U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey_ Tank Industry Report

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Tank Industry Report

Second Edition January 1947

I. Introduction

1. The German army used three types of armored vehicles during the war: tracked, half-tracked and wheeled.

Ordinarily only the first type, designated by the term "panzer", was used as a combat vehicle. Half-tracks and

armored cars were much less heavily armored and were only lightly armed if at all. Although the German

automotive industry, lent itself to the production of all types of military vehicles, as well as to aircraft

components and other armaments, production of panzers was usually separate from that of other vehicles.

Panzers not only required heavier manufacturing facilities than wheeled or half-tracked carriers but were built for

radically different purposes. They are discussed , therefore, as a separate group from motor vehicles and

halftracks.

2. Three groups of panzer vehicles were produced and used during the war: tanks, assault guns and self-propelled

guns. The tank group included eight types, each of which was produced in a number of models. Five of the eight

types were developed before the war. Of these, three were light tanks; the Mark I, Mark II, and the 38 t. This last

was a Czech design and was produced only in Czechoslovakia. Two were medium tanks, the Mark III and the

Mark IV. The three types developed in the course of the war were heavy tanks; the Panther, Tiger I, and Tiger II.

3. Assault guns, also called tank destroyers, consist of a heavy gun mounted on a standard, but somewhat

modified tank chassis. It is therefore essentially a turretless tank with its main gun mounted in the front of a low

covered superstructure and with both its hull and superstructure more heavily armored than in the case of the

corresponding tank. It is slower and less maneuverable than the tank and has a lower silhouette than either the

tank or ordinary self-propelled. The first assault guns, built in 1940, consisted of a 7.5 cm gun mounted on the

modified chassis of a Mark III or IV tank. This chassis continued to be used for most of the assault guns produced

during the war, although newer and heavier guns were mounted. In the later years of the war, assault guns were

also built on the chassis of the 38 t, the Panther and Tiger tanks. These were called variously the Jagd 38, the

Jagd Panther and the Jagd Tiger.

4. The third group of panzer vehicles, self-propelled guns, consisted of a standard field, medium, or anti-tank gun

mounted on a standard, unmodified tank chassis. Unlike assault guns, they were not specially designed and were

not necessarily produced by serial methods in major tank assembly plants. The chassis was usually that of an

obsolete tank; most of these vehicles, first produced in 1942, used the unmodified chassis of the light Mark II and

38 t tank, although some in 1944 employed the Mark III or IV chassis.

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II. The Tank Industry Before The War

1. Location. There was no geographical concentration of the plants manufacturing finished tanks. Important

works were located in Nurnberg, Kassel, Brunswick, Magdeburg, and Berlin (Exhibit F). There was, however,

some geographical concentration of tank component manufacturers, such as engines and gears in Friedrichshafen,

hulls, turrets, and guns in the Ruhr, rubber treads in Hanover, and instruments in Berlin. Thus although the

assembly plants were well dispersed, certain main components, especially engines, presented a vulnerable target

to air attack.

2. Ownership and Control. During this period, all companies with the exception of Alkett (which was under the

control of Rhine-Metal Borsig, a subsidiary of the government-controlled Hermann Goering Works) were stock

companies with the stock available for purchase by the public and were apparently privately owned concerns. All

these companies, with the exception again of Alkett, produced tanks in addition to their normal peacetime

manufacture of trucks, locomotives, and other heavy 0equipment. From 1935 onward, the governmentprogressively increased its control over industries engaged in rearmament. By 1938, this control embraced the

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rationing of essential raw materials, factory inventories, labor hours, rates of pay, working conditions, building

and machine tool expansion, plant locations and stock dividends. All companies were forced to join the

Economic Board of the tank industry which handled all questions affecting the industry.

3. Expansion. Since the production of tanks started from zero in 1934, and since the production of tanks is for

the sole purpose of preparing for war, each step taken towards tank production was an expansion of the industry

in anticipation of the possibility that the aggressive policies planned would lead to war. The value of tank output

was small compared to the total cost of German war mobilization (even at the beginning of 1942 it onlyamounted to 3.8 per cent of all armament costs), so that the large companies engaged in production had sufficient

space available without expanding the floor area of the plants to any appreciable degree. There was, therefore, no

excess production capacity available at this time. Also, except for the accumulation by the government of raw

materials, there was no evidence of stock piling of finished components.

4. Production. Tank manufacture was started in the latter part of 1933 and the early part of 1934 with a very light

model of 6 1/2 tons. As the industry expanded, the designed weight was increased. There were no subsidies given

to the companies for plant machinery and equipment, but the cost of development was borne by the government.

There Was, of course, close technical contact between the Army and the manufacturers during the period of

design development. The following is a brief history of the five models developed before the war.

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a. The orignal model developed by Krupp was named the LAS and later the Model I. It had a gross weight of 6

1/2 tons an was armed only with machineguns.

b. Model II was designed by MAN in 1934. This model had a weight of 9 1/2 tons and was powered by a

Maybach 150-HP, liquid cooled, six cylinder inline, gasoline engine. At first fire power consisted of 20-mm

machine guns but later this changed to 37-mm cannon plus machine guns. Editor's note: This latter statement is

incorrect, the Panzerkampfwagen II was never armed with a 37-mm gun.

c. Daimler-Benz, in 1938, designed the Model III, an 18 to 20-ton tank powered with a 220-HP, liquid cooled,

V-12 gasoline engine, and armed with a 37-mm cannon and machine guns.

d. Model IV was another product of Krupp design in 1936. This tank weighed 23 tons and was driven by the

HL-120 engine, a 300-HP, V-12, liquid cooled, Maybach product. It was armed with a 75-mm cannon and

machine guns.

e. The 38 t was an 11-ton tank of Czech design developed by Skoda.

f. The following table lists the six German plants engaged in tank manufacture in 1939, the model produced, and

the date production commenced. At this time also, two companies in Czechoslovakia were turning out tanks of

Skoda design.

Table 1

The Tank Manufacturers in 1939

Name Location Date Production Commenced Model

Krupp-Gruson Magdeburg1934 LAS

1939 Model IV

MAN Nurnberg

1935 LAS

1936 Model II

1939 Model III

Miag Brunswick 1939 Model III

Henschel Kassel

1936-7 LAS

1938-9 Model III


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4. Stalingrad and North Africa 1943: Revision of Production Program

a. The end of the year 1942 marked a turning point both in the war and in the panzer production program. The

great defeat at Stalingrad and the landing of Allied forces in North Africa set under way the long series of

continuous retreats, broken only by a few minor offensive actions, which finally ended in surrender. The

quantities of panzer equipment for current front-line operations and for replacement of losses increased

enormously. As the scale of the conflict widened, it automatically increased the proportion of stocks which had to

be used in the frontlines rather than held in reserve. The battle of Stalingrad, beginning in November 1942,

brought wastage rates to new heights, with a loss of 500 panzer vehicles in that month alone, followed by 200 inDecember, 700 in January, and 2,200 in February when the encircled forces finally surrendered. The jump in

attrition rate is best indicated by a statement of General Thomas, Chief of the Economic and Armament Office of

the Wehrmacht High Command until January 1943, that losses in the Russian campaign up to the battle of

Stalingrad were the equivalent of equipment for perhaps 50 divisions (of all types) whereas in that one battle

equipment for 45 divisions was lost. Stocks of panzer vehicles, which had been built up to a total of almost 6,000

by 1 November, dropped yo 5,000 on 1 March 1943.

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b. The 1942 summer campaign in Russia had changed the entire conception of panzer requirements before the

Stalingrad debacle; the new viewpoint had dictated an immediate revision in the scale of the panzer production

program. Where previously the program of facility expansion undertaken in 1942 had been considered adquate to

provide all needed panzer equipment it became apparen that it would fall far short. Although Speer had at times

conveyed the impression that production programs formulated by his organization always met requirements as set

by the military, the evidence does not bear him out. The record at this time is is one of constantly rising demands

by Hitler and of explanations by Speer and Dr. Saur, his chief aide, that the demands could not be immediately or

fully met. All indications are that military demand caused continuous upward revisions in programs proposed by

the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, but that even the revised programs aimed at goals short of the

desires of the military. In short, after the end of 1942 the brake upon panzer production was no longer a modest

level of military demand but rather the capacity of the German economy as then organized.

c. The development of the new panzer program in the late 1942 provides one of the best illustrations of the role

of the Fuehrer in war production. Hitler had in September 1942 asked for a production goal of 1,400 armored

fighting vehicles per month including 800 tanks of which 600 were to be Panthers and 50 Tigers, 300 assault

guns and 300 self-propelled guns. He directed that this goal be reached by the spring of 1944 and that special

measures be taken to provide the labor and machine tools necessary to assure its achievement. In December at a

meeting called by Hitler to consider the formulation, the Chairman of the Main Committee for Panzer

Production, Dr. Rohland, presented a report which pointed out the difficulties involved in obtaining enlarged

factory space, additional raw materials and machine tools, and other prerequisites of expanded panzer production

but Hitler demanded that in spite of the difficulties the panzer production program be carried out "whatever the

cost".

d. Despite this insistence by their chief, the "Adolf Hitler Panzer Program" as formulated by Speer and his

colleagues aimed at the production of only 1,200 Panzer vehicles per month, and that goal not to be reached until

the end of 1944. On 17 January 1943, before the program had been officially approved but when it had already

been unofficially announced, Speer and Saur were summoned by Hitler and informed that their program was

completely inadequate and must be revised upward. They agreed, but explained that although immediate

increases might be achieved in output of assault guns and Mark II and IV tanks, Tiger and Panther output could

not possibly be expanded within five months. Dr. Rohland and other officials directly responsible for panzer

production considered the new committment - a revised program aimed at 1,500 to 2,100 panzer vehicles by the

end of the month - utterly fantastic.

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What impressed the experts most was the difficulty of expanding production capacity to the extent necessary;

they believed that the program could be effected only at considerable expense to other armaments production.

e. The need for fulfilling the Adolf Hitler Panzer Program was so urgent, however, that the required steps were


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taken. On 22 January 1943 Hitler issued a decree directing that all necessary measures be taken immediately to

increase the production of panzer vehicles "even if by these measures other important branches of the armament

industry are adversely affected for a time." Specifically, the decree authorized the Reichsminister for Armaments

and War Production to provide plants producing panzer vehicles and their components with abundant supplies of

technicians, raw materials, machinery and electric power, and for this purpose to draw upon the capacities of

other was production industries. The decree also prohibited the drafting of men from the panzer industry and

cancelled all drafts made after December 1942.

f. The enormous increases in production which resulted from this program will be treated later in some detail.

Nevertheless, production failed to satisfy the mounting demands. Military leaders knew that panzer production

after 1942 was deficient both in numbers and in quality. The prodigious advance planned for German production

in 1944 - even if fully realized - would have left German panzer output at less than half the estimated Allied

level. Estimates prepared for the Wehrmacht High Command indicated that in 1942 and 1943 Allied production

of armored fighting vehicles was more than five times as high as Germany's; Russian production alone was three

times that of Germany in 1942, twice as high in 1943. The comparative output figures for 1943, as compiled by

the Germans, showed a total of 68,000 for the Allies (US, British Empire, Soviet Union) against 12,000 for

Germany.

g. German army leaders, as for example General Thomas, have said that the effects of panzer shortages in 1943

were not more serious in the field only because the troops in the west were not in action and so could absorbmcuh of the deficiency. When reductions in output were later brought about by bombing, the strength of the front

forces was considerably weakened.

h. Table 3 gives the 1943 tank production by model and by producer. The only air attack on the tank industry that

caused any serious interference with output was the one in October 1943 on the Alkett plant, Berlin. This raid

reduced the year's production by some 300 to 400 tanks (about four percent).

i. Between the beginning of 1942 and the end of 1943 the value of the output of the tank industry (in relation to

the whole armament

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program) more than doubled. Table 4 gives the value proportions of the principal branches of the armament

program as determined by Dr. Rolf Wagenfuehr, statistician of the Speer Ministry.

Table 3

1943 Panzer Production by Model and Producer

Model Producer Units Produced Percent of Total Tank Production

Mark I and II MAN 77 .8

Mark III and IV

Krupp 785 8.3

Vomag 816 8.7

Alkett 2,500 26.6

Nibelungen 1,289 13.7

Miag 1,350 14.3

Marienfelde 1 0.0

Totals 6,741 71.6

Mark V Panther

MAN 525 5.5

MNH 781 8.3

Marienfelde 544 5.8

Totals 1,850 19.6

Mark VI Tiger Henschel 647 6.9


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Nibelungen 2 0.0

Totals 649 7.0

Mark 38 t BMM and Skoda 87 1.0

Self-Propelled Guns* 2,659

Total Panzers 12,013 100

* Breakdown to producer unavailable

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Table 4

Proportions of the Principal Branches of the Total Value of Armament Production

Percentage of Total Value

1942 1943

Groups Beginning Middle End Middle End

Tanks 3.8 3.6 4.7 6.4 7.9

Motor Vehicles 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.8 3.5

Tractors 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.0

Aircraft 46.1 38.7 36.3 41.9 35.7

Warships 9.3 12.1 10.9 9.7 6.6

Ammunition 23.1 29.2 30.6 24.6 31.5

Weapons 7.0 6.6 8.2 8.0 9.7

Powder 3.2 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.1

j. During 1943 bottlenecks appeared in the supply of finished components. As strategic bombing up to this timehad had little or no effect on production, it is probable that the spreading out of the component product section of

the industry during this period was primarily for the purpose of increasing production and not as a means of

protecting the output of finished tanks. The most notable example of this is the starting up of Maybach engines at

the Siegmar plant of Auto-Union. However, the potential capacity of this new source of engines was such as to

make it evident that the Germans had not overlooked the possibility of bombing crippling the then existing

engine output. Naturally, bottlenecks offer a highly vulnerable target to precision bombing so tha the expansion

of component manufacturing automatically reduced the vulnerability of the section of the industry.

k. The light Mark II and 38 t tanks went out of production during 1943 although their chassis were for some time

thereafter used as mounts for a variety of self-propelled guns. Production of the Mark III medium tank was also

discontinued in favor of assault guns on the same chassis. The Mark IV chassis was produced during 1943 in

greatly increased numbers for use both as a tank and an assault gun, but principally as an assault gun in 1944.Heavy tanks also increase particularly in the case of the Panther.

5. Dispersal

Because of the heavy raids on Alkett during October-November 1943, tank assembly moved to Falkensee and

hull machining to Spandau. It is probable this was done more because of the location of Alkett in

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Berlin and because plant space at Falkensee was not being used, rather than because the plant was damaged

beyond repair. No attempt was made to disperse other assembly plants even though damage in some cased was

severe. Tank assembly plants are difficult to move due to the special type of structures required and due to the

heavy machinery employed and the special forges and heat-treatment facilities required. The production of amodel, Tiger excepted, in several plants acted as a substitute for dispersal insamuch as when bombing interrupted


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August

Krupp IV 423,031 sq ft 42.2

Miag III 128,658 sq ft 14.0

Marienfelde Panther Unknown

September

Henschel Tiger 1,321,000 sq ft 48.0

MAN Panther 541,372 sq ft 23.6


October

Henschel Tiger 1,231,200 sq ft 45.3




December Henschel Tiger 60,000 sq ft 0.2

January

Henschel Tiger 942,300 sq ft 34.4



FebruaryMAN Panther 60,115 sq ft 2.6


March

Henschel Tiger 246,450 sq ft 9.0


Vomag IV 156,433 sq ft 3.6

6,647,863 sq ft

It will be seen from the above table that damage to Henschel, the sole Tiger producer, and MAN, the largest

Panther producer, amounted to 5,594,102 square feet, or 84 percent of total surveyed floor damage in the tank

industry.

7. Casualties.

Loss of workmen killed by air attacks on the plants had little effect on production. Based on the casualty figures

of five plants with a total 1944 employment of 45,332, one percent (464) were killed. As the plants on which this

percentage is based were the most

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heavily hit it is probable that the percentage killed over the entire industry would run even less.

8. Dispersal as a Recuperation Factor.

At the five plants surveyed, only one, Vomag, started dispersal of manufacturing facilities before bomb damage

made such a step necessary. At that plant 50 percent of the machine tools used in the manufacutre of small parts

were dispersed during the summer of 1944. The efficiency of the program could not be determined as the plant

was not damaged until March and April 1945. The remaining four plans attempted dispersal only when it became

necessary becaus of damage to the plants. Only the facilities for the manufacture of small parts such as steering

gears were dispersed. As the dispersal program in itself was of a very limited nature, its value as a recuperation

factor was also limited but, within its small scope, the program was a success.

9. Changes in Air Raid Protection as a Result of Bombing Offensive

a. Early in 1944, orders were issued for the construction of baffle walls throughout all war plants for the

protection of important machine tools, assembly lines, transformer stations and sub-stations, and other critical

facilities. Only a limited amount of this work was completed, however, because of the inability of the plants to

obtain the power distribution panels and special, hard to replace machines were finally protected.


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b. During the first half of 1944, air raid shelters at practically all plants were made more secure and enlarged to

shelter foreign workers as well as the German workers. In many case new shelters were provided either by the

construction of massive concrete bunkers, by digging new tunnels in nearby hillsides or by altering existing

tunnels. The original bunkers consisting of reinforced basement shelters were, for the most part, abandoned as it

was found the older types would not stand up under heavy bombing. Undoubtedly many of the worker's lives

were saved as a result of this program.

10. Training of Labor.The training of labor was evidently left to each plant. The extensive prewar apprentice school boy system was

practically abandoned during the war. Taking its place was the major task of quickly training the foreign civilian

workers and prisoners. These workers amounted to 50 percent of the total labor force in 1944. Of the foreign

workers, on the average only 10 percent to 20 percent could be classed as having previously acquired skill for the

work they were called upon later to perform. Apparently the government had evolved no uniform or general plan

for training either the German or foreign shop personnel. No school system was employed and all training was

actually done in the shops themselves.

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11. Adequacy of Supplies.

Tank factory inventories of raw materials averaged three to four months requirements during the entire war untilabout October 1944. There were shortages of particular and varying items from time to time but these shortages

were not of such a nature as to affect montly production to any degree. The supply of components was generally

sufficient to maintain the plants's schedules. It is probable the planned production of finished tanks was

determined by the capabilities of the component manufacturers. There were cases, however, late in 1944 where

planned increase in finished tank production at particular production plants as at MNH were not realized because

of the inability of the component plants to increase output, and because of the difficulties arising at this time in

transportating supplies.

12. Labor.

The composition of the labor force in the tank industry followed the same lines as other important German

industries with 50 percent of the workers made up of foreign labor and prisoners of war. At the five plants

surveyed representing 41 percent of the total tank output, there was an average of 45,332 employees in 1944.Assuming the remainder of the industry to be in proportion, an approximate total labor force of 110,000 was

employed in the assembly plants. The size of the labor force remained substantially the same during 1943 and

1944, although production nearly doubled, due probably to the fact that the workers had become familiar with the

models being produced and therefore were more efficient. There was no evidence of production having been

hindered by a shortage of labor.

13. Changes in Productive Facilities.

There was neither plant abandonement nor new construction in 1944 in the tank plants. Three new plants ,

however, did get into production, Demag and Deutsche Eisenwerke, in the first months of 1944 and MBA in the

last of 1944; but in very small volume. Actual production figures are not available for these plants, but the

planned production for December was 163 Mark III tanks for Deutsche Eisenwerke, 30 Panthers for Demag and

10 Panthers for MBA.

14. Priority Program

a. The Speer Ministry in June 1943 established a system of priority order numbers which goverened the

procurement of raw material by the German factories. All orders for production were given numbers, depending

on their importance, which placed them in one of five priority groups. Practically all orders for important army

production, including tanks, received numbers within Group I, which was the top priority group.

b. A new system was decreed in July 1944 which differed from the old one, chiefly in that two new priority

groups had been added, at

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Over a 15-day period, 95 percent of the floor area was made unusable with a resulting production loss of 70

percent over a period of three months. This amount of damage at a motor vehicle plant would probably have

caused complete stoppage of work for a period of at least six months. Only 35 percent and 15 percent loss in

production over a three month period resulted to MAN and Krupp, respectively, where raids over a 40 day period

caused 59 percent to become unusuable. Comparing this to Daimler-Benz, a motor vehicle plant, 60 percent floor

space damage caused a 75 percent loss of production over a three month period. From the above it appears

evident that tank assembly plants are able to absorb building damage to a much greater extent than motor vehicle

plants.

5. The Importance of the Combined Use of HE and IB.

There were several cases where HE bombing was immediately followed by incendiary bombing before debris

resulting from HE bombing had been cleared

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away. This resulted in damage to machine tools and losses in production which exceeded the normal expectancy

for the amount of building damage. These cases occured in factory structures with wood roof wherein HE blast

caused collapse of the combustible roof construction, thereby greatly increasing the vulnerability of machines,

wiring, and material to incendiary bombs. A high percentage of roofs in German plants were wood, even in the

latest modern buildings. However, at the Henschel tank and truck plant in Kassel all combustible materials notrequired in manufacturing was removed from the plan and the dropping of incendiary bombs after the high

explosives did little or no damage.

6. Machine Tool Damage.

a. A survey of machine tool damage at five tank plants gave no definite conclusion as to the most effective

method of knocking out machine tools. From the plants investigated, it was shown that no fixed relationship

existed between total building damage and damage to machine tools.

b. At the Henschel plant in Kassel, it was the opinion of the managing director that out of 11 raids on the plant,

the attack in which a large number of 100-lb fragmentation bombs were dropped caused the largest amount of

machine tool damage.

7. Indirect Effects of Bombing.

The disruption of transportation facilities from October 1944 to the end of the war was the most indirect effect of

bombing most successful in curtailing production. Plant officials were unanimous in declaring that operations at

dispersed plants were practically impossible and operations at main plants were greatly hindered by

transportation difficulties during this period. This is the chief reason for the final decline in tank productin in the

first months of 1945.

8. Recuperation.

On the whole, recuperation at tank plants was very successful and was carried out with a minimum of repairs. In

at least one instance, individual shelters were erected over machines exposed to the elements by the destruction

of the roof, with the rest of the working space remaining open. For the most part, efforts to return to production

were concentrated in the main plants with dispersal playing only a minor role.

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Exhibit A

Panzer Production (Actual) (Speer Document #7)*

(Tanks, Assault Guns and Self-Propelled Guns)

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep O

Mark I and II 9 233 306 77 7 7

Mark III 895 1,845 2,555 349


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16/17 Mar 43 1090.0 1376.0

27/28 Aug 43 952.0 872.0

19 Oct 44 392.0 614.0

3 Jan 45 1464.0 691.0

20 Feb 45 1339.0 253.0

21 Feb 45 1028.5 981.5

Totals 6781.5 5328.0 12,109.5

Krupp-Gerson

Magdeburg-Buckau

Plant Raids

5

5 Aug 44 202.5

11 Sep 44 105.7 36.4

7 Oct 44 181.0

16 Jan 45 187.5 2.5

2 Mar 45 543.8 30.0

Totals 1220.5 68.9 1289.4

Area Raids

14

21 Jan 44 1016.0 1223.7

21/22 Jan 44 1066.6 1206.1

29 Jun 44 120.5 105.7

28 Sep 44 657.8 373.8

6 Feb 45 947.5 1.8

14 Feb 45 583.0 221.6

15 Feb 45 878.7 1.4

Totals 5270.5 3134.1 8404.6

Miag

Brunswick

Plant Raids

2

5 Aug 44 195.9 261.8

3 Mar 45 114.5 79.2

Totals 310.4 341.0 651.4

Area Raids

6

20 Feb 44 213.8

15 Mar 44 183.0 566.0

29 Mar 44 92.5 299.2

8 Apr 44 400.3 75.4

12/13 Aug 44 934.3 492.3

14/15 Oct 44 182.5 817.2

Totals 2006.4 2250.1 4256.5

MNH

Hannover

Plant Raids

2

14 Mar 45 181.0 71.5

28 Mar 45 117.0 58.3

Totals 298.0 129.8 427.8

Skoda

Pilsen

Plant Raids

10

25/26 Apr 42 13.0

4/5 May 42 10.7

13/14 May 42 519.8 7.0

16 Oct 44 110.5

20 Oct 44 2.5

23 Oct 44 201.0 106.0

9 Dec 44 44.25


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16 Dec 44 206.75

20 Dec 44 124.5

25 Apr 45 407.0 116.0

Totals 1640.0 229.0 1869.0

Deutsche-Eisenwerke

Mlheim

Area Raids

8

22/23 Jun 43 845.8 877.7

14 Oct 44 4.75

1/2 Nov 44 6.0

8 Dec 44 932.5

11 Dec 44 104.7

18 Dec 44 1434.2 378.2

22 Feb 45 3.0

22 Mar 45 119.9 61.8

Totals 3450.8 1317.7 4768.5

BMMPrague

Plant Raids

125 Mar 45 377.5

Area Raids

1

14 Feb 45 103.5 49.0

Totals 481.0 49.0 530.0

Nibelungen

St Valentin

Austria

Plant Raids

4

16 Oct 44 143.3

17 Feb 45 11.5

20 Mar 45 18.0

23 Mar 45 258.3

Totals 431.3 431.3

Vomag

Plauen

Plant Raids

4

17 Mar 45 361.0

21 Mar 45 308.0

26 Mar 45 351.7

26 Mar 45(?) 299.5 114.0

Totals 1320.2 114.0 1434.2

Area Raids

3

12 Sep 44 47.5

19 Mar 45 1038.5

8 Apr 45 208.7 46.0

Totals 1294.7 46.0 1340.7

Alkett

Berlin

Plant Raids

1 6 Oct 44 176.0 46.0 222.0

Area Raids

3

26 Nov 43 791.1 632.7

20/31 Jan 44 1085.6 868.4

1/2 Feb 44 9.4 .2

Totals 1886.1 1501.3 3387.4

Daimler-Benz

Marienfelde

Plant Raids

2

21 Jun 44 44.5 31.8

6 Aug 44 179.5 47.5

Totals 224.0 79.3 303.3

Area Raids

1

23/24 Aug 44 945.6 826.5

Totals 945.6 826.5 1772.1


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Exhibit C

Correlation of Attacks on 5 Plants with Floor Area Destroyed or Heavily Damaged in Sq Ft

February 1944 - April 1945

Henschel MAN Krupp Miag VomagTotal

Raids

Floor

AreaDayFloor

AreaDay

Floor

AreaDay

Floor

AreaDay

Floor

AreaDay

Floor

Area

1944

February 20 81,992 1 81,992

March15 48,850

2 96,14029 47,290

April 8 34,970 1 34,970

May 0 0

June 29 418 1 418

July 0 0

August5 423,031 5 117,152

3 551,689

12 11,506

September

22 403,800 10 541,372 11 75,555

5 1,937,92727 99,200

28 818,000

October2 643,800 3 563,610 7 108,800 14 44,355

6 2,237,5607 587,400 19 289,615

November 0 0

December15 36,000

2 60,00030 24,000

Totals 7 2,612,200 3 1,394,597 4 607,804 7 386,115 0 0 21 5,000,696

1944

January1 845,300 2 338,440 16 46,341

4 1,327,08121 97,000

February20 60,115 6 33,925

3 126,37415 32,334

March

9 246,450 3 4,379 17 26,050

5 407,26221 50,050

26 80,333

April 8 84,567 1 84,567

Total 3 1,188,750 2 398,555 3 112,600 1 4,379 4 241,000 13 1,945,284

Grand

Total10 3,800,950 5 1,793,152 7 720,404 8 390,494 4 241,000 34 6,945,980

Exhibit D

Monthly Weight of Attacks on Tank Plants

Plant Raids Area Raids

Date HE IB Total HE IB Total

April 42 13.0 13.0

May 42 10.7 10.7


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19/19

August 42 151.0 104.0 255.0

March 43 1455.0 1813.0 3268.0

May 43 519.8 7.0 526.8

June 43 845.8 877.7 1723.5

August 43 1897.6 1698.5 3596.1

October 43 924.9 1117.6 2042.5

November 43 791.1 632.7 1423.8

January 44 3168.2 3298.2 6466.4

February 44 223.2 .2 223.4

March 44 183.0 566.0 749.0

April 44 400.3 75.4 475.7

June 44 44.5 31.8 76.3 120.5 105.7 226.2

August 44 577.9 311.3 889.2 934.3 492.3 1426.6

September 44 2150.7 1141.8 3785.1 579.2 1431.2 2010.4

November 44 6.0 6.0

December 44 1124.4 149.0 1273.4 3946.4 450.7 4397.1

January 45 187.5 2.5 190.0 1551.5 692.8 2244.3

February 45 11.5 11.5 4883.2 1518.3 6401.5

March 45 2986.9 400.0 3386.9 1250.9 361.0 1611.9

April 45 407.0 116.0 523.0 208.7 46.0 254.7

Total: 10,677.2 3483.2 14,160.4 24,226.1 15635.1 39,881.2

Return to the Table of Contents of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

Return to The Sinews of War.


19 von 19 20 07 12 15:40

Documents

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey_ Tank Industry Report