially, the United Nations system highlighted promotion of ¶ rights, and the nongovernmental human rights movement tended ¶ to stress protection of rights, often in response to horrific and ¶ systematic rights violations. More recently, both intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies have recognized and responded to the fundamental interdependence of rights promotion and protection.

Venezuela Relations

1NC

Text: the United States federal government should fire Samantha Power and reinstate a United States ambassador for Venezuela

Solves relations – Power killed progress – firing her would allow room to resume talksNeuman 7-20 – NYT Venezuela correspondent (William, “Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve U.S. Relations”, July 20 of 2013, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-us-relations.html ) CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela announced late Friday that it was stopping the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for

U nited N ations ambassador .¶ ¶ The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on Wednesday,

said that part of her role as ambassador would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society” in several

countries, including Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro had already lashed out on Thursday at Ms. Power for her

remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign Ministry said that it was terminating efforts to improve relations with the United States.¶ Those efforts had inched forward just last month after Secretary of State John Kerry publicly shook hands with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, during an international meeting in Guatemala — one of the highest level meetings between officials of the two countries in years.

New ambassador solves better – allows effective and authoritative communicationArnson 13 – Director of the Latin America Program at the Wilson Center (Cynthia, “Setting Priorities for U.S. Policy in latin America”, January 2013, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/setting_priorities_for_us_policy_in_latin_america.pdf)Second, efforts to restore diplomatic recognition at ¶ the ambassadorial level should continue . Venezuela ¶ expelled the U.S. ambassador in 2008, the United ¶ States responded in kind, and Venezuela subsequently rejected a U.S.

diplomat nominated as a replacement. The State Department has rightly renewed ¶ efforts to move the U.S.- Venezuelan relationship ¶ out of the deep freeze now that the post-Chávez era ¶ is around the corner. U.S. interests in Venezuela are ¶ better served by having a confirmed ambassador in ¶ Caracas who is seen as speaking authoritatively for ¶ the administration. There is no guarantee that an ambassador will be able to overcome the many difficult ¶ issues on the bilateral agenda—drug trafficking, the ¶ relationship with Iran, democracy itself—but

diplomacy at the highest level is better than its absence.

2NC – Power Solves Relations

Solves relations – firing Powers would signal to Venezuela that they will respect Venezuela Bercovitch 7-23 – staff writer for the Green Left Weekly (Sascha, “Venezuela: 'Zero tolerance to gringo aggression' — Maduro ends US talks”, July 23 of 2013, http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/54582)¶ The conversations started in June between Venezuela and the United States have definitively ended, Venezuelan President

Nicolas Maduro announced on July 20 at an event of the Strategic Regions of Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state.¶ ¶ “My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against Venezuela,” Maduro said. “I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it be verbal, political, or diplomatic.¶ ¶ “Enough is enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves anymore in Venezuela.”¶ ¶ The announcement comes after controversial statements from Samantha Powers, President Barack Obama’s nominee for US envoy to the United Nations. Powers testified to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 17, during which she said she would fight against a “crackdown on civil society being carried out in countries like Cuba, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela”.¶ ¶ In a statement written on July 19 that marks the last

communication between the two countries, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua wrote: “The preoccupation expressed by the US government regarding the supposed repression of civil society in Venezuela is unacceptable and

unfounded .¶ ¶ “To the contrary, Venezuela has amply demonstrated that it possesses a robust system of constitutional guarantees to preserve the unrestricted practice and the respect of fundamental human

rights, as the UN has recognised on multiple occasions.”¶ ¶ Jaua spoke with US Secretary of State John Kerry in a meeting in Guatemala in June that Kerry described as the “beginning of a good, respectful relationship”.¶ ¶ However, relations cooled after Bolivian President Evo Morales’ presidential plane was prevented from entering the airspace of four European countries after false information that US whistleblower Edward Snowden was on board. It further cooled

with Maduro’s offer of political asylum to Snowden.¶ ¶ Maduro said: “I told Jaua to convey to Kerry [in June] that we are ready to have relations within the

framework of equality and respect. If they respect us, we respect them .¶ ¶ “But the time has run out for them to meddle in the internal

affairs of our countries and publically attack us. Their time has run out, in Latin America in general and in particular with us.”

2NC – Ambassador Solves Relations

Ambassador signals to Venezuela that the US will support them – spurs better relationsMeacham 13 – director of the Americas Program at the CSIS (Carl, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela Relations?”, June 21 of 2013, http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations)Last week, the Washington Post published an editorial that suggested recent U.S. overtures to Venezuela are something of a lifeline, thrown while the Venezuelan government is struggling to maintain its legitimacy and when its neighbors, although having recognized the Maduro government, have recognized the need for an impartial audit of the election results.¶ Many believe it more appropriate for the United States to prioritize delicate issues such as human rights violations and antidrug policies before being willing to consider reinstating ambassadors.¶ Appointing ambassadors would certainly signal a real intention from both countries to forge a positive relationship. Having a U.S. ambassador in countries that have similar conditions to those of Venezuela is not something to be opposed across the board . In

many situations, having a U.S. ambassador in a nondemocratic country serves as a symbol to advance our most cherished beliefs. It also serves as proof of the U.S. government’s willingness to keep lines of communication open. But the timing of this appointment would imply that the Unites States would deny the opposition’s claims of a fraudulent election, as well as the urgency of the audit of the election results. This also comes at a time when Venezuela is more divided than ever, politically and economically. So rather than serve as an example of a pragmatic posture, this maneuver would be viewed by a critical mass of a very motivated Venezuelan opposition as U.S. government support for the Maduro government.

AT: Links to Politics

Diplomatic missions with Venezuela are empirically popular – policymakers support themSullivan 13 – Specialist in Latin American Affairs (Mark, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations”, CRS Report, April 9 of 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf)The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez on March 5, 2013, after 14 years of ¶ populist rule, has implications not only for Venezuela’s political future, but potentially for ¶ the future of U.S.-Venezuelan relations . This report provides a brief discussion of those ¶ implications. For additional background on President Chávez’s rule and U.S. policy, see CRS ¶ Report

R40938, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan. ¶ Congress has had a strong interest in Venezuela and U.S.

relations with Venezuela under the ¶ Chávez government . Among the concerns of U.S. policymakers has been the deterioration of ¶ human rights and democratic conditions, Venezuela’s significant military arms purchases, lack of ¶ cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts, limited bilateral anti-drug cooperation, and Venezuela’s ¶ relations with Cuba and Iran. ¶ The United States traditionally enjoyed close relations with Venezuela, but there has been ¶ considerable friction in relations under the Chávez government. U.S. policymakers have ¶ expressed hope for a new era in U.S.-Venezuelan relations in the post-Chávez era. While this ¶ might not be possible while Venezuela soon gears up for a presidential campaign, there may be an ¶ opportunity in the aftermath of the election.

Turns Case

Power kills US legitimacy – even perception turns the caseGaffney et al 13 – Formerly the Assistant Secretary of Defense under Reagan, currently the President of the Center for Security Policy (Frank, James Lyons was Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and U.S. Military Representative to the United Nations, “NEEDED: AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UN--NOT SAMANTHA POWER”, July 16 of 2013, http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2013/07/16/Power-No)Allowed to go unchallenged, the cumulative effect of such conduct would be to diminish our sovereignty, infringe upon our freedoms and undermine our allies – especially Israel. First-hand experience like Admiral Lyons’ with the UN makes clear that fighting such efforts requires a firm grasp of what is at stake. That should start with an unwavering commitment to the attributes that have made this country

exceptional and great, and an equally clear rejection of what the various transnationalists and other U.S. foes seek to do to her.¶ Unfortunately, President

Obama has nominated as the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations someone whose record indicates she is unsuited for the job in both regards. In fact, Samantha Power has for decades found fault with America and its historical role in the world. For example, in 2003, she wrote in the New Republic:¶ We need: a historical reckoning with crimes committed, sponsored, or permitted by the United States….Instituting a doctrine of the mea culpa would enhance our credibility by showing that American decision-makers do not endorse the sins of their predecessors. When Willie Brandt went down on one knee in the Warsaw ghetto, his gesture was

gratifying to World War II survivors, but it was also ennobling and cathartic for Germany…¶ In the same essay, Power declared that: “Much anti-Americanism derives from the role U.S. political, economic and military power has played in denying such freedoms to others.” It is one thing to hear this sort of anti-American propaganda from foreigners who choose to ignore our country’s unsurpassed history of expending vast quantities of lives and national treasure to help secure others’ freedoms. It would be totally unacceptable in our representative at the UN.¶ Power also seems to dismiss blithely the huge contribution made by the United

States in response to many international tragedies, at which the first ones on the scene are often our military personnel, providing

assistance and asking nothing in return. Such sentiments should be considered absolute disqualifiers for the position of one of our nation’s most visible diplomats.¶ Power has also been an advocate for various initiatives aimed at restricting U.S. freedom of action. This includes notably subordinating the use of its military and foreign assistance to UN mandates and circumstances in which we have no national interest.

For instance, as recently as 2008, she opined: “Influence is best measured not only by military hardware and GDP, but also by other people's perceptions that we, the United States, are using our power legitimately…that we are acting in the interests of the

global commons and in accordance with the rule of law….”¶ This is , of course, a formula for allowing the U nited Na tions or

“other people’s perceptions” to define the legitimacy of U.S. actions . And when there may be a conflict between the

“interests of the global commons” (UN-speak for the international community and the parts of the globe over which it asserts authority, e.g., the oceans, the air and even near-earth space), clearly in her view, America must defer and submit. As she has put it:¶ The United States must cease its reliance on gratuitous unilateralism. We make rules and create international institutions precisely in order to bind states when their short-term interests would otherwise lead them toward defection…¶

It is no exaggeration to observe that Samantha Power would make a perfect representative of the United Nations to the United States, but not the other way around.¶ Entrusting the job of standing up for America at the UN to someone so ill-, or at ill-equipped, or at least so ill-disposed for that task will be tantamount to unilaterally disarming in not just the war of ideas. It will embolden our adversaries to redouble their efforts to use the United Nations as a vehicle for hamstringing this country, like the fictional Lilliputians did with Gulliver.¶ The last thing we can afford at a moment when the world needs strong and effective leadership from the United States, both in the UN and elsewhere, is to entrust the duty of providing it at Turtle Bay to someone who has spent her professional career deriding this country, defaming it and seeking to circumscribe its power wherever

possible. ¶ We urge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to explore Samantha Power’s problematic record with care during its hearing on her nomination on July 17th and, having done so, to ensure that such a person is not confirmed as our representative to the United Nations.

**Affirmative**

AmazonDoesn’t solve – it only displaces deforestation elsewhere and disregards other sectors Elgert 13 – Assistant Professor in Social Science and Policy Studies and Environmental andSustainability Studies at Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts (Lauren, “Shifting the debate about ‘responsible soy’ production in Paraguay A critical analysis of five claims about environmental, economic, and social sustainability”, March of 2013, http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/LDPI/LDPI_WP_23.pdf)Closing the yield gap and Indirect links and ‘Leakage’ occur whereby deforestation is not reduced,¶ But

simply displaced¶ Once the soy moratorium was put in place, many researchers illustrated its positive influence of¶

reducing Amazonian deforestation(Rudorff et al., 2011), even alongside increasing soy production.¶ Others, however, point out several reasons to be cautious about this impact over the short and long¶ term. First, The Union of Concerned Scientists points out that at least part of the continued growth¶ in soy production after the moratorium was due to increased productivity rather than expansion¶ (Boucher, 2011). Brazilian and

Paraguayan yields per hectare were improved to levels comparable¶ to the US – where the highest productivity levels are

found (Table 3). As this ‘yield gap’ is closed,¶ “the potential gain from ‘catching up’ is reduced” (Boucher, 2011:8;

Licker et al., 2010), suggesting¶ That the benefits of intensification are likely to have a time limited effect.¶

Calculations the author is using are of soy cropland and production data (MAG, 2010).¶ Secondly, many authors raised alarm bells that the continued growth of the soy industry combined¶ with decreasing deforestation, implied leakage of deforestation to other regions and ecosystems or¶ via other sectors. Leakage may occur into countries or regions with more relaxed environmental¶ legislation and enforcement, or to ecosystems not protected by existing enforcement. For example,¶ the displacement of soy expansion from tropical forests to savannahs has been highlighted(Merry¶ Baker & Small, 2005).¶ Finally, there are concerns that as the direct causal relationship between soy production and¶ deforestation declines in importance, the indirect influences bear greater attention. Other sectors¶ or industries, for example, can mediate effects of leakage. Cattle production, for instance, has been¶ assigned much of the blame for deforestation rates that were once reserved for soy. This however, neglects the expansion of soy onto former pasture, pushing cattle production – not subject to the¶ soy moratorium –into newly deforested regions(Barona et al., 2010). Soy production is distanced¶ from deforestation, but is still part of the broad causal relationship.

Doesn’t stop cultivation – companies still buy the soy FWE 11 – Food and Water Europe (“The Perils of the Global Soy Trade Economic, Environmental and Social Impacts”, February of 2011, http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/EUsoyFeb2011.pdf)While the moratorium has slowed down deforestation, it ¶ has not come close to stopping it . Indeed,

monitoring by ¶ the Brazilian Oilseed Processors Association (ABIOVE) ¶ found that deforestation is continuing apace. During the ¶ 2008/2009 season, ABIOVE found that soy was being illegally cultivated on 0.8 percent of the cleared land it monitored, but during the 2009/2010 season, soy was cultivated ¶ on 2.1 percent of the land it monitored.42 While the land ¶ ABIOVE monitored doubled, the cultivation of soybeans on ¶ illegally cleared land increased nearly five-fold from 1,384 ¶ hectares to 6,300 hectares.43 Importantly, the illegally cultivated soybeans enter the soy marketplace. While major ¶ companies may not buy them right off the land, they may ¶ purchase them further downstream.

Prefer peer-reviewed statistics – the counterplan doesn’t stop soy production or Amazon destructionAnscombe 11 – science journalist based with degree in photonics (Nadya, “Indirect effect hampers Brazil's 'soy moratorium' from protecting forest”, May 25 of 2011, http://environmentalresearchweb.org/cws/article/news/46082)When a soy farmer buys pasture and turns it to soy production, this does not have a direct effect on deforestation and is in keeping with Brazil's "Soy Moratorium", an agroindustry-led initiative to limit deforestation by stopping direct encroachments of soy-fields into closed moist forest.¶ However, the rancher who has sold his land to the soy farmer can now, due to the high price of pasture land, afford to purchase up to five times the amount of forestry land and turn it into pasture.¶ This indirect connection between soy production and deforestation has been hypothesized for many years, but has ,

until now, not been measured and quantified. "The main challenge is that the areas of interest are often separated by large distances," said Eugenio Arima, from University of Texas at Austin in the US and lead author of the study, which has been published in Environmental Research Letters (ERL).¶ "We estimate that a 10% reduction of soy in old pasture areas would have decreased deforestation by as much as 40% in heavily forested counties of the Brazilian Amazon

between 2003 and 2008," he told environmental research web. "This shows that the voluntary moratorium on primary forest conversions by Brazilian soy farmers has failed to stop the deforestation effects of expanding soy

production."¶ Arima and his colleagues used three different models to estimate this phenomenon of

indirect land-use change, and also implemented a new statistical methodology capable of linking frontier deforestation to distant events, such as the expansion of soy production in a settled agricultural area. The results from the three models – ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects without time lag for soy (FE1), and fixed

effects with time lag for soy (FE2) – are shown in the figure. "We introduced a time-lag into one of the models as land-use change is not an immediate effect," explained Arima.

Doesn’t address the leading cause of deforestationMangabay no date – Tropical rainforest conservation and environmental science news (“Amazon Destruction: Why is the rainforest being destroyed in Brazil?”, http://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/amazon_destruction.html#ag)Cattle ranching is the leading cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon . This has been the case since at least the 1970s: government figures attributed 38 percent of deforestation from 1966-1975 to large-scale cattle ranching. Today the figure is closer to 60 percent , according to research by Brazil's National

Institute for Space Research (INPE) and its Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa). Most of the beef is destined for urban markets,

whereas leather and other cattle products are primarily for export markets. ¶ Brazil is today the world's largest exporter and producer of beef. Much of its expansion has taken place in the Amazon, which currently has more than 80 million head of cattle, up from 26.6 million in 1990 and equivalent to more than 85 percent of the total U.S. herd. The Brazilian Amazon has more than 214,000 square miles of pasture, an open space larger than France. ¶ Several factors have spurred recent Brazil's growth as a producer of beef:¶ CURRENCY DEVALUATION—In the 1980s and 1990s the devaluation of the Brazilian real against the dollar effectively doubled the price of beef in reals and created an incentive for ranchers to expand their pasture areas at the expense of the rainforest. The weakness of the real also made Brazilian beef more competitive on the world market. But this has changed since 2004 as the real as strengthened, reducing the competitiveness of Brazilian beef overseas.¶ CONTROL OVER FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE—The eradication of foot-and-mouth disease in much of Brazil has increased price and demand for Brazilian beef.¶ INFRASTRUCTURE—Road construction gives developers and ranchers access to previously inaccessible forest lands in the Amazon. Infrastructure improvements can reduce the costs of shipping and packing beef, while larger and more modern slaughterhouses have made cattle processing more efficient

Credibility

Can’t solve credibility—Iran won’t compromise over nuclear powerThe Economist 13 ("Breaakout beckons", June 22 2013, www.economist.com/news/briefing/21579815-neither-irans-election-nor-sanctions-nor-military-threats-are-likely-divert-it-path)THE resounding victory of Hassan Rohani, the most moderate and outward-looking of the presidential candidates deemed fit to contest the

election by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has raised hopes for a nuclear deal between Iran and the international community. As the Islamic Republic’s nuclear negotiator for nearly two years from October 2003, he showed a degree of flexibility that was depressingly absent in the most recent talks between Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members plus Germany (P5+1).¶ Mr Rohani seems pragmatic enough to know that Iran needs relief from sanctions to revive its economy, and that a more constructive negotiating stance on the nuclear programme will be needed to get that. Nevertheless, the change in Iran’s top civilian office is unlikely to bring an end to the interminable Iranian nuclear crisis.¶ Even if Mr Rohani wanted to do the kind of deal that would be acceptable to the West (and there is nothing in his past to suggest that he

might), the guiding hand behind Iran’s nuclear policy will remain that of the supreme leader, whose introspective, suspicious view of the world outside Iran has not changed. The die is already cast: nothing is likely to stop Iran getting the bomb if and when it decides it wants one.¶ The last set of talks

between the P5+1 and Iran, the fifth of the current round of negotiations, were in early April and ended on a downbeat note. They followed a proposal in February to allow a modest easing of sanctions in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s uranium-enrichment programme and more comprehensive inspections by the IAEA. Intended as a prelude to a more far-reaching deal, the offer represented a slight softening of the six powers’ position, by allowing Iran to keep a small amount of uranium enriched to 20% (for use in a reactor to make medical isotopes) and calling only for the suspension of enrichment at Fordow, a plant buried deep within a mountain, rather than its closure.¶ Iran’s negotiator, Saeed Jalili (an unsuccessful presidential candidate close to Mr Khamenei), replied that he wanted a suspension of all sanctions in exchange for only a temporary halt to 20% uranium enrichment, an impossible demand.¶ Mr Rohani’s election means the next round of negotiations will be conducted in a better atmosphere. But to what end? The answer is that the process serves a purpose for everybody. For Iran, the continuation of talks is a means of getting some easing of sanctions in exchange for concessions that will have little impact on its nuclear programme. For America and its allies, the absence of progress up to now has kept the international community lined up behind sanctions. Both sides, preferring to avoid a military confrontation, have an interest in demonstrating that the diplomatic path to a solution has not yet reached a dead-end.¶ Yet the inconvenient truth is that while the talks seem destined to continue, Iran is close to what is known as “critical capability”—the point at which it could make a dash to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one or more bombs before the IAEA or

Western intelligence agencies would even know it had done so. Despite the severe economic pain that the tightening of sanctions

has inflicted on Iran’s people and their evident desire for change, Iran’s strategic calculus has not shifted. The nuclear programme is worth almost any sacrifice because it guarantees the regime’s survival against external threats, as America’s differing policies towards Libya and North Korea illustrate.

Can’t solve credibility—internal divisionsChubin 10 (Shahram, Geneva-based specialist on Iranian politics and a non-resident senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "The Politics of Iran's Nuclear Program", September 1 2010, iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program)Nuclear politics¶ Iran’s nuclear program unfolded in context of its overall politics. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran’s political elite has long been divided over how the theocracy should evolve and what international role

it should pursue. Beyond broad concepts, such as independence, self-reliance and social justice, consensus has proven elusive—even

three decades after the Islamic Republic’s birth. The most fundament difference is whether Iran should continue as a revolutionary state willing to defy the world, or whether it should settle down and become a normal state that plays by international rules. The nuclear issue is increasingly a reflection of this basic division. ¶ ¶ Throughout the program’s early stages, there appeared to be a general consensus among the political elite about the need or

right to proceed. But by 2005, the consensus appeared to be crumbling. Rival factions in Iran’s political labyrinth began to criticize the nuclear program’s costs and centrality to Iran’s development goals. Iran’s nuclear program had become a domestic political football.¶ ¶ For the public, the nuclear program also initially enjoyed broad popular support since it promised energy independence and scientific progress. It was also popular because the regime depicted it as an assertion of Iran’s rights against foreign arrogance. But the program has not been subjected to informed debate or public discussion about its ultimate goals, the costs, and the relationship with Iran’s other objectives. Consensus ends where specifics begin.

Cuba Economy

External investment fails – multiple structural barriers to the economyLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

The Guidelines and measures thus far, while dramatic compared to decades of inertia, do not address a fundamental shortcoming of the Cuban economy: its inability to produce goods to consume at home and export abroad. While long-standing investments in human development have led to a booming service sector, and reforms made in the 1990s led to a profitable tourism sector, neither the industrial nor agricultural sectors have recovered to pre-1989 levels. Cuba’s production lags behind that of many of its Caribbean neighbors. The country is unable to generate wealth by expanding or creating new goods-producing industries due to low investment in manufacturing and agriculture, distorted pricing, low wages and high production costs. Its poor export performance and chronic deficits in merchandise trade have produced poor savings and investment rates, leading to de-capitalization of productive sectors, and compounding Cuba’s inability to attract significant investment from abroad to offset its large external debt. Economists contend that Cuba needs to develop policies to attract increased foreign investment in productive sectors and adjust domestic investment schemes so that more funds are directed toward farms and factories. Productive sectors of the economy will become more competitive and efficient only if state-owned enterprises are given greater autonomy in labor and pricing policies, and forced to go under when unprofitable. The government has acknowledged the challenge of reigniting productive sectors of the economy to some degree in the Guidelines, but has yet to introduce concrete policy solutions to get this underway. Although the Guidelines call for increased investment in productive sectors and participation of foreign capital, they do not outline clear policy steps to make those goals reality. Current Cuban law allows for foreign investment in nearly any sector of the economy and the document calls for seeking increased investment in the sugar industry and developing special economic zones. However, aside from development of golf courses and accompanying villas, and large infrastructure projects, no significant new joint-venture projects have yet been announced.

Cuba’s presence on the Terror list prevents much possible US investmentLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

Cuba should also be removed from the U.S. State Department list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. This designation subjects Cuba to sanctions including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; controls over exports of certain dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. Cuba’s presence on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism is both substantively wrong132 and harmful to the Cuban economy, because it punishes Cuba for legal trade and financial transactions and deprives its people access to modern technology. The president can remove Cuba unilaterally from the terror list. He should do so.

Links to PtxLaverty ’11 [2011, Collin Laverty is a Cuba consultant at the Center for Democracy in the Americas. “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for US Policy”http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf]

None of these actions would sit well with the hardest of the hardliners in the Cuban American

community or their representatives in Washington. Their terms of surrender for Cuba , as Phil Peters

pointed out in his Cuban Triangle Blog, are written into the statutes of the U.S. embargo. In Congress, legislators including Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart, David Rivera and others, are trying to reverse President Obama’s travel reforms, dialing back family travel and remittances to the levels imposed by President Bush.134 They will certainly fight actions that loosen restrictions to help push along Cuba’s economic reforms.

Drug Trafficking

Nobody will like thisSiegel ’12 [3/27/12, Adam Siegel is a researcher in Eurasia Group's Latin America practice. “America’s drug war partners are speaking their minds,” http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/27/america_s_drug_war_partners_are_speaking_their_minds?wp_login_redirect=0]

Other leaders, from Vice President Joe Biden to Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega, have rejected the decriminalization proposals out of hand. Nevertheless, the coordinator of Obama's trip to Colombia recently indicated that the U.S. was "ready to have a good dialogue between all countries to hear their views," though he reiterated that

U .S. opposition to any legalization will not change . Of the suggestions offered at the Guatemala conference last weekend, some could be endorsed by the U.S. -- such as the creation of a regional Central American court for trying traffickers that would reduce local corruption and relieve pressure on national justice systems, while others -- mandating that the U.S. take "co-responsibility" and pay individual countries for every drug raid or plant eradicated -- don't stand a chance. Obama's challenge at the Summit will be to offer policy alternatives to the status quo. Latin American leaders warn that Washington has asked them to take tough choices over the years, and they want to see the U.S. demonstrate the political courage to consider a few of their own. Latin Americans are far from united on

decriminalization or any other single solution, but the gathering in Cartagena will make clear that they have

become increasingly willing and able to propose new ideas they know that Washington won't

like . If Guatemala's Perez Molina gets his way, we'll even see him start discussions on a formal drug transit corridor for moving cocaine between South America and the United States.

Market forces will cause the regulations to failKonczal ’13 [6/29/13, Mike Konczal is a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, where he focuses on financial regulation, inequality and unemployment. He writes a weekly column for Wonkblog. Follow him on Twitter here. “Legalizing marijuana is hard. Regulating a pot industry is even harder,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/29/legalizing-marijuana-is-hard-regulating-a-pot-industry-is-even-harder/]

It’s not every day that a former Microsoft executive holds a press conference to announce his new venture into the exciting and profitable world of drug dealing. But that’s exactly what happened earlier this month when Jamen Shively, a former Microsoft corporate strategy manager, announced that he wants to create the equivalent of Starbucks in the newly legalized pot industry in Washington state.All this is happening at the same time that the Washington State Liquor Control Board is looking to finalize rules on the new, legal marijuana industry. And one of the major debates right now among board members is how much they ought to prevent or encourage the kind of market consolidation in which a few firms dominate the whole industry.As Chris Marr of the Liquor Control Board argued, “How do you prevent a Microsoft millionaire from getting this idea and deciding that — playing by the rules — they’re going to dominate the market?” And if that is the concern, what can economics inform us about how this new market should be set up?To provide some background, voters in Washington state passed Initiative 502 last fall in a general ballot, creating a statewide legal market in pot. Unlike Colorado, which has passed a bill to expand its medical marijuana industry and make pot legally available to everyone, Washington is folding pot under regulations for the liquor industry. As such, the Washington Liquor Board has regulatory control over the new marijuana industry.As with alcohol, a marijuana firm is classified as a producer, processor or retailer. The first question, therefore, is how aggressively regulators should try to check the market power of front-line sellers. As of now, if there is excess demand for licenses, which cost $1,000 each, they will be subject to lottery. Licenses can’t be traded in a secondary market, and it is possible that the regulators will cap the number of licenses per holder.

The law also requires regulation for public safety and public health. As with the tobacco industry, voters don’t want firms marketing and selling pot to underage users. And public health officials are concerned about companies marketing to “problem users” who would like to quit or reduce their usage but find themselves unable to.If that’s the case, then perhaps having pot dealers with large market power is a good idea. Economists usually consider monopolists a problem because they produce too little of a product and charge too much for it, earning substantial profits. But that could be a good thing for the pot industry. Safe profit margins mean that a firm might be less likely to compete on price for every potential consumer — and also much more likely to follow the law.Yet people involved with the Washington law have two main responses to this. The first is that firms with market power could go outside the market and use their extensive profits and influence to exert political power.“The idea is to prevent the retail industry from becoming so large that they have enough wealth and power to roll over anyone trying to enforce, expand or update the public-health-focused rules that are designed to protect the public’s health and safety,” says Roger Roffman, a University of Washington professor and author of the forthcoming book “Marijuana Nation.”Second, consolidated firms may that they themselves pose threats to public health. “If a firm has market power, the profits they get from selling above market costs means that they can have a bigger marketing department,” says UCLA public policy professor Mark Kleiman. “In the real world, spending here will increase their market share by creating additional problem users. This, combined with lobbying efforts that will rival the alcohol industry in terms of avoiding taxes and adjusting the rules, is a major problem.”A third argument comes from University of Chicago economics professor E. Glen Weyl. He argues that “long-term players who have market power have an incentive to get people addicted. A monopolist, in particular, has a big incentive to advertise to get people addicted over the long-term, as they are sure to reap all those rewards.” If a marijuana firm has a monopoly, then the financial gains of turning someone into a heavy, problem user of a product (rather than a specific brand) will all go to that firm. A market with smaller, fragmented firms with greater turnover would be a check on this dynamic.Both Weyl and Kleiman argue that Washington should consider bolder ideas to regulate the industry. Weyl suggests some sort of mandatory turnover policy to discourage firms from turning people into problem users. Another possibility, which Kleiman considers, is to create a state-run nonprofit retail firm that has no interest in creating problem users or expanding the market. (Given that pot is still illegal at the federal level, this isn’t likely to happen).Market consolidation is also an issue when it comes to a firm’s vertical structure. Under Washington state law, if a firm is a retailer, it can’t be a producer as well as a processor. This is meant to fragment the vertical chain of production, and it contrasts with Colorado’s system, in which dealers are required to grow 70 percent of what they sell (as that is how the medical marijuana system works).Another related economic issue is the location of pot retailers. The law in Washington, as currently structured, requires pot retailers to be at least 1,000 feet away from a school, day-care facility, playground, teen arcade game center, recreation center, transit center or library. Though this may sound minor, in practice it means that it will be very difficult to put pot retailers in dense population spaces. Retailers might be limited to industrial or largely depopulated areas.That could force what economists who study spatial models of economies call the agglomeration model — as when certain kinds of restaurants all cluster together to create an area people go to for certain goods. As Weyl notes, “often ethnic restaurants cluster into neighborhoods so that people can find the best places, creating ethnic neighborhoods. Do we want a ‘pot town’ to grow up in our cities? Perhaps not, but that is the logical consequence of forcing dealers away from a convenience model.”Kleiman thinks the main issue with regard to pot retailers’ ultimate location has more to do with advertising and discretion than anything else. “An alcoholic trying to quit drinking will pass by alcohol in bars, billboards and grocery stores. That person uses up a lot of emotional energy always having to say no.” Instead of focusing on 1,000 feet within certain buildings, the bigger issue Kleiman emphasizes is whether storefronts and signs aggressively advertise their product.It’s important to get these issues right because they interact with the three background constraints on this new market. The first is the black market, while the second is the legal medical marijuana market. For some reason, the medical marijuana market won’t be taxed, while the new legal market will be taxed around 25 percent. (The black market is, of course, not taxed at all.)Note that if the price goes too high, or if the location restrictions prove too inconvenient, pot consumers might just stick with medical marijuana or the black market. State lawmakers are currently trying to get the medical marijuana market folded under the same regulations that the Liquor Board is creating for the legal pot market, and Mark Kleiman notes that police may need to escalate crackdowns on illegal distribution as they legalize the market.A third constraint is the federal government, which enforces laws that still make pot illegal. If legalization is seen as a disaster, it is possible that the federal government will move to shut down the process by preempting state law. But even if it doesn’t, background laws will probably hurt the scale and efficiency of pot retailers.As Jack Finlaw explains, since marijuana is banned at the federal level, new pot retailers “often cannot conduct their businesses through banks. They also cannot deduct business expenses from their federal taxes.” It is possible the normal interactions between businesses that allow them to thrive — things like having a legal bank account — won’t be immediately available.Markets are constructed through laws and regulations, and the market for pot that is being created in Washington state is no exception. The regulators see how the consolidated alcohol industry is able to avoid taxation and accountability and are determined to avoid these problems in the new pot industry. Thus this market may help economists understand a crucial role of regulations that has lapsed in recent decades: the role of government in curbing the excess power of the private sector.

Legalization fails to solve the drug war – multiple warrantsLongmire ’11 [6/18/11, Sylvia Longmire, a former officer and investigative special agent in the Air Force, is the author of the forthcoming book “Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico’s Drug Wars.” “Legalization Won’t Kill the Cartels,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/opinion/19longmire.html?_r=0]

Legalization FOR a growing number of American policy makers, politicians and activists, the best answer to the spiraling violence in Mexico is to legalize the marijuana that, they argue, fuels the country’s vicious cartels and smugglers. After all, according to official estimates, marijuana constitutes 60 percent of cartels’ drug profits. Legalization would move that trade into the open market, driving down the price and undermining the cartels’ power and

influence. Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. Marijuana legalization has many merits, but it would do little

to hinder the long-term economics of the cartels — and the violent toll they take on Mexican society. For one thing, if marijuana makes up 60 percent of the cartels’ profits, that still leaves another 40 percent, which includes the sale of methamphetamine, cocaine, and brown-powder and black-tar heroin. If marijuana were legalized, the cartels would still make huge profits from the sale of these other drugs. Plus, there’s no reason the cartels couldn’t enter the legal market for the sale of marijuana, as organized crime groups did in the United States after the repeal of Prohibition. Still, legalization would deliver a significant short-term hit to the cartels — if drug trafficking were the only activity they were engaged in. But cartels derive a growing slice of their income from

other illegal activities . Some experts on organized crime in Latin America, like Edgardo Buscaglia, say that cartels earn just half their income from drugs. Indeed, in recent years cartels have used

an extensive portfolio of rackets and scams to diversify their income. For example, they used to kidnap

rivals, informants and incompetent subordinates to punish, exact revenge or send a message. Now that they have seen that people are willing to pay heavy ransoms, kidnapping has become their second-most-lucrative venture, with the targets ranging from businessmen to migrants. Another new source of cartel revenue is oil theft, long a problem for the Mexican government. The national oil company, Pemex, loses hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of petroleum every year to bandits and criminal gangs who tap into pipelines and siphon it off. Now the cartels are getting involved in this business, working with associates north of the border to sell the oil to American companies at huge markups. In 2009 a federal court convicted an American businessman of helping to funnel $2 million in petroleum products stolen from Pemex by a Mexican cartel, eventually selling it to a Texas chemical plant owned by the German chemical company BASF. The chemical company claims never to have known where the products came from. Cartels are also moving into the market in pirated goods in Latin America. The market used to be dominated by terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, who operated in the triborder area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Now the field is being overtaken by Mexican cartels, which already have so much control over the sale of pirated CDs, DVDs and software that many legitimate companies no longer even bother to distribute their full-price products in parts of Mexico. Taking another page from traditional organized crime, cartels are also moving into extortion. A cartel representative will approach the owner of a business — whether a pharmacy or a taco stand — demanding a monthly stipend for “protection.” If those payments aren’t made on time, the business is often burned to the ground, or the owner is threatened, kidnapped or killed. A popular cartel racket involves branded products. For example, a cartel member — most often from Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana, two of the largest and most diversified cartels — will tell a music-store owner that he has to sell CDs with the Zetas logo stamped on them, with the cartel taking a 25 percent cut of the profits. Noncompliance isn’t an option. With so many lines of business, it’s unlikely that Mexican cartels would close up shop in the event of legalization, even if it meant a serious drop in profits from their most successful product. Cartels are economic entities, and like any legitimate company the best are able to adapt in the face of a changing market. This is not to say that drug legalization shouldn’t be considered for other reasons. We need to stop viewing casual users as criminals, and we need to treat addicts as people with health and emotional problems. Doing so would free up a significant amount of jail space, court time and law enforcement resources. What it won’t do, though, is stop the violence in Mexico.

Legalization doesn’t solve – other elicit activities garner much more revenueLara [Tania Lara is a second-year Master of Global Policy Studies student at the LBJ School of Public Affairs. “Drug War Continues to Spark Tensions Between U.S. and Central America,” http://www.lbjjournal.com/op-ed/global-policy-studies-and-international-security/drug-war-continues-spark-tensions-between-us]

It is naive to think that decriminalizing drugs is going to end violence in the Americas. Crime rates are usually the result of economic disparities, lower educational levels, high unemployment rates and weak and corrupt law enforcement agencies. Legalization will not

solve any of these issues . On the other hand, criminal organizations in Mexico and Central America profit not only from drug trafficking, but also from other illegal activities. As an example, Mexico’s infamous Zetas organization is rarely involved in drug trafficking. Its main businesses include oil theft, human trafficking, kidnappings, extortion and brothels. And finally, if drugs are legalized in the Americas but remain illegal in the U.S., criminal organizations from Latin America will keep fighting between each other to reach the profitable American market.

Other businesses are much more lucrative for drug traffickersBolton ’12 [10/16/12, Gene Bolton is a research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. “DRUG LEGALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA: COULD IT BE THE ANSWER?” http://www.coha.org/drug-legalization-in-latin-america-could-it-be-the-answer/]

Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel, provides an interesting case study in illustrating this point. The Mexican DTO decided to venture into migrant smuggling in an effort to increase its profits. Today such smuggling is Los Zetas’ second most lucrative activity; its influence has spread all the way to Petén in northern Guatemala. According to the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, human smuggling was not a part of organized criminal networks before Los Zetas began targeting the industry. Instead, “coyotes,” independent human smugglers, would charge fees to smuggle groups of migrants through Mexico and into the United States. Because of their substantial drug profits, Los Zetas completely transformed the human smuggling industry. While coyotes could only smuggle scarcely more than twenty migrants at a time, Los Zetas could smuggle hundreds of migrants in armored vehicles across the border. Ultimately, Los Zetas gained control of the Guatemalan human smuggling market, killing anyone attempting to travel beyond their control.10 The estimated industry value of migrant smuggling in Latin America today is $6.6 billion USD according to the U.N. report on crime globalization, having grown in no small part from Los Zetas.11 Morris Panner, a former U.S. federal crime prosecutor, suggests that the trend of DTOs exploring new “business” ventures is far more pervasive than their drug trade involvement. He goes on to imply that the entire business model for Latin American organized crime is in a transitional period, in which these organizations are diversifying ways to earn money, either as a growth or survival strategy.12 For example, PEMEX, the Mexican state-owned oil company, has reported that the local committee has lost approximately 40 percent of its production, or $750 million USD, to oil theft in cartel-controlled territory.13 While other figures are difficult to estimate, kidnap ransoming is valued between $200 million and $500 million USD annually.14 It appears that these industries are growing as a result of continuing U.S. drug demand and DTO incubation. While Panner does not adequately address the potential impact of widespread drug legalization, he does conclude that criminal organizations are “pursuing a larger, more extensive agenda.”15 It appears DTOs are able to expand into other illicit markets because of their substantial drug trade revenues.

CP solves Latin American relations – all leaders want thisSerrano ‘13 [1/7/13, Aflonso Serrano is a Senior Editor at Time.com. “U.S. Marijuana Laws Ricochet Through Latin America,” http://world.time.com/2013/01/07/u-s-marijuana-laws-ricochet-through-latin-america/]

A major concern centers on drug cartels. Estimates of Mexican cartel profits from marijuana sales to the U.S. vary from $2 billion to $20 billion annually. And recent studies suggest that the Colorado and Washington pot laws could dent cartel profits

by up to 30% given the probable emergence of cheaper, U.S.-produced marijuana. That loss of revenue, and therefore of power, could generate more violence in the region, experts fear. But the notion that drug cartels would suffer mammoth losses remains an open question. It also underestimates the growing sophistication of Mexican criminal groups. Mexican cartels have diversified their criminal portfolios with impressive speed since 2006, when Calderón began deploying the army against them. Besides marijuana profits, cartels generate an estimated $15 billion annually from human trafficking, preying on Central and South American migrants making their way north toward the U.S. Criminal gangs are also increasingly relying on Pemex, Mexico’s state-owned oil behemoth, for added income. Oil theft has surged in recent years, netting cartels roughly $500 million annually, according to Mexican studies. And the methamphetamine market represents another opportunity to supplement any revenue lost to marijuana sales. Cartels have responded to a recent drop in U.S. meth production by flooding the market with the synthetic drug, producing it on a mass scale in northern Guatemala. “The [U.S.] marijuana laws will have absolutely no impact on criminal group’s balance sheets,” Edgardo Buscaglia, an organized-crime expert and senior research scholar at Columbia University, tells TIME. “They have diversified their criminal activity with astounding efficiency, just like any legal enterprise.” Whether the U.S. laws will undercut cartels at all remains to be seen, but no impact is likely to be felt anytime soon. Still, the Washington and Colorado referendum results have reshaped the drug-war debate in Latin America, emboldening regional leaders to press for a global discussion on drug policy, organized through the U.N., aimed at changing drug-war tactics.

Mexican Econ

SQ solves telecom reform—only a matter of timeHarrup 13 (Anthony, Mexican bureau chief at Dow Jones, published in the Wall Street Journal, "Mexican President Signs Telecommunication Reform into Law", June 10 2013, online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130610-709564.htmlMEXICO CITY--Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto on Monday signed into law a far-reaching reform of the telecommunications and broadcast industries that aims to curb the market power of companies like America Movil (AMX, AMX.MX) in

order to increase competition and investment in the sector.¶ The overhaul creates a new regulatory body, Ifetel, which will have expanded powers, including the ability to apply asymmetric regulation on dominant players and even force

them to sell assets.¶ In signing the changes in the constitution, Mr. Pena Nieto set the clock running for the drawing up and approval of secondary legislation, which Congress has six months to complete. The scope and spirit of the constitutional reform, which seeks to give Mexicans access to better and cheaper telecommunications services and raise competitiveness in Mexico, should be reflected in the secondary laws, Mr. Pena Nieto said.

SQ solves—Movil says there won’t be changes, implementation by 2014Comlay 13 (Elinor, reporter for Reuters, quoting America Movil, leading Mexican telecommunications business, "America Movil sees material impact from Mexico telecom reform", April 30 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-mexico-americamovil-idUSBRE93T0RE20130430)Once the bill is approved by the Senate, it must be approved by legislatures in the majority of Mexico's states. Mexico's Congress will also need to draw up secondary legislation to implement the new rules.¶

"We expect that the bill will become effective in substantially its current form," said America Movil in the filing. "If it is approved rapidly, we would expect specific rules and regulations to begin taking effect in 2014."

Peso devaluation empirically devastates Mexico’s telecom sectorGriffith 98 (Kathleen, published author in the field of Telecommunications, edited by Carlos Casasus, mesico's Undersecretary of Communications and Technological Development, Jaime Chico pardo, Director-General of Telmex and Carlos Mier y Teran, Directior-General of Telecommunications, "Telecommunications in Mexico", www.vii.org/papers/mexi.htm)The economic crisis that began with the devaluation of the Mexican peso on 19 December 1994 devastated Telmex' share price. Series L shares traded in New York fell to a low of US$23 on 11 March 1995, less than their initial offering price of $27.25 in May 1991 and 76 percent below their high of $75.50 on 8 February 1994.¶ The crisis may lead to a reprioritization of the terms of deregulation. Before the devaluation, SCT had announced interconnection guidelines favorable to new entrants as regards open markets entry, number of interconnection points, and ability to bypass. A key pronouncement remains pending (as of December 1995): the full interconnection plan. High-level negotiations continue on this issue between the Mexican government, Telmex officials, and potential competitors.

Telecommunications strong now and don’t reflect overall economic trends—historically insulated from economic pressuresHarrup 13 (Anthony, Mexican bureau chief at Dow Jones, published in the Wall Street Journal, "Mexico's Telecom Industry Outpaced Economy in First Quarter", May 27 2013, online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130527-703534.html)MEXICO CITY--Mexico's telecommunications regulator said Monday that the industry continued to outgrow the overall economy in the first quarter, led by growth in services such as satellite television and mobile broadband.¶ The Federal

Telecommunications Commission, or Cofetel, said its telecommunications index, which measures services and subscribers in the

sector, increased 12.5% from the first quarter of 2012, well above the 0.8% growth registered in gross domestic product.¶ Telecommunications have for years been expanding faster than the economy, and even greater growth and investment is expected following the recent passage of telecom reform, which seeks to increase industry competition.

Telecom reforms failPrieto 11 (Jana Palacios, telecommunications expert at the Mexican Institute for Communications, "Telecommunications Industry in Mexico: Performance and market structure analysis, and conflicts of interest prevailing between operators and authoritiies", May 16 2011, imco.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2011/6/telecomm_mexico_may_2011_final_version1.pdfAlso, these actions will not be enough to achieve the desired levels of appropriation ¶ of telecommunications among the population and it will also be necessary to work on other ¶ 1. Although in the different market segments the dominant operator has been losing ¶ its market share, the shortage of the essential resources(networks, links, spectrum, content) ¶ causes the rest of the operators to still depend to a high extent on the dominant operator.¶ 2. Public policy has sought to substantially reduce the dependence of the operators ¶ with regards to essential facilities of the dominant operator, but still, there will be regions in ¶ the country where the market is simply not attractive for any of the telecommunication ¶ companies to invest in .¶ 3. In places where there are no networks, there will be no services; and in those ¶ regions where the networks are only a few, transmission prices will be expensive, which ¶ will cause a negative impact on the adoption of new telecommunication services, especially ¶ among the low-income population who need affordable telecommunication services in ¶

order to become users.¶ 4. Investments in infrastructure take time to mature. To accelerate that the ¶

telecommunications arrive to every corner of the country at affordable prices, it will ¶ probably be necessary to regulate access of third parties to the networks in the short term. ¶ Recent history shows that the application of all kinds of regulation is legally questioned ¶ 5. Even if we suppose that telecommunication services will reach every place in this ¶ country, this is not enough to achieve the appropriation of services among the population. ¶ The virtual existence of relevant contents applications and information is also important ¶ for telecommunication users and human resources with sufficient training on the use of ¶ equipment and contents. More networks do not automatically translate into more ¶ telecommunication users.

Mexico RelationsSecurity talks allow problems to continue – Mexico doesn’t allow US involvement in operationsWalser 13 – senior policy analyst specializing in Latin America at the Heritage Foundation (Ray, “Obama in Mexico: Change the Reality, Not the Conversation”, May 1 of 2013, http://blog.heritage.org/2013/05/01/obama-in-mexico-change-the-reality-not-the-conversation/)Cooperation with Mexico may be scaled back or waning as U.S. officials are excluded from intelligence fusion centers the U.S. helped to set up. A new emphasis on citizen security may take the law enforcement heat of trafficking kingpins, who will likely attempt to move drugs across Mexico with less violence and greater efficiency as Mexican law enforcement focuses on the most violent criminal elements.¶ Changing a conversation is easy. Politicians and diplomats do it all the time. But hard facts and real deeds shape the bedrock of reality. On both sides of the border, the U.S. and Mexico are far from resolving the insecurity-producing challenges posed by transnational crime, drug consumption, human trafficking, and border insecurity. Happy talk and wishful thinking will not

make these problems go away . In fact, they have a reasonable chance of allowing them to worsen.

Meetings don’t solve – no agreement on security issuesGoldfarb et al 13 – staff writer covering the White House, focusing on President Obama’s economic, financial and fiscal policy (Zachary, Nick Miroff overs Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean for the Washington Post, “Obama begins bilateral meeting with Peña Nieto”, May 2 of 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-begins-bilateral-meeting-with-pena-nieto/2013/05/02/07475caa-b368-11e2-9a98-4be1688d7d84_story.html)But the security partnership between Mexico and the United States has been the biggest potential

point of conflict between the two leaders ahead of the meeting . With drug trafficking and the illegal transport of weapons over the border still major problems, U.S. officials are concerned that the new Mexican government seems less inclined to provide the same level of deep coordination with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies that was offered by the administration of Felipe Calderóno.¶

Peña Nieto has consolidated all law enforcement cooperation with the United States through Mexico’s Interior Ministry, reining in the wide-ranging and personal connections between U.S. and Mexican military and law enforcement officials.

Previous meetings were successful – no reason more are keyPresta 13 – author of an award-winning book Mr. and Mrs. Grassroots and book reviewer of political books (John, “President Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto at news conference”, May 3 of 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/president-obama-and-mexican-president-enrique-pe-a-nieto-at-news-conference)President Barack Obama had a busy day in Mexico yesterday, on the first day of his trip to Mexico. After the official arrival ceremony which

he was greeted by a delegation led by Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, President Obama had a bilateral meeting with the Mexican President. They then held a press conference at the Palacio Nacional in Mexico City,

Mexico.¶ President Barack Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto issued a joint statement and President Nieto discussed some of that agreement (see below for the joint statement). "First of all, we have reached an agreement that the relation between Mexico and the United States should be broad in terms of the areas that it covers. It should open up opportunity and collaboration spaces in different arenas, with a very clear purpose in mind to make the North American region a more productive and competitive region that will, end result, trigger the enormous potential that our peoples have, that our

nations have."¶ Nieto discussed "all the achievements made upon the free trade agreement and the benefits that our economies have received from it. The exports made from the U.S. to its top trade partners, Mexico and Canada, this represents one-third out of each three products that are exported from the U.S. and only the relation with Mexico is higher than the one the U.S. has with European countries like the U.K., France, the Netherlands all together, or the exports sent to China and Japan together doesn’t reach the level that the U.S. has with Mexico."

Only cooperation on economics solves – it is the necessary starting pointSlack 13 – USA Today/Gannett Washington Bureau Reporter (Donovan, “Obama, Peña Nieto: Our relationship is about more than security”, May 2 of 2013, http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/05/obama-pea-nieto-our-relationship-is-about-more-than-163151.html)President Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto sought Thursday to broaden U.S.-Mexican relations and the focus on those ties beyond security as both touted newly inked cooperative agreements on improving trade and educational exchange.¶ “Too often two issues get attention: security or immigration,” Obama said during a joint press conference after their bilateral meeting.¶ "We are not going to target this relation in one specific area," Peña Nieto said, according to a translator. "We have emphasized trade and commerce in this visit."¶

Both leaders said they had agreed to form a high-level economic working group that will seek to improve trade and foster economic growth on both sides of the border. Vice President Joe Biden will be involved in the effort.¶ They agreed to establish a bilateral forum on higher education, innovation, and research that will develop a shared vision on educational cooperation. They also agreed to work together to try and ensure the completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement by the end of the year.¶ The overarching theme, they said, was to make the region as a whole more productive and competitive in the global economy, while enhancing opportunities within each country.¶ "We live in a world that is changing rapidly," Obama said. "…Both in the United States and Mexico, we can't be caught flat-footed.... We have to make certain that our economies are competitive around the world."

Meetings inevitablePresta 13 – author of an award-winning book Mr. and Mrs. Grassroots and book reviewer of political books (John, “President Obama and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto at news conference”, May 3 of 2013, http://www.examiner.com/article/president-obama-and-mexican-president-enrique-pe-a-nieto-at-news-conference)The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to act as co-responsible partners through a renewed collaborative approach to citizen security. President Peña Nieto discussed the importance of ensuring a peaceful Mexico, as one of the five main pillars of his government’s strategy, and of preventing crime by addressing the conditions that contribute to its occurrence, and strengthening institutions and the rule of law.¶ President

Obama reiterated U.S. support for Mexico’s efforts, and in particular for the transition to an accusatory system of justice that is transparent, effective, and efficient. The Presidents also emphasized the importance of continued actions against transnational organized crime, enhanced counter-illicit finance and arms trafficking efforts, and measures to reduce drug use and its consequences.¶ Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto will remain in close consultation on these and other issues of mutual interest, in order to further advance the partnership between their nations.

Terrorism

Can’t solve terror—external factorsThe Economist 13 ("Secure enough", June 22 2013, www.economist.com/news/united-states/21579828-spending-billions-more-fences-and-drones-will-do-more-harm-good-secure-enough)Fortifying the border has two immediate effects: it makes it easier to catch illegal migrants and it deters others from trying. Raising the cost of crossing must keep out some economic migrants. But the record number of deportations under Mr Obama has created a giant class of expelled foreigners with deep roots in the United States. One survey of recent deportees found that 22% had offspring who were American citizens. Parents separated from their children are unlikely to be put off by extra helicopters or double fencing. The policy, says Ms Reineke, often “forces people to choose between social death and the risk of physical death.”¶ Mexico may no longer be a big net exporter of people, but it is increasingly a transshipment point for migrants from Central America. A growing number of youths are fleeing crime and deprivation in countries such as Guatemala and, particularly, Honduras. Apprehensions of what the Border Patrol

calls OTMs (“other than Mexicans”) grew from 51,000 in 2010 to 95,000 in 2012. The proportion of OTMs among the dead bodies

identified by Ms Reineke’s project doubled between 2000-05 and 2006-12.¶ Even before they reach the border these migrants face dangerous conditions. Mexican authorities say that kidnappings of migrants have soared to around 20,000 a year. Organised criminals rob migrants on a terrifying cargo train known as La Bestia (The Beast), which travels from southern Mexico to the north, with migrants clinging to the roof. In May

at least ten Hondurans were injured after criminals threw them off the train, reportedly for refusing to pay extortion money.¶ Most of America’s 2,000-mile southern border is tighter than it has ever been. Greater use of surveillance technology may reduce crossings further. Yet the growth in numbers from Central America shows how strong the “push” factors behind migration remain. America’s politicians may or may not find a way to declare the border “secure”. But if Mexico’s economy stutters, or violent crime soars again, the magnets of high wages, jobs and security across the border will prove too powerful for many to resist .

Drones tech is hyped—empirically fails at the border and doesn’t provide enough bang for its buckBarry 13 (Tom, senior policy analyst at the Center for International Policy, director of the TransBorder project, specializes in immigration policy, homeland security, border security, and the outsourcing of national security, "Predator Drones Stalk US Borders Without Budget or Strategy", Jan 31 2013, truth-out.org/news/item/14239-predator-drones-stalk-us-borders-without-budget-or-strategy)Flush with billions of dollars in post-9/11 funding for "border security," DHS hurriedly launched the campaign to patrol the borders - north and south - with these Predators. In the rush to secure the homeland, DHS trampled over due-diligence standards to speed through orders for the drones, pilots and crews supplied by General Atomics.¶ CBP started deploying drones along the Arizona border without a plan for how they would be deployed, without a strategy defining their role in border security and without any cost-benefit evaluations, which would determine how effective and cost-efficient drones are compared to other instruments of border control - like agents on the ground, light manned aircraft or less-expensive, smaller drones.¶ The border agency claimed that the Predator drones would function as a "force multiplier." Yet CBP offered no research indicating

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) would indeed increase the efficiency of Border Patrol agents or result in higher rates of drug seizures and apprehensions.¶ Even accepting the notion that arrests of unauthorized immigrants and seizures of marijuana backpackers illegally crossing the border with their bundles of Mexican-grown weed contribute to homeland security, the numbers of immigrant

apprehensions and drug seizures (almost exclusively marijuana) are low for these high-tech, high-budget drone operations.

Drones aren’t successful as anti-terrorist technologyBarry 13 (Tom, senior policy analyst at the Center for International Policy, director of the TransBorder project, specializes in immigration policy, homeland security, border security, and the outsourcing of national security, "Predator Drones Stalk US Borders Without Budget or Strategy", Jan 31 2013, truth-out.org/news/item/14239-predator-drones-stalk-us-borders-without-budget-or-strategy)Then, there is the matter of drones as counterterrorism instruments: how these unmanned remotely piloted vehicles can be used to identify, track and apprehend terrorists and terrorist weapons of mass destruction.¶ The drone program, according to CBP, focuses operations on the CBP priority mission of anti-terrorism by helping "to identify and intercept potential terrorists and illegal cross-border activity." Yet, neither as part of its decision to launch the drone program nor in any subsequent pronouncements, releases, strategy statements or descriptions of drone accomplishments has CBP ever supported its assertion that drones are effective counterterrorist instruments.¶ The failure to link actual drone operations to the agency's "priority mission of anti-terrorism" is not surprising or unexpected. CBP makes the same claim about all its border security operations without ever attempting to detail how these operations are shaped or evaluated by its anti-terrorism mission.

Venezuela RelationsLinks to politics – Obama pushed for her nomination – the CP means he would flip flop which upsets top republicansThe Guardian 13 – (“Obama's UN nominee Samantha Power highlights Syria and Israel”, July 17 of 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jul/18/samantha-power-un-syria-israel-confirmation)Senator Bob Corker, the top Republican on the committee, said he expected Power would be "a significant and positive force at the United Nations", but was one of several senators who urged her to pursue reforms at the world body.¶ "All too often the UN acts as a place where bad actors deflect criticism," he said. Power had been criticised by some conservatives for seeming to suggest, in a 2002 interview

with an academic, that the US army might be needed to police the Middle East conflict if it escalated.¶ Power has disassociated herself many times from that comment. On Wednesday, she called it part of "a long, rambling and remarkably incoherent response to a hypothetical question that I should never have answered".¶ There was some pointed questioning about past statements – some made more than a decade ago – but Power was praised by many Republicans, as well as by Obama's fellow Democrats. Several senators said they looked forward to her UN tenure.

They won’t accept a new ambassador – Maduro already cut off relationsBercovitch 13 – staff writer for the Green Left Weekly (Sascha, “With “Zero Tolerance to Gringo Aggression,” Maduro Cuts Off Venezuela-U.S. Talks”, July 21 of 2013, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/9872)Caracas, July 21st 2013 (Venezuelanalysis.com) – The conversations that were started a month and a half ago between Venezuela and the United States have definitively ended , Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro announced yesterday at an event of the Strategic Regions of Integral Defense (REDI) in Cojedes state.¶ “My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against Venezuela. I'm not going to accept any aggression, whether it

be verbal, political, or diplomatic. Enough is enough. Stay over there with your empire, don't involve yourselves

anymore in Venezuela ,” he said.

Diplomatic missions fail – Brownfield provesNikandrov 12 – Journalist and political analyst covering Latin America's politics (Nil, “US Ambassadors to Venezuela: A Chronology of Failure”, February 18 of 2012, Venezuela Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6816)Brownfield’s credentials were accepted by Chavez at Miraflores Palace on October 15 2004. First, the ambassador tried to leave a good impression of himself and emphasized the need to improve the US-Venezuela relations at least on some levels and lay the basis for further cooperation. Very soon,

however, Brownfield’s policy changed, and he spent much time talking to opposition members and NGO activists. He paid several

visits to Venezuela’s Zulia state, openly demonstrating his solidarity with local pro-separatism politicians. He criticized practically everything Chavez did: the purchase of Russian arms, oil cooperation with Cuba, expanded partnership with Iran, contribution to Latin American integration and the creation of the mechanism of regional security without the US membership. ¶ In response, the officials in Caracas paid absolutely

no attention to the new US envoy . Brownfield’s mission ended in the middle of 2007. This is how one of Venezuelan analysts

commented on Brownfield’s work: “Defeated, he is leaving. He failed to implement Washington's plans of making the opposition stronger and Chavez weaker. On the contrary, while Brownfield stayed in Venezuela, Chavez saw his

approval rating going up to 73%... Brownfield simply turned into a vulgar immoral instigator. His only success was giving dollars to opposition 'puppets'”.

Empirics go AFF – diplomatic missions are uselessNikandrov 12 – Journalist and political analyst covering Latin America's politics (Nil, “US Ambassadors to Venezuela: A Chronology of Failure”, February 18 of 2012, Venezuela Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6816)Brownfield wished his successor Patrick Duddy all the best at his post. Describing Duddy as a ''very smart, intellectual man, who knows Latin America very well', Brownfield said: ''Probably, he will manage to achieve the goals I’ve failed to approach.” Duddy continued his predecessor's course, though in a more careful way: his intelligence background helped him. There was not a single reason to reproach him for anything, although the Venezuelan counterintelligence received reports that the US embassy was preparing a 'surprise' for the 2008 elections [in 2008 state governor elections were held in Venezuela]. In August of 2008, in a gesture of solidarity with Bolivia, Chavez said that Duddy must leave Venezuela within 72 hours. The US ambassador to La Paz in Bolivia Philip Goldberg was a key

figure in organizing opposition rallies and instigating separatism. He was implementing the US plans to overthrow Evo Morales.¶ Duddy returned to Caracas nine months later. His further stay in Venezuela was not in any way remarkable, except the WikiLeaks reports dealing with the embassy’s financial ties to pro-opposition mass media. Journalists addressed Duddy asking him for money allegedly to fight the Chavez regime. Duddy [who’s term

of service in Venezuelan ended July 2010] was not happy with the situation because the results were very poor

despite huge spending .