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Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan,Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones,

Alessandro R. Ungaro

THE ROLE OF ITALIANFIGHTER AIRCRAFT INCRISIS MANAGEMENTOPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS

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V. Camporini, T. D

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. Nones, A.R. U

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The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of inter-national politics and international relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.

A non-pro�t organization, IAI was founded in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli, its �rst director.The Institute aims to promote understanding of international politics through research, promotion of political ideas and strategies, disse-mination of knowledge and education in the �eld of foreign policy.IAI main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationa-lisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East; defence economy and policy; and transatlantic relations.

Italian combat aircraft have played an increasing important role in the international missions in which Italy has participated in the post-Cold War era – from the First Gulf War to Libya, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan. This participation has been a signi�cant tool of Italy's defense policy, and therefore of its foreign policy towards crisis areas relevant to its national interests (from the Western Balkans to the Mediterranean), as well as towards its most important allies within NATO and the EU. This IAI publication analyses the role of these military capabilities in recent operations and their prospects for the future. In fact, a number of trends can be inferred from the operational experience in ten international missions, in which Italy deployed more than 100 combat aircraft in more than 13,000 sorties, clocking up 36,000 �ight hours. These trends are considered in light of the recent developments in the doctrine of Air Power, as well as possible future scenarios for the use of combat aircraft in crisis theaters. The aim of the analysis is to understand the needs of the Italian Armed Forces – the Air Force and Navy in particular – which will have to replace a substantial portion of their current combat �eets in the near future due to the gradual obsolescence of the aircraft in service – an operational necessity linked to the inevitable political decisions regarding the options available in the �eld of military procurement for maintaining the capabilities required so far for international missions. In this context, the study looks into the acquisition of F-35 aircraft, also considering the industrial aspects of a multinational program that will produce more than 3,000 units for over 12 countries.

Vincenzo Camporini is Vice President of IAITommaso De Zan was intern in the Security and Defence Programme at IAIAlessandro Marrone is Researcher in the Security and Defence Programme at IAIMichele Nones is Head of the Security and Defence Programme at IAIAlessandro R. Ungaro is Research Assistant in the Security and Defence Programme at IAI

IAI Research Papers

N. 1 European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones, 2011

N. 2 Democracy in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, edited by Ra�aello Matarazzo, 2011

N. 3 The Challenges of State Sustainability in the Mediterranean, edited by Silvia Colombo and Nathalie Tocci, 2011

N. 4 Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprisings, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Miguel Haubrich-Seco, 2012

N. 5 The transformation of the armed forces: the Forza NEC program, edited by Michele Nones and Alessandro Marrone, 2012

N. 6 Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, edited by Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2012

N. 7 Stop Mass Atrocities, edited by Luis Peral and Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2013

N. 8 The Uneasy Balance, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Andrea Dessì, 2013

N. 9 Global Turkey in Europe, Edited by Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Anne Duncker, Daniela Huber, E. Fuat Keyman and Nathalie Tocci, 2013

N. 10 Italy and Saudi Arabia confronting the challenges of the XXI century, edited by Silvia Colombo, 2013

N. 11 The Italian Civil Security System, Federica Di Camillo, Alessandro Marrone, Stefano Silvestri, Paola Tessari, Alessandro R. Ungaro, 2014

N. 12 Transatlantic Security from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2014

N. 13 Global Turkey in Europe II, edited by Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Daniela Huber, Meltem Müftüler-Baç, E. Fuat Keyman, Jan Tasci and Nathalie Tocci, 2014

N. 14 Bridging the Gulf: EU - GCC Relations at a Crossroads, edited by Silvia Colombo, 2014

N. 15 Imagining Europe, edited by Nathalie Tocci, 2014

N. 16 The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations: Trends and Needs, Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan, Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones, Alessandro R. Ungaro, 2014

ISSN 2239-2122

9788868123291_148_FM_2

S E G U I C I S U I S O C I A L N E T W O R K

12.40 EURO

IAI Research Papers

The Role of Italian Fighter Aircraft in Crisis Management Operations:

Trends and Needs

Vincenzo Camporini, Tommaso De Zan, Alessandro Marrone, Michele Nones, Alessandro R. Ungaro

Edizioni Nuova Cultura

SeriesEditorNatalinoRonzitti _________________________ First published in March 2014 by Edizioni Nuova Cultura For Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Via Angelo Brunetti 9 - I-00186 Roma www.iai.it Copyright©2014EdizioniNuovaCultura‐RomaISBN:9788868123291Cover:byFrancescaMinnocciGraphicComposition:byLucaMozzicarelli Theunauthorizedreproductionofthisbook,evenpartial,carriedoutbyanymeans,includingphotocopying,evenforinternalordidacticuse,isprohibitedbycopyright.

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Table of Contents

ExecutiveSummary........................................................................................................................9Preface...............................................................................................................................................23ListofAcronyms.............................................................................................................................271. Italy’sparticipationincrisismanagementoperations:fighteraircraft’s

role................................................................................................................................................31

1.1. Iraq(1990‐1991)........................................................................................................311.2. Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 .......................................................................351.3. Kosovo(1999)..............................................................................................................421.4. Afghanistan(2001‐2014)........................................................................................471.5. Libya(2011)..................................................................................................................531.6. TheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincrisismanagementopera‐

tions...................................................................................................................................592. Currentandfutureairoperations:doctrineandtrends......................................65

2.1. AirPower:doctrine’sfundamentals...................................................................652.2. Trendsfromtherecentoperationalexperience............................................69

3. Scenariosofpossiblefutureairoperations...............................................................73

3.1. Establishing and enforcing a No‐Fly Zone: “Protect Turians”scenario............................................................................................................................74

3.1.1Strategiccontext...............................................................................................74 3.1.2Missionobjectives............................................................................................75 3.1.3Criticalfactorsoftheoperationalenvironment.................................76 3.1.4Adversary’scapabilitiesandCourseofAction....................................76 3.1.5 Air Component’s Course of Action and required capabi‐

lities........................................................................................................................773.2. Air support to land‐basedoperation: “Stability inBanon” sce‐

nario..................................................................................................................................80 3.2.1Strategiccontext...............................................................................................80 3.2.2Missionobjectives............................................................................................81

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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3.2.3Criticalfactorsoftheoperationalenvironment.................................82 3.2.4Adversary’scapabilitiesandCourseofAction....................................83 3.2.5 Air Component’s Course of Action and required capabi‐

lities........................................................................................................................83 4. ThemilitaryneedsofItalianArmedForcesandtheF‐35programme.............87

4.1. Firstkeyquestion:doesItalianparticipationincrisismanage‐mentoperationsservenationalinterests?........................................................88

4.2. Second key question: what kind of air capabilities does Italyneedtoparticipateincrisismanagementoperations?..............................95

4.3. Thirdkeyquestion:whatprocurementoptionsareavailabletoacquirethiskindofaircapabilities?..................................................................101

4.4. Forthkeyquestion:itisbettertobuyF‐35“off‐the‐shelf”ortoparticipateinthemultinationalprocurementprogramme?................110

5. TheF‐35programmeandItaly:theindustrialperspective.................................115

5.1. Thebestvalueformoneyapproach.................................................................1155.2. TheItalianparticipationintheprocurementprogramme....................121

Conclusions..................................................................................................................................129Bibliography.................................................................................................................................131AnnexI.Listofinterviews......................................................................................................145

TablesandFiguresFigure1.ItalianAirForceactivitiesininternationalmissions.............................13Figure 2. Participation of Italian fighter aircraft in international mis‐sions:achronology................................................................................................63Table1.Internationalmissions 1990‐2013 :anoverview.....................................61Table2.Italiancontributiontointernationalmissions 1990‐2013 ..................62Table3.F‐35’sacquisitionplans.........................................................................................116

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Theresearchteamwouldliketothankseveralpeoplefortheircontribu‐tion to thisResearchPaper: theGen. StefanoCont CapoUfficioper laPoliticaMilitare,MinisterodellaDifesa forthefruitfulandconstructiveexchangeofviewsonthecontentofthisstudy;theGen.RobertoNordioComandanteComandoOperazioniAeree,PoggioRenatico andtheCol.StefanoGensiniandLeut.Col.FabrizioPiermarioli,aswellastheentireSezioneStatisticaoftheStatoMaggioreAreonautica,fortheirextremelyusefulsupportonfindingdataonItalianAirForce’scapabilitiesincrisismanagementoperations; theGen.LucioBianchi CapodelCentroPoli‐funzionaleVelivoliAerotattici,Cameri , forthevaluableopportunitytovisittheCameribaseanddiscussaboutitsfutureperspectives,andtheEng.Stranda AleniaAermacchi forkindlyguidingusinsidethefacility.Aspecialthanksgoestothepeopleinterviewedforthisresearch,whosefrank, interestingandwell‐informedthoughtshave fed theelaborationof this study.A listof interviewswitha shortbiographyof each inter‐viewedpersonis includedintheAnnexIof thisResearchPaper.Obvi‐ously, the authors bear the entire and exclusive responsibility for thecontentof thisstudy.Thisresearchhasbeencarriedoutwith thesup‐portofLockheedMartin.

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Executive Summary

ThisResearchPaperconsiderstheroleofItalianfighteraircraftinmis‐sions abroad in the post‐Cold War period, the current Air Power’strends and doctrinal evolution, aswell as possible future scenarios ofcrisismanagementoperationsinthe“EnlargedMediterranean”envisag‐ingtheuseoffighteraircraft.Onthebasisofsuchanalysis,theneedsofItalianmilitaryconcerningfighteraircraftareoutlined,andthepossibleprocurementoptionstosatisfythemarediscussed.Thelastchapterad‐dresses the Italian participation in the F‐35 procurement programmeanditsindustrialaspects.

ThefirstchapterisaimedtooutlinetheroleofItalianfighteraircraftincrisismanagementoperationsthatoccurredinthelast24years.Sev‐eralmissions abroadhavebeen considered: theFirstGulfWar in Iraq1991 , the NATO operations in Bosnia‐Herzegovina 1993‐1998 , inSerbiaandKosovo 1999 andAfghanistan 2001‐2014 ,aswellasthemultinational air campaign inLibya in2011,which cameunderNATOcommandafterthefirstphase.

IntheFirstGulfWar,underaUNmandate,theUSleda“coalitionofthewilling” including35 countries to conductOperationDesert StormaimedatfreeingKuwaitterritoryoccupiedbyIraq.Thebulkofairsor‐ties was flown by the US 89,1% , while a non‐marginal contributionwasprovidedbytheUK,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,FranceandItaly.Inpar‐ticular, Italy deployed 8 Tornadowhich flew 2,326 sorties during the40‐day long air campaign. The military operation ended when IraqwithdrewitsforcesfromKuwaitandacceptedtheceasefireconditions.

Between1993and1998,underUNmandate,NATOundertooksev‐eraloperationstodealwiththecivilwarinYugoslaviaandparticularlyin Bosnia‐Herzegovina. They included: Operation Sharp Guard in sup‐

THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS

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portofmaritimeembargotocombatants 1993‐1996 ;OperationDenyFlight aimed to enforce aNo‐FlyZone NFZ overBosnia‐Herzegovina1993‐1995 ;OperationDeliberate Force to protectUN‐declared “safeareas”bytargetingBosnianSerbmilitarycapabilities 1995 ;OperationJoint Endeavour 1995‐1996 a peace‐keeping ground mission withconsiderableairsupportincludingfighteraircraft;finallyOperationDe‐liberateGuardtosupportOperationJointGuard 1996‐1998 .Italycon‐tributedtoallmissionsbydeployingTornado,AMXandAV‐8B,conduct‐ing5,023sortiesandflyingfor11,973hours.Italyalsoprovidedthemil‐itarybasesandthelogisticssupportindispensabletoconducttheseop‐erations.ThesetofNATOcrisismanagementoperationswasinstrumen‐taltoforcethevariousYugoslavpartiestosigntheDaytonAgreementin1995,andtoenforceitinthefollowingyears.

OnMarch 1999 NATO undertook Operation Allied Force, aimed toputanendtothearmedrepressionofKosovarminoritiesconductedbytheSerbianmilitaryandparamilitaryforces.Theaircampaignlastedfor78dayswithintensebombingagainstSerbiantargets.Italycontributedwithapproximately50aircraft, includingF‐104,Tornado,AMX, reach‐ingup1,072sortiesand2,903hoursof flight.Overall, thequantitativeandqualitativeeffortof the Italian forceswashighlyregarded,as Italywas the third largest European contributor of aircraft and the fourthlargestEuropeanintermsofnumberofairsorties.Inparticular,Torna‐dowereutilizedforSuppressionofEnemyAirDefence SEAD tasks.AsalreadyhappenedfortheoperationsinBosnia‐Herzegovina,Italianmili‐tarybasesandlogisticssupportprovedtobeessentialtoconducttheaircampaign.TheoperationendedinJune1999withamilitaryagreementbetweenNATOandSerbiawhichenvisagedthecompletewithdrawalofSerbian forces fromKosovo.TheUNSecurityCouncilresolution1244/1999pavedthewayforthesubsequentNATOpeace‐keepingmissioninKosovo.

Since2001,theUnitedStatesstartedoperationEnduringFreedominAfghanistan, with the contribution of several European countries com‐prising Italy, toundermine terrorist activities fromgroups linked toAl‐Qaeda. Concerning the aerial component, the Italian contribution wasmainly effectuated by AV‐8B deployed on the Garibaldi aircraft carrierfrom 2002 to 2006,which carried on Intelligence, Surveillance andRe‐

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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connaissance ISR andCloseAirSupport CAS operations,amountingto328sortiesand860hoursof flight. In themeanwhileandstarting from2001, the International Security Assistance Force ISAF has been de‐ployedinAfghanistanunderaUNmandate, inordertoactivelysupporttheestablishmentofapeacefulandstableAfghanstatethatwillnotcol‐ludewithAlQaedaorotherterroristgroupsthreateningNATOmembers.InAugust2003,NATOtookoverthecommandofISAFandextendedtheareaofoperationtocovertheentirecountrywiththecontributionoffiftyNATOmembersandpartners. Italyhasparticipated to ISAFsince2002.ItalianGeneralMauroDelVecchiotookcommandofthewholeISAFoper‐ationbetween2005and2006.Sincetheestablishmentof ISAFRegionalCommandsin2006,ItalyhasmaintainedtheRegionalCommandWest.Asof February 2014, Italy had 2,165 units on the ground, ranking fourthamongcontributingnations.Concerningaircapabilities,in2007theJointAirTaskForcewasestablishedinKabulaspartoftheRegionalCommandWest.Asof31stDecember2013,thefighteraircraftdeployedbyItaly,in‐cludingTornado,AMXandAV‐8B,conductedatotalof3,301airsortiesintheatre,and8,477flighthours.MostsortiesconcernedISRactivities,butfighteraircraftwerealsousedforCAStogroundtroopsengagedwithin‐surgents.TheISAFmissionissettolastuntiltheendof2014,whenthetransition of security responsibilities to Afghan national security forcesandcivilianauthoritieswillbecompleted.

ThereasonsthatledsomeNATOcountriestoplanandconductapro‐longedaircampaigninLibyain2011arestillacontentiousissueandanobject of studies and analysis. InMarch 2011 theUN Security Councilresolution1973authorizedtheuseofforce,includingtheestablishmentof aNFZ toprotect civiliansandcivilianareas targetedby theGaddafiloyalistforces.On19MarchtheUS‐ledoperationOdysseyDawnstartedwithFrenchandBritishmilitarysupport.On31March,NATOformallyassumedcommandoftheOperationUnifiedProtector,whichlastedun‐til31October2011.Bothoperationsresulted intheestablishmentandenforcementofaNFZovertheentireLibyanterritory,aswellasintar‐getingofLibyangovernment’smilitaryandparamilitaryforces.Themil‐itaryoperationendedwiththecollapseoftheLibyangovernment,with‐out,nonetheless,any follow‐upNATOmission tosupport thestabiliza‐tionofthecountry.Italianmilitarycontributionwasthree‐fold.First,ina

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chronologicalorder,theItalianNavyledtheNATOnavaloperationtoen‐forcetheUNarmsembargo.Second,theuseofmilitarybasesintheItal‐ian territory was crucial to carry on operations, which could not havebeenpossiblewithoutsuchalargefootprintclosetotheoperationalthea‐tre.Third,andmostimportantlyforthefocusofthisstudy,Italianaircraftconductedabout7%ofthetotalalliedmissionsintheLibyanskies.ThebulkofcommittedItalianaircapabilitieswerefighteraircraftincludingF‐16,AMX,AV‐8B,EurofighterandTornado.Theseaircraftexecuteddiffer‐enttypesofmissions,suchasSEAD,DefensiveCounterAir DCA ,Offen‐siveCounterAir OCA ,StrikeCoordinationandReconnaissance SCAR and ISR activities. The Italian armed forces totalled 2,113 sorties flownand7,255 flighthoursduringoperations inLibya,being this the largestaircampaignItalianAirForcehasbeenengagedinsinceWorldWarII.

Considering the aforementioned 10 air operations,1 Italy has de‐ployeditsfighteraircraft90%underUNSecurityCouncilmandate,and80%underNATO’s chainof commandandcontrol.This insight showsnot only Italy’s deep integration and commitment to those organiza‐tions,butalsothestronginfluenceofaglobalizedinternationalsystemwhich requires the management of crises by the whole internationalcommunity. Moreover, Italy’s operational participation in missionsabroad envisaging the use of Air Power has grown in qualitative andquantitativetermsoverthelast24years.

Italy’s use of fighter aircraft in the post‐ColdWar period has gonehandinhandwithdevelopmentsoccurredinAirPower’sdoctrine.ThesecondchapterofthisResearchPaperoutlinesthedoctrinefundamen‐talsandtrendsstemmingfromtherecentoperationalexperience,withtheaimtounderstandcurrentandpossiblefuturewaystoutilizeairca‐pabilities,includingfighteraircraft.AirPowerisdefinedasthecapacityto project power in the air to influence people’s behaviour and thecourse of events. Coupled with increasingly capable technology, AirPowerisaflexible,rapid,24/7availabletooltoinfluencetheoperating

1DesertStorm,DenyFlight,SharpGuard,DeliberateForce,DecisiveEndeavour,De‐

liberateGuard,AlliedForce,EnduringFreedom,UnifiedProtector,andInternationalSe‐curityAssistanceForce ISAF .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Figure1.ItalianAirForceactivitiesininternationalmissions

environment.Asaresult,AirPowercanbeconsideredasaforcemulti‐plierfordeployedlandandmaritimemilitaryforces.

Overall, it ispossible to identify fourmainroles inwhichAirPowerfinds its concrete application: Control of the Air; Intelligence, Surveil‐lance,TargetAcquisition,Reconnaissance ISTAR ;Engagement;AirMo‐bility.Thefirstthreerolesareparticularlyrelevantinrelationstofighteraircraft.AchievingControlof theAirmeansbeing free tousea specificvolume of airspace in a given period of time for one’s own purposes,whiledenyingitsusetoothers,ifnecessary.Thankstotheacquisitionofinformation, ISTARactivities contribute toplanningactivitiesanddeci‐sionmakingduringallairoperations’phases. It improves theability togain and maintain information superiority, and aims to achieve Situa‐tionalAwareness,thatishavingafullcomprehensionoftheoperationalsituationintheatre.IntermsofEngagement,AirPowerroleincludesvar‐ioustypesofstrikemissions,withmaritimeandterrestrialtargets.

Inthiscontext,someimportanttrendsseemtoemergefromairop‐

THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS

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erationsconductedintheselatest24years.First,therecentoperationalexperience has raised awareness at the political‐strategic level thatcomplexairoperationsrequiretheavailabilityofallaircomponentstoperform the four Air Power’s roles, and that air capabilities aremoreandmoreintertwinedamongeachother.Second,ISTARisnotprovidedonlybydedicatedplatforms,suchastheRemotelyPilotedAircraftSys‐tems RPAS ,butby anumberof sensors and systemsembedded in awideandcomplementaryrangeofaircraft,includingfighter.Third,Con‐troloftheAirshouldnotbetakenforgranted:inLibya 2011 ,Kosovo1999 andIraq 1991 thepriorityofthefirstdaysofoperationswasstill to ensure coalition’s Control of the Air by destroying opponentcommandandcontrol structures,mostof itsairdefence fixedsystemsandcombataircraft.Fourth,withregardtoEngagement,theuseofPre‐cisionGuidedMunitions PGM hasexponentiallygrownfromtheFirstGulfWar to theLibyacampaign. In the future, theneed toattack indi‐vidual targets accurately will continue to be paramount, especially tolimitthenumberofcollateraldamagesinhighlypopulatedareas.

Building on the analysis of previous crisismanagement operations,as well as on trends and doctrinal evolutions of Air Power, the thirdchapterofthisResearchPaperpresentstwoscenarios,showinghowaircapabilities,inparticularfighteraircraft,maybeusedincrisismanage‐mentoperationsinthe2015‐2025timeframe.Inthefirstscenario,itisexposedhowairoperationsareundertaken to establishandenforceaNFZ,whilethesecondoutlineshowairoperationssupportlandopera‐tions.Eachscenariohasbeenredactedon thebasisof thesamestruc‐ture,which includesthe followingelements:StrategicContext;MissionObjectives;CriticalFactorsof theOperationalEnvironment;AdversaryCapabilities and Course of Actions; Air Component Course of ActionsandAssociatedCapabilities.

Despite thisResearchPaperdoesnotaddress the likelihoodof thesetwoscenarios,itisassumedthattheyareatleastpossibleexamplesofairoperationsEuropeancountriessuchasItalymay join inthefuture.Asamatter of fact, Italian fighter have been deployed in different contexts,that is inan interstatewar Gulf , incivilconflicts Bosnia‐Herzegovina,KosovoandLibya andinafailedstatewithsometypicalconnotationsofinsurgencyandcivilwar Afghanistan . Indeed,armedconflictswillstill

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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beafeatureoftheinternationalsecurityenvironmentinthemedium‐longterm,withconflictareasparticularlyconcentratedinAfrica,MiddleEastandEastandSouthAsia.Thephenomenonof“failedstates”willalsore‐mainonthesceneforlong,especiallyifthelevelofviolenceintheafore‐mentionedregionswillnotdecrease.Inthiscontext,itispossibletoimag‐inethe futureemploymentof fighteraircraft inthoseregions,either forcombatorstabilizationpurposes.AsonemightarguethatNATOwillnev‐ergo“thatoutofarea,”onemightreply thatprobablyat the endof theColdWarnonewouldhaveexpectedtoseeNATOrunningpeace‐keepingoperationsinKosovofirstandinAfghanistanlater,orcarryingonmilitaryinterventionsintheBalkansandinLibya.

Theanalysisofpastoperationalexperiences,AirPower’strendsandpossible futurescenariosofairoperationsposeanumberofkeyques‐tionsthatshouldbeaskedtoItalianpolicy‐makers,includingcivilianau‐thorities – in primis the Parliament and the Government – and thearmedforces.Therefore,thefourthchapterofthisResearchPaperaimstoaddresssuchquestions,todiscusstherelatedprocurement’sneedsoftheItalianmilitary,andfinallytoassesswhethertheF‐35procurementprogrammemightbeabletosatisfythoseneedsornot.

ThefirstkeyquestioniswhetherItalianparticipationincrisisman‐agementoperationstogetherwithEuropeanandNorthAmericanalliesdoesservenationalinterests.Thechangesoccurredintheinternationalcontextmakenational interestsaffectedbycrisis,risksandthreatsoc‐curringwellbeyondterritorialborders.Globalizationandeconomicin‐terdependencehaveobviouslyplayedafundamentalroleinthisregard.TheItalianparticipationincrisismanagementoperationsinthelast24yearshascontributeddirectlyor indirectlytoprotectandpromotena‐tional interests. For example, the stabilization of Bosnia‐Herzegovina,Kosovoand,generallyspeaking,theWesternBalkanswasaclear,directnationalinterest.Sincetheearly1990s,Italyhadsufferedboththeflowsofillegalimmigrantsfromtheseregionsandtheemergenceofillicittraf‐fics or the development of organized crime. For that reason, interna‐tional missions, including those conducted through Air Power, havebeeninstrumentaltopacifyandstabilizeageographicalareaextremelyclosetotheItaliansoilandlinkedtoItaly’seconomicsystem.

Italianparticipationinothermissionsabroadhasservednationalin‐

THE ROLE OF ITALIAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS: TRENDS AND NEEDS

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terests inamore indirectway.For instance, theactiveparticipation inNATOoperationsrepresentsaninvestmentinakindof“insurancepoli‐cy”forItaly’snationalsecurity.Italydoesnothavesufficientcapabilitiestoprotectaloneitssecurityinterests.Ineffect,theystretchwellbeyondnationalbordersand include: safe trade routes in the “EnlargedMedi‐terranean,”energysuppliesfromNorthAfrica,MiddleEastandCentralAsia,bordercontrolintheMediterraneaninrelationtoillegalimmigra‐tionandmaritimesecurity.Anactive,reliableandstableItalianpartici‐pationinallNATOmissionsisinstrumentaltogainthenecessarycredi‐bility topush theAlliance todealwith thepurposesof Italian interna‐tionalagenda.Furthermore,being thesecrisismanagementoperationssetupandledbyinternationalorganizations,itallowsItalytosharese‐curity risksandcosts, toextend its intervention’s range toprotectna‐tional interests, and to enhance inter‐allies solidarity. Finally, Italianparticipationinmissionsabroadisalsoamannertomaintainstrongre‐lationswithitsmainsecurityally,theUS.Beingsurroundedbyunstableregions–fromWesternBalkanstotheSouthernMediterraneanshores–andunableasa“middlepower”toshapetheeventsintheseregionsonits own, Italy has traditionally relied on “asymmetric alliances” withstronger partners such as the US to address common security con‐cerns. Italianparticipation in crisismanagementoperations foreseeingtheuseofAirPowerdoesnotguaranteepersétheprotectionofItaly’snationalinterests.Suchprotectiondepends,amongotherthings,bythecapacityoftheItaliangovernmenttomakethebestofthemilitarycon‐tributionprovidedvis‐à‐vistheallies.Inthisregard,Italy’sparticipationinmissionsabroad,whichalsoincludesairoperations,isafundamentalenablerforItaliandefenceandforeignpolicy.

IfitisassumedthatmaintainingthecapacitytoprojectAirPowerincrisis management operations does serve Italian defence and foreignpolicy,andultimatelyItaly’snationalinterests,thesecondkeyquestioniswhatkindofaircapabilitiesareneeded.Asamatteroffact,thefighteraircraftfleetusedsofarwillbephasedoutinthenextdecade.Thereisthusanunavoidableneedtoreplace253aircraftbelongingtothreedif‐ferentline‐ups,including18AV‐8BoftheNavy,136AMXand99Torna‐dooftheAirForce.Manyofthemhavebeenbuiltinthe1980s,oreveninthe1970s,andasfarastheirlife‐cyclereaches35/40years,theycan‐

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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not guarantee safety conditions to the aircrew anymore. Besides, oneshouldconsiderthat,althoughRPASarelikelytocomplementfutureairfleets, theywill not yet replacemanned fighter aircraft completely. Inthisregard,to identifyItalianfutureaircapabilities’needs,several les‐sonscanbelearnedfrommissionsconsideredinthisstudy.Firstofall,interoperabilityconstitutesacrucialrequirement,sinceItalianaircraft–bothfromtheAirForceandtheNavy–havealwaysoperatedwithinin‐ternationalcoalitions.Second,thecapacitytoconnectfighteraircrafttootherplatforms,fromunitsonthegroundtothecommandandcontrolcentresisfundamental:theaircraftshouldbe“net‐centric,”thatisbeingfullyabletogatheranddisseminate informationfromandtotheothernodesofthenet.Athirdcrucialneedistheradarlow‐observability alsocalled “stealthness” , as itgreatly reduces thechancesofanaircraft tobeshutdownbytheopponentairdefencesystem.Finally,thefactthatall considered crisismanagement operations have takenplace beyondnational territory makes “deployability” at strategic distance anotherfundamentalneedforaircapabilities.

If it is assumed that keeping the capacity to project Air Powerthrough crisismanagement operations does serve Italian defence andforeignpolicy,andultimately Italy’snational interests; if it isassumedthatcurrentItalianfighteraircraftfleetneedstobereplacedbyaircraftwhichshouldbeinteroperable,net‐centric,low‐observableanddeploy‐able;thenthenextkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersiswhatprocurementoptionsareavailabletoacquirethekindofaircapabilitiesneededbyIt‐aly.Intheory,afirstoptionistodevelopaEuropeanprocurementpro‐grammebringingtogetherthemainEuropeancountriesintermsofde‐fencecapabilities,namelyFrance,GermanyandtheUK,aimedtodevel‐opa5thgenerationfighteraircraft.Suchaninvestmentshouldhavebeendone inthemid‐1990s inordertodelivera fightercapabilityby2020.Yet,thishasnotoccurred,eitherbecauseEuropeancountriespreferredtoinvestinnationalprocurementprogrammes,likeFranceforinstance,orbecausetheypreferredtocutthedefencebudgetandsobenefitfromtheso‐called“peacedividends”,asGermanydid.Astodaythereisnopo‐liticalwillinEuropetoinvestinthiskindofprogramme,suchprocure‐mentoptionremainsoffthetablebecauseofthechoicesmadebymajorEuropeancountriesback in the1990s.A second theoreticaloption for

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Italy, in order to obtain needed air capabilities to replace old ones,wouldbetodevelopandbuildaground‐attackversionoftheEurofight‐er, the fighteraircraftdesignedbyGermany, Italy,SpainandtheUKinthe 1980s,with a full 5th generation strike capacity.Again, this optionshouldhavebeenundertakenatmaximumintheearly2000s, throughsignificantEuropeanjointinvestmentsinresearchanddevelopmentac‐tivities,aimingtomodifyanaircraftwhichwasnotoriginallydesignedtofulfilsuchaground‐attackrole.GiventhatmembersoftheEurofight‐erconsortiumwere andare notwillingtoundertakethispath,there‐forethisoptionisoffthetabletoo.

ThethirdandlastoptiontosatisfyItalianmilitaryneedsintermsofair capabilities is to acquire F‐35 aircraft. It has been estimated thatmorethan3,000F‐35unitswillbeprocured,2,443of themfor theUSarmed forces, and the rest for other 12 countries Australia, Canada,Denmark,Italy,Israel,Japan,theNetherlands,Norway,Singapore,SouthKorea,TurkeyandtheUK .Thiswillpermithighlevelofinteroperabil‐itytothosecountriestakingparttotheprocurementprogram.TheF‐35presentsall theadvanced features typicalof5th generation fighterair‐craft:itisequippedwithsensorsandcomputingcapacityfordatafusioninanet‐centricperspective; its lowobservability isensuredbyanum‐berofelements, includingitsairframe’sdesign,theconfigurationof itsinternalbayswhereweaponsarestoredandaspecifictypeofpainting.Moreover, theF‐35 internal bays avoid thatweapon’s systems locatedontheexternalsidewoulddamageaircraft’saerodynamic, itsspeedormanoeuvrability; in turn, this diminishes fuel consumption while fa‐vouring the aircraft range and deployability. The latter is greatly aug‐mentedbythepresenceofaspecificversionoftheF‐35 F‐35B capableofverticaltake‐offsandlandingfromaircraftcarriers,forinstancefromItalianCavourcarrier.ThisisparticularlyimportantforItalyinordertomaintainNavy’saircapabilities,sofarguaranteedbyAV‐8Baircraft.

If it isassumedthattheF‐35istheonlyavailableoptiontoprocurean interoperable, net‐centric, low‐observable and highly deployablefighter aircraft to satisfy Italy’s military needs to participate in crisismanagementoperations,thelastkeyquestionforpolicy‐makersregardshowtoacquirethisaircraft.Inprinciple,twowaysareavailable:eitherto participate in the procurement programme, or to buy F‐35 “off‐the‐

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shelf”thatisonthemarketplace.Fromamilitarypointofview,partici‐pating in the procurement programme generates several positive out‐comes.First,itbooststhe“operationalsovereignty”–thatisthepossibil‐ity to have platform, weapons’ system and ISTAR’s functions at yourcomplete disposal,without relying on third parties for technology, up‐dates, security of supply of various components – which is clearly re‐duced,ifnotdepleted,incaseof“off‐the‐shelf”acquisitions.Second,ital‐lows Italianpilots to start as soon aspossible their trainingwithpart‐ners’aircrews–particularlyUSones–thusenjoyingimmediatebenefitsintermsofinteroperability.Eventually,theconstructionoftheFinalAs‐sembly and Check Out FACO of Cameri, as part of the procurementprogramme,impliesthattheItalianMinistryofDefencewillnothavetospendmoretobuildanotherfacilitytomaintainandupgradethe90F‐35ItalyhascommitteditselftobuyfortheAirForceandtheNavy.Indeed,FACOisalreadysettobecometheMaintenanceRepairOverhaulandUp‐grade MRO&U centerforF‐35basedinEurope.Regardingthetimelineof F‐35’s acquisition and its related cost, Italy has chosen to wait thesixthtrancheofLowRateInitialProduction LRIP tobuyitsfirstaircraftat the costof around130milliondollar,way less in comparison to the230milliondollarofthefirstaircraftproduced.Thecostatthefullrateproductionisestimatedtodecreaseat85milliondollarperunit.

ThefifthandlastchapterofthisResearchPaperdiscussestheindus‐trialaspectsoftheF‐35multinationalcollaborationandtheItalianpartic‐ipation in the procurement programme. Italy participation in the F‐35programme began in 1998when the left‐wing government decided toinvest 10milliondollar in theConceptDemonstrationPhase. In 2002,theItalianright‐winggovernmentconfirmedthischoicebycommitting1,028 billion dollar in the System Design and Development Phase. In2007, the left‐wing government signed the bilateral Memorandum ofUnderstanding MoU withtheUSfortheProduction,Sustainment,andFollow‐onDevelopmentPhase,withaninvestmentof904milliondollar.In2009,theItalianParliamentapprovedtheacquisitionof131F‐35.Atthe same time, Italy decided to build the FACO/MRO&U facility atCameri.In2012,theItaliangovernmentreducedtheoverallfleetnum‐berofF‐35 from131to90 60F‐35Aand30F‐35B .Since Italy is in‐volvedintheF‐35programmeasLevel2partner,sharingroughly4%of

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the total cost, it has limited opportunities to influence aircraft’s re‐quirements.

The F‐35 entails a radical change of theway to envisage amultina‐tionalprocurementprogrammeinthedefencefield.Infact,itisbasedontheprincipleof“bestvalueformoney”,whichimpliesacertaindegreeofcompetitionamongsupplierstoofferthebestprice/qualityratiototheprimecontractor–LockheedMartin.ThisisquitenewconsideringItal‐ianindustry’spastexperienceinprogrammesbasedonthe“justeretourprinciple”,wherebycost‐sharedividedamongparticipatinggovernmentsmustequalthework‐shareamongnationalindustriescomposingthein‐dustrial consortium. Nevertheless, it has been considered necessary toapplythesetwoconcepts–competitionandbestvalueformoney–withcertainflexibilitytoavoidto“overstress”thesupplychain.Forinstance,LockheedMartinforeseesthepossibilityofsigningagreementswithtwodifferentsuppliersofagivenitem,as itdeemsstrategictohavingmorethan a single supply source – the so‐called “strategic second sources”method.ThisisthecaseoftheFinmeccanicacompanyAleniaAermacchithathasa“strategicsecondsource”statusfortheF‐35wings.

Themajority of supplier agreements with LockheedMartin have aone‐yearterm,astheUSgovernmentdecidesthenumberofF‐35tobepurchased year by year, influencing the production planning of theprime contractor. Such amanagement system seems tooverstress thesupplychainand itdoesnotencouragesub‐contractors toadopt long‐term investments plans, because it has to take on its own the risk tomakeinvestmentswithouttheassurancethatthevolumeofproductionwillbeguaranteed in thenextyears.Anothercritical issueregards thelackof Italian industries’participation indevelopmentand integrationphases, characterized by a greater use of high technologies. Obstaclesaremainly,butnotonly,duetoUSregulationsuchastheInternationalTrafficinArmsRegulation ITAR ,aswellastoAmericanNationalDis‐closurePolicy.

Around90 Italian companies are involved in the procurement pro‐gramme,andsofarthecontractsawardedtotheItalianindustrieshavereachedanoverallvalueof715milliondollar.Ofthisamount,565mil‐liondollararerelatedtotheFinmeccanicagroup,mainlythroughAleniaAermacchi,whichisresponsiblefortheconstructionofmorethan1,200

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wings.Theterm“wings”includesboththetwosemi‐wings–morethan2,400units–andthecentralcellof theaircraftholdingthemtogether,beingthis30%oftheentireairframewithsignificantengineeringchal‐lenges.ConcerningSmallandMediumEnterprises SMEs ,theyprovedtobeflexibleandadaptableinofferingthebestvalueformoneywithintheF‐35programme.However,theysufferedmorethanlargercontrac‐torstheone‐yearcontractsapproach,thispracticediscouragingthemtomakelong‐terminvestments.

Theprocurementprogrammepresentspotentialrevenuesaround10billiondollarforItalianindustries,butthiswilldependontheabilitytoexploit the infrastructurescreated– firstand foremost theCameriFA‐CO/MRO&U–tobuildcomponentsandtoprovidemaintenance,supportand upgrade, in particular regarding avionics and electronics. TheCamerisiteincludes:aFACOfacilitytoassembletheItalianF‐35AandF‐35B variants, the F‐35A procured by Netherlands, and potentially theaircraft to be procured by other European partners such as DenmarkandNorway; awing construction facilitywhich serves the entire pro‐curement programme; the aircraft test facility aimed at testing low‐observable performance, and the related final paint facility; buildingsaimedtosupportF‐35operatingby theUSandallies inEurope.Beingthe only FACO outside US territory, Cameri represents a fundamentalasset for the entire F‐35 global production and maintenance system.Maintenancewillalsointroducesignificanttechnologicaldevelopmentsandinnovationbecauseitwillgohandinhandwiththeplatform’sup‐gradeandrevisionthroughoutitswholelife‐cycleof30/40years.

Asawhole,theItalianparticipationintheprocurementprogrammepresentsprosandcons,opportunitiesandchallenges.Inotherpastpro‐grammes,basedonthejusteretourprinciple,negotiationslargelyendedwhentheagreementoncost‐shareandwork‐sharewasreached.Thisisnot the case of the F‐35 programme. The new procurement approachbasedonthebestvalueformoneyprinciplehasimposedontheItalianindustrytobecomemorecompetitiveandtotakemorerisksinmanag‐ing its own investments. It also requires the Italianmilitary and gov‐ernment to assist the industry in this regard, bymaking an additionaland constant effort in negotiatingwithUS counterparts on technologytransferandotherrelevantaspectsoftheprocurementprogramme.