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Anthony CollinsFirst published Mon Aug 25, 2003; substantive revision Mon May 20, 2013

Anthony Collins (16761729) was a wealthy English free-thinker, deistand materialist who in his later years became a country squire and localgovernment official in Essex. Along with John Toland, Collins was themost significant member of a close knit circle of radical free thinkers thatarose in England in the first three decades of the eighteenth century. Thisgroup included such men as Samuel Bold, Matthew Tindal, ThomasWoolston and William Wollaston.[1] He was a friend of John Locke inLocke's old age and Locke was one important formative influence on hisphilosophical views. In respect to his materialism and determinism Collinswas clearly influenced more by Hobbes, Bayle and possibly Spinoza thanhe was by Locke. The Latitudinarians may well have influenced his viewsabout free-thinking as well as Locke. Collins' works had some influence inEngland and much more on the continent during the 18th century.

Collins' central passion is the autonomy of reason particularly with respectto religion. Collins was strongly motivated by an aversion to religiouspersecution. Issues revolving around religious freedom are the threads thatrun through all of his writing. It is possible to divide Collins' works intothose that are mainly philosophical and those that are more narrowlyreligious, but they are clearly connected. His 17078 pamphletcontroversy with Samuel Clarke over whether matter can think andother topics, and his book about free will and determinism are chieflyengaged with philosophical topics. Even these topics, however, involvesuch religious issues as the immortality of the soul and punishment andreward in the next life. His writing about reason and free-thinking may beregarded as on the borderline between philosophy and religion. Althoughit deals with epistemological and sometimes metaphysical issues, itfocuses almost entirely on religious issues. His religious works are even

1

more narrowly focused. The Thirty nine Articles are the only officialconfessional statement of Anglicanism. Two of Collins' books deal withthe authenticity of Article 20 of the Thirty nine Articles and whether thechurch has the power to make doctrine. In large measure these representthe doctrines of free-thinking applied to the particular case of the AnglicanChurch. Collins also wrote a book examining the question of whether theprophecies of Christ's messiahship could be accepted. This seems to be arejection of Christianity as a revealed religion. How far Collins went in thedirection of atheism is still a matter of scholarly debate.

Collins was clearly a controversial figure in his time; nor has scholarlytreatment down the years done much better at being objective. As ErnestCampbell Mossner remarks: The Deists were long subjected to the odiumtheologicum and the historians of the movement have almost withoutexception downgraded or slandered them both socially as well asintellectually since the time of John Leland in the eighteenth century.(Mossner, 1967b, p. 335)

1. Life and Works1.1 Life1.2 Chief Works

2. The Collins Clarke Correspondence (170608)2.1 Background: Consciousness and Material Systems2.2 The Correspondence

2.2.1 Clarke's categories2.2.2 Real emergent properties2.2.3 Personal Identity

2.3 Evaluating the Collins Clarke Correspondence3. Determinism and Free Will

3.1 Background3.2. Determinism in Collins early works

3.3 A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, 1717

Anthony Collins

2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

4. Collins, Deism and Freethinking4.1 An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason, 17074.2 Analogical language4.3 A Discourse of Free Thinking, 17134.4 Interpreting A Discourse of Free Thinking

5. Collins and Religion6. Influences

6.1 In England6.2 On the continent

BibliographyBooksArticles

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1. Life and Works1.1 Life

Anthony Collins was born in Heston, Middlesex on June 21, 1676 into afamily of lawyers. He went to Eton and then King's College, Cambridge in1693. Though he had not graduated from Cambridge, Collins went to theMiddle Temple in 1694 to study law. He didn't like the law and was nevercalled to the Bar. In 1698 he married the daughter of a rich Londonmerchant, Sir Francis Child. She died in childbirth in 1703. At the time ofhis marriage he received some property in Essex from his father. Togetherwith his wife's dowry, this made him a very rich man indeed. Collins metJohn Locke on a visit to Oates in Essex in 1703, visited Locke five timesover the next 18 months and carried on a correspondence with him aboutvarious philosophical topics. In one of his letters to Collins Locke

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remarked: Believe it, my good friend, to love truth for truth's sake is theprincipal part of human perfection in this world, and the seed bed of allother virtues; and if I mistake not, you have as much of it as I have evermet with in anybody. Collins was a lifelong bibliophile with a largeprivate research library. In the article on Collins in Birch's Dictionary,Birch notes that his large and curious [library] was open to all men ofletters, to whom he readily communicated all the lights and assistance inhis power, and even furnished his antagonists with books to confutehimself, and directed them how to give their arguments all the force ofwhich they were capable (Birch, quoted in Berman, 1975). During thisperiod Collins also met Samuel Bold and John Toland. From 1703 until1706, after his wife's death, Collins spent the winters in London and thesummers at his fine summer mansion in Buckinghamshirewhere QueenAnne and her court visited him. In 1707 Collins began a pamphletcontroversy with Samuel Clarke, a prominent British philosopher andmember of Newton's inner circle, over the question of whether matter canthink. The controversy continued until 1708. In 1707 Collins alsopublished anonymously the Essay Concerning the Use of Reason inPropositions, the evidence whereof depends on human testimony. Duringthis period Collins frequented the London coffee shops where the deistsand free-thinkers met. Berkeley apparently met him at such a gathering in1713. In 1710 Collins made his first trip to the Continent, spending histime buying books in Holland and meeting John Churchill, first Duke ofMarlborough, and Prince Eugene. Back in England, Collins met severaltimes with Samuel Clarke and William Whiston at the house of LadyCalverly and Sir John Hubern for frequent but friendly debates about thetruth of the Bible and the Christian Religion (Whiston, quoted inO'Higgins, 1970. p. 77). In 1713 he published A Discourse ConcerningFree-Thinking. The Discourse was his most controversial work. He madea second trip to the continent about the time that the Discourse waspublished. Again he went to Holland and France and planned to go on to

Anthony Collins


Italy. The trip was cut short by the death of a close kinsman. In 1715Collins, in effect, took root in Essex, moving into Mowdon Hall. Collinsprobably owned a good 2000 acres in Essex, much of it prime agriculturalland. In 1717 he published A Philosophical Enquiry Concerning HumanLiberty in which he argues for a compatibilist form of determinism andrejects freedom of the will. Samuel Clarke reviewed the book, continuingthe argument that had begun during the Collins-Clarke correspondence of1707-08.

From 1717 on Collins spent most of his time in the country, but still had akeen interest in national politics at a distance, and local politics in person.Collins was a Whig and became a spokesman for the Whigs in thecountry. Collins took a serious role in the government of Essexservingas a justice, a commissioner for taxes, and then Treasurer of the County.He examined roads and bridges. He was involved in finding a place forhousing county records. As Treasurer he was a model of integrity. Inconsidering the relation between Collins, the County official and Collinsthe writer, O'Higgins notes that Collins was probably less tolerant towardsCatholics than other justices (ibid. pp. 1289). And Collins the writer isconsistently anti-Catholic. So, while one might hope that the use of reasonwould produce a higher degree of toleration towards all religious groupsthan one would expect to find among true believers, there seems to belittle conflict here between the writer and the jurist.

In December 1723 Collins' only son suddenly became ill and died. Hisfather was grief-stricken. Collins remarried in 1724 and he published whatis perhaps his most successful book, A Discourse on the Grounds andReasons of the Christian Religion as well as An Historical and CriticalEssay on the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England. From 1725until 1729 Collins' health began to deteriorate. Still, in 1726 he publishedThe Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered. In 1729 Collins published ADiscourse Concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing. He was suffering

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from gall stones and finally died of his disease on December 13, 1729. Hissecond wife Elisabeth and his two daughters survived him. He willed hisunpublished manuscripts to Pierre Desmaizeaux but Desmaizeaux took anoffer from Collins' widow to buy them. It appears that she then destroyedthem. Desmaizeaux quickly regretted his decision, but it was too late.

1.2 Chief Works

An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason, 1707Collins contributions to the Collins Clarke controversy:

A Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 1706A Reply to Mr. Clarke's Defence of His Letter to Mr. DodwellReflections on Mr. Clarke's Second Defence of His Letter to Mr.DodwellAn Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence of His Letter to Mr.Dodwell, 1708

Priestcraft In Perfection 1710A Vindication of the Divine Attributes, in some Remarks on HisGrace the Archbishop of Dublin's sermon intitled DivinePredestination Consistent with the Freedom of Man's Will, 1710A Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, 1717A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,1724An Historical and Critical Essay on the Thirty Nine Articles of theChurch of England, 1724The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered, 1726A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing, 1729

2. The Collins Clarke Correspondence (170708)2.1 Background: Consciousness and Material Systems

Anthony Collins


The chief topic of the Clarke Collins controversy of 170708 is whetherconsciousness can inhere in a material system, a highly controversial issueinspired by Locke's notorious speculation about thinking matter. In BookIV of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in stressing the limitsof human knowledge of substances, Locke writes: We have the Ideas ofMatter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whetherany mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by thecontemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation, to discover whetherOmnipotency has not given to some System of Matter fitly disposed, apower to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter sodisposed, a thinking immaterial Substance... (ibid., IV, iii, 6, pp. 5401).Locke then went on to conjecture that it might be just as easy for God toadd the power of thought to a system of matter organized in the right wayas for God to connect an immaterial thinking thing to a body (ibid.).Clearly, the difficulties in explaining how an immaterial mind could relateto a material body play a significant role in leading Locke to this position.This thinking matter passage raised a storm of protest and discussionthat lasted right through to the last years of the eighteenth century(Yolton, 1983 p. 17). Locke and Collins discussed some of the responsesto this passage that were published before Locke's death in 1704. Locke'sconjecture about thinking matter is, in effect, the centerpiece of the debatebetween Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins between 1707 and 1708,although the issue was also discussed on the continent.

2.2 The Correspondence

The correspondence between Clarke and Collins took its inspiration froma book published in 1706 by Henry Dodwell, putting forward the view onthe basis of various passages from the Bible that without divineintervention the soul would perish at death. Clarke wrote a publicrefutation of Dodwell's book. Besides rejecting Dodwell's interpretation ofscripture, Clarke gave an argument to show that consciousness could not

William Uzgalis


be a property of a material system since the most plausible reason, apartfrom appeals to scripture, for the soul being naturally mortal is that it ismaterial. Thus, without mentioning it, Clarke gave a refutation of Locke'sthinking matter hypothesis. Collins, writing to Dodwell concerningmatters about which they disagreed, noted that he would be happy to seeDodwell have the liberty to publish whatever he thinks fit (Dybikowskip. 188). Collins then wrote a public Letter to Mr. Dodwell in which heclaimed to show that Clarke's philosophical argument against the mortalityof the soul was inconclusive. Clarke responded with A Defence of aLetter to Mr. Dodwell. Over the next two years Clarke wrote three moredefenses of his original letter to Henry Dodwell and Collins wrote threereplies. Each of these was longer than its predecessor. Clarke, who becameincreasingly irritated as the debate continued, got the final word in TheFourth Defence of A Letter.

While the central issue of the correspondence is whether it is possible forconsciousness to inhere in a material system and thus for matter to think,the discussion toward the end turned to other issues such as free will anddeterminism and the adequacy of Collins' account of personal identity.Rather than explain the Correspondence in detail, what follows is adiscussion of Collins' position in respect to two central issues, that ofemergent properties and personal identity.[2]

2.2.1 Clarke's categories

To give a materialist account of life and consciousness, Collins needs toshow that from lifeless and unthinking matter one can get life and thought.In his Letter to Dodwell Collins claims that there are material systemsall about us whose parts do not have the properties found in the whole. Hegives the example of a rose that has the power to produce its sweet scentin us, while the particles that compose it individually do not have thispower (Clarke, p. 751; Clarke and Collins pp. 489). These material

Anthony Collins


systems provide models and analogies to understand how life andconsciousness can arise from lifeless and thoughtless particles. Thus, fromthe beginning, Collins is arguing that consciousness is an emergentproperty, i.e. a property had by the whole, but not by the parts thatcompose that whole.

In his First Defence, Clarke responds by giving an argument to show thatthere are no real emergent properties. He does this by giving anenumeration of all of the kinds of properties. It turns out that there areonly three categories. These categories correspond roughly to the primary,secondary and tertiary qualities of the mechanical philosophy (Attfield, p.46). The correspondence is not precise because Clarke includesconsciousness in the first category, though on a different basis than firstcategory properties of matter such as magnitude or motion. Clarke claimsthat only properties of the first kind are real. Properties of the second kindare not really Qualities of the System, and evidently do not in any properSense belong to it, but are only Effects occasionally produced by it in someother Substance, and truly are Qualities or Modes of that other Substancein which they are produced... (Clarke, p. 759; Uzgalis 2011 p.56). Heat,light, taste and sound are examples of this class of properties. Clarkeclaims that these properties are largely irrelevant to the question aboutconsciousness because they are modes of the other substance in whichthey are produced. The properties of the third kind are fictional. They arenot real Qualities at all, residing in any subject, but merely abstractNames to express the Effects of some determinate Motions of certainstreams of Matter... (ibid., p. 760; Clarke and Collins, p. 57). Theexamples that Clarke gives of third category properties are magnetism,electrical attractions and gravity.

What conditions are required for belonging to Clarke's first class? Inrespect to material wholes, Clarke is a reductionist who holds thatwhatever real property one finds in the whole must be found

William Uzgalis


proportionally in the parts. The height of the bricks and the mortar in awall sum to the height of the wall as a whole. Thus, all the properties in amaterial whole are compositions of the properties of the parts. Call thisClarke's Composition Principle. Any property of a material system thatfails to conform to this pattern is not a real property. It follows thatemergent properties, properties possessed by the whole but not by theparts, cannot be real. They would involve contradictions such as the wholebeing larger than the parts, or that something (some property of the whole)comes from nothing, or that there is something in the effect that is not tobe found in its cause.[3] As a result of his examination of the kinds ofcategories, Clarke claims that all emergent properties belong in his thirdclass, the class of fictional properties. It follows that since consciousnessis a real property it cannot be an emergent property.

Since consciousness is a real property it must belong in Clarke's first classof properties. This being so, it cannot violate the Composition Principle.But consciousness is so strongly unified that it cannot be eithercompounded or divided. This is why it cannot belong to any materialsystem. So, there must be a second sufficient condition for belonging toClarke's first category. Clarke second sufficient condition is that anIndividual Power, properly and strictly speaking...can only proceed fromor reside in, an Individual Being (Clarke, p. 750; Clarke and Collins, p.58). To be an individual power, Clarke tells us, a power must be trulyunitary, and thus not composed of parts. Call this the Individual PowerPrinciple. So, consciousness is an individual power, which belongs to anindividual being, the soul. The soul, too, is so unified that it does not haveparts. Magnitude, in contrast, satisfies the Composition Principle, but isnot an individual power. This is because the matter to which it belongs canalways be divided.

Collins challenges the enumeration of categories of properties with whichClarke seeks to prove that consciousness cannot belong to a material

Anthony Collins


system (Clarke, 1738, Vol. 3, pp. 751; 76770; Clarke and Collins. pp.6972). He continues to maintain that consciousness is a real emergentproperty. He also challenges the Individual Power Principle.

2.2.2 Real emergent properties

In responding to Clarke's First Defense, Collins claims that Clarke has notproperly enumerated the kinds of properties. He claims that Clarke needsto show that his enumeration is complete but has not done so. There maybe powers unknown to Clarke that need to be included in order to give acomplete enumeration of the properties and powers of matter. In order toeffectively defend his materialist account of consciousness, however,Collins pointed out a new class of properties that are arguably real and thatare emergent and do not fit Clarke's composition model for real propertiesof matter.

Collins' chief strategy for showing that there are real emergent propertiesis likely derived from Locke's claim in the Chapter Of Identity andDiversity in the Essay that living things are individuated not by thematter that composes them at a time but by their functional organization(Locke, 1972, ii. xxvii 34, pp. 330331; see also Attfield, 1977, p. 52)[4].Collins begins by considering the different roles that matter andorganization may play in producing all the different kinds of things in theuniverse. He starts with the hypothesis that different parts of matter aredifferent from one another. If this is so the particles of matter may work inthe way different parts of a clock workthe parts of the clock aredifferent from one another and consequently have different powers. Thewhole to which they contribute will have powers that none of the partshave (Clarke, p. 768; Clarke and Collins p. 72). The second hypothesisCollins puts forth is that all matter is the same and therefore completelyinterchangeable. Collins prefers this hypothesis because it makes it easy toargue that all of the differences between the various kinds of things are a

William Uzgalis


result of their organization. The distinction between matter and itsorganization is useful for Collins' purposes because the properties thatresult from the organization of matter are different from the properties ofthe particles. As Collins notes:

The organization of the eye is essential to its proper functioning andindeed to it being an eye at all (ibid., p. 769; Clarke and Collins, p. 72) Itis an emergent property. Collins does not explicitly make the point thatsince the organization of the eye is an essential property it must also be areal property. Perhaps he thought this obvious. Clarke's response was toclaim that the power of the eye to see is a fictional and not a real property.

2.2.3 Personal Identity

The topic of personal identity comes up as early as Clarke's SecondDefence of an Argument because Clarke objects to consciousness being anemergent property of the brain and also objects to the brain being thebearer or seat of personal identity (Clarke, p. 787; Clarke and Collins, Pg.96). Correspondingly, there are important connections between Collins'account of emergent properties and his account of personal identity.Consciousness, for Collins, is both an emergent property and constitutiveof personal identity. In addition, Collins claims that because of the mindbody problem, dualist views do not serve the ends and purposes ofreligion. Clarke replies that it is Collins' materialist views that have

...if the powers of a System of Matter may intirely cease upon theleast Alteration of a Part of that System, it is evident that thePowers of the System inhere not in the Parts in the same Sensewith Magnitude and Motion: for divide and vary the Parts ofMatter as much as you will, there will be Magnitude and may beMotion; but divide or vary the least Part of the Eye, and the Powerof contributing to the Act of Vision is intirely at an end (ibid.).

Anthony Collins


dangerous consequences for the ends and purposes of religion. Many ofthese consequences have to do with personal identity.

What are the connections between Collins' account of emergent propertiesand his account of personal identity? The most important connection is theLockean distinction between the matter that composes a material thing atany given time and the organization of matter. The distinction comes fromLocke's account of the individuation of masses of matter and living thingsin his chapter Of Identity and Diversity in Book II of the Essay. A massof matter is individuated by the particles that compose it, howeverorganized. If the mass gains or loses a single particle it becomes adifferent substance. Living things, by contrast, are individuated by theirfunctional organization (Locke, 1972 II. xxvii 3. p. 330). Collins' summaryof his views on identity and personal identity make it clear that he agreescompletely with Locke's account of identity and the individuation ofmasses, living things and persons (Clarke p. 875; Clarke and Collins, p.2312). But Clarke insists that in order for something to remain the same,it must remain the same substance. In the case of material things like oaks,this means that the matter that composes it must remain the same or it isnot the same oak. Only atoms and persons fulfill this same substancecondition for Clarke. So, oaks are only identical in a fictional sense. Inaddition, it is not possible for any entity to have the same properties it hadpreviously if its substance has changed, because it is not possible totransfer properties from one substance to another (Clarke, p. 798; Clarkeand Collins, p. 113). So, just as Clarke holds that emergent properties arefictional, so he holds that any identity not based on identity of substance isfictional.

Collins accepts Locke's revolutionary view that consciousness and not thesubstantial soul is the bearer of personal identity. Again agreeing withLocke, he regards both memory as crucial to personal identity and feelingsof pleasure and pain as important concomitants of consciousness. Still,

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Collins' account of personal identity is not exactly the same as Locke's.Locke's account is officially neutral in regard to whether the substancethat thinks in us is material or immaterial, simple or compounded.Collins, by contrast, is giving an account that makes the substance thatthinks in us material and compounded. But the neutrality of Locke'saccount of personal identity ought to allow Collins to adopt it withoutsignificant change, and this is what he does. Collins also defends the viewagainst attacks addressed to the concept of memory involved. Clarke holdsthat Collins' account of memory violates a basic principle of Clarke'ssubstantialist account of identitythat properties cannot be transferredfrom one substance to another.

Collins' response to this is to claim that annexing consciousness to thebrain explains the phenomena of consciousness far better than positing anunchanging immaterial substance. It is also a perfectly reasonable sensefor properties to be transferred from one substance to another. In hisReflections on Mr. Clarke's Second Defence he writes:

As for the problem of transferring consciousness from one substance toanother he writes:

For if we utterly forget, or cease to be conscious of having donemany things in former Parts of our Lives which we certainly did,as much as any of those which we are conscious that we havedone; and if in fact we do by degrees forget everything which wedo not revive by frequent Recollection, and by again and againimprinting our decaying Ideas; and if there be in a determinateTime a partial or total flux of Particles in our Brains: What canbetter account for out total Forgetfulness of some things, ourpartial Forgetfulness of others, than to suppose that the Substanceof the Brain in constant Flux? (Clarke, p. 809; Clarke and Collins,p. 130)

Anthony Collins


This account of how memory works nicely fits the model of thepreservation of organization through change of matter that Locke uses toexplain the identity of living things. However Clarke does not accept thisexplanation because he holds that only a theory of the substantial soul canprovide the underpinnings for an account of veridical memory.

2.3 Evaluating the Collins Clarke Correspondence

In evaluating the controversy, one would have to say that of all theencounters between the Newtonians and the free thinkers, the one betweenCollins and Clarke was the most philosophically significant andinfluential. O'Higgins holds that Collins is important to us mainly becausehe defends an early version of materialism. While there is surely sometruth to this, O'Higgins is clearly damning Collins with faint praise. Whatwe should recognize is that Collins was indeed a pioneer in trying to showthat consciousness is a real emergent property of the brain and in thisregard certainly showed more originality than O'Higgins gives him creditfor.(See note 2) O'Higgins also claims that Collins' arguments are not verygood. This also does not give Collins enough credit. It is true that Collinsdoes give some arguments that are not very good. On the other hand,

I will suppose myself conscious at Forty of having been carried toa Market or Fair at Five Years old, without any Particle of Matterabout me, the same which I had at that Age: now in order to retainthe Consciousness of that Action, it is necessary to revive the Ideaof it before any considerable Flux of Particles, (otherwise I musttotally lose the Memory of it (as I do of several things done in myChildhood) and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprintafresh the Consciousness of having done that Action, by which theBrain has a lively and Impression of Consciousness (though it benot entirely composed of the same Particles) as it had the day afterit did the Action... (ibid).

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Collins forced Clarke to clarify his position in a number of respects. Healso uncovered a number of weak points in Clarke's position. Clarke's poortreatment of Collins example of the power of a rose to produce a sweetsmell in us is one example. He answered as if Collins was talking aboutthe smell of the rose and claims that this secondary quality properlybelongs in his second class of properties. But Collins properly objects thathe was talking about the organization of the particles of the rosethecause of this effect, and not the effect on us. Clarke's response is weak.One of Collins' strongest points was his critique of Clarke's doctrine thatthough the soul is immaterial it is extended (Vailatti, 1993). One can alsosee how much pressure Collins is applying to Clarke's system as thenumber of properties in Clarke's third classfictional propertiescontinues to mount in the course of the correspondence. In respect to thecentral issues of the debate, Collins is struggling to articulate a materialistand empiricist metaphysics that can compete with the well developeddualist metaphysics that Clarke deploys. As Barresi and Martin comment:His faltering, but often successful attempts to reformulate traditionalmetaphysical issues empirically, embodies the birth pangs of a newapproach (Martin and Barresi, p. 51). But perhaps most strikingly,Collins is attempting to defend a doctrine of emergent properties that doesnot become prominent in English philosophy until Mill's System of Logic(1843)

3. Determinism and Free Will3.1 Background

Collins deals in passing with determinism and freedom of the will in the170708 correspondence with Samuel Clarke and in his 1707 book AnEssay concerning the Use of Reason. His A Philosophical InquiryConcerning Liberty of 1717 is entirely devoted to the issue. From thebeginning, Collins is a determinist with a compatibilist account of free

Anthony Collins


action. Clarke attacked Collins' determinism in the 170708correspondence. He also reviewed the 1717 book and defended a doctrineof libertarian free will as he had in the earlier correspondence.

Since the nature of human choices and action are central to debates aboutfree will and determinism there is a close connection between positionsabout these issues and positions about consciousness and personal identity.The kind of determinism that Collins advocates is a natural extension ofhis materialist, empirical and naturalistic account of consciousness. In hisaccount of consciousness, Collins makes the pursuit of pleasure and theavoidance of pain the most basic motives of action. This makes happinessand misery necessary concomitants of consciousness, and thus consciousbeings are endowed with a desire for happiness. This is true as much ofanimals as it is of human beings and accounts for a large number ofsimilarities in the behavior of humans and animals. Collins holds that ifthe behavior of animals is determined, then that of humans must be aswell.

3.2. Determinism in Collins early works

In the Clarke Collins correspondence of 170708 Collins claims thatClarke's argument for dualism is useless to religion and morality becauseof the problem of explaining how the immaterial mind and the materialbody interact. One of Clarke's counter-charges is that Collins' materialismis dangerous to religion and morality because it implies a determinism thatis destructive of religion and morality.

Collins claims that human action is caused in much the same way as theactions of clocks. Both are necessary agents, though the causes thatproduce the action in either case are very different. Both are necessarilydetermined in their Actions: the one by the Appearances of Good and Evil,the other by a Weight or Spring (Clarke., p. 872; Uzgalis 2011 p. 226).

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Collins also attacks the free will position. He holds that the same causeswill always produce the same effects and claims that the free willexplanation of being able to do otherwise violates this basic principle ofcausal explanations (ibid., pp. 873 and 874; Clarke and Collins, p. 227 and230).

Collins also expressed determinist views in his first bookAn EssayConcerning the Use of Reason, 1707. He does this in the context of theproblem of reconciling God's foreknowledge with human free-will. AsO'Higgins puts it: He solved the problem to his own satisfaction bysaying that all things, including human choices, are determined in theircauses and as such can be foreseen by an all-knowing God (O'Higgins,1976, p. 6). This view also plays a role in Collins' 1710 critique ofArchbishop King's views about the problem of evil and theepistemological status of the attributes of God. King claimed that God'sattributes, including his foreknowledge of events, was analogical. In thecase of God's foreknowledge, he did this to avoid contradictions betweenGod's knowing what was to come and the contingency of events andhuman free will. Collins is content to reject human free will and tosuppose that foreknowledge has a univocal meaning when used withreference to God or humans.

3.3 A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, 1717

In A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty Collins brieflystates his position. He rejects the view that there is any freedom fromnecessity and claims that insofar as there is human freedom it is liberty orfreedom from outward impediment to action. Such freedom is compatiblewith necessity. Collins holds that every action has been caused and mustnecessarily have occurred. The future is as much determined as the past.He then gives six arguments for this form of determinism.

Anthony Collins


The first of Collins' arguments has to do with experience. Defenders offree will hold that the experience of even ordinary people shows that theychoose freely. Collins' response is much the same as that of Hobbes andSpinoza. He claims that that those who say such things are either notattending to, or not seeing, the causes of their actions. Collins goes on toclaim that some defenders of free will admit that the issues is tangled andnot to be resolved by appeals to vulgar experience.

William Rowe notes that Collins and Clarke share a volitional theory ofaction. Rowe describes the theory in this way: According to this theory,actions are of two sorts: thoughts and motions of the body. What makes athought or bodily motion an action is its being preceded by a certain act ofwill (volitions) which bring about the thought or motion. Volitions, then,are action starters (Rowe, p. 54). Rowe also notes that Collins andClarke share the assumption that if a volition is causally determined thenthe person doing the act does not have free will (ibid., p. 53). Rowe saysthat as the two antagonists agree on these points, they play little or no partin the debate. But they do explain the strategy that Collins uses to arguethat experience actually shows that we are determined. He examinesexperience under four topics relating to choice and action: 1. Perception ofIdeas; 2. Judging of Propositions; 3. Willing; and 4. Doing as we will.Collins argues that each of these is causally determined.

In respect to perception he holds that perception, both of ideas of sensationand reflection, is not even voluntary. So, perception can hardly be free. Inrespect to judging, he claims that we judge in terms of how things appearto us, and that we can't change these appearances. In respect to the will, heclaims that there are two questions to be considered. One is whether weare at liberty to will or not. The second is whether we are at liberty to willone or the other of two or more objects. In respect to the first questionhe claims that Locke made a mistake in holding that people are at libertyto will because they can suspend willing. So, Collins holds that Locke's

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answer to the first question would be affirmative. Collins claims thatsuspense of willing is as much an act of will as any other. So, his answer isnegative. In respect to the second question Collins argues for a valuedeterminism that makes the answer to the second question negative aswell. In defining willing, he remarks: Willing or preferring is the samewith respect to good and evil, that judging is with respect to truth orfalsehood. So, if something seems better than the alternatives we willchoose it. Collins is thus a moral determinist who holds that we must dowhat seems best to us. In giving his negative answer to his secondquestion, Collins is also rejecting the claim that we could have doneotherwise. Collins then proceeds to consider cases where we can see nodifference between the objects we are to choose among, e.g., which of twoeggs we will take. Collins' response is that:

If one were truly indifferent one simply would not choose. But once thereis a will to choose, the cascade of causes that leads to action willdetermine the choice one way or the other. What Collins means by doingas we will is what we do consequent to willing. Here again he finds nofreedom from necessity. We do what we have willed unless some externalimpediment or intervening cause hinders us from doing so. Finally, hecompares the actions of animals to those of men. He claims that whileanimals are supposed to be necessary agents and humans free agents, thereis no perceivable difference between their actions that would allow us to

It is not enough to render things equal to the will, that they areequal or alike in themselves. All the various modifications of theman, his opinions, prejudices, temper, habit and circumstances, areto be taken in and considered as causes of election no less than theobjects without us among which we chuse; and these will everincline or determine our wills, and make the choice we do make,preferable to us, though the external objects of our choice are everso much alike to each other. (O'Higgins, 1976, p. 47)

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make this distinction.

Collins' second argument is that man is a necessary agent because all hisactions have a beginning. He holds that whatever has a beginning has acause and all causes are necessary. Collins (as he had in the Collins Clarkecontroversy) also rejects the proposition that the same causes couldproduce different effects. Thus Collins rejects the doctrine of free willbecause it violates the basic principle of causal explanations. The thirdargument claimed that liberty is an imperfection. Going back to judgingpropositions, Collins points out that if we were free, we would be able tojudge probable what is improbable, and so on. This is the analog of moraldeterminism to the epistemic realm. Just as we are not free to knowinglychoose the worse over the better, we cannot affirm that what seemsimprobable to us is the probable. If we could we would be worse off thanwe are. The fourth argument is that liberty is inconsistent with God'sforeknowledge. This is again similar to the view that Hobbes held andrepeats the assertions of Collins' first book An Essay concerning the Useof Reason. The fifth is that if man was not a necessary agent, anddetermined by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation forrewards and punishments. The sixth is that if a man were not a necessaryagent he would be ignorant of morality and have no motive to practice it.These last two arguments make the point that causality is necessary for theoperation of morality in the world, and to introduce a causeless free will isto make the teaching of morality or its motivation by punishment orreward pointless.

Jacopo Agnesina has recently argued that the An Inquiry ConcerningHuman Liberty was in fact a response to Dr. Clarke and rational theology.Agnesina claims that Collins was attempting to demonstrate thatdeterminism follows from Clarke's first principles. (Agnesina, 2011)Interestingly, there was only one response to Collins' book in England.Samuel Clarke reviewed it and argued that the notion of a necessary

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agent was incoherent, for to be an agent one must be active and Collins'position was that the humans are completely passive and thus (in Clarke'ssense) not agents at all. Clarke charges that in discussing being able to dootherwise, Collins fails to distinguish between physical and moralnecessity. (See Harris, p. 59) Clarke also complained that Collins treatedperception as actions when perception is passive. (Clarke, p. 722) Clarkedevelops his own account of free will arguing that motives, pleasures andpains, reasons and arguments, are simply occasions for the self-movingpower that is active to freely determine action. What we have again is acompeting set of explanations for the same phenomena. Clarke failed totake a number of Collins' arguments seriously, because the free willarguments being refuted were not his arguments.

In a series of letters Collins discussed Clarke's review of his book with hislong time friend and collaborator Pierre Desmaizeaux. He had written up areply. Eventually, however, Collins concluded that Clarke had beenthreatening him with civil action, and that to reply would provide Clarkewith the opportunity to do so. (Dybikowski, pp. 2601, 269 and 281)Consequently Collins made no reply to Clarke's review. In 1729 a shortbook, A Dissertation of Liberty and Necessity, with the initials A.C. on thetitle page, was published. For a number of reasons O'Higgins holds thatCollins is not the author of this work. His first reason is that the booktreats the substance of the soul as unknowna Lockean doctrine thatCollins had rejected. O'Higgins also cites contemporary reviews that claimthe arguments of the book are weak compared to the Inquiry. Still, weakor not, the arguments are certainly consistent with the determinist positionthat Collins was holding in the earlier work. The author also takes intoaccount at least one of Clarke's criticisms of the Inquiry.

The author of A Dissertation remarks that he will attempt to solve thePoint of Free Will, by tracing the progress of the Soul through all itsOperations which we are conscious of, and examining in each whether tis

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Active or Passive (Collins, 1729 p. 1). The point is that at every stage inthe process, from perception to action, we are passive. The authorapparently accepted Clarke's point in his review of Collins Inquiry thatperception is not an action, for he is now calling it not an action but anoperation. The author explicitly takes up Clarke's views when he arguesthat we are passive in judgment. He quotes Clarke at length. Clarke holdsthat judgment is passive, but distinguishes between judging and acting.The author continues: But I conceive the doctor here begs the Question,by asserting the Self-motive Power in the Soul without proving it, andthen reasons from it as granted to him (ibid., p. 6). The author of ADissertation thus returns to Clarke a charge that Clarke had made aboutCollins in his 1717 review of A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning HumanLiberty.

4. Collins, Deism and FreethinkingThe 17th and early 18th century in England saw a rationalist treatment oftheology that spanned many competing groups from the Latitudinarians tothe Dissenters to the Deists. Samuel Hefelbower in The Relation of JohnLocke to English Deism remarks that among the progressivestheologians, philosophers and deistsall accepted a rationalistic religion.The question then becomes what exactly is the role of reason vis visrevelation. The discussion of the relation of reason to revelation goes backat least to Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinasthat is to the scholasticauthorities. Albert held that reason has a role to play in religion, but thereare questions where philosophy has no final answer and revelation mustdecide. Revelation is above reason but not contrary to it. Thomas has asimilar position (Hefelbower, p. 47). Locke holds that reason isresponsible for determining what counts as genuine revelation. Locke alsoholds the view that there is revelation that tells us about things abovereason but not contrary to it. Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against

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GOD, and thereby lost their first happy state: And that the dead shall rise,and live again: These, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of Reason,are purely matters of Faith, with which Reason has directly, nothing todo. (IV. XVIII. 7. 1014 P. 694) The Deists tend to hold a more radicalview than the one that Locke advocates.

Samuel Clarke in his Boyle lectures of 1704 distinguishes four grades ofdeists. First there were those who acknowledged a future life and otherdoctrines of natural religion. Second were those who while denying afuture life, admitted the moral role of the deity. Third are those whoacknowledged providence in natural religion, but not in morality. Andfinally, those who denied providence altogether. Where does Collins fit, inthese grades of deism? According to O'Higgins: In his books, Collinscame to emphasize the part that morality should play in religion and toassert the importance of natural religion (O'Higgins, 1970, p. 40). Collinsclaims to believe in a future life (if not natural immortality). Collinsrejects Revelation. So, if O'Higgins is right, Collins fits Clarke's first gradeof deists. David Berman has disputed this view, arguing that Collins is, infact, an atheist.

4.1 An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason, 1707

An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason, Collins' first book, waspublished anonymously in 1707. The main thrust of the book is to rejectreligious mysteries. Collins starts his approach to the issues of religion andreason along the same lines that Locke does. He defines reason as thatfaculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives the truth, Falsehood, Probabilityor Improbability of Propositions (Essay, p. 3). Propositions consist ofwords which stand for Ideas concerning which some agreement isaffirm'd or deny'd (Essay, pp. 34). Thus he accepts Locke's definition ofknowledge. He also distinguishes in the way Locke does intuitive,demonstrative and probable truths, and treats claims about revelation as

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probable propositions that largely derive from testimony. Perhaps onediversion from Locke is that Collins distinguishes between two differentkinds of probability. The stronger kind resembles demonstration but theconnection between ideas is merely probable. The weaker kind ofprobability is testimony. Collins' position is that a person is not expectedto believe anything that is not comprehensible by the human intellect. So,if terms take on meanings that cannot be understood, humans cannot beexpected to believe them.

O'Higgins sees a strong affinity between Collins' book and John Toland'sChristianity Not Mysterious, which had been published in 1696. He quotesToland's remark that:

O'Higgins claims that this is very much the position that Collins is takingin the Essay. There is, however, some reason to doubt that O'Higgins iscorrect in equating Collins' position with that of Toland. It depends onhow we interpret the phrase contrary to or above it. Does this mean thatToland rejects all truths above and, contrary to reason or that Tolandrejects the claim not only that there are no truths contrary to reason in thegospel but also no truths above iteven those compatible with it? If thefirst interpretation is correct, then O'Higgins is very likely correct inclaiming that Collins and Toland are holding the same position, but if thesecond is correct then their positions are likely distinct.

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Locke allowed that therewere some truths that were above reason but compatible with it. Some

We hold that reason is the only foundation of all certitude...thatnothing reveal'd, whether as to its manner or to its existence, ismore exempted from its disquisitions, than the ordinaryphenomena of nature ... that there is nothing in the gospel contraryto or above it.

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scholars regard this as a mere verbal commitment to truths above reason,while others regard it as substantive. What is clear is that Locke would notaccept truths above and contrary to reason. On this point, Locke, Toland,and Collins are in complete agreement. Collins, for example, claims thatthe distinction between reasonable propositions and things above, andthings contrary to reason is the distinction that theologians use on behalfof mysteries and theological contradictions against those who say that theycan only believe what they understand. (Collins, 1984, p. 24) Toland,however, has a more radical position than Locke in that he rejects truthsabove reason, even where these truths are compatible with reason. (SeeWoolhouse 2007 p. 372) Thus Toland might well not accept the story ofthe rebellion of the angels or the claim that the dead shall rise. Collins, onthe other hand, seems to hold the same position Locke does. He quoteswith approval a passage from Boyle who uses an analogy of a deep seadiver to clarify the issue. If the diver asks you if you can see to the bottomof the ocean and after you have declared that you cannot, brings up oysterswith pearls in them, you will have no objection to the claim that there areoysters with pearls in them at the bottom of the sea. If, on the other hand,the diver claims that the pearls he shows you are larger than the shellscontaining them, you would doubtless judge what he asserts contrary tothe information of your eyes (Collins, 1984 pp. 256) Turning fromanalogy to theological doctrines, we find that Collins accepts, for example,the resurrection of Christ while rejecting transubstantiation. (ibid, Pg. 24)Collins also objects to the doctrine of the Trinity because it is notunderstandable and on some interpretations involves contradictions.Acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity is the first of the Thirty-nineArticles to which an Anglican was supposed to subscribe. It is plain thatCollins, like Locke, Newton, Clarke, Whiston, Toland and others, objectedto this article. Many of these men concealed their views about the Trinityand claimed that they were orthodox Anglicans. At any rate, it seems clearthat Collins holds much the same position as Locke in respect to truths

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above and truths above and contrary to reason.

4.2 Analogical language

In A Vindication of the Divine Attributes, in some Remarks on His Gracethe Archbishop of Dublin's sermon intitled Divine PredestinationConsistent with the Freedom of Man's Will, (published in 1710) Collinstakes on another way of evading his demand that whatever we believemust be comprehensible to us. This is the doctrine of analogy that goesback to St. Thomas Aquinas. The form in which Collins finds it in theworks of Archbishop King of Dublin, is the doctrine that not only doesGod not have hands and feet and a beard in a literal sense, he does nothave wisdom, benevolence or justice in any sense that we can understandthese terms. Thus King remarked: It does not follow from hence, that anyof these are more properly or literally in God after the manner they are inus, than hands or eyes, than mercy, than love or hatred are. Collins rejectsthe claim that God's wisdom and benevolence could have meanings thatwe do not comprehend. He asserts that God's knowledge and his attributesare univocal with ours (O'Higgins, 1970, p. 63).

David Berman in his A History of Atheism in Great Britain, gives anumber of reasons to take Collins as an atheist rather than a deist. He seesCollins' account of the creation of matter ex nihilo in the Answer to Mr.Clarke's Third Defence as an argument for atheism disguised as anargument against atheism (Berman, 1988, pp. 8081). He sees Collins asusing Bayle to raise the problem of evil in the Vindication of the DivineAttributes and then showing that both the solution offered by Bayle andDr. King are unacceptable. Collins' official position at the end of theVindication is that King is wrong but atheism is avoidable. Berman askswhat the actual conclusion of the Vindication is. He continues:

It is simply that there are very formidable, or insuperable,

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Collins clearly rejects theism based on revelation. But one could also be atheist based on arguments from natural religion. Berman sees theVindication as aimed at the heart of natural religion (ibid.). If this were so,we would have good reason to regard Collins as an atheist. On the onehand, Collins' position about analogical language may seem to stronglysupport natural religion. Insofar as the meaning of the divine attributes isunivocal with our use of the same words about human beings, the analogythat natural religion relies on would work at its best. (The basic analogy onwhich natural religion depends is that humans are to the machines theymake as God is to the world.) Archbishop King's position, on the otherhand, would completely undermine the analogy. There is, however, asecond consideration. Insofar as the problem of evil is left unresolved innatural religion, it would suggest that it can provide no effective answer tothis fundamental difficulty in theism. This is Berman's point. O'Higgins,by contrast, claims that in the Vindication Collins simply sets aside theproblem of evil (O'Higgins, 1970, p. 63).

4.3 A Discourse of Free Thinking, 1713

Like Locke, Collins is an advocate of the use of reason to determinereligious truths. One necessary condition for being able to think freely isnot to be persecuted for considering views that are different from theaccepted ones. Only in such an environment can one genuinely consideralternatives. It must be possible to adopt whichever of the possibilitiesturns out to be the most reasonable. Collins, like Locke, is committed tothe view that one should proportion assent to a proposition on the basis of

difficulties in the theistic conception of Godrevealed by theManichean problemsand that the latest attempt to cope with, orsolve, these difficulties, i.e. King's theory, has failed; for themedicine is as bad as the disease. But the disease remains!(Berman, p. 84)

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the evidence for it. Religious persecution aims to limit the possibilities andthe evidence that one can consider. Though Collins was strongly anti-clerical, he does distinguish between good priests and bad priests. Thegood priests are the ones who advocate freedom of thought, the badpriests, on the other hand, are persecutors who want to prevent peoplefrom thinking through the truths of religion for themselves. In his owntime, Collins most controversial work was his A Discourse of Freethinking(1714).

Concerning the Discourse, J.M. Robertson writes that it ...may be said tosum up and unify the drift not only of previous English freethinking, butof the great contribution of Bayle, whose learning and temper influence allEnglish deism from Shaftesbury onward (Robertson, 1936 p. 722).Perhaps the motto of A Discourse of Free-Thinking ought to be Whereexperts disagree, any person is free to reason for themselves. Collins ischiefly concerned with religion, so the vast bulk of the disagreements hecites have to do with religious issues, from whether one religion is betterthan another, down to the details of Anglicanism. Looking at conflictingclaims often leads to skepticism. Where exactly this approach leadsCollins is a question that we will have to consider.

In A Discourse of Free-thinking Collins defines free-thinking as The Useof the Understanding, in endeavouring to find out the Meaning of anyProposition whatsoever, in considering the nature and Evidence for oragainst it, and in judging of it according to the seeming Force or Weaknessof the Evidence (p. 5). Collins claims that we have a right to think freely.Richard Bently in his Remarks about a Late Discourse of Free-Thinkingcharges that this definition is too broadthat it amounts to a definition ofthinking. James O'Higgins in his study of Collins agrees with Bently. This,however, is not a good evaluation. Collins' account is surely intended torule out believing without evidence, or against the evidence, or withoutcarefully considering conflicting evidence. Either these are not going to be

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admitted as thinking at all, or Collins' definition is not too broad.

The Discourse is divided into three sections. In the first two Collins givesa series of arguments in favor of free-thinking and in the third he answersobjections to free-thinking and gives a list of historical figures who heviews as free-thinkers. The arguments treat thinking effectively as like acraft or art and a number of the early arguments work on this analogy. Heclaims that just as putting restrictions on painting would reduce theproficiency of the painter, so putting restrictions on thinking can onlyreduce the proficiency of the thinker. To fail to think freely leads to theholding of absurd beliefs and superstition. Collins gives a brief history ofthe efforts of priests to control what people believe by fraud from theancient world to the Reformation. Collins then claims that free-thinking isresponsible for the decline in the belief in witchcraft.

Section 2 begins with Collins arguing that right opinion in matters ofreligion is supposed to be essential to salvation and errors to lead todamnation. But if one is not to think freely oneself about such subjects,then one must simply take up the opinions of those among whom onehappens to live. But this means that they will only be right by accident. Onthe other hand, if people think freely, they will have the evidence ofthings to determine them to the side of truth (ibid., p. 33). There are in allages an infinite number of pretenders to revelations from Heaven,supported by miracles. These pretenders offer new notions of the Deity,new doctrines, commands, ceremonies and modes of worship. To decidewhich of these are genuine and which spurious requires that one thinkfreely about the competing evidence that would show that one is genuinewhile the other an imposter. Collins remarks that since the AnglicanChurch has an organization to support foreign missionaries (The Societyfor Propagating the Gospel in Foreign Lands) this really requiressupporting free-thinking throughout the world and therefore at home aswell. Indeed: As there can be no reasonable change of opinions among

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men, no quitting of any old religion, no reception of any new religion, norbelieving any religion at all, but by means of free-thinking; so the HolyScriptures agreeably to reason, and to the design of our blessed Savior ofestablishing his religion throughout the whole universe, imply everywhereand press in many places the duty of free thinking (ibid., pp. 436).Finally Collins claims that the conduct of the priests who are the chiefPretenders to be the Guides to others in matters of Religion, makes free-thinking on the nature and attributes of the eternal being of God, on theauthority of the scriptures, and on the sense of scriptures, unavoidable(ibid., p. 46). He goes on to list disagreements and differences of opinionamong priests on all these topics.

In section 3 Collins takes up various objections to free-thinking. Tosuppose that all men have a right to think freely on all subjects is tosuppose that they have the capacity to do so. But they do not. So it isabsurd to think that they have a duty to think freely. Collins replies that tosuppose a right to a thing also implies a Right in him to let it alone, if hethinks fit (ibid., p. 100). As for free-thinking being a duty, Collinsresponds that it is so only in cases where those who contend for theNecessity of all Men's assenting to certain Propositions, must allow thatmen are qualify'd to do so (ibid.). If it were the case that the great bulk ofmankind lacked the capacity to think freely on matters of speculation, thenthe priests should conclude that men should in no way be concerned abouttruth and falsehood in speculative matters. In short, they should hold noopinion. Even in this case, however, the right to think freely would remainuntouched in those disposed to think freely. The second objection is that toencourage free-thinking will produce endless Divisions of Opinion andby consequence Disorders in Society. Collins suggests that theconsequence is false and that any remedy is worse than the disease. Third,free-thinking may lead to atheism. Collins points out that many divineshold that there never was a real atheist in the world while Bacon holds thatcontemplative atheists are rare. Still, even if free-thinking were to produce

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many atheists, the number of those who are superstitious or enthusiasticthat will be produced in the absence of free-thinking is even greater. Andthese are worse evils for society than atheism. Fourthly, priests are theexperts who are to be relied upon in their subject as doctors and lawyersare to be relied upon in theirs. Collins argues that the analogy betweendoctors and lawyers and priests does not hold. First, while doctors andlawyers act for us, we need not believe the principles or opinions on whichone prescribes and the other acts. But in matters of religion, I am obligedto believe certain opinions myself. No man's belief will save me exceptmy own (ibid., p. 109). Finally, free-thinkers are the most infamous,wicked and senseless of all mankind. (Ibid., p. 118) Collins answers thisobjection in various waysarguing that in fact free-thinking makes onevirtuous. He ends by listing a variety of men he considers free-thinkerswhose moral character was impeccableSocrates, Plato, Aristotle,Epicurus, Plutarch, Cicero, Varo and others among the ancients. Amongthe moderns he includes, Bacon, Hobbes and Archbishop Tillotson.

4.4 Interpreting A Discourse of Free Thinking

The Discourse leaves us with a variety of questions. What exactly isCollins trying to achieve in this book? Reflecting on the first two sectionsof the Discourse, James O'Higgins notes: A good deal of what he wrotecan be interpreted as the writing of an anti-clerical protestant, insisting onprivate judgment for the laity. A few other passages ... such as those fromVaro and Socrates, seem to imply a bias against Christianity itself, or atleast against Revelation (p. 89). Some of Collins critics accused him ofbeing an atheist. But, unless one gives the work an esoteric reading, thishardly seems warranted. Collins is, however, clearly extolling a universalreligion based on reason.

The Discourse received a good number of replies. Steele commented thatthe author of the Discourse deserved to be denied the common benefits of

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air and water (quoted in O'Higgins, 1970 p. 78). The Guardiancampaigned against the Discourse. Among the articles it published weresome by the young George Berkeley. There is a certain amount ofscholarly debate about how effective these replies were. From early on,historians have often claimed that Richard Bently in his Remarks about alate Discourse of Freethinking delivered a crushing rejoinder to Collins.Robertson pretty much alone rejected this opinion. James O'Higgins in hisbook-length study of Collins probably gives the most balancedassessment. O'Higgins admits that Bently, on the whole, makes a strictlyad hominem attack on Collins. He attacked Collins' scholarship andaccused him of atheism. O'Higgins thinks that Bently succeeded inshowing that Collins was not the man to produce a critical edition of theBible (O'Higgins, 1970, p. 84). O'Higgins also remarks that Bentlycorrectly points out that Collins did not understand the role of textualvariants in reducing (rather than increasing) our uncertainty about themeaning of a text. Since Collins is maintaining that everyone capable ofdoing so should reason about religious matters, claims that he failed toreason correctly may have more bite to them than other ad hominemarguments. But while these are good points, set against the fact that Bentlycompletely failed to address the main issue of religious authority, this canhardly amount to a crushing rejoinder. Robertson is also surely right inholding that Collins' scholarship is not as bad as Bently claimed and thatBently's scholarship is often not as good as historians have claimed.

5. Collins and ReligionEdward and Lillian Bloom note in their introduction to A DiscourseConcerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing that:

For several years and in such works as Priestcraft in Perfection(1710) and A Discourse of Free-Thinking (1713), he was a flailingpolemicist against the entire Anglican hierarchy. Not until 1724

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In Priestcraft in Perfection, 1710, and An Historical and Critical Essay onthe Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England, 1724, Collins attacksthe first clause of Article 20 of the 39 articles: The Church hath power todecree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith. Collinsgoes over the history of the clause in considerable detail to argue that it isa forgery. Clearly if this were a forgery, the church would have no powerto decree rites nor authority in controversies of faith. The point is that:...the just and true establishment of religion lies, in allowing every man tohave a conscience of his own; to use and follow his own private judgment;and particularly, to understand, profess and practice, what he thinks Godteaches in the holy scriptures (Collins, Preface to the Essay, quoted inO'Higgins, 1970 pp. 1434). O'Higgins notes that this might be theposition of any dissenting minister. O'Higgins gives a detailed summary ofthe controversy in Chapter IX of his study of Collins.

In A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion,1724, Collins attacks the basis of Christianity as a revealed religion. InThe Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke had made the messiahship ofChrist the single fundamental tenet for being a Christian. In the DiscourseCollins is rejecting it. The argument is that Christianity is founded onJudaism, or the New Testament on the Old. The New Testament is only ofimportance in this regard insofar as it shows that the prophecies of the Oldare fulfilled. Collins rejects the claim that they are fulfilled in the NewTestament.This, he claims, is the only proof for Christianity. Collins'critics disputed this claim; there was the proof from miracles. But Collinsrejected such proofs.

did he become a polished debater, when he initiated a controversythat made a very great noise and which ended only with hisdeath. The loudest shot in the persistent barrage was sounded byGrounds and Reasons and its last fusillade by the DiscourseConcerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing. (Collins, 1729 p. iii)

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In rejecting the argument from prophecies Collins is once again joustingwith the Newtonians. William Whiston (16671752) was a close associateof Newton's and was probably influenced by Newton's interest inprophetic arguments. Stephen Snobelen points out in his review of thecontroversy that Whiston hoped to set up an exact science of prophecies.As Snobelen notes: For Whiston, fulfilled prophecy was as certain as aBoylean experiment or a Newtonian demonstration(Snobelen, p. 205).Collins shared much of Whiston's desire for precision. Often it wasallowed that a prophecy in the old testament had dual fulfillments, one inthe prophet's own day and one in the more remote future. One of these wassupposed to be literal, the other allegorical. Both Whiston and Collinsreject allegorical interpretations for literal ones. But while Whistonregarded the later fulfillment as literal and the earlier as allegorical,Collins insisted that it was the earlier one that should be regarded asliteral.

Using the catalog of Collins' library produced by Giovanni Tarantino,Jacopo Agnesina has persuasively argued that A Discourse ConcerningRidicule and Irony in Writing published in 1729 is a genuine work ofAnthony Collins, though O'Higgins in his biography of Collins doubted itauthenticity. (Agnesina, 2009) Edward and Lillian Bloom in theirintroduction to their reprint of the Discourse remark that:

For the modern reader, the Discourse concerning Ridicule andIrony is the most satisfying of Collins's many pamphlets andbooks. It lacks the pretentiousness of the Scheme, the snideconvolutions of the Grounds and Reasons the argument by half-truths of the Discourse of Free-Thinking. His last work is free ofthe curious ambivialance which marked so many of his earlierpieces, a visible uncertainty that made him fear repression and yetcourt it. On the contrary, his last work is in fact a justification ofhis rhetorical mode and religious beliefs; it is an apologia pro vita

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The aim of the Discourse is to refute a claim by Nathanael Marshall thatwhile serious arguments about religious issues should be allowed, ridiculeand irony in attacks on established religion should be prosecuted by themagistrate. This is a clear indication of how much his Anglican opponentshad let Collins' irreverent wit, biting satire and ironical remarks get undertheir skin. Collins' opponent was vulnerable on a number of points andCollins makes telling arguments against his claim. He notes that the bestwriters on religion will be found to be committing these crimes indisputation; that the best punishment would be either to be ignored or toreturn ridicule with ridicule rather than to be punished by the magistrate.He points out that when Mr. Marshall discovers how many of those whopractice these crimes are of his party and are encouraged in these practiceshe will give up his position, and so on. The theme of allowing liberty ofdiscourse in public debates about religion is the over-arching theme of theDiscourse, and it certainly one of the main themes of Collins' workthroughout his life.

6. Influences6.1 In England

We have already considered in some detail Samuel Clarke's reaction toCollins' views about emergent properties, personal identity and issuesabout determinism and free will in the early eighteenth century. TheCollins Clarke correspondence of 170608 was reprinted twice andreferred to many times in the course of the eighteenth century (Martin andBarresi, p. 33). The conservative reaction to Locke and Collins concerningpersonal identity and materialism represented by Clarke continued to bemaintained by many thinkers in eighteenth century England as well as on

sua written with all the intensity and decisiveness that such ajustification demands. (Collins, 1729. p. xv)

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the continent. In fact, we can see an on-going debate between thematerialists and dualists on these topics all the way through the eighteenthand into the early nineteenth century in England.

Bishop Joseph Butler (16921752) a protege of Samuel Clarke attackedthe Locke/Collins account of personal identity in the Appendix onPersonal Identity to his Analogy of Religion. Butler largely acceptedClarke's substantialist account of identity and personal identity. Indeed heclarified Clarke's position by summarizing it briefly and naming thedistinction Clarke had been making between real and fictional identity. Hecalled it the distinction between identity in the strict and proper sense andidentity in the loose and popular sense. (Ducharme, p. 370) He reiteratesClarke's claim that Collins account of personal identity is dangerous toreligion and in particular the doctrine of the resurrection. He accusedCollins of taking Locke's doctrines to a strange length. (Perry, Pg.102)By this Butler meant that Collins account of personal identity would notallow a person's identity to persist for more than a moment and thus thatLocke's account of personal identity implied and that Collins explicitlystated a doctrine of successive persons. Butler claimed that such a doctrinewould destroy both morality and any doctrine of the resurrection. This hasbeen an influential misinterpretation of Collins. (See Uzgalis 2008b)

George Berkeley (16851753) met Collins at a freethinking coffee housemeeting and later told his American follower, Samuel Johnson, thatCollins was an atheist. As noted earlier, Berkeley attacked the Discourseof Free-Thinking in Steele's Guardian, and continued his attacks onCollins in Alciphron. While Berkeley holds a quite distinct set ofphilosophical views from those of Clarke, together they represent aconservative Anglican response to Locke and Collins on the issue ofpersonal identity. Berkeley agrees with Clarke about the substantial natureof persons.

William Uzgalis


Scholars are still debating the influence of Collins on David Hume (17111776). How much influence is attributed to Collins depends largely on theinterpretation given to Hume's philosophy. (See Macintyre, 1994, Russell,1995 and Harris, 2005) MacIntyre and Russell despite their differencesagree that in a Treatise Of Human Nature Hume was systematicallyattacking Clarke's position on the mind/body relation as articulated both inClarke's Boyle lectures and the Collins Clarke correspondence of 170608and that many of Hume's arguments resemble those of Collins. Harris,focusing on the issue of free will and determinism and using the Enquiriesto interpret the Treatise, has a contrasting view. He argues that Hume'saccount of necessity is weaker than that defended by Collins and beforehim by Hobbes, and he goes on to claim that in giving this weakeraccount Hume is giving the same kind of account that Bramhall andClarke gave in trying to find a middle way between necessitarianism andthe liberty of indifference. (Harris, p. 73) Harris may be correct in noting avariety of ways in which Hume's account of causality and necessity differsfrom that of Hobbes, Locke and Collins. On the other hand, he fails tonote the important way in which Collins' claims that while some wholesare caused by a composition of their parts there are a whole range of caseswhere this is not true distinguishes his view from that of Hobbes andbrings it closer to Hume's. Hume's rejection of heirloom theories ofcausality and the necessary connection that goes along with themundermines Clarke's position on the causal relation of mind and body farmore than Harris seems to allow. I think these considerations tend toweaken Harris' judgement that while Collins is a dogmatist on theseissues, Hume is a skeptic. (See Harris, note 22 p. 79)

Thomas Reid (17101796) holds positions on materialism, personalidentity and free will that have much in common with the views of Clarke.Reid deploys reduplication arguments in objecting to the views aboutpersonal identity of Joseph Priestly (see Martin and Barresi, p. 47).Priestly's views have strong connections to those of Collins and Locke.

Anthony Collins


Joseph Priestley (17331804) was sufficiently impressed with Collins'Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Free Will to arrange the publication ofa new edition of that work. Priestley also held that matter can think, buthis views were based on a different conception of matter than the onewhich Collins and Clarke shared. Priestley had an active conception ofmatter derived from Boscovich. Priestley was also impressed by Collins'work on the prophecies. (Yolton, 1983 pp. 108113)

6.2 On the continent

Collins' influence on the continent in the second half of the eighteenthcentury was much more considerable than his influence in England.O'Higgins remarks that Small though his part in English literature mayhave been, during his own lifetime there were few English writers whowere more fully reported in the continental journals, or more noted inforeign universities (O'Higgins, p. 203). Pierre Desmaiseaux knewCollins for some 26 years and was his friend and collaborator.Desmaiseaux played an important role in raising Collins reputation both inEngland and on the continent. Collins discussed Clarke's response to hisbook on determinism with Desmaiseaux and Desmaiseaux kept Collins incontact with the intellectual life on the continent and also served as apublicist for Collins. He had Collins' Inquiry translated into French andhandled the printing of his other books. In 1720, under Collins' direction,Desmaiseaux published A collection of several pieces of Mr. John Locke,never before printed, or not extant in his works. Pub. by the author of theLife of the ever-memorable Mr. John Hales, &c which contained a numberof Locke's letters to Collins. There was considerable interest on thecontinent in the thinking-matter controversy. There is a certain amount ofdebate about the influence of Collins' book on free will and determinismon Voltaire. O'Higgins accepts the evidence produced by Torrey inVoltaire and the English Deists that Voltaire was converted todeterminism by reading Collins (O'Higgins, pp. 21920). As time passed

William Uzgalis


free-thinking came out into the open in France and Collins' name wasassociated with it. Finally, his works on the materiality of the soul,determinism and free will and the prophecies influenced the group aroundBaron Holbach. (For a detailed treatment of Collins' influence on thecontinent, see O'Higgins, 1970, Chapter XI.) Whether Collins would havebeen happy with this depends on whether we view him as a deist withO'Higgins, or as an atheist with David Berman. This disagreement overwhether to regard Collins as a deist or as an atheist (or someone whoseviews changed over time or were unclear even to himself) is our mostserious unresolved problem in determining Collins' proper place in thehistory of ideas.

BibliographyBooks

Bayle, Pierre, ed. and trans. Richard Popkin, Historical and CriticalDictionary Selections, 1991, Indianopolis, Hackett Publishing Co.

This contains a translation of the article "Diaearchus" in whichBayle attacks the thinking matter hypothesis.

Berman, David, A History of Atheism in Great Britain: From Hobbesto Russell, 1988, London, Croom Helm.

Berman makes the case the Collins was an atheist. This is acompeting interpretative hypothesis to O'Higgins' view thatCollins believed in the existence of God and a future state.

Bedau, Mark A. and Humphreys,Paul, Emergence, ContemporaryReadings in Philosophy and Science, 2008, Cambridge, Mass., MITPress

While not dealing with emergent properties before Mill, thetwentieth and twenty-first century treatments of emergence inthis book gives some real perspective on the interest andimportance of the arguments Collins gives for such properties in

Anthony Collins


the Collins Clarke correspondence of 170608.Clarke, Samuel, The Works of Samuel Clarke, Vol. 14, 1738, 1928republished New York, Garland Press

Clarke's works have Clarke's Boyle lectures, the Collins Clarkecorrespondence in its entirety and Clarke's review of Collins'1717 book on determinism and free will.

Clarke, Samuel and Collins Anthony, The Correspondence of SamuelClarke and Anthony Collins, 170708, ed. William Uzgalis, Ontario,CA, 2011, Broadview Press

A new edition of the Correspondence with an introduction,notes, index and supplementary readings that put thecorrespondence in context.

Collins, Anthony, An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason and ADiscourse of Free Thinking, ed. Peter Schouls, 1707, 1984,republished New York, Garland Press

A republication of Collins' first book and his 1713 book on freethinking, both in their original 18th century type.

Collins, Anthony, A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony inWriting, ed. Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom, 1729, 1970,republished, Los Angeles, The William Andrews Memorial ClarkeLibrary, No. 142.

A republication of Collins' last book with an interestingintroduction and notes.

Cottingham, John, The Rationalists, 1988, Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress

Explains heirloom theories of causalityDybikowski, James, ed. The Correspondence of Anthony Collins(16761729), Freethinker, 2011, Paris, Honore Champion

A fine edition of Collins' letters that includes an introduction,extensive notes that make clear many of the references in theletters that would otherwise be unintelligible, and an index.

William Uzgalis


Fergusen, James, The Philosophy of Dr. Samuel Clarke and itsCritics, 1974, New York, Vantage Press

Fergusen deals with the Collins Clarke controversy overdeterminism and free will. He considers critically Clarke'sresponse to Spinoza and Hobbes.

Fox, Christopher, Locke and the Scriblerians, identity andconsciousness in early eighteenth century Britain, 1988, Berkeley,University of California Press

A fine treatment of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centurydebate over consciousness and personal identity that includes anaccount of the Collins Clarke correspondence of 170608 andthe influence it had on the Scriblerians.

Harris, James A., Of Liberty and Necessity, The Free Will Debate inEighteenth Century British Philosophy, 2005, Oxford, OxfordUniversity Press

Puts the views of Clarke and Collins in the context of otherviews about free will and determinism in the eighteenth century.

Hefelbower, S.G., The Relation of John Locke to English Deism,1918, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

An effort to characterize the defining features of English DeismJacob, Margaret, C., The Newtonians and the English Revolution16891720, 1976, Ithaca, Cornell University Press

Profiles the latitudinarian Anglicans both before and after theRevolution of 1688 who used Newtonian natural philosophy as abasis for justifying a particular social order against amaterialistic, Hobbesian philosophy that they regarded asatheistic that justified a competing social order. Jacob thus putsthe controversies between Clarke and Collins in a meaningfuland interesting historical and intellectual context.

John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. PeterNidditch, Oxford, 1975, Oxford University Press

Anthony Collins


Locke's magnum opus had a considerable influence on Collinsboth in respect to his epistemological views and in respect toparticular issues such as whether matter can think.

John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, Vol. 8, ed. E. S. DeBeer, Oxford, 1989, Oxford University Press

Contains Locke's letters to Collins during the period of theireighteen month friendship. It is thus a major source for the studyof their relationship.

Martin and Barresi, The Naturalization of the Soul: Self and PersonalIdentity in Eighteenth Century, London, 2000.

Deals with the Collins Clarke correspondence of 170608 in thecontext of the history of the debate over consciousness andpersonal identity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Mijuskovic, B.L., The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments, The Hague,Martinus Nijhoff

Gives a history and analysis of the simplicity argument, centralto Clarke's claims about consciousness and the soul, that Collinsargues against in the Collins Clarke correspondence of 170608.He discusses its uses in arguing for immortality and in questionsabout personal identity.

O'Higgins, James, Anthony Collins The Man and His Works, TheHague, 1970, Martinus Nijhoff

The only full length study of Anthony Collins. The book isstrong in its account of Collins' life, his predecessors, histheological views, and his influence on the continent. What ismissing is depth in the account of Collins' philosophical views.

O'Higgins, James, Determinism and Free Will, The Hague, 1976,Martinus Nijhoff

Provides the text of Collins' A Philosophical Inquiry ConcerningHuman Freedom along with annotations and a usefulintroduction that discusses Collins' place in the debate over free

William Uzgalis


will and determinism and provides an analysis of the text.Overhoff, Jurgen, Hobbes' Theory of the Will: Ideological Reasonsand Historical Circumstances, Lanham, 2000, Rowen and LittlefieldPublishers Inc.

Provides an excellent account of the nature of Hobbes'determinism and its context. This is helpful in assessing Collins'place in the history of determinism.

Perry, John, Personal Identity 2nd edition, 2008, Los Angeles,University of California Press

The second edition of the book includes selections on personalidentity from the Collins Clarke correspondence of 170608 andan essay on Collins' views on personal identity as well as manyof the relevant chapters on personal identity from the earlymodern period as well as the twentieth century.

Robertson, J..M., A Short History of Freethought: Ancient andmodern, London, 191415, Watts & Co.

Treats Collins sympathetically in the context of the history ofFreethinking.

Rowe, William, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Reality, CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca, 1991.

Treats Locke, Collins and Clarke's views concerning free willand necessity as background for an exposition of the views ofThomas Reid. Rowe sees Reid as giving the best account oflibertarian free will. In discussing the Collins/Clarke interactionon determinism, he focuses on Clarke's account of agency as animportant antecedent to Reid.

Stephen, Leslie, History of English Thought in the EighteenthCentury, London, 1936, Watts & Co.

Gives a detailed history of English Deism in both theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries and on the continent. Thereare several chapters devoted to Deism and one of these to

Anthony Collins


Collins.Tarantino, Giovanni, Lo scrittoio di Anthony Collins (16761729). Ilibri e i tempi di un libero pensatore (in Italian), Milan, 2007 FrancoAngeli

This catalog of Collins' library, the third largest in Englandwhen he died, allows one to see what sources were available toCollins the prolific writer.

Torrey, N.L.,Voltaire and the English Deists, New Haven, YaleUniversity Press, 1930

Discusses the influence Collins had on Voltaire's conversion todeterminism.

Vailati, Ezio, Le

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