University Press Scholarship Online Oxford … character, situational factors, justice, social psychology, culpability, cumulative consequences, naïve realism This chapter discusses

Two Social Psychologists' Reflections on Situationism and the Criminal JusticeSystem

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014.All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of amonograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: MiamiUniversity - Ohio; date: 06 October 2014

UniversityPressScholarshipOnline

OxfordScholarshipOnline

Ideology,Psychology,andLawJonHansonandJohnJost

Printpublicationdate:2012PrintISBN-13:9780199737512PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.001.0001

TwoSocialPsychologists'ReflectionsonSituationismandtheCriminalJusticeSystem

LeeRoss

DonnaShestowsky

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199737512.003.0024

AbstractandKeywords

Thecriminaljusticesystemreliesonlaynotionsofculpabilitythatareincompatiblewithcontemporarysocialpsychology,andarguablywithreasonablestandardsoffairnessandjustice.Agivenwrongdoer’sactionsareviewedinthatfieldlessastheproductofstabledispositionor“character”andmorethatofsituationfactorsandtheircumulativeconsequencesthaneitherlayorlegalconceptionsacknowledge.Moreover,thelegaldistinctionsmadebetweenrelevantandirrelevantmitigatingfactorsareonesthatsocialpsychologistswoulddeemuncompellingandevenincoherent.Whilerecognizingtheimpedimentstodramaticsystemicchange,andtheimportantrolethatpublicapprovalplaysinmaintainingthecriminaljusticesystem,thischapterquestionswhetherjusticecantrulybeservedwhenthelaw’stheoryofculpabilityissofundamentallyatoddswiththelessonsofsocialscientificresearch.Italsoconsiderstheimplicationsofamore


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enlightenedview.

Keywords:character,situationalfactors,justice,socialpsychology,culpability,cumulativeconsequences,naïverealism

Thischapterdiscussesthetensionbetweenlayviewsofaccountability,freewill,andmitigatingcircumstances—viewsreflectedinourcriminaljusticesystem—andcontemporarypsychology'sunderstandingofthedynamicrelationshipbetweenthepersonandthesituationindeterminingbehavior.*1Insodoing,italsoaddressesthetensionbetweenutilitarianconcernsofsocialorderandethicalconcernsaboutthejustimpositionofpunishment.Weshouldbeclearfromtheoutsetthatwearenotadvocatingforthesignificantshiftsinlegalpracticeandpolicythatfollowfromtheanalysisweoffer.Werecognizethatthelegalsystemcannot,andshouldnot,divergetoofarfromtheviewsoffairnessandefficacythatunderliethe“laypsychology”thatpervadesoursocietyifitistoretainthetrustandsupportofthepublic.Rather,wehighlighthowlayunderstandingsaboutthedeterminantsofbehaviorareatoddswiththelessonsofthebehavioralsocialsciences,andweoffersomesuggestionsregardingtheneedforeducationabouttherelativepowerofinfluencesthatareconsideredindiscussionsofmitigationandappropriatepunishmentforviolationsofthelaw.Thosesuggestions,webelieve,strikeabalancebetweenpoliticalandpragmaticconcernsandthoselessons.

Wefirstconsiderthetendencyforlaypeopletounderestimatetheimpactofsituationalpressuresandconstraintsandthustomakeunwarranteddispositionalorcharacterologicalattributions.Thistendency,wethensuggest,isexacerbatedbynaïverealism—theassumedveridicalityandobjectivityofone'sownperceptionsandjudgmentsrelativetothoseofone'speers.Ourmaincontentionisthatthelegalsystem'sconsiderationofmitigatingfactorsor“excuses”reflectslayconceptionsofbehavioralcausationanddualisticnotionsof“freewill”thatareneitherempiricallynorlogicallydefensible.Theimpositionofcriminalpunishment,weconcede,mayservevalidgoalsrangingfromgeneralandspecificdeterrenceofantisocialbehaviortosatisfyingthe(p.613) needforcatharsisandpromotingthesensethatjusticehasbeenserved.Butthecurrentworkingsofthecriminaljusticesystemshouldtroubletheconscienceofanyonewhothinksdeeplyaboutthedeterminantsofhumanbehavior.Alogicallycoherentaccountofbehavioralcausationthatincorporatesthelessonsofempiricalresearch,wecontend,wouldattheveryleastcompelustotreattransgressorswithmorecompassionthantheytypicallyreceive.

I.LayDispositionismandUnderappreciationofthePoweroftheSituationAsallstudentsofsocialpsychologyknow,whenpeoplearecalledupontoevaluateorpredictthebehaviorofothers,theytendtounderestimatetheimpactofsituationalorenvironmentalfactorsandtooverestimatetheimpactofdispositionalones.2CulturalpsychologiststellusthatmembersofindividualisticculturessuchasthoseoftheUnitedStates,Canada,Australia,NewZealand,andmostofWesternEuropeareparticularlylikelytoshowsuchadispositionistbias(seeGabler,Stern,&Miserandino,1998;Markus&Kitayama,1991).Thislaydispositionismleadspeopletooverestimatethedegreeofstabilitythatwillbefoundinagivenindividual'sbehaviorovertimeandthedegreeof


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consistencythatwillbefoundacrossdifferentsituations.Peoplearesimilarlypronetounderestimatetheextenttowhichchangesintheparticularcircumstancesorenvironmentconfrontingthatindividualmightsignificantlychangehisorherbehavior.

Onespecificimplicationoflaydispositionismforjudgmentsmadewithinthelegalsystemisclear:inattemptingtounderstand,predict,andcontrolproscribedbehavior,peopleareapttoinfertraitssuchas“criminality”andrelyonoverlybroadandsimplisticnotionsofgoodorbad“character”withoutproperlyappreciatingthepowerofthesituationalpressuresandconstraintsthatshapebehavior.Thedifficultyofgettingjurorstoacceptclaimsofentrapmentorofinducedfalseconfessionsmayreflectthisshortcoming.Thatis,weknowthatjurorsaredisinclinedtobelievethat“traps”setbypoliceofficerscouldinduceotherwisehonestpeople(likethem)tocommitcriminalacts.3Theyalsofailtoappreciatehowhonestpeople(likethem)couldbeinducedbypsychologicaltacticssuchaspromisesofleniency(asopposedtophysicaltorture)toconfesstocrimestheydidnotcommit.4

Assessmentsregardingtheroleofsituationalpressuresandconstraintsinproducingparticularmisdeeds,however,applytoawiderrangeofcriminalcasesandpotentialdefenses.5Forcrimesrequiringproofofcriminalnegligence,forexample,thelegalsystemcommonlyinvokesthenotionofa“reasonable”person—thatis,itasksjurorsorjudgestoconsidertheextenttowhich(p.614) areasonablepersonwouldhavebeenabletoanticipatetheconsequencesofhisorheractionsand,assumingthatsuchconsequenceswereanticipated,theextenttowhichareasonablepersonwouldhavefeltcompelledtoactinaparticularfashionunderthecircumstancesinquestion.6

Moreover,iftheactorisperceivedtohavelacked“choice”orfreedomtoactotherwise,theactionisdeemedtobejustifiedandnoncriminal,eveniftheconsequencesoftheactionwereapparentatthetime.7Thenecessitydefenseillustratesthispoint.Thisdefenseallowsanindividualtoconcedetheactconstitutingthecrimebutavoidpenaltywheneitheractinginthegreatergoodorchoosingthelesseroftwoevils.8Actionsthatwouldlikelybedeemedjustifiedinclude,forexample,aprisonerescapingfromaburningprison,oradriverdisobeyingtrafficlawstohastenaseverelyinjuredindividual'stransporttothehospital(Martin,2005).9

If,ontheotherhand,theactorisnotperceivedaslacking“choice”but,rather,ashavingacteddeliberatelyandwithsomedegreeoffreedomtohaveactedotherwise,situationalfactorsbecomerelevant,notindeterminingguiltversusinnocence,butinweighingany“extenuating”or“mitigating”factorswhendecidingontheappropriatepunishment.Inmakingthelatterdetermination,jurorsandjudgesessentiallyassesstheextenttowhichthebehaviorinquestionreflectedthedefendant'sdispositionorcharacterasopposedtothepressuresandconstraintsofthesituationheorshewasinwhentheoffensewascommitted.Tosomeextentthetestisoneofempathy—thatis,anassessmentofthelikelihoodthatonemighthaverespondedsimilarlyinthefaceoftherelevantsituationalfactors.

Whattherelevantresearchobligesustorecognizeisthatlaypeople'sintuitionsabout


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howtheyorother“reasonable”peoplewouldhaveactedinthefaceofvarioussituationalfactorsandconstraintsarelikelytobeerroneous.Attributionsabouttheroleof“badcharacter”versus“situationalpressuresandconstraints”areapttoexaggeratetheformeranddisregardthelattertoanextentthatisnotwarrantedbytheevidenceofexperimentalsocialpsychology.Thatrelativelackofinsightinconsideringthepowerofthesituationisparticularlylikelyincasesinwhichtheexternalinfluencesatplayarenotovertthreats,traumas,deprivationsoropportunitiesforenrichmentbut,rather,subtlermattersofpeerpressureorofsituationsinducingsmallinitialtransgressionsthatinturnlead,stepbystep,toincreasinglyseriousones.Researchconductedinthesituationisttraditionimpliesthatmany,ifnotall,people(includingthosewhositinjudgmentoftransgressors)couldbeled,bytherightsetofsubtleandnotsosubtlesituationalpressuresandconstraints,tocommitsimilartransgressionsormoregenerallytodothingsthattheywouldcondemnothersfordoingandthattheybelievethemselvesincapableofdoingunderanyconceivablecircumstances.10(p.615)

Socialpsychologistscertainlydonotclaimthatindividualdifferencesarenonexistentorunimportantindeterminingbehavior.Nordoweclaimthatallactorswillrespondsimilarlytoagivensituationorsetofincentivesanddisincentives.Indeed,oneofourdiscipline'smainintellectualcontributionsoverthepasthalf-centuryhasinvolveduncoveringthefactorsthatproducevariabilityandunpredictabilityinthewayindividualsrespondtothesituationsandeventstheyexperience.

Whatlaboratoryandfieldstudieshavedemonstratedabouttheimpactof“thepersonversusthesituation”canbestatedsuccinctly:seeminglysmallandsubtlemanipulationsofthesocialsituationoftenhavemuchlargereffectsonbehaviorthanmostlayobserverswouldpredict.Thoseeffects,moreover,arelikelyto“swamp”theimpactofpreviouslyobservedormeasuredindividualdifferencesinpersonality,values,ortemperament.Furthermore,thepredictabilityandstabilityofbehaviorobservablethatweseeintheeverydaybehaviorofourpeers,familymembers,andworkmatesmayresultlessfromthestabilityof“character”thanfromthestabilityandpowerofthesocialcircumstancesthatdirectandconstrainbehaviorinparticularsettingsorthecircumstancesinwhichwehavemadeourobservations.Asaconsequence,changesinroles,expectations,incentivestructures,andotherfeaturesoftheactor'ssocialenvironment,includingthosethatsimplyreduceopportunitiesforwrongdoing,arelikelytoproducegreaterchangesinbehaviorthanmostlaypeople—includingpresumablymostjudges,jurors,andpolicymakers—wouldanticipate.11

Therelevanceofresearchonthepowerofsituationandthedispositionistbiasinlayattributionsregardingcriminalbehaviorshouldbeobvioustosocialpsychologistsandtomostpeoplefamiliarwiththefindingsandinsightsofthatfield.Equallyobviousisthepotentialvalueofalteringinfluentialfeaturesofthesocialenvironmentthatareconducivetocriminalbehavior,suchastheprevailingsubgroupnorms,thesalienceofpoorrolemodelsandtheabsenceofgoodones,andtheeaseofaccesstoguns,alcohol,anddrugs.Lessobvious,asweshallelaboratebelow,aretheimplicationsofasituationistperspectiveforconcernsofcriminaljusticeor,morespecifically,fordecisionsaboutthe


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justinflictionofpunishment.Fornow,letussimplynotethattotheextentthatourlegalinstitutionsandpracticesreflecterroneouslayconceptionsaboutthedeterminantsofbehavior,thoseinstitutionsandpracticesarelikelytobelesseffective,andarguablylessfair,thantheywouldbeiftheywereguidedbymoreaccurateandinsightfulconceptions.12Theappropriatenessofeducatingand“de-biasing”lawmakersandpolicymakersaboutsituationalversusdispositionaldeterminantsofbehavioristhusworthyofcontemplation.Andinsofarascriminalstatutesarecreatedbylegislatorswhoaresomewhat(p.616) directedbytheprevailingattitudesoftheirconstituents,theimportanceofeducatingand“de-biasing”thoseconstituentsisclear.

Providingsupportforthesituationistassertionsthatwehaveofferedherehaslongbeenoneofexperimentalsocialpsychology'sprimaryundertakings.Wewon'tdigressheretoreviewtheresultsofthesituationistclassicsbyAsch,orMilgram,orLatanéandDarley,orFreedmanandFraser,13orotherinvestigatorswhoseworkenlivensourtextbooks.Butitisperhapsworthnotingthatmostoftheseclassicstudiesdidnotexplicitlycontrastactualeffectsofexperimentalmanipulationsorcircumstanceswithexpectedeffects.Nor,generally,didtheypitsituationistfactorsagainstmeasuresoftraitsordispositionsthatonemighthaveexpectedtoaccountforvariabilityinparticipants'responsestothesituationormanipulationinquestion.Rather,theinvestigatorsimplicitlyinvitedreaderstoconsidertheirownexpectationsabouthownormaladultslikethemselveswouldrespondtothosecircumstancesormanipulations,andthenpresentedfindingsthatviolatedthoseexpectations.Thestudiesalsoinvitedustoinfer(butdidnotprovidedatatoshow)thatinformationaboutactors'personalitiesorpastbehaviormaytelluslessaboutwhowouldbe,say,altruisticversuspunitiveorcooperativeversuscompetitiveinagivensituation,thanwouldinformationaboutvariouspsychologicallyrelevantfeaturesofthatsituation.

Ethicalconcernsprecludemostformsofexperimentalresearchonthecross-situationalconsistencyofreal“criminality.”Thatis,contemporaryresearchregulationsdonotallowresearcherstoexposeacross-sectionofrespondentstoarangeofpotentiallycrime-provokingcircumstancesandobservethedegreetowhichtheindividualswhoresorttocrimeinonesituationalsoresorttocrimeinothersituations.Buttheclassicstudiesontraitssuchashonesty14suggestthat“criminality”isunlikelytobeatraitthatmanifestsitselfwithoutregardtothespecificsofattendingcircumstances.Moreover,insofarascertainindividualsdoshowcross-situationalconsistencyincriminalbehavior,itislikelytobedueatleastasmuchtotheconstantorrecurrentnatureoftheincentivesandconstraintsintheirenvironmentsasitistotheirenduringpersonaldispositions.15Indeed,whatweterm“good”or“bad”charactermayitselfbeareflectionofexposuretoearliersituationalforcesandconstraintsoverwhichtheindividualactorexercisedlittle,ifany,control.

II.Subjectivism,NaïveRealism,andAttributionsofObjectivityVersusBiasInconsideringtheimpactofthesituationonbehavior,itisimportanttonotethatpeoplenecessarilyrespondnottosomeobjectiverealitybuttotherealitythattheyperceive.Indeed,muchofcontemporarypsychologyfocuseson(p.617) theprocessesandbiasesthatdeterminehowobjectivestimuliaresubjectivelyinterpretedbythe


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individual,andalsoonthestepsbywhichthoseinterpretationsleadfirsttoemotions,motivations,andintentionstoact,andultimatelytobehavioritself.Assuch,legalscholarsandotherswhoattempttounderstandbehaviorinvariousdomainsoflegalconcern—includinglawyerswhoseektoinfluencejurorsandjudges—haveaclearinterestinmakinguseoftherelevanttheoreticalinsightsandempiricalfindings.

Cognitiveandsocialpsychologistshavewrittenextensivelyontherolethatcognitiveschemasorscriptsplayinorganizinghumanperception,recall,andevaluation.Morerecentinvestigationshavefocusedontheimpactofnonconsciousprocesses,includingaffectiveprocesses,andontheefficacyofsubtle“priming”manipulationsininfluencingjudgmentsanddecisionmaking.16Ourpresentdiscussionhasanarrowerfocus—onethatdealsnotwiththefactorsthatdeterminethewaypeoplemakejudgmentsbut,rather,withthebeliefsthatindividualshaveabouttheaccuracyandobjectivityoftheirownparticularconstructionsofreality.Suchbeliefs,weargue,arethesourceofthenegativeassessmentspeoplemakeaboutindividualswhomtheyfindtohaveconstruedthatrealitydifferently.Therelevantepistemicstance,whichwetermnaïverealism,17canbesummarizedinfirst-persontermswiththepropositionthat“Iseeactionsandeventsastheyareinreality—thatmyperceptionsandreactionsarearelativelyunmediatedreflectionofthe“realnature”ofthoseactionsandevents.”Onecorollaryofthispropositionisthat“Ibelieveotherpeoplewill,oratleastshould,sharemyperceptionsandreactions.”Anothercorollaryisthat“totheextentthatothers'perceptionsandreactionsdifferfrommyown,thoseperceptionsandreactionsareunreasonable—theproductnotofrealityitselfbutthatofsomedistortinginfluenceonperceptionandjudgment.”18Thisaccountofnaïverealismwasoriginallyformulatedtodescribethedivergentattributionsthatpeoplemakeabouttheirownversusothers'perceptionsofsocialissuesandevents.Butitappliesequallywelltotheattributionspeoplemakeaboutthosewhoviolatemoralorlegalnormsandtotheattributionstheymakeaboutthosewhodisagreewiththemaboutthefairnessofparticularsanctions.

Thetenetsofnaïverealismhavesomeimportantimplications.Oneimplicationisthatwetendtooverestimatetheproportionofotherpeoplewhoagreewithusorwouldrespondsimilarlytousinanygivencontext(theubiquitous“falseconsensus”effect;seeRoss,Greene,&House,1977).Asecondimplicationisthatwetendtothinkthatourownviewsonanysocialorpoliticaldimensionfallattheappropriatepointonthatdimension—forexample,thatweareexactlyasliberalasitisreasonabletobeontheideologicaldimension(p.618) andthatthosewhoaremoreliberalarenaïveandunpragmaticwhilethosewhoarelessliberalarehard-heartedandgreedy.Similarperceptionsareapttocolorourviewsaboutthelegalsystem.Inparticular,wearelikelytobelievethatthosewhofavorlesspunishmentthanwedolackcommonsenseandthatthosewhofavorharsherpunishmentlackcompassion.19

III.ImplicationsofaSituationistPerspectiveSocialpsychology'slessonsaboutthepowerofsituationalpressuresandconstraints,andabouttheimportanceofattendingtothesocialactor'sconstrualor“definition”ofthesituationsthatthatactorfaces,haveimportantimplicationsforcrime-reductionpolicies.


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Liberalswhoaremindfulofthesituationistmessagewouldlikelystresstheneedtoaddresstheclassicenvironmentalfactorsimplicatedincrime—forexample,childabuseandneglect,lackofeducationandjobopportunities,absenceofappropriaterolemodels,andmalignantpeergroupinfluences.Conservativeswhoappreciatethatsamelessonwouldbemorelikelytostresstheneedtostrengthentheinfluenceoffamily,church,school,andcommunity,andotherinstitutionsthatmightconstrainpotentialtransgressors.Behavioristsofallpoliticalpersuasionswouldemphasizetheimportanceofincentivestructuresandreinforcementcontingenciesthatrewardorpunishandthusencourageordiscourageparticularbehaviors.Andwhileallofuswouldreadilyconcedethedifficultiesofaccomplishingthekindofstructuralchangesinsocietythatwouldremedyeconomicorsocialinequalityofthesortthatisassociatedwithelevatedcrimerates,researchinsocialpsychologyprovidessomeevidencethatrelativelymodestinterventionscangoalongwayinaddressingoneofthemostobviousriskfactorsforcriminality—thatis,academicfailureandhighdrop-outrates.20

Butthisencouragingresearchevidencedoeslittletoadvancetheimmediategoalsofthecriminaljusticesystem,oneofwhichisensuringpublicsafety.Inconsideringwaystoaccomplishthatgoal,therelativeeffectivenessofthreatsofincarcerationversusothertypesofinterventionconstitutesanempiricalquestion—oneforwhichnosimpleanswerislikelytobeforthcoming.Whenapprehensionandpunishmentareperceivedascertain,crimeisclearlyoftendeterred.Whetherthethreatofharsh,22asopposedtobenign,conditionsheightensthedeterrentvalueofaprospectiveincarcerationtermismoredebatable.However,thehighrecidivismrateswecurrentlyobserveforparoleesbeliesanynotionthatthepresentpenalsystemisgenerallysuccessfulinproducingpositivechangeinprisoners'attitudesandvalues,intheircapacitiesforself-restraint,orinthecalculationstheymakeaboutthepotentialrisksversusbenefitsoffuturecriminalbehavior.23Moreover,highrecidivismrates(p.619) suggestthatthepressuresandconstraintsoftheenvironmentstowhichparoleesreturn,andthevariousburdensofstigmatization(includingthedifficultyoffindingdecentlypaidemployment),maybemoredeterminativeoffuturebehaviorthananypositivechangesproducedbyincarceration.

Oncewegrantthatwewouldchangethesituationalfactorsthatpromptcrimeifwecould(oratleastwheresuchchangeswerecost-justified),weareobligedtolookbeyondtheaccountabilityofthetransgressorsandconsiderourown.Tobeginwith,areasonablesocietysurelywouldplacetheburdenofproofandethicaljustificationonthosewhowouldarguethatinhumaneprisonconditionsbetterachievethegoalsofspecificandgeneraldeterrencethandomorehumaneones.24

Ifsociety'sgoalistohaveacriminaljusticesystemthatisnotonlyeffectivebutalsologicallyandethicallycoherent,additionalimplicationsofasituationistperspectivecometothefore.Onesuchimplicationwouldsurelybeamore“forgiving”responsetotransgressorswhohavebeensubjectedtounusuallystrongsituationalpressures,includingpressureswhosestrengthisunlikelytobeappreciatedbylayobserverswhohaveneverfacedthosepressures.Anotherimplication,wewouldargue,wouldbeagreaterwillingnesstomitigatepunishmentincaseswherethesituationalforcesthat


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weighedonthetransgressorswereonestowhichtheydidnotchoosetoexposethemselvesoroneswhoseimpacttheycouldnothaveanticipatedinadvance.Dysfunctionalfamilysituations,negativecommunitynormsandrolemodels,andlackofaccesstolawfulmeansofacquiringmoneysufficientforone'sbasicneeds(coupledwithtemptationsofunlawfulmeans)wouldclearlyfallunderthatcategory.25

Pragmaticconcernswouldalsoleadonetoconsiderthelikelihoodthatthesituationalfactorsthatpromptedtheactortocommittherelevant“badacts”wouldpresentthemselvestothatactoragaininthefuture.Transgressorswhohappenedtofindthemselvesinthewrongplaceatthewrongtime,orwhootherwisefacedunusualchallenges,wouldthusseemtomeritnotonlyourempathybutalsoourleniency,sincesuchactorswouldberelativelyunlikelytocommitfutureoffensesregardlessofwhetherornottheyweresubjectedtopunishment.Pragmaticconcernsregardingthelikelihoodofrecidivismthuscanclashwithconcernsofevenhandednessandfairness.Individualsalreadyadvantagedintermsoftheirpresentandprobablefuturelifesituationswhosuccumbtothepressuresandconstraintsofunusualcircumstanceswouldreceivemorelenienttreatmentthanthosealreadydisadvantagedintermsoftheirpastandlikelyfutureenvironments.

Inthiscontext,casesof“situation-specific”criminalbehaviorcometomind.AparticularlyprovocativecaseisthatofPatricia(“Patty”)Hearst.26Kidnapped(p.620) andsubjectedtoabusebyapoliticallymotivatedgroup,thisyoungwoman,whohadpreviouslyenjoyedalifeofgreatprivilege,wasinducedtojoinhercaptorsinseriouscrimes.Jurorswouldhavefounditdifficulttooverlookthefactthat,notwithstandingherinitialmisfortuneinbeingkidnapped,shelaterseemedtoparticipatewillinglyinseriouscrimesratherthanreturntoherfamily.Italsowouldhavebeenhardforthemtodenythat,butforanaccidentoffateinwhichshewasundeniablyavictim,her“character”wouldneverhavepromptedhertobecomeabankrobber.ButitwouldhavebeenequallyhardforthemtodenythatotherbankrobbersaresimilarlyvictimizedbylifecircumstancesandthatgiventhechancetoleadalifeasprivilegedasthatofPattyHearst,theywouldneverhaveresortedtocrimeandwouldrefrainquitereadilyfromdoingsointhefuture.Morecommoncasesofsituational-specificcriminalbehaviorthanthatofPattyHearst,includeonesinvolvingviolentactsbyseverelyabusedspouses,euthanasiabylovedones,orparentalwithholdingofnecessarymedicaltreatmentfromillchildrenbecauseofreligiousconvictions.27

Perhapsmoredifficulttograpplewiththanthoseexamplesarecasesinwhichmultipleandcontinuingchildhoodabusesconstitutethefirstlinksinacausalchainthatendswithadulttransgressions.ParticularlyproblematicarecasessuchasthoseofCaryStaynerorJohnLeeMalvo,forwhomboththeheinousnessoftheircrimesandthepowerofthesituationalinfluencestheyhadfacedseemuncontestable.28Butlessdramaticcasessimilarlyinvolvemisdeedsthatlikelywouldnothaveoccurredintheabsenceofunfortunateearlyexperiences,immediatepeerpressure,orparticularnormsendemictotheperpetrators'occupations,subcultures,orsocialsituations.Again,ourpointisnotthatthewrongdoersintheselessexceptionalcaseswerenotfreetoactotherwiseatthe


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momentoftheircrime.Indeed,manyactorsinsimilarsituations(andmanywhofacedevenmoredysfunctionalchildhoodenvironments)didactotherwise.Rather,itisthatthedeterminationof“just”treatmentinsuchcasesshouldbebasedonafuller,moresophisticatedappreciationofthepoweroftherelevantsituationalforces.

Casesinvolvingcriminalactscommittedinatimeofwarorintergroupconflictgiverisetosimilarlydifficultdilemmas.Towhatextentdoesasituationistperspectiveobligeonetooptforleniencyinthecaseofperpetratorsofgenocide,especiallythosewho(asistypicallythecase)leadunexceptionallivespriortofindingthemselvesrespondingtoexceptionalsituationalpressuresinexceptionaltimesandwho,whenpermittedtodoso,resumenormal,noncriminallivesafterwards?Contemporaryexamples,includingtheRwandagenocideperpetratedbyHutusagainstTutsis(Prunier,1995)andotherhorrendousinstancesofmurderandmayhemthathaveanobvioussociocultural(p.621) component,posethesamedilemmaastheholocaust.Theactionsoftheperpetratorsshocktheconscienceandcryoutforaccountability.29Yettheevidenceisoftenalltooclearthattherelevantmisdeedswerepromptedbyexceptionalcircumstancesofasortthatwouldhaveled,andinfactdidlead,many,perhapsevenmost,membersoftheirsocietytoactsimilarly.

Afinalcaseinpoint—alltoosalientatthismomentinhistory—isthatofterroristswhohavebeensubjectedtoalifetimeofhatefulpropagandaandsocialnorms,andwhoseexpressedmisgivings,ifany,weremetwithauthoritative,disapprovingpronouncementsfromtrustedsourcesaboutthewillofGod.Wemayfeeljustifiedinpunishingsuchindividualsharshlybecausetheirdeedsseemsoinherentlyeviltousandbecausewebelievethatharshpunishmentisnecessary,notonlytodeterfuturewould-beterroristsbutalsotosatisfytheoutrageofourcommunity.Butwecannotclaimingoodconsciencethattheterrorists'choices,whichpresumablyweretheproductofsomecombinationofheartfeltgrievances,culturallyprescribedunderstandings,religiousorpoliticalindoctrination,andvariouscompliancetechniquesskillfullyemployedbytheirhandlers,were“freely”made.30Wecannotclaimthatsuchchoiceswereasimplereflectionofbadcharacterorevildispositionsanymorethanwecouldmakesuchaclaimaboutactorswhocommittedtheircrimesatgunpointorinthefaceofgrievousthreatstotheirfamiliesorothercoerciveinfluences.

Thetensionbetweenthegoalofgeneraldeterrenceandthatofgivingappropriateweighttomitigatingcircumstancesshouldnowbeclear.Ononehand,theprospectofpunishmentrepresentsyetanothersituationalfeaturethatmayinfluencethebehaviorofpotentialtransgressors.Totheextentthatthepotentialoffenderisrationalandinformed,wecanreasonablyassumethatthemorecertaintheprescribedpunishmentis,thegreateritsdeterrentvaluewillbe(seeScodro,2005).Ontheotherhand,thefailuretomitigatepunishmentinlightofthepowerofthesituationalfactorsthatpromptedtheactor'sbehaviorseemstoviolateourlaynotionsoffairness.Itispreciselythisdilemmathatpromptsustocontrasttheperspectiveofthesocialpsychologiststeepedinthesituationisttraditionwiththoseofthelegalscholarandthelayperson.

Inassessingculpabilityandmakinginferencesabout“badcharacter,”thesocial


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psychologist(particularlythesocialpsychologistwhohasspentalifetimeconsideringtheproblemsandfindingsofattributiontheory)wouldbetemptedtoconsiderthedegreetowhichotheractorshaveprovedwillingandabletoresistthesituationalpressuresandconstraintsthattheoffenderfaced.Thelegalscholarorlayperson,bycontrast,wouldseektodistinguishbetweenresponsesfreelychosenbytheindividualactorandresponsesthatoccurred(p.622) withouttheactor'scapacitytoactotherwise,orwithouttheconsciousexerciseofchoiceatall.31

Acoupleofexamplesmayservetoclarifytherelevantdistinction.32Mostpeoplewouldbewillingtoconsiderevidenceofspousalabuse,oreventheimmediatefearofsuchabuse,inthecaseofacrimecommittedagainsttheabuser.Mostwouldalsobewillingtogiveweighttoevidenceofearlierparentalabusewhenevaluatingthemisdeedsofateenageoffender,despitethefactthatonlyasmallminorityofabusedspousesorabusedchildrengoontocommitsuchoffenses(seeWidom,1989).Wefurthersuspectthatneitherlaypeoplenorlegalscholarswouldtreatevidenceofastrongandmalignantpeergroupinfluenceasequallymitigating,eveniftheywerepresentedwithevidencethatthepercentageofindividualsintherelevantneighborhoodwhosuccumbedtosuchenvironmentalandpeergroupinfluencesbycommittingsomesimilarlyseriousoffensewasrelativelyhigh(seeMeares&Kahan,1998).

Ifthoseassumptionsarecorrect,thecriterionfordecidingwhethertheperpetratorofagivenactdeservesleniencyclearlyisnotbasedonacarefulempiricalassessmentofthedegreetowhichthemisdeedreflectedastatisticallyexceptionalresponsetotherelevantsituationalfactors.Rather,thehypotheticalexamplesweofferedabovesuggestthatleniencyispromptedbyfeelingsofsympathyorempathyfortheperpetrator,ratherthananobjectiveassessmentofthepotencyofthesituationalfactorinquestion,orevenoftheactor'sdeliberatenessandconsciousnessofchoice(whichisarguablygreatestinthechoiceofaspouse,lessinthechoiceofaneighborhoodorpeergroup,andleastinthechoiceofparents).

“Person-based”excusesposesimilarchallengestoanycoherenttheoryofjustice.Whileweareinclinedtodistinguishbehaviorreflectiveoftheactor'scharacter,temperament,inclination,or“dispositions”frombehaviorreflectiveoftheactor'ssituation,itwouldbeunreasonableforustoarguethatpeoplearesomehowmoreresponsibleforthegeneticallyandphysiologicallydeterminedaspectsoftheirdispositionsorcharacterthantheyareforwhateversituationalpressuresandconstraintstheyareunabletoovercome,orevenfortheresiduesofpriorexperiencesmanifestintheirpresentcharacter.Attributionresearchersstudylayviewsabouttherelativepotencyofpersonalandsituationaldeterminantsofbehavior,butanyconventionalpsychologicalanalysisproceedsfromthetruismthatbehaviorisnecessarilyaproductofboththepersonandthesituation,or,moreprecisely,theproductoftheinteractionbetweenperson-basedandsituation-basedcharacteristics.Theuseoftheterm“interaction”isinstructive.Itreflectstherecognitionthatthesamesituationmayhaveadifferenteffectonpeoplewithdifferinginbornphysiologicalcharacteristicsordifferingresidualeffectsofsimilarpriorexperiences.(p.623)


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Conversely,differentsituationsmayproducesimilarbehavioronthepartofdifferentindividuals.

Wewillconsidertheimplicationsofsuchaninteractionistperspectiveforlogicallycoherentassessmentsofculpability,forassignmentofappropriateweighttovarious“excuses”orclaimsofmitigatingcircumstances,andforotherissuesofcriminaljusticeintheconcludingsectionofthischapter.Beforeproceedingtothatdiscussion,however,wewouldliketodistinguishbetweentwooptionsoursocietyhasfordealingwithcriminaltransgressors.Inasense,wemustdecidewhether(oratleastwhen)toapplythenormsthatcharacteristicallygovernourdealingswithstrangers,asopposedtothenormsthatgenerallygovernourdealingswithfamilymembersorfriends.Theformersetofnormsentailstreatingpeopleaswefeeltheydeservetobetreated.Inthatcase,thenormofevenhandednessisparamountandweplacesignificantweightontheactor'sabilitytoanticipatetheconsequencesofhisorheractions.Thelattersetofnorms,bycontrast,entailstreatingpeopleinthemannerthatwouldbestservetheirindividualneeds.Inthatcase,weareapttotakeintoconsiderationpersonalcapacitiesandweaknesses,todeemphasizetheforeseeabilityofconsequencesandgivelittlethoughttoevenhandednessoftreatment,andinsteadsearchforpossiblewaystoachieverehabilitation.33

Ofcourse,eventhemostnurturingofparentsconsidersequityissueswhenbuyingbirthdaypresentsorassigninghouseholdchores.Butifsuchparentslearnthatoneoftheirchildrenseemstobethrivinginthepublicschoolenvironmentanddemandslittleattention,whereasanotherisdisruptive,unmotivated,andunabletomasterthethird-gradecurriculum,thoseparentsareapttoadoptchild-specificremedies.Inparticular,theymaytransferthelatterchildtoaschoolthatoffersstudentsmoreindividualattention,hireprivatetutors,urgeschoolofficialstocreatereinforcementcontingencies,andsolicitsupportoftrainedpersonnelwhowillbetterservetheirchild.Insodoing,theywillnotbedissuadedbycomplaintsthattheyaretreatingtheirchildrenunequally—thatis,complaintsthatthattheyarerewardingtheirwaywardchildforhisorherfailings,andinasense“punishing”theirwell-adaptedchildforhisorhersuccessesbykeepingthatchildintheless-than-stellarregularschool.

Adoptingasimilarlyperson-specificapproachtodealingwithcriminaltransgressors,however,isfraughtwithproblems.34First,sincetheregimenlikelytoworkbestforonetransgressormightnotbetheonelikelytoworkbestforanother,wemightoftenbeobligedtotreatdifferenttransgressorsdifferently,andwithunequaldegreesofharshness,forsimilarmisdeeds.Indeed,ifallwrongdoersweresubjectedtowhatevertreatmentweredeemedmostlikelytomaketheirbehaviorconformtothedictatesoflawandsociety,(p.624) therelativeharshnessofthepunishmentmightprovetobeuncorrelated,orevennegativelycorrelated,withourintuitiveassessmentsofhowmuchsympathy,empathy,orleniencythetransgressorsdeserve.

Mostpeoplesurelywouldbewilling—onbothconsequentialistandfairnessgrounds—tohavepeoplewhoaremerelypotentialtransgressorsreceivetreatmentthatwouldbeeffectiveinpreventingthemfromengaginginlatercriminalbehavior,especiallyifthe


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costsofsuchtreatmentweremodest.Furthermore,thefactthatthetreatmentrequiredtoproducelaw-abidingbehaviormightbedifferentfordifferentindividualswouldraisefewobjections.Thetreatmentmight,forexample,involvebiochemicalinterventionforsome,educationalorpsychiatricinterventionforothers,provisionofgoodrolemodelsforothers,andtheharshdisciplineofabootcampforstillothers.Bycontrast,afteracriminaloffensehasoccurred,evenwhentheoffenderisyoung,andevenwhentheoffenderisatleastsomewhatavictimofhisorhercircumstances,theissueoffairnessor“horizontalequity”(similartreatmentforsimilaroffenses)posesadifficultdilemma,onethatweaddressinthenextsectionofthischapter.

IV.PsychologicalVersusLegalReasoning:FairnessConsiderationsOurlegalsystemclearlydoesnottreatindividualsconvictedofthesamecrimeinauniformfashion.Inparticular,itdistinguishesbetweenjuvenileoffenders,whosecharactersandabilitiestocalculatetheimplicationsoftheiractionsarepresumedtonotyetbefullyformed,andadults,whosematurityinthoserespectsisassumedasamatteroflaw(seeScott,2000;Vining,2002).Thelawdrawssuchdistinctionsevenforcasesinwhichthenatureoftheadult'smisdeedsobviouslybeliessuchassumptions.Whendeterminingpunishmentfortransgressors,ourlegalsystemalsogivessomeweighttoextenuatingfactors.Inotherwords,evenwhenanindividualisjudgedtobeguiltyofacriminaloffense,itdistinguishesgood“excuses”frompoorones(seeHaney,2002).Thecogencyofsuchdistinctions,however,isanothermatter,aswenowshalldiscussingreaterdetail.

Evidenceofabraininjuryorofabiochemicalimbalance,wesubmit,wouldbetreatedbythelegalsystemasarelativelygoodexcuseforanassaultagainstpersonorproperty,largelybecausetheconditioninquestionwasneitherwillednorwelcomedbytheoffender.Thisexcusewouldbeespeciallygoodiftheinjuryorimbalanceoccurredjustpriortotheassault,andifnosimilaroffenseshadoccurredbeforetheoffendersufferedtheinjuryorimbalanceinquestion.Ifacriminalhadvoluntarilyingestedalcohol,amphetamines,or(p.625) otherdrugsjustpriortocommittingacrime,theresultingintoxicationwouldbetreatedasalesssatisfactoryexcuse,althoughitstillmightwintheoffendersomeleniencybecauseofthepresumeddiminishmentofvoluntarycontroloverbehaviororthecognitiveimpairmentthatmayhavemadethetransgressorunabletoformulatetherequisitementalstateforthecrime.Afarbetterbiochemicalexcuse,ontheotherhand,wouldbeoneinvolvingtheunanticipated(or“involuntary”)sideeffectsofapotentdrugprescribedbyaphysiciantotreatanongoingillnessortoalleviateaparticularsymptom,evenifsucheffectswererare.35

Various“situational”antecedentstoanoffensethatasocialpsychologistmightconsidertobeimportantproximatecausesofthatoffense,bycontrast,wouldbeunlikelytowintheoffenderanyleniency.Considertheexcusethattheoffender'sassaultagainstamemberofsomegrouphadbeenoccasionedbyaparticularlyeffectiveincendiaryspeechagainstthegroupinquestion—perhapsevenaspeechtowhichthelistenerhadbeenexposedbyhappenstanceorforceratherthanchoice.Orconsidertheexcusethataparticularoffenderhadbeentauntedbyapeerwhoquestionedhiscourage,or


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challengedbytherespectedleaderofheractivistgrouptoprovethedepthofherdedicationtotheirsharedcause.

Wehavenoevidencetociteforthefailureof“situationalexcuses”inthetypesofcasesnotedabove.Indeed,iftherelevantprecipitantstoactionwereintroducedinacriminaltrial,itmightverywellbebytheprosecution,inanefforttoexplainthedefendant's“motive.”Nevertheless,wetrustthatlaypeopleandexpertsalikewouldagreethatappealstothepowerofthesocialsituationinsuchinstances(asopposedtoahistoryofabusecoupledwiththepresenceorimmediatethreatofsuchabuse)wouldbefutile,36andthatneitherstatisticalevidencenorexperttestimonyaboutthedegreetowhich“similarlysituated”individualswouldhavebehavedsimilarlywouldresultinleniencyforthedefendant.Theonlyevidencethatfact-finderswouldlikelyfindexculpatorywouldbeevidenceshowingthatthedefendantfailedtoformtherequisitementalstateforthecrimeorsomehowlackedtheabilitytoactotherwise.37

Certainly,fact-findersdoconsidersomeexcusesinvolvingsituationalfactors.“Crimesofpassion”occasionedbythediscoveryofinfidelityorotherinsultstohonor,providedthattheyarecommittedinthe“heatofthemoment,”aregenerallytreatedwithsomeleniency.38Asnotedabove,excusesinvolvingpriorabusebyaparentorspousecarrysimilarweight,especiallyiftheoffenderisyoungandtheeffectsofthatabuseareevidentfromtheoffender'slackofsocialadjustment.Butconsiderthelikelysuccessoftheexcusethatanoffender'sparentswerelaxindiscipline,overlyindulgent,orpoorrole(p.626) models.Wesubmitthattheintroductionofsuch“extenuating”factorswouldbedismissedasirrelevantandeventreatedwithscorn.39Moreover,experttestimonythatatleastsomechildrenrespondverybadlytoindulgentorlaissez-faireparenting(seeKochanska,Forman,Aksan,&Dunbar,2005)woulddolittletoimprovethedefendant'sprospects.

Otherexcusesthatdefendantshaveoffered,withvaryingdegreesofsuccess,inseekingdismissalofchargesormorelenienttreatmentincludetheeffectsofjunkfood,sleepdeprivation,societalracism,hormonaldisturbance,andawiderangeofclinicalabnormalities.40Criticsofourlegalsystem,includingsomelegalscholars,havebeenquicktoridiculemanyoftheseexcuses(see,e.g.,Dershowitz,1994;Morse,1995),andtocallforareassertionoftheprincipleofpersonalaccountability.41Moresympatheticlegalscholarshavetriedtoexplainandjustifythebasisfordistinguishingbetweenlegitimateandillegitimateexcuses.Inparticular,theyseektodistinguishbetweencasesinwhichthedefendantwaslegallyandmorallyaccountablefromcasesinwhichlackofcapacityor“freewill”diminishedoreliminatedsuchaccountability.42Toacademicallytrainedsocialpsychologists,however,thedistinctionsmadebetweengood“excuses”andbadonesseemdubious—aproductlessofanycoherentanalysisortheoryofpersonalagencythanofthefactorsthatinspirefeelingsofsympathyorempathy.Mostimportantly,claimsabouttheroleof“freewill”relyonadualistconceptionofmindandbody(whereinwill,asopposedtomotiveorattention,isnotreducibletoaphysiologicaland/orcognitiveprocesswithinthebrainandbody)thatmostpsychologistswouldregardaslittlebetterthanhand-waving.43


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Letustrytomakesenseof,oratleastdescribeingreaterdetail,someofthelayandlegalnotionsinquestion.Ingeneral,itappearsthatwhereonecanbothspecifythenatureofthemalignantcausalagentorfactorandshow,orreasonablypostulate,adirectlinkfromthatagentorfactortothetransgressionsinquestion,theexcuseistypicallydeemedtobeagoodone—especiallyiftheactordidnotchoosetoexposehimselftothatfactor.Bycontrast,ifonecannotarticulatetheparticularcausalprocessesoratleastthechainofeventsthatledtoaparticulardeed—evenwheretheactorissimilarlyinnocentofhavingchosentoexposehimselftotheinitiallinksinthatchain—thedeedisattributedtofreewillandtheindividualisheldaccountable.

Considerourpreviousexampleofanabusedchildwholaterbecomesanabuserhimself.Mostpeoplemaybequitewillingtoconsidersuchpriorabusetobeafactorthatcontributedtothecrimeandmanywouldconsiderleniencyonthatbasis.But,asnotedearlier,ifasecondpersonwhohadneverbeenabused,buthadbeenconsistentlyspoiledandneversubjectedtoreasonableparentaldiscipline,weretocommitthesameoffense,pleasfor(p.627) leniencywouldlikelyfallondeafears.Atfirst,thedistinctionseemsreasonable,oratleastinaccordwithoursympathies.However,themoredeeplyweexaminethecausesofanyspecificaction—thatis,themorethoroughlyweexploretheinteractionsofsituationsandactorsinmakingagivenresponselikelyorunlikelytooccur—themoreproblematicthebasisforthatdistinctionbecomes.

Researchsuggeststhatsomechildrenpossessageneticmakeupthathelpsthemcopewithabusewithoutbecomingabusers,whileotherchildrenlacksuchgeneticallybased“hardiness”(seeCaspietal.,2002).Scientistsmaysoondiscoverthespecificgenesorthespecificprenatalorearlypostnatalexperiencesthatplayaroleinmediatingvulnerabilityandhardinessinthefaceofvariousothertypesofpotentiallypathogenicenvironments.Shouldsuchadiscoverypromptustostartpunishingcertaintransgressorslessharshly?Shouldthe“spoiledrichkid”whoselawyerofferslackofparentaldisciplineasanexcuseforthewhite-collarcrimeshehascommittedasanadultbetreatedwithgreatersympathyandshownmoreleniencybecausesomescientisthassucceededinidentifyingthespecificgeneticfactorthatmakesparticularchildrenvulnerabletolackofparentaldiscipline?Supposewehavegoodstatisticalevidencefromtwinstudiesfortheroleofgeneticfactorsinproducingsuchvulnerabilitybutscientistshavenotsucceededinisolatingandidentifyingthespecificgeneticmarkers?Shouldourwillingnesstoshowleniencyreallydependontheprogressofscientistsindiscoveringspecificgeneticunderpinnings?

Scientistsarebeginningtodiscoverthegenetic44orearlyexperientialfactorsandtheircognitiveandphysiologicalresidues45thatcanbelinkedstatisticallytoahostofotheradolescentandadultpathologiesandadjustmentproblems.Mostofthiswork,however,doesnotconclusivelyidentifytheexactlinksbetweentherelevantcausalfactorsandthedeviantorcriminalactswithwhichtheyhavebeenassociated.Decadesofresearchleavelittledoubtthattheseassociationsareapttoincludecomplexinteractioneffects,inwhichmuchofthevariabilityinoutcomeswillremainunexplained.Thatis,notallindividualspossessingthegeneticmarkerwillmanifesttheproblemandnotallindividualsmanifesting


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theproblemwillshowthatparticularmarker.

Inalllikelihood,sometermreflectingsuchunexplainedvarianceorrandomness(whichinturncanbeseenasthevariabilityaccountedforbyasofyetunspecifiedfactorsandinteractionsbetweenthosefactors)willstillhavetobeincludedinanypredictionequation.Shouldthecomplexityofthepredictionequationorthesizeoftheerrortermsforunexplainedvarianceinthatequationreallydetermineourreceptivenesstotherelevantmitigationclaim?Shouldthedegreeofspecificityorcomplexityintherelevantprediction(p.628) equationreallyplayaroleinourdecisionsabouttheethicaljustificationformetingoutharshpunishmenttothosewho“freely”choosetodowronginlightofageneticmakeupandearlyparentalenvironmentthattheyobviouslydidnot“freely”choose?

Letussuppose,forthesakeofargument,thatwedoultimatelydiscovertheexactgenetic(orotherphysiological)basisforabnormallevelsofaggression,emotionalliability,poorimpulsecontrol,lowsocialintelligence,poordecision-makingability,orotherriskfactorsintemperamentandcapacitythatarelinkedtocriminalbehavior.Suppose,infact,wecometounderstandfullythebiologicalandexperientialbasisforpsychopathy,thediagnosiswenowusetoexplainactionssoinherentlyevilandfreeofconcernforthevictimthattheydefyourcomprehensionandcapacityforempathyandfuelasenseofmoraloutragethatcriesoutforharshpunishment.Inthefaceofsuchadiscovery,wouldwe,andshouldwe,thentreattherelevantoffendersmoreleniently,withanemphasisontherapy—perhapsevengene-alteringtherapy—ratherthanonpunishment?Ifso,fromwhomshouldwewithholdsuchleniency?Shouldwepunishthoseforwhomourtherapyprovesineffective,orthoseforwhomitprovestobe“toolittleandtoolate”?Andhowshouldwetreatthosepossessingthese“badgenes”incomparisontothevictimsofparticularexperientialmisfortunesorincomparisontoindividualsforwhomsuchbiologicalandexperientialfactorshappentohaveinteractedinarare,unpredictable,buthighlyunfortunatemanner?

Theremaybenoentirelysatisfactoryanswertosuchhypotheticalquestions,andwemayneverhavetoanswerthem.Butinstrikingabalanceamongthegoalsofdeterrence,retribution,remediation,andwhateverothergoalsthecriminaljusticesystemisdesignedtoserve,itseemsneitherlogicallydefensiblenorfairtomakethebalancedependsoheavilyonlayintuitionsthatweknowfromscoresofresearchstudiestobefaultyandsusceptibletobiases.Policiesandpracticesinevitablywilldependontheamountofprogressthatwehavemadeinprovidingamorescientificallysatisfactoryunderstandingofcriminalbehaviorandoursuccessineducatinglegaltheorists,legislators,andthebodypoliticaboutthatprogress.

Beyondcallingforamoreaccurateviewofhowdispositionalandsituationalfactorsinteractinproducingbehavior,weultimatelymustaddresshead-ontheveryconceptof“freewill.”46Philosophers,laypeople,andlegalscholarsalikeareapttosidesteptheissueoffreewillandcontentthemselveswithaskingwhethertheactorintendedhisorheractionandintended,orperhapsactedwithoutconcernsfor,itsconsequences.Casesinwhichthetransgressor'sactionsclearlyreflectapreternaturallystrong(andpresumably


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biologicallydetermined)47inclinationraiseaparticularlyvexingproblem.(p.629)

Whatisajustresponsetosomeonewhopossessesandrespondstosuchyearnings?Whatifoneperson'sdesiretouseaparticulardrug,oreventomolestachildinhiscare,isasstrongatthemomentitisacteduponasistheaverageperson'sneedanddesireforfoodwhenhungry,orforsleepwhentired,orevenforairwhendeprivedofoxygen?Wesuspectthatthewrongdoersinquestionwoulddenythatthey“willed”tohavesuchneedsordesires.Theycouldalsocrediblyclaimthattheywishthatneedsanddesiresincompatiblewiththeirmisdeeds(needsandwishesthathadheldswayinothersituations)hadpreventedthosemisdeedsinthespecificsituationsinwhichtheyactedwrongly.Suchadefense,wesuspect,wouldfallondeafears.

Leavingasidesuchspeculationsaboutdeliberateactsthatreflecttherelativestrengthofcompetingmotives,wecanaskabouttwoothertypesofwrongfulacts.Whatiftheprocessesthatleadaparticularactortocommitaparticularcrimeareessentiallyfreeofcoolcalculationofconsequences,inparticular,asfreeofsuchrationalcalculationofharmtoothersastheprocessesthatmightleadanordinarydrivertoveerhercarontoacrowdedsidewalktoavoidacollision?Andwhatifthemotivesthatprompttheoffendertocommithisorheroffenseareasstrongasthemotivesthatleadabankemployeetoaccedetoanarmedthief'sdemandthatsheopenthesafeortieupafellowvictim?

Inthecaseofthedriverwhoveersintoacrowdorthebankemployeewhocooperateswitharobber,theextenuatingcircumstancewouldinalllikelihoodprecludepunishment.Wesubmitthatourleniencyinbothcaseswouldreflectourabilitytoempathize.Inbothinstancesweknowthatwe,andpeoplewhoweloveandrespect,mightactsimilarlyiftheyfacedthesamesetofcircumstances.Bycontrast,fewofuswouldempathizewiththeaddict'scravingsfordrugs,andfewerstillwouldbeabletoempathizewiththecravingsofmolester.Butshouldthefactthatwedonotsharesuchcravings—andcannotevenimaginesharingthem—makeusdoubttheirpower,ordissuadeusfromfavoringleniencyonceweacknowledgehowpowerfultheyareforthemolesteroraddict?Morespecifically,shouldourabilityorinabilitytorealizethatwemightcommitsimilaractsinthefaceofsimilarlystrongcravingsenterintothecalculuswhenweweightheappropriatenessofpunishmentversustherapeutictreatment?

Imaginethatthroughsurgery,orbyusingsomedrugorbehaviormodificationprogram,wecoulddramaticallyweakenthepotentialmolester'sdesiretomolestorstrengthenhisorhercapacitytoexerciseself-restraint.Surelyallofuswouldapproveofsuchatreatment.Manyofuswouldevenbewillingtoforgo(oratleastmitigate)punishmenttherelevantcrimehasalreadybeencommittedprovidedthatwecouldnowachievealastingcure.Ifso,anobviousquestionarises:Towhatextentshouldourcurrentlackof(p.630) suchmeansofpreventionorcurejustifythewithholdingofsympathyandleniency?

Imagineagainthatscientistssuddenlydiscoveraprenatalorearlypostnatalinterventionthatwouldeliminateanidentifiableriskfactorforthedevelopmentofpsychopathyinthesamewaythatwecannoweliminatetheriskofmentalretardationandother


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manifestationsofPKU48throughearlyidentificationandtreatmentofnewborns.Shouldthefailureofparentstoprovidethatinterventionconstituteamitigatingfactorwhentheadolescentcommitsatypicallypsychopathiccrime?Shouldthosewhocommitasimilarpsychopathiccrimebutweredeniedsuchprenataltreatmentsimplybecausetherelevantdiscoverycametoolateforittobeadministeredbeabletomakeasimilarpleaforleniency?Shouldtheabsenceofsuchatreatmentnow,coupledwithknowledgeofwhatsuchatreatmentmightlooklikeifwecouldsolveparticulartechnicalproblems,providethebasisforaclaimnow?Questionsbasedonsuchcounterfactualsaredifficult,anditisnotsurprisingthatlegalscholarsandpractitionersgenerallyhavenotchosentoaddressthem.Butthe“slipperyslope”theypresentshouldbetroublingtoanyonewhomightbeinclinedtoconsiderleniencyinsomebutnotallofthehypotheticalcaseswithwhichwehaveburdenedthereader.

Contemporarypsychologycannotprovidefullysatisfyinganswerstothequestionsofwhenandwhyparticularactorscommitparticularcrimes.Norcanitprovidereliableremediestopreventcrimesandreformcriminals.Intime,wemaymakeprogressonbothfronts.Butitisimportantnottolosesightofthetruismthatpsychologywouldpromptustobringtoouranalytictask.Theexplanationforallmisdeeds(liketheexplanationforallbehavior)canbestated,atleastintheabstract,intermsthatrecognizetheroleofmotives,needsordesires,andevenintentions,withoutreferenceto“will.”Werarely,ifever,canspecifyexactlyhowandwhyagivensituationorexperience,alongwiththeresidueofvariouspastexperiences,hasproducedaparticularresponseinaparticularindividualwithaparticularmindandbody—bothofwhich,ofcourse,arethemselvessimilarlytheproductofsomecombinationofgenetics,physiologicalprocesses,andexperience.Nevertheless,wemustpresumethatsuchan“interaction”betweenthefactorsinquestionhasoccurred.Decidinghowtoaddthenotionofpersonalresponsibilityor“willfulness”toanysuchaccountthusbecomesmoreamatterofculturalconvention(andasourceofjustificationforthewaywehappentotreatparticularclassesofoffenders)thantheproductofsomecoherentorlogicalanalysisaddressingtherelativeimpactofbehavioraldeterminants.

Psychologistsarenotaloneintryingtosidesteptheissueofaccountabilityorfreewillinaccountingforantisocialorcriminalbehavior.(p.631) Schopenhauer(1839/1960)observedmorethanacenturyandahalfagothatmancandowhathewills,butthathecannotwillwhathewills.Nor,wewouldadd,canman“will”howstronglyandirresistiblyhewillsordesiresit,orhowstrongandsuccessfulhiswilltoresistthatwillordesiremightprovetobe.

PhilosopherscontinuetodebateSchopenhauer'sfamouschallengetothenotionoffreewill,butanysocietyorlegalsystemthatattemptstopursuejusticeinthetreatmentoftransgressorscannotescapethefactthatallbehavioriscausedbythestructuresofbodyandmind,byimmediateexperience,bytheresidueofordinaryandextraordinarypastexperience,andbythewaythesefactorshappentointeractineachindividualcase.Thenatureofthisinteractionremainsbeyondourlimitedabilitytopredictandcontrol.Butpostulatingaselfthatissomehowindependentofgeneticendowment,early


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experience,orsocialcontext,aselfthatexercises“freewill”inbendingto,resisting,oralteringthevarioussituationalpressuresandconstraintsthatdeterminebehaviordoeslittletoimproveourefforts.Suchanexerciseindualismmayquietourmisgivingsindispensingpunishment,butitdoeslittletoimprovethequalityofthejusticewedispenseortojustifythevagariesandcrueltiesofourpenalsystem.

Thereisroomtodisputetheconventionalpsychologicalaccountofthefactorscontrollinghumanbehaviorthatwehaveofferedhere.Thereisevenmoreroomtodisputeourcontentionsabouttheepistemicstatusoffreewill.Indeed,the“compatibilists”inphilosophyandotherdisciplines(seeBok,1998;Fischer&Ravizza,1999;Mele,1995)havelaboredtocomeupwithadefinitionoffreewillandbehavioralaccountsthatarenondeterministicandmaysatisfythosewhoseekacoherentbasisforassessingculpabilityandpunishment.Butthebehavioralanalysisofferedbypsychologyatleastobligesdefendersofthecontemporarycriminaljusticesystemtobemoremodestintheirclaimstobedispensingjustice.Legalscholars,jurors,andjudges—indeedallofus—recognizethelimitsofourabilityto“willwhatwewill.”Butthey,andwe,areneverthelessalltoowillingtoinsistthatothersoughttobeabletowillwhattheywill,orinanycase,thatothersoughttofaceharshconsequencesfornotbeingabletodoso.

V.PragmaticConsiderationsVersusConsiderationsofJusticeWhiletheremaybenologicallysatisfyingresolutiontotheproblemsofdistinguishinggoodfrombadexcusesandjustlydecidingwhichoffendersmeritlenienttreatment,thereisnodenyingthatpunishmentdoesserveobvioussocietalfunctions.Potentialoffendersrespondnotonlytoperceivedcontingencies(p.632) andlikelyconsequencesofpunishmentbutalsototheperceivedsocietalnormsandvaluescommunicatedbyourlawsandsanctions.Inlightofthatrealityandoftheproblemsofjusttreatmentthatwehavediscussedhere,areasonablestancewouldbetoadmitthatoursocietyemployscriminalsanctionsnottodispensejusticepersebuttocontrolhumanbehavior,especiallybehaviorthatwedeemdangerousoroffensivetoourindividualorcollectivewell-being.

Whenweknowhowtoendparticulartransgressionsonthepartofparticularindividualsthroughmedicalorpsychiatricintervention,throughcounselingoreducation,orthroughotherformsofrehabilitation,weshouldnothesitatetodoso,anymorethanweshoulddenytreatmenttoindividualswhoseantisocialbehaviorcanbetracedtopurelymedicalmaladiesortraumas.Whenwedonotknowhowtoachievesuchcontrolthroughmorebenigntreatmentofoffenders,wemusttakeituponourselvestoimposeeffectivesanctions,toisolatetheoffendersfromthepeopletheycouldharm,ortootherwiselimittheirfreedominordertoreducetherelevantrisk.49

Whatismoredifficulttojustify,ofcourse,isretribution—thatis,inflictingsufferingbecausewefeelthattheoffenderdeservestosuffer—ratherthandeterrence,socialsignaling,orotheraspectsofsocialcontrol.50Wisdomandconcernforfairnessalikedictatethatwetreatoffendersashumanelyasisconsistentwithachievingthetypeanddegreeofcontrolthatoursocietydeemsnecessaryandappropriate.Indeed,onecouldreasonablyarguethatweshouldtreatoffendersaswewouldtreatsomeonewhosuffersacurrentlyuntreatablecommunicabledisease.Thatis,suchindividualsshouldbe


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deprivedofthenormalcomfortsoflibertyonlytotheextentthat,andonlyaslongas,itisnecessarytodosotoprotectbothourselves,andthem,fromsocialharmsthatthemembersofoursocietycollectivelyagreetobeappropriate.51

Apairofrelatedobjectionscouldberaisedtotheprescriptionimpliedabove.First,itcouldreasonablybearguedthatthecriminaljusticesystemshouldreflectthesentimentsandbeliefsaboutbotheffectivenessandfairnessthatthepeopleservedbythatsystemholdratherthantheabstractconceptionsofacademicpsychologists—evenifthoselayviewshappentobelogicallyand/orempiricallymisguided.Itcouldfurtherbearguedthatconformitytothecitizenry'scurrentviewsaboutwhytransgressorsbehavethewaytheydoandtheappropriatesanctionsformisbehaviorisnecessaryinorderforthecriminaljusticesystemtoachieveoneofitsothercommonlycitedfunctions—namely,providingsocietyingeneral,andvictimsofcrimeinparticular,thesenseofjustretributionthatisrequiredforthemtoforgothe“self-help”optionofindividualvengeance.

Ourownanswertosuchclaimscanbeanticipatedfromthecontentoftheargumentsandobservationswehaveofferedhere.Whiletheworkingsofthe(p.633) criminaljusticesystemshouldrespecttheviewsthatmembersofsocietyhaveaboutresponsibilityandjustice,weshoulddowhatwecantoeducatelegislators,legalscholars,andlaypeopleaboutthelessonsprovidedbytheharddataofempiricalpsychology.Morespecifically,treatmentofoffendersshouldnotcontinuetobeguidedbyillusionsaboutcross-situationalconsistencyinbehavior,erroneousnotionsabouttheimpactofdispositionsversussituationsinguidingbehavior,orfailurestothinkthroughthelogicof“person/situation”interactions.Norshouldtheybeguidedbycomfortingbutnotdeeplyconsiderednotionsoffreewillanymorethantheyshouldbeguidedbyoncecommonbutnowabandonednotionsaboutwitchcraft,demonicpossession,orunbalanced“humors.”

Itisworthnotingthatthescienceandpracticeofmedicinetakeadvantageofnewdiscoveriesaboutthefailingsofmindandbodywithoutwaitingtoeducatethelaypublic,muchlesswaitingforsucheducationtotakefulleffect,beforeitadjustsitsmodesoftreatment.Arguably,legaltheoryandpracticeshoulddomoretotakesimilaradvantageofadvancingbehavioralscienceknowledge;although,twocaveatsareinorder.First,thelegalsystem,farmorethanthemedicalsystem,derivesitslegitimacyfrompublicassent.Second,giventhemodesteffectivenessofmostofouravailable“treatments”forthepersonalandsocialillsthatpromptcriminalbehavior,ourexhortationsandrecommendationsshouldbeofferedwithacommensuratedegreeofmodesty.

Societyhasbeenobligedtotreatpunishmentasawaybothtoexercisesocialcontrolandtosatisfyourcollectivesensethatthosepunisheddeservetheirfateandthatjusticehasbeendone,inpartbecausewelackthemeansandtheknowledgerequiredtopursuebetteroptions.Thatwecannotachievethoselegitimateendswithoutimposingsufferingandlossoflibertyonindividualswhoareinarealsensethemselvesvictimsofbadfortune—inthebodiesandmindstheyinheritedandinthesituationsthatalteredthosemindsandbodiesinproducingtheirmisdeeds—shouldbeasourceofhumilityand


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regret.Self-righteousinsistencethatthewrongdoersmustfully“pay”fortheirtransgressionsandnotbe“coddled”iswarrantedneitherbythedictatesoffairnessnorbydeeperanalysisofthedeterminantsofhumanbehavior.

Notes

Reference

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Notes:

(*)TheauthorsareindebtedtoPhoebeEllsworthforherinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.TheyalsowouldliketothankresearchassistantsRebekahBarlowYalcinkayaandShannonClawsonfortheirassistance.

(1.)ThisdiscussionisanexpansionofideasthatappearedearlierinRossandShestowsky(2003).

(2.)Forthoroughdiscussionsoftherelevantresearch,seeRoss(1977);andNisbettandRoss(1980).

(3.)SeeWrightsman,Nietzel,andFortune(2002)forareviewoftherelevantempiricalresearch.

(4.)SeeKassinandKiechel(1996)andKassinandSukel(1997)forsummariesofempiricalresearchonmockjurordecision-making.However,itshouldbenotedthatKassinandKiechel(1996)foundthatwhenmockjurorswerepresentedwithconfessionsthatwereinducedbyathreatofpunishment,theywereinclinedtodiscountthem.

(5.)Theextenttowhichthelaypersonacknowledgestheimportanceofsituationalpressuresincreatingcriminalbehavioroverorintandemwithdispositionalconsiderationsisaddressedinstudiesofjurydecision-making.Mitigatingfactorsthatjurorsconsiderinthedeterminationofcapitalpunishment,forexample,includeyouth,mentalretardation,andwhetherthedefendanthadalackofchoiceorcontrolovertheproximatecircumstancesleadingtothecrime(Garvey,1998).Theextenttowhichourlegalsystemacknowledgestherolethatsituationalpressuresplayinthecausationofcriminalbehaviorislikewiseillustratedbyhowcourtsallowforspecificjuryinstructionsincertainkindsofcases(Dressler,2006).Insomecaseswherethebatteredwomansyndromedefenseisused,forexample,courtstendtoaccountforthefactthatwomendonotcommithomicideasfrequentlyasmendo,andalsothatwhentheydokill,thevictimisoftenanabusivehusbandorpartner.Dresslerobservesthattherearethreetypicalhomicidepatternsinbatteredwomancases,andthattheallowanceofjuryinstructionspertainingtoself-defensevariesaccordingtoperceivedimmediacytodefendagainsttheabuse.Inthefirstpattern,theconfrontationalhomicide,thewomenkillsherpartnerwhileinthemidstofbeingbattered(pp.258–59).Courtshavegenerallyallowedjuryinstructionsforself-defenseinthiscategoryofcases(p.260).Inthesecondtypeofbatteredwomancase,thewomankillstheabuserduringatemporarybutsignificantcessationintheabusecycle(p.259).Themajorityofcourtsdonotallowjuryinstructionspertainingtoself-defenseinsuchcases(p.260).Inthethirdtypeofcase,“hired-killer”


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casesinwhichthewomanhiredorotherwisepersuadedathirdpartytocommitthehomicide,thecourtshaveunanimouslydisallowedjuryinstructionsregardingself-defense(pp.259–60).MonahanandWalker(1985)andMorse(1995,1998)discussanalogousbackgroundfactorsthatmayalsobeconsideredindeterminingtheappropriatenessofjuryinstructionsregardingself-defense,suchasthebatteredchildsyndromeandtherapetraumasyndrome.Foradiscussionoftheextenttowhichcourtshavealsoallowedculturalbackgroundtobe\consideredasamitigatingfactorinthedeterminationofculpability,seeRenteln(2004).Foranexaminationofjurors'difficultiesinunderstandingandapplyingtherelevantinstructions,seeHaney(1998).

(6.)TheModelPenalCodeprovidesinpertinentpart:“Apersonactsnegligentlywithrespecttoamaterialelementofanoffensewhenheshouldbeawareofasubstantialandunjustifiableriskthatthematerialelementexistsorwillresultfromhisconduct.Theriskmustbeofsuchanatureanddegreethattheactor'sfailuretoperceiveit,consideringthenatureandpurposeofhisconductandthecircumstancesknowntohim,involvesagrossdeviationfromthestandardofcarethatareasonablepersonwouldobserveintheactor'ssituation”(§2.02(2)(d));“apersonisnotguiltyofanoffenseunlessheactedpurposely,knowingly,recklesslyornegligently,asthelawmayrequire,withrespecttoeachmaterialelementoftheoffense”(§2.02(1)).

(7.)Theduressandnecessitydefensesareexamplesofthisphenomenon.TheModelPenalCodeprovidesfortheformerbystatingthat“[i]tisanaffirmativedefensethattheactorengagedintheconductchargedtoconstituteanoffensebecausehewascoercedtodosobytheuseof,orathreattouse,unlawfulforceagainsthispersonorthepersonofanother,thatapersonofreasonablefirmnessinhissituationwouldhavebeenunabletoresist”(§2.09(1));theCodeaddressesthelatterbystatingthat“[c]onductthattheactorbelievestobenecessarytoavoidaharmoreviltohimselfortoanotherisjustifiable,providedthat:theharmorevilsoughttobeavoidedbysuchconductisgreaterthanthatsoughttobepreventedbythelawdefiningtheoffensecharged;andneithertheCodenorotherlawdefiningtheoffenseprovidesexceptionsordefensesdealingwiththespecificsituationinvolved;andalegislativepurposetoexcludethejustificationclaimeddoesnototherwiseplainlyappear”(§3.02(1)(a)-(c)).However,scholarssuchasMearesandKahan(1998)notethattherationalactorstandardembeddedincriminallaw—evidentintheframingofdefensessuchasduressandnecessity—ignoretheroleandinfluenceofsocialnormswithinacommunity.Forexample,thereasonablepersonstandardwouldnottakeintoconsiderationtheextenttowhichdelinquencymayactuallybestatus-enhancingforgangmembers.MearesandKahan(1998)arguethatthiskindofoversightofsocialnormsandgroupdynamicsmaythencausetraditionalcrimedeterrencestrategiessuchasseverepenaltiestobackfire.

(8.)Martin(2005,p.1527)notesthatthenecessitydefense,“likeotherjustificationdefenses,allowsadefendanttoevaderesponsibilityforotherwisecriminalactionsnotwithstandingproofoftheelementsoftheoffense.”

(9.)Assomelegalscholarshavenoted,thisjustificationprincipleisinterpretedtopertainonlytoextraordinaryfactualcircumstances(seeRobinson,1982).Forexample,in


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California,between1990andMay2009,outof19appellatecases,onlyonecasefoundsufficientevidenceforadefenseonthesegrounds—theappellatecourtinInreEichorn,69Cal.App.4th382(Cal.Ct.App.1998)grantedapetitionforwritofhabeascorpuschallengingthehomelesspetitioner'sconviction,findingthatthepetitionerhadpresentedsufficientevidencetopresentadefenseofnecessitytothejury,forthemisdemeanoroffenseofviolatingacityordinancewhichbannedsleepingindesignatedpublicareas.Incontrast,Peoplev.Trippet(1997),56Cal.App.4th1532(Cal.Ct.App.1997)heldthatthecommonlawmedicalnecessitydefensewasproperlyexcludedasthedefendanthadadequatelegalalternativestotransportingandpossessingmarijuana.AndPeoplev.Garziano(1991)heldthatthosewhocommitcrimeswhiledemonstratingatmedicalclinicsthatprovideabortionscannotescapecriminalresponsibilitybyinvokingthenecessitydefense.

(10.)Inthatregard,longitudinalstudiesofholocaustperpetrators,soldiersguiltyofwartimeatrocities,andurbanriotersareinstructive.Mostnotably,studiesofconcentrationcampguardsinWorldWarIIsuggestthattheindividualsinquestiontypicallyledunexceptionallivesbeforeandaftertheirwartimemisdeeds(Steiner,2000).Indeed,butforHitler'simprobablerisetopowerandEichmann'sparallelriseintheSchutzstaffel(SS),onecanwellimaginethatEichmannwouldhavelivedouthislifeasafacelessbureaucratormid-levelcorporatemanagerratherthanasthemonstrousperpetratorofthecrimesagainsthumanityforwhichhewaspunished.

(11.)FieldobservationsbytheCountyofSantaCruzProbationDepartmentinSantaCruz,California,suggestthatevenrelativelysmallinterventionsthatmightbedescribedassituational,suchasprovidingjuvenilesaridehomefromeventswhentheirparentsareunabletodoso,canreducetheneedforjuveniledetention(Mariscal,2003).

(12.)SeeHaney(1998)foradiscussionofcontrastingindividualistandsituationistorientationstothelaw.

(13.)Forexample,Asch'sconformitystudiesillustratethelong-standinginterestamongsocialpsychologistsseekingtodeterminehow,andtowhatextent,socialforcesinfluencebehavior.Inparticular,Aschexploredwhetheranindividualwouldgiveresponsesconflictingwithobjectivereality,suchasmisrepresentingthelengthoflinesonpaperwhenthemajorityofpersonstheywereinteractingwithdidso(seeAsch,1951,1955,1956).DarleyandLatané'swork(1968)suggeststhatsituationalforcesalsomediatelesstrivialresponses,suchasthelikelihoodofanindividualreportinganemergencyheorshewitnesses,forexample—overhearinganepilepticseizureorobservingsmokeinaroom.Wheninthepresenceofothers,orwhenholdingthebeliefthatothersarealsoawareoftheevent,participantswerelesslikelytoreporttheemergency.Similarly,Milgram'sfamousstudyonobediencedemonstratesthatthepresenceandinstructionsofanauthorityfigurecanbeenoughtoencourageindividualstocontinuewithactionsthattheybelievearecausingconsiderablepaintoanother(Milgram,1963).FreedmanandFraser(1966)illustrateasimilarpsychologicalprocessatworkwhenaperson(whohasnoobjectiveauthoritystatus)makesasubstantialrequestthattheparticipantconcedestosimplybecauseheorshepreviouslyagreedtoarathertrivialbutrelatedrequest.


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Foramorecomprehensivereviewofthesituationisttraditioninsocialpsychology,seeRoss,Lepper,andWard(2010).

(14.)Mischel's(1968)classicearlydiscussionofthisissue(seealsoreviewsbyNisbett&Ross,1980;Ross&Nisbett,1991)includedasummaryoftheworkbyHartshorneandMay(1928),showingthatthecorrelationbetweenhonestyinonetypeofsituation(suchasanopportunitytostealmoney)andhonestyinanothertypeofsituation(suchasanopportunitytocheatonatest)wasmodestatbest.Mischelandcolleaguessubsequentlyaddedtoourunderstandingofconsistencyandstabilityinmanifestationsofpersondispositionsbyexploringmore“idiographic”(person-specificandsituation-specific)patternsor“signatures”ofbehavior(see,e.g.,Mischel,2004;Mischel,Shoda,&Mendoza-Denton,2002;Mischel&Shoda,1995;Mischel,Shoda,&Smith,2003).Buteventhatlaterworksuggeststhat“criminality”onthepartofanygivenindividualislikelytoreflectconsiderablesituationaldependence.Ineverydaycontexts,thereis,ofcourse,acomplexinteractionor“confounding”betweenthepersonandsituation(Ross&Nisbett,1991,pp.19–20).Thatis,tosomeextent,peoplechoosethesituationstowhichtheythenareobligedtorespond,andtosomeextentotherpeopleimposeinducementsandconstraintsasafunctionofwhattheyperceivetobethenatureofthepersonwithwhomtheyaredealing.Itisthisconfounding,which,ofcourse,isanimportantsourceoftheconsistencyofbehaviorthatwedoobserveoutsidethelaboratory,thattheearlyinvestigatorsofbehavioralconsistencydiscussedbyMischel(1968)soughttoeliminatewhentheyexaminedhowasampleofrespondentswouldrespondtoanidenticalsetofstimuluscircumstances.

(15.)Onemustbecautiousinunderestimatingtheimportanceofsituationalfactorsandattributingviolentbehaviorsolelyorprimarilytoperson-basedvariables,asthismayresultinthefundamentalattributionerror(seeRoss,1977;Ross&Nisbett,1991).

(16.)AthoroughreviewofthisliteraturefromacriticalrealismperspectiveisfoundinChenandHanson(2004).Inparticular,theirdiscussionofthelinkagebetweenschemasandtheaffecttiedtoortriggeredbytheseschemasisinstructive.

(17.)ThemostcomprehensiveaccountofnaïverealismisprovidedinRossandWard(1996);seealsoPronin,Gilovich,andRoss(2004).TherelevantideasarealsodiscussedinaseminalpaperbyIchheiser(1949).

(18.)EvidenceofthetendencytoseeothersingeneralasmorebiasedthanoneselfispresentedinPronin,Lin,andRoss(2002).Evidencethatperceivedbiasinothersisafunctionofperceiveddiscrepancybetweenone'sownviewsandothers'viewsispresentedinPronin,Gilovich,andRoss(2004).Itisinterestingtonotethatpeopleareawarethattheirparticularviewsandprioritiesmaybeshapedbyexperiencesarisingfromtheirparticularclass,racial,ethnic,orgenderidentity,buttheyfeelthatintheirowncasesuchfactorsareasourceofenlightenment,whereasotherpeople'sparticularexperiencesandidentityareasourceofwhatisatbest“understandable”bias(seeEhrlinger,Gilovich,&Ross,2005).


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(19.)Athirdimplicationofnaïverealismisatendencyforpeopletothinkthattheywillbemoresuccessfulinpersuadingindividualsonthe“otherside”thanviceversa,andbythesametokenthatdisinterestedthirdpartieswillagreewiththemmorethanwiththosepresentingtheopposingviewpoint.Thelattermisperception,ofcourse,hasimplicationsforsettlementnegotiation(insofaraslitigantsmayforgosettlementopportunitiesbecausetheyoverestimatethelikelihoodthatajudgeorjurywillseethingsastheydo)andforlitigants'expectationsabout,andresponsesto,outcomesultimatelyproducedinthecourtroom.

(20.)SeeNisbett(2009)foradiscussionoftheacademicgainspromotedbyintroducingmessagesthatexplicityassuredisadvantagedminoritygroupchildrenthatthedifficultiestheyarefacinginaneweducationsettingareonesthatallstudentsinitiallyexperience,thattheyarewelcomeand“belong,”andthattheirteachershavebothhighexpectationsforthem,andconfidencethattheywillmeetsuchexpectations.

(22.)Whethercapitalpunishmenthasadeterrenteffectissimilarlyahotlydebatedissue.Shepherd(2005)arguesthattheambiguityoverwhethercapitalpunishmentdeterscrimeresultsfromaclashofmethodsbetweendisciplines,whichheclaimscanbereconciled.Shepherdnotesthatempiricalstudiesbyeconomistsconsistentlyshowthatcapitalpunishmenthasadeterrenteffect,whereasresearchbylegalscholarsandsociologistshasarrivedattheoppositeconclusion.Theformerusedlargedatasetscompiledfromall50states,whilethelatterfocusedtheiranalysisononestateorasmallgroupofstates.Inreconcilingthesemethods,Shepherdassertsthatbothconclusionsarecorrect.Capitalpunishmentdoesdeter—butonlyinasmallnumberofstatesthatexecuterelativelymoreprisoners.Whendatafromstateswithalargenumberofexecutionsandahighdeterrencerateareaveragedwiththosefromstateswithasmallnumberofexecutions,theresultisthatthehighdeterrenceratefromthestateswithmanyexecutionsoverwhelmsthelackofdeterrenceandevenincreasedbrutalizationinstateswithfewerexecutions.OfparticularsignificanceisShepherd'sfindingthatalthoughcapitalpunishmenteffectivelydeterscrimeinsomestates,itisalsoassociatedwithanincreasedmurderrateinalmosttwiceasmanyotherstates.

(23.)Onestudysupportingthisconclusionexamined962felonyoffendersinEssexCounty,NewJersey(Gottfredson,1999).Inthisresearch,thequestionofwhetherpunishmentincreasedordecreasedcriminalbehaviorwasaddressedbycomparingjudicialperceptionsofthelikelihoodofrecidivism,characteristicsoftheconvicted,typeofsentence,andtimeactuallyserved.Gottfredsonnotedthatotherthantheeffectofincapacitationitself,confinementdidnotalterthelikelihoodoffuturecriminality.Inaddition,wheretheoffenderwasconfinedmadelittledifference.Thelengthofsentencethatwasissueddidnotimpactfuturebehavior,andtimeactuallyservedhadonlyaslighteffectonthelikelihoodoffuturecrimes.DoobandWebster(2003)examinetherelationshipbetweensentencingseverityandlevelsofcrime,findingthatvariationsinsentencingareunlikelytodetercrime.

(24.)Theanalogythatcomestomindisthatofdealingwiththecarrierofalife-threateningcommunicabledisease.Thejustificationforquarantineisclearenough,buttherewould


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benojustificationformakingtheconditionsofthatquarantineanymoreaversivetotheindividualthanisnecessarytoprotectthepublic.Bersoff(2002,p.573),whoarguesthatwhileitmaybeappropriatetoseparatecriminalsfromsociety,findingthatsuchsegregationisjustifiableisdistinguishablefrombelievingthatcriminalsdeserve“hatefulretribution,”andthatthelaw'sresistancetocreatingmorehumaneinstitutionsandusingmoreempiricallyvalidatedinterventionstodealwithcriminalsillustrateshowunreceptivethelawistoscienceandreality.Alackofappropriateresourcescanalsobackfireandleadtothebreakdownoftheprisonsystem.InColemanv.Schwarzenegger(2009),forexample,thecourttentativelyheldthattheovercrowdinginCalifornia'sprisonsistheprimarycauseofthestate'sfailuretoprovideconstitutionallyadequatemedicalandmentalhealthcaretoCaliforniainmates;thecourtalsonotedthatinlightofCalifornia'seconomiccrisisandthelowprobabilityofincreasedfundstoaddressthisissue,aswellasthefailureofpreviousremedialmeasures,a“prisonerreleaseorder”wasnecessary.

(25.)Thesituationistperspectiveregardingculpabilityissomewhatalignedwiththatofphilosopherswhoexpressskepticismaboutmoralresponsibilityonthegroundsthatmoralassessmentsandtheweightgiventosuchassessmentsarethemselvesproductsofsituationalinfluencesofwhichtheactormayormaynotbeaware.Rosen(2004)discussesthisskepticalstanceandnotesitsparticularlegitimacyinthecaseofassessmentsofmoralculpabilitythataremadeabouttheactionsofothers.

(26.)NotwithstandingthefactthatPattyHearstcame,foratime,toholdbeliefsandadoptgoalsuponwhichshe“freely”actedincommittingatleastsomeofhertransgressions,thesocialsituationintowhichshewastemporarilythrust,ratherthan“badcharacter”intheusualsenseoftheterm,clearlywasthecauseofhertransgressions.Mostobserverswouldagreethatshemeritsthepublicsympathy,andthegovernmentalpardon,thatsheeventuallyreceived.Fewwouldbesurprisedtolearnthatshecommittednoadditionalcriminaloffensesintheyearsfollowingherimprisonment.Thissagagivesrise,however,toaprovocativequestion.Whyshouldyoungfelonswho,byaccidentsofbirthandcircumstanceratherthanchoice,wereexposedtotheinfluenceofpotentantisocialnorms,adoptedantisocialbeliefsandvalues,enjoyedreadyaccesstoweapons,andsuccumbedwhengivenopportunitiestotransgress,meritoursympathyandleniencylessthanPattyHearst?Giventhesameprivilegedcircumstancesthatsheenjoyedbothbeforeandafterherforayintocriminalbehavior,fewyoungmenorwomenbecomebankrobbersoraccomplicestohomicide.Indeed,criminalactionswouldseemtobealesslikelyconsequenceoftheunusualsituationtowhichMs.Hearstwasexposedthanofthemoremundanelytoxicchildhoodexperiencesandsocialenvironmentsthatfacedmanyofthepeoplewholanguishinourprisons.

(27.)Mather(1988)reviewsspousalabuseself-defensecases(suchasthebatteredwoman'sdefense),andLamparello(2001)discussescasesinwhichparentsrefusedmedicaltreatmentfortheirchildrentocomplywithreligiousstrictures.

(28.)CaryStayner,triedinCaliforniain2001formultiplemurders,hadbeensubjectedtothekindsofsexualandphysicalabusethathaveoftenbeenlinkedtolatercriminal


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behavior,andwasalsothebrotherofayoungmanwhohadsufferedseveralyearsofsexualabuseatthehandsofhiskidnapperbeforebeingrescued(Zamora,1999).MalvowasateenagerwhocommittedastringofmurdersinWashington,D.C.,Maryland,andVirginiaunderthestronginfluence,ifnottotalcontrol,ofanoldermentorlaterknownas“theDCSniper.”

(29.)Insuchcases,itisalsoappropriatetodiscussfunctionsofpunishmentotherthandeterrenceor“justretribution”—inparticular,theneedforcatharsisonthepartofthefamiliesandkinsmenofvictims.Wewillreturntoadiscussionofsuchsubjective,psychicneedsandconsiderationslaterinthischapter.

(30.)Atran(2003)arguesthatautomaticallyattributingpsychopathologytosuicideterroristscanbeviewedasareflectionofthe“fundamentalattributionerror”(Ross,1977).

(31.)ThisissimilartothenotionexpressedbyphilosopherssuchasKant,thatluckshouldnotdeterminetheculpabilityofanindividual(seeNagel,1979).ToNagel,moralluckreferstothephenomenoninwhichanindividualcontinuestobethesubjectofmoralassessment,whetherpositiveornegative,evenwhensignificantaspectsofthecircumstancesathandarenotwithintheindividual'scontrol.

(32.)Ofcourse,onecanacknowledgethelikelihoodthatonewouldrespondsimilarlyinsimilarcircumstancesandexpecttobepunished(andperhapsevenregardsuchpunishmentasjustandappropriate).Suchanacknowledgmentwouldreflecttheideathat“moralluck”canplayasignificantandjustifiableroleindeterminingpunishment.

(33.)Foradetaileddescriptionofthesealternativeformulations,seeLakoff(1996)whoarguesthatdifferencesbetweenpoliticalconservativesandliberalsintheUnitedStatesarerootedincompetingmodelsormetaphorsoffamilylife,wherebyconservativesembracethemodelofastrictfatherwhogiveschildrenwhattheyearnbyobeyingrulesandliberalsembracethemodelofanurturingparentwhogiveschildrenwhattheyneed.

(34.)Inasense,theSentencingReformAct(SRA)representsarejectionofahighlyperson-specificapproachbysettinglimitsonthediscretioninsentencingformerlyenjoyedbyjudgesinfederalcriminalcases.ForadiscussionofthehistoryandrationaleoftheSRA,seeDriessen&Durham(2002).

(35.)This“unanticipatedside-effects”excuseisinfactbeingdiscussedinrelationtowhetheranantimalarialdrugmighthavebeenthecauseofasmallnumberofmilitarypersonnelkillingtheirwivesafterreturningfromtheirSpecialOperationsserviceinAfghanistan(Lutz&Elliston,2002).Forausefuldiscussioncontrastingthelegalimplicationsofvoluntaryandinvoluntaryintoxication,seeDressler(2006,pp.345–361).

(36.)Seenote5,supra.Inillustratingthiscontrast,considerthatjustificationisanaffirmativedefenseforcriminalchargesundertheModelPenalCodeart.3.Ingeneral,conduct(suchasconductostensiblydoneinthenameof“selfdefense”)isjustifiedwhen


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theactorbelievesthatitisnecessarytoactinsuchawaytoavoidharmorevilfromoccurringtooneselfortoothersiftheharmorevilsoughttobeavoidedisgreaterthanthatoftheoffensecharged(see§3.02(1)(a)).Theuseofforceisgenerallyjustifiablewhentheindividualactingreasonablybelievesittobeimmediatelynecessarytoprotecthimselfagainsttheunlawfuluseofforcebyanother(see§3.04(1)).Whereanindividualassaultsamemberofagroupafterwitnessinganeffectiveandincendiaryspeechagainstthatgroup,asocialpsychologistmayviewtheincendiaryspeechtobeanimportantproximatecauseoftheassault,butitisunlikelytomeetthereasonablepersonstandardfor“immediatelynecessary”toprotectoneselfagainstunlawfuluseofforcebyanother.Therefore,theforceusedinthiscircumstancewillnotbejustified.Similarly,theindividualwhorespondswithforcewhenfacedwithatauntbyapeerorchallengeaboutthedepthoftheircommitmentwillalsoprobablyfailthe“immediatelynecessary”requirement.Renteln(2004)providesaprobinganalysisofthedifficultiesindeterminingtowhatextentfact-findersshouldconsideradefendant'sculturalbackgroundwhenapplyingthereasonablepersonstandardandassessingculpabilitygenerally.

(37.)SeeMalle(1997)on“folk”or“lay”theoriesofaction.Hisdistinctionbetween“explanations”and“reasons”forbehaviornicelycapturesthedifferencebetweenscientificandlayconceptionsofbehavioralcausation.

(38.)Whenahomicideiscommittedintentionally,butalsoastheresultof“adequateprovocation,”suchanoffensemaybemitigatedfromachargeofmurdertothatofmanslaughter(Dressler,2006,p.571).Incontemporarylegalpractice,juriestypicallydecidewhatconstitutesadequateprovocation,althoughtheyaregenerallyadvisedtoapplyareasonablepersonstandardwhenmakingthatassessment(Dressler,2006,p.573).

(39.)Forexample,thelowregardinwhichthelegalsystemholdstherottensocialbackgrounddefense(RSBD)isinstructive.TheRSBDproposesthatbecausethesocialconditionsinwhichonewasraisedcannegativelyinfluenceanindividual'slateractions,factorssuchasgrowingupinpovertyandbeingsubjectedtoneglectormistreatmentshouldexcuseanactorfromcriminalliability,seeKaye(2005,p.1173).JudgeDavidBazelonfirstwroteabouttheRSBDinhisdissentingopinioninUnitedStatesv.Alexander(1973).ThoughBazelon'sopinionsparkedscholarlydebate,theargumentitselfwasneverturnedintoavalidlegaldefense.TheRSBDfailsasavaliddefenseforseveralreasons.Legalscholarshavearguedthatbecauseresearchhasnotarticulatedanydirectrelationshipbetweenaparticularsocialconditionandaparticularcriminalactwithsufficientclarity,defendantsshouldnotbeabletouseitasadefense(Kaye,2005,p.1173).Also,theRSBDunderminestheretributivetheoryofpunishment:ifsocialbackgroundfactorscauseapersontocommitacrime,retributivejustificationsforpunishingthatpersondisappearbecausethecrimewouldhavebeencausedbyfactorsbeyondtheperson'scontrol(seeKirchmeier,2004,p.684).Atitsextreme,theRSBDwouldeliminateaperson'sresponsibilityforhisorheractionsbecauseone'supbringingalwaysinfluencesthechoicesapersonmakes(seeForde-Mazrui,2004,p.730).

(40.)SeeKagan(2007),notingthatwithinthefieldofpsychologyoverthelastcentury


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therehasbeenanincreasedemphasisonthewaysinwhichbiologyshapeshumanbehavior.Examininganumberofpsychologicalstudiesinthisvein,Kagancritiquesthemethodsemployedinthesetodateandalsocautionsagainstignoringthecomplexitybetweengenesandenvironment.

(41.)Forexample,MassachusettsMutualLifeInsuranceCo.v.Woodal(2003)discusseslegalloreandthemisunderstandingofthepublicandmediaoftheuseofexcuses,andcommentingonthefamouscaseofDanWhite,chargedwithmurderingSanFranciscoMayorGeorgeMoscone,andHarveyMilk,thefirstopenlygaymantobeelectedtopublicofficeinCalifornia.

Attrial,White'slawyerarguedthathewassufferingfrom“diminishedcapacity,”acontroversialdefensethenpermissibleinCaliforniacourts.Whitesupposedlywassufferingfromdepressionandthusincapableofpremeditatedmurder.Asevidenceofthis,psychiatristMartinBlindertestifiedthattheformerlyhealth-consciousWhitehadrecentlybecomeajunkfoodjunkie.Blindercommentedthattoomuchsugarcanaffectthechemicalbalanceinthebrainandworsendepression,butdidn'tblamethecrimeonbaddiet.Rather,heofferedjunkfooduseasproofofWhite'smentalstate—inotherwords,TwinkieconsumptionwasaneffectratherthanthecauseofWhite'sproblems.Butthemediaandpublicimmediately—andmisleadingly—dubbedthedefense'sargumentthe“Twinkiedefense”(fn.7).

WhileWhite'sdefenseteamdidarguesuccessfullyforarulingofdiminishedcapacity,resultinginaverdictofvoluntarymanslaughterratherthanmurder,thediminishedcapacitydoctrinewasabolishedinCaliforniabyballotinitiativein1982followingthenegativepublicitysurroundingthecase.

(42.)Arenella(1992)contraststheconditionsformoralblamesetforthbymoralphilosopherswiththoseentrenchedincriminallaw.Arenella(1996)arguesthatthelawespousesaminimalistviewofwhatittakestobeamorallyaccountableagentinordertoensurethatallbutthemostseverelydisabledoffendersareheldaccountablefortheircrimes.

(43.)Possiblereconciliationsofdeterminismandfreewillisofcontinuinginteresttophilosophersandotherscholarsconsideringtheproblemofmoralresponsibilityforone'sactionsandtheconsequencesofsuchactions(seeWatson,1988;alsodiscussionsof“compatibilism“byBok,1998;Fischer&Ravizza,1999;Mele,1995).However,theconceptsoffreewill(asopposedtomotivationorintention)anddeterminismarenormallynottopicsofconcerninmainstreampsychology.

(44.)LaFaveandScott(1986)provideevidencethat“XYY”malesaremorelikelythanotherstoengageinantisocialorcriminalconductleadingtoinstitutionalconfinement(althoughskepticshavesuggestedthatthegeneticfactorinquestionissimplycorrelatedwithlowintelligence,andperhapsincreasedlikelihoodofapprehension).StoffandCairnes(1996)reviewstudiesoncorrelationsbetweenaggressivebehaviorandvariousotherfactorsincludingfamilyandgeneticepidemiology,neurotransmitterandtemporallobe


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deficiencies,serotoninlevels,andautonomicreactivity.Raine(1997,p.50),however,emphasizesthatgeneticfactorsspeakmerelytoapredispositionforcrime:

Twinandadoptionstudiesnotonlydemonstratethatasubstantialamountofvarianceincriminalbehaviorcanbeattributedtogeneticfactors;theyalsodemonstratethatenvironmentalfactorsareequallyimportant.Forexample,whileaheritabilityestimateof.50indicatesthat50%ofthevarianceincriminalbehaviorisduetogeneticinfluences,italsoindicatesthat50%ofthevariancecanbeattributedtonongenetic(environmentalfactors).

(45.)Masters(1997),forexample,arguesthatearlyexposuretolead(notably,theleadfoundinpaints)seemstobeoneofthestrongestpredictorsofbothviolentcrimesandpropertycrimes.

(46.)Wilson(1997)andHaney(2002)providefurtherdiscussionofthisissue.

(47.)Therelevantanalysisactuallyappliesregardlessofwhetherthose“preternaturallystrong”needs,desires,orinclinationshavetheiroriginingeneticsandphysiologyorinearlyexperiences.Inneithercasedoestheindividualchoosetohave(asopposedtochoosetoacton)thefeelingsinquestion.

(48.)PhenylketonuriaorPKUisageneticdisordercharacterizedbyaninabilityofthebodytoutilizeanaminoacidcalledphenylalaninewhichisessentialforthebuildingofbodyproteins.Thecondition,causedbytheabsenceoftheenzymephenylalaninehydroxylase,canbedetectedwithafewdropsofbloodtakenshortlyafterbirth,andcanreadilytreatedbyprovidingtherequiredenzyme.Theexampleofapotentiallycatastrophicgeneticallydeterminedpredispositionthatcanbecompletelyremediedbyapurelyexternalorsituationalinterventionprovidesanobviousmodelforthosewhoseekwaysofforestallingtheeffectsofothergeneticallyorphysiologicallybaseddispositions,includingperhapscriminalbehavioraldispositions.

(49.)Suchaprescription,whilehumaneinitsintent,shouldnotbetakenassupportfortheunconstitutionalholdingofpeoplewhohavenotenjoyed“dueprocess”andtheotherrightsnormallyaffordedthoseaccusedofacrime.

(50.)DarleyandPittman(2003)discussthepsychologicalbasisfor,andstrengthof,theimpulsetocompensatethevictimandtopunishtheoffender.RegardingdeterrenceandthedeathpenaltyRadeletandBorg(2000)arguethatthosewhosupportcapitalpunishmenthavelessenedtheextenttowhichtheycananddorelyondeterrenceasjustificationforitscontinueduse.

(51.)ThisdiscussionowesanobviousdebttotheseminaldiscussioninJohnRawls's(1971)TheoryofJustice.ApplyingRawls'sideaswouldpromptthesuggestionthatpunishmentsimposedonparticularoffendersforparticularoffensesshouldbethosewewouldchoosetoimposefrombehinda“veilofignorance”regardingourstatus—thatis,notknowingwhetherwewouldprovetobeanoffender,avictimofanoffense,oramere


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bystander(justaswewouldapplythesametestindecidinghowtotreatthefrail,thehandicapped,ortheindigent).Asourearlierdiscussionofnaïverealismsuggests,however,ourcapacityforsuchobjectivityislimited,andwemightdowelltomakesomeallowanceforthatlimitation.Butitsurelywouldbedifficulttojustifydoinglessthanapplyingsuchatest.

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University Press Scholarship Online Oxford … character, situational factors, justice, social psychology, culpability, cumulative consequences, naïve realism This chapter discusses