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ERIK DAVTYAN

UNPACKING THE GEORGIA-UKRAINE-MOLDOVA COOPERATION:

AN OPEN-ENDED OR NARROWLY FOCUSED PARTNERSHIP?

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EXPERT OPINION

ERIK DAVTYAN

UNPACKING THE GEORGIA-UKRAINE-MOLDOVA COOPERATION: AN OPEN-ENDED OR NARROWLY FOCUSED PARTNERSHIP?

2019

ÓÀØÀÒÈÅÄËÏÓ ÓÔÒÀÔÄÂÉÉÓÀ ÃÀ ÓÀÄÒÈÀÛÏÒÉÓÏ ÖÒÈÉÄÒÈÏÁÀÈÀ ÊÅËÄÅÉÓ ×ÏÍÃÉGEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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The publication is made possible with the support of the US Embassy in Georgia. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy.

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All rights reserved and belong to Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, including electronic and mechanical, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views

of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies.

Copyright © 2019 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

ISSN 1512-4835 ISBN 978-9941-8-1855-4

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Introduction

In 2015, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova made their first step towards the institutionalization of a trilateral partnership which further developed in the subsequent years. This paper will address two research questions: why did the trilateral cooperation emerge in 2015 and not (much) earlier and what is/are the primary driver(s) behind it given the fact that these states have already established a regional organization called GUAM? The paper is organized as follows: the first section briefly reviews the foreign policy contours of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova and then discusses the rapprochement of their national interests amid European integration. The second section unpacks the emergence of the trilateral cooperation and approaches the format from three aspects: EU affairs, economic interdependence and hard politics. The third section weighs in on the EU’s influence on the development of the trilateral cooperation. The conclusion sums up the main findings of the research.

Understanding Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova’s European Policies Before and After the Association Agreements

A brief throwback to the general patterns of international relations of the recent decades easily unveils the fact that, coupled with globalization, regionalism increasingly looms large in the foreign policies of a state and the post-Soviet states are no exclusion. Although the South Caucasus is a highly conflictual and fragmented region where the economies of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are deeply enmeshed in and influenced by the ongoing conflicts, this did not militate against the endeavors at launching regional cooperation formats. Armenia targeted the development of a north-south cooperation with Russia, Georgia and Iran while Azerbaijan has developed trilateral cooperation formats with Turkey, Georgia, Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia.

Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has pursued a geographically broader policy which not only embraced the South Caucasus but also put much more weight on the Black Sea region. It goes without saying that major regional integration projects in the post-Soviet space have been launched and/or influenced by Russia (CIS, CSTO, EAEU). That said, Ukraine and Georgia have been the only post-Soviet countries that have energetically attempted to propel a new integration model. To give an

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example, it was the Borjomi declaration, signed by the Ukrainian and Georgian presidents, Viktor Yushchenko and Mikheil Saakashvili, in 2005 that paved the way, although unsuccessfully, for the establishment of the Community of Democratic Choice.1

Although these three countries are situated in different sub-regions, they share a high level of political partnership. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova have all tried to thwart deeper (especially military) integration in the post-Soviet space as they have perceived it as deference to Russia and an encroachment on their sovereignty. Sharing much in common in their foreign policy vision and behavior pushed Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova into rapprochement and the establishment of GUAM, first as a consultation forum and then as a full-fledged regional organization. Experience in this organization later facilitated the emergence of the trilateral cooperation format.

The foreign policy visions of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova became even closer as soon as the European Union elaborated a clear-cut and more ambitious policy towards the post-Soviet states. Accession to the European Neighborhood Policy and then the Eastern Partnership (EaP) offered a wide toolkit for cooperation between the EU and partner countries. Having a roadmap for Europeanization and closer integration with the EU were functional for the instrumentalization of trilateral cooperation.

Before discussing the nitty-gritty of the partnership format, it is critically important to understand its timing. Why did Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia forge a trilateral cooperation after signing Association Agreements (AAs) and not right after the EaP Prague summit in 2009 or earlier by revolutionary elites of Georgia and Ukraine? When the EaP kicked off in 2009, the EU stuck to a holistic approach, trying to develop the same agenda with all of the partner countries. At the beginning it seemed quite plausible as the EaP did reach some positive outcomes: the EU signed Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements with almost all EaP partner countries and supported social-economic development via a panoply of tools like EU4Business.

The critical moment arrived in 2013-2014 when partner countries ended up in different stages of integration with the EU. Armenia refused to sign the AA and joined the EAEU, Azerbaijan reiterated its reluctance towards wider integration with the EU and actually narrowed it down to energy affairs while Belarus continued to keep a low-profile engagement in the

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EaP. The other three partner states - Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova - signed the AAs and thus significantly updated the agenda of bilateral relations. Moreover, these countries also became beneficiaries of a visa-free regime with the EU.

For Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, the implications were twofold. Firstly, in 2014 the EaP turned out to be a four-trajectory project where one trajectory is followed by three associated states and the other three by Armenia, Belarus and Azerbaijan separately. Belarus, as already mentioned, is not deeply interested in European integration while Armenia narrowed its cooperation with the EU down to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. As for Azerbaijan, it approaches the EaP in a completely different way as it does seek closer relations with the EU but primarily in the sphere of energy rather than human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, Azerbaijan rejected the draft of a new partnership agreement that the EU had proposed and offered to negotiate its own draft agreement.2

Secondly, signing the AAs opened an entirely new chapter in EU-Georgia, EU-Ukraine and EU-Moldova relations. Although it does not suppose EU membership per se, the AAs set a much broader partnership agenda that is not available for the other three states. Suffice it to say that, if successfully implemented, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine will adopt up to 80 percent of the EU acquis.3 The achievement of this highly ambitious goal is time-consuming so in 2014 Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia found themselves in a room where all three states were to accomplish roughly the same “homework.”

The sheer fact that these states have signed AAs buttressed the mutual sense of solidarity in two important ways. On the one hand, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine shared the same foreign policy goal; namely, EU membership. On the other hand, they perceived European integration as a wherewithal of internal modernization and sustainable development.4

In a nutshell, all of this pushed Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova to ponder a new partnership format which will disassociate them from the rest of the EaP. These states believed that although the six partner states indeed had a common agenda under the EaP, the project needed a serious reconstruction as the gap between the partners (both in terms of their expectations from and the current state of relations with the EU) was increasing. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova decided to come up with a new

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regional format which would bridge the EU with exclusively associated states and practically demonstrate the EU’s special commitment to the three nations in its eastern neighborhood.

Institutionalization of Trilateral Cooperation: Breaking Down the Agenda

As already mentioned, the Ukraine-Georgia-Moldova trilateral cooperation materialized immediately after the AAs were signed. In 2015, the states established an Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Initiative (IPCI). Unsurprisingly, this trilateralism turned out to be a highly EU-focused format where EU- and AA-related issues dominated the agenda. According to the Joint Declaration of the IPCI founding meeting, out of the six issues in which the parties agreed to cooperate, four touched upon EU-related affairs; namely, approximation with the EU, harmonization with the EU acquis, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) and the European Energy Community.5 In this regard, the IPCI serves as a platform for discussing the implementation of the AAs and elaborating a modus operandi for meeting their AA-related obligations more successfully.

To sustain coherence, it is necessary to approach this topic from different aspects, too. In this regard, a question pops up: is European integration the only driver of Georgia-Ukraine-Moldova cooperation? As the three countries share a legacy of uneasy relations with Russia, it obviously was and still is on the agenda of the trilateral partnership. For instance, in 2018 the countries decided to scrutinize and fend off Russian influence on the population residing in the disputed territories.6 Again in 2018, Georgian, Ukrainian and Moldovan MPs adopted a resolution on Condemning Aggressive Actions by the Russian Federation in the Kerch Strait against Ukraine.7

Additionally, a tendency to “speak with one voice” can be traced among the three states. At the level of international organizations, they tend to tailor their national interests to those of the triad. For instance, when addressing the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Georgian former Defense Minister and former MP, Tinatin Khidasheli, indirectly framed it as part of a bigger picture saying that the “Soviet Union still ended and despite all, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are independent states, not being a part of Russia.”8 Similarly, in international forums Georgian officials have started to voice expectations of EU membership not only for Georgia, but Ukraine and Moldova, too.9

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Source: National Statistics Office of Georgia and the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova

Turning to the realm of the economy, it is necessary to assess the level of economic interdependence. The charter above illustrates the huge asymmetry in bilateral trade as the three states do not enjoy a comparable level of economic interaction with each other. Georgia and Moldova have registered roughly the same amount of trade with Ukraine while the Georgia-Moldova trade is a missing link in this trilateral interaction.

Additionally, the emerging trilateralism does not have military teeth. Although the 2017 Joint Communiqué envisaged the development of trilateral cooperation on defense and security issues, conflict resolution and the struggle against terrorism and extremism,10 military cooperation will get a very loose form (consultations, exchange of ideas, experience and information). Reluctance to go beyond the bilateral format was aptly exemplified in GUAM. For example, in the late 1990s Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan promoted the idea of GUAM peacekeeping forces and even conducted a trilateral military exercise in 1999 although Moldova abstained from this initiative.11 Moldova’s constitutionally neutral status affects the perspectives of trilateral military cooperation even further.

On top of that, the trilateral cooperation faces potential risks of stagnation as it is exposed to fluctuations in bilateral relations. For instance, the issue of Georgian ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili’s extradition, to some extent, temporarily froze Georgia-Ukraine relations. Georgia denounced Saakashvili’s criticism of Georgian authorities as Saakashvili was the governor of the Odessa region and whatever he said was interpreted as interference by a Ukrainian official in Georgian politics. Another demonstration of uneasy relations was Ukraine’s decision not to appoint an ambassador to Georgia for nearly two years.12

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Assessing the Ratio of Internal-External Dynamics: EU Engagement

After studying the internal dynamics of the Ukraine-Georgia-Moldova cooperation, it is necessary to zoom in on the EU’s role in this “partnership within a partnership.” The first document, where the EU separated these states from the rest of its eastern neighbors, was the 2008 resolution by the European Parliament (EP) which urged “to speed up, in relation to Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova in particular, the establishment of a free trade zone”13 (Italics are mine - E. D.). The EU’s approach towards these states became distinct and discrete in 2014 as Georgia and Moldova had hardly signed their AAs when the EP issued a resolution calling Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova “European states” and hinting at the EU’s open-door policy and the eligibility of these nations to apply for EU membership should they meet all of the necessary criteria.14

Having said this, the most eye-catching aspect of the EU’s differentiated policy is the EP’s recommendation of 2017 which urged the EU Council, Commission and the EEAS to consider the “EaP+” model as a new format for interaction with the associated states. Furthermore, the recommendation stated that Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova could join the Schengen area, the EU customs, digital and energy unions and even the internal market as well as benefit from better access to EU transport and industrial networks.15 Although the 2017 EaP summit failed to address this proposal and pinpoint the divergent cooperation paths within the partnership, the EU actually did expand cooperation with the associated states. In 2017, the European Investment Bank Group facilitated the allocation of a EUR 100 million loan to support small and medium-sized enterprises in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.16

On top of that, the EU established several channels of communication with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova which contributed to the further strengthening of trilateralism between the associated states. At the parliamentary level, two such channels started functioning, one dealing with exclusively AA-related affairs (Ad hoc Working Group under the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly) and the other one tasked with broader inter-parliamentary cooperation.17 At the executive level, the format of informal meetings was established between the EU Trade Commissioner and the ministries of economy of the three associated states.18

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The EU clearly acknowledges the fact that in the post-AA period it has to somehow upgrade its partnership with the associated countries as their juxtaposition with non-associated ones could potentially be interpreted as reluctance on behalf of the EU to demonstrate a robust commitment to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. On the other hand, such a policy boosted Georgia-Ukraine-Moldova cooperation (both at the parliamentary and executive levels) by means of stronger interaction and mutual support for the better implementation of the association agenda. Last but not least, intensified communication contributes to a greater socialization between governing elites which ultimately has a say on the overall development of trilateral cooperation.

Conclusion

The Georgia-Ukraine-Moldova trilateral cooperation is one of many regional partnership initiatives established throughout the post-Soviet space. This case is of particular interest for its timing and the (f)actors that have bolstered the format. We showed that in the post-AA era Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine’s perception of themselves as champions of the EaP incentivized them to forge a trilateral partnership to consolidate their bid for EU membership and distance themselves from those EaP partners not pursuing EU membership. Let alone the pursuit of membership, the initiative is functional vis-à-vis the establishment and development of trilateral ties. The EU-related agenda, rather than economic issues or hard politics, constitutes the primary determinant of trilateralism. In its turn, the EU facilitated the development of this grassroots format, first by partially indulging Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova’s European aspirations and second, by expanding interaction formats which eventually contributed to strengthening of Georgia-Ukraine-Moldova cooperation.

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References

1. Civil.ge. (2005). Ukraine, Georgia Propose “Democratic Alliance.” [online] Available at: www.old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=10540 [Accessed 26 Jun. 2019].

2. Azeri Daily. (2019). Mogherini: ‘Inshallah, EU and Azerbaijan will soon conclude new agreement.’ [online] Available at: www.azeridaily.com/politics/47049 [Accessed 28 Jun. 2019].

3. K. Böttger and C. Ghinea. (2015). Elements for an Eastern Partnership Plus: A New Association Package for Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. IEP Policy Briefs on Eastern Europe and Central Asia No 05/15., p. 4. [online] Available at: www.iep-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1505_PB_Ghinea-Boettger_Elements-for-v02.pdf [Accessed 28 Jun. 2019].

4. MFA of Georgia. (2018). The new format high-level meeting between the Georgian Government and the European Commission has delivered definite results. [online] Available at: www.mfa.gov.ge/News/evrokomisiasa-da-saqartvelos-mtavrobas-shoris-umag.aspx?lang=en-US [Accessed 28 Jun. 2019]. See also MFA of the Republic of Moldova. (n.d.). Moldova-EU relations. [online] Available at: www.mfa.gov.md/en/content/moldova-eu-relations [Accessed 28 Jun. 2019].

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6. Ukrinform. (2018). Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia to create platform for studying Russia’s influence on population in occupied territories. [online] Available at: www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/2579690-ukraine-moldova-georgia-to-create-a-platform-to-study-russias-influence-on-population-in-occupied-territories.html [Accessed 28 Jun.2019].

7. Parliament of Georgia. (2018). Resolution of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Parliament of Georgia, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Condemning Aggressive Actions by the Russian Federation in the Kerch Strait against Ukraine. [online] Available at: www.parliament.ge/ge/ajax/downloadFile/108437/2018-12-03_GUMPA_Resolution_on_the_Kerch_Strait_1 [Accessed 28 Jun. 2019].

8. Parliament of Georgia. (2014). Tinatin Khidasheli called upon PACE members to support Ukraine. [online] Available at: www.parliament.ge/en/media/axali-ambebi/tinatin-xidashelma-evrosabchos-saparlamento-asambleis-wevrebs-ukrainis-demokratiuli-xelisuflebis-sruli-mxardacherisken-mouwoda.page [Accessed 29 Jun. 2019].

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10. Parliament of Georgia. (2017). Joint Communiqué Strategic Rethinking of the Eastern Partnership. [online] Available at: www.parliament.ge/uploads/other/73/73963.pdf [Accessed 29 Jun. 2019].

11. O. Pavliuk. (1998). GUUAM: The Spillover of Politics into Economics? The Turkish Yearbook. 28, p. 14.

12. V. Rukhadze. (2017). Georgia and Ukraine Welcome New Thaw in Bilateral Relations. Eurasian Daily Monitor, 14(51). [online] Available at: www.jamestown.org/program/georgia-ukraine-welcome-new-thaw-bilateral-relations/ [Accessed 29 Jun.2019].

13. European Parliament. (2008). European Parliament resolution of 3 September 2008 on the situation in Georgia. [online] Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0396+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN [Accessed 29 Jun. 2019].

14. European Parliament. (2014). European Parliament resolution of 17 July 2014 on Ukraine (2014/2717(RSP)). [online] Available at: www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014IP0009 [Accessed 30 Jun. 2019].

15. European Parliament. (2017). European Parliament recommendation of 15 November 2017 to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit (2017/2130(INI)). [online] Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0440_EN.pdf [Accessed 30 Jun. 2019].

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18. European Commission. (2018). EU Trade Commissioner and Members of the Governments of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine met in Brussels. [online] Available at: www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1910&title=EU-Trade-Commiss ioner-and-Members-of-the-Governments-of-Georgia-Moldova-and-Ukraine-met-in-Brussels [Accessed 30 Jun. 2019].