Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger

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JAMES DUERLINGER

VASUBANDHU’S PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THEV ATS IPUTR IYAS’ THEORY OF PERSONS (I)

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of his “Refutation of the Theory of Self”

( Atmav adapratis.

edha), the appendix to his Treasury of Knowledge with

Commentary ( Abhidarmako sabh as.

ya), Vasubandhu presents a series

of philosophical objections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons.1 A

theory of persons is a metaphysical account of persons which includes

or implies accounts of their nature, existence, unity, and identity over

time. The V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory in the “Refutation” explicitly concerns

only the nature and existence of persons. What is meant by “persons” is

that to which we refer when we use the pronoun, “I,” and its equivalents

in other languages, to refer to ourselves. I present here the first of three

articles in which Vasubandhu’s objections to the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas’ theoryand their replies to these objections are reconstructed and evaluated.2

The theory to which Vasubandhu objects is that persons ( pudgala-s)

exist in the sense that they exist apart from being perceived or conceived3

and are neither other than nor the same as4 the phenomena (dharma-

s) in dependence upon which they are perceived and conceived.5

Both Vasubandhu and the V ats ıputr ıyas believe that the phenomena

in dependence upon which persons are perceived and conceived are

the bodies and mental states of persons. Let us, as Vasubandhu and

V ats ıputr ıyas do, refer to these phenomena as the aggregates (skandha-

s).6 What is neither other than nor the same as the phenomena in

dependence upon which it is perceived and conceived is a phenomenon

which the V ats ıputr ıyas’ call inexplicable (avaktavya).7 Let us say

that persons conceived in dependence upon the aggregates are the

objects of the concept of ourselves. The V ats ıputr ıyas are claiming

that these objects exist and are inexplicable. I shall also express their

theory by saying that we exist and are inexplicable, since I shall use

“we” (“us,” “ourselves,” etc.) to refer to the objects of the conceptsof ourselves. Their theory may also be expressed by the claim that we

exist and are neither other than nor the same as our aggregates, where

Journal of Indian Philosophy 25: 307–335, 1997.c

1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



308 JAMES DUERLINGER

“our aggregates” is used to refer to the aggregates in dependence upon

which we are perceived and conceived.

Vasubandhu and the V ats ıputr ıyas agree that we are by convention

conceived to be appropriators (up ad atar -s) of the aggregates, which

are therefore called the appropriated aggregates (up ad anaskandha-s),

and that we are not correctly conceived in this way if we are the sameas our aggregates. By virtue of being conceived as appropriators of the

aggregates, they also seem to agree, we are conceived to be perceivers

of objects, thinkers of thoughts about them, performers of actions and

experiencers of the results of these actions. Vasubandhu thinks that we

are incorrectly conceived in these ways, since he believes that we are

in fact the same as our aggregates. The V ats ıputr ıyas think that we are

correctly so conceived, since they believe that we perceive ourselves

when our aggregates are present, and that what is perceived in this caseis not the same as our aggregates. Although the perception of ourselves

which attends the presence of our aggregates, they believe, establishes

our existence, it does not establish our conceivability apart from the

aggregates, since we cannot be conceived without reference to them.

In this first article I shall reconstruct and assess what I shall call

Vasubandhu’s two-realities objection to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory, the

V ats ıputr ıyas’ aggregate-reliance reply, Vasubandhu’s causal objection

to this reply, the V ats ıputr ıyas’ fire-fuel reply to this objection, and

the V ats ıputr ıyas’ middle-way argument for their theory. In the secondarticle, I shall reconstruct and assess Vasubandhu’s objections to the

V ats ıputr ıyas’ fire-fuel reply and their replies to these objections. In

the third article, I shall reconstruct and assess Vasubandhu’s objections

to their theory that inexplicable persons are known to exist by percep-

tion and their replies to these objections. Then I shall make my final

assessment of the entire exchange.

VASUBANDHU’S TWO-REALITIES OBJECTION

The “Refutation” begins with a statement of Vasubandhu’s own theory of

persons. He argues that liberation from suffering is not possible for the

T ırthikas,8 who do not accept the Buddha’s teaching that we are nothing

but our aggregates, which are a collection of substances (dravya-s) of

different sorts in a causal continuum, since their belief that we are

substances separate in existence from our aggregates will prevent them

from abandoning the grasping at a self which causes them to suffer.He claims that we are our aggregates, since only the aggregates are

known, by means of direct perception ( pratyaks.

a) and sound inference



V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ THEORY OF PERSONS (I) 309

(anum an.

a), to be the phenomena in dependence upon which we are

conceived.9 This argument sets the stage for his introduction of the

V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons. “They assert,” he says, “that a person

exists” ( pudgala santam icchanti). The Sanskrit word for “person”

( pudgala) is being used here, as the V ats ıputr ıyas use it, to refer to

an appropriator of aggregates, which is not the same as the aggregates

appropriated. The Sanskrit word for “exists” (santam) is used, as

Vasubandhu also uses it, to signify the possession of existence apart

from being perceived or conceived. So when the V ats ıputr ıyas assert

that a person exists, they are implying that the person to whom they

refer is not the same as its10 aggregates and asserting that it exists.

Vasubandhu begins his first objection to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of

persons by challenging them to explain whether, in saying that a person

exists, they are claiming that a person is real in the way a substance is(dravyasat ) or real in the way a mental construction is ( praj ~ naptisat ).11

He continues:

If it is a distinct entity like bodily form and other such things [each of which is anentity of a certain sort],12 it is real in the way a substance is; but if [by analysis] itis [shown to be the same as] a collection [of substances of different sorts], like milk and other such things [each of which seems to be, but is not, an entity of a certainsort], it is real in the way a mental construction is. Consequently, if a person is realin the way a substance is, it must be said that it is other than the aggregates in theway that each of them is other than the others, since it will possess a different nature

[than possessed by any of the substances of which the aggregates are comprised].[If it is other than the aggregates, it must be either causally conditioned or causallyunconditioned. If it is causally conditioned,] its causes should be explained. But if itis causally unconditioned, the false theory [of persons] espoused by the T ırthikas isheld and a person has no function [to perform in the production of aggregates]. If [a person is said to be] real in the way a mental construction is, [it is the same asthe aggregates, and] this is the theory [of persons found in the Buddha’s discoursesand is] held by us.

According to Vasubandhu, to be real in the way a substance is is

to be an ultimate reality ( param arthasatya) and that to be real in the

way a mental construction is is to be a deceptive conventional reality

(sam.

vr .

tisatya), as these realities are defined by the Vaibh as.

ikas.13 What

exactly are these two realities?

The substances to which Vasubandhu refers in the passage above

are distinct entities in the sense that they are phenomena which possess

by themselves just one nature and are conceived on the basis of their

possession of this nature. They are called ultimate realities, apparently,

because they are what they are conceived to be. Substances are known to

be what they are conceived to be because they continue to be conceivedeven if they are taken apart physically or are mentally analyzed into

parts and brought to consciousness in that form. They continue to be




conceived because they are conceived on the basis of natures they

possess by themselves rather than on the basis of merely appearing to

possess such natures. Substances may be causally conditioned (sam.

skr .

ta)

and impermanent (anitya), as are the substances of the different sorts

which comprise the aggregates, or causally unconditioned (asam.

skr .

ta)

and permanent (nitya), as are space (ak a sa) and noncyclic existence(nirv an

.

a).

Mental constructions are called deceptive conventional realities

because they are by convention conceived to be entities of a certain

sort, and so, seem to possess by themselves just one nature on the basis

of which they are conceived, even though they do not, yet are real, since

analysis shows that they are collections of substances of different sorts.

They are known not to be the entities they are conceived to be because

they do not continue to be conceived if they are taken apart physicallyor are mentally analyzed into parts and brought to consciousness in

that form. They are known to be collections of substances of different

sorts because, when they are taken apart physically or are mentally

analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that

form, what appear to consciousness are collections of substances of

different sorts. Phenomena which are neither ultimate realities nor

deceptive conventional realities do not exist, and so, are unreal (asat ),

since they are neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way

a mental construction is.In the passage quoted above Vasubandhu assumes, first of all, that

analysis of what is conceived, if it exists, reveals that it is either

a substance or a collection of substances of different sorts. This is

equivalent to the assumption that an entity which exists and is conceived

is either a phenomenon which possesses by itself just one nature and is

conceived on the basis of its possession of this nature or is a collection

of such phenomena which seems to possess by itself just one nature on

the basis of which it is conceived, but does not. Alternatively, we maysay that Vasubandhu assumes that a concept of an object is formed either

in dependence upon a substance or in dependence upon a collection of

substances of different sorts which seems to be an entity of a certain

sort, and that that in dependence upon which the concept of an object

is formed must be the object of the concept.

When an object is conceived in dependence upon a substance, he

assumes, the object is correctly conceived. Phenomena, so conceived,

exist, since they are substances. Vasubandhu believes that substances

are known to exist by means of direct perception or sound inference.But when an object is conceived in dependence upon a collection




of substances of different sorts, he believes the object is incorrectly

conceived, since the object falsely appears to the consciousness which

conceives it as an entity of a certain sort. What Vasubandhu calls a

mental construction is the object of a concept formed in dependence

upon a collection of substances of different sorts which seems to be

an entity of a certain sort. The object is called a mental construction, Isurmise, because its appearance of being an entity of a certain sort is

mentally constructed. Although a collection of substances of different

sorts does not by itself possess just one nature on the basis of which it

is conceived, it is known to be the same as the object being conceived,

Vasubandhu believes, by means of the analysis which eliminates the

false appearance of the object being an entity of a certain sort, since what

is present to consciousness after analysis is a collection of substances

of different sorts.In the passage translated above, Vasubandhu in effect claims, (a) that

if we are other than our aggregates, we are ultimate realities, (b) that

if we are the same as our aggregates, we are deceptive conventional

realities, and argues, on the basis of the assumption, (c) that we must be

either other than our aggregates or the same as our aggregates, that we

must be either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional realities. At

first sight, it would seem that Vasubandhu’s assumption, that we must

be either other than or the same as our aggregates, is an application of

the logical principle, that of any two things which exist, one is eitherother than the second or the same as the second, which is expressed in

standard logical notation as “(x) (y) (–[x = y] v [x = y]).”14 However,

when he speaks of our being other than our aggregates, he does not

mean that we are not identical to them. What he means is that we are not

clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates in the

sense that we are separable in existence from them, possess by ourselves

just one nature and are conceived on the basis of our possession of this

nature. If there can be phenomena which are separable in existencefrom other phenomena without being clearly and distinctly separable

in existence from them, the claim that we are either other than or the

same as our aggregates is not an application of a principle of logic.

Both Vasubandhu and the V ats ıputr ıyas believe that we are other than

our aggregates if and only if we are substances which exist apart from

our aggregates, and that we are the same as our aggregates if and only

if we are reducible in existence to our aggregates. What they disagree

about is whether or not we can exist without being substances which

exist apart from our aggregates or being reducible in existence to ouraggregates.




In order both to avoid the impression that Vasubandhu is merely

invoking a principle of logic in his objection and to incorporate a uniform

terminology into my discussion, hereafter I shall substitute “are clearly

and distinctly separable in existence from” for “are other than” in my

discussion of the statement that we are other than our aggregates. And to

make it clear that the statement that we are the same as our aggregatesis a result of the reductive form of analysis used by Vasubandhu to

show that we exist, I shall substitute “is reducible in existence to” for

“is the same as” in my discussions of this statement.

So Vasubandhu thinks that if we exist, as the V ats ıputr ıyas claim

we do, we must be either substances, which are clearly and distinctly

separable in existence from our aggregates, as the T ırthikas claim, or

mental constructions, which are reducible in existence to our aggregates,

as he himself claims. When the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas claim that we exist,Vasubandhu is objecting, they must accept the T ırthikas’ theory of

persons, which they cannot do, or his own theory, since there is no

other alternative available.

Vasubandhu’s objection to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons may

now be reconstructed. According to the V ats ıputr ıyas,

(i) We exist.

(ii) If we exist, we must be either clearly and distinctly sep-

arable in existence from, or reducible in existence to, ouraggregates.

(iii) If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

our aggregates, we possess by ourselves just one nature and

are conceived on the basis of our possession of this nature.

(iv) If we possess by ourselves just one nature and are con-

ceived on the basis of our possession of this nature, we are

ultimate realities.

(v) If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, by con-vention we are conceived in dependence upon the collection

of substances of different sorts called the aggregates.

(vi) If by convention we are conceived in dependence upon the

collection of substances of different sorts called the aggre-

gates, we are deceptive conventional realities.

Therefore,

(vii) We are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventionalrealities.




The point of the objection, of course, is that the V ats ıputr ıyas’ only

alternative to adopting Vasubandhu’s own theory of persons is to accept

that of the T ırthikas, and they do not accept that of the T ırthikas. So

how can persons exist if they are not reducible in existence to their

aggregates?

V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ AGGREGATE-RELIANCE REPLY

The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply to Vasubandhu’s objection is as follows:

A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mentalconstruction is, since it is conceived in reliance upon aggregates which pertain toourselves, are appropriated, and exist in the present.

In other words, we are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conven-

tional realities, as Vasubandhu defines them, since we are conceived

in reliance upon aggregates which possess the three attributes listed.

Let us set aside for the moment a discussion of the three attributes

of these aggregates so we may first come to an understanding of the

V ats ıputr ıyas’ use of “in reliance upon” (up ad aya) in the claim that

we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates.

Although we exist, the V ats ıputr ıyas believe, we are inexplicable

phenomena in the sense that we are not ultimate realities, since we are

not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our aggregates, nordeceptive conventional realities, since we are not reducible in existence

to our aggregates. We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in

existence from, nor reducible in existence to, our aggregates, because

we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates. But what is meant by

our being conceived “in reliance upon” aggregates? To understand its

meaning let us begin by seeing why inexplicable phenomena are not

conceived in the way substances are conceived.

Phenomena which are inexplicable, according to the V ats ıputr ıyas,

are like substances insofar as their existence is not reducible to that of

a collection of substances of different sorts. But they are also unlike

them insofar as they do not by themselves possess just one nature

and are conceived on the basis of their possession of this nature. The

V ats ıputr ıyas apparently believe that inexplicable phenomena do possess

by themselves natures by reason of which they exist, but not that they

can be conceived on the basis of possessing these natures. It is precisely

because the natures we possess by ourselves do not enable us to be

conceived that we must be conceived in reliance upon aggregates.In the third article in this series I shall discuss Vasubandhu’s dispute

with the V ats ıputr ıyas concerning how we are known to exist. If we are




to comprehend fully what the V ats ıputr ıyas mean by our being conceived

in reliance upon aggregates, we need to anticipate their views about

this matter. The V ats ıputr ıyas will claim that we are known to exist by

means of perception. Vasubandhu will have difficulty understanding

this claim, since he assumes that a perception which establishes the

existence of the object of a concept must involve a discriminationof the single nature the object possesses by itself. Only if the single

nature an object possesses by itself is discriminated when the object is

perceived, he believes, can the existence of the object be established by

the perception, since a discrimination of this nature is what determines

the content of the concept of that object. Let us call a perception of

this sort a clear and distinct perception of the object of a concept. The

V ats ıputr ıyas, however, do not believe that we possess by ourselves

single natures the discrimination of which is included in the perceptionwhich establishes our existence. In other words, they do not believe

that the perception which establishes our existence is clear and distinct.

Nonetheless, they believe, the existence of the object of the concept

of ourselves is established by perception. How is this possible? How

can a perception establish the existence of the object of the concept of

ourselves if it is not a clear and distinct perception of this object? It

is possible, they believe, if the concept is not formed on the basis of

a clear and distinct perception of ourselves, but on the basis of clear

and distinct perceptions of phenomena which are present when we arebeing perceived. Since our natures cannot be discriminated when we

are perceived, the concept of ourselves must be formed on the basis of

clear and distinct perceptions of the phenomena present when we are

perceived. These phenomena are the aggregates.

We have come to see the difference between the way in which the

V ats ıputr ıyas believe we are conceived and the way in which ultimate

realities are conceived. Ultimate realities are conceived on the basis of

the single natures they possess by themselves, while we are conceivedon the basis of the single natures of the aggregates present when we

are perceived. What is the difference between the way in which the

V ats ıputr ıyas think we are conceived and the way in which deceptive

conventional realities are conceived?

Vasubandhu likens our being conceived in reliance upon aggregates to

the way in which milk is conceived in dependence upon its constituents.

The aggregates in reliance upon which we are conceived, according

to this comparison, must be that to which the concept of ourselves

is applied, just as the collection of phenomena in dependence uponwhich milk is conceived is that to which the concept of milk is applied.




Vasubandhu assumes in both cases that that in dependence upon which

a concept of a phenomenon is formed is that to which the concept

is applied. Let us call that in dependence upon which a concept is

formed the cause of the concept, meaning by this that it determines

the content of the concept formed. Let us also call that to which a

concept is applied its object. The V ats ıputr ıyas claim that the objectof the concept of ourselves is not its cause. Part of what they mean to

express by saying that we are conceived “in reliance upon” aggregates

is that the aggregates are the cause of the concept of ourselves without

being its object.

The theory that the object of a concept must always be its cause I

shall call the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts. Vasubandhu

accepts this theory, while the V ats ıputr ıyas do not. Since we are con-

ceived in reliance upon aggregates, according to the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas,our aggregates cause the concept of ourselves, but they are not its

object. This is another implication of our being conceived “in reliance

upon” aggregates upon which the V ats ıputr ıyas draw in their reply to

Vasubandhu’s two-realities objection.

One of the forms which the V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply from aggregate-

reliance can take may now be reconstructed.

(i) We are conceived in reliance upon aggregates

(ii) If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, we do notposses by ourselves single natures on the basis of which we

are conceived.

(iii) If we do not possess by ourselves single natures on the basis

of which we are conceived, we are not clearly and distinctly

separable in existence from our aggregates.

Therefore,

(iv) We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence fromour aggregates.

(v) If we are not clearly and distinct separable in existence from

our aggregates, we are not ultimate realities

Therefore, from (iv) and (v) we may infer,

(vi) We are not ultimate realities.

Moreover,




(vii) If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggre-

gates are the cause, but not the object, of the concept of

ourselves.

(viii) If our aggregates are the cause, but not the object, of the

concept of ourselves, we are not reducible in existence to

our aggregates.

Therefore, from (vii) and (viii) we may infer,

(ix) We are not reducible in existence to our aggregates.

But,

(x) If we are not reducible in existence to our aggregates, we

are not deceptive conventional realities.

Therefore, from (vi) and (xi) we may infer,

(xii) We are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional

realities.

Vasubandhu, we shall see, would reject premise (vii) of this recon-

struction. But since the objection he is about to make against the reply

is directed against its unreconstructed form, the objection will merely

assume the falsity of premise (vii) rather than show it to be false.

We must be careful at this point not to draw the conclusion thatthe V ats ıputr ıyas mean to deny the truth of the Buddha’s doctrine of

two realities. They are, of course, denying the truth of that doctrine

as Vasubandhu interprets it. The V ats ıputr ıyas, we may assume, have

their own interpretation of the Buddha’s doctrine of the two realities.

Indeed, the Vaibh as.

ika interpretation, which is accepted by Vasuhandhu,

is rejected by scholars belonging to all of the other Indian Buddhist

philosophical schools except the school based on Vasubandhu’s Treasury

itself. The V ats ıputr ıyas, I suggest, would interpret the Buddha’s doctrine

in such a way that the inexplicability of persons is their ultimate reality,

while such persons, as conceived , are deceptive conventional realities

insofar as the conceiving of them makes them appear to be entities of

a certain sort. Analysis would then show the falsity of our appearance

of being entities of a certain sort, and thereby, enable us to free our

perception of ourselves of the conceptual overlay which causes us to

see ourselves as selves ( atmadr .

s.

t .

i).15




THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE AGGREGATES IN RELIANCE UPON WHICH WEARE CONCEIVED

Let us now discuss the attributes the V ats ıputr ıyas assign to the aggre-

gates in reliance upon which they believe we are conceived. They say

that these aggregates are those which pertain to ourselves ( adhy atmik an),are appropriated (up att an), and exist in the present (varttam an an). The

aggregates which pertain to ourselves are our organs of perception and

mental states, and perhaps even our so-called bodily properties.16 The

aggregates are appropriated, the V ats ıputr ıyas seem to believe, in the

sense that they are “clung to” as possessions of the self which we falsely

appear to be because we form a concept of ourselves in dependence

upon the presence of these aggregates. The self we falsely appear to be,

they claim, is a permanent and partless substance.17 The effect produced

by the aggregates being appropriated in this sense would seem to be the

continued existence of their causal continuum from one lifetime to the

next.18 As causes of the continued existence of this continuum, we are

not selves, since we separately exist without being separate substances.

Vasubandhu verbally agrees with the V ats ıputr ıyas that the aggregates

in reliance upon which we are conceived are those which pertain to

ourselves and are appropriated. But he believes, first of all, that we are

conceived in reliance upon these aggregates in the way in which milk

is conceived in dependence upon its constituents, not in the specialway the V ats ıputr ıyas claim we are conceived. Secondly, he seems to

think that the inexplicable person the V ats ıputr ıyas believe to be the

appropriator of the aggregates is itself the self. For he does not, as the

V ats ıputr ıyas do, believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that

we are permanent and partless substances which exist apart from our

aggregates, yet does believe that we suffer by reason of assuming that

we exist without being reducible in existence to our aggregates. Thirdly,

he thinks that the appropriator of the aggregates is real in the way a

mental construction is, not in the way an inexplicable phenomenon is.

In truth, he insists, there is no appropriator of the aggregates which

exists apart from them.

When the V ats ıputr ıyas say that the aggregates in reliance upon which

we are conceived exist in the present, what they must mean by the

present is the time we are actually being conceived. The V ats ıputr ıyas

are implying that past and future aggregates, which are those not present

at the time when we are conceiving ourselves, are not phenomena in

reliance upon which we are conceived.19 It might be objected thatwe conceive ourselves in reliance upon past aggregates when we

remember something we did or experienced in the past and that we




conceive ourselves in reliance upon future aggregates when we foresee

or imagine what we shall do or experience in the future. In these cases,

would we not be conceiving ourselves in reliance upon past and future

aggregates? The V ats ıputr ıyas would surely reply that, if we conceive

ourselves on the basis of past and future aggregates, we would not be

conceiving ourselves from the first-person singular perspective, sincepast and future aggregates are the phenomena on basis of which we

would conceive ourselves from the third-person singular perspective.

The concept of ourselves is the concept of ourselves as it is used from

the first-person singular perspective, for example, as it is used in the

thoughts that I am feeling pleasure now, that I felt pleasure yesterday,

and that I shall feel pleasure tomorrow. It should be clear that in each

of these cases, I am conceiving myself in reliance upon thinking these

thoughts, not in reliance upon the content of these thoughts.

VASUBANDHU’S CAUSAL OBJECTION TO THE AGGREGATE-RELIANCEREPLY

Vasubandhu objects, on the assumption that the cause of a concept must

be the object of the concept, that it cannot be true, as the V ats ıputr ıyas

claim, that if we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, we are

neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities.

If we are to understand this obscure statement [of how a person exists without beingeither real in the way a substance is or real in the way a mental construction is], itsmeaning must be disclosed. What is meant by [saying that a person is conceived]“in reliance upon [the aggregates]”? If it means [that a person is conceived] “on thecondition that the aggregates have been perceived,” then the concept [of a person]is applied only to them, just as when visible forms and other such things [thatcomprise milk] have been perceived, the concept of milk is applied only to them. If [saying that a person is conceived “in reliance upon the aggregates” means that itis conceived] “in dependence upon the aggregates being present,” then [once again,the concept of a person is applied only to them], because the aggregates themselves

will cause it to be conceived. [Therefore,] the difficulty is the same.

Vasubandhu here argues that insofar as the first premise of the

V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply from aggregate-reliance is true, it cannot be used

in a sound inference to prove that its conclusion is true. The sense in

which that premise is true, he claims, is that the concept of ourselves

is formed because the aggregates have been perceived or because the

aggregates are present. The distinction Vasubandhu is drawing between

the perception of the aggregates being a condition for the concept of

ourselves being formed and the presence of the aggregates being thecondition for the concept being formed does not mark a real difference

in his view about the cause of the concept of ourselves, since the




aggregates which are present, he thinks, are present to consciousness

as objects of perception. He is arguing that if the aggregates cause the

concept of ourselves, the concept is applied only to the aggregates, and

hence, that the aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves.

He can draw this conclusion, however, only if he assumes that

the phenomena which cause a concept must be the object of thatconcept. This assumption, I have already noted, is contradicted by

premise (vii) of my reconstruction of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ aggregate-

reliance reply. Vasubandhu supports his use of this assumption with the

example of how milk is conceived. Since milk is conceived in reliance

upon the collection of its constituents, he argues, the collection of the

constituents of milk is the object of the concept of milk; likewise,

if we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates, our aggregates are

the object of the concept of ourselves. Finally, Vasubandhu concludeshis objection with the statement that “the difficulty is the same.” The

difficulty to which I believe he alludes is that the V ats ıputr ıyas’ cannot

say that we exist unless they accept the view that we are either ultimate

realities or deceptive conventional realities.

Vasubandhu’s objection, which I call the causal objection to the

aggregate-reliance reply, may now be reconstructed. Let us assume,

with the V ats ıputr ıyas, that

(i) We are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates.(ii) If we are conceived in reliance upon the aggregates, the

aggregates cause the concept of ourselves.

Therefore,

(iii) The aggregates cause the concept of ourselves.

But

(iv) What causes a concept is the object of the concept.

Therefore,

(v) The aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves.

But

(vi) If the aggregates are the object of the concept of ourselves,

we are reducible in existence to our aggregates.

Therefore,

(vii) We are reducible in existence to our aggregates.




But

(viii) If we are reducible in existence to our aggregates, then we

are deceptive conventional realities.

Therefore,

(ix) We are deceptive conventional realities.

It follows from (ix), by the rule of logic called addition, that

(x) We are either ultimate realities or deceptive conventional

realities.

Hence, from (i), which is the first premise of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply

from aggregate-reliance, Vasubandhu has derived the alternatives he

first posed to the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas. So the reason they give for rejectingthese alternatives, he is arguing, provides a reason for accepting them.

The theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts, as well as its use to

reject the content of our actual concept of ourselves, has its analogue in

the philosophy of David Hume, whose own phenomenalistic version of

the theory is that ideas are copies of impressions. He, like Vasubandhu,

uses a version of the theory to argue for the falsity of our actual

concept or idea of ourselves as a phenomenon irreducible in existence

to the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived. Like

Vasubandhu, moreover, he in effect argues that if we exist at all, wemust be reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence upon

which we are conceived, since, if we exist, we must be either clearly

and distinctly separable in existence from, or reducible in existence to,

the phenomena in dependence upon which we are conceived, and we

know that we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

these phenomena, since we are not clearly and distinctly perceived. This

parallel helps us to see what is at stake in Vasubandhu’s use of the theory

of cause-dependent objects of concepts to reject the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas’ theoryof persons. Vasubandhu’s acceptance of the theory of cause-dependent

objects of concepts is surely motivated by the same fundamental concern

that motivates Hume’s theory of concept formation, which is to provide

a way to verify claims about what exists.

V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ REPLY FROM FIRE AND FUEL

The crux of the dispute at this point between Vasubandhu and theV ats ıputr ıyas concerns whether or not what causes a concept to be

formed must be the object of the concept. So what the V ats ıputr ıyas




now need to do, and indeed, do, is to find a way to reject the theory of

cause-dependent objects of concepts. Their rejection of this theory is

built into their attempt to provide an example of a phenomenon other

than a person which is conceived in dependence upon a collection

of substances of different sorts and is neither clearly and distinctly

separable in existence from, nor reducible in existence to, that collectionof substances. The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply is as follows:

A person is not conceived in this way, but rather in the way [in which] fire isconceived in reliance upon fuel. Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel, [they claim,in the sense that] it is not conceived unless fuel is present, and it cannot be conceivedif it either is or is not other than fuel. If fire were other than fuel, fuel [which isburning] would not be hot. And if fire were not other than fuel, what burns wouldbe the same as the cause of its burning.

In the translation I have taken the V ats ıputr ıyas to be providing an

account of what it is for fire to be conceived in reliance upon fuel and

have added to that account the qualification that fuel is burning, since it

is clear that fuel which is not burning is not hot and it is being assumed

that the fuel to which the V ats ıputr ıyas are referring is in fact hot.

The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply is more than a simple counter-example on

the basis of which they would have us reject the assumption upon

which Vasubandhu’s causal objection is based, since it includes, as I

have interpreted it, a definition of “conceived in reliance upon.” For

if what I am calling their definition of this phrase is substituted forthe phrase in the original aggregate-reliance reply, that reply will then

take the form, “A person is neither real in the way a substance is nor

real in the way a mental construction is, since it [is conceived, but] is

not conceived unless aggregates are present and it cannot be conceived

if it either is or is not other than aggregates.” This definition in fact

supplies us with premises (iv) and (ix) of the reconstruction I made

above of the aggregate-reliance reply. In my reconstruction, however,

I have supplied the premises upon which (iv) and (ix) are derived, and

then supplied the further premises from which the conclusion of the

aggregate-reliance reply is derived.

A logically perspicuous reconstruction of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply to

Vasubandhu’s causal objection will include arguments for the premises

(a) that fire is not conceived unless fuel is present, (b) that fire is not

clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, and (c) that fire

is not reducible in existence to fuel, and it will end with the conclusion

(d) that that in dependence upon which a phenomenon is conceived need

not be what is conceived. Both Vasubandhu and the V ats

ıputr

ıyas agree,of course, that fire is conceived and that it is conceived in the sense

that a concept of fire is formed. Both also agree that fire is the object of




this concept, but Vasubandhu believes fire to be a mental construction

reducible in existence to the elements of which it is composed and the

V ats ıputr ıyas believe it to be an inexplicable phenomenon conceived

in dependence upon fuel. When it is said that fire is not conceived

unless fuel is present, this means for both that fire is conceived in

dependence upon fuel. But they do not agree, as I shall explain in thenext article, that fire is in fact conceived in dependence upon fuel.

Since the V ats ıputr ıyas do not present an argument for this premise,

we shall need to reconstruct an argument for it on their behalf if we

are to identify the cause of their disagreement.

Their reason for believing that fire is conceived in dependence upon

fuel is surely that they define fire by reference to fuel. Our first clue to

uncovering their definition is to note that they most likely believe that

fire is known to exist by perception, since fire is used as the analogue of a person, whose perception, we have seen, is the basis upon which they

claim that a person exists. But fire is not always perceived when fuel

is present. It is perceived only when fuel burns (dahyate). Because fire

is perceived only when fuel burns, the V ats ıputr ıyas surely reason, fire

may be defined by reference to the burning of the fuel. It should be no

surprise, therefore, that the V ats ıputr ıyas are in fact later represented by

Vasubandhu as defining fire as what causes fuel to burn. So defined, fire

cannot be conceived without reference to fuel, and in this sense, fire is

conceived in dependence upon fuel. We can be sure that their definitionof fire is not a statement of what it is according to its own nature, since

they must believe that we cannot know what fire is according to its

own nature. They must believe that we cannot know this because they

are presenting fire as the analogue of ourselves and they believe that

we cannot know what we are according to our own natures.

If we are to understand the V ats ıputr ıyas’ definition of fire and

the role it plays in their reply to Vasubandhu’s causal objection, we

need to contrast their definition of fire to that given in the Treasuryaccount of the elements (bh uta-s) of which all bodies are comprised.

According to the Treasury account, bodies are mental constructions

reducible in existence to collections of substances of different sorts,

including four primary elements (mah abh uta-s), known to exist by

sound inference, and various secondary elements (bhautika-s), known

to exist by clear and distinct perception. The four primary elements are

called fire (tejas), earth ( pr .

thiv ı), air ( ıran.

a), and water (ap), which are

substances all of which are present in every body in equal proportions

and which in combination must be present if the body is to possess thesecondary elements, which are the special objects of the five senses.20




Each of these elements has by itself just one nature which is called

its defining property (laks.

an.

a) and which cannot be present in any of

the other elements. The defining property of the fire-element is heat

(us.

n.

at a).21 As the defining property of the fire-element, heat cannot be

present in any of the other three primary elements. In addition to the

fire-element, which is an ultimate reality, there is the fire which is adeceptive conventional reality and is reducible in existence to the special

collection of substances of different sorts of which it is composed. In

the “Refutation” itself Vasubandhu so analyzes fire, as conventionally

conceived, and claims that fuel, which is similarly analyzed, is the

cause of the arising of fire in the way that milk is a cause of the

arising of curds. Since the four primary elements exist in every body in

equal proportions, a body would seem to be called a fire not because it

contains more fire-elements than the elements of earth, air and water,but because of the greater intensity of the heat of the fire-elements it

contains.22

It should be clear that when the V ats ıputr ıyas define fire as the

cause of the burning of fuel they are offering an alternative to the

Treasury accounts of fire as an ultimate reality and as a deceptive

conventional reality. In the “Refutation,” when Vasubandhu requests

from the V ats ıputr ıyas more specific accounts of fire and fuel, they

identify fire with the heat (aus.

n.

yam) which is present in burning fuel

( prad ıpta), and claim that fuel is comprised of the earth-, air- andwater-elements. It is likely that the V ats ıputr ıyas hold the view that

fuel is a collection of elemental substances, as they are defined in

the Treasury, since they seem to hold the view that the aggregates,

the analogue of fuel in their analogy, is a collection of substances of

different sorts. But we can be sure that the fire-element, as defined in

the Treasury, is not what the V ats ıputr ıyas call fire, because (a) the

fire-element is not the cause of the burning of fuel, (b) the fire-element

is not present in fuel if fuel is comprised solely of the earth-, air- andwater-elements, and (c) the fire-element is not perceived, as fire is, but

inferred to exist on the basis of a clear and distinct perception of its

defining property, heat. Nor can fire, which the V ats ıputr ıyas also call

heat, be the heat which defines the fire-element, since the heat with

which the V ats ıputr ıyas identify fire is present in fuel, while the heat

which defines the fire-element cannot be present in fuel. Fire, according

to the V ats ıputr ıyas, is the heat present in burning fuel which causes

the fuel to burn. This cause of the burning of fuel, we may suppose, the

V ats ıputr ıyas call “heat” because the heat present in fuel is generallyconsidered to be the cause of its burning. Moreover, this fire or heat




which is present in fuel, if it is an analogue to persons as conceived by

the V ats ıputr ıyas, will be separable in existence from the fuel it causes

to burn without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

it, just as persons are separable in existence from the aggregates they

cause to be appropriated, without being clearly and distinctly separable

in existence from them.Whether or not the V ats ıputr ıyas believe that, in addition to fire, as

they define it, there is also a fire-element, as defined in the Treasury,

is not clear. If they do assert that both fire and the fire-element exist,

they would certainly deny that the heat which is present in fuel is the

defining property of the fire-element, since it is present in fuel and the

defining property of the fire-element cannot be present in fuel. They

would also be forced to claim that the fire or heat present in fuel is

separable in existence from the fire-element without being clearly anddistinctly separable in existence from it, since they believe (a) that it

exists, (b) that it is not reducible in existence to the fire-element, and

(c) that it is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the

fire-element. They seem to think (a) that it exists, since it is perceived,

(b) that it is not reducible in existence to the fire-element, since it

causes fuel to burn and the fire-element does not, and (c) that it is

not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the fire-element,

since it is not a substance. The perception of heat present in burning

fuel, we may also infer, would not be the same as the perception of the heat present in the fire-element, since that heat, according to the

Treasury account, is clearly and distinctly perceived, while the heat

with which the V ats ıputr ıyas identify fire cannot be so perceived if it

is a true analogue to a person.

If the V ats ıputr ıyas do not accept, in addition to their own view that

fire is inexplicable, the view that all bodies include fire-elements of

the sort explained in the Treasury, their analogy between persons and

their aggregates and fire and its fuel would seem to be more exact,since there is no mention of anything comparable to the fire-element

in the analogy. In this case, they would be rejecting the view that fire

is an elemental substance of the sort earth, air and water are and offer

a quite different explanation of the presence of heat in bodies.

Although the V ats ıputr ıyas define fire as what burns fuel, they do

not explain what they mean by the burning of fuel. The only account of

burning I have found in the Abhidharmako sabh as.

ya is in the “Refutation”

itself, where Vasubandhu reports what is commonly said about fire and

fuel so that he may then offer his own reductive analysis of what issaid.23 He reports that it is commonly said that fire burns fuel “by




bringing about an alteration in its continuum” (santati vik ar ap as an at ).

If we suppose that the V ats ıputr ıyas accept as true Vasubandhu’s report

about what is commonly said about how fire burns fuel and that they

believe that what is commonly said is correct, how would they explain

this alteration?

We may be sure that the V ats ıputr ıyas do not believe that an alterationin the continuum of fuel is a change of some sort in a substance, since

all Indian Buddhists reject the idea of a substance which undergoes

change. However, there remains the following possibility. When fire is

present in fuel, which is conceived in dependence upon a collection of

momentary substances of different sorts existing in a causal continuum,

it causes the part of the collection in which it is actually present in

one moment to cease, in the next moment, to be part of that collection;

then in that next moment, without changing or having ceased to exist,it is present in another part of the collection, which it causes, in the

next moment, to cease to exist, etc., until the collection of momentary

substances in dependence upon which the fuel is conceived ceases to

exist. In this case, there is no element which undergoes a change of

any sort, but the continuum of the fuel is changed in the sense that

the collection of substances in dependence upon which it is conceived

as fuel is being reduced in number to the point where there are no

more phenomena in dependence upon which fuel is conceived. The

fuel, in this sense, is consumed by the fire. The general idea is thatthe fire or heat present in fuel continues to exist, without changing,

in its continuum, until it gradually causes the continuum to cease to

exist. The changelessness of fire, of course, will be inexplicable in the

sense that it is not that of a permanent and partless substance or that

of a causal continuum of momentary substances of different sorts as a

collection.

The basic similarities to which the analogy between fire and persons

is meant to call attention, of course, are that both persons and fireare not conceived on the basis of the single natures they possess

by themselves, since they are not substances, and that they are not,

respectively, reducible in existence to the phenomena in dependence

upon which they are conceived. One crucial difference, however, is that

fire would seem to come into existence at the time its fuel begins to

burn, while a person, according to the V ats ıputr ıyas, is a beginningless

phenomenon. Another difference is that fire would seem to cease to

exist once its fuel has been consumed, while a person, according to

the V ats ıputr ıyas, would not seem to cease to exist once the continuum

of the aggregates it appropriates ceases to exist.24 Neither of these




differences, however, is pertinent to the point the V ats ıputr ıyas are

trying to make in the analogy. They do not claim that all inexplicable

phenomena are, as persons are, beginningless and endless.

The V ats ıputr ıyas’ definition of the fire as what causes fuel to burn

supports my earlier suggestion that they define a person by reference to

effects it produces in the continuum of its aggregates. It would seem,if my analysis thus far is correct, that the V ats ıputr ıyas adopt the view

that just as a person is an inexplicable phenomenon which causes the

continuum of the aggregates in which it is changelessly present to

continue to exist, so fire is an inexplicable phenomenon which causes

the continuum of the fuel in which it is changelessly present to cease

to exist. These inexplicable phenomena, we may say, are inexplicable

causes in the sense that they are neither clearly and distinctly separable in

existence from, nor reducible in existence to, the continua of phenomenain dependence upon which they are conceived to be causes of the

continued or discontinued existence of these continua. Although the

V ats ıputr ıyas would not be claiming that all causes are inexplicable,

they would be making a radical addition to the Treasury account of

the causal relation, according to which all momentary phenomena, by

their own natures, are effects produced by other momentary phenomena

or causes which produce other momentary phenomena, yet are clearly

and distinctly separable in existence from one another.25 Inexplicable

causes, by contrast, (a) are not momentary, (b) are not, by their ownnatures, effects produced by momentary phenomena or causes which

produce momentary phenomena, and (c) are not clearly and distinctly

separable in existence from other phenomena, yet (d) are causes of

effects in the continua of collections of substances of different sorts

in dependence upon which the causes are conceived. Unfortunately,

Vasubandhu’s text does not provide us with any clues by which we can

elaborate on this picture of inexplicable causes.

My interpretation of how the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas believe fire to cause fuelto burn, as an inexplicable heat present in its continuum, enables us to

understand the next part of their reply from fire and fuel, which is their

argument for the premise that fire is not other than fuel. Their explicit

argument consists simply in the statement that if fire were other than

fuel, fuel would not be hot ( yadi hy anyah.

sy ad, anus.

n.

am indhanam.

sy at ). We can now take this argument to mean that if the fire which

burns fuel by its presence, as heat, in its continuum, were clearly and

distinctly separable in existence from fuel, fuel which is burning would

not, per impossible, be hot. The argument, in other words, turns on theaccount of fire as the heat which causes fuel to burn by its presence in




the continuum of fuel. If this account of fire is correct, fire cannot be

clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. For in that case

fire would be either (a) a permanent substance, which is impossible,

since a permanent substance, all Indian Buddhists agree, cannot produce

an effect of any sort, or (b) the impermanent substance called the fire-

element, which is impossible, since the fire-element cannot be presentin fuel, and the fire or heat which causes fuel to burn is present in fuel

until the fuel is consumed. Their argument for the theory that fuel which

is burning would not be hot if fire were clearly and distinctly separable

in existence from fuel, can, for our purposes, take for its premises (a)

that if fire were clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel,

it would not be present in fuel as the heat which causes it to burn,

(b) that if it were not present in fuel as the heat which causes it to

burn, fuel which is burning would not be hot, and (c) that fuel whichis burning is hot.

The next part of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply from fire and fuel is the claim

that if fire were not other than fuel (i.e. were reducible in existence

to fuel), what burns and what causes it to burn would be the same

(ath ananyah.

sy at, d ahyam eva d ahakam.

sy at ). Since they present this

claim as part of an argument for the conclusion that fire is not reducible

in existence to fuel, we may assume that they take it for granted that

what burns and what causes it to burn cannot be the same. But fire,

they have assumed, is what causes fuel to burn. So what they deem tobe the impossible consequence of fire being reducible in existence to

fuel seems to be that fuel is what causes fuel to burn. The principle

employed in this argument, therefore, is that nothing can produce an

effect in itself.26 In other words, the V ats ıputr ıyas are assuming that a

cause of an effect must be separable in existence from that in which it

produces its effect.

The V ats ıputr ıyas’ reply from fire and fuel, thus far, may be rendered

as follows:(i) Fire is what causes fuel to burn.

(ii) If fire is what causes fuel to burn, fire is conceived in depen-

dence upon fuel.

There, from (i) and (ii) we may infer

(iii) Fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel.

The argument for fire not being clearly and distinctly separable in

existence from fuel may be reconstructed as follows:




(iv) If fire is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

fuel, the heat which burns fuel is not present in fuel.

(v) If the heat which burns fuel is not present in fuel, fuel which

burns would not be hot.

(vi) Fuel which burns is hot.Therefore, from (iv), (v) and (vi) we may infer

(vii) Fire is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

fuel.

The argument for the irreducible existence of fire may be reconstructed

as follows:

(viii) If fire is reducible in existence to fuel and fire is what causes

fuel to burn, fuel is what causes fuel to burn.(ix) Fuel is not what causes fuel to burn.

Therefore, from (i), (viii) and (ix) we may infer

(x) Fire is not reducible in existence to fuel.

We are now in a position to see how the V ats ıputr ıyas’ fire-fuel reply

constitutes a rebutal of the theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts.

Since fire is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel cannot be the

object of the concept of fire, and since fire is conceived in dependence

upon fuel, fuel is the cause of the concept of fire. Therefore, the cause of

the concept of fire is not the object of the concept of fire. Therefore, the

theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts is false. In reconstructed

form, the fire-fuel reply is concluded as follows:

(xi) If fire is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel is not the

object of the concept of fire.

Therefore, from (x) and (xi) we may infer

(xii) Fuel is not the object of the concept of fire.

From (iii) and (xii) we may infer

(xiii) Fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not

the object of the concept of fire.

It is obvious that




(Xiv) If fire is conceived in dependence upon fuel and fuel is not

the object of the concept of fire, then that in dependence

upon which something is conceived need not be the object

which is being conceived.

Therefore, from (xiii) and (xiv) we may infer

(xv) That in dependence upon which something is conceived

need not be the object which is being conceived.

I shall argue in the next article of this series that Vasubandhu, on

question-begging grounds, rejects premises (i) and (vi) in his objection

to the fire-fuel reply, and fails to address the actual point of the reply,

which is that the cause of the concept of ourselves need not be the

object of the concept.

The V ats ıputr ıyas, according to my interpretation of their fire-fuel

reply, are attempting to introduce into the standard Buddhist theory of

causality the idea of an inexplicable phenomenon which can cause the

continuum of a collection of substances of different sorts in dependence

upon which this cause is conceived to continue to exist or to cease

to exist. To be possible, this inexplicable cause must be separable in

existence, without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence,

from the continuum of the collection of substances in which it produces

its effect. Vasubandhu, we shall see, does not even attempt to show,on philosophical grounds, why a cause of this sort is not possible.

THE V ATS IPUTR IYAS’ MIDDLE-WAY ARGUMENT FOR THEIR THEORY OFPERSONS

We have seen how the V ats ıputr ıyas use the fire-fuel reply to overturn

Vasubandhu’s causal objection to their aggregate-reliance reply to his

two-realities objection to their theory of persons. Their reply is used to

show that our aggregates need not be, as Vasubandhu assumes, what

is conceived when we are conceived. Immediately after replying to

Vasubandhu’s objection, they introduce premises analogous to those

used in the reply to formulate their main argument for the view that

we are in fact inexplicable phenomena. This is the argument I have

called their middle-way argument.

Similarly, a person is not conceived unless the aggregates are present, [and] if itwere other than the aggregates, the reificationist theory [that a person is a substance]would be held, and if it were not other than the aggregates, the nihilist theory [thata person does not exist at all] would be held.




This argument takes the form of showing, on the assumption that

persons, nonreductionistically conceived, exist, that the V ats ıputr ıyas’

inexplicablist theory of persons is the middle-way between reificationist

and nihilist theories. The implication is that since the Buddha propounded

a middle-way theory of this sort, the theory of the V ats ıputr ıyas is

that held by the Buddha. Although the V ats ıputr ıyas in this argumentimplicitly appeal to the Buddha’s rejection of extreme theories of

persons in order to argue that we are inexplicable phenomena, these

extreme theories, within the Buddhist tradition, are typically rejected on

independent philosophical grounds. For this reason, I shall assume, it

is in fact an attempt to provide an independent philosophical argument

for the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory.

Since the conceiving of persons in dependence upon the aggregates

is meant to be analogous to the conceiving of fire in dependence uponfuel, it is reasonable to assume that the V ats ıputr ıyas’ middle-way

argument is predicated on a definition of persons as inexplicable causes

of effects produced in the continuum of their aggregates, just as their

fire-fuel reply is predicated on the definition of fire as an inexplicable

cause of an effect produced in the continuum of its fuel. The definition

they assume in their argument, I believe, is that a person is what causes

the continuum of its aggregates to continue to exist from one lifetime

to the next. Since the causal action by which this effect is produced

they call appropriation, we may render their definition by saying thatwe are what appropriate aggregates. So defined, they can claim, we are

conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate. Since

we do not, by our own natures, appropriate the aggregates, they can

reason, we can exist without appropriating them. It follows that when,

at the time our cyclic existence ends, the continuum of our aggregates

ceases to exist, there will be no phenomena in dependence upon which

we can be conceived, but we can continue to exist. So the advantage

of the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas’ theory, unlike that of Vasubandhu, does not implythat the goal of the practice of Buddhism, our noncyclic existence, is

our extinction. It implies only our inconceivability when we achieve

this goal.

If the above definition of persons is adopted by the V ats ıputr ıyas,

the reconstruction of the middle-way argument begins as follows:

(i) We are what appropriate aggregates.

(ii) If we are what appropriate aggregates, we are conceived in

dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (i) and (ii) we may infer,




(iii) We are conceived in dependence upon the aggregates we

appropriate.

A central belief of the V ats ıputr ıyas, not shared by Vasubandhu,

is that we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates.

We have seen how they can hold this belief, in spite of also believingthat we cannot be conceived on the basis of the natures we possess by

ourselves. Their principal reason for accepting the correctness of this

conception of ourselves, as can be shown by an analysis of their later

objections to Vasubandhu’s reductionist theory, is their belief that we,

as perceivers of objects, thinkers of thoughts, agents of actions and

experiencers of the results of actions, inexplicably retain our identity

through changes of the perceptions, thoughts, actions, feelings and

bodies which we appropriate.27 If we do not inexplicably retain our

identity through changes of our aggregates, they believe, we do not exist

at all as we are actually conceived, and this is precisely the nihilism

the Buddha warned his followers to avoid. Vasubandhu’s theory, they

also seem to believe, is also a form of nihilism insofar as it makes us

into mental constructions, which are not, pace Vasubandhu, reducible

in existence to our aggregates, since our aggregates are not in fact the

object of the concept of ourselves. We need not here rehearse all of the

reasons the V ats ıputr ıyas may have for adopting their own minimalist

version of the nonreductionist theory of persons, since it would requirean extensive consideration of the later exchanges between Vasubandhu

and the V ats ıputr ıyas in the “Refutation.” For the purposes of the

reconstruction of their middle-way argument, I shall take their belief

that we are correctly conceived in a nonreductionistic way as the basis

of their belief in our separate existence. Our reconstruction, therefore,

may continue as follows:

(iv) We are correctly conceived to be appropriators of

aggregates.(v) If we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggre-

gates, we exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore,

(vi) We exist apart from the aggregates we appropriate.

The remainder of the middle-way argument will be comprised of

arguments for the claims that we are neither clearly and distinctly

separable in existence from the aggregates we appropriate nor reduciblein existence to them.




In the text, the claim that we are not clearly and distinctly separable

in existence from our aggregates is supported by the claim that if we

should say that we are so related to them, we would be committed to

the reificationist theory of persons rejected by the Buddha. The theory

rejected here, of course, is that we are substances which exist apart

from our aggregates. This theory, we have seen, is the same as thetheory that we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from our

aggregates. Indian Buddhists offer a variety of arguments to show that

this theory is false. The very simplest of these arguments we could use

in this context is that we cannot be substances which exist apart from

our aggregates, since we are conceived in dependence upon aggregates.

We may represent this argument, which would also be accepted by

Vasubandhu, as follows:

(vii) If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence fromthe aggregates we appropriate, we are not conceived in

dependence upon the aggregates we appropriate.

Therefore, from (iii) and (vii) we may infer:

(viii) We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from

the aggregates we appropriate.

Since this part of the middle-way argument is acceptable to Vasubandhu,

we need not discuss it further.In the text, the premise, that we are not reducible in existence to our

aggregates, is supported by the claim that if we should say that we are

reducible in existence to them, we would be committed to nihilism.

The form of nihilism to which the V ats ıputr ıyas believe we would be

committed is the theory that we lack existence apart from the aggregates

we appropriate. This is the nihilist view rejected in premise (vi) of my

reconstruction of the middle-way argument. Hence, the reductionist

theory of persons, they would have us conclude, implies that (vi) isfalse. In other words,

(ix) If we are reducible in existence to the aggregates we

appropriate, we do not exist apart from the aggregates we

appropriate.

Therefore, from (vi), (ix) we may infer,

(x) We are not reducible in existence to the aggregates we

appropriate.




Finally, on the basis of (viii) and (x), they conclude that their own

theory of persons is the middle way between the extremes of asserting

that we are separate substances and that we lack existence apart from

our aggregates. Hence,

(xi) We are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existencefrom the aggregates we appropriate nor reducible in exis-

tence to the aggregates we appropriate.

The V ats ıputr ıyas’ middle-way argument, so reconstructed, shows us that

the most basic disagreement between them and Vasubandhu concerns

the truth or falsity of premise (iv), that we are correctly conceived to

be appropriators of the aggregates. Unfortunately, in the “Refutation”

Vasubandhu does not discuss the V ats ıputr ıyas’ middle-way argument,

and the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas are, for the most part, made simply to assumethe truth of (iv) in their arguments against Vasubandhu’s own theory

of persons, just as Vasubandhu assumes its falsity in his arguments

against their theory. So what the middle-way argument accomplishes,

in the end, is simply a reformulation of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of

persons which fits with the Buddhas’ claim that his own theory is a

middle way between extreme views. To support their theory they need

to argue that we are in fact correctly conceived to be appropriators of

aggregates. Consequently, their middle-way argument cannot be said

to provide by itself a good reason to accept the truth of their theory

that we are inexplicable phenomena.

University of Iowa,

Iowa City 52242

NOTES

1 What is known about the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory is for the most part found in thepolemical works of their Indian Buddhist critics, which include, besides the “Refu-tation” of Vasubandhu, Mogal ıputtatissa’s Kath avatthu, Asanga’s Sutr alamk ara and Madhyantavibhan ga, S antideva’s Bodhicary avat ara, Candrak ırti’s Madhyamak avat ara,and Kamala sila’s Tattvasamgraha, along with S antaraksita’s Pa ~ njika commentary onKamala sila’s work. Of the texts of the V ats ıputr ıyas school, only the fifth centuryC. E. S ammit ıyanik aya S astra survives, and that only in a Chinese translation. AnEnglish translation of a Chinese translation of this text has been published, butneither it nor the Kath avatthu, at least in their English translations, seems to me toportray a clear statement of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons. In any case, in this

study, I confine my discussion to the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas’ theory of persons as Vasubandhupresents it.There are three translations of the “Refutation” in print. The most recent translation

is based on the Sanskrit text which was discovered in Tibet in 1934. It was composed




by myself and published in The Journal of Indian Philosophy in 1988 (17: 137–187)On the basis of Ya somitra’s commentary and a Tibetan translation T. Stcherbatskycomposed an English translation, entitled “The Soul Theory of the Buddhists,” publishedby the Bulletin de l’Academie des Science de Russie, 1919, pp. 823–854, 937–958(reprinted in 1976 by the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi). A French translation,by L. De la Vallee Poussin, which is in the last volume of his L’Abhidharmako sa de

Vasubandhu (Paris, 1923–1931), is based on Ya

somitra’s commentary and a Chinesetranslation by Hs uan-tsang. There is also a complete English translation of Poussin’stranslation made by Leo Pruden in 1990 and published by the Asian HumanitiesPress in Berkeley, California.2 Since Vasubandhu’s subsequent criticisms of their theory of persons are basedprimarily on scriptural quotations, they require a different sort of treatment which Ihope to provide elsewhere in the context of a more comprehensive account of theargumentation of Vasubandhu’s “Refutation.” Discussions of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theoryof persons can be found in Nalinaksha Dutt’s Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi, 1978),ch. VIII, and Edward Conze’s Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor, 1967), pp.122–134. In my 1982 paper, “Vasubandhu on the V ats ıputr ıyas’ fire-fuel analogy,”

in Philosophy East and West (32: 151–158), I made an attempt to make sense of Vasubandhu’s critique of the V ats ıputr ıyas’ use of the analogy to fire and fuel tosupport their theory, but I have, since its publication, radically changed my view. Acompletely new analysis is laid out in the second article of the three of which thepresent article is the first. The discussions by Dutt and Conze do not carefully analyzewhat I am here calling Vasubandhu’s philosophical objections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’theory of persons. Nor do they, in my opinion, adequately represent the V ats ıputr ıyas’theory as it is set out in Vasubandhu’s “Refutation.” Claus Oetke, in “ Ich” und das Ich (Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Stuttgart: 1988), presents a summaryof Vasubandhu’s “Refutation” and a close analysis of his own reductionist theory of persons, but he does not carefully analyze Vasubandhu’s critique of the V ats ıputr ıyas’

theory of persons.3 Among the Indian Buddhist schools, only the M adhyamikas deny that we possessan existence apart from beign perceived or conceived.4 Vasubandhu often uses “is not other than” in place of “is the same as,” therebycreating the impression that the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory violates a law of logic. Thatthe theory does not in fact violate a law of logic I shall argue below.5 Here and elsewhere when I use “conceived” by itself I mean “conceived to bean entity of a certain sort.” Similarly, an object of a concept is assumed to be anobject conceived to be an entity of a certain sort, and to form a concept is assumedto be to conceive an object to be an entity of a certain sort.6 We need not enumerate and explain the very complicated theory of the aggregates

laid out in the Treasury in order to reconstruct and assess Vasubandhu’s philosophicalobjections to the V ats ıputr ıyas’ theory of persons.7 Alternatively, inexplicable phenomena may be defined as those which are neitherreal in the way a substance is nor real in the way a mental construction is, or asthose which are neither ultimate realities nor deceptive conventional realities. Seebelow.8 Ya somitra, in his commentary on the “Refutation,” makes it clear that the T ırthikaopponents Vasubandhu has in mind are primarily the Ny aya-Vai sesikas.9 A more detailed exposition of Vasubandhu’s argument can be found in JamesDuerlinger, “Reductionist and Nonreductionist Theories of Persons in Indian BuddhistPhilosophy.” in Journal of Indian Philosophy (21: 79–101), 1993.

10 Here and elsewhere I shall use the neuter pronoun and its correlates to refer toa person, since the gender of the phenomena to which we apply “I” is irrelevant toits analysis.




11 Dravyasat and praj ~ naptisat are difficult terms to translate, an indication of which is the many different ways in which they have been translated. Part of thedifficulty is that their meanings are differently construed by different Indian Buddhistphilosophers. I have chosen translations which I believe convey the sense they havefor Vasubandhu.12 In my translations of passages from the “Refutation” I place in brackets words,

phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressedparts of theses and arguments presented in the text. So the reader can distinguishwhat Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in an effort to make it clearer, Ihave translated the text so that it can be read either with or without these additions.To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader needs todisregard punctuations required for the readability of the expanded translation.13 In verse 4 of Bk. VI of the Treasury and in his commentary on the verseVasubandhu presents, with approval, the Vaibh asika accounts of these two realities.The accounts are operational definitions in which we are given the means by which todetermine whether a phenomenon known to exist is a deceptive conventional realityor an ultimate reality. A deceptive conventional reality is defined as a phenomenon

which is no longer conceived if it is taken apart physically or is mentally analyzedinto constituent parts and brought to consciousness in that form. An ultimate realityis defined as a phenomenon which continues to be conceived if it is been taken apartphycically or is mentally analyzed into constituent parts and brought to consciousnessin that form,14 See note 4.15 See Conze, op. cit., p. 125.16 We attribute to ourselves not only the possession of sense organs and mentalstates, but also physical properties such as height, weight, color, odor, etc. We neednot, as Stcherbatsky and Poussin do, take adhy atmik an in the technical sense of “internal” or “subjective.”17

This claim is, among the Indian Buddhist schools, peculiar to the V

ats

ıputr

ıyas.18 We must distinguish the effect produced by the false view of self from the effectproduced by the false view of the aggregates. By reason of accepting as true ourappearance of being permanent and partless substances, the V ats ıputr ıyas seem tobelieve, we continue to appropriate our aggregates, and by reason of appropriatingour aggregates, the continuum of our aggregates is perpetuated from one lifetime tothe next.19 We need not suppose, with Poussin, that the V ats ıputr ıyas deny that past andfuture phenomena exist.20 Abhidharmako sabh as ya, I, 12a–b.21 Ibid ., I, 12d.

22 See Stcherbatsky’s The Central Conception of Buddhism (Motilal Banarsidass,Delhi: 1970), p. 13.23 Stcherbatsky and Poussin in fact attribute this account to the V ats ıputr ıyas. Ifollow Ya somitra in attributing it to Vasubandhu.24 Dutt claims (op. cit., p. 185) that the V ats ıputr ıyas believe that persons cease toexist when the continuum of their aggregates ceases to exist, but no such view isexpressed in the “Refutation” itself.25 This view is later deemed contradictory by the Buddhist philosophers of theM adhyamika school.26 The standard Indian Buddhist example of this principle is that a knife cannot cutitself.27 See Conze (op. cit., pp. 125–126).

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Vasubandhu's Philosophical Critique of the Vatsiputriyas Theory of Persons I - James Duerlinger