U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: LEVER OR HANDOUT? A Thesis

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: LEVER OR HANDOUT?

A Thesis

submitted to the Faculty

of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Master of Arts in Security Studies

By

Jörn A. Pung, M.S.

Washington, DC

April 16, 2010

ii

Copyright 2010 by Jörn A. Pung

All Rights Reserved

iii

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: LEVER OR HANDOUT?

Jörn A. Pung, M.S.

Thesis Advisor: Jennifer Sims, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Background: Security assistance and security cooperation have been mainstays in U.S. foreign

policy. The relationship between how U.S. security assistance affects the security cooperation of

other nations with the U.S. is of interest with U.S. security interests expanding worldwide. A

study of this relationship is reported here.

Methods: The study examined two separate groups, allied seeking and non-allied seeking nations,

which had all received security assistance and provided forces to U.S. led security initiatives.

Quantitative results are shown for measuring both military financing and sales, which are subsets

of assistance, compared to force contributions. The analysis was performed on actual and

normalized data in order to accommodate for differences in military budgets or populations

between nations.

Results: The data suggests a resiliency of partner nations, both allied seeking and non-allied

seeking, to provide troop contributions in the face of consistent or decreasing levels of military

financing and sales. Although, over time, allied seeking nations were more consistent force

providers than non-allied seeking nations. The normalization of military assistance data

established ranges of military assistance, financing and sales, as potential indicators for force

contribution.

Conclusions: The analysis indicates that military assistance does not act as a lever eliciting

security cooperation in the form of force contributions, but that the existence of a pre-existing

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security relationship or the desire to attain membership in an alliance may be factors in security

cooperation.

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The research and writing of this thesis

is dedicated to my beautiful wife, Stacie, and our lovely daughters, Kaylin and Lauren.

Many thanks and I love you,

Jörn A. Pung

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction…………………………………………………………..………………………....1

U.S. Security Assistance Overview.………………………………………..…………………..5

NATO Seeking Nations…………………………………………………………..………….....9

Non-NATO Seeking Nations…..……………………………………………………...……….21

Combined Analysis……………….……..……………………………………………..............32

Policy Recommendations…………...…………………………………………………………39

Considerations for Further Study………………………………………………………………....42

Conclusion………………………………..…………………………………………….............44

Appendix A: Methods………………………………………………………………………….46

Appendix B: NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables…………………………………………….48

Appendix C: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables……………………………………….59

Appendix D: Combined Charts and Figures……....……………………………………………70

Bibliography……………………………………….…………………………………………...78

1

INTRODUCTION

“We [the U.S.] have an enduring need to build future coalitions and help partners

address their own indigenous challenges, and we need the right tools positioned beforehand

rather than having to respond from scratch to each contingency or systematic failure. We have

historically underinvested in these capabilities; now is the time to build on lessons learned and

institutionalize them to better position the United States for a complex future.” Quadrennial

Defense Review Report (QDR), February 2010

With the War on Terrorism transcending national boundaries and limited U.S. military

resources available for this and other potential missions around the world, the U.S. needs to

capitalize on leverage and influence gained through security assistance. The above statement

from the United States 2010 QDR highlights the importance of multinational coalition warfare,

the link between partner efforts in common goals and U.S. assistance programs, and the need to

reform the process and ensure that the United States is prepared for the next conflict with willing

and capable partners.

The U.S. is currently engaged in multiple security initiatives around the world, with the

active use of military forces, in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Balkans, and the Horn

of Africa. The U.S. Congress allocated $28.9 billion in security assistance in fiscal year 20091 to

enhance the recipient nations‟ security by helping train and equip their military forces, providing

them economic support or offering development initiatives. These assistance programs are

designed to enhance U.S. national security interests in maintaining state, regional, and worldwide

stability.

1 Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance, Summary Tables Fiscal Year

2010, Table 1: International Affairs Request <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/124295.pdf>

(accessed March 1, 2010)

2

The U.S. has strong defense relationships with NATO allies and other nations under the

U.S. security umbrella. Due to these security relationships, many countries have provided forces

for U.S. led security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. International participation from nations

outside these alliances has also provided force contributions to the missions in Iraq and

Afghanistan. This act of contributing forces without an expressed security alliance with the U.S.

raises the question of why nations have contributed forces to these operations.

There are many factors involved in a nation‟s decision to go to war or contribute forces to

a coalition, such as bilateral or multilateral economic ties, political considerations, incentives

offered by the coalition leader, or purely security concerns. This study will examine one specific

area, security assistance, which may provide insights into a national decision to provide forces to

U.S. led operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not meant to discount other elements of

national decision-making, but to focus on one area to determine potential indicators or patterns of

security cooperation based upon military assistance.

This study will analyze U.S. security assistance, focused on funding levels of military

financing and military sales, and how variations in levels of assistance have influenced support

for U.S.-led security initiatives from 2000 until 2008. Support will be measured through

contribution of military forces to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom-

Afghanistan. By analyzing the relationship between assistance and benefits, this study can

provide insights into how the U.S. may structure and allocate funds in various programs to

increase contributions to U.S.-led security initiatives.

U.S. bilateral relationships between the nations of Georgia, Macedonia, Ukraine, El

Salvador, Mongolia, and Thailand have all elicited support to U.S.-led security initiatives.

Examining them may reveal commonalities that have made a difference for coalition building for

3

wartime action.2 Three of these nations, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine, have sought NATO

membership, which may provide them with an additional incentive for force contribution.

Comparing U.S. security assistance to and force contributions of these three states with others

that have no such ambitions (El Salvador, Mongolia, and Thailand) should provide additional

insights for defense policy makers.

The literature on the topic of security assistance and cooperation has generally focused

the macro issues of alliance formation and security cooperation or on a more specific issue of

arms trade, which may be regarded as a subset of security assistance. In terms of the former,

multiple authors have examined the issue of security cooperation with regards to the security

dilemma and choices nations make in forming alliances (Jervis, 1978; Jervis, 1985; Lipson, 1984;

Glaser, 1997; Snyder, 1984), aspects and elements of alliance formulation (Morgan and Palmer,

2003; Sorkin, 1994; Campbell, 2004), and residual effects of military assistance within the

recipient-nation (Sylvan, 1976; Maniruzzman, 1992).

With regard to arms trade, the literature captures a major debate: Some authors have

shown that the supplier-nation use arms trade as leverage (Betts, 1980; Sislin, 1994; Luck 1977);

other authors have demonstrated that to the contrary, arms trade is not a significant lever over

recipient nations (Kinsella, 1998; Menon, 1982; Wheelock, 1978). A majority of the authors on

both sides of the debate point to Wheelock‟s definition of leverage as “manipulation of the arms

transfer relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient-state to conform its policy or actions

to the desires of the supplier-state.”3 Even with a common point of reference, various studies

have provided mixed results in terms of leverage and arms trade.

2 This study will not examine benefits that are reflected in third country agreements.

3 Thomas R. Wheelock, “Arms for Israel: The Limit of Leverage”, International Security, 3, no.2 (autumn,

1978): 123.

4

In any case, the current literature does not encompass a holistic view of security

assistance, which includes elements of military financing and security engagement programs in

addition to arms trade. This study will examine the aspects of military financing and military

sales, or arms trade, and benefits attained by the supplier nation in an attempt to expand the

literature on military assistance and security cooperation.4 Additionally, this study will also

examine an aspect of a claim by Donald Sylvan that a lag time is associated with an increase in

military assistance and participation in armed conflict.5

The significance of this research for contemporary policymaking is evident with just a

cursory review of budgetary considerations. With the U.S. Department of State requesting an

appropriation of $30.5B in fiscal year 2010 for economic and security assistance, one would

expect to see tangible benefits returned to the U.S. in terms of security cooperation for U.S.-led

security initiatives. I do not to suggest that the U.S. should „call in‟ all its markers and demand

immediate military support from recipient nations, but instead, the U.S. should examine where

and how it has had success in the past with garnering military support from recipient nations.

Such an effort, along the lines of what is offered in this study, would be in line with the 2010

QDR goal of improving capacities for multinational and peacekeeping operations and efforts to

boost “contributing nation capacity.”6

4 See Appendix A: Methods for an explanation of data sources and analysis methods used in this study

5 Donald A. Sylvan, “Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for International Conflict and

Cooperation” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20, no. 4 (December, 1976): 626.

6 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C., 2010): 30.

5

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE OVERVIEW

The U.S. has used security assistance and security cooperation as a primary means of

foreign policy since the founding of the nation. Security assistance and cooperation dates back to

the Revolutionary War, when France provided arms and military forces to fight the British.

While during the nineteenth century, the U.S. focused internally on economic and political

development of the nation, the twentieth century witnessed an expanded use of security assistance

in U.S. foreign policy. In World War I, the U.S. provided arms shipments in excess of $2.2B

prior to joining the war effort7, and in World War II, the U.S. established the Lend-Lease Act that

accounted for more than $50B to the Allies before joining the war in December 1941.8

Throughout the Cold War and today, security assistance remains an essential tool of U.S. foreign

policy.

The method and means of U.S. security assistance has changed over time and is currently

codified in U.S. law under both Title 10 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse/Department of State)

and Title 22 (Department of Defense) programs.9 While the Department of Defense (DOD)

implements all Title 10 programs, it also administers select Title 22 programs with Department of

State (DOS) oversight, which are elements of foreign assistance and governed by the Foreign

7 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, (Wright-

Patternson AFB, OH, January 2010): A3-3.

8 Ibid., p.A3-4.

9 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background,

Major Issues, and Options for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, Richard F. Grimmett, Rhonda

Margesson, John Rollins, Taiji Salaam-Blyther, Curt Tarnoff, Amy F. Woolf, Liana Sun Wyler, and Steve

Bowman (Washington, D.C., August 25, 2008): 1.

6

Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).10

The two security assistance

components that this study will address11

will be military financing12

and military sales. 13

Security assistance has been mentioned as a key element in U.S. national security policy

in numerous national strategy documents. These strategies call for an increase in multilateral

operations, using security assistance as a means to enhance friendly and allied contributions. The

1988 National Security Strategy (NSS) noted the requirement to “shape the international

environment through defense cooperation and security assistance to assist allies in deterring

aggression and coercion.”14

In 2004, the National Military Strategy stressed that the U.S. should

10 Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, p.1-1.

11 All of the programs examined in this study are Title 22 programs as Title 10 program funding

information is classified For Official Use Only (FOUO) and only portions of the program information has

been released through the Freedom of Information Act.

12 Military financing includes foreign military financing (FMF), an appropriated fund, administered by DoD,

of loans and grants which enable foreign governments to purchase US defense articles, services, and

training either through FMS or DCS, international military education and training (IMET) program, which is

an appropriated fund administered by DoD that provides grant assistance to a foreign government for

military training in the U.S. or other locations, peacekeeping operations (PKO), appropriated funds

implemented by DoS to support US and UN peacekeeping efforts in the world, , international narcotics

control and law enforcement (INCLE), an appropriated fund administered by DoS to help suppress

manufacture, transit, financing and distribution of illicit drugs, and nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and

nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs (NADR), an appropriated fund

administered by DoS, clear UXO, conduct demining, help enforce border controls, and fund IAEA and the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Definitions from Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management,

The Management of Security Assistance.

13 The military sales component includes foreign military sales (FMS), administered by DoD whereby

“foreign government purchase defense articles, good, services, and training from the Unites States

government”, direct commercial sales (DCS), which are commercial exports from the U.S. defense

industry of articles, goods, services, or training to a foreign government administered by DoS, excess

defense articles (EDA), authorized transfer of DoD articles for sale from military depots for a percentage

of its value, and military drawdowns, where the President is authorized to provide USG articles, services,

and training at no charge to friendly countries. Definitions from Defense Institute of Security Assistance

Management, The Management of Security Assistance.

14 President, National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C., 1998): 12.

7

enable multinational partners through security assistance in order to enhance U.S. warfighting

strategies and decision-making.15

The 2005 National Defense Strategy listed one of its objectives

as strengthening allies and partners to improve their capacity “to defend themselves and meet

challenges of common interest.”16

The 2006 QDR highlighted the need for assistance to become

more flexible and responsive to coalition partners. The capability to conduct burden sharing and

coalition warfare because of security assistance and political-military relationships was

emphasized in the Department of State/USAID Strategic Plan for FY2007-2012.17

Most recently,

the 2010 QDR emphasized a requirement to build the capacities of foreign partners‟ militaries to

defend and deter attacks and to boost the capacity to contribute to coalition and peacekeeping

operations. None of these documents detail definitive expectations of partner nations that receive

support in terms of security assistance, be it security assistance financing or through arms sales,

in terms of force contributions to a coalition or multinational operation in a quid pro quo manner.

Regardless, within these same documents, there is a recurring theme of anticipation and

expectation that security assistance programs will assist in eliciting material support to the U.S. in

the form of combat forces to take part in coalition or multinational operations.

With this rich history of security assistance forming part of its foreign policy and

integrated with its national strategies, the U.S. expects, not unreasonably, a potential return on its

investment. While force contribution may not be a possibility for every nation, with whom the

U.S. provides security assistance, it has been a tenet of national strategy demonstrated in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm and highlighted in the 1995 National Military Strategy for security

assistance to “provide means to defend their own nation and fight alongside U.S. forces in

15

Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C., 2004): 8.

16 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, (Washington, D.C., 2005): i.

17 Department of State, Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2007 – 2012, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for

International Development, (Washington, D.C., 2007): 3.

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combat.18

” Therefore, by examining security assistance relationships, which have borne benefits

to the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, this study seeks to enhance the understanding of when force

contribution may occur.

18

Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, (Washington, D.C., 1995): 8.

9

NATO SEEKING NATIONS

Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine have been actively seeking NATO membership since

the early to mid-1990s through 2008. While these nations were at various stages of membership

admission to NATO at the end of 2008, the U.S. strongly supported each of the cases. In viewing

these three case studies, the security assistance and security cooperation data provides some

interesting insights that may prove useful to policy makers when determining security assistance

levels and when looking for security cooperation with alliance seeking nations.

Georgia has been adamant on gaining membership within NATO in an attempt to balance

the threat it feels from Russia. It attained Partnership for Peace (PfP) status from NATO in 1994

and declared membership aspirations in 2002.19

Since September of 2006, the U.S. has

continuously advocated for extending a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia for entrance

into NATO.20

Following the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, the U.S. and

Georgia issued the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership with security language focusing

on a capable self-defense, full integration into Europe, expansion of U.S. security cooperation

programs, and candidacy for Georgia into NATO.21

Backed by overwhelming domestic support, Macedonia has sought NATO membership

since independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Macedonia entered the PfP program in 199522

and

gained Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 but is still awaiting final approval for

19

Malkhaz Jamureli, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 8 March 2010.

20 Congressional Research Service, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for

U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol (Washington, D.C., January 14, 2009): 39.

21 Ibid., 35-36.

22 Joel R. Hillison, New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?, U.S. Army War College

Strategic Studies Institute (April 2009), 37.

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membership into the alliance.23

The U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs noted that

Macedonian participation in Iraq and Afghanistan and that participation in coalition operations

would have a positive impact into NATO membership considerations.24

The sole obstacle in

NATO membership seems to be an enduring name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, as

the alliance determined that Macedonia had met all the qualifications for membership during the

April 2008 NATO summit.25

In its Strategic Defense Bulletin and White Book, key Ukrainian military strategy and

transformation documents, Ukraine detailed out its plans for military professional development,

desires to be interoperable with NATO, and the need to invest in equipment to transform the

military.26

The U.S. has been an ardent supporter of Ukrainian membership and signed the

Charter on Strategic Partnership in December 2008, after Ukraine failed to obtain MAP, to detail

the future of security cooperation between the nations and steps to increase potential for MAP.27

Although, while Ukraine still does not have a MAP for entrance into NATO, all NATO nations

had accepted the viewpoint that Ukraine will become part of NATO in the future.28

The recent

election of Victor Yanukovich and his political party, the Party of Regions, having the largest

23 Congressional Research Service, NATO Enlargement: Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates,

by Paul Belkin, Carl Ek, Vincent Morelli, Jim Nichol, Steven Woehrel, (Washington, D.C., April 14, 2009):

10.

24 Statement by U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Skopje, Macedonia,

November 6,2003 in Congressional Research Service, Macedonia (FYROM): Post-Conflict Situation and U.S.

Policy, by Julie Kim (Washington, D.C.: June 17,2005): 14.

25 Congressional Research Service, NATO Enlargement, Summary.

26 Deborah Sanders, UKRAINE AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: CAN IT COMPLETE MILITARY

TRANSFORMATION AND JOIN THE U.S.-LED WAR ON TERRORISM?, U.S. Army War College Strategic

Studies Institute (October 2006), 7, 14, 18.

27 Ibid., 13-14.

28 Congressional Research Service, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel

(Washington, D.C., March 5, 2009): 7.

11

voting bloc in parliament, may significantly alter the current relationship between NATO and

Ukraine as the governing coalition stated it would pass a law preventing Ukraine from joining

any military alliance, fulfilling a vow by Yanukovich to block Ukrainian entry into NATO.29

Between 2000 and 2008, all three of the nations received funding and conducted

procurement through the same programs, with the exception of Georgia accounting for two

additional procurement programs in 2002. The levels of normalized military assistance30

(NMA)

varied quite significantly between all three nations, and even fluctuated significantly within the

levels of financing and sales for both Georgia and Macedonia between 2002 and 2008. Despite

the differences in financing and sales, all nations had soldiers forward deployed to either

Afghanistan or Iraq from 2003 to 2008. This suggests a potential link between the political

commitment to joining NATO and continuous military support to a leader within that institution.

MILITARY FINANCING

An examination of military financing compared with troop contributions does not suggest

any type of relationship between these factors for NATO seeking nations (see Figures 1 – 3). A

comparison of military financing and troop contribution benefits indicates that the level of

military financing remained within a $5M band for both Georgia and Ukraine, yet from 2003-

2008 the corresponding troop contribution benefits varied extensively. For Macedonia, the level

of military financing actually reduced through the period, yet the troop contribution benefits

increased over time. These tendencies indicate that military financing levels may not induce

troop contributions.

29 Associated Press, “Ukraine: Bid To Ban Military Ties” New York Times, 17 March 2010.

30 Normalized military assistance is defined as a three-year average of military assistance, financing and

sales, as a percentage of the recipient nation’s military budget. (See Appendix A: Methods for further

explanation)

12

Figure 1: NATO Seeking Nations Financing vs. Troop Contribution Benefits31

Figure 2: Troop Contribution Benefits32

Figure 3: Military Financing33

In examining military financing as a normalized data set, there is an indication of a four-

year lag time between a peak of normalized military financing34

(NMF) and peak of per capita

31 Figure created by author using data from Table 10: Composite Data for Analysis in Appendix B: NATO

Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefits as X-axis and 3Yr Finance as Y-axis


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and Benfits as Y-axis


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years X-axis and 3Yr Finance as Y-axis

34 Normalized military financing is defined as a three-year average of military financing as an equivalent

percentage of the recipient-nation’s military budget. (See Appendix A: Methods for further explanation)

13

yearly troop contribution35

(PCTC) for Georgia and Macedonia (see Figures 4 – 6). This

comparison also shows that troop contributions for both Georgia and Macedonia increased

despite declines in NMF. Ukrainian data did not follow the same trends and actually indicated a

decrease in PCTC even though levels of NMF remained relatively constant. The continued

presence of a „lag time‟ between peaks of military assistance and military cooperation, as

demonstrated here, may support Donald Sylvan‟s idea about military assistance followed by

military action or support.

Figure 4: NATO Seeking Nations Financing vs. Troop Contributions (Normalized) 36

35 Per capita yearly troop contribution (PCTC) is determined by dividing the yearly average troop

contribution level by the nation’s population. (See Appendix A: Methods for further explanation)

36 Figure created by author using data from Table 10: Composite Data for Analysis with PCTC as X-axis

from Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance with Normalized MIL Financing as Y-axis in Appendix B:

NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables

14

Figure 5: Troop Contributions37

Figure 6: Mlitary Financing38

The analysis of raw and normalized data indicates that military financing may not

influence force contributions. Additionally, the data demonstrates a potential willingness by

nations to accept a reduction in military financing without negatively affecting force contribution.

If this trend continues throughout the study, it will agree with the arguments put forth by

academic scholars that military assistance does not provide a lever between supplier-nations and

recipient-nations.

MILITARY SALES

Military sales compared to troop contribution benefits displayed a marginal positive

correlation (see Figures 7 – 9). In the case of Georgia, there were significant increases in military

sales and comparative increases in troop contribution benefits. For Ukraine, decreased military

sales accompanied decreased levels in troop contribution benefits and with an increase in sales

came in marginal increase in troop contribution benefits. These trend lines indicate that increased

military sales may accompany troop commitments, and vice-versa.


Seeking Nations Data Tables with PCTC as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

38 Figure created by author using data from Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance in Appendix B: NATO

Seeking Nations Data Tables with Normalized MIL Financing as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

15

Figure 7: NATO Seeking Nations Sales vs. Troop Contribution Benefits39

Figure 8: Troop ContributionBenefits40

Figure 9: Military Sales41

The normalized data set of military sales to troop contributions also produced a four-year

lag time, just as in previous example, between a crest of normalized military sales42

(NMS) and a

peak of PCTC for Georgia and Macedonia (see Figure 10 – 12). This lag period also


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Sales as Y-axis


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefit as Y-axis and Years as X-axis


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and 3Yr Sales as Y-axis

42 Normalized military sales is defined as a three-year average of military sales as an equivalent

percentage of the recipient-nation’s military budget.

16

demonstrated an increase in troop contributions for both Georgia and Macedonia despite declines

in NMS. As with NMF, the data on Ukraine data demonstrated a decrease in PCTC with

consistent levels of NMS. Here again, we do not see the presence of a potential lever between

supplier-nation and recipient-nation, but actually the opposite occurring with a reduction in

military assistance followed by an increase in military cooperation.

Figure 10: NATO Seeking Nations Financing vs. Troop Contributions (Normalized) 43



43 Figure created by author using data from Table 10: Composite Data for Analysis with PCTC as X-axis

from Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance with Normalized MIL Sales as Y-axis in Appendix B: NATO

Seeking Nations Data Tables


Seeking Nations Data Tables with PCTC as Y-axis and Years as Y-axis

45 Figure created by author using data from Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance in Appendix B: NATO

Seeking Nations Data Tables with Normalized MIL Sales as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

17

By comparing the raw data with the normalized data, we see that the raw data (Figures 7

– 9) provides some evidence that increases in sales actually accounted for a smaller percentage of

the overall military budget for these nations. In this light, while the U.S. may gain benefits with

increased military sales, it has actually lost some of its influence with a decrease in equivalent

percentage of military budget in terms of military sales. A loss of influence may possibly equate

with a loss of advantage to entice nations to contribute forces to a combat operation, yet the data

has not yet substantiated a claim of leverage.

COMPOSITE ANALYSIS

An amalgamated view of U.S. military assistance to these nations and force contribution

for U.S. combat operations implies that military assistance may not have played a deciding role

for nations to provide forces to U.S. security efforts. While there were not any clear correlations

present between military sales or military financing and troop contributions common among all

three nations, there were some common trends between nations.

There was a clear indicator of a lag time between a peak of NMA and PCTC in the cases

of Georgia and Macedonia. In this case, there was a four-year lag time between a peak of NMA

in 2003, in both elements of military financing and sales, and a peak of PCTC in 2007. The data

also shows that troop contributions for both Georgia and Macedonia increased despite declines of

in NMA from 2002 to 2008. For Georgia, this could be explained by its desire to demonstrate its

military competency and gain military capabilities in a dual effort to show NATO allies it is ready

to be part of the alliance and to improve operational capabilities for defense of the nation against

Russian aggression.46

While Macedonia does not have a threatening former super-power on its

border that it needs to balance, the viewpoint of its leaders, in that Macedonia will always

46

Jamureli.

18

conduct combat as part of an alliance, whether in defense of the nation or as a part of a coalition

outside the national borders, may make clear its continued force contributions.47

While trends in Ukrainian security assistance and cooperation did not match the pattern

of a lag period shown with the other nations, it actually indicated a decrease in PCTC even

though levels of NMA, both financing and sales, remained relatively constant. This was due to a

decision of the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko in 2005 to withdraw all combat forces

units from Iraq,48

potentially due to political tensions within the Ukraine following the Orange

Revolution of 2004. Additionally, only the Ukrainian parliament can authorize the deployment of

a combat unit, so even though Yushchenko may have supported follow-on deployments the

President can authorize the deployment of individual Soldiers or Officers to serve in non-combat

roles without the support of parliament.49

In addition to not being able to establish a correlation between military assistance and

force contribution, the analysis was inconclusive in terms of a return on investment (see Figures

13 and 14). Macedonia yielded a consistently low rate of return, but it also received the least

amount of military assistance. Georgia consistently received the greatest amount of military

assistance throughout the period, yet only had the highest return on investment from 2006-2008.

Finally, Ukraine initially had a high rate of return with a similar amount of military assistance

compared to Macedonia, yet while its return on investment rate fell, the United States actually

increased the amount of military assistance provided to Ukraine.

47 Sonja Bajdeska, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 26 March 2010.

48 Andriy Yakovliev, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 15 March 2010.

49 Ibid

19

Figure 13: NATO Seeking Nations Total Military Assistance50

Figure 14: NATO Seeking Nations Return on Investment to the US51

For NATO seeking nations, it appears that security assistance did not serve as a lever on

security cooperation during this period, as it relates with force contributions to Iraq or

Afghanistan. There was the presence of a lag time between peaks of NMA and PCTC for two

nations, but not for all NATO seeking nations. Additionally, the analysis was inconclusive on


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and Total as Y-axis


Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and ROI as Y-axis

20

returns on investment with no established trend. These results will provide further insights when

compared with the analysis of non-NATO seeking nations.

21

NON-NATO SEEKING NATIONS

The trends displayed by the military assistance and cooperation data from El Salvador,

Mongolia, and Thailand provide a different view than the NATO seeking nations presented to

policy makers who are charged with managing security assistance programs. Even though these

three nations are non-alliance seeking nations, they still have strong bilateral ties to the U.S. over

a wide range of topics to include political, military, economic, and security issues.

El Salvador has been a sturdy ally for the U.S. in Central America. It had been the

largest recipient of foreign aid in the 1980s as the El Salvadorian government battled an

insurgency until 1992, when the insurgents assimilated into the political process.52

While the

U.S. remains a major provider of foreign assistance to El Salvador, the predominance of the

bilateral ties have focused on economic and development assistance,53

not on regional security.

The U.S. has a strong interest in the geopolitics of Mongolia, nestled between Russia and

China. Even with the presence of these powerful neighboring states, government officials have

reached out the U.S., which they view as a “third neighbor”54

, due to the democratic political

nature that Mongolia now shares with the United States. As with El Salvador, the U.S. has

concentrated its efforts on the economic and political development of Mongolia, vice a military

alliance.

While Thailand remains outside of a security alliance like NATO, it has enjoyed strong

security ties with the United States. From 1954 to 1977 Thailand, the U.S. and other nations were

52 Congressional Research Service, El Salvador: Political, Economic, and Social Conditions and U.S.

Relations, by Clare Ribando Seeke, (Washington, D.C., January 21, 2010): 5.

53 Ibid., 6.

54 Congressional Research Service, Mongolia and U.S. Policy: Political and Economic Relations, by Kerry

Dumbaugh and Wayne M. Morrison, (Washington, D.C., June 18, 2009): 9.

22

members of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a mirror of NATO, which

called on members to “act to meet a common danger.”55

While this organization has dissolved,

the U.S.-Thailand security relationship has flourished with President Bush designating Thailand

as a “major non-NATO ally” in 2003.56

Yet, even with a strong bilateral security relationship

dating back to 1954 and the moniker of Thailand as “major non-NATO ally”, the U.S. and

Thailand do not have a formalized security alliance today.

Between 2000 and 2008, all three nations received military financing and purchased

articles and services in the form of military sales from the United States. While the U.S.

Department of State did not administer a NADR or INCLE program within Mongolia, as it did

for the other nations in this group, Mongolia still received more military financing as a percentage

of its military budget then did El Salvador or Thailand during this timeframe. Additionally,

normalized military assistance levels for the programs ranged between 16% and .2% for NMF

and 15% and 3.3% for NMS. While all nations received military assistance from 2000 through

2008, only El Salvador deployed soldiers on a consistent basis from 2003 to 2008 to the Middle

East, with Thailand only contributing forces from 2002 to 2004 and Mongolia contributing forces

from 2003 to 2007. These factors will be contrasted with the NATO seeking nations later in this

study in order to provide insights for U.S. policy makers.

MILITARY FINANCING

The combination of actual and normalized military financing data sets compared to force

contribution levels indicate the presence of a potential lag time between benefits provided and

received by the supplier nation and an element of resiliency in the bilateral security relationship.

55

Congressional Research Service, Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations, by Emma Chanlett-Avery,

(Washington, D.C., January 22, 2010): 8.

56 Ibid., 9.

23

Analysis of actual military financing levels and contribution benefits to the U.S. indicates a

potential lag time of one to two years between peak financing and peak contribution benefits (see

Figure 15 – 17). This is present in all three of the nations‟ data. Therefore, while a lag time

exists, it cannot be established that military financing is a continuous lever for troop contributions

as none of the three countries follows a similar trend line, other than a decrease in military

financing over the same time-period where they all have provided the U.S. with contribution

benefits.

Figure 15: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Financing vs. Troop Contribution Benefits57

57

Figure created by author using data from Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis in Appendix C: Non-

NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Finance as Y-axis

24

Figure 16: Troop Contribution Benefits58 Figure 17: Military Financing59

Normalized levels of military financing provide much better insights than the funding

levels (see Figure 18 – 20). Once again, the data set demonstrates a lag period of one to two

years between a peak of NMF and a peak of PCTC, with a stabilization of PCTC until there is a

decrease of troop contributions. The data also indicates a continuous decrease in level of NMF

by approximately 50% over the time-period, even through PCTC increases and then decreases.

This indicates an acceptance by the recipient-nation of less financing while still contributing more

forces to the security initiative of the supplier-nation.

58 Figure created by author using data from Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis in Appendix C: Non-

NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefit as Y-axis and Years as X-axis


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with 3Yr Finance as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

25

Figure 18: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Financing vs. Troop Contributions (Normalized)60


Figure 20: Military Financing62

The combination of normalized data and actual levels of military assistance to troop

contributions indicates the presence of a lag time of one to two years with an element of

durability in the relationship, which sustains force contributions over time regardless of declines

in normalized military financing. These factors suggest that consistent financing is not a lever for

60 Figure created by author using data from Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis with PCTC as X-axis and

from Table 16: Normalized Military Assistance with Normalized MIL Financing as Y-axis in Appendix C:

Non-NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with PCTC as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

62 Figure created by author using data Table 16: Normalized Military Assistance in Appendix C: Non-NATO

Seeking Nations Data Tables with Normalized MIL Financing as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

26

force contributions and support the claim by Donald Sylvan about a lag time between a peak in

assistance and participation in combat.

MILITARY SALES

The data indicates that military sales, in terms of actual and normalized data (see Figures

21 – 26), have not been a factor in determining force contribution benefits or in terms of per

capita troop contributions to Iraq or Afghanistan. Actual data of military sales and benefits

returned to the U.S. does not demonstrate any correlation between sales and force contribution

benefits. Throughout the period, the level of military sales remained relatively the same with a

slight increase between the initial and final levels of sales in 2002 and 2008. Additionally, the

comparison of NMS to PCTC indicates that military sales may not be a lever for troop

contribution. From 2002 to 2008, the level of PCTC increased and decreased according to troop

deployments, while the level of NMS remained consistent. These factors signal that military

sales levels between the U.S. and these nations has remained constant even in the face of combat

operations and troop deployments, hence arms trade may not be a lever to elicit benefits to the

supplier-nation.

27

Figure 21: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Sales vs. Troop Contribution Benefits63

Figure 22: Troop Contribution Benefits64


63

Figure created by author using data from Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis in Appendix C: Non-

NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Sales as Y-axis


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Benefit as Y-axis and Time as X-axis


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with 3 Yr Sales as X-axis and Time as X-axis

28

Figure 24: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Sales vs. Troop Contributions (Normalized) 66

Figure 25: Troop Contribution67


COMPOSITE ANALYSIS

A holistic view of U.S. military assistance to these nations and force contribution for the

U.S. signals that military assistance may not have played a role of a consistent lever in decisions

to provide forces to Iraq or Afghanistan. In the case of actual data on assistance and contribution

66 Figure created by author using data from Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis with PCTC as X-axis and

from Table 16: Normalized Military Assistance with Normalized MIL Sales as Y-axis in Appendix C: Non-

NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with PCTC as Y-axis and Years as X-axis

68 Figure created by author using data from Table 16: Normalized Military Assistance in Appendix C: Non-

NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Normalized MIL Sales as Y-axis and Years as the X-axis

29

benefits, force contributions increased and decreased while the overall level of military assistance

remained constant. In terms of normalized data, per capita troop contributions increased and

decreased as level of NMA decreased over time by at least 3-5% from 2002 to 2008. Also, while

there existed a lag time between a peak of NMA and peak in PCTC for El Salvador and

Mongolia, the decreased levels of financing and sales could only suggest a potential of a initial

lever to induce force contributions.

While a correlation was not established between military assistance and force

contribution, the concept of a return on investment provides an interesting observation (see

Figures 27 and 28). The U.S. sustained a higher return on investment over the period in question

based upon the military assistance provided to El Salvador and Mongolia, yet the total level of

security assistance (financing and sales) was significantly less than Thailand, primarily due to

Thailand‟s military sales purchases. At least with these cases, there is an implication that the U.S.

could have a higher rate of return on its assistance going to a nation with a more modest military

budget where the U.S. still provides military financing equal to between 5-15% of its military

budget and conduct arms sales equal to approximately 8% of its military budget.

30

Figure 27: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Total Military Assistance69

Figure 28: Non-NATO Seeking Nations Return on Investment to the US70

The composite analysis on the non-alliance seeking nations implies that there is not a

clear correlation to military assistance to these nations and force contribution to Iraq or

Afghanistan. The presence of a lag time between peaks of NMA and PCTC may indicate the

potential of a relationship between these factors even as the level of military assistance declined

with the increase of force contributions. Finally, a major finding in this section is the potential


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and Total as Y-axis


NATO Seeking Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and ROI as Y-axis

31

that the U.S. could gain more, in strictly financial terms, by engaging nations with more modest

military budgets. These results will be joined with findings from the NATO seeking nations in

the following section for a combined analysis.

32

COMBINED ANALYSIS

The integration of both data sets provides a more complete picture of U.S. security

assistance and cooperation across the globe. In doing so, we can confirm trends or patterns seen

with one section or both sections as well as draw new lessons and implications. The results will

be the basis for formulating potential policy recommendations for decision makers concerned

with security assistance and security cooperation.

In terms of a return on investments to the U.S. government, comparing troop contribution

benefits to military assistance provided to the supplier-nation, the data points indicate an

increasing return on investment with a short period of consistent returns on investment followed

by a slight decrease, similar in shape to a parabola (see Figure 29). This trend is not surprising

because unless the U.S. is involved in a conflict where nations can contribute forces, this metric

would register zero for a return on investments. Therefore, it follows that there will be increasing

returns on investment, with an increase in force contributions, until a steady-state has been

reached and then a point in time where forces are being withdrawn from the conflict, whereby the

return on investments will decline until it returns to zero.

Figure 29: Military Assistance Return on Investments to the US71

71 Figure created by author using data from Table 10: Composite Data Analysis in Appendix B: NATO

Seeking Nations Data Tables and Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis in Appendix C: Non-NATO Seeking

Nations Data Tables with Years as X-axis and ROI as Y-axis

33

All of the nations in the study did not provide the U.S. with a peak of financial benefits at

the outset of their force contributions, but increased them over time, with a majority of the nations

requiring two to four years until they reached a maximum of a return on investment to the United

States. Additionally, there were mixed results for returns on investment when comparing NATO

seeking to non-NATO seeking nations, which suggests that neither group provides the U.S. with

more benefits compared to the other. Although while it is unclear which group provides a better

return on investment, the financial data shows that allied seeking nations received more financial

assistance and purchased less arms than non-allied seeking nations. These outcomes imply that

partner nations require time to provide benefits to the U.S. during an extended combat operation

and that non-allied seeking nations may be more financially advantageous for the U.S. to seek out

as force providers, strictly in terms of cost-benefit analysis.

Despite great variances in actual dollar financing levels and arms sales between recipient-

nations, such as Georgia and Mongolia in financing or between Thailand and Mongolia for arms

sales, the normalization of the data, in terms of percentage of military budgets, established

general ranges to include a majority of the countries. The study finds that on average, the U.S.

provided appropriated funds as military financing that equaled between 5-15% of a nation‟s

military budget and that the recipient-nation purchased U.S. arms equal to 6-10% of its military

budget (see Figures 30 to 33).72

While Thailand and Ukraine were partial outliers in this data,

Georgia conformed to this trend after 2004 when it expanded its military budget. This may

indicate that when U.S. financing or arms sales are within these ranges or bands, a nation may be

inclined to provide forces to a U.S.-led combat operation.

72

See Figures 14 – 17, with Figures 15 and 16 removing data from Georgia in order to focus in on trends of

other nations.

34

Figure 30: Normalized Military Financing v. Troop Contributions (All Nations) 73

Figure 31: Normalized Military Financing v. Troop Contributions (Minus Georgia) 74

73 Figure created by author using data from Table 10: Composite Data Analysis and Table 20: Composite

Data for Analysis with PCTC as X-axis and from Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance and Table 16:

Normalized Military Assistance with Normalized MIL Financing as Y-axis

74 Ibid

35

Figure 32: Normalized Military Sales v. Troop Contributions (All Nations) 75

Figure 33: Normalized Military Sales v. Troop Contributions (Minus Georgia) 76


Data for Analysis with PCTC as X-axis and from Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance and Table 16:

Normalized Military Assistance with Normalized MIL Sales as Y-axis

76 Ibid

36

Through the examination of force contribution over time, NATO seeking nations were

more consistent force providers than non-NATO seeking nations (see Figures 34 and 35). NATO

seeking nations provided forces to Iraq or Afghanistan continuously from 2003 to 2008 as

opposed to non-NATO seeking nations. El Salvador was the only non-NATO seeking nation that

had consistently provided forces during this period. Additionally, NATO seeking nations

contributed more soldiers on a yearly average and had a higher combined PCTC than did non-

NATO seeking nations. Normalized financing and sales levels were generally the same for both

groups, as expressed previously, thus nations seeking to be part of an alliance may have increased

interests in these cases to increase and sustain force contribution over a longer period than non-

alliance seeking nations.

Figure 34: Force Contributions by Year77


Data for Analysis from Appendix B: NATO Seeking Nations and Appendix C: Non-NATO Seeking Nations

with Years as X-axis and Ave Troops as Y-axis

37

Figure 35: Normalized Force Contributions by Year

78

The ability to contribute forces to a multinational force depends upon the population size

and military budget of the nation in question. More populous states with larger budgets, like

Thailand and Ukraine,79

have a greater capacity to provide more soldiers to a contingency

operation and this impacts the overall mission, because a larger military force provides the

ground commander with more resources in order to accomplish the assigned mission. The data

set shows that these were the first to provide forces, potentially because they have larger

militaries, which allows them to commit units to a multilateral operation or because they have

contingency forces available for deployment that do not require a long lead time to deploy (see

Figure 18 above). In addition, these purchased more arms but were equal in terms of receiving

military financing compared to less populous nations. In this manner, the U.S. could benefit


Data for Analysis from Appendix B: NATO Seeking Nations and Appendix C: Non-NATO Seeking Nations

with Years as X-axis and PCTC as Y-axis

79 Thailand and Ukraine have populations and military budgets on an order of magnitude of ten times

larger than the other nations in the study, see Tables 5 and 15: National Statistics.

38

more by maintaining tight bilateral security relationships with large nations with large military

budgets versus smaller nations with smaller military budgets.

The data suggests a resiliency of partner nations, both allied seeking and non-allied

seeking, to provide troop contributions in the face of consistent or decreasing levels of military

financing and sales. While actual military financing dollars decreased along with modestly

decreasing levels of NMF and NMS over the period, all recipient-nations increased troop

commitments for two to three years, maintained them for a short period, and reduced them with

the Iraq war ending (see Figures 30 – 35). This durability suggests the potential that the U.S. has

already established solid relationships with these nations, whereby their force contributions did

waver in the face of reductions in normalized military financing from the U.S. government or

normalized military sales contracts with the U.S. defense industrial base with approval from the

U.S. government.

These findings were based upon analysis and relationships within the data, in terms of

actual levels of military assistance and troop contribution levels and normalized levels of military

assistance to account for the size of military budgets and populations of the various nations, and

how those relationships formed trends among the diverse nations. These results can now provide

some tentative policy recommendations for decision makers who formulate policy on security

assistance and those concerned with security cooperation and building future coalitions.

39

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The composite analysis of military assistance and security cooperation in each group, in

concert with the comprehensive analysis of both groups provide potential policy

recommendations and suggestions for political and military decision makers concerned with

security assistance and security cooperation. These recommendations must be viewed in light of

this study, which has room for expansion and improvement.

Military decision makers must be mindful of a partner nation‟s capabilities and posture

when requesting participation in a contingency operation. Partner nations may not always be able

to provide forces immediately to an operation; especially countries will relatively smaller

populations and/or military budgets. Partner nations with larger populations and larger military

budgets will most likely be able to assist with an initial entry force, but these nations, just like

their smaller brethren, still will need additional time to build up force contributions in support of

a U.S.-led combat operation. Therefore, decision makers may want to seek out partner nations

capable of contributing forces for an initial entry into a combat zone, yet understand that

additional forces will most likely come at a later point in time.

Alliance potential had significant impact on force contribution to demonstrate capabilities

and commitment to a potential alliance. Policy makers should be aware that alliance-seeking

nations are more willing to contribute forces and maintain them over the duration of the conflict

that non-alliance seeking nations. This is especially true when alliance-seeking nations are

attempting to achieve a balance of power when facing a super-ordinate power, such as the case

with Georgia feeling pressure from Russia. Additionally, partnership in an alliance, such as

NATO, is an incentive that a nation wishes to attain and it may enhance its chances for attaining

membership through a demonstration of capabilities during combat deployments with current

members of the alliance. The element of achieving a balance in power, emphasized by Jervis and

40

Snyder, plays a role in determining when and how a nation conducts alliance formulation and

security cooperation. While the U.S. should not look to exploit this potential, the incentives of a

potential nation to enhance its potential for membership in an alliance like NATO can present an

opportunity to provide force contributions to a security initiative led by the United States. This

relationship should not be viewed as a trade-off between force contributions for membership

support, because a complex alliance, such as NATO, involves much more than a simple quid pro

quo, but decision makers should be aware of this potential and pitfall.

While incentives for alliances may play a role in force contributions, the U.S. will still

want to remain engaged with non-allied seeking nations. Non-NATO seeking nations may not

have been seeking alliance incentives, but these nations still contributed forces and provided a

comparable return on investment to the U.S. compared to the NATO seeking nations.

Additionally, the U.S. actually provided less financial aid to these nations compared to NATO

seeking countries, so in essence it was fiscally advantageous for the U.S. to maintain these states

as partner nations who would be willing to commit forces to U.S.-led security initiatives.

This study determined potential bands of military financing and arms sales that could be

indicators for force contributions by recipient-nations to U.S. combat operations. The study

found, that on average, the U.S. provided appropriated funds for military financing in amounts

that equaled between 5-15% of a nation‟s military budget. It also found that recipient-nations

purchased U.S. arms and training equal to 6-10% of its military budget. The presence of these

bands may be in indicator that nations, with similar levels of military financing and military sales

in terms of military budgets may also contribute forces in the same manner. These indicators

may help target policy makers towards potential force contributing nations or to develop

programs to achieve these levels with the potential for future force contributions.

41

The increased and sustained force contributions to Iraq and Afghanistan by recipient

nations in the face of reductions in military financing and arms sales, as a percentage of military

budgets, indicates a presence of factors other than continuous levels of military financing and

arms sales, which have built resiliency into the security cooperation relationship. Policy makers

should further examine how these relationships have developed and maintained in terms of

military assistance and other factors in order to replicate the effects with other nations. Potential

factors stemming from the study include the presence of military assistance prior to the

contribution of forces or continuous military assistance from the supplier nation throughout the

period of force contribution, as these elements were present in all of the case study nations.

These elements indicate a potential that a portion of the efforts to attain force contributions for a

U.S.-led operation were accomplished prior to the initiation of the conflict, with a requirement to

sustain programs of military assistance in order to maintain those contributions.

While these recommendations are a result of the findings in the study, they must be

viewed in light of the constraints and limitations in which the study was conducted. Further

studies on this subject based upon recommendations in the next section, will provide means to

give decision makers more robust and higher quality policy recommendations and suggestions.

42

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTHER STUDY

As this study examined military assistance and how it may affect force contribution of a

recipient nation to a multinational combat operation led by the supplier nation, various elements

may be added to further enhance this study. Further studies may include elements of the

following; expansion of the data set in terms of nations, expanding the timeline of the study,

studying other benefits provided by recipient-nations and inclusion of other sources of financing.

This study may be enhanced with the expansion of the data set in terms of number of

nations, to include current allies, ally-seeking nations, and non-ally seeking nations. An

expansion of the data would serve to enhance the findings of this study or alter them based upon

new data. The inclusion of current specified allies, like those in NATO, could serve as a means

to help verify how much an alliance truly provides to the U.S. in terms of benefits to a U.S.-led

combat operation with multinational support.

Expanding the timeline of the study will provide a much broader view of U.S. security

assistance in terms of military financing and military sales to the nations within the case study.

This action will help bring a better historical viewpoint to the dataset with regard to long-term

trends of financing and sales and potentially include contributions outside of forces to Iraq and

Afghanistan, but also to UN missions or benefits besides force contributions.

While force contributions are a tangible and measurable resources provided by a

recipient-nation to a supplier-nation, there are other potential benefits provided to the supplier-

nation, to include basing rights, over-flight right, political support within international

organizations for U.S. actions, or economic contributions to defray the cost of military operations.

These benefits, and others, may provide a more holistic view of the benefits realized by supplier-

nations from recipient-nations.

43

Inclusion of other sources of military financing, such as Title 10 funds, can provide a

more complete view of U.S. government actions, concerning appropriated funds and military

assistance. While this data is not readily available due to classification by the military and

government, this data may provide a more nuanced appreciation for how and where funds are

spent to ensure foreign forces can gain additional interoperability with U.S. forces for more

effective operations in a combat environment.

These additions and expansions of the study will provide further insights for both

uniformed and civilian decision makers about military assistance and security cooperation. While

further studies may expand the current dataset and provide new recommendations, it must retain

the underpinnings of international relations theory to maintain consistency.

44

CONCLUSION

Results of this study demonstrate that the U.S. receives a return on its security assistance

investments when partner nations contribute forces to a U.S.-led security initiative. Although the

issue of security assistance providing a means to leverage force contributions from recipient

nations is a much more complicated issue because it was shown that decreasing levels of military

assistance did not lead to declining levels of force contributions. This is especially the case when

recipient-nations are seeking membership within a powerful alliance where the supplier-nation is

a dominant actor within that alliance. Security assistance, in terms of military financing and arms

sales, by a supplier nation may be beneficial to a recipient nation and in developing its defense

architecture, but if membership within a powerful alliance can enhance that architecture

significantly more than security assistance, then a recipient nation may be more willing to

contribute military forces to a coalition operation, if it determines this action may enhance its

potential for membership in the alliance.

A similar viewpoint holds true for the supplier-nation, as the study indicates that the U.S.

may benefit by building strong bilateral relationships with a variety of nations: alliance seeking,

non-alliance seeking, large nations, and small nations alike. In this manner, a supplier-nation

establishes numerous security relationships and thus maintains numerous potential sources for

force contributions, or other forms of support, should it enter into war and see the need for

coalition partners. Force contributions, which may result due to the security relationships,

provide much more than combat power. These contributions provide a sense of international

approval and support for U.S. actions.

These themes of establishing multiple alliances and conducting a balance of power

politics by both the supplier-nation and recipient-nations return to the themes put forth by Robert

Jervis, Glenn Snyder, and Kurt Campbell as they emphasize alliance development within an

45

anarchical world and declare that nations do what is in their best interest to ensure their security.

While security assistance may not be a lever to obtain force contributions to U.S. security

initiatives, it most certainly remains a tool of foreign policy to build and maintain durable

bilateral security relationships. This idea is present in the 2010 QDR, as it emphasizes the need

for security assistance and coalition building to include a “whole of government approach” and to

ensure that partners view the U.S. as a reliable partner with the right programs and measures to

meet partner needs and requirements.80

In the same light, this study has provided insights into

how decision makers may approach the process of security assistance and cooperation to meet

U.S. strategic goals.

80

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, D.C., 2010): 74-75.

46

APPENDIX A: METHODS

DATA: Data for this study came from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Information

on military financing came from the U.S. Department of State Congressional Justification

documents on foreign aid. Data on military sales came from the Defense Security Cooperation

Agency and the U.S. Department of State. National statistics, such as GDP, population, and

military budgets, were sourced through the World Bank. Information about force contributions

was sourced through U.S. Central Command, national ministries of defense and from defense

attachés or political-military advisors at foreign embassies in Washington, DC.

ANALYSIS: The security assistance programs were separated into military financing and

military sales and were analyzed in terms of raw data and normalized data. The analysis of raw

data examined levels of military financing or military sales compared with a „dollarization‟ of

benefits based upon a yearly average of troop contributions. The analysis of normalized data

compared the level of financing or sales based on a percentage of the nation‟s military budget

with a per capita yearly troop contribution81

to a U.S. led security initiative. These two views

allow the study to not only look at the data in terms of overall cost and benefits with raw data but

also allow for a more balanced comparison among nations by normalizing the data set for budget

and population.

The computations for „dollarization‟ of benefits from troop contributions were based

upon average yearly troop contributions and an annual average cost per deployed troop from a

U.S. Government Congressional Research Report.82

While the report notes that these figures may

81 Per capita yearly troop contribution (PCTC) is determined by dividing the yearly average troop

contribution level by the nation’s population

82 Congressional Research Service, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror

Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco (Washington, D.C., September 28, 2009): 45.

47

not directly estimate the cost of increasing troop levels, the study has used these figures to

estimate replacement costs of U.S. soldier for a foreign soldier. Therefore, even though the U.S.

force commitment may increase, the overall size of the contingent would remain the same.

Additionally, this was the only source that itemized cost averaging per soldier per year to allow

this type of analysis.

While levels of soldier proficiency and value added to the mission vary between nation

and even within military units of the same nation, this study does not engage in this debate. The

study considers all soldiers of all nations equal because it has concentrated on force contributions

levels, not on efficacy on the battlefield.

This study uses a three-year average for both levels of military assistance, financing and

sales, as an indicator versus a single data point of military financing for the specific year. This

method captures prior commitments of military assistance on a recipient nation‟s decision to

contribute forces. An example of averaged normalized military sales for 2003 would be an

average of normalized military sales from years, 2001, 2002, and 2003. This averaging occurs

for both raw and normalized data of military financing and military sales.

While some armed conflicts do not have well-defined start and end points, there are only

limited years and contingency operations where recipient nations may contribute forces to

operations led by a supplier nation. This factor affects the current study because this study is only

analyzing forces contributed to Iraq and Afghanistan, which did not initiate until 2001 and 2003

respectfully. Additionally, political situations may influence the ability to contribute forces, such

as the situation in Iraq where all non-U.S. forces were compelled to leave at the close of 2008.

By keeping this limitation in mind, one is able to better understand the analysis and findings of

this study.

APPENDIX B: NATO SEEKING NATIONS DATA TABLES

Table 1: U.S. Security Assistance for Georgia: 2000 – 2008 (US$)83 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FMF 3,000,000 4,490,000 31,000,000 6,900,000 12,000,000 11,904,000 11,880,000 9,700,000 9,000,000

IMET 409,000 481,000 889,000 1,184,000 1,040,000 1,413,000 1,263,000 1,154,000 799,000

NADR 27,000 1,000,000 1,100,000 1,050,000 1,500,000 4,346,000 3,137,000 5,115,000 3,210,000

PKO 340,000 3,000,000

FMS 8,272,000 3,363,000 33,578,000 11,941,000 13,598,000 34,924,000 49,658,000 81,593,000 50,404,000

DCS (Services) 630,870 3,780,000 3,458,433 301,000 20 616,935 4,478,178 25,075,969 78,736,000

DCS (Articles) 2,000,000 2,175,000 100,000

EDA 806,000

Drawdowns 21,366,000

83 Columns of data are by year from the following sources: Department of State, FY2002 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,

(Washington, D.C., 2002) through FY2010 Congressional Budget Justification with yearly data drawn from Congressional Budget Justification two years

later, i.e. data for 2001 is drawn from the FY2003 Congressional Budget Justification. FMS row is from Department of Defense, Defense Security

Cooperation Agency, Historical Facts Book, (Washington, D.C., September, 2008). DCS rows are from Department of State, Report by the Department of

State Pursuant to Sec. 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Direct Commercial Sales for Fiscal Year 2000, (Washington, D.C.) through Fiscal Year 2008.

48

Table 2: U.S. Security Assistance for Macedonia: 2000 – 2008 (US$)84

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FMF 13,619,000 10,500,000 11,900,000 7,950,000 5,208,000 3,960,000 3,420,000 2,822,000

IMET 504,000 541,000 579,000 676,000 844,000 729,000 700,000 640,000 551,000

NADR 335,000 215,000 180,000 300,000 550,000 2,118,000 2,295,000 1,784,000 932,000

PKO 4,100,000

FMS 40,006,000 15,939,000 4,469,000 10,098,000 15,732,000 1,821,000 5,710,000 4,734,000 4,603,000

DCS (Services) 482,866 1,492,670 200,000 726,981 1,689 1,358,306 1,851,763 2,148,193 6,492,000

DCS (Articles) 100,000 150,000 2,250,000 150,000






49

Table 3: U.S. Security Assistance for Ukraine: 2000 – 2008 (US$)85

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FMF 3,250,000 3,991,000 4,000,000 4,500,000 5,000,000 2,976,000 10,890,000 9,500,000 6,036,000

IMET 1,338,000 1,443,000 1,638,000 1,698,000 1,809,000 1,854,000 1,748,000 1,856,000 1,865,000

NADR 1,090,000 770,000 800,000 2,000,000 2,142,000 3,350,000 3,100,000 1,360,000 2,100,000

PKO 1,200,000 1,000,000 3,500,000

FMS 9,733,000 2,852,000 4,970,000 2,812,000 11,874,000 280,000 7,861,000 20,586,000 7,280,000

DCS (Services) 26,200 415,351 100,000 17,075 104,435 1,586,215 5,399,323 2,661,999 1,839,967

DCS (Articles) 12,124,832 41,191,000 700,000 3,200,000 833,290 53,500,000 5,300,000






50

Table 4: US Security Assistance (Financing and Sales in current US$)86

Georgia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 3436000 5971000 33329000 9134000 17540000 17663000 16280000 15969000 13009000

Sales 8902870 7143000 59208433 14242000 15773020 35540935 54136178 106768969 129140000

Total 12338870 13114000 92537433 23376000 33313020 53203935 70416178 122737969 142149000

Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 839000 18475000 11259000 12876000 9344000 8055000 6955000 5844000 4305000

Sales 40488866 17431670 4669000 10924981 15883689 5429306 7711763 6882193 11095000

Total 41327866 35906670 15928000 23800981 25227689 13484306 14666763 12726193 15400000

Ukraine 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 5678000 7404000 7438000 8198000 12451000 8180000 15738000 12716000 10001000

Sales 9759200 15392183 5070000 44020075 12678435 5066215 14093613 76747999 14419967

Total 15437200 22796183 12508000 52218075 25129435 13246215 29831613 89463999 24420967

86 Data from Tables 1, 2, and 3 with Financing = FMF + IMET + NADR + PKO and Sales = FMS + DCS + DCS + EDA + Drawdowns

51

Table 5: National Statistics87 Georgia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

GDP (current US$) 3.06E+09 3.22E+09 3.4E+09 3.99E+09 5.13E+09 6.41E+09 7.76E+09 1.02E+10 1.28E+10

Military expenditure (% of GDP)

0.615582 0.740186 1.000533 1.068414 1.374144 3.3388 5.221208 9.153682 8.111173

Population, total 4720061 4665815 4613639 4563848 4516981 4473409 4432981 4398588 4364461


Macedonia, FYR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008


1.946783 6.584389 2.804036 2.501929 2.51944 2.183735 1.977711 2.052371 2.046959


Ukraine 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008



3.63615 2.863999 2.774899 2.84839 2.59712 2.792603 2.771647 2.870003 2.667575


87 From The World Bank Group Quick Query selected from World Development Indicators <http://ddp-

ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135> (accessed on February 1, 2010)

52

Table 6: Normalized Military Assistance88 Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

MIL Budget 69828843 226302891 1.06E+08 115827291 135254652 126978224 126041770 162684561 194899728

Financing/MIL Budget 0.0120 0.0816 0.1059 0.1112 0.0691 0.0634 0.0552 0.0359 0.0221

Sales/MIL Budget 0.5798 0.0770 0.0439 0.0943 0.1174 0.0428 0.0612 0.0423 0.0569

Normalized MIL Financing 0.06652 0.0995705 0.0953859 0.0812287 0.0625669 0.0515128 0.0377302

Normalized MIL Sales 0.233592 0.0717561 0.0852252 0.0848382 0.0737925 0.0487486 0.0534716

Georgia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

MIL Budget 18821148 23830198 33975886 42644420 70435395 214055187 405264688 931429769 1.038E+09


Sales/MIL Budget 0.4730 0.2997 1.7427 0.3340 0.2239 0.1660 0.1336 0.1146 0.1244



Ukraine 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

MIL Budget 1.137E+09 1.089E+09 1.18E+09 1.428E+09 1.685E+09 2.406E+09 2.987E+09 4.096E+09 4.811E+09


Sales/MIL Budget 0.0086 0.0007 0.0007 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0010 0.0003 0.0004



88 Table comprised of data from Tables 4 and 5 with MIL Budget = national military budget (US$), Financing/MIL Budget = level of military financing /

national military budget, Sales/MIL Budget = level of military sales / national military budget, Normalized MIL Financing = Three-year average of the

Financing/MIL Budget, and Normalized MIL Sales = Three-year average of the Sales/MIL Budget

53

Table 7: Georgia Force Contributions89

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers 43.75 191.00 907.25 1018.42 1762.08 1166.67

Per Capita Troop Contribution 0.00001 0.00004 0.00020 0.00023 0.00040 0.00027

Cost (US$) 14000000 64940000 317537500 397182500 769678000 580944000

Average Annual Cost Per Deployed Troop90

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cost (US$) 320000 340000 350000 390000 436800 497952

% Increase 1.0625 1.029411765 1.114285714 1.12 1.14

89 Georgia force contributions for Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers were amalgamated from the following sources US Central Command, “United States

Central Command – Coalition Countries” <http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/georgia/> (accessed on January 25, 2010) and Georgia

Ministry of Defence, “Participation in International Missions” <http://www.mod.gov.ge/index.php?page=-10&Id=34&lang=1> (accessed on January 25,

2010) and confirmed by MAJ Malkhaz Jamureli, Georgian Defense Attaché, in a personal interview on March 8, 2010. Table created with data from

Table 5 and where Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers represents the yearly average of soldiers deployed to a combat zone, Per Capita Troop Contribution

(PCTC) = Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers / National Population, and Benefit = Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers * Average Annual Cost Per Deployed

Troop

90 CRS calculations based on average deployed troop strength from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and costs from Defense Finance Accounting

Service, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports, FY2003-2006 with CRS estimates of unrelated expenses from Congressional Research Service,

The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11, by Amy Belasco, (Washington, D.C., September 28, 2009): 45, with

% increase estimated for 2007 and 2008.

54

Table 8: Macedonia Force Contributions91

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers 27.5 64.583333 78.333333 135.5 138 88.8333333


Cost (US$) 8800000 21958333 27416667 52845000 60278400 44234736


2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cost (US$) 320000 340000 350000 390000 436800 497952

% Increase 1.0625 1.029411765 1.114285714 1.12 1.14

91 Macedonia force contributions for Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers were amalgamated from the following sources US Central Command, “United

States Central Command – Coalition Countries” <http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/macedonia/> (accessed on January 25, 2010) and

Macedonia Ministry of Defence, “Ministry of Defence’” <http://www.morm.gov.mk/morm/en/homepage.html> (accessed on January 25, 2010) and

confirmed by Ms. Sonja Bajdeska, Macedonia Political-Military Attaché, in a personal interview on March 26, 2010. Table created with data from Table 5

and where Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers represents the yearly average of soldiers deployed to a combat zone, Per Capita Troop Contribution (PCTC)

= Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers / National Population, and Benefit = Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers * Average Annual Cost Per Deployed Troop





55

http://www.morm.gov.mk/morm/en/homepage.html

Table 9: Ukraine Force Contributions93

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers 750 1300 690 16 51 68.1666667


Benefit (US$) 240000000 442000000 241500000 6240000 22276800 33943728


2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cost (US$) 320000 340000 350000 390000 436800 497952

% Increase 1.0625 1.029411765 1.114285714 1.12 1.14

93 Ukraine force contributions for Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers were amalgamated from the following sources US Central Command, “United States

Central Command – Coalition Countries” <http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/ukraine/> (accessed on February 3, 2010) and Ministry of

Defence of Ukraine, “The history of the Ukrainian Armed Forces participation in Peacekeeping operations”

<http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history#14> (accessed on February 3, 2010), “Ukrainian peacekeeping personnel

as part of NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) (from FEB 2006)” <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=iraq>

(accessed on February 3, 2010), “Current Participation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Peacekeeping Operations”

<http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?part=peacekeeping&lang=en> (accessed on February 3, 2010), “International security assistance force in

Afghanistan (ISAF) (from May 2007)” <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=afghanistan> (accessed on February

3,2010) and confirmed by COL Andriy Yakovliev, Ukrainian Defense Attaché, in a personal interview on March 15, 2010. Table created with data from

Table 5 and where Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers represents the yearly average of soldiers deployed to a combat zone, Per Capita Troop Contribution

(PCTC) = Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers / National Population, and Benefit = Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers * Average Annual Cost Per Deployed

Troop





56

Table 10: Composite Data for Analysis

Georgia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 3436000 5971000 33329000 9134000 17540000 17663000 16280000 15969000 13009000

Sales 8902870 7143000 59208433 14242000 15773020 35540935 54136178 1.07E+08 1.29E+08

Total 12338870 13114000 92537433 23376000 33313020 53203935 70416178 1.23E+08 1.42E+08

3 Yr Finance 14245333 16144667 20001000 14779000 17161000 16637333 15086000

3 Yr Sales 25084768 26864478 29741151 21851985 35150044 65482027 96681716

3 Yr Total 39330101 43009144 49742151 36630985 52311044 82119361 1.12E+08

Ave Troops 43.75 191 907.25 1018.417 1762.083 1166.667

PCTC 9.59E-06 4.23E-05 0.000203 0.00023 0.000401 0.000267

Benefit 14000000 64940000 3.18E+08 3.97E+08 7.7E+08 5.81E+08

ROI Finance 0.867159 3.246838 21.48572 23.14448 46.2621 38.50882

ROI Sales 0.521134 2.183507 14.53129 11.29963 11.75403 6.00883

ROI 0.325512 1.305533 8.668549 7.592708 9.372674 5.19778

Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 839000 18475000 11259000 12876000 9344000 8055000 6955000 5844000 4305000

Sales 40488866 17431670 4669000 10924981 15883689 5429306 7711763 6882193 11095000

Total 41327866 35906670 15928000 23800981 25227689 13484306 14666763 12726193 15400000

3 Yr Finance 10191000 14203333 11159667 10091667 8118000 6951333 5701333

3 Yr Sales 20863179 11008550 10492557 10745992 9674919 6674421 8562985

3 Yr Total 31054179 25211884 21652223 20837659 17792919 13625754 14264319

Ave Troops 27.5 64.58333 78.33333 135.5 138 88.83333

PCTC 1.36E-05 3.18E-05 3.85E-05 6.65E-05 6.77E-05 4.36E-05

Benefit 8800000 21958333 27416667 52845000 60278400 44234736

ROI Finance 0.619573 1.967651 2.716763 6.509608 8.671487 7.758665

ROI Sales 0.799379 2.092753 2.551339 5.462061 9.031256 5.165808

ROI 0.349042 1.014138 1.315727 2.970002 4.423858 3.101076

57

Table 10 Cont.

Ukraine 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 5678000 7404000 7438000 8198000 12451000 8180000 15738000 12716000 10001000

Sales 9759200 15392183 5070000 44020075 12678435 5066215 14093613 76747999 14419967

Total 15437200 22796183 12508000 52218075 25129435 13246215 29831613 89463999 24420967

3 Yr Finance 6840000 7680000 9362333 9609667 12123000 12211333 12818333

3 Yr Sales 10073794 21494086 20589503 20588242 10612754 31969276 35087193

3 Yr Total 16913794 29174086 29951837 30197908 22735754 44180609 47905526

Ave Troops 750 1300 690 16 51 68.16667

PCTC 1.57E-05 2.74E-05 1.46E-05 3.42E-07 1.1E-06 1.47E-06

Benefit 2.4E+08 4.42E+08 2.42E+08 6240000 22276800 33943728

ROI Finance 31.25 47.21045 25.13094 0.514724 1.824273 2.648061

ROI Sales 11.16586 21.46725 11.73 0.587972 0.696819 0.967411

ROI 8.226479 14.75702 7.997243 0.274458 0.504221 0.708556

Table created by author with data from Tables 4, 7, 8, and 9. With the following computations: 3 Yr Financing = Average military financing level for three years (US$), 3 Yr Sales = Average military sales level for three years (US$), 3 Yr Total = Average military assistance (financing + sales) level for three years, Ave Troops = Yearly Average Troops Deployed, PCTC = Per Capita Troop Contribution, Benefit = Associated cost of the yearly average troops deployed (US$), ROI (Return on Investment) = Benefit / 3 Yr Total, ROI Finance = Benefit / 3 Yr Finance, and ROI Sales = Benefit / 3 Yr Sales

58

APPENDIX C: NON-NATO SEEKNG NATIONS DATA TABLES

Table 11: U.S. Security Assistance for El Salvador: 2000 – 2008 (US$)95

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FMF 1,000,000 2,480,000 5,000,000 1,488,000 9,900,000 7,225,000 5,631,000

IMET 523,000 653,000 814,000 1,165,000 1,480,000 1,794,000 1,782,000 1,824,000 1,619,000

INCLE 744,000

NADR 50,000 267,000 423,000

PKO 2,004,000 2,228,000 2,463,000 2,466,000

FMS 2,416,000 1,678,000 2,623,000 1,943,000 2,821,000 6,403,000 1,665,000 6,243,000 22,414,000

DCS (Services) 6,612,024 4,965,673 6,218,195 3,954,972 3,190,925 413,168 1,280,164 2,256,109 2,997,575

DCS (Articles) 3,000 101,600 500,000 800,000






59

Table 12: U.S. Security Assistance for Mongolia: 2000 – 2008 (US$)96

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FMF 1,995,000 2,000,000 990,000 995,000 992,000 2,970,000 3,791,000 993,000

IMET 521,000 750,000 686,000 767,000 872,000 1,009,000 866,000 955,000 943,000

PKO 1,460,000 1,710,000 1,765,000 1,000,000

FMS 2,124,000 199,000 3,179,000 1,275,000 65,000 4,093,000 5,033,000 4,344,000

DCS (Services) 300,000 41,800 1,800 2,210

DCS (Articles) 250,000






60

Table 13: U.S. Security Assistance for Thailand: 2000 – 2008 (US$)97 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

FMF 1,300,000 1,990,000 881,000 1,488,000 1,485,000 423,000

IMET 1,730,000 1,652,000 1,748,000 1,768,000 2,572,000 2,526,000 2,369,000 1,202,000

NADR 1,220,000 1,300,000 720,000 200,000 1,380,000 2,782,000 3,989,000 2,100,000 2,483,000

INCLE 3,000,000 4,095,000 4,000,000 3,700,000 2,000,000 1,608,000 990,000 900,000 1,686,000

PKO 1,178,000 1,144,000 1,262,000 1,818,000 500,000

FMS 174,920,000 54,286,000 77,859,000 70,208,000 29,809,000 16,694,000 74,978,000 87,493,000 56,410,000

DCS (Services)

49,496,174 39,766,332 87,890,488 58,555,424 74,220,448 117,405,873 94,789,958 146,419,597 226,195,548

DCS (Articles)

47,092,000 120,231,475 187,232,201 45,492,199 94,645,457 73,251,000 55,505,352 41,204,740 92,151,485






61

Table 14: US Security Assistance (Financing and Sales in US$)98

El Salvador 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 2527000 2881000 4277000 6161000 6480000 3549000 12105000 9049000 7994000

Sales 9028024 6643673 8844195 5897972 6113525 7316168 2945164 9299109 25411575

Total 11555024 9524673 13121195 12058972 12593525 10865168 15050164 18348109 33405575

Mongolia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 521000 4205000 4396000 3522000 2867000 2001000 3836000 4746000 1936000

Sales 0 2124000 199000 3479000 1525000 106800 4094800 5035210 4344000

Total 521000 6329000 4595000 7001000 4392000 2107800 7930800 9781210 6280000

Thailand 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 7128000 8191000 9030000 9476000 7333000 8404000 8833000 3000000 5794000

Sales 271508174 214283807 352981689 174255623 198674905 207350873 225273310 275117337 374757033

Total 278636174 222474807 362011689 183731623 206007905 215754873 234106310 278117337 380551033

98 Data from Tables 11, 12, and 13 with Financing = FMF + IMET + NADR + INCLE + PKO and Sales = FMS + DCS + DCS + EDA + Drawdowns

62

Table 15: National Statistics99 El Salvador 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008



0.852739 0.789126 0.761881 0.704473 0.670958 0.63854 0.621864 0.598844 0.533584


Mongolia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008



2.227853 1.978262 1.986579 1.680293 1.528325 1.292066 1.244484 1.439274 1.392739


Thailand 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008



1.447733 1.469036 1.407614 1.30171 1.163391 1.178255 1.152318 1.35341 1.579227


99 From The World Bank Group Quick Query selected from World Development Indicators <http://ddp-

ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135> (accessed on March, 30 2010)

63

Table 16: Normalized Military Assistance100 El Salvador 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

MIL Budget 112000000 109000000 1.09E+08 106000000 106000000 109000000 116000000 122000000 118000000


Sales/MIL Budget 0.0806 0.0610 0.0811 0.0556 0.0577 0.0671 0.0254 0.0762 0.2154



Mongolia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

MIL Budget 24265558 23124768 25282127 24333210 27749561 29796731 38981450 56560409 73240718


Sales/MIL Budget 0.0000 0.0918 0.0079 0.1430 0.0550 0.0036 0.1050 0.0890 0.0593



Thailand 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

MIL Budget 1.777E+09 1.697E+09 1.79E+09 1.857E+09 1.877E+09 1.977E+09 2.289E+09 3.202E+09 4.117E+09


Sales/MIL Budget 0.1528 0.1263 0.1976 0.0938 0.1058 0.1049 0.0984 0.0859 0.0910



100 Table comprised of data from Tables 14 and 15 with MIL Budget = national military budget (US$), Financing/MIL Budget = level of military financing /

national military budget, Sales/MIL Budget = level of military sales / national military budget, Normalized MIL Financing = Three-year average of the

Financing/MIL Budget, and Normalized MIL Sales = Three-year average of the Sales/MIL Budget

64

Table 17: El Salvador Force Contributions101

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers 200 400 400 400 400 200


Cost (US$) 64000000 136000000 140000000 156000000 174720000 99590400


2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cost (US$) 320000 340000 350000 390000 436800 497952

% Increase 1.0625 1.029411765 1.114285714 1.12 1.14

101

El Salvador force contributions for Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers are from US Central Command, “United States Central Command – Coalition

Countries” <http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/el-salvador/> (accessed on March 30, 2010). Table created with data from Table 15 and

where Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers represents the yearly average of soldiers deployed to a combat zone, Per Capita Troop Contribution (PCTC) =

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers / National Population, and Benefit = Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers * Average Annual Cost Per Deployed Troop

102 CRS calculations based on average deployed troop strength from Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and costs from Defense Finance

Accounting Service, Supplemental & Cost of War Execution Reports, FY2003-2006 with CRS estimates of unrelated expenses from Congressional

Research Service, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11, by Amy Belasco, (Washington, D.C., September

28, 2009): 45, with % increase estimated for 2007 and 2008.

65

Table 18: Mongolia Force Contributions103

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers 65.75 150.5 148.375 96.875 5

Per Capita Troop Contribution 0.00003 0.00006 0.00006 0.00004 0.00000

Cost (US$) 21040000 51170000 51931250 37781250 2184000


2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cost (US$) 320000 340000 350000 390000 436800 497952

% Increase 1.0625 1.029411765 1.114285714 1.12 1.14

103

Mongolia force contributions for Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers are from US Central Command, “United States Central Command – Coalition

Countries” <http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/mongolia/> (accessed on March 30, 2010). Table created with data from Table 15 and






28, 2009): 45, with % increase estimated for 2007 and 2008.

66

Table 19: Thailand Force Contributions

2002 2003 2004

Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers105 54.17 195.42 258.42

Per Capita Troop Contribution 8.49881E-07 3.02864E-06 3.959E-06

Cost (US$) 16791666.67 62533333.33 87861667


2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Cost (US$) 310000 320000 340000 350000 390000 436800 497952

% Increase 1.0625 1.029411765 1.114285714 1.12 1.14

105

Thailand force contributions for Yearly Average Deployed Soldiers are from US Central Command, “United States Central Command – Coalition

Countries” <http://www.centcom.mil/en/countries/coalition/thailand/> (accessed on March 30, 2010). Table created with data from Table 15 and






28, 2009): 45, with cost for 2002 and % increase estimated for 2007 and 2008.

67

Table 20: Composite Data for Analysis

El Salvador 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 2527000 2881000 4277000 6161000 6480000 3549000 12105000 9049000 7994000

Sales 9028024 6643673 8844195 5897972 6113525 7316168 2945164 9299109 25411575

Total 11555024 9524673 13121195 12058972 12593525 10865168 15050164 18348109 33405575

3 Yr Finance 3228333 4439667 5639333 5396667 7378000 8234333 9716000

3 Yr Sales 8171964 7128613 6951897 6442555 5458286 6520147 12551949

3 Yr Total 11400297 11568280 12591231 11839222 12836286 14754480 22267949

Ave Troops 200 400 400 400 400 200

PCTC 3.32E-05 6.63E-05 6.6E-05 6.58E-05 6.55E-05 3.26E-05

Benefit 64000000 1.36E+08 1.4E+08 1.56E+08 1.75E+08 99590400

ROI Finance 14.4155 24.11633 25.94194 21.14394 21.21848 10.25014

ROI Sales 8.977903 19.563 21.73051 28.5804 26.79694 7.934258

ROI 5.53237 10.80117 11.8251 12.15305 11.84183 4.472365

Mongolia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 521000 4205000 4396000 3522000 2867000 2001000 3836000 4746000 1936000

Sales 0 2124000 199000 3479000 1525000 106800 4094800 5035210 4344000

Total 521000 6329000 4595000 7001000 4392000 2107800 7930800 9781210 6280000

3 Yr Finance 3040667 4041000 3595000 2796667 2901333 3527667 3506000

3 Yr Sales 774333.3 1934000 1734333 1703600 1908867 3078937 4491337

3 Yr Total 3815000 5975000 5329333 4500267 4810200 6606603 7997337

Ave Troops 65.75 150.5 148.375 96.875 5 0

PCTC 2.65E-05 5.98E-05 5.81E-05 3.75E-05 1.92E-06 0

Benefit 21040000 51170000 51931250 37781250 2184000 0

ROI Finance 5.206632 14.23366 18.56898 13.02203 0.619106 0

ROI Sales 10.87901 29.50413 30.48324 19.7925 0.709336 0

ROI 3.521339 9.601576 11.53959 7.854403 0.330578 0

68

Table 20 Cont.

Thailand 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Financing 7128000 8191000 9030000 9476000 7333000 8404000 8833000 3000000 5794000

Sales 2.72E+08 214283807 3.53E+08 1.74E+08 1.99E+08 2.07E+08 2.25E+08 2.75E+08 3.75E+08

Total 2.79E+08 222474807 3.62E+08 1.84E+08 2.06E+08 2.16E+08 2.34E+08 2.78E+08 3.81E+08

3 Yr Finance 8116333 8899000 8613000 8404333 8190000 6745667 5875667

3 Yr Sales 2.8E+08 2.47E+08 2.42E+08 1.93E+08 2.1E+08 2.36E+08 2.92E+08

3 Yr Total 2.88E+08 2.56E+08 2.51E+08 2.02E+08 2.19E+08 2.43E+08 2.98E+08

Ave Troops 54.16667 195.4167 258.4167 0 0 0 0

PCTC 8.5E-07 3.03E-06 3.96E-06 0 0 0 0

Benefit 16791667 62533333 87861667 0 0 0 0

ROI Finance 2.068873 7.027007 10.20105 0 0 0 0

ROI Sales 0.060058 0.252993 0.363109 0 0 0 0

ROI 0.058364 0.244201 0.350628 0 0 0 0

Table created by author with data from Tables 14, 17, 18, and 19. With the following computations: 3 Yr Financing = Average military financing level for three years (US$), 3 Yr Sales = Average military sales level for three years (US$), 3 Yr Total = Average military assistance (financing + sales) level for three years, Ave Troops = Yearly Average Troops Deployed, PCTC = Per Capita Troop Contribution, Benefit = Associated cost of the yearly average troops deployed (US$), ROI (Return on Investment) = Benefit / 3 Yr Total, ROI Finance = Benefit / 3 Yr Finance, and ROI Sales = Benefit / 3 Yr Sales

69

APPENDIX D: COMBINED CHARTS AND FIGURES

US Military Assistance Levels vs. Partner Per Capita Troop Contributions (Normalized)107

107 Figures created by author using data from Table 10 and Table 20 from Appendix B and Appendix C respectfully with PCTC as X-axis and from Table 6

and Table 16 from Appendix B and Appendix C respectfully with Normalized MIL Financing or Sales as Y-axes

70

71

US Military Financing vs. Partner Troop Contribution Benefits108

108

Figure created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Finance

as Y-axis and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Finance as Y-axis

72

US Military Sales vs. Partner Troop Contribution Benefits109

109

Figures created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Sales

as Y-axis and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Benefit as X-axis and 3Yr Sales as Y-axis

73

US Military Assistance (Financing and Sales) vs. Partner Troop Contribution Benefits110

110

Figures created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Benefit as X-axis and 3 Yr Total

as Y-axis and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Benefit as X-axis and 3 Yr Total as Y-axis

74

Return on US Military Assistance Investment Over Selected Period111

111

Figures created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Years as X-axis and ROI as Y-axis

and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Years as X-axis and ROI as Y-axis

75

Partner Troop Contributions to US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan112

112

Figures created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Years as X-axis and Ave Troops

as Y-axis and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Years as X-axis and Ave Troops as Y-axis

76

Partner Troop Contributions to US Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (per capita)113

113

Figures created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Years as X-axis and PCTC as Y-

axis and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Years as X-axis and PCTC as Y-axis

77

US Military Assistance (financing and sales) Provided to Partner Nations114

114

Figures created by author using data from Table 10 in Appendix B with Years as X-axis and 3 Yr Total as

Y-axis and from Table 20 in Appendix C with Years as X-axis and 3 Yr Total as Y-axis

78

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Documents

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE: LEVER OR HANDOUT? A Thesis