VANCOUVER LANDFILL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM SAFE WORK … Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedures Background Information Page 7 of 84 In addition to those in the field, various

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VANCOUVER LANDFILL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM

SAFE WORK PROCEDURES

Most Recent Revision: Next Scheduled Revision:

July 2009 January 2010

Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedures

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Manual Contents

SAFE WORK ON THE VANCOUVER LANDFILL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION 3 WORKING ALONE AND RESPONSE PROCEDURE _________________________________________ 27 LFG INSPECTION AND MONITORING __________________________________________________ 33 WATER LEVEL MEASUREMENTS IN EXTRACTION WELLS AND CONDENSATE TRAPS _____________ 37 INSTALLING OR REPLACING INSTRUMENTATION ON LFG PIPE ______________________________ 41 PURGING A PIPE – LFG COLLECTION SYSTEM ____________________________________________ 43 SHORTENING WELLS OR REPLACING HOSES ____________________________________________ 47 REPAIRING, REPLACING, OR CONNECTING A LFG PIPE TO A HEADER_________________________ 51 RESTARTING THE FLARE AND RESETTING ALARMS AND AUTODIALER _______________________ 55 WORKING WITH COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDERS _________________________________________ 63 CLEANING OF DEMISTER PAD IN KNOCK‐OUT POT #3 _____________________________________ 67 INSPECTION OF FLAME ARRESTOR ____________________________________________________ 71 FLARE LOCKOUT AND ISOLATION FOR ENTRY ___________________________________________ 75 WORK PROCEDURE HAZARD ASSESSMENT _____________________________________________ 81


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

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SAFE WORK ON THE VANCOUVER LANDFILL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This background document describes the basic hazards associated with the Landfill gas control system at the Vancouver Landfill; specifically the facilities that collect, move, and flare Landfill gas. This document provides information fundamental to use and understanding of the Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedures which provide specific guidance for working safely around the system.

FIGURE REFERENCE

• Figure 1 Gas Collection System

• Figure 5 Flare Abstraction Plant Layout

CONTACTS

• Landfill Gas Technician

• Transfer and Landfill Operations Superintendents

• Transfer & Landfill Operations Manager

See the current City of Vancouver Transfer & Landfill Operations phone list for current names and numbers.

REFERENCES

• City of Vancouver, Vancouver Landfill, Landfill and Transfer Operations, Emergency Response Plan, as revised.

• City of Vancouver Excavation, Shoring, and Trenching Safe Work Procedure

• Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System, May 2001, prepared by CH2M Gore & Storrie Ltd. (“O&M Manual”)

• Workers Compensation Act, Occupational Health & Safety Regulation, BC Reg 296/97 www.worksafebc.com

• SafetyLine Mobile Worker Monitoring System User Manual – Mobile User with Interactive Voice Response (IVR) Telephone Interface, Tsunami Solutions Ltd., Release 3.0, 2001.

• SafetyLine Mobile Worker Monitoring System User Manual –System Administrator, Tsunami Solutions Ltd., Release 3.0, 2001.

• SafetyLine IVR Menu Guide (wallet card).

Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedures Background Information

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION CONTENTS

Figure Reference ___________________________________________________________________ 3 Contacts __________________________________________________________________________ 3 References ________________________________________________________________________ 3 Background Information Contents _____________________________________________________ 4 Description Of Landfill Gas (LFG) Control System _________________________________________ 6 Emergency and First Aid Response _____________________________________________________ 8 Personal Emergency Procedures ____________________________________________________________ 8 Mutual Aid ______________________________________________________________________________ 9 Emergency Shut Down ____________________________________________________________________ 9 First Aid ________________________________________________________________________________ 9

Safety Precautions _________________________________________________________________ 11 Hazards _________________________________________________________________________ 12

Explosion _____________________________________________________________________________ 12 Oxygen‐Deficient and Oxygen‐Rich Environments ____________________________________________ 12 Hydrogen Sulphide _____________________________________________________________________ 13 Leachate and Condensate _______________________________________________________________ 13 Trips and Falls _________________________________________________________________________ 14 Working at Heights _____________________________________________________________________ 14 Working Alone ________________________________________________________________________ 14 Hot Surfaces __________________________________________________________________________ 14 Moving Parts __________________________________________________________________________ 15 Electrical Equipment ____________________________________________________________________ 15 Welding ______________________________________________________________________________ 15 Heavy Lifting __________________________________________________________________________ 16 Noise ________________________________________________________________________________ 16 Heavy Equipment and Vehicles ___________________________________________________________ 16 Fire _________________________________________________________________________________ 17 Compressed Gas _______________________________________________________________________ 17 Overhead Hazards _____________________________________________________________________ 17 Buried, Overhead and At‐Grade Pipelines or Power Lines ______________________________________ 17 Confined Space ________________________________________________________________________ 18 Unstable Structures ____________________________________________________________________ 18 Excavation and Spoil Piles _______________________________________________________________ 18 Sharps _______________________________________________________________________________ 18

Hazard Assessments _______________________________________________________________ 19 Personal Protective Equipment ______________________________________________________ 20

High‐Visibility Clothing __________________________________________________________________ 20 Steel‐Toe Boots ________________________________________________________________________ 20 Eye Protection ________________________________________________________________________ 21 Hearing Protection _____________________________________________________________________ 21 Gloves _______________________________________________________________________________ 21 Personal Gas Detector __________________________________________________________________ 21 LFG Analyzer __________________________________________________________________________ 22 Communication Devices _________________________________________________________________ 22


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Hard Hat _____________________________________________________________________________ 22 Face Protection ________________________________________________________________________ 23 Chemical Resistant Clothing ______________________________________________________________ 23 Air Purifying Respirators _________________________________________________________________ 23 Self‐Contained Breathing Apparatus _______________________________________________________ 23 Fire Extinguisher _______________________________________________________________________ 24 Infra‐red Thermometer _________________________________________________________________ 24 Inert Gas _____________________________________________________________________________ 24 Ventilation fans _______________________________________________________________________ 24 Hair Bands ____________________________________________________________________________ 25

Training Requirements _____________________________________________________________ 25 Abbreviations ____________________________________________________________________ 26


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DESCRIPTION OF LANDFILL GAS (LFG) CONTROL SYSTEM

The main purpose of the Landfill gas (LFG) system is to control odours. Landfill gas is primarily composed of methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide (CO2), with relatively small concentrations of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and hydrogen sulphide (H2S). The CH4 content generally ranges from 45% to 65% by volume, with the remainder of the LFG being mostly CO2. Although concentrations of H2S up to 1000 ppm have been recorded, concentrations in the main header are typically less than 90 ppm. Nitrogen and oxygen are typically present in LFG when the suction is sufficient to cause air to flow towards the LFG extraction wells by short circuiting from the surface or due to leaks in the collection system.

Landfill gas in the Landfill is generally about 35° to 55°C. As LFG flows in the lateral, sub-header and header pipes, it cools and condenses. Condensate traps capture this liquid (condensate) from the pipes to prevent blockage within the pipes and direct this condensate to the Landfill’s leachate ditch.

Landfill gas is delivered by the LFG collection system to the Flare Station and Maxim Power Corporation’s (Maxim’s) on-site gas conditioning facility (Maxim’s Facility), which pressurizes the LFG for pipeline transport to generate electricity and hot water at an off-site facility. The LFG control system at the Landfill comprises approximately 230 LFG extraction wells: lateral and header pipes that range up to 450 mm diameter: 34 condensate traps, and a blower/flare abstraction plant (Flare Station). During operation, Maxim’s blowers and/or the City’s blowers create suction to extract LFG from the Landfill’s waste mass. Downstream of the blowers, LFG is under gauge pressures ranging from about 0.04 psi (1 inch water column) to 13 psi.

The LFG system collects LFG from all areas of the Landfill except for the Western 40 Hectares as shown on Figure 1. As a result of the suction at each well, LFG is drawn through the waste into the LFG extraction well, past the wellhead through flexible hose into a lateral (100 mm to 150 mm diameter) pipe. LFG is then drawn through sub-header and header pipes to the Flare Station.

At the Flare Station, LFG flows past a control valve and monitoring station to a tee. From this point, the LFG is directed to one of the following, based on valve positions (see Figure 5):

• A tall condensate knock-out, through Maxim’s blowers to the conditioning facility, and then through the LFG transmission pipeline to Maxim’s co-generation plant located across Highway 99 at the Village Farms greenhouses. Any LFG that is not required by the co-generation plant is returned to the flares via a 100 mm pipe; or

• A shorter condensate knock-out, through the City’s blowers, and then to the flares.


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In addition to those in the field, various instrumentation, monitoring ports and valves are located at various points with the Flare Station and Maxim’s Facility. Electric power is used for the blowers and other functions. In the event of power failure, the City’s back-up electrical generator system automatically activates to power the City’s blower and flares, but not Maxim’s Facility.

The current operations and maintenance manual for the LFG control system is CH2M Gore & Storrie Ltd.’s Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System, May 2001 (O&M Manual). The utilization component, including Maxim’s Facility, has been added to the system since the O&M Manual was prepared.


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EMERGENCY AND FIRST AID RESPONSE

Refer to the current City of Vancouver, Vancouver Landfill, Transfer and Landfill Operations, Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for detailed emergency information. This section provides some key information on emergency procedures from the ERP.

An incident may be an emergency or crisis if it:

• Is escalating out of control;

• Threatens to harm or alarm staff, customers, or the community;

• Endangers or threatens the security of facilities; or

• Puts the environment at risk.

PERSONAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

Each employee must be aware of safety procedures in his/her normal work place and any other required work place. This includes the following:

• Personal safety procedures to protect from injury and harm.

• Evacuation and muster procedures.

• Facility re-entry procedures.

If an emergency occurs while Landfill staff are at work, staff should:

1. Protect Themselves

Follow safety procedures for personal safety to protect from injury and harm. Request or obtain emergency assistance, if needed.

2. Assist Co-workers

Follow safety procedures to assist co-workers with protection for personal safety and protection from injury. Request, provide, or obtain emergency assistance, if needed.

3. Contact a Supervisor

Immediately check in with the Supervisor. Do not leave without notifying the Supervisor.

4. Check on Families

If the emergency extends beyond the facility, (e.g., earthquake) the Landfill will provide an opportunity for families to be contacted to determine their safety and status. In some


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circumstances, communication and travel may be severely restricted and contact will be delayed. During this time, staff should continue with emergency assignments.

5. Assume Emergency Response Assignments

Report to your work place or to your assignment in the Landfill’s Emergency Response Plan or as directed by the person in charge when you arrive. Staff with no assignments are to leave emergency contact numbers to make arrangements for reporting back to work when needed.

MUTUAL AID

The City of Vancouver has established a written agreement with Delta Fire Department for the provision of confined space entry and hazardous environment exposure rescue at the Vancouver Landfill. The Landfill does not maintain suitable equipment to allow Landfill personnel to effect such a rescue.

EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN

If it is necessary in an emergency to close down the LFG system, the following actions should be undertaken:

• Switch off the power to the blowers; and

• Isolate the section of the Landfill by closing the appropriate LFG manifold valve and/or LFG extraction well valve (see Figure 1).

FIRST AID

If First Aid is required, contact the Landfill First Aid attendant. If a medical emergency involves a person down in an area where Landfill gas may be present, the Emergency Response Procedures for approaching a downed person must be followed.


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TABLE 1: Important LFG Characteristics

Compound Important Gas Concentrations

Comments

Explosive Gas

Less than 10% LEL(1)

To control the risk of explosion, explosive gas concentrations are to be maintained at less than 10% of the lower explosive limit (LEL) at all times in the work area.

Methane Less than 1,000 ppm or 0.1% by volume(1)

Methane concentrations in the breathing zone are to be maintained at less than 5,000 ppm or 0.5% by volume at all times (Excursion Limit) and for an 8 hour day (TWA), must be below 1,000 ppm. If all of the explosive gas is methane, 1,000 ppm of methane is equivalent to 2% LEL.

Oxygen 19.5% to 23.5% (1) Oxygen concentrations below 19.5% represent an oxygen-deficient atmosphere.

The ambient atmosphere has an oxygen concentration of 20.9%.

Hydrogen Sulphide

Less than 5 ppm (1)

Hydrogen sulphide is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) at a concentration of 100 ppm.

WorkSafe BC’s Ceiling Exposure Limit for hydrogen sulphide is 10 ppm.

Hydrogen sulphide concentrations should be maintained at less than 5 ppm to reduce the risk of reaching the ceiling limit of 10 ppm and thereby having an exposure. If hydrogen sulphide concentrations exceed this level, work procedures should be reviewed to ensure that site personnel are adequately protected.

At elevated concentrations, hydrogen sulphide gas will deaden your sense of smell within minutes.

You can smell hydrogen sulphide at concentrations less than 1 ppm. The smell is often described as being like rotten eggs. Most people can smell hydrogen sulphide at concentrations below the detection limit of monitoring instruments.

Note: (1) Personal Gas Detectors shall be set to alarm when gas concentrations exceed the gas concentrations identified in Table 1. If the monitor’s alarm sounds, evacuate the work area immediately and notify the Landfill Gas Technician, Manager, or designate.


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SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

The following safety precautions shall be followed with respect to Landfill gas:

1. Do not smoke anywhere on the Landfill. Open flames are only permitted on the Landfill with prior written permission from the Landfill Gas Technician, Manager or designate.

2. Comply with WorkSafe BC regulations when entering any confined space, depression, or potentially poorly ventilated areas. Adhere to the precautions and procedures identified in Table 1: Important LFG Characteristics.

3. Ensure that all Personal Gas Detectors are in good working order and are bump tested daily prior to use. If bump testing identifies that the Personal Gas Detector is not working within its tolerance limits or if the equipment is outside of its calibration period, it shall be removed from service immediately. Personnel shall be trained in the use and limitations of the Personal Gas Detectors used.

4. Do not access the fenced enclosure at the Flare Station beyond Maxim’s trailer or conduct any work around the Landfill gas system without a Personal Gas Detector (which is able to detect LEL, oxygen, and hydrogen sulphide concentrations). If the Personal Gas Detector alarm sounds, evacuate the area immediately and notify the Landfill Gas Technician, Manager or designate.

5. If possible, stand upwind of wells or any other Landfill gas works when conducting work in or around the Landfill gas collection system. If an accidental or uncontrolled release of Landfill gas is believed to have occurred near your work area, attempt to remove yourself from the area by taking a path that is crosswind from the source and attempt to get upwind if it is determined to be safe to do so.

6. Use caution when conducting work within well or manifold boxes. Personal Gas Detectors should be used to determine gas concentrations within the boxes prior to work being conducted. If the monitor’s alarm sounds, allow the box to ventilate prior to rechecking gas concentrations. Work should not proceed until gas concentrations are below alarm levels.

7. If a hydrogen sulphide odour is detected and you do not have a hydrogen sulphide detector in good working condition, you should remove yourself from the area of concern and notify the Landfill Gas Technician, Manager or designate.

8. Be aware of other people present in your work area and consider the potential hazards of your respective activities.


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HAZARDS

This section identifies some key hazards that may be associated with the LFG system and general safety precautions for these hazards.

EXPLOSION

Landfill gas is primarily composed of methane and carbon dioxide, of which methane is a potential explosion hazard. Methane is potentially explosive at concentrations between 5% and 15% by volume in air. The lower limit (5% by volume) is the lower explosive limit (LEL), whereas the upper limit (15% by volume) is the upper explosive limit (UEL). Thus, 5% by volume of methane is 100% LEL. City of Vancouver Engineering Services requires that the concentration of flammable gas shall not exceed 10% LEL1 in the working airspace to account for the possibility of explosive gases other than methane being present. Based on the LEL, the maximum allowable methane concentration would be 0.5%, however, methane also has effects on the nervous system and the maximum 8 hour average concentration is 1,000 ppm (0.1%), with a 30 minute Excursion Limit of 3,000 ppm (0.3%) and maximum Excursion Limit of 5,000 ppm (0.5%).

This hazard is mitigated by prohibiting smoking, not allowing open flames or hot work to proceed near the LFG collection system without an approved Safe Work Procedure, identifying and clearing all buried services prior to any digging or other subsurface penetrations, and by following safe work procedures. Sparks due to static electricity (e.g., cutting high-density polyethylene pipes) shall be mitigated by grounding.

OXYGEN-DEFICIENT AND OXYGEN-RICH ENVIRONMENTS

The two major constituents of LFG, methane and carbon dioxide, can displace oxygen and create an oxygen-deficient atmosphere. In addition, oxygen-deficient environments may exist in confined spaces, ditches and depressions. The release of some compressed gasses from a cylinder can also displace oxygen. An oxygen-deficient atmosphere can result in loss of consciousness and possibly death.

Oxygen-rich environments will not typically be present on the Landfill site. However, certain work process, such as welding, may require the use of oxygen, potentially creating an oxygen-rich environment.

1 The WorkSafe BC limit is 20% LEL (Clause 5.31 of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation).


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Vancouver Landfill policies require that working space oxygen concentrations be maintained between 19.5% and 23.5% by volume2.

This hazard shall be mitigated by monitoring oxygen levels of confined spaces, ditches and depressions when working in these spaces and by moving away and upwind of potential uncontrolled LFG discharge sites. If working near a controlled LFG discharge site, workers shall monitor oxygen levels and try to work upwind of the discharge or install intrinsically safe ventilation fans to introduce fresh air into the space.

HYDROGEN SULPHIDE

Hydrogen sulphide (H2S) is a toxic gas and has often been described as having an odour like rotten eggs. Hydrogen sulphide can be detected by the sense of smell at extremely low concentrations. However, olfactory fatigue can occur very quickly and no odours may be detected. The sense of smell shall not be relied on as an indicator of the presence of H2S.

Vancouver Landfill requires that the concentration of H2S be maintained below 5 ppm in the working airspace. WorkSafe BC requires that the H2S concentration be below 10 ppm at all times and 100 ppm is the IDLH. Excessive H2S concentrations can result in irritation of the mucus membranes, breathing problems, nausea, and possibly death.

This hazard shall be mitigated by moving away and upwind of potential uncontrolled LFG discharge sites. If working near a controlled LFG discharge site, personnel shall monitor hydrogen sulphide levels and try to work upwind of the discharge or install intrinsically safe ventilation fans to introduce fresh air into the space.

LEACHATE AND CONDENSATE

Leachate and condensate are typically skin irritants, but when occurring in high strength can be corrosive, odorous, and poisonous. Personnel may come in contact with leachate and condensate when completing inspection, repairs or sampling.

City-supplied coveralls, safety glasses, and gloves are sufficient to prevent contact for most activities when work is conducted in a manner that minimizes splashing or contact. If contact does occur, the leachate or condensate should be washed off immediately.

If work is conducted on equipment containing leachate or condensate that is known or suspected to be high strength or concentrated, the hazard should be mitigated by workers using disposable

2 The WorkSafe BC definition of “oxygen deficient” is less than 19.5% oxygen by volume in air (Part 1 of

Occupational Health & Safety Regulation).


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chemical resistant coveralls, nitrile or vinyl gloves, and safety goggles or face shield. A nearby eyewash station should be available if there is a risk of splashing.

TRIPS AND FALLS

Most of the LFG-related tasks at the Vancouver Landfill are carried out in the field where there can be uneven terrain, exposed piping, or other trip and fall hazards.

This hazard shall be mitigated by instructing personnel to be aware of such hazards, marking or removing such trip and fall hazards where practical, and by using footwear as described in the VLF/VSTS Safe Work Procedure: Personal Protective Equipment.

WORKING AT HEIGHTS

Working at heights represents a fall hazard to the individual working at the elevated height. In addition, personnel working below may be injured by falling objects.

This hazard will be mitigated by complying with Part 11: Fall Protection and Part 8: Personal Protective Clothing and Equipment of the WorkSafe BC Occupational Health and Safety Regulation.

WORKING ALONE

In many instances, personnel working on the LFG management system work alone. There is a risk of personnel working alone being injured and unable to summon help.

Personnel working alone shall follow the Vancouver Landfill Working Alone and Response Procedure. This procedure establishes a call-in system that personnel are to follow whenever they are working alone or in isolation. This procedure is not to be used for work in confined spaces.

HOT SURFACES

Some equipment, such as the flare stacks, generates high temperatures that can cause bodily harm if contacted by a worker. In some circumstances, the blowers and motors may become hot.

Surfaces that are frequently hot shall be identified by warning signs and shall be isolated by guards to prevent contact, whenever practical. Infrared thermometers can be used to confirm surface temperatures.


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MOVING PARTS

Machinery and equipment having moving parts can cause bodily harm if a person, their clothing, hair, jewellery, or other objects come in contact with it.

Before entering the Flare Station, long hair should be tied back and kept away from moving parts. Moving parts shall be identified and sufficiently guarded with fixed or movable guards. If a movable guard is used, an interlock switch shall be installed so that the moving parts of the machinery are stopped immediately when the guard is lifted.

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Electrical equipment and power lines can result in electrical shock, electrocution and fire hazards. These hazards become significantly greater when personnel are working near this equipment without appropriate care and attention.

All electrical equipment shall be properly maintained in good condition. Only qualified personnel with appropriate training and certification shall be allowed to work on or near energized electrical equipment. Lock-out procedures shall be used when electrical equipment is being serviced, repaired or maintained, and for the following tasks:

• Lock-out of flare; and

• Cleaning of demister pad in condensate knock-out.

Check for buried or covered power lines prior to excavation or drilling.

WELDING

Welding can introduce many hazards, including fire, ultraviolet radiation, infrared radiation, intense light, noise, compressed air cylinders, explosive and asphyxiant gases, chemical exposures, and electrical hazards.

All hot work shall be done by qualified personnel with appropriate training and certification. In addition to the general safety precautions applicable to hot work, extra care shall be exercised when performing hot work near the LFG system components because of the methane content of the LFG. All components of the LFG system that could potentially be affected by hot work shall be isolated, locked out and purged with an inert gas (e.g., nitrogen) before hot work is commenced.


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HEAVY LIFTING

Lifting objects improperly can result in breaks and strains. The frequency of injuries can be reduced by using administrative and engineering controls, and by modifying work procedures. Engineering controls include improved design, limiting loads and using mechanical devices to lift and transport objects when possible. To minimize the impact of heavy lifting, personnel should warm up before lifting heavy objects, bring loads close to their body, keep their backs straight, and use legs to lift when possible.

At the Vancouver Landfill, compressed gas tanks stored at the Flare Station are considered to be heavy objects and should be transported using mechanical devices, such as a trolley, whenever possible.

NOISE

Elevated noise levels have been identified near the City’s and Maxim’s blowers. Personnel entering the fenced area of the Flare Station/Maxim’s Facility shall use hearing protection that is at least Grade 2 or Class B hearing protection device or better, as identified by CSA Standard Z94.2-02, Hearing Protection Devices – Performance, Selection, Care and Use. In addition, warning signs (Caution - Noise Hazard - Hearing Protection shall be worn in this area) shall be posted at all entrances to the Flare Station.

Elevated noise levels may also be present when working around heavy equipment.

HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES

Heavy equipment and vehicles can be encountered throughout the Landfill and collisions with such vehicles are a potential hazard. Excavators, backhoes, and cranes may have booms or projecting parts that can cause impacts.

These hazards can be mitigated by personnel wearing high-visibility clothing as described in the VLF/VSTS Safe Work Procedure: Personal Protective Equipment, avoiding working near such equipment where possible, ensuring eye contact with the machine operator, never crossing the path of a piece of machinery until it has come to a complete stop (even with eye contact), and using warning cones when working near roadways or machinery.

Personnel operating vehicles and equipment on site shall do so in a controlled manner, adhering to all posted speed limits and directions.


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FIRE

Fire can be a significant hazard on site due to the methane content of the LFG. The LFG can be ignited by an open flame or spark. In addition, the high density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe, wood posts and refuse in the Landfill are all potentially flammable if ignited. Refuse in the Landfill can undergo spontaneous combustion if excessive air is drawn into the Landfill by applying excessive suction in individual LFG extraction wells.

This hazard is mitigated by prohibiting smoking, not allowing open flames or hot work to proceed near the LFG collection system without an approved Safe Work Procedure, and by following safe work procedures. Sparks due to static electricity (e.g., cutting high-density polyethylene pipes) shall be mitigated by grounding.

COMPRESSED GAS

Compressed gas can cause bodily injury due to the low temperature of the discharging gas and the gas can displace oxygen resulting in an oxygen-deficient atmosphere. The low temperature can be transferred to valves or pipes that may be exposed. If damaged, a cylinder can act as a projectile and if involved in a fire can explode.

Gas cylinders shall only be stored in identified and secured locations, such as an identified area in the Flare Station compound. Cylinders shall be secured by a chain in an upright position wherever practical or secured in a horizontal position. Gas cylinders temporarily stored in the field shall be flagged and cordoned with traffic cones.

OVERHEAD HAZARDS

Overhead lines, wires, and objects can be a hazard by presenting an electrical hazard and as falling objects. At the Vancouver Landfill, overhead hazards occur primarily at the Flare Station and along the alignment of overhead power lines. One of the valve stems at the Flare Station extends down vertically and can present an overhead hazard. Any overhead hazards should be marked to prevent accidental impact.

BURIED, OVERHEAD AND AT-GRADE PIPELINES OR POWER LINES

Buried, overhead or at-grade LFG pipes, condensate pipes, leachate pipes, and power lines exist on the site. These buried, overhead or at-grade utilities can be a hazard if they are damaged.

No excavation or subsurface drilling or penetration work shall take place without first locating the buried pipes, and power and/or communication lines that may exist and without the supervision of the Landfill Gas Technician, Manager or designate.


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CONFINED SPACE

Confined spaces are defined as an enclosed or partially enclosed area that has limited or restricted means for entry or exit and that is not designed or intended for continuous human occupancy. The atmosphere in a confined space may be hazardous due to lack of oxygen and the presence of toxic or flammable gases. The three condensate knock-outs at the Flare Station and the manholes to access the two 200 mm diameter Phase 1 branch saddle valves are confined spaces. In addition, the City has designated the flares as confined spaces.

Whenever accessing confined spaces on the site, the VLF/VSTS Safe Work Procedure: Guideline for Confined Space Safe Entry shall be used and a copy of the completed City of Vancouver Confined Space Entry Permit shall be posted, as required.

UNSTABLE STRUCTURES

Most permanent structures in the LFG management system are designed to be stable. However, the use of step ladders and other extension ladders at the Flare Station may be a safety concern.

All ladders and temporary platforms shall be properly maintained and inspected. Extension ladders shall be set on firm ground and shall be stabilized against the structure before each use.

EXCAVATION AND SPOIL PILES

The slopes of excavations and waste spoils can fail, presenting engulfment and entrapment hazards. In addition, asbestos buried in the Landfill could be disturbed by drilling or excavation.

Personnel shall not enter excavation pits or approach spoil piles that are greater than four feet in height unless they are sloped and/or shored in accordance with WorkSafe BC requirements, or approved in writing by an engineer as being safe.

SHARPS

Sharp objects may be found in the waste and on the edges of equipment.

To help minimize these hazards, personnel shall use CSA approved safety footwear at all times when on site and shall use work gloves as appropriate.


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HAZARD ASSESSMENTS

Hazard Assessments in the Safe Work Procedures have been developed using the following method. More information is included in the Hazard Assessment SWP.

Health and Safety Program Risk Matrix Probability

Scale Key Words Typical Frequency Expectation A Likely to occur Once per month B Probable over time Once per year C Possible over time Once per 10 years D Remotely possible Greater than once per 40 years

Severity Rank Injury Odour Cost Range

1 Fatality Shut Down > 1 week; off-site odour $300,000+

2 Lost time injury Shut Down 2 days to 1 week; potential off-site odour $100K to $300K

3 Reportable injury Shut Down 1 to 2 days; local odours only $30K to $100K

4 Minor injury Shut Down < 1 day; no odour <$30,000 Severity considers a range of conditions for employees, the public, other affected parties and costs. There is no assumed equivalence between aspects with the same severity; they reflect relative severity within the set of conditions.


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PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT

Personal protective equipment (PPE) is essential to ensure the safety of personnel working on or near the LFG management system. Equipment should be properly selected, used, inspected before use and maintained in accordance with manufacturers’ requirements. Any equipment that is damaged or no longer provides adequate protection shall be repaired or replaced immediately. Unusable equipment shall be marked as unusable and disposed of to prevent reuse. Personnel using PPE should be trained in its proper selection, use, and limitations. PPE shall be CSA or ULC approved, as applicable. The PPE shall be stored at the Landfill and be readily available when required.

Personnel shall use personal protective equipment in accordance with the VLF/VSTS Safe Work Procedure Personal Protective Equipment. Personnel shall use high visibility apparel and above-the-ankle footwear with an external green CSA patch whenever on the site. The PPE required in the LFG SWPs is further described below.

HIGH-VISIBILITY CLOTHING

Personnel who conduct outdoor tasks shall wear high-visibility clothing that meet the type 1 (i.e., vest, shirt or other similar garment worn on the torso with a fluorescent background and attached visibility enhancing trim) or type 2 (i.e., jacket, coat, coverall or other garment with a bright coloured background and attached visibility enhancing trim) requirements as identified by the WorkSafe BC Standard: PPE 2 High Visibility

Garment - Personal Protective Equipment Standard 2.

STEEL-TOE BOOTS

Above-the-ankle steel-toe (or equivalent) boots that have puncture resistant soles and adequate ankle support shall be worn by personnel conducting outdoor tasks for physical protection against falling objects, punctures and strains. Steel-toe (or equivalent) boots shall be approved under CSA-Z195-M92 and shall be Grade 1, with an external green CSA triangle prominent on the boot for identification purposes.

In some instances, it may be necessary to immerse feet in leachate or condensate. If this is the case, boots shall meet the standards above as a minimum, and shall also be resistant to influxes of moisture (e.g., rubber).


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EYE PROTECTION

Eye protection approved under CSA Standard CAN/CSA-Z94.3-92 shall be worn by personnel working in any locations where the potential of eye injury exists by splashing leachate or condensate, projectiles, gases, or vapours. Common types of eye protection are safety glasses and safety goggles. Safety glasses are suitable for protection from particulates. Safety goggles are suitable when there is a risk of

splashing or vapours of a corrosive substance. Personnel who wear corrective lenses can select prescription safety glasses, goggles or approved tempered glasses with side shield, as appropriate. Face shields that provide some protection from projectiles are also available.

HEARING PROTECTION

Hearing protection is required when personnel may be exposed to high ambient noise levels (over 85 dBA). Appropriate ear plugs and/or ear muffs shall be worn by personnel working in the vicinity of heavy equipment and at the Flare Station. Hearing protection shall be approved under CSA Standard Z94.2-02.

Personnel entering the fenced area of the Flare Station/Maxim’s Facility shall use hearing protection that is at least Grade 2 or Class B as identified by CSA Standard Z94.2-02, or better.

No personal listening devices shall be used at the landfill.

GLOVES

Latex, vinyl, nitrile or neoprene gloves shall be worn by personnel who may have direct contact with leachate or condensate when carrying out their tasks. For personnel whose tasks may encounter hot or cold surfaces or objects that have sharp or irregular edges, cotton, wool or leather gloves shall be worn, as appropriate.

PERSONAL GAS DETECTOR

A Personal Gas Detector is a portable instrument that can measure explosive gas concentrations up to 100% LEL, oxygen concentrations from 1% to greater than 23.5% by volume, and H2S concentrations from 1 ppm to greater than 500 ppm. The detector shall be calibrated such that it can verify that the airspace in the work area meets the minimum Vancouver Landfill criteria in Table 1 (i.e., LEL less than 10%, oxygen 19.5% to 23.5%, and H2S less than 5 ppm). Personal Gas Detectors shall be used at all times when

Leather Work Nitrile

Personal Gas

Detector


Page 22 of 84

working on the Flare Station or LFG piping.

The Personal Gas Detector shall be maintained in good working order and be bump tested daily prior to use. If bump testing identifies gas monitoring equipment that is not working within its tolerance limits or if the equipment is outside of its calibration period, it shall be removed from service immediately. Personnel shall be trained in the use and limitations of the gas detection equipment used. The monitor shall not be used if the calibration date has passed.

The Personal Gas Detector shall be deployed between the breathing zone of the user and the source of the contaminant and shall be located so the user can hears and/or see the detector alarm.

LFG ANALYZER

A LFG analyzer is a portable instrument that can measure methane concentrations from 0% to 100% by volume and LEL, and oxygen concentrations from 1% to greater than 21%. This instrument is not to be used as a personal gas detector but is used to measure concentrations of LFG in pipes and equipment.

The LFG analyzer shall be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.

COMMUNICATION DEVICES

Cellular telephones and two way radios are primary communication methods for Landfill workers and supervisors and are the main method of announcing emergency conditions for personnel working outside the office areas. Personnel who work alone shall carry a working cellular telephone with a charged battery on the site. In an emergency situation, personnel should be aware that common cellular telephones are not intrinsically safe and shall

not be used in an explosive environment.

HARD HAT

Hard hats shall be worn by personnel working in an environment where there is a danger of head injury from falling, flying or thrown objects, or other harmful contacts3. Hard hats shall be approved under CSA Standard CAN/CSA-Z94.1-92 and shall not contain metal or electrically conducting materials. Hard hats shall be worn properly to provide maximum protection and be maintained properly to ensure their protection qualities.

3 OHS Regulation 8.11

Landfill

Gas Analyzer

Two Way VHF

Cell Phone


Page 23 of 84

FACE PROTECTION

Face protection shall be worn by personnel working in any locations where a risk of face injury exists. Possible causes of face injury are high speed projectiles (e.g., from cutting or grinding) or radiation from welding operations. Face protection shall be approved under CSA Standard CAN/CSA-Z94.3-92.

Face protection may not replace the need for eye protection. For example, safety goggles and a face shield may both be required.

CHEMICAL RESISTANT CLOTHING

In some instances, because of the risk of splashing of a corrosive or otherwise dangerous chemical, chemical resistant clothing may be required. This clothing may be in the form of coveralls, such as Tyvek or Tychem®, or may be as simple as a splash apron with integral arm covers.

Chemical resistant clothing should be used when there is a risk of direct contact with a corrosive substance. If the chemical resistant clothing becomes contaminated, the contaminant should immediately be wiped off.

AIR PURIFYING RESPIRATORS

Air purifying respirators may be used from time to time on the site. These respirators shall not be used in an oxygen-deficient atmosphere or if an atmosphere is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). Because air purifying respirators can prevent the wearer from detecting low, warning concentrations of hydrogen sulphide, use when working with LFG must be weighed against risks of not detecting hydrogen sulphide.

They may be used for contaminants that are present in concentrations less than 50% of the maximum use concentration of the respirator. Personnel shall only use respirators for which they have been assigned, fit-tested and trained in their use.

SELF-CONTAINED BREATHING APPARATUS

Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) is required when it is necessary for personnel to work in an atmosphere that is oxygen-deficient or that contains harmful airborne contaminants. The apparatus shall be properly cleaned, stored in clearly marked and properly designated areas, and inspected periodically. Personnel shall only use SCBAs for which they have been assigned, fit-tested and trained in their use. There is no SCBA

equipment available at the Landfill.


Page 24 of 84

Escape SCBAs are maintained at the Landfill in circumstances when there is a potential for a loss of control of Landfill gas. They are not intended for work activities, only for escape from a hazardous environment where circumstances prevent other controls from being effective. If escape SCBAs are used, personnel shall be trained in the use and limitations of the escape SCBAs, but do not need to be fit-tested.

FIRE EXTINGUISHER

Fire extinguishers shall be stored and readily available for use in areas around the Flare Station. Fire extinguishers are present in all City Landfill vehicles and one shall be immediately available for work on the collection system that may create sparks. The fire extinguishers should be Class ABC as they are able to extinguish most types of fires that would occur at the Landfill.

INFRA-RED THERMOMETER

Infra-red thermometers shall be used from time to time to verify that surfaces have cooled sufficiently to allow for human contact. In particular, infra-red thermometers may be used to verify the temperature of flare stacks prior to working on or around the stack.

INERT GAS

Industrial grade nitrogen is an inert gas. Nitrogen is economical, has a density almost the same as air, and should be used whenever possible for purging LFG piping or equipment. Carbon dioxide, which is not an inert gas and has a WorkSafe BC exposure limit, is heavier than air and should be used as a purge gas only for special applications when nitrogen is not suitable.

VENTILATION FANS

When there is a potential for the creation of a hazardous atmosphere, ventilation fans shall be used for ventilation purposes. Ventilation fans shall be positioned upwind of the work area and intrinsically safe ventilation fans shall be used. Caution should be taken to ensure that ventilation fans only draw in uncontaminated air and that they are directed so that hazardous air is forced away from workers. Ventilation fans for

confined space entry shall be capable of blowing clean, respirable air into the work area at a rate of 85 m3/h (50 cfm) per confined space entrant for the duration of the time an entrant is in the space.

Escape SCBA

ABC

Nitrogen


Page 25 of 84

HAIR BANDS

Personnel with hair longer than shoulder length, who will be within 0.6 m of moving parts, such as the purge fan motor of the flares, the shaft between the blowers and the motors at the Flare Station, shall tie their hair with hair bands or confine their hair in a hard hat.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Personnel who are to work on or close to the LFG management system shall, as a minimum, have compulsory training on the following prior to the commencement of work:

• Vancouver Landfill New Employee Orientation

• Site safety orientation, including sign-in

• Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedures

• Safety aspects at municipal solid waste landfills, in general, and in the LFG system operation in particular

• Atmospheric hazards (i.e., explosive gases, oxygen-deficient atmospheres, H2S) associated with landfill gas and Vancouver Landfill procedures to deal with these hazards

• Operation of air monitoring instruments required for sampling atmospheres in the working zone

• Use and limitations of required PPE

• Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System, City of Vancouver, British Columbia, Volume 1

Supervisors shall ensure that all personnel working around the LFG management system have acquired the above training before the work is started and that there are adequate records of this training.

Optional training that may be considered for personnel include the following courses:

• H2S Alive

• Confined space entry

• Golder Associates’ Operating Principles of LFG Management

• SWANA Landfill Gas Basics

• SWANA Landfill Gas Systems, Operations and Maintenance

For any activity that WorkSafe BC has prescribed that Certification is required, no person shall conduct the activity unless they hold the required certification.


Page 26 of 84

ABBREVIATIONS

CH4 Methane H2S Hydrogen Sulphide

CO Carbon Monoxide LFG Landfill Gas

CO2 Carbon Dioxide N2 Nitrogen

CT Condensate Trap O2 Oxygen

SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

LEL Lower Explosive Limit

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

ppm Parts Per Million

SWANA Solid Waste Association of North America

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 27 of 84

WORKING ALONE AND RESPONSE PROCEDURE

Some tasks performed while working at the Vancouver Landfill (VLF) involve working alone or in isolation for part or entire shifts. This Procedure describes the role of the worker and their supervisor when the worker is working alone at the VLF. This procedure applies to the following tasks, but is not limited to: contouring surface cover, washing mobile equipment on graveyard shift, water sampling, and working on any aspect of the Landfill gas collection, control, and conditioning system.

This Safe Work Procedure is to be followed by all staff when they work alone.

The term Support Workers used in this Procedure means personnel from other City branches and/or a contractor.

A worker is considered to be working alone or in isolation (working alone) when there are conditions which present a risk of disabling injury if the worker might not be able to secure assistance in the event of injury or other misfortune.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

Personal Protective Equipment

Type Cell Phone

Personal Gas

Detector (LFG work)

SafetyLine Mobile Worker

Monitoring System

WORKSAFE REGULATION AND OTHER REFERENCES

• WorkSafe BC Occupational Health & Safety Regulation, Part 4, Section 4.20.1, Working Alone or in Isolation

• SafetyLine IVR Menu Guide (wallet card).

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

Procedures to be followed by responders to Non-Responsive Workers are contained in the Vancouver Landfill Emergency Response Procedures.

Working Alone and Response Safe Work Procedure

Page 28 of 84

HAZARDS

The hazards associated with working alone are the hazards based on the activity, not the act of working alone. The SWP applicable to the work must be referred to for hazards and risk management measures. Working alone alters the response to injury and increases the need for monitoring, PPE, and risk management measures.

Typical hazards associated with the Landfill are described below.

Hazard Hazard Event

Description/ Location Risk Management Probability Severity

Trips and falls

Uneven ground, slippery conditions in poor weather Appropriate footwear A 3

Sharp objects Stepping on or displacing sharp objects

Appropriate footwear and work clothing. B 3

Leachate or condensate

Contact with leachate in LFG system or ditches

Gloves and eye protection B 4

Heavy equipment and vehicles

Vehicle impact parking on side of haul road

Hi-viz vests and low speed limit, most monitoring not near the haul road. C 2

Drowning

Falling or driving into ditch and unable to escape.

Appropriate footwear, training D 1

Explosion General risk No smoking, personal air monitoring D 1

Oxygen deficiency General risk Personal air monitoring D 1 Hydrogen sulphide General risk Personal air monitoring D 1

Note: (see Background Information for detail) A is most

likely

1 is most

severe

TRAINING AND SUPERVISION

• New employee Orientation shall include identifying situations when this procedure is required.

• Supervisors shall ensure that all employees are trained and supervised in the implementation of this procedure.

• SafetyLine Mobile Worker Monitoring System.

• Workers must be trained and knowledgeable in the operation of applicable equipment and trained to perform the assigned work.

• Workers must be trained and knowledgeable to recognize work requiring machinery Lock Out and/or De-energization and to implement Lock Out and/or De-energization.


Page 29 of 84

• Workers must be trained in the identification of Confined Spaces and understand that no

Confined Space Entry may be conducted Working Alone.

• Support Workers are responsible for providing their own training, procedures, tools and equipment.

PROCEDURES FOR USING THE SAFETYLINE MOBILE WORKER MONITORING SYSTEM

Users log in to the SafetyLine IVR system at the start of working alone, at assigned intervals during the work, and at the end of working alone. Users, in consultation with their supervisor, should determine the interval period for checking in. The default interval is 60 minutes and may need to be shorter depending upon the risks of the particular task. Support Workers and other Users without a personal ID/password will have one assigned by Landfill Reception staff.

To log-in to the SafetyLine IVR system, the user will:

1. phone SafetyLine at 604.299.6266 2. enter the Landfill’s Company ID 51# 3. enter personal ID (as assigned) and # 4. enter password (same as ID) and #

The system will respond with a voice message “Not system monitored”.

Support Workers will need to enter their cell phone number by:

1. press 0 (Advanced Menu) 2. press 6, enter your cell phone number then press # 3. press 1 (to confirm the phone number) 4. press * to exit to the main menu

To start system monitoring, all users will need to press 2, record a voice message stating your work location, then # to report ok and * to exit.

To check-in during the work, log in to the system as above and at the voice prompt, enter 2 and #. If your work location has changed, record a new voice message.

To log-out at the end of work, log in to the system as above and at the voice prompt, enter 5 and #; you will hear “Thank you for using SafetyLine”.

Note: these sequences can be programmed using the speed-dial or one touch button function on most cell phones.


Page 30 of 84

To change the check in period from 60 minutes, the user will:

1. press 0 (Advanced Menu) 2. press 4# (Change your IVR dial out number) 3. enter the number of minutes for the desired interval, then # 4. press * to exit to the main menu 5. press * to exit the system

See below for details on the menu options.

SAFETY LINE INTERACTIVE VOICE RESPONSE SYSTEM MENU

Additional SafetyLine information can be found on the City of Vancouver server at:

H:\Safety\Working Alone\SafetyLine manuals

REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIC TO SUPPORT WORKERS

All support workers are required to have a Site Safety Orientation on their initial visit. Support Workers must sign in and out at the Landfill office and advise Landfill Reception staff that they will be working alone. The Support Worker will then be assigned a personal ID number by Landfill Reception staff (0010 or 0020).

Main Menu Advanced Menu Key Key 1 Emergency 1 GPS 2 Report OK 2 Data 3 Status 3 Password Change 4 Set Next Report Time 4 Set Report Interval 5 End System Monitoring 5 Record Name 6 Monitor Menu 6 Change Your IVR Dial Out No. 0 Advanced Menu # Repeat # Repeat * Return to Main Menu * Exit SafetyLine


Page 31 of 84

SAFETYLINE EMERGENCY CALL BACK PROCEDURES FOR NON-RESPONDING USERS

1. If the user does not call in to the system at the end of the check in period, the automated attendant at SafetyLine will call the user at their cell phone number. The user will be asked to confirm their status.

2. If the user does not respond, SafetyLine will phone again in five minutes.

3. If the user still does not respond, SafetyLine will call the Landfill callout list (see below), report the Emergency, and Landfill staff will respond to the emergency. Safetyline will continue to call all of the people on the list until the emergency is acknowledged. Staff will acknowledge the emergency using their password and are then responsible for resolving that situation.

Landfill callout list

Office #1 – Landfill Office #2 – Landfill Supervisor 1 Supervisor 2 Landfill Manager

LANDFILL OFFICE RESPONSE

1. When you receive a call from SafetyLine, a recording giving you the company number (51), your user id and the id of the person in an emergency will be played to you.

2. SafetyLine will ask you to acknowledge that you will be taking responsibility for the emergency by entering an emergency code and #.

3. The emergency code will be your password (last four digits of your telephone/cell number).

4. You will then be asked to record a voice message and then press #. Your voice message can contain any information regarding your taking over the responsibility of the emergency.

5. If you are unable to respond to the emergency, do not enter the emergency code and hang up, SafetyLine will call the next number on the callout list and continue calling the numbers in a cycle until a response is received.

6. Once you have taken responsibility for the emergency, all SafetyLine call outs will stop. At this point you need to contact the site Superintendent or senior person on site to activate the emergency response procedures.

The response to a non-responsive call back shall be considered an Emergency under the Vancouver Landfill Emergency Response Procedures.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 33 of 84

LFG INSPECTION AND MONITORING

This Safe Work Procedure is applicable for inspection and monitoring of the LFG collection and control system.

Inspection refers to visual observation of the site and collection system components.

Monitoring consists of the use of a LFG analyzer, pressure gauge, and/or other instrumentation to measure LFG parameters (e.g., methane, oxygen, temperature, pressure) at LFG extraction wells, manifolds, or header monitoring points. If trained in LFG system operation, occasional hand operation of LFG control valves may be conducted. This procedure does not apply to any other measurement methods, or manipulating any other components.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Landfill Gas Analyzer

Dwyer Magnehelic differential

pressure gauge

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 1, 2, 3, 4



Type In Flare Station

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone

REFERENCES

• Landfill Gas Analyzer Reference Manual.

LFG Inspection and Monitoring Safe Work Procedure

Page 34 of 84

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls



Contact with liquid from sample port

Sample ports are on top and leachate only discharged if well under pressure. B 4



Hi-viz vests and low speed limit, most monitoring not near the haul road. C 2




likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

INSPECTION

1. Observe wind direction and approach the components to be inspected from the upwind side, if possible.

2. Ensure that your Personal Gas Detector is operational, located to monitor your breathing zone, and placed so that you can hear or see the alarm.

3. Avoid vehicles and machinery. Use traffic cones as appropriate.

4. If working in the Flare Station compound, use hearing protection.

5. Continuously monitor the airspace with the Personal Gas Detector to verify that the airspace meets Vancouver Landfill requirements (see Background Information Table 1). Leave the area in an upwind or crosswind direction immediately if warning signals are emitted by the Personal Gas Detector.

6. Stand upwind with your face at least one arm’s length horizontally away from any monitoring port. Do not work with the monitoring port pointing towards your face.

7. Report any strong odours, equipment malfunctions, or abnormal conditions to the Supervisor.

LFG Inspection and Monitoring Safe Work Procedure

Page 35 of 84

MONITORING

1. Each well must be checked for gas flow, pressure, and constituents. The following steps describe the monitoring procedures to be performed at the wellheads. Figures 3 and 4 show the locations of items described in the following procedures. Similar measurements may be made as desired at the manifold monitoring stations to check overall system performance.

2. Ensure that instruments are calibrated properly.

3. For Type B wells that are located inside a vault, sweep the Personal Gas Detector over the vault. If there is an alarm, do not proceed with this task. Remove the vault cover and use the Personal Gas Detector to sample the air inside the vault. If there is an alarm, move away from the vault in an upwind direction and contact the Landfill Gas Technician, Landfill Manager or designate for further directions.

4. Use the Landfill Gas Analyzer to obtain readings for CH4, H2S, CO2, CO, O2, temperature, static and differential pressure. For complete instructions on how to use the Landfill gas analyser, consult the product manual. For readings outside the normal operating range, repeat the readings to reduce the possibility of measurement error.

5. Alternate Flow and Pressure Monitoring Procedures are provided in the O&M Manual.

6. After readings have been taken, replace the vault cover.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 37 of 84

WATER LEVEL MEASUREMENTS IN EXTRACTION WELLS AND CONDENSATE TRAPS

This Safe Work Procedure outlines the steps for measurement of leachate levels in vertical LFG extraction wells and water levels in bucket-type condensate traps.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Landfill Gas

Analyzer

Water at least

1 L

Water level probe

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 1, 2, 3, 4



Type Nitrile Personal

Gas Detector

Cell Phone

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls


Leachate or condensate Contact with condensate

Leachate and condensate are neutral pH, not corrosive or irritating. A 4

Oxygen deficiency

Some traps are in depressions and LFG could accumulate. Personal air monitoring B 3


Hydrogen sulphide General risk Personal air monitoring D 1

Water Level Measurements in Extraction Wells and Condensate Traps

Safe Work Procedure

Page 38 of 84

Hazard Hazard Event




Hi-viz vests and low speed limit, traps are near, but not on, haul roads. D 1


likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

LEACHATE LEVEL MEASUREMENTS IN LFG EXTRACTION WELLS

1. Observe wind direction and approach the components to be inspected from the upwind side, if possible.


3. Note the valve setting position and then close the gate valve at the well.

4. Ensure that your head is at least one arm’s length horizontally away from the well at all times throughout this procedure.

5. Remove the cap, plug or clamp on the wellhead, whichever is applicable, to access the vertical LFG well pipe.

6. Wet the water level tape (if not already wet) and slowly lower the water level probe into the well until the leachate level is encountered. Record the depth of leachate level below the top of the plastic pipe and lift the water level probe out of the well. Record the water level on the appropriate form.

7. Replace the cap, plug or clamp on the wellhead.

8. Restore the setting of the gate valve.

WATER LEVEL MEASUREMENT IN BUCKET-TYPE CONDENSATE TRAPS

1. Observe wind direction and approach the components to be inspected from the upwind side, if possible. If there is no wind, use a ventilation fan to blow contaminants away from personnel.


3. Open the monitoring port valve and connect a LFG analyzer to the monitoring port on the CT. If the oxygen concentration is less than 1% by volume, proceed to the next step. If the oxygen concentration is more than 1% by volume, do not proceed.

Water Level Measurements in Extraction Wells and Condensate Traps

Safe Work Procedure

Page 39 of 84

4. Shut down LFG flow in the LFG header by closing the downstream valve. Allow the LFG pressure

within the header to equalize with atmospheric pressure (the pressure transducer on the LFG analyzer should show low vacuum or pressure), and then close the LFG valves (manifolds or wellheads) that could cause flow of LFG to the CT. These valves may be down-gradient of LFG flow during normal operations.

5. Unbolt the blind flange of the CT riser and remove the blind flange.

6. Wet the tape measure with water.

7. Insert the water level probe into the CT riser and measure the water level. Keep your head at least one arm’s length horizontally away from the CT riser. Do not look down the CT riser while measuring the water level. Record the water level on the appropriate form.

8. When measurements are complete, reinstate blind flange.

9. Restore the settings of the valves.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 41 of 84

INSTALLING OR REPLACING INSTRUMENTATION ON LFG PIPE

This Safe Work Procedure provides guidance for installing or replacing an instrument at a sample port, or inspection of the instrumentation (e.g., inspection and cleaning of the probe on the thermal flow meter).

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES


pressure gauge

Gasket or seal as required

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 1, 2, 3



Type Leather Work

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event Description/

Location Risk Management Probability Severity

Trips and falls Uneven ground, slippery conditions in poor weather Appropriate footwear A 3



Hi-viz vests and low speed limit, most monitoring not near the haul road. D 1




likely 1 is most severe

Installing or Replacing Instrumentation on LFG Pipe

Safe Work Procedure

Page 42 of 84

PROCEDURE

1. Have the replacement instrument or a suitable blank or plug prepared for immediate installation upon removal of the instrument under repair.

2. Observe wind direction and work from the upwind side. If there is no wind, defer this task to another time when there is wind, or use a ventilation fan to blow contaminants away from workers.


4. Shut off the valve(s) downstream of the instrumentation location so that the suction from the blower is eliminated and no air enters the LFG collection system.

5. Install a pressure gauge on a monitoring port in the same section of pipe as the instrumentation. When the suction in the LFG well drops to 0 (i.e., LFG pressure in the pipe is the same as atmospheric), continue with the next step. If the suction does not fall to 0, check that the downstream valves are completely closed.

6. Shut off the valve(s) upstream of the instrumentation location so that no LFG can enter from an upstream location.

7. Remove the instrumentation or bolts of the flange.

8. Quickly replace instrumentation or blind flange with the prepared instrument, fabricated flange, or temporary plug. Replace gaskets or seals prior to re-installation.

9. Restore all valves to their previous settings.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 43 of 84

PURGING A PIPE – LFG COLLECTION SYSTEM

Pipes in the LFG management system are filled with LFG in normal circumstances. When a task is to be done directly on a pipe filled with LFG, it shall be purged by an inert gas prior to the commencement of the task to minimize the risk of explosion and LFG exposure to personnel. This safe work procedure is for purging LFG in a pipe that is upstream of the first set of blowers in the Flare Station. This procedure does not apply to work in a confined space. It may not be possible to follow this purge procedure for work at all locations, and in such a case, a specific Safe Work Procedure should be developed for the particular situation.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES


Nitrogen purge gas

Valve lock(s) and tag(s)

Traffic cones,

barriers or barrier tape

Pressure regulator and hose

Adjustable wrench

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figure 2 Typical Condensate Trap Layout



Type Leather Work

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone

Ventila-tion fan

Escape SCBA (work sub-

grade)

REFERENCES

City of Vancouver Excavation, Shoring, and Trenching Safe Work Procedures

Purging a Pipe – LFG Collection System Safe Work Procedure

Page 44 of 84

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls

Numerous areas of uneven ground or materials. Protective footwear A 3

Oxygen deficiency

LFG is intentionally discharged to air in the work area, collection in a depression or any location without dispersion can be oxygen limited. Personal Gas Detector C 1

Hydrogen sulphide

LFG is intentionally discharged to air in the work area, collection in a depression or any location without dispersion can contain hydrogen sulphide. Personal Gas Detector C 1

Heavy equipment and vehicles.

Vehicle impact parking on side of haul road.

Park off road, watch for vehicles, training C 1

Compressed gas

Accidental release due to broken valve. Cold parts due to gas cooling.

Gas is non toxic, but is oxygen deficient. Wear gloves to protect from cold components. C 4

Explosion

LFG is intentionally discharged to air in the work area, an ignition source can result in explosion.

Controlled entry to work zone, gas monitoring, no ignition sources D 1


likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

1. Observe wind direction and work from the upwind side of the pipe. If there is no wind, defer this task to another time when there is wind, or use a ventilation fan to blow contaminants away from workers.

2. Place barrier tape or warning cones in a 3 metre radius of the valves or flanges to prevent unauthorized entry.

3. Isolate the section of the pipe to be purged by closing and locking out all valves immediately downstream of the section. Using a pressure gauge, monitor the pressure in the section of pipe


Page 45 of 84

to be purged. When the pressure has reduced to between 0.0 and -0.5 inch water column, close and lock out the valves immediately upstream of the section of pipe to be purged.

4. If workers must work in a section of pipe that is more than 1.3 metres below grade, escape SCBA’s are to be available within easy reach of the workers. In addition, shoring or other excavation protection must be present in accordance with City of Vancouver Excavation, Shoring, and Trenching Safe Work Procedures.

5. Use a Personal Gas Detector to monitor the breathing airspace, particularly at the discharge ends. Continuously monitor the airspace within the work area (i.e., the location where work on the pipe is being carried out) during the work to verify that the airspace meets Vancouver Landfill requirements (see Background Information Table 1).

6. Open a sample port valve at both ends of the section to be purged and then move away immediately in an upwind direction. The upstream (in relation to normal LFG flow in the pipe) sample port valve should be the discharge sample port valve. The downstream sample port valve should be the location where purge gas is introduced (i.e., purge sample port valve).

7. Select the next blind flange immediately upstream of the upstream sample port valve4. This will be where LFG will be discharged during purging (i.e., discharge flange). Open this blind flange and place barrier tape or warning cones in a 3 meter radius of the valves or flanges to prevent unauthorized entry.

8. Using an inert gas bottle that has a pressure regulator, connect the regulator on the inert gas bottle to the sample port valve upwind of the work area, and then introduce the inert gas into the pipe at a gradual and controlled rate. Work gloves are required to protect hands from cold burns on regulators and valves.

9. Use a LFG analyzer at the flange of the discharge end to monitor the methane content of the exhaust gas. The sample should be drawn from the header or subheader pipe, not the vertical riser (the gas in the vertical riser is oxygen-deficient). Do not connect the LFG analyzer directly to the sample port valve since this would impede the purging process.

10. Terminate the supply of inert gas when the methane level drops to 0.1% by volume for at least 20 seconds at the discharge flange.

11. All workers in the vicinity of the purged pipe should be made aware that an oxygen-deficient condition exists within the pipe.

12. Monitor the gas content in the sample port valve adjacent to the discharge flange for 2 minutes using the LFG analyzer5. If the LFG analyzer indicates a methane content greater than 1.0% by volume, the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required). If the LFG analyzer indicates a methane content less than 1.0% by volume, commence work.

4 For example, if the work area is CT20 and purge gas is to be introduced at CT19, then the discharge

sample port valve (for monitoring) would be CT21 and the flange would be removed from CT22. 5 For example, if purge gas is introduced at CT19 and the discharge blind flange is CT22, then monitoring

would be carried out on the sample port valve at CT21.


Page 46 of 84

13. While work is being carried out, continue monitoring at the discharge sample port valve and the

purge sample port valve. If the LFG analyzer indicates a methane content greater than 1.0% by volume, the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required).

14. Work should be carried out without stoppage. If it is necessary to temporarily stop the work, then prior to re-commencing work, the LFG analyzer should be used to assess the methane content within the pipe at the work location, the purge sample port valve and the discharge sample port valve. Work can re-commence unless the LFG analyzer indicates a methane content:

a. at the sample port valves of greater than 1.0% by volume, in which case the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required); or

b. within the pipe at the work area of greater than 0.2% by volume, in which case the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required).

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 47 of 84

SHORTENING WELLS OR REPLACING HOSES

This Safe Work Procedure provides guidance for shortening vertical LFG extraction wells and replacing the flexible hose on LFG extraction wells.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES


pressure gauge

Water at least

1 L

50 mm diameter PVC cap for

hose replacement

Pipe, couplings and glue as

needed

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 1, 3, 4



Type Nitrile Personal

Gas Detector

Cell Phone

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls



Leachate and condensate are neutral pH, not corrosive or irritating. Safety glasses for eye protection A 4

Oxygen deficiency

Some traps are in depressions and LFG could accumulate. Personal air monitoring B 3

Shortening Wells or Replacing Hoses Safe Work Procedure

Page 48 of 84

Hazard Hazard Event



Hydrogen sulphide General risk Personal air monitoring D 1



Hi-viz vests and low speed limit, traps are near, but not on, haul roads. D 1


likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

SHORTENING OF LFG EXTRACTION WELLS

1. Observe wind direction and stand upwind of wellhead. If there is no wind, defer this task to another time until there is wind, or use ventilation fans to blow LFG away from workers.


3. Note the valve setting position and then close the gate valve at the well (Figure 3).

4. Ensure your face is at least one arm’s length horizontally away from the wellhead throughout this procedure. Do not work in-line with the wellhead.

5. Remove the wellhead.

6. Cut the PVC pipe with a hand-operated hacksaw. To dissipate static electricity, place a cloth or burlap strip over or around the pipe and onto the ground. Flood the cloth with water containing a small amount of detergent.

7. Wipe excess water from the pipe and apply PVC glue to the fittings. Insert a coupling into the cut section, connect the existing pipes to the coupling and seal the connections with glue.

8. Restore the setting of the gate valve.

REPLACEMENT OF FLEXIBLE HOSE ON LFG EXTRACTION WELLS

1. Prepare a flexible hose to the desired length and loosely position hose clamps.

2. Observe wind direction and stand upwind of wellhead. If there is no wind, defer this task to another time until there is wind, or use a ventilation fan to blow contaminants away from workers.

Shortening Wells or Replacing Hoses Safe Work Procedure

Page 49 of 84

3. Ensure that your Personal Gas Detector is operational, located to monitor your breathing zone,

and placed so that you can hear or see the alarm.

4. There are two types of well heads, one with downstream valves and one without.

a. Units With Downstream Valves

i. Record the position of the gate valve at the wellhead, and shut off the gate valve. If there is another 50 mm diameter ball valve (e.g., Area 1A wells), shut it off.

ii. Remove and replace the flexible hose, tightening the clamps.

iii. Restore the setting of the gate valve and open the ball valve (if closed).

b. Units Without Downstream Valves

i. Measure the static pressure at the labcock. If the suction to the well exceeds 5 inches water column, decrease the suction to the area of the wellhead by turning down the manifold valve to 5 inches water column or less.

ii. Record the position of the gate valve at the wellhead, and shut off the gate valve.

iii. Loosen the stainless steel clamp at the downstream end of the hose.

iv. Detach the downstream end of the old hose from the wellhead and quickly cover the opening (which may be under suction) with the 50 mm diameter PVC cap.

v. Install the new hose and attach the upstream end with a hose clamp.

vi. Quickly remove the 50 mm diameter PVC cap covering the lateral pipe and attach the new hose with a hose clamp.

vii. Tighten the clamps at both ends of the new hose.

viii. Restore the setting of the gate valve and open the ball valve (if closed).

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 51 of 84

REPAIRING, REPLACING, OR CONNECTING A LFG PIPE TO A HEADER

This Safe Work Procedure outlines the steps to repair, replace, or connect a LFG pipe to a header. This Safe Work Procedure requires that pipes are purged prior to commencement of this procedure.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Landfill Gas

Analyzer

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 1, 2, 3, 4



Type Leather Work

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone

Ventila-tion fan

Escape SCBA

(work sub-grade)


• SWP Purging a Pipe LFG Collection System

• Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System.

• City of Vancouver Excavation, Shoring and Trenching Safe Work Procedures

Repairing, Replacing, or Connecting a LFG Pipe to a Header

Safe Work Procedure

Page 52 of 84

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls



Contact with leachate from sample port

Leachate and condensate are neutral pH, not corrosive or irritating. C 4



Hi-viz vests and low speed limit. C 2

Explosion

LFG release from pipes near work area and at explosive concentration, with a spark from static discharge.

No smoking, personal air monitoring, static charge grounding D 1

Oxygen deficiency Purged LFG collects in a depressed area

Personal air monitoring, escape SCBA or ventilation fan when in excavation. D 1

Hydrogen sulphide Purged LFG collects in a depressed area

Personal air monitoring, escape SCBA or ventilation fan when in excavation. D 1


likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

1. Before the work can be commenced, the SWP Purging a Pipe, LFG Collection System must be completed unless the pipe is known and confirmed to be in an equivalent purged status.

2. All workers in the vicinity of the purged pipe should be made aware that an oxygen-deficient condition exists within the pipe.


4. Monitor the gas content in the sample port valve adjacent to the discharge flange for 2 minutes using the LFG analyzer6. If the LFG analyzer indicates methane content greater than 1.0% by volume, the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required). If the LFG

6 For example, if purge gas is introduced at CT19 and the discharge blind flange is CT22, then monitoring

would be carried out on the sample port valve at CT21.

Repairing, Replacing, or Connecting a LFG Pipe to a Header

Safe Work Procedure

Page 53 of 84

analyzer indicates methane content less than 1.0% by volume, commence work and ensure that the ventilation fan is operating.

5. While work is being carried out, continue monitoring at the discharge sample port valve and the purge sample port valve. If the LFG analyzer indicates methane content greater than 1.0% by volume, the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required).

6. Work should be carried out without stoppage. If it is necessary to temporarily stop the work, then prior to re-commencing work, the LFG analyzer should be used to assess the methane content within the pipe at the work location, the purge sample port valve and the discharge sample port valve. Work can re-commence unless the LFG analyzer indicates a methane content:

a. at the sample port valves of greater than 1.0% by volume, in which case the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required); or

b. within the pipe at the work area of greater than 0.2% by volume, in which case the situation should be re-assessed (additional purging may be required).

7. City of Vancouver Excavation, Trenching, and Shoring Safe Work Procedures shall be followed and, of particular note, the following shall be observed:

a. No person shall enter an excavation greater than 1.2 metres depth unless the excavation is shored or sloped to prevent slope failure.

b. An escape SCBA shall be carried by each person working in an excavation to provide sufficient time to evacuate the area in the event of a LFG release. Alternately, a ventilation fan can be used to provide air into the excavation.

8. When cutting a pipe, there is a potential for build up of static electricity into any connected component of the piping system. To limit static build up, place a burlap or cloth strip over the pipe and onto the ground. Flood the strip with water to which a small amount of dishwashing detergent has been added.

9. Upon completion of the work, test the new connections for leaks as appropriate, remove blinds and restore valves to their operating positions.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 55 of 84

RESTARTING THE FLARE AND RESETTING ALARMS AND AUTODIALER

This Safe Work Procedure provides guidance for assessment of conditions for restarting the flare and resetting the alarms and autodialer at the Flare Station. The alarm and autodialer system at the Flare Station notifies City personnel of a failure of the flare system. When a failure occurs, the system activates red lights on a display panel adjacent to the flares (City panel, see Figure 7) and automatically notifies City personnel of the failure by dialling a series of telephone numbers stored in the system’s memory. Depending on the type of alarm, City personnel may be required to go to the panel to acknowledge the alarm, assess and correct the cause of the alarm, and reset the alarm.

The system is designed to automatically restart the flares on most occasions. This SWP is applicable if there are no manifold valves closed in the collection system, the main header and pinch valve is open, the Maxim blowers are being used to collect LFG from the field, and the Maxim system is operating.

Re-starting the Maxim LFG Conditioning Plant is outside the scope of this procedure.

Manual operation of the City Flares, isolation of the Maxim LFG Conditioning plant, and the re-start of the Maxim plant are beyond the scope of this SWP.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Landfill Gas

Analyzer

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figure 5, 6, 7



Type Personal

Gas Detector

Cell Phone

Restarting the Flare and Resetting Alarms and Autodialer

Safe Work Procedure

Page 56 of 84


• Callidus Technologies; Operation and Maintenance Manual, Delta Landfill, Delta, B.C., December 2000

• Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System, CH2MHill

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Noise

Certain areas of Flare Station have noise levels above 80 dB Hearing protection worn A 4




Trips and falls

Many tripping hazards worse in poor weather conditions Grates and walkways C 2




likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

1. Observe wind sock for wind direction and plan to approach equipment from the upwind direction. Also use the wind direction to determine the best evacuation route if there is a release.


3. Enter the Maxim trailer and note the status/condition of the status indicator lights on the Motor Control Center (MCC) panels located along the South wall of the trailer.

4. Enter the “office” portion of the trailer and check the status of the LFG conditioning system process skid “Process Screen” on Maxim’s computer. The screen will indicate alarms; which blowers are running, and other operational details. Note which Flares have been selected (Flare 1, Both, Flare 2, None).


Safe Work Procedure

Page 57 of 84

5. Continuously monitor your personal airspace with a personal gas detector during the work to

verify that the airspace meets Vancouver Landfill requirements.

6. Proceed to the City Panel (Figure 7) and observe the status of the indicator lights and system.

7. Press the “Alarm Acknowledge” button. This will re-set a timer on the Auto-dialler, and will stop alarm notification via the autodialer for 60 minutes.

8. Assess the cause of the flare shut down. Status indicator lights on the City Panel identify the cause of the flare failure. The alarm and failure conditions are described in Table 3-1 in the Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System, CH2MHill and included at the end of this procedure.

NOTE: If the cause of the shut down or alarm cannot be determined, do not attempt a restart until either the LFG Technician or Manager have reviewed the situation with you and agreed that a restart is advisable.

9. If possible, correct the cause of the flare shut down. Table 3-4 Troubleshooting Guide in the CH2MHill Manual provides suggested remedies for many of the common reasons the flare might fail. A copy of Table 3-4 is included at the end of this procedure.

10. Press the “Alarm Reset” button. This will clear the alarm indicator lights and the flare will attempt a restart.

START UP SEQUENCE

The operating procedures are contained in the Callidus Technologies; Operation and Maintenance Manual, Volume 1, Tab #4, Startup Checklist, and Tab #5, Detailed Operating Instructions. The operator must consult these sections for specific instructions on operating the blower/flare system before attempting to manually start the system.

The Callidus instructions pre-date the installation of the Maxim LFG conditioning plant, and the manual does not contain any information on the Maxim system.

A summary of the startup instructions for automatic operation is presented below.

1. Automatic Startup sequence begins as follows:

a. The Purge in Progress indicator lights will come on for approximately one minute while the flare(s) purge blower(s) purge the flare enclosure(s).

b. The Purge Complete indicator lights will come on and igniter(s) will light pilot gas in Flare #2 first and then Flare #1, if operating two flares.

c. If pilot flame ignition is successful, Flame Proved light will come on.

d. The blower(s) will start and the inlet valves will open.


Safe Work Procedure

Page 58 of 84

e. If pilot flame ignition is not successful, the system will automatically attempt to re-purge

and re-start.

2. Do not stand within 7.5 m of the flare stacks during start-up due to potential flameback.

FLARE SYSTEM MANUAL SHUTDOWN

In the event that the Flare System must be shut down, the following procedure shall be followed.

1. Push Emergency Shutdown (E-Stop) switch on Control Panel (PNL-101).

2. Close manual valve on main header if shutting down the system for more than one hour. Prior to closing the valve, note valve position setting for future reference.

3. Close condensate valve CT-15 on main header if shutdown is for more than one hour or if header pressure becomes greater than 6 inches water column.

4. Close manual valves on manifolds at Area 3, Area 2-E and Area 2-W if shutting down the system is for more than one day or if header pressure becomes greater than 6 inches water column. Prior to closing the valve, note valve position setting for future reference.

END OF PROCEDURE


Safe Work Procedure

Page 59 of 84

Table 3-1 Alarm/Failure Conditions & Required Responses, Rev 5

Alarm Condition

Programmed Action Operator Response

1 Flame failure flare #1

• Flare shuts down automatically, and then restarts

• Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel

1st occurrence - note 2nd occurrence – operator investigates

2 Flame failure flare #2




3 High temperature flare #1




4 High temperature flare #2




5 High oxygen • Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel • Flare station does not shut down

Operator investigates

6 Low temperature flare #2

• Flare shuts down automatically • Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel


7 Blower failure #1 or #2

• Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light(s) on blower

panel • Flare station shuts down

automatically, and does not restart


8 High temp at flame arrestor flare #1

• Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel • Flare station shuts down



9 High temp at flame arrestor flare #2





Safe Work Procedure

Page 60 of 84

Alarm

Condition Programmed Action Operator Response

10 Low pilot gas pressure




11 Inlet valve failure #1




12 Inlet valve failure #2




13 Low temperature flare #1

• Flare shuts down automatically, and does not restart



14 High high oxygen • Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel • Flare shuts down automatically, and

does not restart


15 Low methane • Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel • Flare station does not shut down


16 Low low methane

• Autodialer dials City alarm centre • Alarm indicator light on control panel • Flare shuts down automatically, and

does not restart



Safe Work Procedure

Page 61 of 84

Table 3-4 Troubleshooting Guide

Problem or Observation Potential Causes Action

1) Pilot won't light Pilot gas not reaching pilot Confirm pilot gas line is clear

Pilot gas pressure too high/ Low Confirm correct pilot gas pressure

Spark plug not sparking Remove and replace spark plug

Flame scanners malfunctioning Check scanner for proper operation

2) Panel indicates pilots are not lit

Fuel gas supply lost Confirm gas is available & at correct pressure

Pilots are damaged or mixers plugged

Inspect & blow out fuel gas line

Pilot fuel lines are plugged Inspect & blow out fuel gas line

Flame scanner malfunctioning Check scanner for proper operation

3) Cannot prove main flame

Waste gas flow too low/ insufficient methane content

Increase flow to minimum rate

Flame scanners malfunctioning Check scanner for proper operation

Flame scanner sighting angle incorrect

Modify scanner nozzle orientation

4) Flare Smokes Manual damper not in proper position

Adjust air damper position

Improper operation of automatic air damper

Confirm correct operation of auto air dampers

Waste gas flow too high Decrease flow to design rate


Safe Work Procedure

Page 62 of 84

Problem or Observation Potential Causes Action

5) Flare doesn't reach minimum temperature

Waste gas flow too low Increase waste gas flow rate

Manual damper not in proper position


Improper operation of automatic air damper

Confirm correct operation of auto dampers

6) Flare Temperature too high

Damaged thermocouple Confirm correct T/C operation

Manual air damper not in proper position


Improper auto damper operation Confirm correct operation of auto air dampers

Waste gas flow too high Decrease waste gas flow to design rate

7) Blower Failure Motor starter overload tripped Verify correct voltage to motor

Auxiliary contact failure Verify connections are tight and clean

Automatic waste gas valve Not indicating open

Check nitrogen cylinder, check limit switch

8) Miscellaneous General erratic operation operational problems

PLC failure


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 63 of 84

WORKING WITH COMPRESSED GAS CYLINDERS

This Safe Work Guideline provides specific guidance for working with Compressed Gas Cylinders. Compressed gases are required to operate the automatic shut-off valves and the flare of the LFG system. Compressed gases are shipped to the Landfill in heavy cylinders and are stored at the Flare Station east of the City panel. The gases stored at the Landfill include nitrogen (for gas inlet valve open operation), propane (for ignition of pilot flame in the flares) and calibration gas containing oxygen, methane, carbon dioxide, and/or hydrogen sulphide.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Landfill Gas

Analyzer

Cylinder dolly or trolley

Adjustable wrench

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figure 5, 6, 7, 8



Type Leather Work

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone


• WorkSafe BC Occupational Health & Safety Regulation, Part 5.36 - 5.47

Working with Compressed Gas Cylinders Safe Work Procedure

Page 64 of 84

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Noise

Certain areas of Flare Station have noise levels above 80 dB

Hearing protection worn A 4

Heavy lifting Injury due to lifting or dropping gas cylinder

Steel toes, safe lifting and movement procedures, dollies B 2




Trips and falls

Many tripping hazards worse in poor weather conditions Grates and walkways C 2

Pressurized hose failure

Fitting or hose fails and creates whipping hose or blowing debris.

Check all hoses and fittings before pressurization, maintain position outside of the whip zone. C 2

Compressed Gas

Accidental release due to broken valve from tip over or drop

Safe handling procedures to limit risk of accidental release C 4


Oxygen deficiency General risk Personal air monitoring D 1


likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

1. Observe wind sock for wind direction to determine evacuation routes in the event of a release.


3. If a pressure gauge is present (Figure 8), confirm that there is low pressure in the gas cylinder.

4. If low pressure is present in the gas cylinder, shut off the bottle valve on top of the gas cylinder (Figure 8).

5. Shut off the control valve at the pipe T (Figure 8) associated with the empty gas cylinder.

6. Ensure that the valve opening is away from your face. Use a wrench to very slowly unscrew the pressure regulator (or the hose if the propane cylinder is to be changed) from the empty

Working with Compressed Gas Cylinders Safe Work Procedure

Page 65 of 84

cylinder. The pressure regulator or hose should be unscrewed very slowly to relieve any residual gas pressure.

7. Move the empty cylinder to its designated area with a trolley or a similar mechanical device, chain the cylinder in place, and mark as empty.

8. Move the full cylinder into place with a trolley or a similar mechanical device, if necessary, and secure the cylinder with a chain.

9. Slowly screw the pressure regulator to the new cylinder until it is hand-tight. Use a wrench to further tighten it a quarter of a turn.

10. Slowly open the supply valve on top of the new cylinder and inspect the reading on the pressure gauge, if available, to ensure that it increases. Check if leakage occurs and shut off the supply valve immediately if gas leakage is detected. Tighten the pressure regulator further, open the supply valve slowly and check for leakage.

11. Open the valve at the pipe T.

12. If necessary, reset the alarms and autodialer on the City panel subsequent to the replacement of compressed gas cylinders.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 67 of 84

CLEANING OF DEMISTER PAD IN KNOCK-OUT POT #3

This Safe Work Guideline provides specific guidance for cleaning of the demister pad in Knock-out Pot #3, which is in-line with the Maxim system. The City’s condensate knock-outs in-line with the City’s blowers do not have a demister pad.

This procedure does not allow entry into the knock-out pot or any other confined space.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Nitrogen purge gas 1 x 8.4 m3

Valve lock(s) and tag(s)



pressure gauge

Adjustable wrench

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12



Type Nitrile Splash Goggles

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone


• WorkSafe BC Occupational Health & Safety Regulation, Section 11, Fall Protection

• City of Vancouver – Working at Heights, Confined Space Entry Procedures

Cleaning of Demister Pad in Knock-Out Pot #3 Safe Work Procedure

Page 68 of 84

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Noise



Trips and falls

Many tripping hazards worse in poor weather conditions Grates and walkways A 3


Leachate and condensate are neutral pH, not corrosive or irritating. A 4

Overhead hazards Head bumps from low pipes Mark pipes A 4

Working at heights Falls, dropped equipment

Secure ladder, work at heights procedures. B 1

Confined space (if necessary) Hazardous atmosphere CSE procedures B 1 Heavy equipment and vehicles.






likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

1. Observe wind sock for wind direction. If there is no wind, defer this task to another time until there is wind, or use ventilation fans to blow contaminants away from workers. Plan to work from the upwind direction.


3. Continuously monitor the airspace within the work area during the work to verify that the airspace meets Vancouver Landfill requirements (see Background Information Table 1).

4. Check that the 50 mm diameter condensate knock-out drain valve (see Figure 10) is open and there is no liquid visible in the sight glass (see Figure 9). Close the 50 mm diameter condensate knock-out drain valve.


Page 69 of 84

5. Contact Maxim to request that the Maxim blowers be shut off and locked out and downstream

users are notified prior to shut-down.

6. Measure the pressure in Knock-out Pot #3. When the pressure is equalized (i.e., pressure is equal to atmospheric), shut off and lock out HV-901 and HV-902 (the 400 mm diameter hand valves upstream and downstream of Knock-out Pot #3, see Figure 10).

7. Shut off HV-900 (the main header valve on the 450 mm diameter header, see Figure 10).

8. Clear all personnel within 30 m downwind of the condensate knock-out while purging is being carried out. This may require traffic control, depending on wind direction.

9. Remove the cap from the 50 mm diameter port at the top of the condensate knock-out. Bring the cap to ground level after it is removed from the condensate knock-out so that it does not become an overhead hazard for the personnel working below.

10. Introduce at least 4 m3 of nitrogen into the condensate knock-out through the sample port between HV-901 and Knock-out No. 3 (see Figure 11).

11. Stop purging and leave the sample port open for 10 minutes. The downwind exclusion zone for the purge is no longer required.

12. After 10 minutes, sample the gas from the sample port valves adjacent to HV-901 (see Figure 11) and HV-902 (see Figure 12) using a LFG analyzer. If the concentration of methane is less than 0.5%, continue with the next step. If the concentration of methane is equal to or greater than 0.5%, the valves may not provide a sufficiently tight seal to LFG and this procedure should be reassessed.

13. Set up the ventilation fan with a hose at least 2 m from and upwind of the condensate knock-out. Switch on the ventilation fan and direct it at the 450 mm access port of Knock-out Pot #3 (see Figure 10).

14. Remove the 450 mm access port to Knock-out Pot #3, but do not stick your head or breathe the gas inside the condensate knock-out.

15. With the ventilation fan continuing to operate, place the ventilation fan hose into the 450 mm access port of Knock-out Pot #3 and leave the ventilation fan operating for five minutes. Allow the ventilation fan to continue operating while work is being carried out.

16. If entry into the condensate knock-out is required a Safe Work Procedure for that task must be developed to reflect confined space entry procedures, lock-out and isolation.

17. Clean the demister pad using only water. Do not stick your head into the condensate knock-out or use any flame or spark inside the condensate knock-out.

18. Close the access port, the 50 mm diameter port at the top of the condensate knock-out, and sample port valves.

19. Purge Knock-out Pot #3 of air using nitrogen. This involves opening of two sample ports at either end of Knock-out Pot #3 or connecting piping, introducing about 4 m3 of nitrogen into one


Page 70 of 84

sample port and allowing purged air to escape from the other sample port. Close sample ports when purge is complete.

20. Restore valves to normal operating position, notify Maxim that the Maxim system can be restarted.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 71 of 84

INSPECTION OF FLAME ARRESTOR

This Safe Work Guideline provides guidance for inspection of the flame arrestor in the Flare Station.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES


Nitrogen purge gas 3

x 8.4 m3

Cylinder regulators, hoses and

attachments

Replacement gaskets

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figure 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20



Type Leather Work

Personal Gas

Detector

Cell Phone Infra-

red


• City of Vancouver VLF/VSTS Safe Work Procedure, Lockout Procedure

• WorkSafe BC Occupational Health & Safety Regulation, Part 10: De-energization and Lockout

Servicing of Flame Arrestor Safe Work Procedure

Page 72 of 84

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls


Hot surfaces

Burns from contact with hot surface from flare operations

Wait for equipment to cool before service A 3

Noise

Certain areas of Flare Station have noise levels above 80 Db


Compressed gas

Accidental release due to broken valve, freezing of regulator.

Gas is non toxic, but is oxygen deficient, gloves to protect from freezing. C 4




likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

1. Observe the wind sock for wind direction and ensure two gates are open for emergency egress. If there is no wind, a ventilation fan should be available to blow contaminants away from the work area.


Stop Gas Flow to Flares and Cool

3. Place the City’s Flare Select switch on the Maxim Process Overview screen on the computer located in the trailer to “NONE” from “1”, “2”, or “BOTH” to stop the gas flow to the flares.

4. Close Inlet Valves for Connection to LFG Collection System and Maxim

5. Close and lock out HV-800 of Knock-out Pot #1 (see Figure 14), HV-800 of Knock-out Pot #2 (see Figure 13),

6. Close and lock out the hand valve on the Maxim 50 mm diameter feed line (near Maxim monitoring instruments, see Figure 5).

7. Close the Hand Valve upstream of the Rotork valve (see Figure 18).


Page 73 of 84

8. Close and lock out HV-990 (Maxim’s 200 mm diameter hand valve, see Figure 18).

Purge Header and Flares

9. Open hand valves HV-806 (downstream of City’s blowers, see Figure 17), HV-804 (upstream of flame arrestor, see Figure 20), and actuated valves FCV-600 and FCV-700 (Figure 20).

10. Connect a regulator on each of two compressed nitrogen cylinders to the sample ports in the HDPE pipes immediately downstream of the City’s Blower #1 (PI-602-BVA-1, see Figure 17) and Blower #2 (PI-702-BVA-1, see Figure 17). Open the sample port valves and introduce nitrogen into the pipes almost simultaneously at a gradual and controlled rate until both nitrogen cylinders are empty. Do not allow personnel within 5 m downwind of the flares during the purging.

11. Sample the gas from the sample port at PI-605 and PI-705 (between HV-804 and the actuated valves FCV-600 and FCV-700, see Figure 20) using a Landfill gas analyzer. If the methane and oxygen content of the gas is less than 0.2% by volume, proceed to the next step. If the methane and oxygen content of the gas is not less than 0.2% by volume, open HV-804 to the flare that has excess methane and oxygen, and continue purging with nitrogen until the methane and oxygen content of the gas at the sample port is less than 0.2% by volume. HV-804 should then be closed.

12. Close HV-806 downstream of Blower #2, disconnect the nitrogen cylinder and close the sample port valve PI-702-BVA-1 downstream of Blower #2 (see Figure 17).

13. Close and lock out the two HV-804 valves (see Figure 20).

14. Close actuated valves FCV-600 and FCV-700 (see Figure 20).

Isolation and Electrical Lock Out

Shut off and lock out the power to the City’s blowers. To complete the electrical lock-out for the flares:

15. Place the City’s Inlet Valve Selector switch on City’s control panel (see Figure 7) to “OFF” from “AUTO”.

16. Disconnect and lock out the main breaker located on the Flare Skid on the South side of the City Panel (see Figure 7).

17. Open the labcock adjacent to the City’s flow meter (see Figure 19) and attach a pressure gauge. Monitor the pressure gauge and if a pressure 10% greater than atmospheric pressure is observed check the position of all valves to ensure they are locked out.

18. At this point the flame arrestor is locked out and isolated and can be inspected or serviced.


Page 74 of 84

Reconnection Procedure

19. When the work is complete, close all sample ports and labcocks.

20. Re-energize the LFG and electrical power supply systems:

a. Unlock and open the manual LFG valves and the LFG inlet valves to their previous settings.

b. Re-connect the flexible lines on the nitrogen and propane gas cylinders, and open the gas cylinder bottle valves and control valves.

c. Place the City’s Inlet Valve Selector switch to “AUTO” from “OFF” on the City panel.

d. Unlock and re-connect the electrical power to the City’s blowers.

e. Select flares as appropriate on the Maxim Process screen and monitor flare start-up.

21. If no other work is scheduled or in progress, follow the “Vancouver Landfill Gas Conditioning Restart” procedure to restart the Maxim gas conditioning equipment and plant, if required.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

Page 75 of 84

FLARE LOCKOUT AND ISOLATION FOR ENTRY

This Safe Work Procedure provides guidance for locking out and de-energizing machinery and equipment for one or both flares at the Vancouver Landfill. This procedure is for lockout and isolation only, not entry into the flare stack. This procedure is intended to allow presence of Landfill Gas in the header pipe and operation of the Maxim system but does NOT permit operation of a flare during entry to the other flare.

EQUIPMENT RESOURCES


Nitrogen purge gas 3 x 8.4 m3

Carbon dioxide

1 x 20 lb OR compressed

air

12 Lock-out lock(s) and 14 tag(s) +

Group lock if 2 or more workers on

same machine.



pressure gauge

1 blind and gasket to replace

valve HV804 for each

flare to be isolated

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 5 through 20



Type Personal

Gas Detector

Cell Phone

IR Temp


• WorkSafe BC Occupational Health & Safety Regulation, Part 10: De-energization and Lockout

• City of Vancouver Confined Space Entry Permit (2 maximum)

• City of Vancouver Confined Space Identification and Hazard Assessment #617

Flare Lockout and Isolation for Entry Safe Work Procedure

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CONTACTS

• Delta Fire and Rescue Services Rick Lehbower, Deputy Chief, 604.952.3102 – notify of confined space work before work is started

HAZARDS

Hazard Hazard Event


Trips and falls


Hot surfaces

Burns from contact with hot surface from flare operations

Wait for equipment to cool before service A 3

Noise



Overhead hazards Head bumps from low pipes Mark pipes A 4

Moving parts

Clothing or body parts caught in moving equipment

No loose clothing, guards in place C 2

Compressed gas Accidental release due to broken valve

Gas is non toxic, but is oxygen deficient C 4




likely

1 is most

severe

PROCEDURE

The flare stack normally has a high hazard atmosphere. However, following the completion of the lock-out, isolation, purge and ventilation procedure identified below, the flare stack will have a low hazard atmosphere. The flare stack is a permit-required confined space for which a Confined Space Entry Permit is Required. Do not commence work until the Confined Space Entry Permit has been received.

1. Observe the wind sock for wind direction and ensure two access gates are open for emergency egress. Use the wind direction to plan an upwind escape route.


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2. Ensure that your Personal Gas Detector is operational, located to monitor your breathing zone,

and placed so that you can hear or see the alarm.

Stop Gas Flow to Flares and Cool

3. Place the City’s Flare Select switch on the Maxim Process Overview screen on the computer located in the trailer to “NONE” from “1”, “2”, or “BOTH” to stop the gas flow to the flares.

Close Inlet Valves for Connection to LFG Collection System and Maxim

4. Close and lock out HV-800 of Knock-out Pot #1 (see Figure 14), HV-800 of Knock-out Pot #2 (see Figure 13),

5. Close and lock out the hand valve on Maxim 50 mm diameter feed line (near Maxim monitoring instruments).

6. Close the hand valve upstream of the Rotork valve (see Figure 18).

7. Close and lock out HV-990 (Maxim’s 200 mm diameter hand valve, see Figure 18).

Purge Propane Gas Lines

8. Shut off each of the two propane gas cylinders stored to the east of the City’s control panel that supply propane to the pilots of the flares (see Figure 5), close the 2 BV-100 HVs downstream of the flexible line and disconnect the flexible lines. Label the flexible lines with the text “Confined space entry in progress – do not use”, with the LFG technician name, and date and time of removal. Only the LFG technician may remove this tag and reconnect the propane tank.

9. Close the HV for the propane line located immediately upstream of PI 110 and PI 120 and lock out each valve.

10. Open PI-110-BVA-1 at PI-110 of Flare #1 (see Figure 16), connect a nitrogen or carbon dioxide cylinder with a regulator to the sampling port and purge the propane supply line. Open the regulator slowly until the flow of compressed gas makes a slightly audible noise, count 10 seconds, then shut off the gas cylinder. Close PI-110-BVA-1 and remove the gas cylinder.

11. If Flare #2 will also be isolated open PI-120-BVA-1 at of Flare #2 (see Figure 16), connect a nitrogen or carbon dioxide cylinder with a regulator to the sampling port and purge the propane supply line. Open the regulator slowly until the flow of compressed gas makes a slightly audible noise, count 10 seconds, then shut off the gas cylinder. Close PI-120-BVA-1 and remove the gas cylinder.

Purge Header and Flares

12. Open hand valves HV-806 (downstream of City’s blowers, see Figure 17), HV-804, and actuated valves FCV-600 and FCV-700 (upstream of flame arrestor, see Figure 20).


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13. Connect a regulator on each of two compressed nitrogen cylinders to the sample ports in the

HDPE pipes immediately downstream of the City’s Blower #1 (PI-602-BVA-1, see Figure 17) and Blower #2 (PI-702-BVA-1, see Figure 17). Open the sample port valves and introduce nitrogen into the pipes almost simultaneously at a gradual and controlled rate until both nitrogen cylinders are empty. Do not allow personnel within 5 m downwind of the flares during the purging.

14. Close HV-806 downstream of Blower #2, disconnect the nitrogen cylinder and close the sample port valve PI-702-BVA-1 downstream of Blower #2 (see Figure 17).

15. Close and lock out the two HV-804 valves (see Figure 20).

16. Sample the gas from the sample port at PI-605 and PI-705 (between HV-804 and the actuated valves FCV-600 and FCV-700, see Figure 20) using a Landfill gas analyzer. If the methane and oxygen content of the gas is not less than 0.2% by volume, return to Step 13 and repeat purge cycle.

17. If the methane and oxygen content of the gas is less than 0.2% by volume, proceed to the next step.

Purge Sweep of Flare Header Ring

18. Test interior flare surface temperature with the infra-red thermometer. If the interior flare temperature is less than 35°C, proceed to the next step.

19. Without entering the flare stack and standing upwind, attach the Landfill Gas Analyzer sample hose to a 1.2 m long stick and sample the exhaust from the flare nozzle of Flare #1 that is furthest from the flame arrestor (see Figure 20). Leaving HV-804 closed and ensuring that FCV-600 is open, introduce compressed air from a compressor or carbon dioxide from a compressed carbon dioxide cylinder through the bleed valve near PI 605 of Flare #1 (Figure 20). When the Landfill gas analyzer sampling gas at the flare nozzle tip indicates normal air concentrations if using compressed air or elevated carbon dioxide concentrations (>10% by volume) and the methane content is less than 0.1% by volume, discontinue purging and close the bleed valve.

20. Repeat Step 18 for Flare #2 (see Figure 20).

21. Close actuated valves FCV-600 and FCV-700.

Isolation and Electrical Lock Out

22. Shut off and lock out the power to the City’s blowers. To complete the electrical lock-out for the flares:

23. Place the City’s Inlet Valve Selector switch on City’s control panel (see Figure 7) to “OFF” from “AUTO”.


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24. Disconnect and lock out the main breaker located on the Flare Skid on the South side of the City

Panel (see Figure 7).

25. Unbolt the flange on HV 804, the manual valve upstream of the flame arrestor (see Figure 20) and insert a manufacturer-supplied and certified blind and gasket or a steel blind of minimum 1 mm (0.039 inch) thickness with a gasket in accordance with WorkSafe BC requirements.

26. Open the labcock adjacent to the City’s flow meter (see Figure 19) and attach a pressure gauge. Monitor the pressure gauge and if a pressure 10% greater than atmospheric pressure is observed check the position of all valves to ensure they are locked out.

27. Test the surface temperatures of both louvers of the flare with the infra-red thermometer. If the louver surface temperatures are less than 35°C, remove one or both louvers, as required.

28. At this point the flare is locked out and isolated and flare entry can be conducted subject to confined space entry procedures.

Reconnection Procedure

29. When the flare work is complete, close all sample ports and labcocks.

30. Remove the blind and reconnect HV804.

31. Re-energize the LFG and electrical power supply systems:

a. Unlock and open the manual LFG valves and the LFG inlet valves to their previous settings.

b. Re-connect the flexible lines on the nitrogen and propane gas cylinders, and open the gas cylinder bottle valves and control valves.

c. Place the City’s Inlet Valve Selector switches to “AUTO” from “OFF” on the City panel.

d. Unlock and re-connect the electrical power to the City’s blowers.

e. Select flares as appropriate on the Maxim Process screen and monitor flare start-up.

END OF PROCEDURE


SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

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WORK PROCEDURE HAZARD ASSESSMENT

This Safe Work Procedure outlines a method to review the hazards of new work and prepare a Safe Work Procedure.

FIGURE REFERENCE

Figures 1 – 20

TEMPLATES

• SWP Template (Word Document)

• LFG Hazard Assessment (Excel Spreadsheet)

REFERENCES

• WorkSafe BC Occupational Health & Safety Regulation www.worksafebc.com

• Operation and Maintenance Manual for Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System, CH2MHill.

• Operating Principles of Landfill Gas Management, Golder Associates Ltd.

• City of Vancouver Safe Work Procedures

• Vancouver Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedure, Background Information

HAZARDS

The Safe Work Procedure, “SAFE WORK ON THE VANCOUVER LANDFILL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION” provides details on hazards, PPE and other general information that is critical to assessment of hazards and assurance of safe work conditions at the Landfill. This information is required to commence a Hazard Assessment.

HAZARD ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

Before commencing work on a task that does not have a Safe Work Procedure or, where a SWP exists but the planned work will vary from the SWP, conduct a hazard assessment. The following procedure provides a method of reviewing the hazards and ranking them to assist in developing work procedures to protect the safety of workers, customers, and the general public.

Work Procedure Hazard Assessment Safe Work Procedure

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Develop a Clear Vision of What the Work Will Involve

1. Understand and document the goal of the work.

2. Note the equipment, tools, personnel, environment, weather, and any other work conditions that may affect the work – not just from the perspective of safety, but also from the perspective of performance. Identify options for performing particular tasks.

Identify the Hazards

3. What equipment, tools, personnel, environment, and hazards exist?

4. What could go wrong?

5. If something does go wrong, what are the possible outcomes, e.g. risk to personnel, equipment, environment?

6. What could change? What happens if we have too much or not enough of anything (e.g., more oxygen than normal or no oxygen)?

7. Will any work activities potentially interfere with each other?

8. List the hazards on an Excel spreadsheet.

9. There may be multiple possible hazards; however, typically there are a few that are most severe and most likely. For this level of assessment, consider the most likely method that a risk could be generated.


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ASSESS THE RISKS

Use the probability and severity chart to develop a hazard level for the risks.

Health and Safety Program Risk Matrix

Probability Scale Key Words Typical Frequency Expectation

A Likely to occur Once per month B Probable over time Once per year C Possible over time Once per 10 years D Remotely possible Greater than once per 40 years

Severity Rank Injury Odour Cost Range

1 Fatality Shut Down > 1 week; off-site odour $300K +

2 Lost time injury Shut Down 2 days to 1 week; potential off-site odour $100K to $300K

3 Reportable injury Shut Down 1 to 2 days; local odours only $30K to $100K

4 Minor injury Shut Down < 1 day; no odour <$30K Severity considers a range of conditions for employees, the public, other affected parties and costs. There is no assumed equivalence between aspects with the same severity; they reflect relative severity within the set of conditions.


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RISK CONTROL

1. For high severity or probability risks (usually taken as probability:severity rankings above the diagonal line in the matrix graphic; red and orange squares plus the yellow squares on the line can go either way, depending on the circumstances), a Safe Work Procedure is required to address the risks.

2. Consider if assistance is needed to develop appropriate SWPs – occupational or industrial hygienists, safety professionals, engineers, or other expertise.

3. Consider what tools, equipment, safety monitoring supplies, or other resources are needed to safely complete the work.

4. There are three types of risk control to consider and are provided in order of preference:

a. Engineering Controls (elimination, substitution, guards, automatic shutdown devices, ventilation, etc.)

b. Administrative Controls (permits, procedures, communications, training, alter the timing or location, etc.)

c. Personal Protective Equipment (fall protection, hard hats, respirators, goggles, etc.).

DEVELOP A SAFE WORK PROCEDURE

1. Either copy an existing safe work procedure and edit it to reflect the work to be conducted or use the Microsoft Word document SWP Template LFG System.

2. Safe work procedures should be detailed enough to make the order of the procedures clear and identify the expected successful outcome before advancing to the next step.

3. The draft SWP should be reviewed by the Manager or designate to ensure it is consistent with CoV policies. The Manager will determine whether the SWP should be reviewed by the Health & Safety Manager and/or the Joint Health and Safety Committee.

CONDUCT WORK AND RE-ASSESS

1. Be prepared to stop and re-evaluate the procedures and controls during the work if the conditions change or the procedures are not having the desired effect. For example, re-evaluate if the situation is not safe, there are new risks or hazards, or there are complications or changed tasks that change the nature of the work or the applicability of the Safe Work Procedure.

END OF PROCEDURE

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Documents

VANCOUVER LANDFILL GAS CONTROL SYSTEM SAFE WORK … Landfill Gas Control System Safe Work Procedures Background Information Page 7 of 84 In addition to those in the field, various