United States v. Davila-Felix, 1st Cir. (2014)

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    United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

    No. 13- 1225

    UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

    Appel l ee,

    v.

    CARLOS DVI LA- FLI X, a/ k/ a Car l os Mona,

    Def endant , Appel l ant .

    APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURTFOR THE DI STRI CT OF PUERTO RI CO

    [ Hon. Franci sco A. Besosa, U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

    Bef or e

    Tor r uel l a and Li pez, Ci r cui t J udges,

    and Gel p , * Di st r i ct J udge.

    I gnaci o Fer nndez- de Lahongr ai s, by appoi nt ment of t he cour t ,f or appel l ant .

    Luke V. Cass, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, wi t h whomRosaEmi l i a Rodr guez- Vl ez, Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, Nel son Pr ez- Sosa,Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, Chi ef , Appel l at e Di vi si on, andMar cel a Cl audi a Mat eo, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, wer e onbr i ef , f or appel l ee.

    August 18, 2014

    * Of t he Di st r i ct of Puer t o Ri co, si t t i ng by desi gnat i on.

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    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Thi s case mar ks t he second

    t i me t hat Appel l ant Car l os Dvi l a- Fl i x ( "Dvi l a") has appear ed

    bef or e t hi s cour t t o chal l enge hi s sent ence. I n Mar ch 2009, a j ur y

    convi ct ed Dvi l a of r obbi ng an FDI C- i nsur ed bank usi ng f or ce and

    i nt i mi dat i on, i n vi ol at i on of 18 U. S. C. 2113( a) , ( d) ( "Count

    One") , and of car r yi ng and br andi shi ng a f i r ear m t o commi t t hat

    r obber y, i n vi ol at i on of 18 U. S. C. 924( c) ( 1) ( A) ( i i ) ( "Count

    Two") . As t o Count One, t he di st r i ct cour t i mposed a mandat or y

    l i f e sent ence pur suant t o t he f eder al "t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e, 18

    U. S. C. 3559( c) ( 1) , and as t o Count Two, i t sent enced Dvi l a t o

    t he mandat or y mi ni mum of 84 mont hs' i mpr i sonment , t o be ser ved

    consecut i vel y. I n Dvi l a' s f i r st appeal , he ar gued t hat t he

    di st r i ct cour t er r ed i n sent enci ng hi m under t he "t hr ee st r i kes"

    st at ut e. We agr eed and r emanded f or r esent enci ng.

    At t he resent enci ng hear i ng, t he gover nment pr esent ed

    addi t i onal evi dence about Dvi l a' s pr i or of f enses. The di st r i ct

    cour t f ound t hat t he evi dence est abl i shed t hat Dvi l a was a car eer

    of f ender , and t he cour t enhanced Dvi l a' s Gui del i nes sent ence

    accor di ngl y. As a r esul t , Dvi l a r ecei ved a sent ence of 300 mont hs

    f or Count One and 120 mont hs f or Count Two, f or a t ot al of 420

    mont hs' i mpr i sonment . Dvi l a now appeal s hi s second sent ence,

    ar gui ng t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed by per mi t t i ng t he gover nment

    t o i nt r oduce addi t i onal evi dence at r esent enci ng t o suppor t t he

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    car eer of f ender enhancement . Af t er car ef ul consi der at i on, we

    af f i r m.

    I. Background

    The det ai l s of Dvi l a' s of f ense conduct and f i r st

    sent enci ng wer e descr i bed t hor oughl y i n Uni t ed St at es v. Dvi l a-

    Fl i x, 667 F. 3d 47 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) ( "Dvi l a I ") , so we pr ovi de onl y

    a br i ef r eci t at i on of t hose f act s her e.

    I n 2003, begi nni ng i n May and endi ng i n November , Dvi l a

    par t i ci pat ed i n a st r i ng of si x bank r obber i es i n Puer t o Ri co. The

    Commonweal t h ar r est ed Dvi l a and char ged hi mwi t h ar med r obber y and

    r el at ed weapons of f enses ar i si ng out of f i ve of t he si x r obber i es.

    The f our t h r obber y t hat t ook pl ace on Sept ember 8, 2003, however ,

    was not i ncl uded i n t he char ges. Dvi l a pl ed gui l t y and r ecei ved

    a si x- year sent ence.

    I n Apr i l 2008, Dvi l a was agai n i ndi ct ed, t hi s t i me f or

    vi ol at i ons of f eder al l aw st emmi ng f r om t he pr evi ousl y unchar ged

    Sept ember 8, 2003, r obbery. Bef ore t r i al began, t he government

    f i l ed an i nf or mat i on pur suant t o 21 U. S. C. 851( a) ( 1) , gi vi ng

    not i ce t hat i t i nt ended t o seek a mandat or y l i f e sent ence under t he

    f eder al "t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e, 18 U. S. C. 3559( c) ( 1) . 1 The

    1 The f eder al "t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e pr ovi des t hat :

    [ A] per son who i s convi ct ed i n a cour t of t he Uni t edSt at es of a ser i ous vi ol ent f el ony shal l be sent enced t ol i f e i mpr i sonment i f - - ( A) t he per son has been convi ct ed( and t hose convi ct i ons have become f i nal ) on separatepr i or occasi ons i n a cour t of t he Uni t ed St at es or of a

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    i nf or mat i on l i st ed f our pr i or convi ct i ons t hat t he gover nment

    bel i eved t r i gger ed t he " t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e: ( 1) a May 23, 1993,

    convi ct i on f or second- degr ee mur der ; ( 2) a J une 25, 1993,

    convi cti on f or vi ol at i ons of Ar t i cl e 401 of t he Cont r ol l ed

    Subst ances Act of Puer t o Ri co; ( 3) a J ul y 20, 2000, convi ct i on f or

    a vi ol at i on of Ar t i cl e 404 of t he Cont r ol l ed Subst ances Act of

    Puer t o Ri co; and ( 4) t he Apr i l 5, 2004, convi ct i on f or bank robber y

    and weapons vi ol at i ons.

    Af t er a f our - day t r i al , t he j ur y convi ct ed Dvi l a on bot h

    t he r obber y and f i r ear m count s, and he was sent enced on

    Sept ember 29, 2009. At t hat sent enci ng hear i ng, t he di st r i ct cour t

    f ound t hat Dvi l a had t wo pr i or vi ol ent f el ony convi ct i ons: ( 1) t he

    second- degr ee mur der convi ct i on f r om May 26, 1993, and ( 2) t he

    ar med bank r obber y convi ct i on f r om Apr i l 5, 2004. The sent enci ng

    j udge began by obser vi ng t hat t hese t wo convi ct i ons qual i f i ed

    Dvi l a as a car eer of f ender , 2 but ul t i mat el y concl uded t hat t he

    St at e of - - ( i ) 2 or mor e ser i ous vi ol ent f el oni es; or( i i ) one or mor e ser i ous vi ol ent f el oni es and one or mor eser i ous dr ug of f enses; and ( B) each ser i ous vi ol entf el ony or ser i ous dr ug of f ense used as a basi s f orsent enci ng under t hi s subsect i on, ot her t han t he f i r st ,was commi t t ed af t er t he def endant s convi ct i on of t hepr ecedi ng ser i ous vi ol ent f el ony or ser i ous dr ug of f ense.

    18 U. S. C. 3559( c) .2 The Sent enci ng Gui del i nes pr ovi de t hat a def endant i s a careerof f ender i f :

    ( 1) t he def endant was at l east ei ght een year s ol d at t het i me t he def endant commi t t ed the i nst ant of f ense of

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    pr i or of f enses t r i gger ed a mandat or y l i f e sent ence under t he " t hr ee

    st r i kes" stat ut e. Accor di ngl y, t he di st r i ct cour t sent enced Dvi l a

    t o l i f e i mpr i sonment as t o Count One, and t o t he mandat ory mi ni mum

    of 84 mont hs f or Count Two, t o be ser ved consecut i vel y.

    Dvi l a' s f i r st appeal f ol l owed. He ar gued t hat hi s

    sent ence was i mposed i n er r or because hi s Apr i l 5, 2004, armed

    r obber y convi ct i on di d not qual i f y as a pr edi cat e of f ense under

    ei t her t he "t hr ee st r i kes" or car eer of f ender pr ovi si ons. I n

    Dvi l a I , t hi s cour t agr eed, hol di ng t hat t he Apr i l 2004 convi ct i on

    di d not qual i f y as a pr i or convi ct i on f or "t hr ee st r i kes" or car eer

    of f ender pur poses because t he Apr i l 2004 convi ct i on occur r ed af t er

    - - not pr i or t o - - Dvi l a' s commi ssi on of t he Sept ember 8, 2003,

    of f enses. 667 F. 3d at 52, 55.

    Addi t i onal l y, we f ound that t he recor d on appeal was

    i nadequat e t o est abl i sh t hat Dvi l a' s J une 25, 1993, convi ct i on

    qual i f i ed as a "cont r ol l ed subst ance of f ense" 3 t hat coul d t r i gger

    convi cti on; ( 2) t he i nst ant of f ense of convi cti on i s af el ony t hat i s ei t her a cri me of vi ol ence or a cont r ol l edsubst ance of f ense; and ( 3) t he def endant has at l east t wopr i or f el ony convi ct i ons of ei t her a cr i me of vi ol ence ora cont r ol l ed subst ance of f ense.

    U. S. S. G. 4B1. 1( a) .

    3 As used her e, a "cont r ol l ed subst ance of f ense" i s:[ A] n of f ense under f eder al or st at e l aw, puni shabl e byi mpr i sonment f or a t er m exceedi ng one year , t hatpr ohi bi t s t he manuf act ur e, i mpor t , expor t , di st r i but i on,or di spensi ng of a cont r ol l ed subst ance ( or a count er f ei tsubst ance) or t he possessi on of a cont r ol l ed subst ance

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    t he car eer of f ender sent enci ng enhancement . I d. at 55- 57. As t hi s

    cour t expl ai ned i n Dvi l a I , t he 1993 convi ct i on st emmed f r om t wo

    vi ol at i ons of Ar t i cl e 401 of t he Cont r ol l ed Subst ances Act of

    Puer t o Ri co. That st at ut e cr i mi nal i zes a r ange of of f enses

    i ncl udi ng conceal ment , di st r i but i on, di sper sal , and possessi on wi t h

    i nt ent t o di st r i but e cont r ol l ed subst ances. See P. R. Laws Ann.

    t i t . 24, 2401. The r ecor d on appeal , however , was i nsuf f i ci ent

    t o al l ow t hi s cour t t o det er mi ne whet her Dvi l a' s J une 1993

    convi ct i on was f or mer el y conceal i ng a cont r ol l ed subst ance, whi ch

    woul d not qual i f y as a pr edi cat e "cont r ol l ed subst ance of f ense, " or

    whet her t he convi ct i on was f or possessi on wi t h i nt ent t o di st r i but e

    a cont r ol l ed subst ance, whi ch woul d qual i f y as a pr edi cat e of f ense.

    I d. We t hus r eversed and r emanded f or r esent enci ng.

    At r esent enci ng, t he gover nment pr ovi ded t he di st r i ct

    cour t wi t h addi t i onal document s - - i ncl udi ng Dvi l a' s change of

    pl ea mot i on - - t o pr ove t hat t he J une 25, 1993, convi ct i on

    qual i f i ed as a cont r ol l ed subst ance of f ense t hat suppor t ed t he

    appl i cat i on of t he career of f ender enhancement . 4 Dvi l a obj ect ed,

    ar gui ng t hat t hi s cour t ' s opi ni on i n Dvi l a I f or ecl osed

    ( or a count er f ei t subst ance) wi t h i nt ent t o manuf act ur e,

    i mpor t , expor t , di st r i but e, or di spense.

    U. S. S. G. 4B1. 2( b) .

    4 I n addi t i on, t he gover nment of f er ed f or t he f i r st t i me t hesear ch and sei zur e or der and cer t i f i cat e of f or ensi c anal ysi sr el at ed t o t he J une 1993 convi ct i on.

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    r econsi derat i on of t he 1993 convi ct i on, and t hat t he gover nment

    shoul d not be gi ven an oppor t uni t y t o pr esent suppl ement al evi dence

    t o est abl i sh t he car eer of f ender enhancement on r emand.

    Af t er br i ef i ng by bot h par t i es, t he di st r i ct cour t r ul ed

    t hat t he r emand was not l i mi t ed i n scope and t hat t he gover nment

    coul d i nt r oduce t he addi t i onal evi dence. The cour t t hen det er mi ned

    t hat - - i n l i ght of t he May 1993 second- degr ee mur der convi ct i on

    and t he J une 1993 convi ct i on f or dr ug of f enses - - Dvi l a qual i f i ed

    as a car eer of f ender . Thi s meant t hat Dvi l a' s gui del i nes sent ence

    f or Count One i ncr eased f r omt he or i gi nal r ange of 84 t o 105 mont hs

    t o an enhanced r ange of 360 mont hs t o l i f e. The di st r i ct cour t

    t hen i mposed a 300- mont h sent ence f or Count One - - t he st at ut ory

    maxi mum- - t o r un consecut i vel y wi t h Dvi l a' s 120- mont h sent ence on

    Count Two.

    II. Analysis

    Thi s cour t r evi ews t he cor r ect ness of a di st r i ct cour t ' s

    l egal anal ysi s at sent enci ng de novo. Sampson v. Uni t ed St at es,

    724 F. 3d 150, 161 ( 1st Ci r . 2013) ; Uni t ed St ates v. Wal l ace, 573

    F. 3d 82, 92 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) . We t hus consi der anew Dvi l a' s

    asser t i ons t hat t he sent enci ng j udge er r ed by per mi t t i ng t he

    gover nment t o i nt r oduce addi t i onal evi dence r el at ed t o hi s pr i or

    convi ct i on, t her eby vi ol at i ng t he l aw of t he case doct r i ne and

    exceedi ng t he scope of r emand. See Uni t ed Stat es v. Genao- Snchez,

    525 F. 3d 67, 69 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( expl ai ni ng t hat t he i nt er pr et at i on

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    of t hi s cour t ' s mandat e "i s a qui nt essent i al l y l egal quest i on, so

    our r evi ew i s pl enar y") .

    Bef ore we addr ess t he mer i t s of Dvi l a' s cl ai m, however ,

    a bi t of backgr ound on t he gover ni ng l egal f r amewor k i s i n or der .

    The l aw of t he case doct r i ne i s a pr udent i al pr i nci pl e r oot ed i n

    i mpor t ant pol i cy i nt er est s l i ke "st abi l i t y i n t he deci si onmaki ng

    pr ocess, pr edi ctabi l i t y of r esul t s, pr oper wor ki ng r el at i onshi ps

    bet ween t r i al and appel l at e cour t s, and j udi ci al economy. " Uni t ed

    St at es v. Bel l , 988 F. 2d 247, 250 ( 1st Ci r . 1993) ( i nt er nal

    quot at i on mar ks and ci t at i on omi t t ed) . I t pr ovi des gener al l y t hat

    "when a cour t deci des upon a r ul e of l aw, t hat deci si on shoul d

    cont i nue t o govern t he same i ssues i n subsequent st ages i n the same

    case. " Wal l ace, 573 F. 3d at 87- 88 ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks and

    ci t at i ons omi t t ed) .

    The so- cal l ed "mandat e r ul e" i s a br anch of t he l aw of

    t he case doct r i ne t hat "pr event s r el i t i gat i on i n t he t r i al cour t of

    mat t er s t hat wer e expl i ci t l y or i mpl i ci t l y deci ded by an ear l i er

    appel l at e deci si on i n t he same case. " Uni t ed St at es v. Mor an, 393

    F. 3d 1, 7 ( 1st Ci r . 2004) . Put anot her way, t he mandat e r ul e

    r equi r es t hat t he t r i al cour t conf or m wi t h t he di r ecti ons of t he

    appel l at e cour t on r emand. Bel l , 988 F. 2d at 251. A di st r i ct

    cour t seeki ng t o det ermi ne t he scope of r emand must t heref ore

    consi der car ef ul l y "bot h t he l et t er and t he spi r i t of t he mandat e,

    t aki ng i nt o account t he appel l at e cour t ' s opi ni on and t he

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    ci r cumst ances i t embr aces. " Genao- Snchez, 525 F. 3d at 70 ( quot i ng

    Uni t ed St at es v. Connel l , 6 F. 3d 27, 30 ( 1st Ci r . 1993) ) .

    I n keepi ng wi t h t hi s l egal f r amewor k, we begi n our r evi ew

    by consi der i ng car ef ul l y t he l et t er and spi r i t of Dvi l a I . As

    per t i nent t o t hi s appeal , our opi ni on i n Dvi l a I expl ai ned t hat

    t he di st r i ct cour t had i nt er pr et ed t he "t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e and

    t he career of f ender enhancement er r oneousl y, and t hat t he r ecord

    di d not suppor t t he appl i cat i on of ei t her . 677 F. 3d at 52- 55.

    Al t hough we di d not f or ecl ose t he possi bi l i t y t hat Dvi l a' s

    vi ol at i ons of Ar t i cl e 401 of t he Cont r ol l ed Subst ances Act of

    Puer t o Ri co coul d qual i f y as a "cont r ol l ed subst ance of f ense"

    wi t hi n t he meani ng of U. S. S. G. 4B1. 1, we hel d t hat t he government

    had not pr ovi ded suf f i ci ent r ecor d evi dence f or t hi s cour t t o make

    such a det er mi nat i on one way or t he ot her . I d. ( "On t he r ecor d

    bef or e us, t he i nf or mat i on pr esent ed r egar di ng t hese dr ug

    convi ct i ons si mpl y does not cont ai n t he r equi si t e i nf or mat i on t hat

    woul d per mi t a cour t t o det er mi ne whet her t hey i ndeed const i t ut e

    ' cont r ol l ed subst ance of f enses' as def i ned by U. S. S. G.

    4B1. 2( b) . " ) . We ul t i mat el y concl uded t hat t he " r ecor d pr ovi des

    i nsuf f i ci ent i nf or mat i on t o j ust i f y t he i mposi t i on of t he sent ence"

    based on Dvi l a' s dr ug of f enses, and that " t he sent ence i mposed by

    t he di st r i ct cour t i s r ever sed and t he case i s r emanded f or

    r esent enci ng. " I d. at 57- 58.

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    Poi nt i ng t o t hi s l anguage, t he gover nment argues t hat

    Dvi l a I i ncl udes no expr ess l i mi t at i on on t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

    abi l i t y t o r ecei ve new ar gument s or evi dence at r esent enci ng. I n

    t he absence of any such pr ohi bi t i on, t he gover nment posi t s t hat t he

    di st r i ct cour t was f r ee t o consi der addi t i onal evi dence i nt r oduced

    f or t he f i r st t i me at r esent enci ng. See Uni t ed St at es v. Br yant ,

    643 F. 3d 28, 33 ( 1st Ci r . 2011) .

    The gover nment i s cor r ect t hat Dvi l a I i mposed no

    expr ess l i mi t at i ons on t he scope of r emand. However , t he absence

    of an expr ess l i mi t at i on does not a l i mi t l ess r emand make. Unl i ke

    some of our si st er ci r cui t s, t he Fi r st Ci r cui t does not gener al l y

    al l ow de novo r esent enci ng on r emand. Compar e Uni t ed Stat es v.

    McFal l s, 675 F. 3d 599, 605 ( 6t h Ci r . 2012) ( "The pr esumpt i on i n

    f avor of a gener al r emand i s necessar i l y st r ong i n t he cont ext of

    a r esent enci ng because the cal cul at i on of a sent ence under t he

    Gui del i nes r equi r es a bal anci ng of many r el at ed var i abl es, and

    t hese var i abl es do not al ways become f i xed i ndependent l y of one

    anot her . " ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks and ci t at i ons omi t t ed) ) , and

    Uni t ed St ates v. Mat t hews, 278 F. 3d 880, 885- 86 ( 9t h Ci r . 2002)

    ( "On r emand, t he di st r i ct cour t gener al l y shoul d be f r ee t o

    consi der any mat t er s r el evant t o sent enci ng, even t hose t hat may

    not have been r ai sed at t he f i r st sent enci ng hear i ng, as i f i t wer e

    sent enci ng de novo. " ) , wi t h Uni t ed St at es v. Cr uzado- Laur eano, 527

    F. 3d 231, 234 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( "Al t hough some ci r cui t s do gener al l y

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    al l ow de novo r esent enci ng on r emand, t he Fi r st Ci r cui t does not . "

    ( ci t at i ons omi t t ed) ) .

    The r ul e of t hi s ci r cui t i s t hat "upon a r esent enci ng

    occasi oned by a r emand, unl ess t he cour t of appeal s [ has expr essl y

    di r ect ed ot her wi se] , t he di st r i ct cour t may consi der onl y such new

    ar gument s or new f act s as ar e made newl y r el evant by t he cour t of

    appeal s' deci si on - - whet her by t he r easoni ng or t he r esul t . "

    Uni t ed St at es v. Ti cchi ar el l i , 171 F. 3d 24, 32 ( 1st Ci r . 1999)

    ( al t er at i on i n or i gi nal ) ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. Whr en, 111 F. 3d

    956, 960 ( D. C. Ci r . 1997) ) . We t heref ore must determi ne whether

    t he evi dence regardi ng Dvi l a' s J une 1993 convi ct i on was made newl y

    r el evant by ei t her t he r easoni ng or r esul t of Dvi l a I .

    Dvi l a cont ends t hat t he car eer of f ender enhancement was

    not made newl y r el evant by Dvi l a I , whi ch f ound t he record

    evi dence of hi s 1993 convi ct i on i nsuf f i ci ent t o suppor t t he car eer

    of f ender enhancement under t he l ong- si nce- est abl i shed modi f i ed

    cat egor i cal appr oach. 5 667 F. 3d at 56. I n Dvi l a' s vi ew, t he

    gover nment had access t o t he evi dence of hi s 1993 convi ct i on at t he

    f i r st sent enci ng as wel l as t he oppor t uni t y t o pr esent i t t hen.

    5 The modi f i ed cat egor i cal appr oach set f or t h i n Tayl or v. Uni t edSt at es, 495 U. S. 575, 599- 602 ( 1990) , est abl i shes t hat a cour t

    seeki ng t o det er mi ne whet her a pr i or convi ct i on qual i f i es as apr edi cat e of f ense at sent enci ng must l ook f i r st t o t he st at ut or ydef i ni t i on of t he of f ense. I f t he stat ut e i s di vi s i bl e andencompasses bot h pr edi cate and non- pr edi cate of f ense conduct , t hecour t shoul d consul t cer t ai n document s of r ecor d t o det er mi newhet her pr edi cat e conduct f or med the basi s of t he pr i or convi ct i on.I d. ; Descamps v. Uni t ed St ates, 133 S. Ct . 2276, 2281 ( 2013) .

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    Thus, t he gover nment ' s f ai l ur e t o pr ovi de adequat e suppor t f or t he

    career of f ender enhancement at t he f i r st sent enci ng di d not make

    t he t opi c newl y r el evant ; i t const i t ut ed wai ver . I n addi t i on,

    Dvi l a ar gues t hat we ought t o f ol l ow our si st er ci r cui t s i n

    hol di ng t hat t he i nt er est s of f ai r ness and j udi ci al economy must

    pr event t he gover nment f r om get t i ng a "second bi t e at t he appl e"

    af t er havi ng f ai l ed t o meet i t s bur den t o est abl i sh an enhancement

    at t he f i r st sent enci ng. We t ake each ar gument i n t ur n. 6

    Begi nni ng wi t h t he quest i on of whet her t he gover nment ' s

    career of f ender argument was newl y r el evant or wai ved, we f i nd t hi s

    cour t ' s anal ys i s i n Ti cchi ar el l i par t i cul ar l y i nstr uct i ve. I n

    Ti cchi ar el l i , we hel d t hat our mandat e di d not pr ecl ude

    consi der at i on of t he def endant ' s new argument as t o dr ug quant i t y

    at r esent enci ng. Ti cchi ar el l i , 171 F. 3d at 31- 33. We expl ai ned

    t hat wher e our mandate does not expr essl y pr ecl ude i t , " t he

    di st r i ct cour t may consi der . . . such new ar gument s or new f act s

    as ar e made newl y r el evant by t he cour t of appeal s' deci si on. " I d.

    at 32 ( quot i ng Whr en, 111 F. 3d at 960) . Thi s i s t r ue even i n cases

    6 Dvi l a al so ar gues t hat t he gover nment ' s i nt r oduct i on of newl yacqui r ed evi dence at r esent enci ng ought t o have been r ej ect ed f orf ai l ur e t o compl y wi t h Feder al Rul e of Cr i mi nal Pr ocedur e 33( b) ( 1) .

    However , Rul e 33( b) ( 1) deal s onl y wi t h t he abi l i t y of cr i mi naldef endant s t o seek new t r i al s on t he basi s of "newl y di scover edevi dence" f ound wi t hi n t hr ee year s of t he dat e of t hei rconvi ct i ons. Fed. R. Cr i m. P. 33( b) ( 1) . As Dvi l a' s r esent enci ngi nvol ved nei t her "newl y di scover ed evi dence" nor a mot i on f or a newt r i al , Rul e 33( b) ( 1) i s ent i r el y i nappl i cabl e t o t hi s appeal .Accor di ngl y, we wi l l spi l l no mor e i nk on t he subj ect .

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    wher e t he def endant had the oppor t uni t y t o pr esent hi s posi t i on at

    hi s f i r st sent enci ng hear i ng "i f he di d not have a r eason t o r ai se

    i t at hi s or i gi nal sent enci ng. " I d. ( quot i ng Whr en, 111 F. 3d at

    960) . Put anot her way, " [ w] het her t her e i s a wai ver depends not

    . . . on count i ng t he number of mi ssed oppor t uni t i es . . . t o r ai se

    an i ssue, but on whet her t he par t y had suf f i ci ent i ncent i ve t o

    r ai se t he i ssue i n t he pr i or pr oceedi ngs. " I d. at 32- 33.

    I n Ti cchi ar el l i ' s f i r st sent enci ng hear i ng, he had no

    i ncent i ve to ar gue dr ug wei ght because i t coul d not af f ect hi s

    sent ence; t he di st r i ct cour t had al r eady i ssued a rul i ng t hat woul d

    have made any such ar gument mer el y academi c. I d. at 33. As a

    def endant i s under no obl i gat i on t o " r ai se ever y obj ect i on t hat

    mi ght have been r el evant " had t he di st r i ct cour t not al r eady r ul ed

    t o t he cont r ar y, we f ound t hat Ti cchi ar el l i shoul d be af f or ded t he

    oppor t uni t y t o pr esent hi s newl y r el evant evi dence of dr ug quant i t y

    at r esent enci ng. I d. ( ci t i ng Uni t ed St at es v. At ehor t va, 69 F. 3d

    679, 684- 85 ( 2d Ci r . 1995) ( hol di ng t hat t he gover nment coul d

    ar t i cul at e new gr ounds f or a depar t ur e at r esent enci ng wher e t he

    def endant ' s sent ence had i ni t i al l y been aut omat i cal l y set at t he

    st at ut or y maxi mumf or r easons t hat wer e no l onger appl i cabl e af t er

    t he appel l at e cour t ' s deci si on i n an ear l i er appeal ) ) .

    I n Dvi l a' s case, t he di str i ct cour t appl i ed Ti cchi ar el l i

    and f ound t hat t he gover nment had no i ncent i ve t o del ve i nt o t he

    J une 1993 convi ct i on at Dvi l a' s f i r st sentenci ng, and t hus t here

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    was no wai ver . We agr ee. The consequence of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

    er r oneous appl i cat i on of t he "t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e at t he f i r st

    sent enci ng hear i ng was a mandatory sent ence of l i f e i mpr i sonment .

    That mandat or y sent ence made i r r el evant any di scussi on of pot ent i al

    sent enci ng enhancement s at t he f i r st sent enci ng. However , t hi s

    cour t ' s deci si on r ever si ng t he mandat or y l i f e sent ence made t he

    subj ect of t he Gui del i nes gener al l y, and t he car eer of f ender

    enhancement speci f i cal l y, newl y r el evant at r esent enci ng. 7

    I n response, Dvi l a ar gues t hat t he gover nment ' s posi t i on

    i s mor e cl osel y anal ogous t o t hat of t he appel l ant i n Bel l t han i n

    Ti cchi ar el l i . I n Bel l , t hi s cour t af f i r med t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

    deci si on t o pr event t he def endant f r omchal l engi ng - - f or t he f i r st

    t i me at r esent enci ng - - hi s st at us as an ar med car eer cr i mi nal .

    988 F. 2d at 248- 50. Si mi l ar l y, Dvi l a r easons, t he gover nment her e

    7 I n t hi s r egar d, Dvi l a' s case i s r eadi l y di st i ngui shabl e f r omt he por t i on of Ti cchi ar el l i hol di ng t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r edby consi der i ng at r esent enci ng an unr el at ed Fl or i da sent ence. 171F. 3d at 35- 36. I n t hat i nst ance, we expl ai ned t hat t he Fl or i dasent ence di d not const i t ut e a "pr i or sent ence" as def i ned byU. S. S. G. 4A1. 2( a) ( 1) . I d. Addi t i onal l y, we obser ved t hat unl i ket he dr ug quant i t y i ssue, t he Fl or i da sent ence was not made newl yr el evant by vi r t ue of our deci si on t hat t he di st r i ct cour t shoul dhave t r eat ed Ti cchi ar el l i ' s dr ugs as mar i j uana rat her t han hashi shoi l f or Gui del i nes pur poses. See i d. Cer t ai nl y, t he r ever sal ofa di scr et i onar y sent ence al one does not r ender newl y r el evant at

    r esent enci ng al t er nat i ve argument s t hat wer e rel evant but notar gued by t he gover nment at a def endant ' s i ni t i al sent enci ng. Butt hat i s not t he case bef or e us. Our deci si on i n Dvi l a I r ever sedt he i mposi t i on of a mandat or y l i f e sent ence under 3559, not adi scr et i onar y sent ence, maki ng newl y r el evant t he pr evi ousl yunargued car eer of f ender enhancement t hat was i r r el evant at t hef i r st sent enci ng.

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    shoul d not have been abl e to ar gue t hat Dvi l a was a car eer

    of f ender f or t he f i r st t i me at hi s second sent enci ng. He al so

    poi nt s out t hat Ti cchi ar el l i i s not ent i r el y on al l - f our s wi t h t he

    f act s of hi s case, because Ti cchi ar el l i r ecogni zed t he abi l i t y of

    a def endant - - not t he gover nment - - t o pr esent new f act s and

    argument at resent enci ng. Moreover , t he sent enci ng j udge i n

    Ti cchi ar el l i had al r eady i ssued a f i nal r ul i ng agai nst t he

    def endant ' s posi t i on pr i or t o t he f i r st sent enci ng, whi l e t her e

    wer e no such f i nal r ul i ngs agai nst t he appl i cat i on of t he car eer

    of f ender enhancement i n t hi s case. See Ti cchi ar el l i , 171 F. 3d at

    33.

    Ul t i mat el y, we f i nd none of t hese di st i nct i ons per suasi ve

    gi ven t he par t i cul ar f acts of t hi s case. As an i ni t i al mat t er ,

    Bel l i s r eadi l y di st i ngui shabl e. I n t hat case, t he def endant

    ar gued successf ul l y dur i ng hi s f i r st appeal t hat t he nat ur e of hi s

    pr i or convi ct i ons cal l ed f or sent enci ng under t he Ar med Car eer

    Cr i mi nal Act ( t he "ACCA") and not t he car eer of f ender gui del i ne.

    Bel l , 988 F. 2d at 249. At hi s r esent enci ng, however , t he def endant

    at t empt ed t o r ever se hi s posi t i on, ar gui ng f or t he f i r st t i me t hat

    t he ACCA shoul d not appl y. I d. at 249- 50. The di st r i ct cour t

    r ef used t o al l ow t he new argument , and on Bel l ' s second appeal , we

    af f i r med t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ng t hat t he mandat e r ul e

    pr event ed r el i t i gat i on of t he i ssue wher e no except i onal

    ci r cumst ances appl i ed and t he i ssue had been pr evi ousl y agr eed upon

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    and deci ded i n t he case. I d. at 252. Her e, i n cont r ast , t he

    gover nment i s not ar gui ng i n cont r avent i on of i t s pr evi ousl y

    asser t ed posi t i on. Addi t i onal l y, i t has expl ai ned i t s f ai l ur e t o

    pr esent t he car eer of f ender evi dence at t he f i r st sent enci ng, and

    i t has pr ovi ded cr edi bl e evi dence to suppor t t he enhancement .

    As f or Dvi l a' s ar gument s t hat Ti cchi ar el l i al l ows onl y

    a def endant t o i nt r oduce new evi dence and t hat i t ought not appl y

    t o the gover nment or i n t he absence of a f i nal or der of t he

    di st r i ct cour t , we cannot agr ee. Fi r st , Dvi l a i gnor es t he f act

    t hat Ti cchi ar el l i ci t es wi t h appr oval a Second Ci r cui t case t hat

    hel d t hat t he gover nment coul d i nt r oduce a new ar gument at

    r esent enci ng when i t l acked i ncent i ve t o i nt r oduce t he argument at

    t he i ni t i al sent enci ng. 171 F. 3d at 33 ( ci t i ng At ehor t va, 69 F. 3d

    at 684- 85) . Second, gi ven t he mandat or y natur e of a l i f e sent ence

    under 3559, t he di st r i ct cour t ' s r ul i ng on t he subj ect pr i or t o

    hear i ng any Gui del i nes ar gument s ser ved as t he f unct i onal

    equi val ent of t he pr i or r ul i ng i n Ti cchi ar el l i , as i t r ender ed al l

    ot her pot ent i al al t er nat i ve ar gument s as t o appl i cabl e Gui del i nes

    i r r el evant .

    I n Uni t ed St ates v. Mont er o- Mont er o, 370 F. 3d 121, 124

    ( 1st Ci r . 2004) , deci ded a f ul l f i ve year s af t er Ti cchi ar el l i , we

    hel d t her e was i nsuf f i ci ent r ecor d suppor t f or t he speci al ski l l s

    adj ust ment i mposed by t he di st r i ct cour t at t he def endant ' s i ni t i al

    sent enci ng. Never t hel ess, we hel d t hat t he di st r i ct cour t coul d

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    al l ow t he par t i es t o devel op t he r ecor d f ur t her at r esent enci ng t o

    determi ne whet her t he adj ust ment was war r ant ed. I d. As we

    expl ai ned, t he case di d not i nvol ve an enhancement t hat t he

    gover nment had sought at t he i ni t i al sent enci ng hear i ng and si mpl y

    f ai l ed t o suppor t adequat el y. I d. Rat her , t he di st r i ct cour t had

    det er mi ned sua spont e t hat a speci al ski l l s adj ust ment was

    war r ant ed wi t hout any such r equest by ei t her par t y. I d. I n t hose

    ci r cumst ances, we hel d that our usual concer ns about t he government

    get t i ng a second bi t e at t he appl e di d not appl y, and t he di st r i ct

    cour t coul d pr oper l y conduct addi t i onal f act f i ndi ng r egar di ng t he

    enhancement at resent enci ng. I d.

    Her e, as i n Mont er o- Mont er o, we f i nd t hat t hi s i s "not a

    case wher e the gover nment asked f or t he enhancement but f ai l ed t o

    adduce suf f i ci ent pr oof f or i t s i mposi t i on. " I d. I n f act, nei t her

    par t y so much as ment i oned t he exi st ence of t he car eer of f ender

    enhancement pr i or t o t he sent enci ng j udge' s sua spont e deci si on t o

    announce t he enhancement ' s appl i cabi l i t y. The di st r i ct cour t t hen

    went on t o r ender t he enhancement moot by sent enci ng Dvi l a i n

    accor dance wi t h t he " t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e. Appl yi ng t he

    Ti cchi ar el l i r ul e t o t he f act s of t hi s case, we f i nd t hat t he

    gover nment di d not wai ve i t s car eer of f ender ar gument by f ai l i ng t o

    advance i t at t he i ni t i al sent enci ng hear i ng when i t l acked t he

    i ncent i ve t o do so. Our r ever sal of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s

    appl i cat i on of t he "t hr ee st r i kes" st at ut e i nval i dat ed a mandat or y

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    sent ence of l i f e i mpr i sonment , t her eby maki ng t he car eer of f ender

    enhancement newl y r el evant at r esent enci ng. I n t he absence of any

    expr ess l i mi t at i ons on our mandat e, t he di st r i ct cour t act ed wel l

    wi t hi n i t s di scr et i on by per mi t t i ng t he par t i es t o i nt r oduce new

    evi dence on the subj ect of t he enhancement at Dvi l a' s

    r esent enci ng.

    As a f i nal mat t er , we consi der Dvi l a' s ar gument t hat we

    ought t o f ol l ow t he l ead of our si st er ci r cui t s and f i nd t hat t he

    i nt er est s of f ai r ness and j udi ci al economy pr event t he gover nment

    f r omobt ai ni ng t oo many bi t es at t he sent enci ng appl e. Our f ai l ur e

    t o do so, he cont ends, wi l l pr ovi de t he government wi t h a bl ank

    check t o t ake as many passes at sent enci ng as necessary t o pr oduce

    t he desi r ed r esul t . 8

    I n suppor t of t hi s vi ew, Dvi l a di r ect s us t o opi ni ons

    f r om our si st er ci r cui t s, poi nt i ng out i nst ances i n whi ch an

    appel l at e cour t expr essl y l i mi t ed t he scope of r emand on t he basi s

    of t he gover nment ' s f ai l ur e t o meet i t s bur den at t he i ni t i al

    sent enci ng. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St ates v. Gammage, 580 F. 3d 777, 779

    8 To t he extent t hat Dvi l a seeks t o i nvoke gener al l y t heconst i t ut i onal pr ohi bi t i on agai nst doubl e j eopar dy, we not e t hatsuch pr i nci pl es ar e ent i r el y i nappl i cabl e t o the si t uat i on at hand,

    whi ch i nvol ves r esent enci ng a def endant t o a l esser sent ence af t ert he def endant ' s successf ul appeal , and not r epeat ed ef f or t s t oconvi ct a def endant f or a gi ven of f ense. See Uni t ed St at es v.Pi mi ent a- Redondo, 874 F. 2d 9, 16 ( 1st Ci r . 1989) ( en banc)( "[ N] ei t her appel l at e revi ew of sent ences nor i ncr eases af t erappeal wi l l or di nar i l y i mpl i cat e doubl e j eopar dy consi der at i ons. "( ci t at i ons omi t t ed) ) .

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    ( 8t h Ci r . 2009) ( "Because t he gover nment was cl ear l y on not i ce t hat

    i t was r equi r ed t o pr ove up [ t he def endant ' s] convi ct i ons bef or e he

    woul d be subj ect t o t he enhancement at i ssue, we di r ect t he

    di st r i ct cour t on remand t o r esent ence [ t he def endant ] based on the

    r ecor d al r eady bef or e i t . ") . He al so di r ect s our at t ent i on t o

    di scussi ons of t he gover nment ' s obl i gat i on t o make i t s case t he

    f i r st t i me ar ound. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Di ckl er , 64 F. 3d

    818, 832 ( 3d Ci r . 1995) ( " [ W] here t he government has t he bur den of

    pr oduct i on and per suasi on . . . i t s case shoul d or di nar i l y have t o

    st and or f al l on t he r ecor d i t makes the f i r st t i me ar ound. I t

    shoul d not nor mal l y be af f or ded a second bi t e at t he appl e. "

    ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks and ci t at i on omi t t ed) ) .

    Wi t hout a doubt , Dvi l a i s cor r ect i nsof ar as he ar gues

    t hat no par t y - - i ncl udi ng t he gover nment - - i s ent i t l ed t o an

    unl i mi t ed number of oppor t uni t i es t o seek t he sent ence i t desi r es.

    Thi s basi c pr oposi t i on i s al r eady wel l - est abl i shed i n t hi s ci r cui t .

    See, e. g. , Connel l , 6 F. 3d at 30 ( "I n t he i nt er est s of bot h

    consi st ency and j udi ci al economy, . . . l i t i gant s shoul d not

    or di nar i l y be al l owed t o t ake ser i al bi t es at t he appel l at e

    appl e. " ) . As we have pr evi ousl y r ecogni zed, i n "a case wher e t he

    government asked f or [ an] enhancement but f ai l ed t o adduce

    suf f i ci ent pr oof f or i t s i mposi t i on . . . t her e woul d not l i kel y be

    r eason t o per mi t a second bi t e at t he appl e. " Mont er o- Mont er o, 370

    F. 3d at 124.

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    Here, however , t he government di d not seek t o i nt r oduce

    at r esent enci ng addi t i onal evi dence t o bol st er i t s f ai l ed "t hr ee

    st r i kes" st at ut e ar gument , or t o suppor t a car eer of f ender ar gument

    i t had pr esent ed unsuccessf ul l y at t he f i r st sent enci ng, ei t her of

    whi ch woul d have const i t ut ed a second bi t e at t he appl e i n

    vi ol at i on of t he mandate r ul e. See Whr en, 111 F. 3d at 959 ( " [ U] pon

    r emand t he Gover nment coul d not of f er new evi dence i n suppor t of

    t he sent enci ng l evel f or whi ch i t had unsuccessf ul l y ar gued at t he

    or i gi nal sent enci ng hear i ng. " ) . Rat her , i t pr esent ed evi dence t o

    suppor t an enhancement - - previ ousl y announced sua sponte by t he

    di st r i ct cour t and not i n r esponse to a r equest f r omt he gover nment

    - - t hat was made newl y rel evant by t hi s cour t ' s r ever sal of a

    mandat or y l i f e sent ence. Cf . At ehor t va, 69 F. 3d at 684- 85

    ( al l owi ng consi derat i on of new gr ounds f or an enhancement at

    r esent enci ng that were not pr evi ousl y addr essed by t he government

    due t o t he aut omat i c appl i cat i on of t he st at ut or y maxi mum at t he

    f i r st sent enci ng) ; Uni t ed St at es v. J ohnson, 378 F. 3d 230, 241 ( 2d

    Ci r . 2004) ( " [ T]he i ssue of ot her enhancement s was put asi de, owi ng

    t o t he murder enhancement , and became newl y r el evant onl y upon

    r emand. " ) . And al t hough Dvi l a seeks to f r ame t he i ssue as one

    unf ai r l y per mi t t i ng t he gover nment l at i t ude deni ed t o a def endant ,

    i n t r ut h, our r emand al l owed t he di st r i ct cour t t o consi der new

    evi dence or ar gument r el at i ng to t he newl y r el evant car eer of f ender

    enhancement as pr oduced by ei t her par t y.

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    Nei t her does Dvi l a' s appeal t o j udi ci al economy do hi m

    any f avors. Our wai ver doct r i ne ensures t hat a par t y must pr esent

    al l r el evant ar gument s bef or e t he di st r i ct cour t i n t he f i r st

    i nst ance t o avoi d wai ver . Our deci si on t oday does not hi ng t o

    under mi ne t hi s gener al l y appl i cabl e r ul e. The nar r ow Ti cchi ar el l i

    except i on appl i es onl y i n i nst ances wher e a pr evi ousl y i r r el evant

    ar gument becomes newl y r el evant as a consequence of an appel l at e

    deci si on; i t does not hi ng t o hel p a l i t i gant who f ai l s t o pr esent

    r el evant evi dence or ar gument bel ow. I n t hi s way, t he Ti cchi ar el l i

    except i on act s i t sel f as a saf eguar d of j udi ci al economy. I t

    guar ds agai nst t he creat i on of an "i r r at i onal " syst em i n whi ch

    l i t i gant s woul d be f or ced t o l i t i gat e ever y concei vabl e sent enci ng

    i ssue at t hei r hear i ng "even t hough i r r el evant t o t he i mmedi at e

    sent enci ng det er mi nat i on i n ant i ci pat i on of t he possi bi l i t y t hat ,

    upon r emand, t he i ssue mi ght be r el evant . " Ti cchi ar el l i , 171 F. 3d

    at 32 ( quot i ng Uni t ed St at es v. J enni ngs, 83 F. 3d 145, 151 ( 6t h

    Ci r . 1996) ) . We ar e t hus conf i dent t hat our deci si on t oday

    pr omot es r at her t han undermi nes j udi ci al economy.

    III. Conclusion

    I n sum, t he di st r i ct cour t di d not er r by consi der i ng at

    r esent enci ng t he newl y r el evant evi dence of Dvi l a' s J une 1993

    convi ct i on. Nei t her wai ver nor t he scope of r emand pr ecl uded such

    consi der at i on. As Dvi l a' s chal l enge on appeal goes onl y t o t he

    pr opr i et y of t he cour t ' s consi der at i on of such evi dence, and he

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    does not ot her wi se cont est t he appl i cat i on of t he car eer of f ender

    enhancement at r esent enci ng, we need go no f ur t her . 9 Accor di ngl y,

    we af f i r m.

    AFFIRMED.

    9 As a f i nal mat t er , we not e t hat Dvi l a f l agged i n hi s br i ef apot ent i al i nst r uct i onal er r or as t o Count Two. He ar gues t hatal t hough he was i ndi ct ed and sent enced f or havi ng br andi shed af i r ear m, t he j ur y made no speci f i c f i ndi ng as t o br andi shi ng, whi chconst i t ut es a vi ol at i on of Al l eyne v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct .2151 ( 2013) . Bot h i n hi s br i ef and at ar gument , however , Dvi l a

    f l at l y conceded t hat he di d not pr eser ve hi s cl ai m by obj ect i ng att r i al or sent enci ng, and t hat hi s unpr eser ved Al l eyne cl ai m coul dnot sur vi ve pl ai n- er r or r evi ew. Our case l aw makes cl ear t hat wer evi ew such unpr eser ved Al l eyne cl ai ms f or pl ai n er r or , Uni t edSt at es v. Del gado- Mar r er o, 744 F. 3d 167, 184 ( 1st Ci r . 2014) , so i nl i ght of Dvi l a' s concessi on on t hat poi nt , no f ur t her di scussi onof t he mat t er i s r equi r ed.

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