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UNRAVELED BY THE UNCONVENTIONAL:

THE BATTLE OF FORT FREELAND AND THE WAR ON THE ON THE PERIPHERY OF

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Ryan Pelletier

History 410: Senior Seminar

Dr. Weaver

December 15,

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At sunrise, on July 28th, 1779, James Watt left the safety of Fort Freeland, to tend to his

sheep. Suddenly, an Iroquoian warrior ambushed, killed, and scalped Watt.1 Upon hearing

Watt’s screams for help, Jacob Freeland Sr. opened the gate to the wooden barricade

encompassing the small frontier fort to a British and Native American war party numbering 300.

Immediately, Freeland was struck and killed by a musket ball, alerting the 21 militia men and 50

women and children of the looming battle.2 From a macro-historical study of the American

Revolution, the Battle of Fort Freeland was a short and seemingly minor engagement in the

backwoods of Pennsylvania. However, a micro-historical approach reveals that the battle holds

substantial relevance in the study of the Revolution. Significantly, the Battle of Fort Freeland

epitomizes a unique style of warfare characterized by unconventional strategies such as scalping,

pillaging, scorched earth, guerrilla fighting, and psychological techniques. This style of combat

differed from a more conventional style of warfare utilized by British regiments and

Washington’s Continental Army on the frontlines, indicating that the American Revolution was

partly a partisan war, a type of conflict that deviates from conditions of the main theater of battle.

Instigated by General Washington and the Sullivan Campaign’s objective of dissolving the

British war effort through attacks on the Six Nations, the unconventional warfare observed in the

Battle of Fort Freeland exemplified the conflict on the periphery of the American Revolution and

contributed to the rebels’ victory by distracting and unraveling the British’s ability to wage war.

While historians of the American Revolution dedicate little direct attention to the Battle

of Fort Freeland, scholars focus on larger topics and their significance to the War for

Independence. Within these larger topics, a connection to the Battle of Fort Freeland emerges.

1 James R. Williamson and Linda A. Fossler, The Susquehanna Frontier: Northeastern Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary Years (Wilkes-Barre: Wilkes University Press, 1997), 50. 2 Glenn F. Williams, Year of the Hangman: George Washington’s Campaign against the Iroquois (Yardley: Westholme Publishing, 2005), 235.

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Academic literature on the American Revolution references the Battle of Fort Freeland through

three main avenues. First, historians emphasize the role Native Americans played on the

Revolutionary frontier. These scholars consider why the Native Americans largely fought

alongside the British and how they waged war against the patriots.3 Second, historians highlight

the Pennsylvania frontier during the Revolutionary years. These works examine efforts at

community building and the struggle for political freedom.4 Finally, scholars concentrate on

larger events such as George Washington’s plan against the Six Nations through the Sullivan

Campaign. These studies critically analyze the individual roles of notable figures, focusing on

how their actions and decisions affected the events on the frontier.5 Although numerous

historians have focused on these three broad topics while briefly mentioning the Battle of Fort

Freeland, there is no connection as to how the battle helped unravel the British war effort.

Therefore, this study will further previous work by examining how the unconventional warfare

surrounding a seemingly isolated event, the Battle of Fort Freeland, prevented the British from

waging war and led to the rebels’ victory. In doing so, and in contrast to previous contributions,

a voice is given to the inhabitants of Fort Freeland and places the conflict in the spotlight of

notable Revolutionary events.

Although secondary source material on the Revolutionary frontier provides insignificant

interpretation of the Battle of Fort Freeland, primary sources allow for a concentrated study of

how the battle demonstrates unconventional warfare and connects to larger events. The history

of the Battle of Fort Freeland is detailed through numerous primary sources, including personal

3 Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972), 202. 4 Williamson and Fossler, The Susquehanna Frontier, x. 5 Joseph R. Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, July-September 1779 (Colombia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997), 182.

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declarations and letters written by both big and small players. Among the most significant

primary sources regarding the Battle of Fort Freeland and its importance are the personal

declarations from the individuals involved in the battle. These declarations account the events

surrounding the battle in vivid detail, speaking to the violence and irregularity of frontier

warfare.6 Moreover, letters written by noteworthy individuals involved in the Battle of Fort

Freeland provide essential information about the battle and its significance. For instance, letters

by Captain McDonell of the Butler’s Rangers describe the ambush and plundering of Fort

Freeland. McDonell’s letters illustrate the unconventional tactics deployed by the British to

bring conflict to the periphery. Similarly, a letter by General Sullivan recognizes the defeat at

Fort Freeland and exposes his refusal to support the Pennsylvania frontier, which suggests

unconventional warfare had a specific purpose on the frontier.7 Together, these sources provide

a comprehensive story of the events before, during, and after the Battle of Fort Freeland, helping

one to recognize the unconventional elements of warfare and identify the link between the battle

and the American Revolution.

Furthermore, it is necessary to focus on how and why warfare was conducted outside of

the major battles of the Revolution. Historian Robert Calhoon argues that the American

Revolution was partly a partisan war. Calhoon describes partisan warfare as “irregular war

which often involves terror inflicted by informal bands of insurgents.”8 The irregular combat on

the periphery of the Revolution can also be described as unconventional warfare as it was a

6 William Miles, “William Miles Declaration Dec. 27, 1832, in Early Events in the Susquehanna Valley: A Collection of the Writings and Addresses, ed. John H. Carter (Millville: Precision Printers, Inc., 1981), 266. 7 John Sullivan to Samuel Hunter, Head Quarters Wyoming, 30 July 1779, In The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, Continental Army, ed. by Otis G. Hammond (Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1939), 89. 8 Robert M. Calhoon, “Civil, Revolutionary, or Partisan: The Loyalists and the Nature of the War for Independence,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 1760-1971, ed. Richard D. Brown (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 251.

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strategy of attrition carried out by unconventional tactics on both sides. With Calhoon’s theory

in mind, this study uses the notion of partisan warfare to explain the unconventional strategies

employed in the Battle of Fort Freeland, exposing a significant link to the Revolution. It is also

important to note that unconventional warfare was introduced to the Pennsylvania backcountry

through the Seven Years’ War, lasting from 1756-1763. Matthew C. Ward contends that the

Seven Years’ War provided the means for conflict in the Pennsylvania backcountry by

transforming the peacefully shared community between settlers and Native Americans into a

territory marked by distrust and interracial violence. The transformed Pennsylvania backcountry

was characterized by unconventional combat as Native American war parties introduced guerilla

and psychological tactics to fight an encroaching settler population newly armed with guns and a

developing racial hatred. While the interracial violence provided the motive for violence,

dwindling governmental authority in the backcountry provided the opportunity for violence.9

Consequently, unconventional customs such as eye gouging, scalping, mutilation, and informal

bands of insurgents were preserved in frontier traditions of violence.

Given the context of the Seven Years’ War, the notion of the Revolution as a partisan war

becomes more comprehensible due to the conflict in the Pennsylvania backcountry as the

fighting on the frontlines drifted to the frontier. Specifically, partisan war occurs when the

military and political institutions of one or more of the contending sides have ceased to function

in part of the contested territory of the war.10 In contrast to conventional warfare,

unconventional combat is unorganized and not necessarily directed at the opponent’s military.

9 Matthew C. Ward, “The Peaceable Kingdom Destroyed: The Seven Years’ War and the Transformation of the Pennsylvania Backcountry,” Pennsylvania History 74, 3 (2007): 267-272, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27778782. 10 Robert M. Calhoon, “Civil, Revolutionary, or Partisan,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 251.

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On the other hand, conventional warfare is a controlled and united effort to weaken an opponent

through attacks on its military. Calhoon suggests that irregular combat does not replace

traditional fighting, but it occurs on the periphery of conventional battle, where neither side can

steadily supply regular troops and a small number of men can upset the balance of power

previously established between the contending parties.11 In short, the meaning of “periphery”

represents the area on the outskirts of the Revolution where involvement was minor. Fort

Freeland adheres to this notion of “periphery” as it was geographically isolated in the wilderness

of Central Pennsylvania. Likewise, the battle was largely fought between irregular combatants

that differed from those fighting on the frontlines of the Revolution. Further, the battle and

subsequent events illustrates how a relatively few number of people disrupted the status quo of

war and contributed to American victory.

Before examining how the Battle of Fort Freeland demonstrated unconventional warfare,

it is important to consider the Pennsylvania settlers’ relevance to this study. In relation to Carlo

Ginzburg’s microhistory on a sixteenth-century miller’s experiences with the Roman Inquisition,

this study voices the story of a small group of Pennsylvania settlers in an extraordinary time of

unrest. In his case study, Ginzburg argues that the limited historical example of a sixteenth

century miller is only known to us through the analysis of fragmented and distorted documents.

However, when pieced together these documents are useful for understanding how ordinary

citizens lived and were by influenced larger events.12 Similarly, the Battle of Fort Freeland and

the individuals involved are a limited case in the Revolution, but their story pieces together a

history of war on the periphery of the Revolution. Moreover, when these fragmented pieces

11 Calhoon, “Civil, Revolutionary, or Partisan,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 251. 12 Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller (New York, Penguin Books, 1982), xxi.

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align, a significant connection and contribution to the Revolution appears. As Ginzburg’s micro-

historical study provides an unparalleled take on the Roman Inquisition through the story of a

common person’s plight, this study aims to offer a unique interpretation of the American

Revolution through the accentuation of the unfamiliar and unconventional battle at Fort

Freeland.

The story begins in 1772 when the land at the mouth of Warrior Run was settled by a

handful of families, establishing Northumberland County.13 Born in Fort Freeland, Mary

Derickson describes the fort’s location, “The fort was situated on the Warrior run creek, about 4-

1/2 miles above where it empties into the Susquehanna river.”14 Furthermore, Derickson details

the settlement of Warrior Run, “In the year 1772, Jacob Freeland, Samuel Gould, Peter Vincent,

John Vincent and his son, Cornelius Vincent, and Timothy Williams, with their respective

families cut their way through and settled within some two miles of where the fort was

afterwards built. They were from Essex county, New Jersey.”15 Visually representing

Derickson’s description, figure 1.1 illustrates the families’ settlement on the Warrior Run Creek

and displays the rugged landscape that the families cut through.16 Expanding from figure 1.1,

figure 1.2 portrays the location of Fort Freeland in relation to the entire province of

Pennsylvania.17 This map speaks to Fort Freeland’s periphery location as it depicts the fort’s

isolation from frontline combat in New York and New Jersey. Moreover, this map demonstrates

the difficulty of sending governmental assistance to Fort Freeland as it was too isolated to send

13 Swartz, Fields of Honor, 19. 14 Mary V. Derickson, “Declaration of Mary Derikson,” In History of Fort Freeland, ed. by Frederic A. Godcharles (Williamsport: Lycoming Historical Society, 1922), 28. 15 Mary V. Derickson, “Declaration of Mary Derikson,” 28. 16“A Map of Pennsylvania Exhibiting Not Only the Improved Parts of that Province But also its Extensive Frontiers,” in The American Atlas by Thomas Jeffreys ( London: R. Sayer & J. Bennett, 1776), From Maps of PA.com, accessed November 2, 2015, http://www.mapsofpa.com/antiquemaps27b.htm. 17 “Map of the Province of Pennsylvania” in The Gentleman’s Magazine (London: St. John’s Gate, 1775), From Maps of Pa.com, accessed November 2, 2015, http://www.mapsofpa.com/18thcentury/1775pa.jpg.

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aid. Together, these maps reflect the facilitation of partisan warfare on the frontier as the remote

area was outside the confines of the contested territory of war.

Figure 1.1

View of the Warrior

Run Creek, where Fort

Freeland was situated.

The asterisk depicts the

fort’s placement

amongst the rugged

Pennsylvania

topography.

“A Map of Pennsylvania

Exhibiting Not Only the

Improved Parts of that

Province But also its

Extensive Frontiers”

Courtesy of The American

Atlas, derived from Maps

of Pa.com.

*

Figure 1.2

View of Fort Freeland in

relation to the entirety

of Pennsylvania. The

asterisk represents the

fort’s settlement on the

periphery. Vast

mountain ranges

separate Fort Freeland

from the frontlines in

New York and New

Jersey.

“Map of the Province of

Pennsylvania” Courtesy of

The Gentleman’s

Magazine, derived from

Maps of Pa.com

*

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Among the few families that cultivated this land were the Vreelandts, as the Freelands

were then known and whose home later became Fort Freeland. Prior to settling at Warrior Run,

the Vreelandts resided in New Jersey where their family had originally immigrated.18 Dutch in

origin, the name Vreelandt is most likely derived from a town in the Netherlands called

Vreeland, which itself is named from the Middle Dutch word verde, meaning “legal protection

against armed violence.”19 Ironically, the Vreelandts’ new home in Northumberland County was

largely unprotected against armed violence. Along with many other settlers on the Pennsylvania

frontier, the Vreelandts suffered from a lack of assistance and security from the government as

the British carried the war into the countryside. Moreover, the adaptation from Vreelandt to

Freeland suggests that the land the family cultivated in the early 1770s was “free land.” Not only

can the Battle of Fort Freeland be observed as the battle of “free land,” but the American

Revolution can also be viewed as a war for “free land.” However, much of this “free land” was

already settled by the Six Nations, whose collaboration with Great Britain fueled unconventional

warfare on the frontier and prompted Washington to develop a strategy that initiated the Battle of

Fort Freeland.

Although the Six Nations, or the League of Iroquois, originally tried to maintain

neutrality, it became impossible to preserve a nonaligned stance between Britain and its rebelling

colonies. Since Native Americans lived on the borders of white settlements and possessed

military prowess, preserving friendship, or at least neutrality, became a major objective of British

and American diplomatic and military strategy.20 One of the five founding nations of the

Iroquois, the Oneida, declared peace through neutrality in 1775. At an address to Connecticut

18 Swartz, Fields of Honor, 19. 19 Swyrich Corporation, “Vreeland Family Name History,” in House of Names, accessed November 5, 2015, https://www.houseofnames.com/xq/ASP/qx/aboutus.htm. 20 Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution, 1.

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and the New England colonies, the Oneida stated, “We cannot intermeddle in this dispute

between two brothers. The quarrel seems to be unnatural; you are two brothers of one blood.

We are unwilling to join either side in such a contest, for we bear an equal affection to both of

you, Old and New-England.”21 While many Native American groups sought impartiality, their

increasing dependence on their white neighbors made neutrality improbable. Historian Gregory

Evans Dowd contends, “British supplies were one reason to take arms against the Anglo

Americans.”22 Whereas the British had the means to supply the Native American with the

goods they needed to survive, the Americans remained too poor to support them. Dowd also

contends that settlers’ previously established and mounting hatred of Native Americans inspired

a series of killings in the backcountry.23 In short, the Six Nation’s eventual alliance with Great

Britain largely stems from the American government’s inability to support Native Americans and

increasing prejudice among settlers, tarnishing the possibility of collaboration with the United

States.

Now supplied and encouraged by the British, the Iroquois’s expertise in unconventional

war tactics posed a huge threat on the frontier. Native American violence on white settlements

increased in 1777, as it signaled the participation of the Six Nations into the conflict. The British

and their Iroquoian ally began attacking lightly defended agricultural settlements along the

Pennsylvania and New York frontiers.24 This tactic strayed from previous combat standards of

the Revolution. Utilizing guerilla tactics, the British formed small contingents of soldiers and

Iroquoian warriors to ambush and raid frontier forts. This strategy was designed to attract

21 “Oneida Indians Declare Neutrality,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 1760-1971, ed. Richard D. Brown (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 225. 22Gregory Evens Dowd, “There Was No Winning Strategy for the Indians, in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 1760-1971, ed. Richard D. Brown (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 241. 23 Dowd, “There Was No Winning Strategy for the Indians,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 241. 24 Williams, Year of the Hangman, ix.

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Washington’s forces away from the centers of the Revolution and to incite terror on the

American homestead. These raiding parties were responsible for the notorious Wyoming Valley

and Cherry Valley massacres that resulted in enormous patriot casualties. As panic spread along

the Pennsylvania frontier, many of the inhabitants along the Susquehanna River began to

abandon their homes in 1778 in what became known as the “Great Runaway.” Some families

returned to their homes following the widespread panic, including the Freelands.25 Due to the

increased attacks on white settlements, the Freelands built a stockade around the family home to

protect the nearby families. Mary Derickson wrote about the construction of the Fort Freeland,

“…in the summer of ‘78, they had to leave the country, and when they returned in the fall they

picketed around a large two-story log house, enclosing half an acre of ground; the timbers were

set close and were about twelve feet high; the gate was fastened by bars inside.”26 Derickson’s

account speaks to the early unconventional tactics against the settlers as she describes the need to

barricade Freeland’s home in an effort to defend their agrarian way of life from unprovoked

violence. Despite mounting fear and anxiety on the frontier, the inhabitants of Fort Freeland

continued to cultivate the “free land” under attack.

Due to Fort Freeland’s location on the periphery, little assistance was provided, forcing

the fort to be protected by the same families that barricaded Freeland’s home. William Miles, a

militiaman in Fort Freeland, detailed the enlistment of the men to the militia as the violence

amplified, “The Indians committed many murders. Colonel Samuel Hunter proposed to the men

in the fort, fit to bear arms, that as Lieutenant of the county, he would enroll them, and take them

into the public service as militia...”27 In short, the men that defended Fort Freeland were

25 Williams, Year of the Hangman, 138. 26 Mary V. Derickson, “Declaration of Mary Derikson,” In History of Fort Freeland, 28. 27 William Miles, “William Miles Declaration,” in Early Events in the Susquehanna Valley, 266.

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untrained civilians that took up arms to fight off the attacks. Further, William Maclay, one of the

first Senators from Pennsylvania, wrote about the conditions the inhabitants of Fort Freeland

were faced with. He specified, “I must say a Word or Two of the deplorable Situation of

Northumberland County; Stript of the whole of the Standing Army…they suffer more than ever,

from the Savage Depredations of an horrid Enemy; a large Body of about forty Savages had

penetrated as far as Freeland’s Mills…”28 Both Miles and Maclay’s accounts reveal the

unconventional tactics utilized on the frontier. Notably, untrained civilians were pushed into

joining the militia because the frontier did not receive help from Congress or the Continental

Army, leaving the frontier vulnerable for attack.

As the frontier became increasingly susceptible to violent guerilla attacks that the settlers

could not thwart, other small forts were built to protect families that did not live in larger

settlements. Illustrating Fort Freeland’s position on the Susquehanna frontier, figure 2 portrays

the fort’s proximity to other frontier forts, white settlements, and Native American villages.29

Denoted by triangles, this map shows prominent Native American villages, mainly located North

of Fort Freeland in New York. Therefore, this map suggests that the British and Iroquois

traveled south to attack frontier forts in Pennsylvania as a means to bring the war to the

countryside. Like Fort Freeland, the other frontier forts, marked by squares, were isolated, small

garrisons built to protect settlers from Native American attacks. However, as William Maclay

noted, the Native Americans infiltrated as far as Fort Freeland, speaking to Fort Freeland’s

isolation even in relation to the other frontier forts and larger settlements, which are represented

28 William Maclay, “Paxton, July 26th, 1779,” In History of Fort Freeland, ed. Federic A. Godcharles (Williamsport: Lycoming Historical Society, 1922), 16. 29 “The Susquehanna Frontier, 1763-1800,” in The Susquehanna Frontier: Northeastern Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary Years, by James R. Williamson and Linda A. Fossler (Wilkes-Barre: Wilkes University Press, 1997), 1.

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by circles on the map. By 1779, the term “forting it” was used to describe the living conditions

for small groups of families on the frontier.30 For the inhabitants of Fort Freeland “forting it”

included constant vigilance and stress while tending to the daily cycle of living.

Following the initial violence facilitated by routine Native Americans attacks, the

introduction of a combined British and Iroquoian force enabled an unconventional style of

warfare that increased the destruction of the isolated frontier surrounding Fort Freeland.

Spearheading the intensified unconventional tactics against the settlers were the Butler’s

Rangers. Known as Tories or Loyalists, these men were British sympathizers recruited from

Canada and throughout the rebelling colonies. Raised by loyalist Colonel John Butler and

commanded by Captain John McDonell, the Butler’s Rangers consisted of eight companies with

30 Swartz, Fields of Honor, 23.

Figure 2

View of Fort Freeland’s

location on the

Susquehanna frontier.

This map shows Fort

Freeland’s proximity to

other forts, white

settlements, and Native

American villages.

“The Susquehanna Frontier,

1763-1800” Courtesy of

James R. Williamson and

Linda A. Fossler, derived from

The Susquehanna Frontier:

Northeastern Pennsylvania

during the Revolutionary

Years

14

each company numbering approximately 50 men.31 Marching through the secluded forests, the

Butler’s Rangers and their Iroquoian ally began ambushing lightly defended frontier settlements.

In a letter to Colonel Butler, Captain McDonell reveals the British’s objective for the isolated

settlements on the Pennsylvania frontier. He wrote, “…I shall, after doing them all the injury I

can in this Quarter…with a few of the most active of the Rangers and about 100 of the

Indians…I shall collect all the cattle of Every Kind as I can, as I am sensible their Provision will

be an object of the utmost consequence.”32 Subscribing to the notion of unconventional warfare,

McDonell’s letter exposes the British’s principle aim was to plunder and terrorize the rebels’

countryside. Moreover, the Butler’s Rangers were not a trained army from Britain, but a band of

insurgents that separated themselves from the patriots’ cause. Demonstrating psychological

warfare, the British sought to create panic on the frontier, not only to scare Americans, but to

force Washington to devote resources to those areas. Lastly, the use of the Iroquois heightened

unconventional warfare tactics as guerilla fighting was utilized to spark fear and anguish in the

hearts of the settlers. Together, the fighting styles of the Butler’s Ranger’s and Iroquois

characterized an unconventional approach that the families at Fort Freeland were ill-equipped to

confront.

Unbeknownst to the families in Fort Freeland, Captain McDonell and his band of

insurgents came upon the fort on the evening of July 27, 1779, which he planned to attack early

the next morning. Captain McDonell’s description of his contingent’s march to Fort Freeland is

a testament to the fort’s isolated location on the periphery of the Revolution. McDonell stated,

“After a very tedious, fatiguing march over mountains and through woods almost impenetrable,

31 Swartz, Fields of Honor, 7. 32 John McDonell to John Butler, Camp 20 miles from Fort Wallace, 24 July 1779. In In Fields of Honor: The Battle of Fort Freeland, July 28, 1779, ed. by Roger G. Swartz (Turbotville: Warrior Run-Fort Freeland Heritage Society, 1996), 72.

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we came upon the settlements the 27th in the evening, continued our march all night, and

invested a small place called Fort Freeland, early in the morning, the then Frontier Post occupied

upon the River.”33 On July 28, 1779, Fort Freeland was attacked by Captain McDonell and his

regiment of Butler’s Rangers and Iroquoian combatants. Once Jacob Freeland fell dead after

opening the gate, the inhabitants rushed to defend the fort. A young Mary Derickson describes

the odds the defenders of Fort Freeland faced, “The fort was surrounded by about three hundred

British and Indians, commanded by Capt. McDonald. There were but 21 men in the fort and but

little ammunition. Mary Kirk and Phoebe Vincent, commenced immediately and run all their

spoons and plates into bullets.”34 Derickson reveals that the fort was severely outnumbered and

ammunition was so low that the women resorted to melting down pewter dishware into bullets.

Furthermore, this account emphasizes a unique example of unconventional warfare as women

participated in the battle, not just the enlisted militiamen. Within a few hours of the first shot,

the outmanned and overpowered defenders of Fort Freeland had no choice but to accept defeat.

As the smell of smoke and death filled the air, the remaining inhabitants of Fort Freeland

accepted the articles of capitulation offered by Captain McDonell, forcing the men in the fort to

turn over their weapons to the victors. Further, all men bearing arms were to surrender

themselves as prisoner and be sent to Fort Niagara in Canada. Finally, the women and children

of the fort were to be set free and not mistreated by the Iroquois.35 Mary Jemison, the wife of

Hiokatoo, a Seneca war chief, emphasized the unconventional brutality of the battle, “After a

short but bloody engagement, the fort was surrendered. As soon as the fort had capitulated and

33 John McDonell to John Butler, Tioga Point, 5 August 1779, In Fields of Honor: The Battle of Fort Freeland, July 28, 1779, ed. by Roger G. Swartz (Turbotville: Warrior Run-Fort Freeland Heritage Society, 1996), 72. 34 Mary V. Derickson, “Declaration of Mary Derikson,” In History of Fort Freeland, 28. 35John McDonell, “Articles of Capitulation, Fort Freeland, 1779,” In Fields of Honor: The Battle of Fort Freeland, July 28, 1779, edited by Roger G. Swartz (Turbotville: Warrior Run-Fort Freeland Heritage Society, 1996),

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the firing ceased, Hiokatoo, with the help of a few Indians, tomahawked every wounded

American, while earnestly begging with uplifted hands for quarter.”36 Jemison’s account of the

Iroquois’ involvement in the battle exemplifies the unconventional tactic of scalping men alive

as they begged for mercy. Even more, the plundering that followed the capitulation of the fort

typifies an aspect of unconventional warfare. The Butler’s Rangers seized the settlers’ cattle and

goods while the Iroquois procured clothing and supplies. What the two parties could not take

with them, they burned, the fort included. By noon, the Iroquoian woman began the preparations

for a feast.37 While the Iroquois prepared their victory feast, Captain Hawkins Boone marched

with a reinforcement party from a nearby fort, Fort Swartz, to ambush the British and Iroquoian

enemy. It is not clear whether Boone heard the firing from his fort or a messenger alerted him.

Nevertheless, Boone marched with his men toward Fort Freeland without knowing the fort

capitulated or the strength of the enemy.

Although Captain Boone and his men had the element of surprise, the small

reinforcement party of 36 militiamen inflicted little damage to the victors at Fort Freeland. As

Boone and his men approached the fort and shot their first volley, native laughter soon turned to

screams and a brief retreatment. Despite the shock, the Butler’s Rangers began to fire in teams

from the front while the Iroquois circled back to hit Boone’s exposed side. Boone’s

reinforcement party was swiftly overcome, forcing the remaining men to retreat.38 Robert

Patterson, the brother of a militiaman who fought in the skirmish, summarized the conflict,

“When the company arrived near the Fort, found it was taken by the Indians and tories. Had a

short engagement and endeavored to retreat. Finding that our retreat was cut off, a severe

36 James E. Weaver, Life of Mary Jemison: The White Woman of Genesee (New York: WM P.LETCHWORTH, 1877; Proquest ebrary, 2000), 188. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/susqulibrary/reader.action?docID=10015053 37 Swartz, Fields of Honor, 33. 38 Swartz, Fields of Honor, 38.

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engagement took place and half of our party were killed.”39 In a letter to Colonel Butler, Captain

McDonell wrote on his regiment’s ability to impede the surprise attack. He wrote, “We had no

intention of their approach atill [until] they were close upon us…The Indians upon the first

Appearance of the rebels retired a little, but soon recovered their surprise and came upon their

Left Flank with a great Fury while the Detachment of the 8th Reg’t and Rangers attacked them in

the front, and put them immediately to the Route…”40 The inexperienced defenders of Fort

Freeland and the reinforcement party stood little chance against the coordinated engagement by

the British.

As the combatants involved disregarded formal formations and strategies that

characterized warfare at that time, the Battle of Fort Freeland typified unconventional warfare on

both sides, resulting in an engagement that was unique to the area and the objectives of war.

Captain McDonell wrote to Colonel Butler, “I did everything in my Power to prevail upon the

Indians to pursue their success, but they were so glutted with Plunder, Prisoners, & Scalps, that

my utmost efforts could not persuade them from retreating to Fort Wallace that night. Next day I

returned with about 100 Indians & Rangers, we burned and destroyed five Forts & about 30

miles of a close settled country.”41 McDonell’s letter specifies the unconventional tactics

designed to raid and terrorize the frontier. On the other side, the defenders of Fort Freeland

practiced unconventional warfare as they had fought out of instinct and necessity, not organized

effort. The initial defenders ran to defend the fort without a formation or strategy, the women

melted down pewter for bullets, and Boone’s reinforcement party employed ambush tactics.

Even more, the rebel combatants that fought for Fort Freeland were everyday people; famers,

39Robert Patterson, “Declaration of Robert Patterson Dec. 19, 1833, in Early Events in the Susquehanna Valley: A Collection of the Writings and Addresses, ed. John H. Carter (Millville: Precision Printers, Inc., 1981), 270. 40John MacDonell to John Butler, Tioga Point, 5 August 1779, In Fields of Honor, 74. 41 John MacDonell to John Butler, Tioga Point, 5 August 1779, In Fields of Honor, 74.

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barbers, and teachers. They resorted to building forts around their homes and enlisting in the

militia so they could carry on with their everyday lives, despite the encroachment of the war.

Commissioned as a surgeon in Pennsylvania, Dr. Francis Alison Jr. summarized the losses at

Fort Freeland, “Of the Garrison, four were killed, & thirteen Scalps were brought into the fort in

a Pocket Hankerchief amongst them were Capt. Boone & Dougherty’s supposed to belong to a

party from Boone’s Fort whc [which] attacked the British.”42 While both sides ascribed to

unconventional fighting, the overwhelmed settlers inflicted minor casualties to the Butler’s

Rangers and Iroquois, reaffirming the need for help on the frontier.

Following the violence at the Battle of Fort Freeland, the beleaguered settlers cried out to

authorities for help. Dr. Francis Alison Jr. stated, “Hurry if possible all the assistance possible

with utmost haste, or else the Consequences on our side will be dreadful.”43 Significantly, Dr.

Alison was in contact with the women of Fort Freeland who were set free and therefore, acts as a

representative voice of the defenders of the fort. Further, one of the first senators of

Pennsylvania, William Maclay affirmed Dr. Alison’s call for assistance, “The Situation of

Northumberland County, beyond description distressing…I need not ask you what is to be done.

Help Help; or the towns of Sunbury and Northumberland must fall; our whole frontier is laid

open…”44 Both of these accounts indicate the deplorable situation on the frontier and speak to

the lack of assistance provided to the besieged settlers. Moreover, both of these men are

individuals of significance. One a doctor, the other a senator, suggest these cries for help express

the seriousness of the conflict on the Pennsylvania frontier. However, to figureheads such as

42 Dr. Francis Allison Jr. to Colonel Joshua Elder, In History of Fort Freeland, ed. Federic A. Godcharles (Williamsport: Lycoming Historical Society, 1922), 20. 43 Dr. Francis Allison Jr. to Colonel Joshua Elder, In History of Fort Freeland, 20. 44 William Maclay to Council, July 30th 1779, In History of Fort Freeland, ed. Federic A. Godcharles (Williamsport: Lycoming Historical Society, 1922), 21.

19

Washington and Sullivan, their distress was a diversion and, consequently, neglected. The

defenders of Fort Freeland were unaware that the losses they suffered were part of a larger plan

to win the war. The turmoil suffered by the settlers on the frontier directly correlated to General

Washington’s strategy to end the British’s ability to wage war against the United States.

The story of Fort Freeland goes unexamined and untold in a macro-historical study of the

Revolution, but a micro-historical study exposes the battle’s connection to major decisions and

events. Thus far, this study has examined the Battle of Fort Freeland as it was experienced by

the settlers, but the battle’s association to the larger events of the American Revolution still

needs to be addressed. The settlers’ experience on the periphery symbolizes the side of partisan

warfare where unconventional fighting occurs as a result of military and political dysfunction in

part of the contested territory of the war. Specifically, informal bands of British and Native

American insurgents attacked areas where neither side could steadily supply regular troops,

turning the Revolution partly into a partisan war. From the other side of partisan warfare,

Washington planned to confront peripheral issues through an attack against the Six Nations,

which initiated the events surrounding the Battle of Fort Freeland. Therefore, this study will

transition by examining the relationship between decisions made from the frontlines and the

distress on the frontier, exemplified by the Battle of Fort Freeland. In other words, as a

microhistory, this study represents a “bottoms up” approach that will shift from the voices of the

settlers to those of significant standing, such as Washington and Sullivan, to explain the

significance of unconventional warfare on the periphery. First, it is important to understand

Washington’s view of the militia and unconventional warfare on the frontier.

As the war began, in Washington’s mind, the establishment of an army provided the

American war effort with dignity, unity, and stability. Unconventional combat, promoted by

20

militias, provided the opposite as it delivered no legitimacy or outside support. Moreover, for a

newly constructed and fragile nation, it posed a threat to the fabric of society.45 In an address to

Congress in September of 1776, Washington warned that the patriot cause would be lost unless

there was an adequate change in the military. He cautioned, “We are now, as it were, upon the

eve of dissolution of our army…a knowledge of the present temper and situation of the troops,

reflect but a very gloomy prospect in the appearance of things now…unless some speedy and

effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will be lost.”46 Washington’s idea of

“speedy and effectual measures” was to establish a unified war effort and, therefore, called on

Congress to establish a formal army. He declared, “It becomes evident to me then, that, as this

contest is not likely to be the work of a day, as the war must be carried on systematically, and to

do it you must have good officers, there are in my judgement no other possible means to obtain

them but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing…”47 Subsequently, Congress

authorized development of the Continental Army and emulated it on the European model.48

This model vastly differed from the loose organization of civil and unprofessional volunteers on

the frontier, which characterized the militia. Significantly, Washington’s preference for a

Continental Army points to a belief that the militia was an inadequate countermeasure against

British aggression.

Although the militia experienced some success during the initial fighting of the

Revolution, Washington was convinced that the militia’s efforts were not enough to win the war.

Regarding the preliminary use of the militia, Washington stated, “For, if I was called upon to

45 John D. Waghelstein, “Regulars, Irregulars, and Militia: The American Revolution,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 6, (1995): 134. 46 George Washington to the President of Congress, Col. Morris, 24 Spetember 1776, in The Washington Papers: Basic Selections from the Public and Private Life of George Washington, ed. Saul K. Padover (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1955), 140-141. 47 George Washington to Col. Morris, in The Washington Papers, 141. 48 Waghelstein, “Regulars, Irregulars, and Militia,” 134.

21

declare upon an oath, whether the militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole, I

should subscribe to the latter.”49 In Washington’s judgment, the use of militia during the early

stages of the Revolution proved to be more of a problem than a solution to winning the war.

Moreover, Washington spoke to the reliability and inexperience of militiamen to further defend

his belief in a formal army. He stressed, “To place any dependence upon the militia is assuredly

resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life,

unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, makes

them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.”50 Notably, Washington’s view of the

militia speaks to the individuals involved in the battle of Fort Freeland. The families at Fort

Freeland were “dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life” in order to protect themselves

from British and Native American attacks. Regardless of experience or interest, the men fit to

bear arms in the fort were enlisted in the militia. The soldiers living in Fort Freeland lacked the

military skill and instinct that Washington wanted in an army. Therefore, Washington created a

Continental Army to fight the British at the frontlines, but accepted the use of militias on the

periphery. The patriot’s ability to utilize both regular troops and militiamen proved to be

devastating to the British war effort.

Despite Washington’s reluctance to utilize the militia, it played a significant role in the

unconventional warfare on the frontier by complementing Washington’s Continental Army.

While Washington was critical of the militia, he acknowledged that his own Continental forces

were unable to contest British regulars and defend the frontier against internal enemies as well.

Therefore, in Washington’s mind, the militia had to act as the sole defense of the frontier because

49 George Washington to Col. Morris, in The Washington Papers, 144. 50 George Washington to Col. Morris, in The Washington Papers, 143.

22

he could not afford to reduce the Continental Army to small unit operations.51 Alone, the

Continental Army was not large or expansive enough to win the war. The Revolution spanned

four general areas: New England and New York; the Middle Atlantic, the Trans-Appalachian

West; and the South.52 The spatial boundary the Revolution was conducted in was far too

immense to garner and support organized military efforts. Therefore, in an effort to keep his

Continental Army concentrated, Washington neglected to send relief to the frontier.

Without Continental support on the frontier, inexperienced militiamen were recruited to

safeguard the regions outside of the frontlines, representing an element of unconventional

warfare. Although inexperienced, Washington relied on the militia to protect the frontier and

support the Sullivan Campaign. He wrote John Sullivan, “I have again written the to the Council

of Pennsylvania urging the necessity of sending you a reinforcement of five or six hundred Men

of some sort to be employed in this way and enable you to keep your Continental force in a

body.”53 Washington’s call on Pennsylvania to provided militia backing suggests that the militia

was used to support the Continental Army in areas where it was inadequate or unable to defend.

In relation to Fort Freeland, the militia that protected the frontier, whether in success or defeat,

enabled Washington’s Continental Army to survive as it diverted British troops, resources, and

strength. Together, the combination of conventional and unconventional warfare posed a

problem to the British with which they could not manage.

Following a year of British and Iroquoian forces terrorizing the frontier and rising alarm

among Americans, General Washington became concerned with the progression of the war and

51 Don Higginbotham, “The Strengths and Weakness of the Militia,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American Revolution, 216. 52 Waghelstein, “Regulars, Irregulars, and Militia,” 135. 53 Gen. Washington to Gen. Sullivan, 5 July 1779, in The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, Continental Army, ed. Otis G. Hammond (Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1939), 73.

23

the patriots’ ability to win. In a letter written to the Speaker of the House in 1778, Washington

suggests that some states were ignorant of the conflict at the heart of the Revolution. He wrote,

“It is much to be feared…that the States, in their separate capacities, have very inadequate ideas

of the present danger.”54 Here, Washington seemed to think there was a divide between frontline

areas and periphery regions, a notion that is reflected in the events surrounding the Battle of Fort

Freeland. The settlers of the Pennsylvania frontier called for Continental support throughout

1778 as Native American attacks increased, but no help came. Therefore, this evidence suggests

that Washington felt that the settlers were too dependent on the forces he needed to fight the

British on the frontlines. However, Washington acknowledged the problem that the frontier

conflict posed to his war effort and, consequently, outlined a strategic plan that the United States

could pursue in the coming year.

In order to suppress the increasing Native American attacks, Washington concluded in

early 1779 that the only realistic option was to stay on the defensive except for smaller

operations against the Six Nations.55 Despite the potential risk of exhausting strength and

resources, Washington laid out three objectives for an expedition against the Six Nations. First,

he sought to conduct a campaign at a time and place where it would cause the least expense to

the army. Second, he wanted to attack the Indians at the proper season that would inflict the

most damage at the least risk to American forces. And third, he intended the expedition to rout

the enemy from New York.56 Significantly, Washington’s plan was an attack on the enemy’s

ability to wage war as it sought to destroy Iroquoian homes and food sources. If successful, the

54 George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, 18 December 1778, in The Washington Papers, 172. 55 Williams, Year of the Hangman, 189. 56 Williams, Year of the Hangman, 192.

24

Six Nations would become a burden for the British and exhaust their war effort. With a basic

concept of the operation, General Washington needed a commander for the campaign.

On March 17, 1779, Major General John Sullivan received a letter from Washington

offering a position to lead part of the Continental Army against the Iroquois Confederacy.

Although Major General Horatio Gates was Washington’s first choice to head the expedition,

Gates declined the proposal and followed Washington’s instructions to pass the offer to

Sullivan.57 In the letter extending the role to Sullivan, Washington wrote, “It is proposed to

carry war into the heart of the country of the Six Nations, to cut off their settlements, destroy

their next year’s crops, and do them every other mischief, which time and circumstances will

permit.”58 In order to confront the issue on the frontier, Washington’s plan proposed employing

the same unconventional tactics the British and Iroquois were using. This plan furthers the

notion that unconventional warfare characterized the periphery of the Revolution. Despite some

reservations, Sullivan accepted the position. Sullivan’s military career to that point had not been

particularly successful. Nonetheless, the campaign required exhaustive planning and

Washington found Sullivan to be skilled in that area.59 Sullivan held no illusions that the

campaign would produce an easy victory. Sullivan described his enemy as “perfectly acquainted

with the countryside, capable of seizing every advantage which ground can possibly afford,

inured to war from their youth, and from a manner of living, capable of enduring every kind of

fatigue.”60 Here, Sullivan acknowledged that the Native Americans were highly experienced

with warfare, suggesting hesitation to carry the war into their homeland. Likewise, Sullivan

57 Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure, 1. 58 George Washington to Gen. Horatio Gate, 6 March 1779, in Writings of George Washington, ed. Worthington C. Ford (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1893), 198-200. 59 Fischer, A Well-Executed Failure, 2. 60 Maj. Gen. John Sullivan to Gen. George Washington, 16 April 1779, In The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, 6.

25

knew that failure would increase the enemy’s confidence and increase the severity of the attacks

on the frontier. Therefore, the campaign was to either drive the enemy out of the frontier and

northward or allow the British to secure a key element to winning the war.

As food became scarce and suspicions of an American response on the frontier began to

worry the British, the launch of Sullivan’s Campaign proved to be a catalyst of the Battle of Fort

Freeland. General Washington decided to supply Sullivan with approximately 4,000 Continental

soldiers, an unpopular decision on the Pennsylvania frontier as it drew Continentals from the

area and left their settlements even more exposed.61 While Continental troops were directed

elsewhere, frontier strongholds faced increasing danger as their settlements became a target for

an enemy food source. Moreover, the British strongly suspected that the Americans were

planning an operation, and increased attacks on border settlements would force Washington to

direct his attention to the frontier. Both Washington and Sullivan acknowledged the British’s

intention and refused to be fooled.62 Thus, Captain McDonell’s successful attack on Fort

Freeland was an orchestrated plan to divert Sullivan’s forces and hinder the campaign. In a letter

preceding the attack on Fort Freeland, Captain McDonell wrote, “That the enemy mean to attack

Indian Country from Wioming remains no longer in doubt… I have reason to apprehend from

the information I have just received that they are about this time in motion…I shall…harass them

as much as possible.63 In short, Captain McDonell suspected an expedition against the Indians

and took measures to contest the campaign by attacking Fort Freeland.

61 Joseph R. Fischer, “The Forgotten Campaign of the American Revolution: The Sullivan-Clinton Expedition Against the Iroquois in 1779,” Valley Forge Journal 4 (1989): 289. 62 Fischer, “The Forgotten Campaign of the American Revolution Sullivan,” 289. 63 John McDonell to John Butler, Camp 20 miles from Fort Wallace, 24 July 1779, In Fields of Honor, 72

26

The British attack on Fort Freeland transpired in part to distract Sullivan and weaken his

regiment, but the British did not anticipate Sullivan’s rejection of the Pennsylvania settlers’ plea

for help. Sullivan wrote Samuel Hunter, the County Lieutenant of Northumberland County,

“…with the Disagreeable inteligence of the loss of Fort Freeland, your situation in consequence

must be unhappy, I feel for you, and could wish to assist you, but the good of the service will not

admit of it, The Object of this Expedition is of such a nature, and its consequences so Extensive

that to turn the course of this Army would be unwise, unsafe and unpolitic.”64 While Sullivan

acknowledged the distress at Fort Freeland, he withheld assistance because it would have

interfered with the launch of his campaign against the Six Nations. Consequently, Sullivan’s

refusal to help the besieged settlers allowed his army to stay on course and proceed with his

preparations to march north.

Moreover, Sullivan adhered to the tactics of unconventional warfare as his campaign

sought to drive the Iroquois out of Pennsylvania by plundering and burning Native American

crops and villages. Sullivan responded to Hunter, “Nothing can so Effectually draw the Indians

out of your Country, as Carrying the War into theirs.”65 Portraying General Sullivan’s northward

advancement from Easton, Pennsylvania, Figure 3 depicts many of the Native American villages

destroyed and helps one visualize the effort to push the Six Nations out of the Pennsylvania

frontier.66 Furthermore, this image illustrates Fort Freeland’s proximity in relation to Sullivan’s

march and conceptualizes how the attack would have diverted Sullivan’s forces, had he sent

relief. Lastly, this map helps explain Sullivan’s mostly uncontested march northward. While

64John Sullivan to Samuel Hunter, Head Quarters Wyoming, 30 July 1779, In The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, 89. 65 John Sullivan to Samuel Hunter, Head Quarters Wyoming, 30 July 1779, In The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, 89. 66 “Sullivan Expedition, July-October 1779,” in A Well-Executed Failure, 3.

27

many Iroquois were away from their homes attacking forts along the West Branch of the

Susquehanna River, Sullivan’s army began destroying their food and villages.

Despite British and Iroquoian efforts to divert and impede the Sullivan Campaign, a lack

of supplies and a unified chain of command forced the Iroquois out of their villages without

resistance. The Iroquois placed a majority of the blame on the British for not providing adequate

defenses or supplies to combat Sullivan’s forces.67 When Sullivan’s army captured the capital of

the Senecas, Genesee Castle, in late September, a path of destruction lay in their wake. Sullivan

employed similar unconventional war strategies that the Iroquois utilized on the frontier such as

ambush, plundering, and scorched earth tactics. Through the use of unconventional methods, the

Sullivan Campaign was successful in drastically reducing the Iroquois’ ability to wage war on

67 Fischer, “The Forgotten Campaign of the American Revolution Sullivan,” 299.

Figure 3:

Denoted by the

connected dots, this map

portrays Sullivan’s march

northward. Also, this

image illustrates the path

of destruction against

Native American villages

while the Iroquois were

away attacking frontier

forts. Further, this map

depicts Fort Freeland’s

location in relation to

Sullivan’s forces.

Courtesy of the

Northumberland County

Historical Society, derived

from A Well-Executed

Failure: The Sullivan

Campaign against the

Iroquois, July-September

1779 by Joseph R. Fischer.

28

the frontier. In his final report to Congress, Sullivan wrote, “The number of Towns destroyed by

this Army amounts to 40, besides scattering houses. The quantity of Corn destroyed at a

moderate computation must amount to 160,000 bushels, with a vast quantity of vegetables of

every kind. Every creek & River has been traced, & the whole Country explored…”68 In

response to Sullivan’s success, Colonel Daniel Broadhead, who led smaller expeditions against

the Iroquois on the Pennsylvania frontier during the campaign, expressed belief that their efforts

brought peace to the frontier. He wrote Sullivan, “I congratulate you on your success against the

Indians and the more savage tories, & am quite happy in the reflection that our efforts promise a

lasting tranquility to the Frontiers we have covered.”69 Ultimately, the Sullivan Campaign

weakened the Iroquois’ military power and relieved tension on the frontier. Following the

campaign, the Six Nations were unable to wage an effective war on the frontier and became

more reliant on the British, further straining their ally’s resources.

While the Sullivan Campaign achieved its objective of driving the Iroquois off the

frontier, the expedition also forced the British to bear their ally’s burden, significantly wilting

their ability to wage war. Upon Sullivan’s return, Congress wrote a letter that thanked Sullivan

for, “effectually executing an important expedition against such of the Indian nations as,

encouraged by the councils and conducted by the officers of his Britannic, majesty, had

perfidiously waged an unprovoked and cruel war against these United States, laid waste many of

their defenseless towns, and with savage barbarity slaughtered the inhabitants thereof.”70

Significantly, this letter speaks to the British and Iroquois’ use of unconventional warfare,

68 Gen. John Sullivan to John Jay, 30 September 1779, in The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, 134. 69 Col. Daniel Broadhead to Gen. Sullivan, 10 October 1779, in The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, 148. 70 Congress Thanks Gen. Washington and Gen. Sullivan, 14 October 1779, in The Letters and Papers of General John Sullivan, 148.

29

viewed to be “unprovoked and cruel” by the U.S. Furthermore, Fort Freeland represents one of

the defenseless towns laid to waste and whose inhabitants were slaughtered. The British’s

decision to attack the frontier backfired as the settlers and Sullivan retaliated with similar

unconventional tactics. In short, the British’s use of unconventional combat on the frontier was

met with a combination of unconventional strategies from both settlers and the Continental

Army, a dynamic that unraveled the British war effort.

Although the Battle of Fort Freeland ended in a loss for the patriots, the battle acts as a

lens with which to view the ramifications of unconventional warfare on the frontier. First, the

Battle of Fort Freeland demonstrates the British’s reliance on the Six Nations as the British could

not have sparked an unconventional conflict on the frontier without them. Second, the British’s

failure to obstruct Sullivan’s objectives and sustain the war can be traced to Fort Freeland as it

exposed their inability to cover and provide supplies to the extensive battles they instigated.

Additionally, the Battle of Fort Freeland can be viewed as a shield for Fort Augusta, a large fort

down river that housed one of Sullivan’s major powder magazines. The destruction of this

powder cache would have dealt the rebels a crippling blow and possibly diverted Sullivan’s

forces. However, following the fall of Fort Freeland, the Native Americans refused to peruse

another attack further south and insisted on returning to their villages.71 Therefore, the Battle of

Fort Freeland represents a hollow victory for the British and Iroquois as they failed to distract

and challenge Sullivan’s forces. Moreover, the Battle of Fort Freeland marked a change in the

Native American’s will to fight. After the fall of Fort Freeland, the Iroquois’ will to fight

deflated as their villages were destroyed by Sullivan’s army. Consequently, the Six Nations’

diminished determination and increased reliance on their ally’s resources became too much of a

71 Fischer, “The Forgotten Campaign of the American Revolution,” 305.

30

burden for the British to bear. According to Mary Jemison, “The Indians were reduced almost to

a state of starvation, while many of our people barely escaped with their lives, and some actually

died of hunger and freezing.”72 Although the Iroquois remained loyal to the Crown, the British

could no longer support the Six Nations in their war effort and no longer posed a threat to the

frontier.

Ultimately, the unconventional war on the periphery proved to be advantageous for the

patriots’ war effort despite the initial success of the British and Iroquois. As a model of

unconventional combat, the Battle of Fort Freeland exemplified the conflict on the periphery of

the American Revolution and contributed to the rebels’ victory by distracting and unraveling the

British’s ability to wage war. On a micro-historical scale, the battle and the individuals involved

represent how the Revolution affected the lives of settlers on the frontier. A colonel stationed in

Northumberland County wrote to Joseph Reed, president of Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive

Council, “For my Part, I think the Distresses of Northumberland County People Equal, if not

Superior to anything that has happened to any Part of the Continent Since the Commencement of

the Present War.”73 Moreover, the Battle of Fort Freeland is linked to the grander interactions of

the war. Significantly, the Battle of Fort Freeland marked a crucial turning point in the war for

the rebels. Thomas Gage, the war’s first British Commander-in-Chief commented on fighting

the Americans, “There is a military spirit…Joined with a common zeal and enthusiasm, the

conquest of the country is not easy.”74 The military spirit highlighted by the events surrounding

the Battle of Fort Freeland piloted the phase in the Revolution where the British could no longer

wage war on the frontier, and eventually throughout the United States. Following the Battle of

72 James E. Weaver, Life of Mary Jemison, 105. 73 Colonel Smith to President Reed, 31 July 1779, in History of Fort Freeland, 22. 74 Waghelstein, “Regulars, Irregulars, and Militia,” 136.

31

Fort Freeland and the Sullivan Campaign, it was confirmed that war on the periphery was

successful at foiling the British war effort. As a result, unconventional warfare was implemented

on the Southern periphery during the remaining four years of the Revolution. The success of the

decisive, unconventional battles that occurred in the South can be linked to the events

surrounding the Battle of Fort Freeland. As the Battle of Fort Freeland demonstrates, the British

could not fight an unconventional war on the periphery and a conventional war in the nucleus of

the Revolution.

32

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