Us in the United Nations

The United States in the United NationsAuthor(s): Chadwick F. AlgerSource: International Organization, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Winter, 1973), pp. 1-23Published by: University of Wisconsin PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706162 .

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THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Chadwick F. Alger

Reports on the United Nations by three United States groups, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, the President's Com- mission, and the United Nations Association of the USA, are sum- marized and compared. They reveal informed concern about United States participation in the UN at a time when Congress and the executive exhibit negativism and neglect. Conclusions are drawn on (1) differing priorities for the UN system and their interdependence, (2) the special capabilities of the United States for setting examples, (3) alternative models for UN problem solving, (4) United States contributions to the UN, and (5) generating political will for creative United States involvement in the UN. Concern is expressed about efforts to cut United States assessments for UN budgets and failure of the reports to adequately consider the political consequences of the fact that "maintenance of international peace and security" is not considered the most important UN task by all members. If congressional and executive neglect are to be overcome, public participation and involvement must be extended.

INTRODUCTION

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations has stimulated the preparation of three reports on the United Nations:

1. "The United Nations: The Next Twenty-Five Years," Twen- tieth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, November 1969 (Louis B. Sohn, chmn.), 70 pages.

2. "Report of the President's Commission for the Observance of the Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations," April 1971 (Henry Cabot Lodge, chmn.), 58 pages.

3. "The United Nations in the 1970's," National Policy Panel of the United Nations Association of the USA, September 1971 (Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, chmn.), 81 pages.

Chadwick F. Alger is Mershon Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Director, Program in Transnational Cooperation in the Policy Sciences, Mer- shon Center, Ohio State University. This paper was prepared at the request of the International Affairs Program of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author.



2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

These reports provide extensive insight on concerns of thoughtful and informed United States citizens about the present state of the UN, and they offer many creative suggestions for alteration of UN struc- tures and extension of UN activities. The appearance of these three reports within a two-year period reflects a deep interest in and desire to strengthen the United Nations. On the other hand, there have also been contrary signs. During 1971 the United States Congress took the following actions:

(1) The House of Representatives, although the action was not final, refused for the first time to provide a voluntary contribution to the UN Development Program.

(2) For the second year in a row, the Congress refused to pay assessed dues to the International Labor Organization (ILO).

(3) The Congress failed to provide the United States contribution to the expansion of UN headquarters facilities in New York city.

(4) The Congress exempted strategic and critical materials, not- ably chrome, from United States implementation of mandatory UN sanctions on imports from Rhodesia.

(5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa- tives held hearings on a bill to limit unilaterally United States financial contributions to the UN. The bill would have the effect of cutting United States contributions to all UN programs from the present figure of approximately 30 percent to 6 percent.

Supporters of the UN, including members of Congress, have accused the executive branch of not making a really energetic fight either to prevent the withholding of ILO assessments or to defeat legislation authorizing violation of the Rhodesian sanctions. The president himself has asked that United States contributions to regular budgets of the UN and its specialized agencies be reduced from the present 31.5 percent to 25 percent.1 The president's report to the Congress on "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's" seems to treat the UN as an afterthought, covering only pages 184 to 205 of a report of 215 pages.

In the light of congressional negativism toward the United Nations and evidence of executive disinterest, are the three UN reports likely to be given serious consideration? Lincoln Bloomfield, who had served on both the President's Commission (PC) and United Nations Associa- tion (UNA) groups, expressed some doubts when testifying on the two reports before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign

I"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace," A Report to the Congress by President Nixon, February 9, 1972 (Washington: Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1972), p. 190.



THE UNITED STATES IN THE UN 3

Affairs:

But there is another element to the problem that is more insidious. I refer to the presence, even when the UN is showing signs of succeeding in something, of a pervasive cynicism within the Gov- ernment about such efforts as the one you are reviewing today. Where anything crucially important to U.S. interests is concerned, the UN is generally the last place that U.S. decisionmakers will turn. I do not mean the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in the State Department. I mean the people who make the real decisions in our Government. They tend on the basis of all the evidence to prefer to handle the matter alone, bilaterally, or at most with a few close allies.

. . . This situation is so ingrained, and the attitudes it reflects so persistent, that it is worth asking whether those who serve on panels about strengthening the UN are not living in some kind of dream world, perpetually detached from reality. ... [But] the hard-headed, unilateral, close-to-the-chest, keep-all- your-options-open approach of the "realist" has in fact become unrealistic because it is increasingly out of keeping with the nature of the external problems this Nation faces. The truly hard-nosed advice may well be that which recommends interpreting the national interest far more broadly by taking bold moves to pool authority, and giving a new lead in cooperative rather than unilateral directions.2

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

There are considerable differences between the reports, but their similarities are significant. All three give a largely implied priority to peacekeeping, peaceful settlement and international law, including the International Court. These subjects are discussed first in each report, reflecting the tradition in most textbooks and courses on the United Nations in the United States, as well as avowed and implied priorities of the American public. In the past there has frequently been a tendency for United States critics of the UN to rely on charter review and strengthening the International Court as key methods for strengthening the ability of the UN to bring peace to the world. These reports offer more varied piecemeal approaches, although the Court is not overlooked.

2tUnited States Role in the United Nations System," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, October 13 and 14, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 67.




Taking note that the International Court of Justice has only one case on its docket, both the PC and UNA urge that the court make itself more visible by meeting outside The Hague at places more con- venient to non-European parties and by setting up regional chambers. In conformity with scores of similar recommendations over the past quarter century, the UNA and PC recommend that the United States repeal the Connally amendment. United States acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court was effectively nullified by this amendment which reserves to the United States the sole determination on whether a complaint is a matter of domestic jurisdiction and thus beyond the court's jurisdiction. Speaking in the General Assembly in 1971, the delegate of Ghana offered a relevant observation:

Ghana is of the view that if States charged with the maintenance of international peace and security [i.e., the permanent members of the Security Council] would accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, they would provide the proper leadership for new nations to follow. With regard to the Security Council, both the UNA and the PC ad-

vocate reserving half of the ten non-permanent seats on the Security Council for the middle powers (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Indonesia, Nigeria, UAR, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia) so that the Council can "be better equipped to play an important role in the maintenance of peace and security."3 The UNA also proposes that the Security Council designate small committees of prestigious individuals to assist parties to a dispute, annual closed meetings of the Security Council at the foreign minister level to review peace and security problems, and that a coalition of UN members be organized who are willing to commit themselves in advance to carry out Security Council resolu- tions adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (CSOP) is much more daring in proposing that the permanent members of the Security Council voluntarily relinquish their right of veto with respect to recommendations relating to peaceful settlement of disputes, permitting decisions by a concurrent vote of a majority of permanent members and a minority of nonpermanent members. They propose the elimi- nation of the veto when enforcement measures are used that do not involve the use of military force. They also suggest the eventual extension of the rule on concurrent majorities to enforcement actions, with the provision that no state should be required to use armed force without its consent.

In regard to peacekeeping, the CSOP, UNA and PC all place em-

3 United Nations Association, September 1971, p. 22.




phasis on better means for factfinding. The UNA gives special attention to the creation of a UN fact-finding center using the latest observation technologies (photographic and electronic) to monitor both potential and actual conflicts and truce and cease-fire arrangements. The PC urges United States initiatives in revitalizing UN peacekeeping capabilities by: indicating readiness to cooperate with the UN and other countries in developing units for a UN Peace Reserve, pledging air/sealift facilities for transport of UN troops, earmarking United States units for backstopping UN peacekeeping operations and for possible participation in such operations, assisting UN peacekeeping efforts in gaining access to the latest relevant science and technology, and helping to create a special fund to meet costs of peacekeeping.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS All three reports consider economic and social questions next, al-

though the PC considers them jointly with "environmental issues" and the UNA considers them jointly with "scientific imperatives." The PC is quite specific about priorities:

The first priority of the UN system must be the maintenance of international peace and security; the second priority, far ahead of any other, should be the equitable economic and social development of the masses of mankind who seek higher standards of living.4

Considering the fact that an increasing number of scholars and other observers are becoming convinced that the division between the rich and the poor of the world is likely to be the key basis of conflict in the concluding decades of the twentieth century, these reports devote slight attention to this issue. The PC allocates only five pages, two of which are devoted to population. But they do strongly urge that United States contributions to the UN Development Program (UNDP) be increased to $200 million by 1975 (from an estimated $86 million in 1971), and that the United States channel more of its aid effort through multilateral agencies.

The UNA report devotes a great deal of attention (23 pages) to economic and social questions, but it is virtually all concerned with organization of the UN system because:

If the United States contribution is to be increased substantially above the $86 million pledged in 1971, and if the other principal UNDP donors such as Sweden, Denmark and Canada, are to make proportionate increases, additional measures will probably have to be taken for integration, and for coordinated planning, within the UN system.5

' President's Commission, p. 16. ' United Nations Association, p. 63.




The proposals include year-round meetings by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and a more active role by ECOSOC in policy making for the economic and social activities of the UN system, a common lan- guage for the budget documents of the numerous economic and social agencies of the UN system, establishment of a center for technological assessment to service a new Council of Scientific Advisers, creation of a UN deputy secretary general for economic and social activities in close alliance with the heads of various operational agencies and the establishment of an international development council composed of the new UN deputy secretary general, heads of certain UN agencies and representatives of donor and recipient countries. While these proposals, and others, are primarily intended to offer more coordination and central guidance to UN economic and social activities, the UNA panel reaches this very important conclusion:

The Panel is not convinced of the desirability at the present time of consolidating the administration of all development programs of the UN system in the economic and social field in a single Unit- ed Nations Development Program.8

The panel arrives at this conclusion because it sees that "in the future, lines of distinction between development and other issues are likely to become less clear," and because the specialized agencies have competence relevant for development activity but yet have closely related technical and regulatory functions that transcend development.

The brief (5 page) CSOP treatment of economic and social issues also recommends structural changes, although with less specificity. But the CSOP takes a broader perspective, advocating an increased role for the UN Conference on Trade and Development in promoting the trade of the developing countries, eventual UN power to regulate international trade, the redirection of arms expenditures into economic development assistance, and the creation of a detailed twenty-five year UN development plan that deals not only with industrialization but also with agricultural development.

The assumption of PC and UNA that improvement of the organizational capacity of the UN system to utilize financial resources is necessary before the developed nations will increase their contributions has broad acceptance and was partly responsible for the Pearson report to the World Bank7 and the Jackson Report8 to the UNDP. But it is doubt- ful if changes in UN organizations alone would bring increased con-

" United Nations Association, p. 51. "Partners in Development, Report of the Commission on International Develop-

ment, Lester B. Pearson, chairman (New York: Praeger, 1969). 8A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Developmeitt System (UN

Document DP/5) (Jackson report) (Geneva: United Nations, 1969).




tributions to the UN development programs. There is a lack of political will in the developed countries (particularly the large ones) that arises from a complexity of factors. Unfortunately, none of these reports ad- dresses itself to this problem. Specifically, what can be done to acquire the interest of the United States Congress and the American public in using the UN system as a conduit for really significant assistance to the less developed countries? Despite many reports supporting greater use of multinational organizations for such assistance, there has been little response.

HUMAN RIGHTS

It is surprising that the UNA report completely ignores human rights issues. Both the PC and CSOP strongly support the establishment of a high commissioner for human rights. The PC urges that the United States (1) press for the implementation of the mandate of the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to call attention to gross abuses of human rights, (2) take the lead in focusing attention on the serious implications for human rights and freedom of present and future developments in science and technology, and (3) clarify its position on those human rights treaties which it has signed but not ratified. The CSOP suggests more extensive strengthening of UN human rights activities by the establishment of a human rights council having equal status with the Economic and Social Council, a special committee of the General Assembly on human rights, and a department of human rights in the UN secretariat headed by an under secretary for human rights. Also urged are an international court of human rights and a world assembly on human rights to assist the General Assembly. The CSOP also urges that individuals every- where have the right to petition the United Nations for protection of their rights.

SELF-DETERMINATION

It is incredible that issues of self-determination are not mentioned in either the PC or UNA reports. Of course, the UNA did publish a separate report, compiled by a different panel, on Southern Africa in December 1971: "Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans." In this report the UNA urged that the United States give strong support to the sanctions imposed by the Security Council by not permitting the im- portation of chrome from South Africa into the United States. This report also urged that the United States support trust funds providing education and relief for refugees from Southern Africa, since "the U.S. supported the creation of these funds, but has done little since




to support them financially."9 The report also asks the United States to withdraw its objection to allocations made to these trust funds from the regular budget of the UN. Presently the United States urges that the trust funds be supported only by voluntary contributions.

The CSOP asks that the secretary-general appoint a committee of experts to study the role which the right of self-determination should play in the post-colonial era, including the possible need for new powers for the UN in this field. The CSOP includes in its concerns the foreign economic domination of countries that have acquired political inde- pendence. Also recommended are arrangements whereby the UN can ascertain free expressions of self-determination in remaining non-self- governing countries, and more effective powers enabling the UN to bring pressure on states that refuse to comply with the wishes of the people in non-self-goveming territories.

NEW TASKS FOR THE UN

The broadening agenda of the UN system is reflected in proposals made for UN activities in disaster relief, protection of the environment, outer space, and the oceans and seabed. The PC suggests that the UN create a long-range, worldwide program to deal with natural disasters in cooperation with other agencies, including the International Red Cross. The PC also recommends the creation of a special UN commissioner for protection of the environment that would represent the interests of all peoples in achieving economic development within the framework of sound evironmental practices, as well as an international monitoring system of pollutants, and vigorous pursuit of internationally cooperative research. The PC advocates an international regime for the exploitation of mineral resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. In addition to a seabed authority, the CSOP urges the establishment of an autonomous living resources of the sea authority with power to adopt regulations concerning all activities relating to living resources of the sea. Also advocated by the CSOP is an autonomous outer space authority to enable all the peoples of the world to participate in space activities.

In order to provide the knowledge base for extended UN activities such as those mentioned in the last paragraph, the UNA proposes the creation of a council of scientific advisors to advise the secretary-general. The council would be supported by a new center for technological assessment, and also by a seventh main committee of the general assembly

"Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans," Report of a Nttional Policy Panel established by the United Nations Association of the USA, William M. Roth, chairman, December 1971, p. 78.




(to replace the Special Political Committee) that would be concerned with science and technology. The CSOP makes a somewhat more ambi- tious proposal for the future, the creation of an autonomous science and research authority to conduct research and keep the UN abreast of national research. Whenever the science and research authority would certify to the General Assembly "that a new area requires international regulation, the UN should be given the power to establish a special authority for the purpose."'0 The CSOP recommends the establishment of a more effective communications system reaching all areas of the world for transmission of messages between United Nations headquarters offices and field personnel. Also advocated by CSOP is UN access to satellite broadcasting and television channels to ensure that the decisions and discussions of the UN are known to the people of the world and as a means whereby nations can share their cultures.

VOTING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

All three of the reports reveal some uneasiness with the single vote for all members of the UN in the General Assembly in the light of the tremendous variation in the size, population and power of these members. Abandoning earlier proposals for a single solution through weighted voting, a variety of procedural changes is advocated. Both the UNA and PC suggest that abstentions count in the total votes cast when computing majorities. Presently a majority is only required of the total of the yes and no votes, with abstentions disregarded.

The UNA urges the United States to cooperate with other members in accepting certain recommendations of the General Assembly as binding if they are "adopted by specified and meaningful majorities."11 A certain percentage of affirmative votes could be required (for example, three-fourths or three-fifths) or the affirmative votes of certain members could be required. In making these binding agreements the United States could join with different coalitions on different issues. The UNA proposes that the United States develop one or more "coalitions for peaceful settlement" composed of members who would be willing, on selected issues, to accept a decision of the General Assembly as binding if reached by a specified vote or if the General Assembly action included the affirmative votes of a specified group of members. In a related proposal, the CSOP asks that the voting rules of General Assembly committees (no charter revision needed) be changed so that more votes are required if the superpowers abstain from or oppose a decision.

"0Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, p. 53. 1 United Nations Association, p. 34.




The UNA also observes that the "decision-making process in the UN can be improved to accord greater weight to the views of those states which make a major contribution to the Organization's activities." The PC notes that UN Development Program decisions on projects are taken by consensus in the governing council in which all of the major donors are represented. Also noted is the United States proposal for an international regime for the exploitation of the resources of the seabed, providing for decisions to be reached by concurrent majorities of developed and developing countries. The PC proposes that the United States "seek special voting arrangements which would give added weight to the views of major contributors to the financing of future UN peacekeeping operations and seek similar arrangements for balanced voting for any greatly expanded UN development funds or new major revenue- producing activities."12

When considering voting adjustments it is notable that the PC places such great emphasis on the relationship between financial contributions and voting power. Other criteria could be used that would be more in accordance with theories of representation applied in domestic political institutions, particularly population. Of course, voting weighted on the basis of financial contributions is particularly advantageous to the United States, the largest contributor to the UN.

UN FINANCING

All of the reports consider the UN financial deficit, primarily caused by the refusal of the Soviet Union and France, as well as a few other countries, to pay for the Middle East and Congo peacekeeping operations. The UN financial deficit has the following components, according to the UNA: (1) a current deficit of $69.6 million of which $52.1 million is owed to governments, and (2) the unamortized portion of UN bonds issued to finance the peacekeeping operations, which stands at $119.4 million. This is a total of $189 mllion. The UNA suggests a comprehensive effort to eliminate the deficit that avoids the battles of the 1960s over peacekeeping finance. They urge that members who purchased bonds waive payment up to the amount they would be obligated to pay in UN assessments, waiver by non-members of the entire face value of the bonds they hold, waiver by members of amounts owed them as a result of the Congo and Middle East operations, cash contributions by members that neither purchased bonds nor made voluntary contributions toward eliminating the UN deficit, and private voluntary contributions from individuals and groups. The UNA wisely emphasizes the small cost to UN members of eliminating the monetary

"President's Commission, p. 42.




deficit in contrast to the tremendous drag it has inflicted on orderly implementation of UN activities.

The PC takes particular note of the fact that the United States causes financial difficulties for the UN each year by not making its first payment until July or later. Because the United States is the largest contributor, this puts a severe strain on the ability of the UN to meet current fiscal obligations. The PC also notes the financial difficulties that ensue when members make contributions in nonconvert- ible currencies in excess of amounts that can be used by the UN. It urges the United States to cease this practice.

In a highly significant recommendation, the PC recommends that the United States seek to reduce its contribution to the regular budget of the UN to 25 percent from the present rate of 31 percent. Whaile making this recommendation, the commission hastens to add that it

wishes to emphasize that it is in no way proposing a diminution of the overall commitment of U.S. resources to the UN system. Each reduction in the U.S. share of the regular budget must be clearly marked by at least a corresponding increase in U.S. contributions to one or more of the voluntary budgets or funds in the UN system.13

In order to understand the full significance of this proposal, and in order to comprehend more fully the congressional attacks on United States financial contributions to the UN, United States contributions to the UN should be examined in some detail.

The emphasis placed on United States financial contributions to the UN by congressional critics and the PC is puzzling when viewed in terms of absolute amounts. In 1971 the United States contributed an estimated $335 million to the United Nations system for budgets of the UN, specialized agencies and other related activities. This is a little more than half the budget for the New York City Police Depart- ment. In 1970 the United States contributed $1.57 per person to the UN compared to $373 per person for military expenditures!

Why do such small amounts of money receive so much attention? Why have United States representatives been waging such a relentless campaign to have the United States contributions reduced? One rea- son is certainly disappointment over the limited effectiveness of the UN in peacekeeping in the Middle East and the inability of the UN to come to grips with conflicts in Vietnam, Bangladesh and elsewhere. To many in the United States, peacekeeping is the UN. Also important are impressions that the United States is doing more than its share compared to other countries. For the period 1946 to 1971, the United

President's Commission, p. 46.




States contributed 39 percent of UN budgets. Although the figure had dropped to 30 percent in 1971,14 it is still more than double the contribution of the next largest contributor. Many seem to think the United States pays more than its fair share. Does it?

UN assessments are based on capacity to pay as derived from national income statistics, with the following modifications giving an advantage to three categories of members:

1. Members with per capita incomes below $1,000 per year and assessment rates above .04 percent are given an allowance for low per capita income which reduces their assessment.

2. The United States contribution is reduced from 39.48 to 31.57 by a ceiling principle limiting the highest contributor to that percentage.

3. A few countries (Canada, Kuwait, New Zealand and Sweden) have received reductions flowing from a corollary of the ceiling principle that states that no nation shall pay more per capita than the contribution of the largest contributor.

Two categories of members pay more than they would be obligated to pay under a strict application of the capacity to pay criterion:

1. All nations must pay at least .04 percent of the budget, requiring 60 of the poorest members to pay more than they would based on capacity to pay.

2. Members with per capita income over $1,000, except those af- fected by the ceiling, pay more than their relative capacity to pay.

Commenting on these assessment standards, in testimony before Con- gress in December 1971, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Samuel de Palna concluded:

.... because of the adoption of an arbitrary ceiling, for over 25 years the United States has paid less than it would have if it had been assessed according to the same criteria applied to the other main industrial states, including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada. .. . .On a strict capacity-to-pay basis, we estimate that at the present time the U.S. rate, based on national income statistics

" These percentages were calculated from figures on United States contributions and total budgets of the United Nations, specialized agencies, voluntary programs and the International Atomic Energy Agency given in the appendix to: US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "United States Contribu- tions to International Organizations," 19th Report from the Secretary of State, Document No. 92-173, November 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971). US contributions for calendar year 1971 were estimated to be $335,443,000 out of a total of $1,115,500,000.




when adjusted to benefit the low per capita states, would actually be 38.40 percent. Comparable figures for the Soviet Union, including Byelorussia and the Ukraine, [would be] 14.66 on the adjusted basis. In fact, the Soviet Union is now assessed at 16.55 percent. The difference between 14.66 percent and 16.55 percent is the extra amount we estimate the Soviet Union is assessed because of the ceiling principle applied to the U.S. contribution.'5

Secretary de Palma's explanation might lead to the conclusion that United States assessments should be increased from 31.5 percent to 38.40 percent. But in testimony before Congress in October 1971, he argued that United States assessments should be lowered to 25 percent. He justifies this by asserting that

in principle no international organization based on the sovereign equality of its members and in which almost all nations are represented should become overly dependent on one state for contributions to its operating budget.16

United States concern over the dependence of the UN on its largest contributor has been expressed since 1946, although United States performance seems not to accord with this concern. While the United States has successfully pressed for reduction of its assessed contribution to UN budgets from 39 percent to 31 percent, the percentage of total United States contributions made to voluntary budgets has risen to 67 percent. This is because of the increasing tendency for UN field activities, particularly in the economic and social fields, to be financed through voluntary contributions. This, of course, gives the UN's largest contributor even more influence because the United States has unilateral competence to determine how much it will contribute to specific voluntary programs. According to the president, the United States desires to continue to decide unilaterally when it will contribute more than twenty-five percent:

This 25 percent limitation should not and will not apply to the voluntary contributions upon which many of the more important UN functions are now dependent.'7

The well-established UN norm that assessments should be based on capacity to pay has both the merit of broad support and conformity with developing norms for bearing the burden of governmental services within

I' "To Limit US Contributions to the UN," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st session, Nov. 18 and Dec. 2, 1971 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972).

"United States Role in the United Nations System," p. 17. 7"U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace," p. 190.




the United States itself. While some American officials may indeed be truly concerned about high financial dependence of the UN on the United States, this is a public posture that does not fully explain recent United States policy. There is little doubt that the executive branch is bowing to the assaults of critical congressmen and is unwilling to invest influence capital in trying to hold the line. There is no significant body of public opinion to challenge this policy. Very few citizens know anything at all about UN financing except the fact that the United States contributes more than any other country. They do not know that the United States ranks twenty-fourth in contributions as a percent of GNP!

THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE UN

Responsibility for the direction and coordination of United States participation in international organizations is vested in the secretary of state. Despite the tremendous growth in United States involvement in international organizations since World War II, the PC reports that the International Organization Bureau of the Department of State has declined from 236 people in 1950 to 155 in 1970. While recognizing that smaller staffs are sometimes more effective than larger ones, the PC is concerned about the capability of the staff to "discharge its responsibilities in planning, supervising, and evaluating the ever-expand- ing and complex work of the principal organs of the UN as well as the performance of a dozen special bodies or programs of the Organization and 14 UN specialized agencies located around the world."'8 Of course, the bureau has no substantive responsibility for policies with respect to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and is highly dependent on other departments, such as Agriculture, Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, etc., for developing United States policy in the specialized agencies.

The PC recommends that (1) the Assistant Secretary for Inter- national Organization Affairs be given more comprehensive authority to deal with economic and social activities, noting that they account for 80 percent of UN expenditures, (2) technical staff members from other departments be attached to the bureau for limited periods of time to work on budgetary and programmatic problems of the specialized agencies, and (3) the bureau be funded adequately to obtain specific evaluations of the programs and effectiveness of UN activities.

The UNA views the coordination of United States policy in the light of recommendations it has made for greater centralization of decision- making in UN economic and social activities. In order for these recom-

8 President's Commission, p. 50.




mendations to be fully effective, it believes that greater coordination by national governments will be required:

The time is past, if it ever existed, when the Department of Agri- culture should determine U.S. policy in the FAO, or the Treasury Department U.S. policy in the World Bank, or the Surgeon Gen- eral's Office U.S. policy in WHO, or the Department of Labor U.S. policy in ILO, with the Department of State responsible only for U.S. policy on budgeting questions in these specialized agencies. U.S. policy on program and budgetary decisions in international organizations should not be allowed to proceed on independent and often colliding paths as in the past.'9 The UNA recommends the creation of a post of under-secretary for

multilateral affairs in the Department of State in order to "symbolize the growing importance of international organizations to the effective international management of the new technologies and to the development of multilateral approaches to conflict control. "It would signal to other Departments in the Government that the time for more centralized decision making on UN system activities was at hand."20

Raising the rank of the official in charge of international organization participation in the Department of State to the rank of under- secretary would seem to make him more effective within the Depart- ment of State where the International Organization Bureau has tra- ditionally had lower status than the geographic bureaus. On the other hand, the centralization of decision making on UN system activities in the Department of State is not as obvious an answer to the problems the United States is facing in influencing and being responsive to the UN system as the UNA assumes. Budgetary centralization may already be contributing to the difficulties encountered in maintaining United States financial support for the UN system because American contributions to international organizations are such a significant portion of the Department of State budget. If they were included as part of the budgets of relevant functional departments, they would hardly be notice- able and would perhaps be perceived in clearer perspective. Contri- butions to the specialized agencies are far less than the magnitude of the interdependencies of national systems of health, labor, agriculture, meteorology, aviation, atomic energy, maritime transport, telecommu- nications, mail, education, etc. Centralization of a "foreign affairs" budget encourages the development of a budgetary perspective in which there is a dichotomy between a "they" (foreign affairs) budget and a "we" (domestic) budget. This inhibits realistic perceptions of functional interdependencies and encourages attacks on the "they" total,

'United Nations Association, p. 73. 'United Nations Association, p. 74.




which is irrelevant to efforts to use national and international organizations, as each is appropriate, to solve human problems.

Furthermore, centralizing decision making with regard to the participation of various departments of the United States government in the UN system is not necessarily the solution to difficult problems involved in linking national and global problem solving. Assuming that greater centralization of decision making in UN economic and social activities is meritorious (not a necessarily valid assumption), the UNA and PC belief that national centralization of policy making for participation in UN activities would facilitate this objective is questionable. Once the various departments of a government have carefully negotiated agreements for an integrated policy for the UN system, it would probably be even more difficult for representatives of that government to engage in collaborative decision making with other governments that had done likewise. Permitting the various functional interests of national governments freerer budgetary and policy making latitude in their activities in the UN system could make them both more responsive and more influential. Admittedly, both the centralized and decentralized arguments are based on anecdote and speculation. But the time has come to divest ourselves of assumptions that the centralization of the international activities of national governments within single departments is necessarily the only or the best way to handle the diversity of problem areas in which the activities of national and international governmental organizations intersect. Particularly in the case of the functional components of large and highly specialized national governments (like the United States), experience suggests that more, rather than less, flexibility and capacity for responsiveness is required if effective global problem solving is to become feasible.

SOME CONCLUSIONS Despite the fact that the three reports under review represent

thoughtful and often creative concern on the part of some influential and highly informed American citizens about United States participation in and contributions to the UN system, there is a marked decline in creative United States involvement in the system. These reports are unlikely to turn the tide unless there is additional inquiry, followed by appropriate action, on the causes of this season of discontent and disinterest. Five themes, all intimately intertwined, would seem to merit closer scrutiny: (1) Differing priorities for the UN system and their interdependence; (2) The special capabilities that the United States has for setting examples; (3) Alternative models for UN problem solving; (4) New perspectives on monetary contributions to international organizations; (5) Generating political will for creative United States involvement in the UN.




1. Differing Priorities for the UN System and Their Interdependence.

None of the reports deals forthrightly enough with variation in priorities for the UN system advocated by diverse interest groups around the globe. Nor do they deal explicitly enough with the political interdependence of UN activities in different priority areas. The assertion of the PC that "the first priority of the UN system must be the maintenance of international peace and security" is not shared by all mankind. It is not inappropriate for the United States to establish this as its first priority in the UN, although many United States citizens would not agree. But it must be recognized that this is just a US priority. UN priorities, like American priorities that come out of United States political processes, must be decided by the political processes of the UN system. Inevitably this will require tradeoffs between different interest groups so that no single priority will make meaningful progress until all those advocated by major interest groups are advanced. The interdependence between the "law and order" and economic development activities of the UN need to be made more explicit in United States discourse about the UN.

The priority given to "maintenance of international peace and security" must be given greater scrutiny in another sense. The most dramatic innovation in the UN charter was the means provided for the enforcement of "international peace and security" through the use of military forces of the major powers. Efforts to implement this innovation have failed, although the UN "laboratory" has generated a sub- stitute: small scale forces primarily used to keep small wars from escalating into large ones. But even this evolutionary development has encountered severe difficulty. One quite plausible explanation is that the assumption that the UN system could first centralize "international peace and security" functions, particularly those requiring military force, is unfounded. Experience in national and regional systems, as well as the UN, suggests that peace cannot be created by starting with the centralization of military force. First a degree of community must be created by collaboration in providing other services in the community.

While the development of some degree of community by responsiveness to diverse needs should not be seen as a simple road to "peace and security," it is at least equally as plausible a means toward that end as military forces. It would seem no less deserving of testing in the UN "laboratory" than one military weapon, such as the F14 aircraft, whose cost dwarfs United States contributions to the UN system. The reluctance with which many approach the contribution by the United States of $1.57 per capita toward making the UN system really responsive to a diversity of interdependent human priorities around the globe




(compared to the $373 for military expenditures) indicates that slight credibility is given to the probable relation between the development of a more viable global community and "intemational peace and security."

2. The Special Capabilities that the United States has for Setting Examples.

What criteria should be applied when a nation evaluates its performance in the UN system? Perhaps we should not be surprised that the criterion is often the performance of other nations, with careful selection of bases of comparison so that the nation of the evaluator looks best. This partly explains the preoccupation of United States critics with absolute amounts of American monetary contributions, rather than contributions based on capacity to pay. When the history of man's efforts to develop viable global institutions in this era is written, it will record that the United States spent twenty-three times as much on military expenditures as it contributed to the United Nations. Is this indicator of priorities really in accord with the fundamental beliefs and aspirations of United States society? Does this performance provide the kind of model for behavior that citizens of the United States would like other big powers, now and in the future, to follow?

The United States will not be the most powerful nation in the world forever. The pursuit of short term self-interest through the preserva- tion of options, as described by Lincoln Bloomfield, may offer some tem- porary advantages. But what will be the legacy, from this era of ex- ceptional United States capability, to the international system in which our children must live? Must we be dragged down to the lowest common denominator by childlike comparisons with the behavior of other nations or dare we provide new examples of the creative use of the capability of a wealthy nation? If our children, or their children, find themselves citizens of a nation that is not top dog, what norms would we wish the most influential nation to follow? The United States has the capability to influence these norms and to help in the development of international institutions that will enforce them.

As the three reports have pointed out, the United States is pre- serving short-term illusions of "sovereignty" rather than shaping the future intemational system in directions reflecting its own domestic national values by refusing to annul the Connally amendment and refusing to ratify numerous human rights conventions. The United States at home is undergoing a dramatic change (although many think not fast enough) as new groups are given access to political power at many levels of government. This is being done partly because it is necessary to preserve domestic order, but also because it is believed to represent a fulfillment of American ideals. The escalating division between the rich and the poor of the world is similar, although more extreme, to




domestic developments in the United States. Will the United States have the creative insight to apply what it is learning about domestic community to global community? Encouragement is not offered by the expectation of the PC that meaningful political processes (i.e., international order) can be based on voting systems in which wealth is a significant determinant of voting power. Domestic experience in the United States has revealed that outcomes of political processes, no matter how great the benefits to groups deprived of participation and influence in these processes, will be suspect and considered illegitimate until full participation is possible. The less developed nations have evolved into an increasingly self-conscious interest group, largely in the context of UNCTAD. Not only is it incredibly naive of the PC to expect that meaningful political processes whereby the rich and the poor nations can reach mutually satisfying accommodation among differing priorities can be based on voting systems in which wealth is a significant determinant of voting power. It also violates proclaimed political values in the United States. Why should the United States, by its own behavior, undermine the extension of these values to global politics?

3. Alternative Models for UN Problem Solving.

While it is easy to criticize the United States for not providing creative examples for the behavior of powerful nations that light the way to an international system that more fully satisfies human needs, it is difficult to specify what this model should be like in the context of the UN system. All three of the reports have made very creative suggestions through which the United States could help to evolve a more dynamic UN system, such as voluntary changes in Security Council procedure, coalitions for peace settlement, the creation of an international development council, the development of a center for technological assessment, the appointment of a special UN commissioner for the protection of the environment, the establishment of an autonomous science and research authority, and the creation of an autonomous seabed authority. But none of the reports offers a comprehensive image of the kind of UN system toward which piecemeal tinkering is leading. Earlier models of global order, often shamefully similar to the domestic governmental systems of their author's country, are now being cast aside. While lessons from domestic experience will be applied, it is increasingly clear that global order will be evolved out of global experience gained by interaction of a diversity of governmental systems and responsive to the special problems created by the tremendous space to be encompassed. It would be ridiculous at this point to describe one specific future model toward which the UN system ought to progress. But it would be exceedingly useful to have alternative models with




speculation about their advantages and disadvantages. Presently most proposals for restructuring the UN system tend to

consider each functional area as though it were independent. Models of alternative futures for the UN would help to spell out the interdependencies between different functional realms. For example, a rich and redundant communication system might seem to involve more du- plication than is necessary for economic development objectives but might be very useful for linking nations with the UN system when more "political" lines are cut off during times of tension. While technical reasons might dictate the location of a regional headquarters in one country, the fact that other UN activities are already there and none in an adjacent, and perhaps hostile, country may dictate that the headquarters be located in the neglected city in order to facilitate the involvement of that country in the UN system.

The UN will inevitably be creating new organizational entities for the environment and the sea. Numerous questions will arise. Should these agencies be an integral part of the UN or quasi-independent? Should pollution of the sea be handled by the environment agency, the sea authority, or both? Should the headquarters of these agencies be in Africa, Asia or Latin America, since all existing UN agencies have their headquarters in either Europe or North America? How will the various options on these decisions affect the rest of the UN system? The avail- ability of alternative models of the UN system, with some delineation of the likely effects of some of their characteristics, would help those tinkering with the system to take a more systematic view of the consequences of organizational change. Included should be alternative models of how nations, particularly large ones, can be organized for effective and responsive participation in the UN system.

4. New Perspectives on Monetary Contributions to International Organizations.

It is of critical importance that the United States escape from its obsession with the relative size of its monetary contributions to the UN that result from the tremendous concentration of income in the United States. Why does the richest nation in the world continually put a strain on the ability of the UN to meet its fiscal obligations by making its payments late out of deference to United States fiscal con- venience? Why does a nation whose currency is dollars pay any of its contributions in other currency, particularly noncenvertible currency? Why does a nation that realizes at least $135 million in income from the UN in New York per year hold up the construction of a desperately needed extension of UN headquarters by not contributing its share, although the city of New York has agreed to contribute its portion? Why




would a nation argue that it wishes its share of assessed budgets dimin- ished so as to curtail its influence but yet enhance that influence by increasing the size of voluntary contributions?

Anyone who reads congressional hearings realizes that some of these acts result from lack of intimate knowledge of the facts and others proceed from assumptions that the nation state system in its present form, and the role of the United States in it, are stable and unchanging. They also are shaped by views of the world that make it possible to apply one set of values and procedures domestically and another set internationally, ignoring the difficulties of maintaining the contradictory systems and the degree to which our fate, and particularly that of our children, will be significantly determined by the character of the international system we are creating. Of course, these are only speculations. Whatever the explanation of the attitudes of some, it is certain that a very small percentage of the American people are acquainted with the details of recent United States financial behavior in the UN, particularly United States efforts to eliminate capacity to pay as the basis for determining its contributions. Nor is it widely known that the United States, along with other major contributors, is making the UN increasingly dependent on voluntary contributions because of the desire to avoid the rates of assessment that an assessment-based system would require. It is vital that the potential long-term consequences of this trend be carefully examined, that the results be distributed to the public, and that the alternatives be debated.

5. Generating Political Will for Creative United States Involvement in the UN.

As United States involvement in the UN seems to display decreasing importance relative to other aspects of foreign and domestic policy, the causes appear to be numerous and intertwined: traditions in the foreign service and Department of State, both organizationally and in terms of human perceptions; trust in weapons of mass destruction for creating 'international order"; inflated expectations and misunder- standing of the reasons for limited achievements of the UN in peacekeeping; perception of the UN as primarily a "peacekeeping" organization; perceived decline in United States influence in the UN; belief that the United States has done more than any other country for the UN and that it is not appreciated; increasing involvement in critical domestic events and problems; lack of press interest in the UN, particularly the "non-political" activities; public disinterest in the United Nations. All of these factors, and perhaps others, help to make UN issues of low priority for the United States government in general and for the foreign policy establishment in particular.




Some would say that executive leadership is all that would be required for more creative United States involvement in the UN. This seems reasonable because over the long run public attitudes toward the UN have been quite positive. But the executive has rarely given UN issues top priority. While Department of State recommendations are often more supportive of the UN than eventual policy (e.g., support for paying United States assessments to ILO and resistance to im- portation of chrome from Rhodesia), these recommendations are generally not considered important enough to require a major effort to win congressional support. Other issues have more influential advocates in the State Department, the White House, the Pentagon, interest groups, and the Congress. A president who wishes to make increased UN support a priority item could probably overcome govemmental inertia by creatively appealing to the public reservoir of positive, although vague and passive, support for the UN. But what incentive does the president have to give UN issues priority so long as other foreign policy interests are more influential and vocal? How might vague public yearn- ings and aspirations for the UN be converted into activity through which these feelings are made more concrete and influential?

Ways must be found to make the links between the individual, whatever his station in life, and the UN system more obvious and vivid. Perhaps more important, new opportunities for involvement must be provided. Before examining some possible innovations, it should be recognized that the UN system has already offered vastly expanded opportunities for direct participation in intergovernmental relations by involving a vast range of governmental and nongovernmental specialists in its parliamentary and technical bodies. The UN system daily involves persons from virtually every profession. These links need to be viewed with broader perspective, not just in terms of the specific technical functions being performed but also in terms of the global links of involvement that are being created. Too often narrow views of efficiency and budgeting miss the multipurpose character of participation in the UN system.

Of the three reports reviewed, the CSOP deals most creatively with the need for bringing citizens more directly into contact with the UN system. They propose three different institutions. A world parliamentary assembly would represent the peoples of the world, in contrast to the UN General Assembly in which governments are represented. Recognizing that this might seem too visionary, the CSOP recommends, as a more feasible first step, a United Nations inter-parliamentary assembly composed of members of national parliaments. Modelled after the existing Inter-parliamentary Union, it would assist the General Assembly on designated issues and thereby offer direct links to national parliaments and, through them, to the citizens that elect them. Also proposed is a world youth assembly.




While even a United Nations inter-parliamentary assembly might seem visionary, it would be responsive to discernible problems in United States participation in the UN. Some congressional resistance to United States involvement in the UN is rooted in conflict over executive dom- inance in United States foreign policy. More extensive legislative involvement would likely bring greater support. Perhaps the world parliamentary assembly, as a second UN parliamentary body representing the peoples of the world, is a long way off. But it is not too soon, nor indeed unrealistic, for the United 'States to begin thinking about ways in which greater democratic control could be exercised over United States participation in the UN system. This could involve direct elec- tion of UN representatives. Such control is not only necessary if popular government is to survive the increasing influence of multinational decision-making on the lives of all citizens. It may also be a prerequisite for citizen ability to identity with and to contribute willingly to the United Nations system.

But it would be a mistake to confine efforts to generate more extensive international identities and involvement to the UN systemn alone. There are now some two hundred intergovernmental international organizations and some three thousand nongovernmental international organizations. These can make important contributions in building a transnational community in which the UN can be more effective. The nongovernmental international organizations cover virtually every profession, business, philanthropy, or hobby in which man is engaged. How many citizens are acquainted with the existing transnational activity and potential of those organizations related to their own professions? It is unfortunate that international relations and the development of international community are looked upon primarily as matters for governments. It is important that more citizens perceive new opportunities for nongovernmental transnational involvement and acquire deeper understanding of the significance of this involvement for shaping the world of the future. It is equally important that the vast number of citizens already engaged in a variety of transnational activity perceives more clearly the interdependencies between governmental and nongovernmental international activity and sees in broader perspective the potential of nongovernmental activity for achieving desired international goals. More multifaceted involvements of individuals in transnational activity, as well as consciousness of links between these involvements and the functioning of the UN system, could also strengthen the political will for more creative United States involvement in the UN system.



Documents

Us in the United Nations