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Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole Attacks. Lingxuan Hu and David Evans [lingxuan, evans]@cs.virginia.edu Department of Computer Science University of Virginia NDSS 20045 February 2004 http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/. Wormhole Attack. B. C. A. D. S. Y. X. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 1
Using Directional Antennas to Prevent Wormhole AttacksLingxuan Hu and David Evans[lingxuan, evans]@cs.virginia.edu
Department of Computer Science
University of Virginia
NDSS 2004 5 February 2004http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 2
Wormhole Attack
S
DA
BC
Attacker needs a transceivers at two locations in the network, connected by a low latency link
Attacker replays (selectively) packets heard at one location at the other location
XY
Pirate image by Donald Synstelien
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 3
Beacon Routing
0
1
2
34
Nodes select parentsbased on minimumhops to base station
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 4
Wormhole vs. Beacon Routing
0
1
2
X
Y
0
1
2
Wormhole attack disruptsnetwork without needing to break any cryptography!
[Karlof and Wagner, 2003]; [Hu, Perrig, Johnson 2003]
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 5
0
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0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Fra
ctio
n o
f R
oute
s to
Bas
e S
tatio
n D
isru
pte
d
Position of Endpoint (x,x)
Base Station at Corner
Base Station at Center
Wormhole Impact
0 500
0 500
A randomly placed wormhole disrupts ~5% of linksA single wormhole can disrupt 40% of links (center)
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 6
Possible Solutions• Packet Arrival Time
– Packet Leashes [Hu, Perrig, Johnson 2003]– Signal is transmitted at speed of light– Requires tightly synchronized clocks (tempora
l leashes) or precise location information (geographic leashes)
• Packet Arrival Direction
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 7
Directional Antennas
Model based on [Choudhury and Vaidya, 2002]General benefits: power saving, less collisions
1
23
4
5 6
North
Aligned to magnetic North, so zone 1 alwaysfaces East
Omnidirectional TransmissionDirectional Transmission from Zone 4
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 8
Assumptions
• Legitimate nodes can establish secure node-node links– All critical messages are encrypted
• Network is fairly dense• Nodes are stationary• Most links are bidirectional (unidirectional links
cannot be established)• Transmissions are perfect wedges• Nodes are aligned perfectly (relaxed in paper)
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 9
Protocol Idea
• Wormhole attack depends on a node that is not nearby convincing another node it is
• Verify neighbors are really neighbors
• Only accept messages from verified neighbors
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 10
Directional Neighbor Discovery A
1. A Region HELLO | IDA
Sent by all antenna elements (sweeping)2. B A IDB | EKBA (IDA | R | zone (B, A))
Sent by zone (B, A) element, R is nonce3. A B R
Checks zone is opposite, sent by zone (A, B)
B
zone (B, A) = 4is the antennazone in whichB hears A
1
23
4
5 6
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 11
A Bzone (B, A[Y]) = 1
zone (A, B [X]) = 1
False Neighbor: zone (A, B) should be opposite zone (B, A)
Detecting False Neighbors
1
23
4
5 6
X Y
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 12
A B
zone (B, A[Y]) = 4
zone (A, B [X]) = 1
Undetected False Neighbor: zone (A, B) = opposite of zone (B, A)
Not Detecting False Neighbors
1
23
4
5 6
X Y
Directional neighbor discovery prevents 1/6 of false direct links…but doesn’t prevent disruption
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 13
Observation: Cooperate!
• Wormhole can only trick nodes in particular locations
• Verify neighbors using other nodes
• Based on the direction from which you hear the verifier node, and it hears the announcer, can distinguish legitimate neighbor
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 14
Verifier Region
v
zone (B, A) = 4zone (V, A) = 3
1
23
4
5 6
A verifier must satisfy these two properties:1. Be heard by B in a different zone:
zone (B, A) ≠ zone (B, V)
2. B and V hear A in different zones: zone (B, A) ≠ zone (V, A)
zone (B, A) = 4zone (B, V) = 5
(one more constraint will be explained soon)
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 15
V
Verified Neighbor Discovery
1. A Region Announcement, done through sequential sweeping2. B A Include nonce and zone information in the message3. A B Check zone information and send back the nonce
A B 4. INQUIRY | IDB | IDA | zone (B, A)
5. IDV | EKBV (IDA | zone (V, B))
Same asbefore
4. B Region Request for verifier to validate A5. V B If V is a valid verifier, sends confirmation6. B A Accept A as its neighbor and notify A
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 16
Verifier Analysis
v
B
A
Region 1
Region 2
X
Y
1
23
4
5 6
1
23
4
5 6
Wormhole cannot trick a valid verifier:zone (V, A [Y]) = 5zone (A, V [X]) = 1 Not opposites: verification fails
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 17
Worawannotai Attackv
B
A
Region 1
Region 2
X
1
23
5 6
23
4
5 6
V hearsA and B directly
A and B hear V directly
But, A and B hear each other only through repeated X
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 18
Preventing Attack
1. zone (B, A) zone (B, V) 2. zone (B, A) zone (V, A)3. zone (B, V) cannot be both adjacent to zone (B, A)
and adjacent to zone (V, A)
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 19
Cost Analysis
• Communication Overhead– Minimal– Establishing link keys typically requires
announcement, challenge and response– Adds messages for inquiry, verification and
acceptance
• Connectivity– How many legitimate links are lost because
they cannot be verified?
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 20
Lose Some Legitimate Links
0
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0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Lin
k D
isco
nn
ect
ion
Pro
ba
bili
ty
Node Distance (r)
Verified Protocol
Strict Protocol(Preventing
W Attack)
Network Density = 10
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1Node Distance (r)
0
Verified Protocol
Strict Protocol(Preventing
W Attack)
Network Density = 3
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 21
…but small effect on connectivity and routing
0
1
2
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4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Ave
rag
e P
ath
Le
ng
th
Omnidirectional Node Density
Strict Protocol
Trust All
Verified Protocol
Network with density = 10
Verified protocol: 0.5% links are lost no nodes disconnectedStrict protocol: 40% links are lost 0.03% nodes disconnected
(More details and experiments in paper)
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 22
Vulnerabilities
• Attacker with multiple wormhole endpoints– Can create packets coming from different
directions to appear neighborly
• Magnet Attacks– Protocol depends on compass alignment of
nodes
• Antenna, orientation inaccuracies– Real transmissions are not perfect wedges
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 23
Conclusion/Moral• An attacker with few resources and no
crypto keys can substantially disrupt a network with a wormhole attack
• Mr. Rogers was right: “Be a good neighbor”– If you know your neighbors, can detect
wormhole– Need to cooperate with your neighbors to
know who your legitimate neighbors are
NDSS 2004 Hu and Evans, UVa 24
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans/ndss04