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UNREPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 1190
September Term, 2012
ABLADE ODOI-ATSEM
v.
PAMELA ODOI-ATSEM
Woodward,
Graeff,
Beckstead, Kathleen L.
(Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Graeff, J.
Filed: October 28, 2013
This case arises from a divorce proceeding in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s
County initiated by Pamela Odoi-Atsem, appellee, against Ablade Odoi-Atsem, appellant.
The parties separated in 2010 after 21 years of marriage. On August 7, 2012, the circuit
court granted Ms. Odoi-Atsem an absolute divorce from Mr. Odoi-Atsem, and awarded her
indefinite alimony, a monetary award of $1,500,000, and $150,000 in attorney’s fees.
On appeal, Mr. Odoi-Atsem presents five questions for our review, which we have1
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s original questions presented are as follows:1
1. Did the lower court improperly disallow the Appellant’s Joint
Statement of Marital Property, when the Appellee was the one that
missed the initial deadline set by the rule to submit her statement of
joint marital property, and there is a history of Appellee’s dilatory in
marital property evaluation?
2. Did the lower court improperly evaluate the marital property of the
parties when it awarded the Appellee One Million, Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000) in cash representing more than 500%
of the actual value of the parties’ marital property?
3. Did the lower court improperly conclude that expenditures and
investments in a company established by the parties during their
marriage transmuted into dissipation of marital property by the
Appellant during the divorce just because the money was not used for
household expenses, and did the lower court fail to recognize that the
Appellee dissipated marital properties to the tune of almost $1,000,000?
4. Did the lower court err in awarding the appellee an indefinite alimony
when her own Doctor testified that she is able to work and her illness
is in remission, she has been continuously employed and needs no time
for retraining?
5. Did the lower court err in awarding the appellee attorney’s fees despite
the evidence that shows that the Appellee withdrew nearly One Million
Dollars ($1,000,000) from the parties’ marital property, and when the
(continued...)
rephrased, as follows:
1. Did the circuit court err in prohibiting Mr. Odoi-Atsem from
introducing his Joint Statement of Marital Property into evidence?
2. Did the circuit court err in valuing the parties’ marital property and in
granting Ms. Odoi-Atsem a $1,500,000 monetary award?
3. Did the circuit court err in its resolution of the parties’ claims of
dissipation of marital property?
4. Did the circuit court err in awarding Ms. Odoi-Atsem indefinite
alimony of $7,500 per month?
5. Did the circuit court err in awarding Ms. Odoi-Atsem attorney’s fees?
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 28, 1989, the parties got married. They have two children, one of whom was
a minor at the time of the proceedings giving rise to this appeal.
In 1988, the parties established a facility and construction management business, Odoi
Associates Inc. (“OAI”), in Mitchellville, Maryland; Mr. Odoi-Atsem is OAI’s sole owner.
Ms. Odoi-Atsem subsequently worked at OAI, serving as Vice-President.
On August 10, 2010, Mr. Odoi-Atsem and Ms. Odoi-Atsem separated after they had
an altercation at the OAI office, during which Mr. Odoi-Atsem fired Ms. Odoi-Atsem from
OAI. Thereafter, Mr. Odoi-Atsem left the marital home.
(...continued)1
Appellee engaged in numerous litigations she later abandoned that are
part of the Attorney’s fees?
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Prior to August 10, 2010, altercation, Ms. Odoi-Atsem suspected that Mr. Odoi-Atsem
was having an affair with Patricia Mensah, one of his employees in a Ghanaian business
venture. Mr. Odoi-Atsem had given Ms. Mensah permission to live in the parties’ home in
Ghana, without informing Ms. Odoi-Atsem.
On October 4, 2010, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce,
asserting constructive abandonment. On December 1, 2010, she filed a Motion for an
Immediate Pendente Lite Hearing, seeking temporary and permanent alimony to support
herself and the parties’ minor son, and noting that she was scheduled to have a mastectomy
of her right breast on January 7, 2011.
On December 2, 2010, Mr. Odoi-Atsem filed his Answer, as well as a Counter
Complaint for Limited Divorce, Custody, Access/Visitation, and Child Support. On
December 10, 2010, he filed a Response and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for an
Immediate Pendente Lite Hearing, arguing that temporary alimony was not required because
he continued to support Ms. Odoi-Atsem and their minor child, and Ms. Odoi-Atsem had
removed $150,000 from the parties’ bank account.
On January 4, 2011, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a Petition for Temporary Restraining
Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction, asserting that, in the last year Mr.
Odoi-Atsem had transferred approximately $500,000 to Ghana, “to one o[r] more corporate
entities controlled by [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] and/or his mistress, Patricia Mensah, or directly to
Ms. Mensah.” She requested that the court grant a temporary restraining order, preliminary
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injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting Mr. Odoi-Atsem from transferring any
additional assets to Ghana.
On January 10, 2011, the court denied Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s request for a temporary
restraining order. The court ordered, however, that Mr. Odoi-Atsem provide Ms. Odoi-
Atsem with seven days advance notice of every transfer of funds or assets overseas which
exceeded $3,500 in value.
On February 14, 2011, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a Request for Letters Rogatory,
asserting her intent “to open ancillary proceedings in Ghana for the purpose of (1) preserving
assets and (2) to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in support of her case.” She
requested that the circuit court issue Letters Rogatory to the Superior Court of Judicature,
High Court of Justice, in Accra, Ghana. 2
On March 16, 2011, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed an initial financial statement with the
circuit court. On May 17, 2011, she filed a Motion to Compel Defendant’s Financial
Statement, alleging that Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s December 2, 2010, answer to her complaint did
not include a financial statement, which was required pursuant to Maryland Rule 9-203.
On May 20, 2011, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a Motion to Enforce Agreement to Retain
Joint Expert. She asserted that Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s counsel had proposed hiring Jeffrey D.
Letters Rogatory, also termed Letters of Request, are defined as follows:2
“[D]ocument[s] issued by one court to a foreign court, requesting that the foreign court (1)
take evidence from a specific person within the foreign jurisdiction or serve process on an
individual or corporation within the foreign jurisdiction and (2) return the testimony or proof
of service for use in a pending case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 924-25 (8th ed. 1999).
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Walsh, CPA, as a joint expert to value OAI. Ms. Odoi-Atsem agreed with his proposal, on
the condition that Mr. Odoi-Atsem agree to pay Mr. Walsh’s retainer and other fees, subject
to allocation by the court. She requested that the court require Mr. Odoi-Atsem to retain
Mr. Walsh as a joint expert and pay Mr. Walsh’s $10,000 retainer.
On June 14, 2011, Mr. Odoi-Atsem filed his Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel Defendant’s Financial Statement, requesting that the court deny Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s
request, or in the alternative, “hold a hearing for [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] to show which . . .
financial statement is missing from . . . over 7,000 pieces of documents with binders upon
binders of financial statements.” On July 5, 2011, the court ordered that Mr. Odoi-Atsem file
a financial statement, in the form required by Rule 9-203(a), by July 26, 2011.
On July 12, 2011, the circuit court issued Letters Rogatory to the court in Ghana, in
accordance with Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s request. In a subsequent pendente lite order entered on
July 13, 2011, the court explained its rationale, as follows:
In this case, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] has for whatever reason (which may in fact be
valid) already transfered [sic] the Lion’s share of net valued assets to Ghana.
The nature and value of those foreign assets will clearly be the crux of the case
at the merits hearing. The Court finds it appropriate to issue the Letters
Rogatory.
In its pendente lite order, the court also ordered Mr. Odoi-Atsem to pay Ms. Odoi-Atsem
$4,000 per month in pendente lite alimony and continue to give Ms. Odoi-Atsem advance
notice prior to transferring any funds or assets to Ghana worth more than $3,500.
On July 20, 2011, Mr. Odoi-Atsem sent a letter to Ms. Odoi-Atsem informing her that
he was terminating her health insurance. On July 22, 2011, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed an
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Emergency Motion to Compel Maintenance of Health Insurance. Ms. Odoi-Atsem asserted
that her health insurance coverage was through a family plan provided by OAI, and
Mr. Odoi-Atsem had terminated her coverage after contending that she had failed to produce
documents pertaining to her cancer treatment.
On July 23, 2011, Mr. Odoi-Atsem filed his opposition to Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s motion,
asserting that Ms. Odoi-Atsem “does not have breast cancer” and “all her purported surgeries
are either elective preventative surgeries or elective cosmetic surgeries that are not covered
by the health insurance at issue here.” On July 29, 2011, the circuit court ordered that
Mr. Odoi-Atsem maintain health insurance for Ms. Odoi-Atsem, pendente lite.
On September 22, 2011, the circuit court granted Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s motion to retain
a joint expert. Accordingly, it ordered that Mr. Odoi-Atsem retain Mr. Walsh to value OAI
and pay Mr. Walsh’s retainer fee.
On October 27, 2011, Mr. Odoi-Atsem advised that he would be shipping three
vehicles to Ghana for business use. He informed counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem that OAI was
“in steep decline,” and as a result, he was pursuing business interests elsewhere.
On November 17, 2011, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a petition for contempt due to
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s failure to pay Mr. Walsh’s retainer fee in accordance with the court’s
order. On February 8, 2012, Mr. Odoi-Atsem filed a Motion to Appoint a Cheaper Business
Evaluator or in the Alternative to Compel the Plaintiff to Pay Any Amount Above $10,000
to Mr. Jeffery D. Walsh.
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On February 16, 2012, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a Supplemental Complaint, alleging
both adultery and a one-year separation period as new grounds for divorce, in addition to the
original ground of desertion.
On February 27, 2012, the court issued a Show Cause Order regarding Mr. Odoi-
Atsem’s failure to pay Mr. Walsh’s retainer fee, ordering Mr. Odoi-Atsem to file a written
response by February 29, 2012, showing cause as to why Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s petition for
contempt should not be granted. The court set a hearing for February 29, 2012. 3
On March 12, 2012, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed an updated financial statement. That same
day, she also filed a Line to the Clerk of the Court requesting that the Clerk file her statement
as the Joint Statement of Parties Concerning Marital and Non-Marital Property, asserting
that, as of March 7, 2012, she had not received a draft Joint Statement from Mr. Odoi-Atsem.
She asserted that her draft joint statement was due to Mr. Odoi-Atsem on February 20, 2012,
and her counsel hand delivered the draft statement to Mr. Odoi-Atsem at his deposition on
February 21, 2012.
Trial began on March 14, 2012, and continued through March 29, 2012, and April 11,
2012. On August 14, 2012, the court filed its written opinion and order granting Ms. Odoi-
Atsem a Judgment of Absolute Divorce. The order provided as follows, regarding the
relevant issues:
The transcript of this hearing was not produced for this Court’s review, and the3
docket entries do not reflect what occurred at the hearing.
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ORDERED, that [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] shall pay [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]
indefinite alimony in the amount of $7,500.00 per month, accounting and
accruing from August 1, 2012. [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] shall pay alimony by wage
lien through the Office of Child Support Enforcement. Alimony arrears, if
any, shall be addressed by the Office of Child Support Enforcement; and it is
further,
ORDERED, that each party shall retain ownership of all properties
titled solely in his or her name; and it is further,
***
ORDERED, that [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] be and hereby is awarded a
monetary award in the amount of $1,500,000.00. Said sum will not be reduced
to judgment at this point at [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s request. Upon [Ms. Odoi-
Atsem]’s written request and a finding as to the unpaid balance, the monetary
award may be reduced to judgment; and it is further,
***
ORDERED, that the [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] be and hereby is directed to pay
to the [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] the sum of $150,000.00 as contribution towards [Ms.
Odoi-Atsem]’s attorney fees. Said sum will not be reduced to judgment at this
point at [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s request. Upon [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s written
request and a finding as to the unpaid balance, the attorney’s fees award may
be reduced to judgment. [4]
On August 20, 2012, Mr. Odoi-Atsem noted his appeal to this Court. 5
The record does not indicate why the monetary award was to be reduced to judgment4
only at Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s written request.
That same day, Mr. Odoi-Atsem filed a Motion to Alter and Amend the circuit5
court’s August 7, 2012, order. He asserted his “profound disagree[ment] with the [c]ourt’s
evaluation of marital property that resulted in a grossly [sic] monetary award to [Ms. Odoi-
Atsem].” He requested that the court order the sale of the parties’ marital assets in Ghana,
and the equal distribution of the proceeds of those sales. Mr. Odoi-Atsem further stated that
he “preserves the issue of indefinite alimony award and all the monetary awards . . . for
appeal.” On September 6, 2012, the circuit court denied Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s motion to alter
or amend.
-8-
MOTION TO DISMISS
We first address Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s motion to dismiss this appeal and for sanctions.
She argues that we should dismiss Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s appeal based on his failure to provide
a complete record of the proceedings below in accordance with the Maryland Rules.
Specifically, she contends that Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s record extract is devoid of 92 exhibits and
30 pleadings that she designated for inclusion, that Mr. Odoi-Atsem failed to order transcripts
for several relevant hearings, and that the trial transcripts he provided were incomplete. She
further argues that Mr. Odoi-Atsem, in violation of the Rules, included documents in his
record extract that occurred after his appeal was noted, which are not properly before us.
Ms. Odoi-Atsem further contends that we should grant her the attorneys’ fees she
incurred in responding to this appeal to sanction Mr. Odoi-Atsem pursuant to Maryland Rule
1-341. She asserts that Mr. Odoi-Atsem is pursuing this appeal in bad faith and without
substantial justification, contending that the appeal was intended to delay her ability to
enforce the judgment against Mr. Odoi-Atsem in Ghana, and asserting that “[i]t is no
accident that the omitted transcripts are the most important parts of [her] defenses.” She
argues that Mr. Odoi-Atsem lacks a colorable claim where he “deliberately fail[ed] to present
accurate facts” and prevented Ms. Odoi-Atsem from presenting her case as well.
Mr. Odoi-Atsem asserts that Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s motion to dismiss is not properly
before us, as it was waived by the filing of her brief. He contends that, “once an Appeal
Brief is filed, the Appellee has waived the non-compliant defects.” In support, he relies on
Maryland Rule 2-322(a), which governs the procedure for filing pleadings and motions in
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circuit court. With respect to the testimony of Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s financial expert he states:
“The so-called forensic accounting expert was not even a Certified Public Accountant, and
yet she was certified as an ‘expert’ by the trial court and walked away with about $25,000
for her useless testimony.” With respect to Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s request for sanctions, he
argues that “this Appeal is far from being frivolous,” and Ms. Odoi-Atsem has not
demonstrated that sanctions are appropriate.
Initially, we reject Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s contention that Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s motion to
dismiss was improperly filed. As indicated, he relies on the Maryland Rule governing filing
pleadings and motions in the circuit court, which is inapplicable here.
On the merits, we note that Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s present motion is the second motion
to dismiss filed with this Court; on November 8, 2012, she filed her initial Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that Mr. Odoi-Atsem had failed to order the transcripts of the
proceedings below for inclusion in the record. On December 10, 2012, we granted Ms. Odoi-
Atsem’s motion and dismissed the appeal due to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s failure to file any
transcripts with this Court.
On December 14, 2012, Mr. Odoi-Atsem filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Supplement Record, requesting that this Court reconsider its order dismissing the
appeal and allow him to supplement the record with the missing transcripts. Along with his
motion, Mr. Odoi-Atsem provided a Designation of Records, listing “[t]he Transcripts for
the following trial dates in 2012: 3/14, 3/15, 3/20, 3/21, 3/26, 3/27, 3/28, 3/29, and 4/11,
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2012.” On February 6, 2013, we granted Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Supplement the Record and ordered that the appeal proceed.
On February 26, 2013, Ms. Odoi-Atsem filed a Motion to Strike Order Granting
Reconsideration, Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, and
Second Motion to Dismiss. With respect to her Motion to Dismiss, Ms. Odoi-Atsem asserted
that, after our order granting reconsideration, she discovered that Mr. Odoi-Atsem failed to
order all necessary transcripts. She included as an exhibit to her motion an email exchange
between counsel for Odoi-Atsem and the transcription service, in which counsel requested
only portions of the trial testimony for transcription.
We agree with Ms. Odoi-Atsem that Mr. Odoi-Atsem has failed to comply with
several Maryland Rules in filing his brief and record extract. Specifically, as Ms. Odoi-
Atsem notes, Mr. Odoi-Atsem did not include portions of the proceedings of the ten day
merits trial, namely portions of Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s testimony, the testimony of her financial
expert, and the testimony of her medical provider, as well as other testimony, in violation of
the Maryland Rules. See Md. Rule 8-411(a)(1)(A) (requiring, in pertinent part, that,
“[u]nless a copy of the transcript is already on file, the appellant shall order in writing from
the court reporter a transcript containing: (1) a transcription of (A) all the testimony or (B)
that part of the testimony that the parties agree, by written stipulation filed with the clerk of
the lower court, is necessary for the appeal.”) (emphasis added); Md. Rule 8-413(a) (“The
record on appeal shall include . . . (2) the transcript required by Rule 8-411”). This, by itself,
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is a basis to dismiss the appeal. See Md. Rule 8-602(a)(6) (permitting an appellate court to
dismiss an appeal where “the contents of the record do not comply with Rule 8-413”).
Moreover, Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s record extract fails to include numerous pleadings and
exhibits relevant to the resolution of this appeal. See Md. Rule 8-501(c) (“The record extract
shall contain all parts of the record that are reasonably necessary for the determination of the
questions presented by the appeal and any cross-appeal.”). This, as well, is a basis to dismiss
the appeal. See Md. Rule 8-602(a)(8) (permitting an appellate court to dismiss an appeal
where “the style, contents, size, format, legibility, or method of reproduction of a brief,
appendix, or record extract does not comply with Rules 8-112, 8-501, 8-503, or 8-504”).
We have seriously considered dismissing this appeal on these grounds. See Rollins
v. Capital Plaza Assocs., L.P., 181 Md. App. 188, 203 (dismissal of appeal was proper where
“[t]he contents of [appellant’s] brief and the [r]ecord [e]xtract are so far removed from the
boundaries of the rules and acceptable appellate practice that they are an affront to the
process ”), cert. denied, 406 Md. 746 (2008); Town of Cheverly Police Dept. v. Day, 135 Md.
App. 384, 391 (2000) (“Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(a)(6), we retain discretion to
dismiss an appeal for failure to comply with the appellate rules for the filing of a proper
record.”). We note that Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s omission of the testimony of Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s
financial expert, based on his view that the testimony had no value, is especially egregious
and presents another ground for dismissal. See Bornstein v. State Tax Comm’n, 227 Md. 331,
335-37 (1962) (intentional omissions from the record extract, which were intended to mislead
the court, warranted dismissal of the appeal).
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Nevertheless, we will exercise our discretion to consider the issues to the extent that
the record permits. Where omitted testimony is necessary, however, we shall find Mr. Odoi-
Atsem’s arguments to be waived due to his failure to provide us with the information we
require in order to review his contentions.
Despite Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s failure to comply with the rules, we decline Ms. Odoi-
Atsem’s request for sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341. She is free, however, to
pursue her request for attorneys fees’ in the circuit court. See F.L. § 11-110 (authorizing the
award of attorney’s fees in an alimony action); F.L. § 7-107 (authorizing the award of
attorney’s fees in a divorce action); F.L. § 12-103(b) (authorizing the award of attorney’s
fees in a child custody action).
DISCUSSION
I.
Joint Statement of Marital Property
Mr. Odoi-Atsem contends that the circuit court “[i]mproperly disallowed [his] Joint
Statement of Marital Property.” Specifically, he argues that Ms. Odoi-Atsem was late filing
her statement of marital property and “displayed systematic dilatory in taking steps to
properly value the parties’ properties in Ghana,” and therefore, “equity require[d] that [he]
should be allowed to file his joint marital statement late.”
Ms. Odoi-Atsem notes that Mr. Odoi-Atsem does not discuss the appropriate standard
of review or “cite a single case” in support of his contentions, and he does not explain how
the ruling was prejudicial. She states that it is not “incumbent on [her] to speculate by
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responding to arguments not made.” She does state, however, that she “cannot conceive of
any argument that [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] might make . . . that would warrant reversal,” noting
that Maryland Rule 9-207(d) “expressly permits the exclusion of certain evidence for failure
to comply” with the Rule.
A.
Proceedings Below
On March 14, 2012, while identifying preliminary matters for the court prior to the
start of the merits trial, Ms. Odoi-Atsem stated that there was no joint statement of marital
property from Mr. Odoi-Atsem in the record. Mr. Odoi-Atsem advised that he had submitted
to counsel the previous day a spreadsheet listing the marital property and the assets of each
party. The following colloquy then occurred:
[COUNSEL FOR MS. ODOI-ATSEM]: I have one page. And I’m not
agreeing that this is even a joint statement, Your Honor.
[COUNSEL FOR MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: And we have – we can immediately
transpose what [Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s] statement is into the joint statement that
they sent, and then file it immediately.
THE COURT: Isn’t that a little late?
[COUNSEL FOR MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: Your Honor, we sent it to them. But
. . . it was late, and we filed it – we’ve got it to them yesterday.
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Counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem advised that the one page document he received at 3:30
p.m. the day before the start of trial “purports to be a joint statement,” but it was “not in
proper form.” He moved that Mr. Odoi-Atsem “be barred from submitting a joint statement,”
arguing that he had been “deprived of any ability to properly prepare [his] case,” that
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s failure to provide the information was deliberate strategy, and “the [c]ourt
must impose a consequence for that.” Counsel requested that the “the joint statement be
accepted as submitted by [Ms. Odoi-Atsem].”
Counsel for Mr. Odoi-Atsem acknowledged sending his client’s joint statement to
Ms. Odoi-Atsem after 3:00 p.m. the day before, but he argued that Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s “own
joint statement was late.” Counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem responded that Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s
joint statement was hand-delivered to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s counsel on February 21, 2012.
The court then ruled as follows:
As per the Joint 9-207 Statement, I have one and only one 9-207 Statement
that’s been filed that’s in the jacket. No other 9-207 Statements will be
permitted. That’s it.
There’s only one in the jacket; nothing else was filed. Pursuant to the
rules, I understand the one in the jacket may have been one-day late, but there
certainly was more than ample time to file a response to that. So I’m not going
to have another one filed sometime in the future, if it hasn’t been filed to date.
B.
Rule 9-207
Maryland Rule 9-207(a) provides that, “[w]hen a monetary award or other relief
pursuant to Code, Family Law Article, § 8-205 is an issue, the parties shall file a joint
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statement listing all property owned by one or both of them.” It further provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(c) Time for filing; procedure. The joint statement shall be filed at least
ten days before the scheduled trial date or by any earlier date fixed by the
court. At least 30 days before the joint statement is due to be filed, each party
shall prepare and serve on the other party a proposed statement in the form set
forth in section (b) of this Rule. At least 15 days before the joint statement is
due, the plaintiff shall sign and serve on the defendant for approval and
signature a proposed joint statement that fairly reflects the positions of the
parties. The defendant shall timely file the joint statement, which shall be
signed by the defendant or shall be accompanied by a written statement of the
specific reasons why the defendant did not sign.
(d) Sanctions. If a party fails to comply with this Rule, the court, on
motion or on its own initiative, may enter any orders in regard to the
noncompliance that are just, including:
(1) an order that property shall be classified as marital or non-marital in
accordance with the statement filed by the complying party;
(2) an order refusing to allow the noncomplying party to oppose designated
assertions on the complying party’s statement filed pursuant to this Rule, or
prohibiting the noncomplying party from introducing designated matters inevidence. Instead of or in addition to any order, the court, after opportunity for
hearing, shall require the noncomplying party or the attorney advising the
noncompliance or both of them to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the noncompliance, unless the court finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.
(Emphasis added).
Where, as here, a party fails to comply with the Rule’s timing requirements, the Rule
explicitly grants the circuit court discretion to accept the statement filed by the opposing
party, and to “prohibit[] the noncomplying party from introducing designated matters into
evidence.” Md. Rule 9-207(d). See Hainesworth v. State, 9 Md. App. 31, 35 (the use of the
term “may” in a statute or Rule indicates that discretion is afforded to the court in its
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application of the standard set forth therein), cert. denied, 258 Md. 727 (1970). Accordingly,
we review the court’s decision to sanction Mr. Odoi-Atsem under the abuse of discretion
standard. As this Court has explained, a ruling generally will not be deemed to be an abuse
of discretion unless it is “‘well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing
court and is beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.’” Moreland
v. State, 207 Md. App. 563, 569 (2012) (quoting Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366, 383 (2005)).
Accord Morris v. State, 204 Md. App. 487, 492 (2012) (This Court will find an abuse of
discretion only “‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial]
court.’”) (quoting King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 697 (2009)).
Here, despite the timing requirement of Rule 9-207(c) regarding the filing of a joint
statement, Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s joint statement had not been filed with the court as of the date
trial was scheduled to start, and it was submitted to counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem the
afternoon before the start of trial. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the
court abused its discretion in precluding him from filing his financial statement.
To be sure, Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s statement also was late; it was delivered to Mr. Odoi-
Atsem’s counsel on February 21, 2012, and filed with the court on March 12, 2012.
Mr. Odoi-Atsem contends that this precluded the court from exercising its discretion in
sanctioning him for failing to submit timely a draft statement. He fails to cite, however, any
caselaw in support of his argument. See Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 377 Md. 55,
88 n.14 (2003) (Failure “to set forth the authority for a proposition, properly is viewed as a
waiver of that issue.”) (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Van Meter v.
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State, 30 Md. App. 406, 408 (appellate court cannot be expected to seek out law to sustain
appellant’s position), cert. denied, 278 Md. 737 (1976). Appellant’s contention in this regard
is without merit.
C.
No Prejudice Shown
Even if Mr. Odoi-Atsem had shown an abuse of discretion, it would not justify
reversal. The Court of Appeals has explained that, generally, a civil litigant must show both
error and prejudice. See Barksdale v. Wilkowsky, 419 Md. 649, 660 (2011) (“[T]he burden
to show error in civil cases is on the appealing party to show that an error caused
prejudice.”). Once an appellant has shown error, “the general rule is that [the appellant] must
show more than that prejudice was possible; she must show instead that it was probable.”
Id. at 662.
Here, other than a bald assertion that the monetary award the court granted to
Ms. Odoi-Atsem was “more than 500% of the actual value of the parties’ marital properties,”
Mr. Odoi-Atsem provides no argument to explain how he was prejudiced by the exclusion
of his statement. Indeed, based on our review of the record, it does not appear even to
include a copy of the financial statement that Mr. Odoi-Atsem wanted to be admitted. See
Davis v. Davis, 97 Md. App. 1, 23 (1993) (where appellant “did not include relevant portions
of the trial transcript, or the alleged incomplete discovery material, in the appendix to her
-18-
brief,” the issue on which the disputed evidence was based was waived), aff’d, 335 Md. 699
(1994). Accordingly, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s claim is
without merit.
II.
Marital Property Award
Mr. Odoi-Atsem next argues that the circuit court “improperly evaluated the marital
propert[y] of the parties,” specifically, the home in Nmai Dzorn, Ghana, which “resulted in
an oversized” monetary award of $1.5 million to Ms. Odoi-Atsem, “represent[ing] more than
500% of the actual value of the parties’ marital properties.” He contends that Ms. Odoi-
Atsem had the burden to produce evidence of the value of the Ghana property, she failed to
do so, and the circuit court did not explain its basis for the valuation of the Ghanaian
property. Instead, he asserts, the court improperly “appear[ed] to rely only on the testimony
of [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] who is not a title owner” or his “speculative wishful thinking deposition
statement.”
Ms. Odoi-Atsem agrees that she bore the burden of proof regarding the value of the
parties’ marital home in Nmai Dzorn, Ghana. She argues that the court’s finding that the6
marital value of that property was $1,000,000 is supported by Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s deposition
testimony.
She notes that Mr. Odoi-Atsem “does not specifically contest any other findings of6
fact concerning the value of property,” other than the home in Nmai Dzorn.
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A.
Proceedings Below
On March 14, 2012, during the court’s disposition of preliminary matters prior to the
start of the merits trial, counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem contended that Mr. Odoi-Atsem had
failed to produce “any documents pertaining to any property in Ghana, except the
construction site plan for the Ghan[a]ian marital home.” Counsel for Mr. Odoi-Atsem
responded that documentation regarding the values of these properties “don’t exist.” 7
During Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s case-in-chief, she admitted Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s deposition
testimony into evidence. At his deposition, Mr. Odoi-Atsem testified as follows regarding
the home where he and Ms. Odoi-Atsem had lived in Ghana:
[COUNSEL FOR MS. ODOI-ATSEM]: Do you know how much the house
is worth presently?
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: The – the difficulty of pricing this house – I designed
the house. I’m very proud of that house. I would like that house to sell for a
million dollars.
At trial, Mr. Odoi-Atsem testified that there were “some structural issues” with the
building, specifically “several cracks in the slab.” With respect to the value of the property,
Mr. Odoi-Atsem testified as follows:
As indicated, Mr. Odoi-Atsem failed to timely provide Ms. Odoi-Atsem with a draft7
statement of marital property, and he was precluded from filing a statement the day of trial.
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[COUNSEL FOR MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: And when you – when you started
building this – this so-called marital property in 2002, or marital home, sorry,
how much money have you taken from the United States to invest in that
property, to build that property?
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: To over this period I have calculated somewhere in the
range of about $120,000.
***
[[COUNSEL FOR MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: So when you – so the one – so that
it’s clear in my mind, the $120,000 . . . you put in that house is just what you
invested in it, not the value of it?
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: Not the value. This is just the direct cash that went
into construction.
***
[THE COURT]: You can tell me what you believe the value of the property is.
***
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: $120,000. That is what I spent on it including the
land.[8]
The only other evidence of the value of the house that we have found was Ms. Odoi-9
Atsem’s joint statement of marital property, where she listed the values of the house in Nmai
Dzorn, Ghana at $1,000,000. 10
Counsel for Mr. Odoi-Atsem conceded, appropriately, at oral argument that the8
amount invested in the property does not necessarily equate with the value of the property.
As indicated, appellant did not provide the entire transcript to this Court for review.9
She also listed values for other properties, as follows: 325 acres of undeveloped10
land in Fettah Beach, $400,000; one plot of land in La Boni, Ghana, $10,000; six acres of
land in Pram Pram Beach, Ghana, $100,000; and “land near beach, Labadi, Ghana,” $10,000.
-21-
In making the marital property award, the court considered the factors set forth in Md.
Code (2006 Repl. Vol.) § 8-205 of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”), discussed infra.
Mr. Odoi-Atsem does not contest any of the court’s findings supporting its decision to grant
the award, other than the valuation of the marital home in Ghana; accordingly, we will not
detail the court’s findings with respect to the factors set forth in F.L.§ 8-205, other than those
of relevance here.
With respect to “[t]he value of all property interests of each party,” the court found,
in addition to its valuation of the properties in Ghana, listed above, and the parties’ other
various properties and bank accounts, as follows:
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] owns additional properties and leaseholds in Ghana, not
previously valued, including: (1) 1.25 acres leased in Fettah Beach, valued at
$60,000.00; (2) inherited land in Labadi Beach, valued at $50,000.00; (3)
clinic space at the Accra Mall, valued at $100,000.00; (4) 1000 acres of farm
land leased in Dodowa, valued at $5,000.00; and (5) a plot of land near Legon,
valued at $5,000.00. Neither OAI nor OAI Ghana was valued. Both are
income generating properties owned solely by [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]. In addition,
twelve bank accounts, titled solely in [Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s] name, were not
valued as marital property.
The court further noted, pursuant to F.L. § 8-205(b)(11), which allows a court to
consider “any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in
order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in property
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both,” as follows:
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem], with [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] as his wife and partner, built
a multi-million dollar enterprise, acquired significant assets and established
connections and a reputation to garner even greater profits in the future.
-22-
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s failure to provide timely discovery significantly
impeded [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s efforts to identify and value marital assets.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s transfer of assets to Ghana constituted an effort to divert
property from the marital estate. [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s testimony about the
foregoing was less than credible. OAI, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s most lucrative
asset, was not valued, nor were multiple bank accounts in [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s
name. [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] has additional marital property, as well, the value of
which was not attributed to him.
The parties have $2,607,376.59 of identified marital property. Of that
amount, $273,517.73 is titled in [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s name and $2,321,773.86
is titled in [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s name. $12,085.00 is jointly titled.
$1,520,000.00 of marital property is located in Ghana. Most, if not all, of the
Ghanaian property is likely beyond [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s reach.
After consideration of the factors set forth in F.L.§ 8-205, the court awarded Ms. Odoi-Atsem
a monetary award in the amount of $1,500,00.
B.
Marital Property Evaluation
The decision whether to grant a monetary award is generally within the sound
discretion of the trial court. See F.L. § 8-205(a) (“the court may . . . grant a monetary award”)
(emphasis added). In making a monetary award, the court must engage in a three-step
process. Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 499 (1993). First, if there is a dispute as to whether
certain property is marital property, the court must determine which property is marital
property. F.L. § 8-203(a). After a determination has been made as to which property is
marital property, the court must determine the value of all marital property. F.L. § 8-204.
After the court has determined which property is marital property, and the value of the
-23-
marital property, it may make a monetary award after considering each of the required
factors. F.L. § 8-205. 11
In determining whether to grant a monetary award, a “trial court need not ‘go through
a detailed check list of the statutory factors, specifically referring to each.’” Gordon v.
Gordon, 174 Md. App. 583, 624 (2007) (quoting Doser v. Doser, 106 Md. App. 329, 351
(1995)). Indeed, although a court “is required to consider certain factors in making a
determination, [it] is not required to enunciate every factor [it] considered on the record.
The required factors include:11
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the
well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is
to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in property
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, was acquired, including the effort
expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in
property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both;
(9) the contribution by either party of property described in
§ 8-201(e)(3) of this subtitle to the acquisition of real property held by the
parties as tenants by the entirety;
(10) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the
court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family
home; and
(11) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate
to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer
of an interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, or both.
F.L. § 8-205(b).
-24-
Rather, it would be sufficient for the [court] merely to state on the record that [it] considered
the required factors in making [its] decision.” Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. App. 577, 585
(1986). “‘A judge is presumed to know the law and to properly apply it. That presumption
is not rebutted by mere silence.’” Imagnu v. Wodajo, 85 Md. App. 208, 221(1990) (quoting
Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350, 370 (1984)).
In reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding a monetary award, we apply the
following standard of review:
First, we utilize the “clearly erroneous” standard to the court’s determination
of what is, and what is not, marital property because ordinarily, it is a question
of fact as to whether all or a portion of an asset is marital or non-marital
property. Factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence are not
clearly erroneous. Second, as to the court’s decision to grant a monetary
award, and the amount thereof, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of
review. Within that context, we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the fact finder, even if we might have reached a different result.
Richards v. Richards, 166 Md. App. 263, 271-72 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted).
C.
Valuation of Nmai Dzorn Property
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s sole contention regarding the marital property award goes to the
second stage of the analysis, the valuation of the marital property. Moreover, as indicated,
his contention is limited to the value of the Nmai Dzorn property.
In support of his argument that the circuit court’s finding regarding the value of
Nmai Dzorn was clearly erroneous, Mr. Odoi-Atsem asserts that Ms. Odoi-Atsem was
“incompetent to testify” regarding the value of the Nmai Dzorn property because she was not
-25-
the owner of the property, and “anything she is testifying to, is pure speculation specifically
designed to inflate the value” of the property. He provided no specific citation to the
transcript, however, where Ms. Odoi-Atsem gave any testimony as to the value of the Nmai
Dzorn property. To be sure, in her joint financial statement, she listed the value of the
property at $1,000,000, consistent with Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s own deposition testimony,
wherein he stated his desire to sell the home for $1,000,000. As Mr. Odoi-Atsem correctly
notes, it is well-settled law that “‘[t]he owner of property is presumed to be familiar with its
value so that his opinion of its value is admissible as evidence.’” Brown v. Brown, 195 Md.
App. 72, 119 (2010) (quoting Hale v. Hale, 74 Md. App. 555, 567 (1988)). Given the court’s
finding that Mr. Odoi-Atsem failed to provide discovery, substantially impacting Ms. Odoi-
Atsem’s efforts to value the marital assets, we conclude that the court’s assessment of the
value of the Nmai Dzorn property, based on the testimony of the titled owner to the property,
was not clearly erroneous.
III.
Dissipation of Marital Property
Mr. Odoi-Atsem next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he dissipated
marital property. Specifically, he contends that “investment in a company established during
marriage is not dissipation of marital property,” and there was no evidence that expenditures
and investments in this company were made when the marriage was going through an
“irreconcilable breakdown.” Additionally, he argues that the court “failed to recognize that
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] dissipated marital properties to the tune of almost $1,000,000.”
-26-
Ms. Odoi-Atsem contends that the failure of Mr. Odoi-Atsem to include transcripts
and exhibits in the record, as well as his “convoluted organization and lack of indexing of
the Record Extract,” makes responding to this argument difficult. In any event, she points
to evidence supporting the court’s findings regarding dissipation of marital property. In
particular, she contends that “an irreconcilable breakdown occurred when [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]
began an intimate relationship with [another woman] sometime before February 10, 2010.”
On the issue of dissipation of marital property, the court found as follows:
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] argued that [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] dissipated
$600,000.00 of marital property. From January 2010 to January 2011,
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] transferred $428,076.00 of marital assets to Global Tytan’s
Merchant Bank account in Ghana, which [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] could not access.[]
From July 2009 until February 2012, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] sent $51,207.08 in
transfers to Ghana, mostly to Patricia Mensah. []
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] purchased several vehicles and shipped them to
Ghana. On or about April 23, 2009, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] spent $22,500.00 to
ship equipment to Ghana. On or about July 23, 2009, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] spent[]
$19,975.00 to ship vehicles to Ghana. [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] also testified that he[]
spent $5,000.00 to $6,000.00 to ship several additional vehicles to Ghana.
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] has met her burden of establishing that [Mr. Odoi-
Atsem] dissipated marital property.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] neither credibly explained how alienated funds were
used in Ghana for any family purpose nor why he shipped the vehicles to
Ghana. Based on the foregoing, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] is deemed to have
dissipated $527,758.08 in marital assets. This extant property is deemed to be
marital and is titled in [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s name.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] argued that [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] dissipated marital
property. Upon the parties’ separation, [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] wrote herself two
checks for $150,000.00 from OAI without [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s knowledge,
only one of which she was able to cash. In addition, [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s
Suntrust bank account statements reflected several transactions involving large
-27-
sums of money, including a withdrawal, on or about November 16, 2010, of
$165,000.00.[]
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] testified that the money covered her living expenses,
insofar as she no longer had a salary. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] admitted to spending
$12,000.00 to $15,000.00 on a weekend retreat for approximately thirty people
at Deep Creek and $27,000.00 for a real estate course in California. The[]
expenditure of funds for living expenses and to pursue an alternate career did
not constitute dissipation. The expenditure of funds for the Deep Creek retreat
constituted dissipation. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] is deemed to have dissipated
$15,000.00 in marital assets.
Dissipation of marital assets refers to conduct by a party intended “to squander marital
property and render it impossible to make an equitable award of property.” Sharp v. Sharp,
58 Md. App. 386, 399, cert. denied, 5300 Md. 795 (1984). Generally, this occurs when a
“spouse uses marital property for his or her own benefit for a purpose unrelated to the
marriage at a time where the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown.” Id. at
401. “[S]uch intentional dissipation is no more than a fraud on marital rights,” and the court
should “consider the dissipated property as extant marital property . . . to be valued with the
other existing marital property.” Id. at 399.
The Court of Appeals recently reviewed the burdens of production and persuasion for
claims involving the dissipation of marital property. Omayaka v. Omayaka, 417 Md. 643,
654-57 (2011). It explained:
The burden of persuasion and the initial burden of production in showing
dissipation is on the party making the allegation. That party retains throughout
the burden of persuading the court that funds have been dissipated, but after
that party establishes a prima facie case that monies have been dissipated, i.e.
expended for the principal purpose of reducing the funds available for
equitable distribution, the burden shifts to the party who spent the money to
produce evidence sufficient to show that the expenditures were appropriate.
-28-
Id. at 656 (quoting Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 102 Md. App. 301, 311 (1994)).
“A trial court’s judgment regarding dissipation [of marital assets] is a factual one and,
therefore, is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.” Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md.
176, 202 (2004). “‘If there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings below,
those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting Fuge v. Fuge, 146 Md.
App. 142, 180 (2002)).
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s argument that there was “no evidence on the record that the parties’
marriage was undergoing any irreconcilable breakdown” before August 10, 2010, is belied
by the record. Indeed, he testified that he was aware that Ms. Odoi-Atsem had been speaking
to divorce attorneys for “well over a year” prior to their separation in August 2010.
Moreover, Ms. Odoi-Atsem testified that she first became aware of a relationship between
Ms. Mensah and Mr. Odoi-Atsem in early 2010. In March 2010, Ms. Odoi-Atsem overhead
Mr. Odoi-Atsem on the phone with Ms. Mensah, and given the tone of the conversation, she
became upset; the parties then got into an argument. Given this testimony, the court’s
finding that the parties’ marriage was undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown at the time
that Mr. Odoi-Atsem sent funds to Ghana was not clearly erroneous.
Mr. Odoi-Atsem does not contest the fact that he sent the funds listed by the court to
Ghana. Thus, the burden shifted to him to show that the expenditures were appropriate.
Omayaka, 417 Md. 656.
Mr. Odoi-Atsem argues that monies sent to Tytan Global Ghana Ltd’s (“Tytan
Global”) bank account were not improper because Tytan Global was a company that the
-29-
parties formed and Ms. Odoi-Atsem is “a shareholder.” This contention is also belied by12
the record. Although Mr. Odoi-Atsem testified that OAI owns 50% of Tytan Global, and that
he and Ms. Odoi-Atsem each owned 25%, Ms. Odoi-Atsem identified Tytan Global as an
asset held solely by Mr. Odoi-Atsem. The court’s ruling indicates that it credited Ms. Odoi-
Atsem’s testimony when it found that Ms. Odoi-Atsem could not access Tytan Global’s
account. The circuit court’s determination regarding Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s dissipation of marital
property was not clearly erroneous.
Mr. Odoi-Atsem also argues that the court erred in failing to find that Ms. Odoi-Atsem
“dissipated almost $1,000,000 of marital properties,” asserting that evidence of Ms. Odoi-
Atsem’s online banking transfers and other withdrawals of funds showed that Ms. Odoi-
Atsem dissipated $871,050 of marital property. He does not, however, cite any evidence that
would contradict the court’s finding that Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s use of marital funds, with the one
exception noted, was for her living expenses and to pursue an alternate career.
The partial record of the proceedings produced by appellant for the purposes of this
appeal is missing a day and a half of trial testimony by Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s financial expert,
as well as, according to counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem, a portion of Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s own
testimony. Without this testimony, we agree with Ms. Odoi-Atsem that we cannot address
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s claim of error regarding her dissipation of marital assets, as this excluded
testimony could contain evidence relevant to the court’s determination regarding Ms. Odoi-
He does not attempt to justify the approximately $50,000 the court found that he12
sent to Patricia Mensah.
-30-
Atsem’s use of funds. Accordingly, by failing to provide us with a complete transcript of
relevant testimony, Mr. Odoi-Atsem has waived his right to appeal this issue. Mora v. State,
355 Md. 639, 650 (1999) (“It is incumbent upon the appellant claiming error to produce a
sufficient factual record for the appellate court to determine whether error was committed.”).
IV.
Alimony
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s fourth contention is that the circuit court erred in awarding
Ms. Odoi-Atsem indefinite alimony. In his argument heading, he indicates that the ruling
was erroneous because “her own Doctor testified that she is able to work, her illness is in
remission, she has been continuously employed and needs no time for retraining.” In his
actual argument, however, he asserts error in the court’s finding that he was “currently
working on multi-million dollar deals in Ghana,” stating that “there is no future ‘multi-
million dollar deal,’” and OAI has ceased operation. 13
Ms. Odoi-Atsem argues that, contrary to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s contention, the circuit
court did not award alimony due to her medical condition, finding that she was able to return
to work despite her medical condition. Rather, she asserts, the court based the alimony
Mr. Odoi-Atsem requests this Court to take judicial notice “that soon after the trial,13
the BB&T bank closed [OAI’s] line of credit, foreclosed on all of its properties and obtained
a confessed judgment of over One Million dollars against [it].” Aside from citing two circuit
court case numbers, Mr. Odoi-Atsem provides no documentation or further information in
support of his request, which we will decline. In any event, we note that we review the
circuit court’s determination based on the facts presented to that court, noting that appellant
is free to request a change in alimony, in the circuit court, based on a claim of a change in
circumstances. Thomasian v. Thomasian, 79 Md. App. 188, 192 (1989).
-31-
award on “an unconscionable disparity in respective standards of living.” She contends that
the court properly exercised its discretion in determining the amount of alimony necessary
to address that disparity.14
Section 11-106(b) of the Family Law Article addresses considerations that must be
made by the court in determining a fair and equitable alimony award, as well as the amount
and duration of same:
(b) Required considerations. — In making the determination, the court
shall consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award,
including:
(1) the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-
supporting;
(2) the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient
education or training to enable that party to gain sufficient education or
training to enable that party to find suitable employment;
(3) the standard of living that the parties established during their
marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the
well-being of the family;
(6) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(7) the age of each party;
(8) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(9) the ability of the party from whom alimony is sought to meet that
party’s needs while meeting the needs of the party seeking alimony;
(10) any agreement between the parties;
(11) the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including:
(I) all income and assets, including property that does not produce
income;
(ii) any award made under §§ 8-205 and 8-208 of this article;
(iii) the nature and amount of the financial obligations of each party;
Ms. Odoi-Atsem does not respond to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s argument that the court14
erred in its assessment of the future income that would come from his business ventures in
Ghana.
-32-
and
(iv) the right of each party to receive retirement benefits.
“[T]he ‘statutory scheme [governing] alimony generally favors fixed-term or so-called
rehabilitative alimony,’ rather than indefinite alimony.” Simonds v. Simonds, 165 Md. App.
591, 605 (2005) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 (1992)). The preference for
rehabilitative alimony stems from “the conviction that ‘the purpose of alimony is not to
provide a lifetime pension, but where practicable to ease the transition for the parties from
the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.’”
Id. (quoting Tracey, 328 Md. at 391).
Notwithstanding the general rule favoring fixed term alimony, the statute recognizes
two “exceptional circumstances” in which a court may award indefinite alimony. Roginsky
v. Blake-Roginsky, 129 Md. App. 132, 142 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 164 (2000). Those
exceptional circumstances, pursuant to F.L. § 11-106(c), allow the court discretion to award
alimony for an indefinite period if the court finds that: “(1) due to age, illness, infirmity, or
disability, the party seeking alimony cannot reasonably be expected to make substantial
progress toward becoming self-supporting”; or (2) “even after the party seeking alimony will
have made as much progress toward becoming self-supporting as can reasonably expected,
the respective standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.”
In this case, we agree with Ms. Odoi-Atsem that the court’s decision was based on the
“unconscionable disparity” exception. The issue of unconscionable disparity must be
determined by projecting into the future, to a time of maximum productivity of the party
-33-
seeking the award, and not by looking solely to the past. Whittington v. Whittington, 172
Md. App. 317, 340 (2007).
Whether the respective standards of living of the parties post-divorce will be
unconscionably disparate is a question of fact, Whittington, 172 Md. App. at 337. “It is a
second-level fact, however, that necessarily rests upon the court’s first-level factual findings
on the factors, listed in F.L. section 11-106(b), that (so long as they are applicable) are
relevant to all alimony determinations, and . . . upon how much weight the court chooses to
give to its various first-level factual findings.” Id. at 337-38. Because the court has broad
discretion in making those factual findings and determining whether to make an award of
alimony, a decision whether to award it will not be disturbed unless the court abuses its
discretion. Roginsky, 129 Md. App. at 143. Accord Tracey, 328 Md. at 385 (appellate courts
will accord great deference to the findings and judgments of trial judges, sitting in their
equitable capacity, when conducting divorce proceedings).
Here, in awarding Ms. Odoi-Atsem indefinite alimony, the court considered the
factors set forth in F.L. § 11-106. The first factor the court looked at was Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s
ability “to be wholly or partly self-supporting,” noting Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s testimony “that she
believed her current earning capacity to be $35,000.00 to $50,000.00,” and that, “if she were
able to obtain employment with the federal government after completing the MBA program
[she was currently enrolled in], her projected income would be $65,000.00 and
-34-
$70,000.00.” Contrary to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s suggestion in his argument heading, the court15
found that Ms. Odoi-Atsem was capable of “making substantial progress towards becoming
self-supporting.”
The court’s alimony award clearly was based on a finding of economic disparity. In
this regarding, the court stated as follows:
The parties have been married for over twenty years and enjoyed a very
high standard of living. Both parties contributed to the financial and
nonmonetary successes of the family. As a result, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s
company has netted millions of dollars. Based upon this, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]
is currently working on multi-million dollar deals in Ghana that will result in
even more wealth in the future. Even after making as much progress towards
becoming self-supporting as can be reasonably expected, the respective
standards of living of the parties will be unconscionably disparate.[16]
Mr. Odoi-Atsem contends that the court’s alimony award was improper as it was
based in part on the court’s erroneous determination that he was “working on multi-million
In determining Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s monthly expenses, the court noted its reliance on15
the testimony of Jenna Adele, Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s financial expert, which, as noted, was
largely excluded from the trial transcripts submitted by Mr. Odoi-Atsem to this Court.
The court additionally stated: 16
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] did not provide evidence of his most recent income,
nor did he provide a W-2 or tax returns for 2011. His April 2011 paystub
showed gross income for two weeks as $8,935.20, or $232,215.20 annually.[]
A paystub dated in December 2010 reflected that Defendant’s gross pay
through December 25, 2010 was $226,895.98. Per the minutes of an OAI[]
Board of Directors Meeting in 2010, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] was given a raise,
increasing his 2011 salary to $275,000. However, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] deferred[]
collecting the increase in his salary. For 2009, OAI reported a revenue of
$11,566,612.00 and distributions of $91,566.00 to [Mr. Odoi-Atsem], the sole
stockholder.[]
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dollar deals in Ghana” that would project more wealth in the future. Although there was no
specific testimony supporting this statement, Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s testimony indicated that he
was involved with several projects in Ghana, and his income was substantial. Given this17
testimony, and his clear attempt to impede discovery of the value of his assets in Ghana, the
court’s determination regarding Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s business prospects in Ghana was not
clearly erroneous. Moreover, the court’s award was based on revenue generated by OAI,
distributions to Mr. Odoi-Atsem as the sole-shareholder, and Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s income as
reflected in past income tax returns.
In response to counsel for Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s questions regarding funds he17
transferred to Ghana to buy equipment, Mr. Odoi-Atsem testified as follows:
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: The intent was to buy the equipment and use it for
specific things that I was going to do with projects in Ghana.
[COUNSEL FOR MS. ODOI-ATSEM]: Projects plural?
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: Projects plural, yes.
[COUNSEL FOR MS. ODOI-ATSEM]: Okay.
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: A variety of things.
[COUNSEL FOR MS. ODOI-ATSEM]: So besides the salt mines, what other
projects?
[MR. ODOI-ATSEM]: If you take a look at what Tytan Global was going to
do and OAI was going to do. It’s a whole range. Covers from tourism to real
estate to construction, to infrastructure, road, highways, bridges, which I have
some knowledge about.
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With respect to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s contention that “the court’s observation of the
current position of [OAI] was equally wrong,” he fails to cite to any portion of the record in
support of that assessment. We decline to search the voluminous record to find such support
for him. See Ak’s Daks Comm., Inc. v. Maryland Sec. Div., 138 Md. App. 314, 337
(declining to address appellants’ argument where they provided no citation to the record to
support their position), cert. denied, 365 Md. 473 (2001). Accord Van Meter, 30 Md. App.
at 408 (Appellate court cannot be expected to delve through the record to unearth factual
support favorable to appellant and then seek out law to sustain his position.). 18
As indicated, the circuit court applied and analyzed each of the factors set forth in F.L.
§ 11-106 in determining that indefinite alimony was appropriate due to the unconscionable
disparity in the parties’ future income, taking into account the future earning potential of both
parties, as well as their respective assets. We perceive no error or abuse of discretion in the
court’s alimony award.
V.
Attorney’s Fees
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s final contention is that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s
fees to Ms. Odoi-Atsem. The court’s ruling in that regard was as follows:
At this time, [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] is unemployed, while [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]
earned $232, 215.20 for 2011, and will again earn over $200,000.00 in 2012.
To the extent that Mr. Odoi-Atsem relies on testimony that OAI was failing, the18
court explicitly determined that Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s testimony regarding his income from OAI
was “not credible.”
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[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] retained three attorneys over the duration of this
case. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] accrued fees and expenses in the amount of $4,425.00
for her first attorney for services rendered from September 2010 to January
2011. The billable hours for that period totaled seventeen (17) at a rate of[]
$250.00 per hour. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] accrued fees and expenses in the amount
of $148,043.12 for the services of her second attorney from December 2010
through March 2011. The billable hours for that period totaled 478.13. []
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s counsel billed for his services at a rate of $350.00 per
hour, and for associates and paralegals at rates of $95.00 to $300.00 per hour.
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] retained a third attorney in January 2012 to serve as co-
counsel. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] accumulated $27,850.00 in fees and expenses for
the third attorney. Counsel accrued 174.2 billable hours at a rate of $250.00[]
per hour. All rates were reasonable. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] accrued $26,157. 98
in expert fees to retain the budget analyst who prepared [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s
financial analysis and budget for trial. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] accrued $1,000.00[]
for the appearance and testimony of Rosemary Ayerle, a certified nurse
practitioner, whose presence was necessary because [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] refused
to stipulate to the fact that [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] had cancer, although he knew of
her illness. []
The litigation was contentious and grueling. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] was
substantially justified in prosecuting this proceeding. [Mr. Odoi-Atsem]
excluded [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] from the multi-million dollar company they had
built as a couple, transferred significant martial assets to Ghana, and secretly
moved his female friend into the master bedroom of the parties’ Ghan[a]ian
home.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] was not forthcoming with his financial information.
He was evasive on the stand when questioned about his businesses and assets.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] admitted on the stand that he failed to comply with the
numerous discovery requests, simply because he did not believe the documents
to be necessary. As a result, [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] was unable to fully identify
and value several assets, including OAI, a company that has been highly
profitable.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem]’s actions caused [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] to return to court
repeatedly to protect marital property, to compel disclosure, to collect court-
ordered expert fees, and to secure pendente lite relief.
[Mr. Odoi-Atsem] displayed an unconscionable indifference to
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s medical issues. After [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] was awarded
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pendente lite relief, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] announced his intention to drop
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] from his family health insurance plan. [Ms. Odoi-Atsem][]
was then compelled to file an Emergency Motion to Compel Maintenance of
Health Insurance. On July 29, 2011, Judge Chapdelaine ordered [Mr. Odoi-
Atsem] to retain [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] on his health insurance. When [Ms. Odoi-
Atsem] requested a continuance of the trial date due to complications
following her surgery, [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] filed an opposition, disputing that
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] had breast cancer or that surgery was medically necessary,
although he had been at the oncologist’s office when [Ms. Odoi-Atsem] was
advised of her cancer.
[Ms. Odoi-Atsem] received $25,000.00 for attorney’s fees in the
pendente lite order. [Mr. Odoi-Atsem] is ordered to contribute an additional
$150,000.00 towards [Ms. Odoi-Atsem]’s attorney’s fees.
He asserts that the court erred in not properly considering that Ms. Odoi-Atsem “was
awash with cash,” asserting that she “withdrew nearly One Million Dollars ($1,000,000)
from the parties’ marital property.” He further asserts that Ms. Odoi-Atsem “engaged in
numerous frivolous litigations that she later abandoned.”
Ms. Odoi-Atsem argues that “it is impossible for this [C]ourt to assess the
reasonable[ness] of the attorney’s fees because of [Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s] failure to include for
the [C]ourt’s review the exhibits cited by the trial court,” and his failure to order all of her
testimony and that of her financial expert. Moreover, she contends that Mr. Odoi-Atsem took
a “scorched earth policy” to the proceedings, including delaying the discovery process and
refusing to provide financial documentation. She provides no response to Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s
argument regarding the parties’ respective financial resources.
We agree with Ms. Odoi-Atsem that this issue is not properly before us. Our
determination of the reasonableness of the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees
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necessarily depends on the evidence presented regarding the parties’ respective financial
resources. See F.L. § 11-110(c) (Before awarding fees in an alimony action “the court shall
consider: (1) the financial resources and financial needs of both parties.”); F.L. § 7-107
(Before awarding fees in a divorce action “the court shall consider: (1) the financial resources
and financial needs of both parties.”); F.L. § 12-103(b) (“In making a determination
regarding an award of costs and counsel fees” in a custody action, “the court shall consider:
(1) the financial status of each party; (2) the needs of each party; and (3) whether there was
substantial justification for bringing, maintaining, or defending the proceeding.”). Mr. Odoi-
Atsem, however, has provided us with only partial transcripts of the trial proceedings. As
Ms. Odoi-Atsem notes in her motion to dismiss, portions of her testimony were excluded, at
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s request to the transcription service, from the transcripts produced for this19
appeal, as well as much of the testimony of her financial expert. Accordingly, we decline
to address this contention where evidence of Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s financial status has been
excluded by Mr. Odoi-Atsem.
MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
Specifically, the transcript Mr. Odoi-Atsem ordered for March 27, 2012, contains19
the following transcriber’s note: “As requested 3:03:39 to 4:49:08 p.m. only has been
transcribed.” The portion of the testimony from March 27, 2012, in the partial transcript is
Mr. Odoi-Atsem’s direct examination, however, the circuit court’s daily sheet for March 27,
2012, indicates that trial began at 9:00 a.m., and that Ms. Odoi-Atsem testified as well. As
indicated, Ms. Odoi-Atsem’s testimony is not included in the transcript that Mr. Odoi-Atsem
provided to this Court.
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COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLANT.
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