US v Epstein

8/9/2019 US v Epstein

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*FOR PUBLICATION*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTDISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

____________________________

:UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, :: Cr . No. 14- 287 ( FLW):

Pl ai nt i f f , :: OPINION

v . ::

MENDEL EPSTEI N, J AY :GOLDSTEI N, DAVI D ARYEH :EPSTEI N, and :BI NYAMI N STI MLER, :

:Def endant s. :

____________________________:

WOLFSON , United States District Judge :

Def endant s Rabbi Mendel Epst ei n, Rabbi J ay Gol dst ei n,

Davi d Epst ei n and Rabbi Bi nyami n St i ml er ( col l ect i vel y,

“Def endant s” ) , have been charged wi t h mul t i pl e ki dnappi ng-

r el at ed cr i mes al l egedl y i nvol vi ng coer ci ve get s obt ai ned

f r om J ewi sh husbands i n Or t hodox J ewi sh di vor ce pr oceedi ngs.

Bef or e and dur i ng t r i al , t he Cour t has deci ded numerous

evi dent i ar y i ssues r ai sed by Def endant s. Whi l e t hose

r ul i ngs have been pl aced on t he r ecor d, t he Cour t expands

upon, i n t hi s wr i t t en Opi ni on, i ssues concer ni ng Def endant s’

r el i gi ous- based def enses and ar gument s. Speci f i cal l y,

Def endant s s eek t he di smi ssal of t he Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment

on t he basi s t hat t he Rel i gi ous Fr eedom Rest or at i on Act

1

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( “RFRA”) f or bi ds t hei r pr osecut i on. I n t hat connect i on, on

si mi l ar gr ounds, Bi nyami n St i ml er ( “St i ml er ”) had moved t o

sever hi s t r i al . Al t er nat i vel y, Def endant s seek t o

i nt r oduce evi dence of t hei r Or t hodox rel i gi ous bel i ef s t o

negat e t hei r cr i mi nal i nt ent and mount a consent def ense t o

ki dnappi ng. The Government has opposed t hese m ot i ons. For

t he r easons set f or t h on t he r ecor d, and f or t he r easons set

f or t h i n t hi s Opi ni on, Def endant s’ mot i ons ar e DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On Sept ember 11, 2014, a gr and j ur y i n Tr ent on, New

J er sey, r et ur ned a f i ve- count Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment agai nst

Bi nyami n St i ml er , Mendel Epst ei n, J ay Gol dst ei n

( “Gol dst ei n”) , and Davi d Ar yeh Epst ei n. 1 Def endant s ar e al l

Or t hodox J ewi sh men and t hei r pr osecut i ons ar i se out of

al l egat i ons t hat Def endant s engaged i n cr i mi nal means t o

f aci l i t at e Or t hodox J ewi sh di vor ces.

Accor di ng t o t he Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment , t o ef f ect uat e

an Or t hodox J ewi sh di vor ce, a husband must pr ovi de hi s wi f e

wi t h a document known as a “get . ” See Super . I nd. at ¶ 1( i ) .

A get ser ves as document ar y pr oof of t he di ssol ut i on of a

mar r i age under J ewi sh l aw, and a di vor ce cannot be ef f ect ed

1 Two addi t i onal def endant s wer e named i n t hi s i ndi ct ment ;however , f or r easons not r el evant t o t hi s Opi ni on, t hesedef endant s ar e not a par t of t he pendi ng t r i al .

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unt i l a get i s gi ven by t he husband. The get i s a dat ed and

wi t nessed document wher ei n t he husband expr esses hi s

i nt ent i on t o di vor ce hi s wi f e and sever al l t i es wi t h her .

The get i s wr i t t en by an exper t scr i be, known as a “sof er , ”

who act s as t he husband’ s agent . Af t er t he get i s wr i t t en

by t he sof er , t he husband hands i t t o hi s wi f e i n t he

pr esence of t wo wi t nesses, who al so si gn t he get . A wi f e

may al so have an agent accept on her behal f . Once t he

mar r i age i s di ssol ved, a r abbi ni cal cour t , known as a “bet h

di n, ” wi l l gi ve bot h par t i es a cer t i f i cat e conf i r mi ng t hei r

new mar i t al st at us. Id. at ¶ 1( i ) .

I f a husband r ef uses t o gi ve hi s wi f e a get , t he wi f e

may sue f or di vor ce i n a bet h di n, whi ch may order t he

husband t o i ssue t he get . Id. I f t he husband does not

compl y, he may be subj ect ed t o var i ous penal t i es t o pr essur e

hi m i nt o consent i ng t o t he di vor ce. Id. A woman whose

husband wi l l not gi ve her a get i s known as an “agunah”

( “agunot ” i n pl ur al ) , a chai ned woman who cannot r emar r y.

Id.

Count I of t he Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment char ges al l

Def endant s wi t h conspi r acy t o commi t ki dnappi ng. The obj ect

of t hi s conspi r acy was t o obt ai n money f r om t he agunot and

t o t hr eat en and coer ce J ewi sh husbands t o gi ve t hei r wi ves

get s , i . e. , ki dnappi ngs . Id. at ¶ 3. The r emai ni ng f our

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Count s char ge t he var i ous Def endant s wi t h t hr ee ki dnappi ngs

and one at t empt ed ki dnappi ng; t he conduct al l eged i n t hese

subst ant i ve count s are al so al l eged i n Count I as par t of

t he over t act s i n t he conspi r acy char ge. 2

Sever al of t he def endant s’ ar r est s st emmed f r om a

“st i ng” oper at i on 3 i n whi ch t wo under cover FBI agent s posed

as an agunah and her br ot her . Id. at ¶ 7( d) . I n summar y, t he

I ndi ct ment al l eges t hat Mendel Epst ei n char ged t he

under cover agent s appr oxi mat el y $10, 000 f or Mendel Epst ei n

t o ar r ange f or t he ki dnappi ng and beat i ng of t he f i ct i t i ous

husband i n or der t o coer ce hi m t o gi ve a get . Id. at ¶ 7( i ) .

The under cover agent s wi r ed Mendel Epst ei n an addi t i onal

$20, 000 on Oct ober 2, 2013, and t he agent s were i nst r uct ed

t o pay t he f i nal $30, 000 at t he t i me of t he f i ct i t i ous

ki dnappi ng. Id. at ¶ 7( u) . Ul t i mat el y, Def endant s St i ml er

and Gol dst ei n wer e ar r est ed at t he scene of t he pur por t ed

ki dnappi ng.

The Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment f ur t her ass er t s t hr ee act ual

ki dnappi ngs, wher ei n t he var i ous def endant s ar e accused of

2 Speci f i cal l y, Count 2 char ges Davi d Epst ei n wi t h a 2009ki dnappi ng; Count 3 charges Mendel Epst ei n, Davi d Epst ei n,and Gol dst ei n wi t h a 2010 ki dnappi ng; Count 4 char gesGol dst ei n, Davi d Epst ei n, and St i ml er wi t h a 2011ki dnappi ng; and Count 5 char ges Mendel Epst ei n, Gol dst ei n,and St i ml er wi t h an at t empt ed ki dnappi ng i n 2013.

3 The event s of t he st i ng oper at i on ar e al so t he basi s f ort he subst ant i ve at t empt ed ki dnappi ng char ge i n Count 5.

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act i ng wi t h ot her s t o ki dnap J ewi sh men and coer ce t hem t o

agr ee t o gi ve t hei r wi ves get s. See Id. at ¶ 7( a) t o ¶ 7( c) .

As par t of t hese ki dnappi ngs, Def endant s ar e accused of

t yi ng up and beat i ng t he vi ct i m- husbands. 4 Id.

DISCUSSION

I. RFRA

St i ml er , j oi ned by hi s co- def endant s, moves t o di smi ss

t he Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment under Fed. R. Cr i m. P. 12( b) on

t he basi s t hat Def endant s’ cr i mi nal pr osecut i on woul d

vi ol at e RFRA. I ndeed, t he Act r equi r es t hat t he Gover nment

“shal l not subst ant i al l y bur den a per son' s exer ci se of

r el i gi on even i f t he bur den r esul t s f r om a r ul e of gener al

appl i cabi l i t y, ” unl ess “t he appl i cat i on of t he bur den t o t he

per son - - ( 1) i s i n f ur t her ance of a compel l i ng gover nment

i nt er est ; and ( 2) i s t he l east r est r i ct i ve means of

f ur t her i ng t hat compel l i ng gover nment i nt er est . ” 42 U. S. C. §

2000bb- 1( a) t o 1( b) ; Holt v. Hobbs , 135 S. Ct . 853, 860

( 2015) . Fur t her mor e, “[ a] per son whose r el i gi ous exer ci se

has been bur dened i n vi ol at i on of t hi s s ect i on may asser t

4 I n hi s Mot i on, St i ml er cl ai ms t hat pr i or t o t he event s oft he “st i ng, ” St i ml er had act ed as a wi t ness i n J ewi shdi vor ces, wher ei n husbands wi l l i ngl y aut hor i zed t he get .St i ml er Br . at 4. I n t hat r egar d, accor di ng t o St i ml er , hewas asked t o accompany cer t ai n i ndi vi dual s t o New J er sey ont he dat e of t he st i ng oper at i on t o act as a wi t ness. Id. St i ml er asser t s t hat he di d not par t i ci pat e i n, nor di d hehave any knowl edge of , any vi ol ence or ki dnappi ng i nconnect i on wi t h t he get pr oceedi ng. Id. at 5.

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t hat vi ol at i on as a cl ai m or def ense i n a j udi ci al

pr oceedi ng and obt ai n appr opr i at e r el i ef agai nst a

gover nment . ” Id. at § 2000bb- 1( c) .

I nvoki ng RFRA, Def endant s i nsi st t hat t hei r pr osecut i on

subst ant i al l y bur dens t hei r Or t hodox r el i gi ous bel i ef s, and

t hat even i f t he Gover nment has a compel l i ng i nt er est , t he

pr osecut i on of Def endant s i s not t he l east r est r i ct i ve means

of f ur t her i ng t hat i nt er est . St i ml er ar gues, i n t he

al t er nat i ve, t hat hi s pr osecut i on, separ at e and apar t f r om

t he ot her t hr ee def endant s, vi ol at es RFRA. 5 Si mpl y put , i t

i s Def endant s’ posi t i on t hat an except i on t o t he ki dnappi ng

st at ut es exi st s because t he al l eged ki dnappi ngs wer e done i n

f ur t her ance of si ncer el y hel d r el i gi ous bel i ef s. That

posi t i on i s not sust ai nabl e.

For one, I concl ude t hat t he Gover nment ’ s deci si on t o

pr osecut e Def endant s does not const i t ut e a subst ant i al

bur den on Def endant s’ r el i gi ous exer ci se. Fur t her , even i f

a subst ant i al bur den does exi st , I f i nd t hat t he Gover nment

has a compel l i ng i nt er est i n pr event i ng cr i mes of vi ol ence,

5 St i ml er addi t i onal l y cl ai ms t hat a cr i mi nal pr osecut i onwhi ch vi ol at es RFRA shoul d be t er mi nat ed bef or e t r i al .St i ml er Br . at 5. Thi s poi nt i s not di sput ed by t heGover nment . The Cour t deni ed t hi s mot i on on t he r ecor d pr i ort o t he begi nni ng of t r i al , on J anuar y 28, 2015, r eser vi ngt he r i ght t o f i l e a l at er opi ni on. St i ml er r enewed t hemot i on on Febr uary 17, 2015, af t er t he j ur y had beensel ect ed and one day bef or e openi ng ar gument s.

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and mor eover , t he ar r est and pr osecut i on of i ndi vi dual s who

vi ol at e such cr i mi nal l aws i s t he l east r est r i ct i ve means of

enf or ci ng t hat i nt er es t .

1. Substantial Burden on Religion

St i ml er ar gues t hat pr osecut i on of t he def endant s i n t hi s

case subst ant i al l y bur dens t he exer ci se of t hei r r el i gi on.

St i ml er Br . at 7. I n suppor t of t hat posi t i on, St i ml er

of f er s t he exper t decl ar at i on of Rabbi Yi t zchok Br ei t owi t z,

who st at es t hat i t i s a “mi t zvah” - - t hat i s , a r el i gi ous

commandment - - t o serve as a wi t ness t o a get , and t o ass i st

an agunah i n obt ai ni ng a get . St i ml er Br . at 9–10,

Br ei t owi t z Decl . at ¶¶ 13, 14, 16. On J anuar y 28, 2015, t hi s

Cour t r ul ed on t he r ecor d t hat St i ml er had not shown a

subst ant i al bur den on hi s r el i gi ous pr act i ce, because t her e

was no evi dence t hat hi s r el i gi on r equi r ed t he use of f or ce.

Fol l owi ng t hi s r ul i ng, St i ml er submi t t ed a Suppl ement ar y

Decl ar at i on of Rabbi Br ei t owi t z, whi ch st at es t hat J ewi sh

l aw aut hor i zes “cer t ai n f or ms of f or ce, ” and t hat f r eei ng an

agunah “i s a ‘ mi t zvah’ even i f f or ce i s necessar y t o secur e

t he husband’ s expr essi on of consent . ” Br ei t owi t z Supp. Decl .

at ¶ 6. The Gover nment , r espondi ng t o t he Suppl ement al

Decl ar at i on, asser t s t hat even i f J ewi sh l aw per mi t s t he use

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of vi ol ence t o obt ai n a get , 6 i t does not condone t he use of

vi ol ence i n exchange f or money. 7 Gov’ t Renewed Br . at 7–8.

“Whet her a bur den i s ‘ subst ant i al ’ under RFRA i s a

quest i on of l aw, not a quest i on of f act . ” Geneva Coll. v.

Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , __ F. 3d __ , __

No. 13- 3536, 2015 WL 543067, at *13 ( 3d Ci r . Feb. 11, 2015) .

I n a case l i ke t hi s, a subst ant i al bur den exi st s wher e “‘ t he

gover nment put s subst ant i al pr essur e on an adherent t o

subst ant i al l y modi f y hi s behavi or and t o vi ol at e hi s

bel i ef s. ’ ” Id. ( quot i ng Washington v. Klem, 497 F. 3d 272,

280 ( 3d Ci r . 2007) ) . Conver sel y, t her e i s no subst ant i al

bur den “i f t he government act i on does not coer ce t he

i ndi vi dual s t o vi ol at e t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s or deny t hem

‘ t he r i ght s, benef i t s, and pr i vi l eges enj oyed by ot her

ci t i zens. ’ ” Id. ( quot i ng Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery

Protective Ass’n , 485 U. S. 439, 449 ( 1988) ) . Whi l e t he

def i ni t i on i s expansi ve, t he t est does not mean t hat “ any

i nci dent al ef f ect of a gover nment pr ogr am whi ch may have

some t endency t o coer ce i ndi vi dual s i nt o act i ng cont r ar y t o

6 The Gover nment has conceded t hat t hat under cer t ai n J ewi sh aut hor i t y, “coer ci ve” act s i ncl udes vi ol ent and non-vi ol ent means. See Tr anscr i pt , Febr uar y 19, 2015, T45: 10-15.

7 I not e t hat St i ml er cont ends t hat as a wi t ness, he di dnot r ecei ve any money f or hi s act i ons. See infra , pp. 24-25.

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t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s sat i sf i es t he subst ant i al bur den

st andar d. ” Klem , 497 F. 3d at 279. I mpor t ant l y, not ever y

bur den i s subst ant i al ; “RFRA' s r ef er ence t o ‘ subst ant i al ’

bur dens expr essl y cal l s f or a qual i t at i ve assessment of t he

bur den t hat t he accommodat i on i mposes on t he . . . exer ci se

of r el i gi on. ” Geneva Coll. , __ F. 3d at __, at *13.

One way t o qual i t at i vel y assess t he bur den t hat a

gover nment pr act i ce pl aces on r el i gi ous exer ci se i s t o

consi der whet her an adher ent has accept abl e al t er nat i ve

means t o pr act i ce hi s r el i gi on. For exampl e, i n Klem , 8 an

i nmat e ar gued t hat hi s r el i gi on r equi r ed t hat he r ead f our

books a day, and t hat t he Pennsyl vani a Depar t ment of

Cor r ect i ons’ ( “DOC”) pol i cy whi ch onl y per mi t t ed t he i nmat e

t o keep t en books i n hi s cel l at one t i me const i t ut ed a

subst ant i al bur den on hi s r el i gi ous exer ci se. Id. at 275.

Whi l e t he Thi r d Ci r cui t agr eed wi t h t he i nmat e’ s posi t i on,

Id. at 282, t he Ci r cui t , nonet hel ess, quer i ed whet her

al t er nat i ves pr esent ed by t he DOC - - t hat t he i nmat e coul d

r ead books i n t he l i br ar y or t r ade books – suf f i ci ent l y

al l owed t he i nmat e t o exer ci se hi s r el i gi ous r equi r ement s.

Id. The cour t hel d t hat t hese al t er nat i ves wer e

8 Al t hough t he Thi r d Ci r cui t , i n Klem , anal yzed t hedef i ni t i on of “subst ant i al bur den” i n t he cont ext of t heRel i gi ous Land Use and I nst i t ut i onal i zed Per sons Act of2000, t hi s t est has been used i nt er changeabl y i n t he RFRAcont ext . See Geneva Coll . , __ F. 3d at __ , at *13.

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i nsuf f i ci ent : t he i nmat e coul d onl y go t o t he l i br ar y once a

week and coul d onl y t ake out f our books each t i me, and t he

r ecor d di d not show t hat t he i nmat e was permi t t ed t o t r ade

books wi t hi n t he pr i son. Id. Thus, absent any meani ngf ul

al t er nat i ves, t he pr i son pr act i ce was a subst ant i al bur den

on t he i nmat e’ s r el i gi ous exer ci se. See Cheffer v. Reno , 55

F. 3d 1517, 1522 ( 11t h Ci r . 1995) ( no subst ant i al bur den when

r el i gi on di d not r equi r e par t i cul ar means of expr essi ng

r el i gi ous vi ew and al t er nat i ve means of r el i gi ous expr essi on

wer e avai l abl e) ; Weir v. Nix , 114 F. 3d 817 ( 8t h Ci r . 1997)

( consi der i ng al t er nat i ves i n det er mi ni ng whet her bur den was

"subs t ant i al " ) ; Henderson v. Kennedy , 253 F. 3d 12, 17 ( D. C.

Ci r . 2001) ( f i ndi ng t hat t her e i s no " subst ant i al bur den"

wher e al t er nat i ves wer e avai l abl e) ; see, e.g., Patel v. U.S.

Bureau of Prisons , 515 F. 3d 807, 813–14 ( 8t h Ci r . 2008)

( f i ndi ng t hat BOP’ s r ef usal t o pr ovi de hal al meat meal s di d

not const i t ut e a subst ant i al bur den on i nmat e’ s r el i gi on

wher e i nmat e had not “exhaust ed al t er nat i ve means of

accommodat i ng hi s r el i gi ous di et ar y needs”) ; Watkins v.

Shabazz , 180 F. App' x 773, 775 ( 9t h Ci r . 2006) ( hol di ng t hat

t her e was no subst ant i al bur den because def endant s gave t he

i nmat e t wo al t er nat i ves- - eat i ng t he nut r i t i onal l y adequat e

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meat - subst i t ut e meal s or f i ndi ng an out si de or gani zat i on t o

pr ovi de hal al meat ) . 9

Here, Def endant s ar e accused of conspi r acy t o commi t

ki dnappi ng and ki dnappi ng, and t he under l yi ng f act ual

al l egat i ons i ncl ude act s of vi ol ence. These act s wer e done,

accor di ng t o Def endant s, i n pur sui t of a val i d r el i gi ous

obj ect i ve: obt ai ni ng a get f or an agunah. Accor di ng t o Rabbi

Br ei t owi t z, an i ndi vi dual “woul d be per f or mi ng a ‘ mi t zvah’

i f he j oi ned an ef f or t t o secur e consent t o t he wr i t i ng of a

get f r om a r ecal ci t r ant husband even i f he ant i ci pat ed t hat

. . . physi cal coer ci on woul d be needed t o overcome t he

husband’ s per si st ence i n r ef usi ng t o aut hor i ze a get . ” Supp.

Br ei t owi t z Decl . at ¶ 10.

Ther e i s no di sput e t hat f aci l i t at i ng an agunah t o

obt ai n a get i s par t of Def endant s’ r el i gi ous exer ci se.

And, whi l e t her e i s consi der abl e debat e i n t he J ewi sh

communi t y r egar di ng t he use of f or ce i n obt ai ni ng a get , I

nonet hel ess accept f or t he pur poses of t hi s Opi ni on t hat

J ewi sh l aw per mi t s t he use of vi ol ence or f or ce t o obt ai n a

get f r om a r ecal ci t r ant husband. However , t her e i s al so no

9 I t i s wor t h ment i oni ng t hat , t hough not appl i cabl e t o t hecase at hand, t he t est t o det er mi ne t he val i di t y of a pr i sonr egul at i on whi ch i mpi nges on pr i soner s’ const i t ut i onalr i ght s i ncl udes as one f act or “whet her i nmat es r et ai nal t er nat i ve means of exer ci si ng t he ci r cumscr i bed r i ght . ”DeHart v. Horn , 290 F. 3d 262, 269 ( 3d Ci r . 2004) ; see Turnerv. Safley , 482 U. S. 78, 90 ( 1987) .

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di sput e t hat t her e ar e al t er nat i ve means of coer ci on t o

per f or m t hi s mi t zvah. For exampl e, Rabbi Br ei t owi t z not es

t hat i n t he st at e of I sr ael , non- vi ol ent means are used by

t he gover nment t o obt ai n get s, namel y j ai l i ng t he husband or

pr ohi bi t i ng t hei r exi t f r om t he count r y. Br ei t owi t z Decl . at

¶ 16. Even i n t hi s count r y, as not ed by Rabbi Br ei t owi t z,

t he St at e of New Yor k has enact ed l aws t o penal i ze husbands

who i mpose “a bar r i er t o r emar r i age. ” Supp. Br ei t owi t z Decl .

at ¶ 3, N. Y. Dom. Rel . Law. §§ 253, 236B. Whi l e t her e may

not be secul ar l aws i n ot her st at es i n t hi s r egar d,

accor di ng t o Rabbi Br ei t owi t z, t he names of husbands who

r ef use t o aut hor i ze a get can be publ i shed i n The Jewish

Press “so t hat t he r eadi ng publ i c wi l l hol d t hem i n

di sr eput e. ” Br ei t owi t z Supp. Decl . at ¶ 3. Thi s i s but onl y

one exampl e of a means used t o shun and embar r ass a

r ecal ci t r ant husband. I n sum, t hese exampl es al l i ndi cat e

t hat whi l e f r eei ng an agunah i s a mi t zvah, J ewi sh l aw

pr ovi des al t er nat i ves t o ki dnappi ng or vi ol ence t o do so.

These al t er nat i ve and meani ngf ul means of obt ai ni ng a get –

e.g. , publ i c shami ng or ut i l i zi ng t he secul ar l aw - - do not

vi ol at e t he cri mi nal l aws of t he Uni t ed St at es, yet st i l l

per mi t Or t hodox J ews t o par t i ci pat e i n t he mi t zvah of

f r eei ng agunot .

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On t he f ace of t he I ndi ct ment , i t i s uncl ear whet her

al l non- vi ol ent met hods wer e exhaust ed bef or e t he al l eged

ki dnappi ngs t ook pl ace her e. That f act , however , does not

change t hi s Cour t ’ s anal ysi s. I ndeed, i f Def endant s had

accept abl e r el i gi ous al t er nat i ves - - i nst ead of r esor t i ng t o

vi ol at i ng t he cr i mi nal l aws - - I f i nd t hat t he Gover nment ’ s

appl i cat i on of t he ki dnappi ng l aws t o Def endant s her e does

not subst ant i al l y Def endant s’ r el i gi ous exer ci se.

Never t hel ess , even i f Def endant s had exhaust ed al l ot her

avai l abl e non- vi ol ent means of coer ci ng a husband t o gi ve

hi s wi f e a get , and t he onl y r emai ni ng met hod of coer ci on,

as ar gued by Def endant s, i s t hr ough vi ol ence or f or ce, i . e. ,

ki dnappi ng, I r emai n convi nced t hat woul d not amount t o a

subst ant i al bur den. Thi s Cour t has not f ound any aut hor i t y

condoni ng t he use of vi ol ence under t he gui se of r el i gi on,

and mor e i mpor t ant l y, no case has f ound t he Gover nment ’ s

appl i cat i on of vi ol ent cri me l aws t o cer t ai n r el i gi ous

pr act i ces i s a subst ant i al bur den.

2. Compelling Interest

Even assumi ng Def endant s coul d pr ove a subst ant i al

bur den on t hei r r el i gi on as a r esul t of t hei r pr osecut i on,

t he RFRA chal l enge f ai l s under t he r emai ni ng t wo pr ongs of

t he t est . As t o t he f i r st of t he t wo el ement s, t he

Gover nment has t he bur den of demonst r at i ng t hat t he l aw

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whi ch const i t ut es a subst ant i al bur den on an i ndi vi dual ’ s

r el i gi on f ur t her s a compel l i ng gover nment al i nt er est .

Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal ,

546 U. S. 418, 429 ( 2006) . On t hi s i ssue, St i ml er posi t s t hat

“det er r ence of possi bl e f ut ur e ef f or t s t o use vi ol ent means

t o coer ce r ecal ci t r ant husbands t o aut hor i ze t he wr i t i ng of

a ‘ get ’ ” i s not a compel l i ng i nt er est . St i ml er Br . at 11. To

cont r ar y, t he Gover nment mai nt ai ns t hat pr osecut i ng cr i mes

of vi ol ence i s compel l i ng. Gov’ t Br . at 16.

When det er mi ni ng whet her a gover nment act i on ser ves a

compel l i ng i nt er est , i t i s not suf f i ci ent t o use br oad

t erms; RFRA “cont empl at es a more f ocused i nqui r y. ” Burwell

v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. , 134 S. Ct . 2751, 2779 ( 2014) .

Thus, even i f t he gover nment can show t hat t he l aw i s i n

f ur t her ance of a gener al i zed compel l i ng i nt er est , t he

gover nment must pr ove t hat “t he compel l i ng i nt er est i s

sat i sf i ed t hr ough appl i cat i on of t he l aw ‘ t o t he Per son’ —

t he par t i cul ar cl ai mant whose si ncer e exer ci se of r el i gi on

i s bei ng subst ant i al l y bur dened. ” Gonzales v. O Centro

Espirita , 546 U. S. 418, 430–31 ( 2006) . For exampl e, i n

Yoder , t he Supr eme Cour t f ound t hat “Wi sconsi n' s i nt er est i n

compel l i ng t he school at t endance of Ami sh chi l dr en t o age 16

emerges as somewhat l ess [ compel l i ng] t han r equi r i ng such

at t endance f or chi l dr en gener al l y. ” Wisconsin v. Yoder , 406

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U. S. 205, 228–29 ( 1972) . The Cour t r easoned t hat whi l e

“compul sor y educat i on f or a year or t wo beyond t he ei ght h

gr ade may be necessary when i t s goal i s t he pr eparat i on of

t he chi l d f or l i f e i n moder n soci et y as t he maj or i t y l i ve, ”

t he same di d not appl y “i f t he goal of educat i on be vi ewed

as t he pr epar at i on of t he chi l d f or l i f e i n t he separ at ed

agr ar i an communi t y t hat i s t he keyst one of t he Ami sh f ai t h. ”

Id. at 222. Thus, t he Supr eme Cour t advi sed t hat i n f i ndi ng

a compel l i ng i nt er est , t he det er mi nat i on must be t ai l or ed

speci f i cal l y t o t he gr oup of r el i gi ous adher ent s. I n t hat

r egar d, t he “t o t he per son” anal ysi s, her e, appl i es t o t he

gr oup of def endant s i n t hi s case as adher ent s t o Or t hodox

J udai sm, not mer el y as t o t he general publ i c. Wi t h t hat i n

mi nd, I wi l l t ur n t o Def endant s’ ar gument s.

To begi n, St i ml er ar gues t hat t he Supr eme Cour t ’ s

deci si on i n O Centro and i t s l i ne of cases suppor t a f i ndi ng

t hat t he Gover nment ’ s appl i cat i on of t he ki dnappi ng- r el at ed

st at ut es t o Def endant ’ s conduct i s not a compel l i ng

i nt er est . St i ml er r easons t hat O Centro st ands f or t he

br oad l egal pr oposi t i on t hat cr i mi nal pr osecut i on of

i ndi vi dual s who ar e engaged i n per f or mance of t hei r

r el i gi ousl y mandat ed dut i es i s not a gover nment al compel l i ng

i nt er es t . I di sagr ee.

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I n O Centro , t he Supr eme Cour t uphel d a di st r i ct

cour t ’ s deci si on hol di ng t hat RFRA pr ot ect ed t he use of

hoasca, a Schedul e 1 dr ug, by a r el i gi ous or gani zat i on, O

Cent r o Espi r i t a Benef i ci ent e Uni ao do Veget al ( “UDV”) . The

Cour t agr eed t hat t he gover nment had not shown t hat “heal t h

or di ver si on concer ns pr ovi de a compel l i ng i nt er est i n

banni ng UDV’ s sacr ament al use of hoasca , ” and t hat t he

gover nment “has not of f er ed evi dence demonst r at i ng t hat

gr ant i ng t he UDV an exempt i on woul d cause t he ki nd of

admi ni st r at i ve har m r ecogni zed as a compel l i ng i nt er est . ”

546 U. S. at 436. The Supr eme Cour t acknowl edged t hat

“Schedul e I subst ances such as DMT are except i onal l y

danger ous, ” but st at ed t hat “[ t ] he quest i on of t he har ms

f r om t he sacr ament al use of hoasca by t he UDV was l i t i gat ed

bel ow. [ T] he Di st r i ct Cour t f ound t hat t he Gover nment had

not car r i ed i t s bur den of showi ng a compel l i ng i nt er est i n

pr event i ng such harms” , id. at 432, despi t e t he par t i es, i n

t he di st r i ct cour t , havi ng pr esent ed ext ensi ve evi dence on

t he danger ousness of hoasca, speci f i cal l y i n t he cont ext of

r el i gi ous use. O Centro Espirita v. Ashcroft , 282 F. Supp.

2d 1236, 1255–62 ( D. N. M. 2002) ( descr i bi ng evi dence whi ch

i ncl uded: st udy whi ch “compar ed f i f t een l ong- t er m member s of

t he UDV, who had dr unk hoasca f or sever al year s, wi t h

f i f t een cont r ol subj ect s who had never used hoasca”;

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obser vat i ons of r esear cher s t hat “t he UDV had const r uct ed a

cer emoni al st r uct ur e f or t hei r r i t ual use of hoasca t hat

opt i mi zed saf et y and mi ni mi zed t he l i kel i hood of adver se

consequences”; and “t he at t ent i on t hat UDV l eader shi p has

pai d t o t he danger of adver se dr ug i nt er act i ons. ”) . The

Supr eme Cour t addi t i onal l y r ej ect ed t he ar gument t hat “t he

Cont r ol l ed Subst ances Act est abl i shes a cl osed r egul at or y

syst em t hat admi t s of no except i ons under RFRA, ” f i ndi ng

t hat t he l ong- st andi ng except i on t o t he l aw f or t he

r el i gi ous use of peyot e f at al l y under mi ned t he cl ai m. Id. at

434–35.

The f act s i n O Centro ar e whol l y di f f er ent f r om t he

ci r cumst ances i n t hi s case. Whi l e t he O Centro Cour t was

concer ned wi t h t he r el i gi ous par t i ci pant s’ r i ght t o use

cont r ol l ed subst ances f or t hei r own use, i n t hi s case,

Def endant s’ pur por t ed use of f or ce t o ef f ect uat e a mi t zvah

i nvol ves ki dnappi ng and even physi cal vi ol ence t o ot her s.

Even mor e compel l i ng, t he Supr eme Cour t i n O Centro f ound

t hat t her e was l i t t l e evi dence t o demonst r at e t he t ype of

har m t o t he r el i gi ous per sonal dr ug user s t hat t he

gover nment t her e pr of f er ed. Thus, t he Cour t f ound t hat t he

gover nment ’ s st at ed i nt er est t o pr ot ect t he heal t h of t hose

r el i gi ous user s was not a compel l i ng one. To t he cont r ar y,

t he Gover nment ’ s i nt er est , her e, i s t o pr ot ect t he heal t h

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and saf et y of t hose i ndi vi dual s who wer e vi ct i ms of

Def endant s’ al l eged vi ol ence and ki dnappi ng. Accor di ngl y, I

f i nd O Centro di s t i ngui shabl e.

I mpor t ant l y, however , t he Supr eme Cour t advi sed, i n O

Centro, t hat “t here may be i nst ances i n whi ch a need f or

uni f or mi t y pr ecl udes t he r ecogni t i on of except i ons t o

gener al l y appl i cabl e l aws under RFRA. ” Id. at 437. I ndeed,

pr i or case l aw has r ecogni zed a need f or uni f or m enf or cement

of a par t i cul ar cat egor y of l aw. For exampl e, i n denyi ng a

chal l enge by t he Ami sh t o t he r equi r ement s t hat t hey pay

Soci al Secur i t y t axes, t he Supr eme Cour t f ound t hat “t he

Gover nment ' s i nt er est i n assur i ng mandat ory and cont i nuous

par t i ci pat i on i n and cont r i but i on t o t he soci al secur i t y

syst em i s ver y hi gh, ” and t hat “ i t woul d be di f f i cul t t o

accommodat e t he compr ehensi ve soci al secur i t y syst em wi t h

myr i ad except i ons f l owi ng f r om a wi de var i et y of r el i gi ous

bel i ef s . ” United States v. Lee , 455 U. S. 252, 258–59, 260

( 1982) ; see Adams v. C.I.R. , 170 F. 3d 173, 178 ( 3d Ci r .

1999) ( “uni f or m, mandat or y par t i ci pat i on i n t he Feder al

i ncome t ax syst em, i r r espect i ve of r el i gi ous bel i ef , i s a

compel l i ng gover nment al i nt er est . . . . As a r esul t ,

r equi r i ng pet i t i oner ' s par t i ci pat i on i n t he Feder al i ncome

t ax syst em i s t he onl y, and t hus t he l east r es t r i c t i ve,

means of f ur t her i ng t he Gover nment ' s i nt er est . ”) . Thus,

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har m”) ; United States v. Mullet , 868 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624

( S. D. Ohi o 2012) ( “vi ol ence i s not a pr ot ect ed f or m of

r el i gi ous exer ci se”) ; see also Chatwin v. United States , 325

U. S. 455, 460 ( 1946) ( “bona f i de r el i gi ous bel i ef s cannot

absol ve one f r om l i abi l i t y under t he Feder al Ki dnappi ng

Act . ” ) ; Davis v. Beason , 133 U. S. 333, 345 ( 1890) , abrogated

by Romer v. Evans , 517 U. S. 620 ( 1996) ( “Cr i me i s not t he

l ess odi ous because sanct i oned by what any par t i cul ar sect

may desi gnat e as ‘ r el i gi on. ’ ”) ; Reynolds v. United States ,

98 U. S. 145, 166 ( 1878) ( aski ng r het or i cal l y i f “one

bel i eved t hat human sacr i f i ces wer e a necessar y par t of

r el i gi ous wor shi p, ” whet her t he gover nment coul d i nt er f er e

wi t h a human sacr i f i ce) .

I n t hat r egar d, t he l aws pr ohi bi t i ng ki dnappi ng and

conspi r acy t o commi t cr i mes ar e l aws f or whi ch t he need f or

uni f or m enf or cement pr ecl udes t he r ecogni t i on of r el i gi ous

except i on i n t hi s case. I ndeed, I have been unabl e t o f i nd a

si ngl e case wher e RFRA has been used as a successf ul def ense

agai nst pr osecut i on f or cr i mes i nvol vi ng f or ce or vi ol ence.

Cf. Mullet , 868 F. Supp. 2d at 624 ( hol di ng t hat Hat e Cr i mes

Pr event i on Act does not vi ol at e RFRA) ; United States v.

Brock , 863 F. Supp. 851, 866 ( E. D. Wi sc. 1994) ( hol di ng t hat

t he Fr eedom of Access t o Cl i ni c Ent r ances l aw does not

vi ol at e RFRA because “FACE addr esses gover nment al i nt er est s

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i n pr event i ng vi ol ence”) . The Gover nment has t her ef ore shown

a compel l i ng i nt er est i n t he uni f or m appl i cat i on of t he

ki dnappi ng and conspi r acy l aws, and no except i on can be made

f or Def endant s i n t hi s case.

C. Least Restrictive Means

St i ml er asser t s t hat even i f t he Gover nment has a

compel l i ng i nt er est i n pr event i ng vi ol ent means t o coer ce a

husband i nt o pr ovi di ng a get , “i t woul d surel y have been

possi bl e t o achi eve such det er r ence by l ess r est r i ct i ve

means t han t hi s ‘ st i ng’ and subsequent pr osecut i on. ” St i ml er

Br . at 11. St i ml er suggest s t hat t he Uni t ed St at es At t or ney

f or t he Di st r i ct of New J er sey, or t he East er n or Sout her n

Di st r i ct s of New Yor k, coul d have det er r ed t hi s conduct by

“i ssu[ i ng] publ i c st at ement s war ni ng t hat anyone who used

f or ce or at t empt ed t o use f or ce t o coer ce a ‘ get ’ woul d be

pr osecut ed i n a f eder al cr i mi nal pr osecut i on. ” Id. The

Cour t di sagr ees.

The l east - r est r i ct i ve- means st andar d r equi r es a showi ng

t hat t he gover nment “l acks ot her means of achi evi ng i t s

desi r ed goal wi t hout i mposi ng a subst ant i al bur den on t he

exer ci se of r el i gi on by t he obj ect i ng par t i es. ” Burwell v.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct . 2751, 2780 ( 2014) . As

st at ed above, t he Gover nment has a compel l i ng i nt er est i n

t he uni f or m pr event i on of vi ol ence. St i ml er has argued, as

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di scussed supra , t hat t he l aw bur dens t he “mi t zvah” of usi ng

f or ce, i f necessar y, t o obt ai n a get ; t hus, t her e i s no

met hod by whi ch t he Gover nment coul d enf orce i t s i nt er est i n

pr event i ng vi ol ence wi t hout bur deni ng Def endant s’ r el i gi ous

exer ci se. I n t hat r egar d, i n t hi s case, any ef f ect i ve means

t o pr event vi ol ence woul d necessar i l y pr event Def endant s

f r om usi ng t he f or ce, whi ch, accor di ng t o Def endant s, i s

permi t t ed by Or t hodox J udai sm.

I do not f i nd t hat t her e ar e ot her ef f ect i ve means t han

pr osecut i ng t hose who commi t a cr i me of vi ol ence, such as

ki dnappi ng, t o enf or ce t he Gover nment ’ s compel l i ng i nt er est .

St i ml er ’ s suggest i on t hat t he Gover nment coul d have i ssued a

war ni ng cannot be t aken ser i ousl y. Fi r st , t he cl ai m t hat

RFRA r equi r es t he government “t o engage i n af f i r mat i ve

out r each” was r ej ect ed by t he Tent h Ci r cui t i n United States

v. Friday , 525 F. 3d 938, 956–58 ( 10t h Ci r . 2008) . I n t hat

case, t he def endant , a Nat i ve Amer i can, shot a bal d eagl e t o

use i n a r el i gi ous cer emony, and was charged wi t h a

vi ol at i on of t he Bal d and Gol den Eagl e Pr ot ect i on Act . Id.

at 942. The def endant had not appl i ed f or a per mi t t o t ake

an eagl e. Id. at 950. The def endant ar gued t hat RFRA

r equi r ed t he gover nment “t o engage i n af f i r mat i ve out r each

t o ensur e t hat t r i bes are awar e of t he per mi t t i ng pr ocess, ”

and t hat i n t he absence of such out r each, “t he pr ocess i s

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mor e r est r i ct i ve t han necessar y. ” Id. at 956–57. The ci r cui t

panel not ed t hat t he per mi t pr ocess “ i s not a secr et ” and

t hat t he def endant had “at l east as much not i ce as i s gi ven

t o t he aver age cr i mi nal def endant subj ect t o t he l egal

f i ct i on t hat ever yone i s pr esumed t o know t he l aw. ” Id. at

957 ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks, ci t at i on, and al t er at i on

omi t t ed) . The cour t t hen hel d t hat t he gover nment di d not

have t he obl i gat i on t o engage i n out r each, st at i ng “We ar e

awar e of no case under RFRA, or under t he Free Exer ci se

Cl ause pr i or t o t he enact ment of RFRA, i n whi ch t he

gover nment was hel d t o have vi ol at ed f r ee exer ci se r i ght s

because t he af f ect ed r el i gi ous adher ent was unawar e of t he

avai l abi l i t y of an accommodat i on. ” Id. The def endant ,

accor di ng t o t he Tent h Ci r cui t , was not r equest i ng t he

gover nment t o l i f t a r est r i ct i on, but was demandi ng

af f i r mat i ve gover nment assi st ance, whi ch i s “gener al l y

di sf avor ed i n f r ee exer ci se cases. ” Id.

The concl usi on t hat RFRA does not r equi r e t he

gover nment t o r each out t o r el i gi ous groups appl i es wi t h

even gr eat er f or ce her e, wher e t he i ssue i s not Def endant s’

f ai l ur e t o t ake advant age of a r el i gi ous accommodat i on, but

t he appl i cat i on of a neut r al cr i mi nal l aw of gener al

appl i cat i on. As apt l y not ed by t he Tent h Ci r cui t , “‘ [ e] ver y

one i s pr esumed t o know t he l aw. ’ ” Id. ( quot i ng United

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States v. Hodson , 77 U. S. ( 10 Wal l . ) 395, 409 ( 1870) ) ; see

also Cheek v. United States , 498 U. S. 192, 199 ( 1991) ( “The

gener al r ul e t hat i gnor ance of t he l aw or a mi st ake of l aw

i s no def ense t o cr i mi nal pr osecut i on i s deepl y root ed i n

t he Amer i can l egal syst em. ”) . Tel l i ngl y, Def endant s have not

suggest ed t hat t hey wer e unawar e t hat t hei r act i ons were

i l l egal , so i t i s uncl ear how such a war ni ng woul d have been

an ef f ect i ve det er r ent . See, e.g. , U.S. v. Edward , 446 Fed.

Appx. 44, 46 ( 9 t h Ci r . 2011) ( “[a] ppl yi ng t he cr i mi nal l aws

pr ohi bi t i ng possess i on and manuf act ur e of mar i j uana t o Lepp

i s t he l east r est r i ct i ve means of f ur t her i ng t he

gover nment ' s compel l i ng i nt er est i n pr event i ng di ver si on of

sacr ament al mar i j uana t o non- r el i gi ous user s. ”) . Because

t he Government has demonst r at ed a compel l i ng i nt er est i n

pr event i ng vi ol ent cr i mes, and because t her e i s no l ess

r est r i ct i ve means avai l abl e t o t he Government whi ch woul d

not i mpose a bur den on Def endant s’ r el i gi ous exer ci se, RFRA

does not pr ovi de a def ense t o Def endant s i n t hi s case.

D. RFRA As Applied to Stimler

I n addi t i on t o t he ar gument s above, St i ml er ar gues t hat

hi s pr osecut i on, i n par t i cul ar , vi ol at es RFRA. St i ml er Br .

at 11–13. Accor di ng t o t he br i ef , by sol el y act i ng as a

wi t ness of t he get pr oceedi ngs, t he Government has “no

evi dence [ what soever ] t hat [ St i ml er ] par t i ci pat ed i n—or had

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any knowl edge of —pot ent i al vi ol ence t o be commi t t ed by

anyone el se. ” Id. at 11. Fur t her , St i ml er was “pai d not hi ng

and pr omi sed not hi ng f or per f or mi ng t hi s r el i gi ousl y

mandat ed act . ” Id. at 11–12. St i ml er asser t s t hat he “cannot

be hel d l egal l y account abl e f or t he al l egedl y cr i mi nal

obj ect i ves of ot her s i n whose company he was i n on Oct ober

9, 2013. ” Id at 12. St i ml er ar gues f ur t her t hat t he

“gover nment al dut y under RFRA, as i nt erpr et ed and appl i ed i n

t he O Centro case, i s t o make a ‘ mor e f ocused’ eval uat i on of

t he i mpact of gover nment al conduct ‘ t o t he per son. ’ ” Id. at

13.

I n essence, St i ml er mai nt ai ns t hat i f t he evi dence

agai nst hi m i s weak, RFRA r equi r es t hi s Cour t t o di smi ss t he

case because hi s pr osecut i on and t r i al i mpose a bur den on

hi s r el i gi ous exer ci se. I n t hat r egar d, St i ml er ,

essent i al l y, asks t hi s Cour t t o wei gh t he Gover nment ’ s

evi dence agai nst hi m. St i ml er ’ s ar gument s ar e cont r ar y t o

wel l - est abl i shed l aw.

On a mot i on t o di smi ss , a cour t r evi ews t he i ndi ct ment

t o det er mi ne whet her i t :

( 1) cont ai ns t he el ement s of t he of f enses i nt ended t o bechar ged,

( 2) suf f i ci ent l y appr i sed t he def endant of what he must beprepar ed t o meet , and

( 3) al l ows t he def endant t o show wi t h accur acy t o what

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ext ent he may pl ead a f or mer acqui t t al or convi ct i on i n t heevent of a subsequent pr osecut i on.

United States v. Vitillo , 490 F. 3d 314, 321 ( 3d Ci r . 2007) .

Al l f act s al l eged i n t he i ndi ct ment must be t aken ast r ue, and t he cour t i s t o empl oy a " common sense

const r uct i on" t her eof . Uni t ed St at es v. Hodge, 211 F. 3d 74,

76 ( 3d Ci r . 2000) . I ndeed, "no gr eat er speci f i ci t y t han t he

st at ut or y l anguage i s r equi r ed so l ong as t her e i s

suf f i ci ent f act ual or i ent at i on t o per mi t t he def endant t o

pr epare hi s def ense and t o i nvoke doubl e j eopar dy i n t he

event of a subsequent pr osecut i on. " United States v. Bergin ,

650 F. 3d 257, 264 ( 3d Ci r . 2011) ( quot i ng United States v.

Rankin , 870 F. 2d 109, 112 ( 3d Ci r . 1989) ) . Thi s i s a

" nar r ow, l i mi t ed anal ysi s gear ed onl y t owar ds ensur i ng t hat

l egal l y def i ci ent char ges do not go t o a j ur y. " Id. at 268.

I n t hat r egar d, t he Thi r d Ci r cui t made cl ear t hat , al t hough

an i ndi ct ment f ai l s t o st at e an of f ense i f t he f act s al l eged

f al l bel ow t he scope of t he cr i mi nal st at ut e " as a mat t er of

s t at ut or y i nt er pr et at i on, " id. at 264- 65, no deeper i nqui r y

i nt o t he ver aci t y or evi dent i ar y val ue of t he i ndi ct ment ' s

al l egat i ons i s per mi t t ed. I n ot her wor ds, a r ul i ng on a

mot i on t o di smi ss i s not “a per mi ssi bl e vehi cl e f or

addr essi ng t he suf f i ci ency of t he gover nment ' s evi dence. ”

United States v. DeLaurentis , 230 F. 3d 659, 660–61 ( 3d Ci r .

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2000) ( ci t at i ons omi t t ed) . Hence, “[ e] vi dent i ar y quest i ons”—

such as cr edi bi l i t y det er mi nat i ons and t he wei ghi ng of

pr oof —“shoul d not be det er mi ned at t h[ i s] st age. ” United

States v. Gallagher , 602 F. 2d 1139, 1142 ( 3d Ci r . 1979) .

Her e, I do not f i nd t hat RFRA r equi r es t hi s Cour t t o

act as t he f i nder of f act and exami ne t he suf f i ci ency of t he

Gover nment ’ s evi dence agai nst St i ml er . See United States v.

Huet , 665 F. 3d 588, 597 ( 3d Ci r . 2012) ( over r ul i ng di st r i ct

cour t ’ s di smi ssal of i ndi ct ment because “case does not

i nvol ve a quest i on of whet her t he f act s al l eged i n t he

i ndi ct ment f al l beyond t he scope of t he r el evant cr i mi nal

st at ut e as a mat t er of st at ut or y i nt er pr et at i on” but r at her

“t he Di st r i ct Cour t ' s det er mi nat i on t hat t he I ndi ct ment

f ai l ed t o st at e an of f ense was based sol el y on i t s

assessment of t he st r engt h of t he Gover nment ' s case. ”) . I n

f act , St i ml er ’ s posi t i on r equi r es t hi s Cour t t o hol d a mi ni -

t r i al on t he mer i t s, i n cont r avent i on of Fed. R. Cr i m. P.

12( b) ( 1) . I n t hat connect i on, St i ml er i s aski ng t hi s Cour t ,

pr et r i al , t o accept t he f act t hat he f unct i oned sol el y as a

wi t ness f or t he get , and t hat he had no i nvol vement i n t he

pl anni ng of t he get , i ncl udi ng t he ki dnappi ng, di d not

par t i ci pat e i n t he ki dnappi ng, and was not awar e t hat ot her s

woul d, or di d, use vi ol ence agai nst t he vi ct i m- husbands.

I f , however , t he f act s as st at ed i n t he Super sedi ng

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I ndi ct ment ar e pr oven at t r i al , St i ml er i s not ent i t l ed t o

use RFRA as a def ense, f or t he r easons t hat have al r eady

been del i neat ed above.

Si mi l ar l y, I do not f i nd hel pf ul t he cases ci t ed by

St i ml er t o suppor t hi s pr oposi t i on t hat he shoul d not be

subj ect ed t o pr osecut i on; t hose cases i nvol ve st andar ds t hat

a j ur y must appl y, and do not r ef er ence RFRA consi der at i ons.

See United States v. Caballo-Rodriguez , 726 F. 3d 418, 433

( 3d. Ci r . 2013) ( “t he jury coul d have r easonabl y concl uded

t hat Carabal l o–Rodr i guez knew t hat he was i nvol ved i n an

i l l egal vent ur e” ( emphasi s added) ) ; United States v. Korey ,

472 F. 3d 89, 93 ( 3d Ci r . 2007) ( vacat i ng convi ct i on because

“[ t ] he j ur y i nst r uct i ons . . . di d not r equi r e t he j ur y t o

f i nd a uni t y of pur pose. ”) .

Next , St i ml er ar gues t hat t he “l east r est r i ct i ve means”

pr ong of RFRA ent i t l es St i ml er t o be sever ed f r om t he

r emai ni ng def endant s. St i ml er Br i ef at 14. Thi s ar gument i s

a novel one. The RFRA st at ut e st at es t hat “[ a] per son whose

r el i gi ous exer ci se has been bur dened i n vi ol at i on of t hi s

sect i on may asser t t hat vi ol at i on as a cl ai m or def ense i n a

j udi ci al pr oceedi ng. ” 42 U. S. C. § 2000bb- 1( c) . Ther e i s

not hi ng i n t he st at ut e whi ch suggest s t hat i t can be used t o

ar gue f or sever ance.

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Mor eover , t he bur dens t hat St i ml er suggest s a j oi nt

t r i al pl aces on hi m ar e not bur dens on hi s rel i gi ous

exer ci se. Accor di ng t o St i ml er , he has “ceased per f or mi ng

t he ‘ mi t zvah’ of ser vi ng as a wi t ness i n J ewi sh di vor ces

even when t he husband i s wi l l i ng and eager t o di vor ce, ” t hat

t he ar r est has “ser i ousl y cr i ppl ed” hi s l i vel i hood, and a

l engt hy t r i al “wi l l i mpover i sh hi m. ” St i ml er Br . at 13. I do

not f i nd t hese ar gument s convi nci ng. The Government i s not

pr osecut i ng St i ml er f or ser vi ng as a wi t ness t o a J ewi sh

di vor ce, but f or par t i ci pat i ng i n a conspi r acy t o ki dnap. I f

a J ewi sh di vor ce does not i nvol ve ki dnappi ng, or use of

physi cal f or ce t hat woul d pot ent i al l y vi ol at e cri mi nal l aws,

t her e i s not hi ng pr event i ng St i ml er f r om act i ng as a wi t ness

i n J ewi sh di vor ces pendi ng hi s cr i mi nal t r i al . I n addi t i on,

t he Cour t acknowl edges t hat a l engt hy t r i al may gener al l y

pl ace enor mous bur dens on def endant s. These bur dens,

however , ar e not r el i gi ous bur dens. An ar r est and

pr osecut i on may i mpact a def endant ’ s empl oyment , r egar dl ess

of hi s occupat i on; t he f act t hat a def endant ’ s l i vel i hood i s

based i n hi s r el i gi on does not make t he consequences of

t r i al a bur den on hi s r el i gi ous exer ci se.

Fi nal l y, St i ml er quest i ons t he val i di t y of hi s

pr osecut i on. I n t hat r egar d, St i ml er mai nt ai ns t hat because

t he Gover nment had acknowl edged t hat t her e i s a gr eat deal

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of debat e on t he i ssue whet her t he def endant s were si mpl y

obeyi ng t he bet h di n’ s cont empt or der s t o ef f ect uat e t he get

by “beat i ng” t he vi c t i ms, i t i s const i t ut i onal l y

i mper mi ss i bl e f or t he Government t o pr osecut e t he def endant s

based on t he Gover nment ’ s own i nt erpr et at i on of J ewi sh l aw,

i . e. , t hat coer ci on under J ewi sh l aw does not i ncl ude

vi ol ence. Thi s ar gument i s mi spl aced. Def endant s wer e not

i ndi ct ed on t he basi s of t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s or t he

Gover nment ’ s i nt er pr et at i on of Def endant s’ r el i gi ous

bel i ef s. Def endant s wer e i ndi ct ed based on t hei r al l eged

conduct of conspi r acy t o commi t ki dnappi ng and ki dnappi ng.

Put di f f er ent l y, even i f t he Def endant s wer e act i ng on a

val i d r el i gi ous or der t o f or ci bl y ef f ectuat e t he get , t hat

r el i gi ous pur pose does not negat e t he f act t hat t hey

al l egedl y used f or ce t o r est r ai n t he vi ct i ms and physi cal l y

r emoved t hem agai nst t hei r wi l l . I t i s t hi s al l eged conduct

wi t h whi ch t hese Def endant s ar e char ged, and t he Gover nment

must pr ove each el ement of t he cr i mes. Def endant s ar e not on

t r i al based on, or because of , t he si ncer i t y of t hei r

r el i gi ous bel i ef s .

Thus, RFRA, when appl i ed t o St i ml er , does not r equi r e

ei t her di smi ssal of t he i ndi ctment or f or St i ml er ’ s t r i al t o

be sever ed f r om hi s co- def endant s.

E. Use of a Sting Operation

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St i ml er ar gues t hat “cr i mi nal pr osecut i on of

i ndi vi dual s such as t he def endant s i n t hi s case who wer e

engaged i n per f or mance of t hi s r el i gi ousl y mandat ed dut y

[ obt ai ni ng a get f or an agunah] obvi ousl y bur dens exer ci se

of t he r el i gi ous obser vance, ” because Def endant s wi l l be

“subj ect ed t o t he sever e bur den of a l engt hy publ i c j ur y

t r i al , ” Def endant s “may be i mpr i soned f or l ong t er ms, ” and

because t he pr osecut i on wi l l have an “ in terrorem ef f ect on

ot her Or t hodox J ews who may seek t o par t i ci pat e i n t he

f ut ur e i n per f or mance of t he ‘ mi t zvah’ of l i ber at i ng an

‘ agunah. ’ ” St i ml er Br . at 10. St i ml er f ur t her ar gues t hat ,

as a r esul t , t he pr osecut i on may not pr oceed unl ess t he

Gover nment can show t hat :

cr eat i ng a “st i ng” oper at i on i nvol vi ng no r eal“agunah” and no r eal r ecal ci t r ant husband and i nvoki ngt he f eder al ki dnappi ng st at ut e agai nst Or t hodox r abbi sand ot her i ndi vi dual s who agr ee t o par t i ci pat e i n t her el i gi ousl y commendabl e ef f or t t o f r ee an “agunah”f ur t her s a compel l i ng gover nment i nt er est and i s t hel east r est r i ct i ve means of achi evi ng t hat i nt er est . ”

St i ml er Br . at 10.

I t i s possi bl e f or a pl ai nt i f f t o asser t a RFRA c l ai m

agai nst t he gover nment f or t he use of i nvest i gat or y t act i cs

whi ch subst ant i al l y bur den r el i gi ous exer ci se. See, e.g. , In

re Grand Jury , 171 F. 3d 826 ( appeal f r om cont empt or der ,

asser t i ng t hat Or t hodox J udai sm pr ohi bi t ed wi t nesses f r om

t est i f yi ng agai nst f at her bef or e gr and j ur y) ; Mockaitis v.

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Harcleroad , 104 F. 3d 1522 ( 9t h Ci r . 1997) , overturned on

other grounds by City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U. S. 507

( 1997) ( sui t br ought under 18 U. S. C. § 1983 asser t i ng, inter

alia , vi ol at i on of Fi r st Amendment and RFRA where Di st r i ct

At t or ney obt ai ned r ecor di ng of conf essi on t o Cat hol i c pr i est

f or use i n cr i mi nal i nvest i gat i on) . However , t he ar gument

pr esent ed her e i s not t hat t he st i ng oper at i on, on i t s own,

vi ol at ed RFRA. I ndeed, St i ml er has not submi t t ed any

evi dence demonst r at i ng t hat t he st i ng oper at i on - -

i ndependent of t he ar r est s and pr osecut i on whi ch f ol l owed - -

const i t ut ed a subst ant i al bur den on hi s r el i gi ous exer ci se.

Even i f St i ml er had made such a cl ai m, i t woul d f ai l .

Whi l e t he Thi r d Ci r cui t has not hel d t hat “t he gover nment ' s

i nt er est i n i nvest i gat i ng and pr osecut i ng cr i me i s always

compel l i ng under RFRA, ” i t has f ound a compel l i ng i nt er est

i n i nvest i gat i ng a ser i ous cr i me whi ch di d not i nvol ve

vi ol ence or a t hr eat t o publ i c saf et y. In re Grand Jury , 171

F. 3d at 832 ( emphasi s added) . Theref ore, based upon t he

Thi r d Ci r cui t ’ s r easoni ng, i t i s l ogi cal t o f i nd t hat t he

i nt er est i n i nvest i gat i ng a cr i me i s mor e compel l i ng wher e

t he cr i me i n quest i on i nvol ves vi ol ence. Mor eover , whi l e

St i ml er emphasi zes t hat t he st i ng oper at i on “i nvol v[ ed] no

r eal ‘ agunah’ and no r eal r ecal ci t r ant husband, ” t he st i ng

oper at i on was i n r esponse t o an al l eged ongoi ng conspi r acy

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t o ki dnap, and was cr eat ed i n r esponse t o mul t i pl e i nci dent s

whi ch al l egedl y i nvol ved t he act ual ki dnappi ngs of

r ecal ci t r ant husbands. The Gover nment ’ s compel l i ng i nt er est

i n pr event i ng t he vi ol ent cr i me of ki dnappi ng i s not r educed

si mpl y because t he f i nal over t act i on of t he al l eged

conspi r acy di d not r esul t i n act ual vi ol ence. Nor does t he

l ack of vi ol ence change t he f act t hat t he st i ng oper at i on

f ur t her ed t he Gover nment ’ s i nt er est , by pr ovi di ng t he

Gover nment wi t h cl ear evi dence of t he conspi r acy.

Accor di ngl y, I f i nd t hat t he Gover nment , her e, had a

compel l i ng i nt er est - - even i f , ar guendo, t he st i ng

oper at i on subst ant i al l y bur dened Def endant s’ r el i gi ous

exer ci se - - i n i nvest i gat i ng t he cr i mes of conspi r acy and

ki dnappi ng whi ch ar e al l eged i n t he Super sedi ng I ndi ct ment ,

and t hat t he st i ng oper at i on f ur t her ed t hat i nt er est .

The next quest i on, t her ef or e, i s whet her t he st i ng

oper at i on const i t ut ed t he l east r est r i ct i ve means of

enf or ci ng t he Gover nment ’ s i nt er est . St i ml er has not

suggest ed any ot her means t hat t he Gover nment shoul d have

empl oyed i n f ur t her i ng i t s compel l i ng i nt er est . I t i s , of

cour se, al ways poss i bl e f or t he Gover nment t o use l ess

aggr essi ve means t o i nvest i gat e a cr i me. However , as

di scussed supra , t he l east - r est r i ct i ve- means st andar d

f ocuses on whet her t he gover nment coul d achi eve i t s goal

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wi t h l ess res t r i ct i on “ on the exercise of religion by t he

obj ect i ng par t i es , ” Burwell , 134 S. Ct . at 2780 ( emphasi s

added) . Because t he st i ng oper at i on di d not bur den any

r el i gi ous exer ci se, I f i nd t hat t he s t i ng oper at i on i s t he

l east r est r i ct i ve means of enf or ci ng t he Gover nment ’ s

compel l i ng i nt er est . Hence, any cl ai m t hat t he st i ng

oper at i on vi ol at ed RFRA on i t s own woul d f ai l .

St i ml er f ur t her ar gues t hat t he st i ng oper at i on, t hough

not a bur den on i t s own, vi ol at ed RFRA because Def endant s’

ar r est s and pr osecut i on as a r esul t of t he st i ng, bur dened

t hei r r el i gi ous exer ci se. Thi s ar gument i s easi l y di sposed

of . I ni t i al l y, i t i s f ar f r om cl ear whet her t he Gover nment

must j ust i f y i t s met hods of i nvest i gat i on when a def endant

asser t s a RFRA def ense t o a pr osecut i on. Regar dl ess , I have

al r eady f ound t hat t he Government di d not bur den Def endant s’

r el i gi on dur i ng i t s pr osecut i on and ar r est of Def endant s.

And, I have f ound t hat t he ways i n whi ch t he Gover nment

i nvest i gat ed Def endant s’ al l eged cr i mi nal act i vi t i es , i . e. ,

a st i ng oper at i on, di d not vi ol at e Def endant s’ r el i gi ous

bel i ef s. Because bot h aspect s of St i ml er ’ s ar gument have

been f ound not vi ol at i ve of RFRA, hi s l ast di t ch ef f or t t o

mount a RFRA def ense i s si mpl y wi t hout mer i t . I n sum, t he

Gover nment ’ s use of a st i ng oper at i on i n connect i on wi t h

Def endant s’ pr osecut i on and ar r est s, does not change my

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concl usi on t hat a RFRA def ense i s not avai l abl e t o

Def endant s i n t hi s case.

II. Evidentiary Issues

I n addi t i on t o t hei r l egal def ense pur suant t o RFRA,

Def endant s, par t i cul ar l y St i ml er , Mendel Epst ei n and

Gol dst ei n, i nt end t o i nt r oduce t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s t o

negat e t he el ement of i nt ent as t o t he conspi r acy and

ki dnappi ng char ges. As a par t of t hi s def ense, Def endant s

concede t hat even i f r el i gi ous l aw does not t r ump secul ar

cr i mi nal l aw, 11 t hei r s i ncer el y hel d r el i gi ous bel i ef s

under mi ne one or mor e el ement s of t he speci f i c i nt ent

r equi r ed t o f i nd t hem gui l t y of conspi r acy t o commi t

ki dnappi ng, at t empt ed ki dnappi ng and ki dnappi ng. Thei r

t heor y r est s on Def endant s’ bel i ef t hat coer ci ve act i ons

t aken agai nst t he vi ct i ms i n t hi s case wer e necessar y t o

ef f ect uat e J ewi sh l aw. I n t hat connect i on, Def endant s al so

mai nt ai n t hat t he vi ct i ms consent ed t o t he al l eged

ki dnappi ngs by vi r t ue of t hei r si gni ng of t he Or t hodox

mar r i age ket ubah, a document r ecor di ng t he f i nanci al

obl i gat i ons whi ch t he husband under t akes t owar d hi s wi f e i n

11 Any ar gument r egardi ng a r el i gi ous except i on has beenaddr essed i n t he f i r st sect i on of t hi s Opi ni on r el at i ng t ot he RFRA.

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r espect of , and consequent t o, t hei r mar r i age, obl i gat i ons

whi ch i n pr i nci pl e ar e i mposed on hi m by l aw. Accor di ng t o

Def endant s, by si gni ng t he ket ubah, an Or t hodox J ewi sh

husband pr omi ses t o be bound by t he l aws of Moses and

I sr ael , bot h t o t he aut hor i t y of t he bet h di n and t o t he

hal akhi c, or t he J ewi sh r el i gi ous l aw, pr ocess of t he

“f or ced” get as t he t er m i s descr i bed by Mai moni des. 12

Ther ef or e, t aken t oget her , Def endant s i nsi st t hat because of

t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s and because of t hei r bel i ef s t hat

t he vi ct i ms have consent ed t o t he coer ci ve act s, i . e. ,

ki dnappi ng, Def endant s l ack t he i nt ent t o commi t t he cr i mes

as char ged. The Cour t r ej ect s t hi s t heor y of def ense.

Def endant s ar e charged wi t h ki dnappi ng, at t empt ed

ki dnappi ng and conspi r acy t o commi t ki dnappi ng. As t o t he

conspi r acy charge, t he Government must pr ove t he f ol l owi ng

el ement s: ( 1) a shar ed uni t y of pur pose; ( 2) an i nt ent t o

achi eve a common i l l egal goal of ki dnappi ng; and ( 3) an

agr eement t o wor k t oward t hat goal . See United States v.

John-Baptiste , 747 F. 3d 186, 204- 05 ( 3d Ci r . 2014) . Wi t h

r espect t o t he subst ant i ve cr i me of ki dnapi ng, t he

Gover nment must pr ove t hat ( 1) t he def endant knowi ngl y and

12 The Cour t t akes j udi ci al not i ce t hat Mai moni des was ani nf l uent i al f i gur e i n t he J ewi sh r el i gi on, who has had apr of ound i mpact on J ewi sh l aw, phi l osophy, and r el i gi ousconsci ousness.

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wi l l f ul l y ki dnapped, abduct ed, sei zed, or conf i ned anot her

per son; ( 2) f or r ansom, r ewar d, or ot her benef i t ; and ( 3)

t r avel ed i n i nt er st at e commer ce or wi l l f ul l y used an

i nst r ument al i t y of commer ce. See 18 U. S. C. § 1201( a) United

States v. Brika , 487 F. 3d 450, 456 ( 6t h Ci r . 2007) ; United

States v. Dixon , 592 F. 2d 329, 340 ( 6t h Ci r . 1979) . As f or

t he at t empt cr i me, t he Gover nment must al so pr ove t hat t he

def endant s t ook a subst ant i al st ep t o commi t t he cr i me of

ki dnappi ng . See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce , 549 U. S.

102, 108 n. 3 ( 2007) . I n t hat r egar d, i t i s necessar y t hat

Def endant s had t he r equi si t e i nt ent t o commi t t he under l yi ng

act . Id. I mpor t ant l y, t hese cr i mes ar e speci f i c i nt ent

cr i mes. See United States v. Maynard , 2015 U. S. App. LEXI S

227, at *2 ( 3d Ci r . J an. 7, 2015) ( conspi r acy i s a speci f i c

i nt ent cr i me) ; United States v. Weir , 587 Fed. Appx. 300,

306 ( 3d Ci r . 2014) ( ki dnappi ng i s a speci f i c i nt ent cr i me) ;

United States v. Pavulak , 700 F. 3d 651, 669 ( 3d Ci r . 2012)

( at t empt cri me r equi r es speci f i c i nt ent ) .

Her e, Def endant s ar gue t hat t hey ar e ent i t l ed t o

i nt r oduce evi dence of J ewi sh l aw, i n t he cont ext of

obt ai ni ng a val i d get , and t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s , t o

est abl i sh t hat t hey di d not possess t he speci f i c i nt ent t o

commi t any of t he cr i mes. I nst ead, accor di ng t o t hei r

def ense, Def endant s wer e mot i vat ed by t hei r r el i gi on t o

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separ at e f r om t he monks' and nuns' pr oper t y; al l of t he

pr oper t y t hat " bel ongs" t o t he Templ e essent i al l y " bel ongs"

t o each of t he monks and nuns. I n t hat connect i on, Hi sa

argued t hat because t he pr emi se of t he i ndi ct ment was t hat

monks and nuns act ed as " condui t s" f or t he Templ e, t he

gover nment necessar i l y r el i ed on a not i on of pr oper t y t hat

was cont r ar y t o her r el i gi ous bel i ef s. The cour t per mi t t ed

Hi sa t o pr esent evi dence of her r el i gi ous bel i ef t o a j ur y.

The cour t r easoned t hat Hi sa’ s bel i ef t hat al l pr oper t y of

t he Templ e was communal coul d negat e Hi sa’ s i nt ent of

decei vi ng t he Feder al El ect i on Commi ss i on on t he i ssue

whet her t he Templ e was t he t r ue sour ce of t he cont r i but i ons.

Rel yi ng on t he Hisa cour t ’ s r easoni ng, Def endant s,

her e, mi st akenl y ar gue t hat t hey ar e ent i t l ed t o pr esent t o

t he j ur y evi dence of t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s t o negat e

i nt ent . The si gni f i cant di f f er ence bet ween Hisa and t he

pr esent case i s t hat i n Hisa , t he def endant ’ s r el i gi ous

bel i ef di r ect l y concer ns one of t he el ement s of t he cr i me

char ged i n t hat case. Put di f f er ent l y, t he cour t i n Hisa

permi t t ed t he def endant t o show t hat she di d not knowi ngl y

and wi l l f ul l y cause f al se st at ement s t o be made r egar di ng

t he i nt ended sour ce of t he f unds because of her si ncerel y

hel d bel i ef t hat t he Templ e’ s f unds ar e communal .

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I n t hi s case, Def endant s wi sh t o i nt r oduce evi dence

t hat t hey wer e act i ng i n conf or mi t y wi t h J ewi sh l aw; t hat

t he al l eged act s commi t t ed t o coer ce t he vi ct i ms i nt o gi vi ng

t he get s wer e necessar y t o f ul f i l l t hei r r el i gi ous dut i es .

However , t he very pur pose of Def endant s her e i nt r oduci ng

such evi dence, unl i ke t he def endant i n Hisa , woul d, at best ,

onl y est abl i sh Def endant s’ mot i vat i on f or commi t t i ng t hese

al l eged coer ci ve act s i n t he name of r el i gi on. But , t he

mot i vat i on t o act i n a cer t ai n manner does not negat e t he

speci f i c i nt ent of commi t t i ng a cr i me. See United States v.

Romano , 849 F. 2d 812, 816 n. 7 ( 3d Ci r . 1988) . I n ot her

wor ds, whi l e t he def endant s mi ght have been mot i vat ed by

t hei r bel i ef t hat “f or ced” get s wer e necessar y under J ewi sh

l aw, t he speci f i c i nt ent t o commi t ki dnappi ng t o car r y out

t hat bel i ef i s separ at e and di s t i nct f r om t hei r r el i gi ous

bel i ef .

As t he Government cor r ect l y ar gues, mot i ve cannot be

used t o negat e speci f i c i nt ent . On t hi s poi nt , t he Ei ght h

Ci r cui t has cogent l y expl ai ned:

“Cr i mi nal i nt ent ” pr oper l y used r ef er s t o t he ment al

st at e r equi r ed by t he par t i cul ar st at ut e whi ch makest he act a cr i me. Once t hat i nt ent has been pr oven, i ti s i mmat er i al t hat a def endant may al so have had somesecondar y, or even over r i di ng, i nt ent . Id. at 200. I ft he i nt ent i s over r i di ng - - t hat i s , i t r ef l ect s t heul t i mat e end sought whi ch compel l ed t he def endant t oact - - i t i s mor e pr oper l y l abel ed a “mot i ve. ” Thi si s t r ue even wi t h r espect t o a "speci f i c i nt ent "

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st at ut e wher e t he i nt ent i t sel f i s st at ed i n t er ms ofan " end, " f or exampl e, br eaki ng and ent er i ng wi t hi nt ent t o commi t t hef t . The " end" of st eal i ng moneyst i l l coul d be j ust a means t o anot her mor e val uedconsequence, such as gi vi ng t o t he poor ; t hat ul t i mat e

goal , however , woul d not r epl ace or negat e t he i nt entof st eal i ng and woul d st i l l be a "mot i ve, " whi l e t hei nt ent t o s t eal woul d s t i l l pr ovi de t he "speci f i ci nt ent " r equi r ed by t he st at ut e.

United States v. Kabat , 797 F. 2d 580, 587- 88 ( 8 t h Ci r . 1986) .

Thi s di f f er ence bet ween mot i vat i on and i nt ent has been

di scussed by t he Thi r d Ci r cui t as wel l . For exampl e, t he

Thi r d Ci r cui t i n Romano caut i oned t hat t he def endant ’ s end

mot i ve of pr ot ect i ng i nnocent l i ves coul d not adequat el y

negat e or expl ai n her speci f i c i nt ent t o br eak i nt o a

mi l i t ar y i nst al l at i on. I mpor t ant l y, t he c i r cui t cour t f ound

t hat whi l e t he def endant ’ s bel i ef s t her e mi ght be pr oper l y

consi der ed at sent enci ng, t hey wer e not r el evant f or

pur poses of def endi ng t he subst ant i ve char ges. Romano, 849

F. 2d at 816 n. 7; see also United States v. Platte , 401 F. 3d

1176, 1181 ( 10 t h Ci r . 2005) ( “[ t ] he hi gh- mi nded mot i ves of

Def endant s do not negat e t hei r i nt ent . . . . [ I ] f t he l aw

bei ng vi ol at ed i s const i t ut i onal , t he wor t hi ness of one' s

mot i ves cannot excuse t he vi ol at i on i n t he eyes of t he

l aw. ” ) ; United States v. Ahmad , 1999 U. S. App. LEXI S 6113,

at *4 ( 2d Ci r . 1999) ( f i ndi ng t hat an i nnocent mot i ve can

nei t her negat e one’ s i nt ent nor knowl edge) ; United States v.

Gump , No. 10- 94, 2013 U. S. Di st . LEXI S 173355, at *42- 44

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( E. D. Tenn. May 6, 2013) ( f i ndi ng t hat Def endant s' “r el i gi ous

convi ct i ons do not pr ovi de a def ense t o t r espassi ng and, as

such, ar e i r r el evant and i nadmi ssi bl e at t r i al . ”) ; see also

United States v. Cullen , 454 F. 2d 386, 390 ( 7 t h Ci r .

1971) ( “i f t he pr oof di scl oses t hat t he pr ohi bi t ed act was

vol unt ar y, and t hat t he def endant act ual l y knew, or

r easonabl y shoul d have known, t hat i t was a publ i c wr ong,

t he bur den of pr ovi ng t he r equi si t e i nt ent has been met ;

pr oof of mot i ve, good or bad, has no r el evance t o t hat

i s sue. ” ) .

Based on t hat r easoni ng, I al so r ej ect Def endant s’

r el i ance on Martines . I n t hat case, t he def endant was

charged wi t h conspi r acy t o manuf act ur e and possess wi t h

i nt ent t o di st r i but e i n excess of 100 mar i j uana pl ant s.

Martines , 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. The def endant sought t o

i nt r oduce evi dence, i ncl udi ng an exper t ’ s t est i mony,

r el at i ng t o t he def endant ’ s Rast af ar i an r el i gi on. I n t hat

cont ext , t he def endant wi shed t o mount a r el i gi ous def ense

t o t he el ement of i nt ent t o di st r i but e. Because, as t he

def endant ar gued, t he gr owi ng of mar i j uana i n hi s home was

consi st ent wi t h hi s r el i gi on, he di d not i nt end t o sel l or

di st r i but e mar i j uana. Id. at 1067. The cour t per mi t t ed t he

def endant t o mount such a f act ual def ense. Agai n, t he

r el i gi ous bel i ef t he def endant sought t o i nt r oduce i n

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knowi ngl y. ” Id. As such, t he Betram cour t ’ s r easoni ng i s

equal l y appl i cabl e her e: r el i gi ous bel i ef s si mpl y do not

negat e i nt ent when a def endant has act ed knowi ngl y i n

cont r avent i on of l aw.

I not e f ur t her t hat dur i ng or al ar gument , t he Cour t

i nqui r ed of Def endant s whi ch el ement of t he cr i mes i s

negat ed by t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s. As t o t he cr i me of

ki dnappi ng, Def endant s mai nt ai n t hat t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s

woul d negat e t he el ement r el at i ng t o t he Government ’ s pr oof

t hat Def endant s act ed i l l egal l y f or r ansom, r ewar d, or ot her

benef i t . I n t hat r egar d, Def endant s cont end t hat t hey must

have t he oppor t uni t y t o pr esent t o t he j ur y t hat t hey di d

not engage i n t he al l eged coer ci ve act i ons f or t he pur pose

of obt ai ni ng money, as suggest ed by t he Gover nment dur i ng

i t s openi ng. I n ot her wor ds, because t he Government has

pl aced “mot i ve” i nt o i ssue, Def endant s submi t t hat t hey

shoul d be abl e t o r ebut t hat mot i ve by pr esent i ng evi dence

of t hei r r el i gi ous mot i vat i on. On t hat poi nt , Def endant s

cl ai m t hat t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s woul d negat e t he

Gover nment ’ s pr oof on t he el ement of “pur pose. ” I do not

f i nd t hi s ar gument convi nci ng.

As I st at ed on t he r ecor d, “ot her benef i t ” i s br oadl y

def i ned under t he st at ut e. I n f act , i n t he case t hat

Def endant s ci t ed dur i ng ar gument , t he Four t h Ci r cui t

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unequi vocal l y hel d t hat t he Supr eme Cour t and t he cour t s of

appeal s “have br oadl y i nt er pr et ed t he Feder al Ki dnappi ng

Act ' s r equi r ement t hat t he ki dnapped per son be “hel d f or

r ansom or r ewar d or ot her wi se. ” United States v. Childress ,

26 F. 3d 498, 503 ( 4 t h Ci r . 1994) ( quot i ng United States v.

Crosby , 713 F. 2d 1066, 1070 ( 5t h Ci r . ) , cert. denied , 464

U. S. 1001 ( 1983) ) . Thus, t o sat i sf y t he Act ' s r equi r ement ,

i t i s suf f i ci ent f or t he gover nment t o show t hat t he

def endant “act ed f or any r eason whi ch woul d i n any way be of

benef i t . ” Childress , 26 F. 3d at 503. ( ci t i ng Gooch v. United

States , 297 U. S. 124, 128 ( 1936) . 13 Thus, t he Gover nment

need not show t hat Def endant s wer e benef i t ed by money t o

meet i t s bur den; i nst ead, t he benef i t coul d be non- monet ar y

i n nat ur e. Even i f Def endant s commi t t ed t he al l eged cr i mes

13 I not e t hat t her e i s some i ndi cat i on by ot her cour t s ofappeal , i ncl udi ng t he Four t h Ci r cui t i n Childress , t hat t her equi r ement t hat a ki dnapped per son be hel d " f or r ansom orr ewar d or ot her wi se" i s not even an el ement of t he f eder alki dnappi ng of f ense. United States v. Martell , 335 F. 2d 764,766 ( 4t h Ci r . 1964) ( hol di ng t hat t he f eder al ki dnappi ngst at ut e i s vi ol at ed "r egar dl ess of t he ul t i mat e pur pose oft he ki dnapper " ) ; Gawne v. United States , 409 F. 2d 1399,1402- 03 ( 9t h Ci r . 1969) ( hol di ng t hat a ki dnapper ' smot i vat i on i s not an el ement of t he f eder al ki dnappi ngof f ense) , cert. denied , 397 U. S. 943 ( 1970) ; Clinton v.United States , 260 F. 2d 824, 825 ( 5t h Ci r . 1958) ( hol di ngt hat t he Federal Ki dnappi ng Act does not make t heki dnapper ' s mot i vat i on an " i ngr edi ent of t he cr i me" ) , cert.denied , 359 U. S. 948 ( 1959) ; see Hayes v. United States , 296F. 2d 657, 665- 67 ( 8t h Ci r . 1961) , cert. denied , 369 U. S. 867( 1962) .

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f or a r el i gi ous pur pose, t hat pur pose coul d be consi der ed

“ot her benef i t ” under t he ki dnappi ng st at ut e.

Next , as t o t he cr i me of conspi r acy, Def endant s cl ai m

t hat t hei r r el i gi ous bel i ef s negat e t he obj ect of t he

conspi r acy. That ar gument mi schar act er i zes t he l aw. As I

have l ai d out above, t he Gover nment must pr ove t hat

Def endant s ( 1) shar ed uni t y of pur pose; ( 2) i nt ended t o

achi eve a common i l l egal goal of ki dnappi ng; and ( 3) an

agr eement t o work t oward t hat goal . The obj ect of t he

conspi r acy, i n t hi s case, woul d be t he i l l egal ki dnappi ng.

Hence, t o t he ext ent t hat Def endant s wi sh t o i nt r oduce

evi dence of t hei r r el i gi on t o show t hat t he obj ect of t he

conspi r acy i s not t o make money, t hat argument f ai l s because

t he obj ect , or t he goal , of t he conspi r acy, her e, i s

ki dnappi ng. On t he ot her hand, t o t he ext ent t hat

Def endant s seek t o i nt r oduce t hi s evi dence t o show t hat t he

obj ect of t he conspi r acy i s f or a per mi ssi bl e r el i gi ous

pur pose, I have al r eady r ej ect ed Def endant s’ argument on

mot i ve i n t hi s r egard. I n sum, t he Government must pr ove

each and ever y el ement of ki dnappi ng and conspi r acy; and,

Def endant s’ mot i vat i on or pur pose – even i f i t i s based on

t hei r r el i gi on – f or commi t t i ng t hese cr i mes i s not an

el ement , and t hus, not r el evant .

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consent must be val i d under t he ci r cumst ances; t o consent ,

i n t he cont ext of a ki dnappi ng, a per son must ( 1) act f r eel y

and vol unt ar i l y and not under t he i nf l uence of t hr eat s,

f or ce, or dur ess; ( 2) have knowl edge t hat he was bei ng

physi cal l y moved; and ( 3) possess suf f i ci ent ment al capaci t y

t o make an i nt el l i gent choi ce whet her t o be physi cal l y moved

by t he ot her per son. See, e.g. , United States v. Moreno-

Florean , 542 F. 3d 445, 454 ( 5 t h Ci r . 2008) ; see United States

v. Williams , 110 F. 3d 50, 52 ( 9 t h Ci r . 1997) ; United States

v. Boone , 959 F. 2d 1550, 1557 ( 11 t h Ci r . 1992) ; see also Vega

v. Arnold , 2014 U. S. Di st . LEXI S 89000, at *17 ( C. D. Cal .

J un. 30, 2014) ( “ I n or der t o consent , a per son must act f r eel y

and vol unt ar i l y and know t he nat ur e of t he act . ”) ; Daniels

v. McDonald , 2012 U. S. Di st . LEXI S 138570, at *45 ( N. D. Cal .

Sep. 26, 2012) ( “To consent , a per son must : One, act f r eel y

and vol unt ar i l y and not under t he i nf l uence of t hr eat s,

f or ce, or dur ess; t wo, have knowl edge she was bei ng

physi cal l y moved; and t hr ee, possess suf f i ci ent ment al

capaci t y t o make an i nt el l i gent choi ce whet her t o be

physi cal l y moved by t he ot her per son. Bei ng passi ve does not

amount t o consent . Consent r equi r es a f r ee wi l l and posi t i ve

cooper at i on i n act or at t i t ude. ") .

Even i f a vi ct i m consent ed t o bei ng t r anspor t ed

i ni t i al l y, he/ she has t he oppor t uni t y t o r evoke hi s/ her

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consent dur i ng t he commi ss i on of t he al l eged cr i me. See,

e.g., United States v. Eagle Thunder , 893 F. 2d 950, 952- 53

( 8 t h Ci r . 1990) ( f i ndi ng t hat al t hough t he vi c t i m vol unt ar i l y

agr eed t o accompany t he def endant , she di d not consent " t o

t he ki nd of t r i p event ual l y under t aken") ; United States v.

Wesson , 779 F. 2d 1443, 1444 ( 9t h Ci r . 1986) ; United States

v. McBryar , 553 F. 2d 433, 434 ( 5t h Ci r . ) ( ki dnappi ng

convi ct i on uphel d wher e def endant agr eed t o t ake vi ct i m t o

one dest i nat i on but dr ove i n opposi t e di r ect i on and r ef used

her r equest s t o be l et out of aut omobi l e) , cert. denied , 434

U. S. 862, ( 1977) ; Martinez v. Gov't of the V.I. , 2008 U. S.

Di st . LEXI S 107613, at *11 n. 4 ( D. V. I . Feb. 26, 2008) ( “ I n a

ki dnappi ng cont ext , even i f a vi c t i m i ni t i al l y goes

vol unt ar i l y wi t h a def endant , i f at any poi nt [ hi s] consent

i s wi t hdr awn, def endant ' s use of f or ce or f ear t o cont i nue

t he [ t r anspor t ] over a subst ant i al di st ance const i t ut es

ki dnappi ng. ”) .

Here, as a def ense t o ki dnappi ng, Def endant s seek t o

i nt r oduce evi dence t hat t he vi ct i ms consent ed t o t he di vor ce

pr oceedi ngs under Or t hodox J ewi sh l aw. I t i s Def endant s’

posi t i on t hat because t he vi ct i ms consent ed t o “f or ced” get s

when t hey si gned t he ket ubah, t hey have consent ed t o t he

al l eged l at er act i ons, i ncl udi ng physi cal r est r ai nt , t aken

by Def endant s. Dur i ng or al ar gument , Def endant s f ur t her

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el abor at ed on t hi s poi nt . They ur ged t he Cour t t o l ook t o

how consent i s def i ned under J ewi sh l aw, and i n t hat

connect i on, what Def endant s bel i eved t he vi ct i ms have

consent ed t o at t i me of t he al l eged ki dnappi ng. I di sagr ee.

Fi r st , consent under Or t hodox J ewi sh l aw i s not t he

t ype of vol unt ar y and knowi ng consent t hat i s r equi r ed f or a

def ense t o ki dnappi ng under t he l aws of t he Uni t ed St at es.

I ndeed, t he onl y vi abl e way Def endant s can asser t a val i d

consent def ense, i s t o show t hat t he vi ct i ms had consent ed

t o bei ng physi cal l y r emoved dur i ng t he commi ss i on of t he

cr i me, and t hat t he consent was not under t he i nf l uence of

t hr eat s , f or ce, or dur ess . See Davis , 19 F. 3d at 169. Thi s

i s not what Def endant s pr of f er ed. I t i s , t her ef or e,

i r r el evant whet her t he vi ct i ms had pr ospect i vel y consent ed

t o be subj ect ed t o gi vi ng “f or ced” get s under J ewi sh l aw;

i ndeed, at t he t i me when t he vi ct i ms s i gned t he ket ubah,

t hey coul d not have knowi ngl y and vol unt ar i l y consent ed t o

bei ng physi cal l y r emoved agai nst t hei r wi l l , because t hey

di d not possess t he knowl edge of Def endant s’ act i ons

under t aken dur i ng t he al l eged ki dnappi ngs. I n ot her wor ds,

a vi ct i m cannot consent t o what he/ she does not know. See

Vega, 2014 U. S. Di st . LEXI S at *17 ( “I n or der t o consent , a

per son must act f r eel y and vol unt ar i l y and know t he nat ur e

of t he act . ” ) .

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I t f ol l ows t hat , i n t he cont ext of consent , Def endant s

woul d have t o bel i eve t hat t he vi ct i ms gave t hei r assent at

the time of the commission of the alleged wrongful acts . I n

ot her wor ds, because consent cannot be pr ospect i vel y gi ven,

Def endant s’ bel i ef – er r oneous or not - - t hat t he vi ct i ms

had consent ed t o bei ng r est r ai ned when t hey had si gned t he

ket ubah

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