UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT COMPLAINT FOR …files.courthousenews.com/2016/04/05/cairinj.pdfApr 05, 2016 · States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 11‐cv‐00050

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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURTEASTERNDISTRICTOFVIRGINIA

ALEXANDRIADIVISIONANASELHADY; )OSAMAHUSSEINAHMED; ) CaseNo.AHMADIBRAHIMALHALABI; ) Hon.MICHAELEDMUNDCOLEMAN; )WAELHAKMEH; )MURATFRLJUCKIC; )ADNANKHALILSHAOUT; ) COMPLAINTFORINJUNCTIVESALEEMALI; ) ANDDECLARATORYRELIEFSHAHIRANWAR; )SAMIRANWAR; )JOHNDOENO.1; )JOHNDOENO.2;and, )JOHNDOENO.3; ) ) Plaintiffs, ) )v. ) )CHRISTOPHERM.PIEHOTA,Directorofthe )TerroristScreeningCenter;inhisofficial )capacity; ) )STEVENMABEUS,PrincipalDeputy )DirectoroftheTerroristScreeningCenter; )inhisofficialcapacity; ) )G.CLAYTONGRIGG,DeputyDirectorof )OperationsoftheTerroristScreening )Center;inhisofficialcapacity; ) )JAMESG.KENNEDY,Director,Transportation )SecurityRedress(OTSR),Transportation )SecurityAdministration(TSA),UnitedStates )DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS),and )DirectoroftheDHSTravelerRedressInquiry )Program(DHSTRIP);inhisofficialcapacity; ) )MATTHEWG.OLSEN,Directorofthe ) NationalCounterterrorismCenter,in )hisofficialcapacity; ) ) Defendants. )

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COMPLAINTFORINJUNCTIVEANDDECLARATORYRELIEF

Plaintiffs, Anas Elhady, Osama Hussein Ahmed, Ahmad Ibrahim Al Halabi,Michael Edmund Coleman, Wael Hakmeh, Murat Frljuckic, Adnan Khalil Shaout,

SaleemAli,ShahirAnwar,SamirAnwar,JohnDoeNo.1,JohnDoeNo.2,andJohnDoeNo.3forthemselvesandonbehalfofallotherssimilarlysituated,throughtheirattorneys,Council on American‐Islamic Relations, Michigan (“CAIR‐MI”), The Law Office of GadeirAbbas,andAkeelandValentine,PLC,stateasfollows:

Introduction

1. OurfederalgovernmentisimposinganinjusticeofhistoricproportionsupontheAmericanswhohavefiledthisaction,aswellasthousandsofotherAmericans.Throughextra‐judicial and secretmeans, the federal government is ensnaring individuals into aninvisiblewebofconsequencesthatareimposedindefinitelyandwithoutrecourseasaresultof the shockingly large federal watch list that now include hundreds of thousands ofindividuals.

2. Indeed,many Americans, includingchildren,enduponthesesecret federalwatchlist–whichtheDefendantshavenamedtheTerroristScreeningDatabase(“TSDB”)–basedonmereguesses,hunches,andconjectureandevensimplybasedonmattersofrace,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religionortheexerciseoftheirconstitutionalrights.

3. These consequences include the inability to fly on airplanes, to go throughsecuritywithouthavingallscreenersreceiveamessagefortheremainderofalistee’slifethat she is a "known or suspected terrorist," to obtain licenses, to exercise their SecondAmendmentrighttoownafirearm,andtobefreefromtheunimaginableindignityandreal‐life danger of having their own government communicate to hundreds of thousands of

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federalagents,privatecontractors,businesses, stateand localpolice, thecaptainsof sea‐faringvessels,andforeigngovernmentsallacrosstheworldthattheyareaviolentmenace.

4. Andunfortunately,thefederalgovernmenthasdesigneditsfederalwatchlistto be accountability‐free. Persons placed on the federal watch list have no means ofremoving themselves or challenging the basis for their inclusion. Indeed, people on thefederalwatch listsonly learnoftheirplacementwhentheyfeel thewebofconsequencesburdeningtheirlivesandaspirations,andtheyneverlearnwhy.

5. Media accounts have made clear that the secret federal watch list is theproductofbigotryandmisguided,counterproductivezeal.Americansaredumpedontothewatch list without being charged, convicted, or in some stomach‐churning cases, evensubjecttoanongoinginvestigation.

6. Instead, two recently leaked government documents and a governmentalreport,whichincludetheMarch2013WatchlistingGuidance(Exhibit2),theDirectorateofTerroristIdentities(DTI):StrategicAccomplishments2013(Exhibit3),andtheDepartmentof Justice's March 2014 Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management ofTerroristWatchlist(Exhibit4)revealthatthecarethefederalgovernmenttakesincreatingits federal watch list is void of proper processing, which in turn results in life‐alteringconsequencesthatflowfromtheseillegalactions.

7. Infact,uponinformationandbelief,Dearborn,acityoflessthan100,000andaplaceArabAmericansandMuslimAmericanshavecalledhomeforgenerations,containsthe second highest concentration of Americans on the federal government's watch list.Moreover,therehavebeenmorethan1.5millionnominationstothefederalwatchlistsince

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2009andthat,in2013forexample,theTerroristScreeningCenterconverted98.96percentofthosenominationsintowatchlistplacements.

8. Uponinformationandbelief,evidencealsoshowsthatthefederalgovernmentuses guilt‐by‐association presumptions to place family members and friends of listedpersonsonthewatchlist.

9. Moreover,traveltoMuslimmajoritycountries—travelthatAmericanMuslimsareverylikelytoengagein—isalsoabasisforwatchlistplacement.

10. In 2009, the federal governmentmade 227,932 nominations to its federalwatchlist.In2013,thatnumbermorethandoubledatanalarminganddangerousrateto468,749.

11. Recently,afederalcourtjudgeobservedinGuletMohamedv.EricR.Holder,Jr.,etal.(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011)),that“[a]showingofpastorongoingunlawfulconductdoesnotseemtoberequired,…Butthe Court has little, if any, ability to articulate what information is viewed by TSC assufficiently‘derogatory’beyondthelabelsithasprovidedtheCourt.Insum,theNoFlyListassumes that there are some American citizens who are simply too dangerous to bepermitted to fly, nomatter the level of pre‐flight screening or on‐flight surveillance andrestraint, even though those citizens cannot be legally arrested, detained, or otherwiserestrictedintheirmovementsorconduct.”SeeUnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011);Dkt.70at19;attachedasMemorandumOpinion(Exhibit1).

12. Moreover,theCourtwentontofindthat“[i]nclusionontheNoFlyListalsolabels an American citizen a disloyal American who is capable of, and disposed toward

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committing,warcrimes,andonecaneasilyimaginethebroadrangeofconsequencesthatmightbe visitedupon such aperson if that stigmatizingdesignationwereknownby thegeneralpublic…TheprocessofnominationtotheNoFlyListisbasedonasuspectedleveloffuturedangerousnessthatisnotnecessarilyrelatedtoanyunlawfulconduct.”SeeUnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011);Dkt.70at14,17;attachedasMemorandumOpinion(Exhibit1).

Parties

13. PlaintiffYaseenKadura isa26yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginCookCounty,Illinois.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

14. PlaintiffOsamaHusseinAhmed isa24yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWayneCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

15. Plaintiff Anas Elhady is a 22 year old United States Citizen and a MuslimresidinginWayneCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

16. PlaintiffGuletMohamed isaUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresiding inFairfax County, Virginia. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events oromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

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17. PlaintiffAhmadIbrahimAlHalabiisa37yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWayneCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

18. PlaintiffMichaelEdmundColemanisa44yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWayneCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

19. PlaintiffWaelHakmeh is a 37 year oldUnited States Citizen and aMuslimresiding inOaklandCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecausea substantialpartof theeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

20. Plaintiff Adnan Khalil Shaout is a 55 year old United States Citizen and aMuslim residing in Jordan. Venue is proper because a substantial part of the events oromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

21. PlaintiffSaleemAliisa43yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWayneCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecausea substantialpartof theeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

22. Plaintiff Shahir Anwar is a 36 year oldUnited States Citizen and aMuslimresiding inMacombCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecauseasubstantialpartof the

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eventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

23. Plaintiff Samir Anwar is a 29 year old United States Citizen and aMuslimresiding inMacombCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecauseasubstantialpartof theeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

24. PlaintiffMariamJukakuisa32yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginAlamedaCounty,California. Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

25. PlaintiffMohammadHaydarisa34yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginAlamedaCounty,California. Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

26. Plaintiff JohnDoeNo.1 isa51yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWashtenawCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

27. Plaintiff JohnDoeNo.2 isa38yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresiding inOaklandCounty,Michigan. Venue isproperbecausea substantialpartof theeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

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28. Plaintiff JohnDoeNo.3 isa55yearoldUnitedStatesCitizenandaMuslimresidinginWashtenawCounty,Michigan.Venueisproperbecauseasubstantialpartoftheeventsoromissionsgivingrisetohisclaimsoccurredwithinthisdistrictwhichiswherethefederalwatchlistiscompiled.

29. Defendant Christopher M. Piehota is the current Director of the TerroristScreening Center (“TSC”). Defendant Piehota was appointed in April, 2013. DefendantPiehotadevelopsandmaintainsthefederalgovernment’sconsolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptsnominationsofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican citizens made to the federal watch list. Defendant Piehota also oversees thedissemination of the stigmatizing label attached toPlaintiffs and other similarly situatedAmericancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”tostateandlocalauthorities,foreigngovernments, corporations, private contractors, gun sellers, the captains of sea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.DefendantPiehotaisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

30. Defendant Steven Mabeus is the current Principal Deputy Director of theTerrorist Screening Center (“TSC”). DefendantMabeuswas appointed inOctober, 2013.Defendant Mabeus develops and maintains the federal government’s consolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptsnominationsofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantMabeusalso oversees the disseminationof the stigmatizing label attached toPlaintiffs and othersimilarly situatedAmericancitizensof “knownor suspected terrorists” to stateand localauthorities,foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptains

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ofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals. DefendantMabeusisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

31. DefendantG.ClaytonGriggisthecurrentDeputyDirectorofOperationsoftheTerrorist Screening Center (“TSC”). Defendant Grigg began serving in September, 2013.Defendant Grigg developed and maintained the federal government’s consolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”),andacceptednominationsofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist.DefendantGriggalso oversaw the dissemination of the stigmatizing label attached to Plaintiffs and othersimilarly situatedAmericancitizensof “knownor suspected terrorists” to stateand localauthorities,foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals. DefendantGriggisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

32. Defendant James Kennedy is the Director of the Office of TransportationSecurity Redress (OTSR), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), United StatesDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS).DefendantKennedyalsoservesastheDirectorofthe DHS Traveler Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). Defendant Kennedy is responsible foroverseeing DHS TRIP, the administrative complaint process to challenge nominations ofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensmadetothefederalwatchlist,andcoordinatingwithothergovernmentagencies,includingtheTerrorismScreeningCenter,toresolvethecomplaint.DefendantKennedyisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

33. Defendant Matthew G. Olsen is Director of the National CounterterrorismCenter (“NCTC”). Defendant Olsen is responsible for Defendant the nominations that

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resultedintheplacementofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlist.Olsenisbeingsuedinhisofficialcapacity,only.

JurisdictionandVenue

34. Under U.S. Const. Art. III §2, this Court has jurisdiction because the rightssoughttobeprotectedhereinaresecuredbytheUnitedStatesConstitution.Jurisdictionisproperpursuantto28U.S.C.§1331,Bivensv.SixUnknownNamedAgentsofFederalBureauofNarcotics, 403U.S.388 (1971),et seq., 5U.S.C. §702,5U.S.C. §706, theUnitedStatesConstitution,andfederalcommonlaw.

35. ThisactionseeksdeclaratoryreliefpursuanttotheDeclaratoryJudgmentAct,28U.S.C.§§2201‐02,Rules57and65oftheFederalRulesofCivilProcedure,andpursuanttothegeneral,legal,andequitablepowersofthisCourt.

36. Thisactionalsoseeksdamagespursuantto28U.S.C.§1343(a)(4)and28U.S.C.§1357.

37. AsubstantialpartoftheunlawfulactsallegedhereinwerecommittedwithinthejurisdictionoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofVirginia.

38. Venue is proper under 42 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as to all Defendants becauseDefendantsareofficersoremployeesofagenciesoftheUnitedStatessuedintheirindividualcapacities and because this judicial district is where a substantial part of the events oromissionsgivingrisetotheclaimsoccurred.

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FactualBackground

TheFederalGovernment’sTerroristWatchList

39. InSeptember,2003,AttorneyGeneralJohnAshcroftestablishedtheTerroristScreeningCenter(“TSC”)toconsolidatethegovernment’sapproachtoterrorismscreening.TheTSC,whichisadministeredbytheFBI,developsandmaintainsthefederalgovernment’sconsolidatedTerrorismScreeningDatabase(the“watchlist”).TSC’sconsolidatedwatchlistis the federal government’s master repository for suspected international and domesticterroristrecordsusedforwatchlistrelatedscreening.

40. Thewatchlisthastwoprimarycomponents:theSelecteeListandtheNo‐FlyList.PersonsontheSelecteeList,includingmanyofPlaintiffs,aresystematicallysubjecttoextrascreeningatairportsandlandbordercrossings,andoftenfind“SSSS”ontheirboardingpassesprintedbyairlineemployeeswhich ismarked to indicateapassenger’swatch liststatus to airline employees and screeners. Persons on the No‐Fly List, including theremainder of Plaintiffs, are prevented fromboarding flights that fly into, out of, or eventhroughUnitedStatesairspace.

41. TSCdisseminates records from its terroristwatch list toothergovernmentagencies that in turn use those records to identify suspected terrorists. For example,applicableTSCrecordsareprovidedtoTSAforusebyairlinesinpre‐screeningpassengersandtoCBPforuseinscreeningtravelersenteringtheUnitedStatesbyland.

42. Uponinformationandbelief,TSCdisseminatedtherecordsofPlaintiffsfromitsterroristwatchlisttoothergovernmentagencies,includingtheTSAforusebyairlinesinpre‐screeningPlaintiffs, andCBP foruse in screeningPlaintiffsuponentering theUnitedStates.

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43. Uponinformationandbelief,DefendantsdisseminatedtherecordspertainingtoPlaintiffsfromitsterroristwatchlisttoforeigngovernmentswiththepurposeandhopethat those foreign governments will constrain the movement of the Plaintiffs in somemanner.

44. Uponinformationandbelief,Defendants’intentionindisseminatingwatchlistrecords,includingthoseofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,aswidelyaspossibleistoconstrainPlaintiffs’movements,notonlywithintheUnitedStates,butabroadaswell.Forexample,somecountriesdetainindividualslistedonthefederalwatchlistwhoenter theirborders, question those individuals at thebehestofUnitedStatesofficials, oraltogetherpreventthoseindividualsfromevenenteringthosecountries.

45. Thus, while the TSC maintains and controls the database of suspectedterrorists,itisthefront‐lineagenciesliketheTSAthatcarryoutthescreeningfunction.Inthecontextofairtravel,whenindividualsmakeairlinereservationsandcheckinatairports,the front‐line screening agency, like TSA and CBP, conducts a name‐based search of theindividual,includingeachofthePlaintiffs,todeterminewhetherheorsheisonawatchlist.

46. Whileagenciesthroughoutthefederalgovernmentutilizethefederalwatchlist to conduct screening, listed persons are subject to a comprehensive portfolio ofconsequencesthatcoverlargeaspectsoftheirlives.

47. Indeed, the federal government disseminates its federal watch list to bothgovernmentauthoritiesandprivatecorporationsandindividualswiththepurposeandhopethat these entities and/or individuals will impose consequences on those individualsDefendantshavelisted.

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48. Upon information and belief, the status of Plaintiffs and similarly situatedAmericancitizensasknownorsuspectedterroristsonthefederalwatchlistdiminishesandevenimperilstheirabilitytoaccessthefinancialsystem.

49. Bankshaveclosedthebankaccountsofindividualslistedonthefederalwatchlist and financial companieshavedeclined toallowsome listed individuals tomakewiretransfers.

50. Moreover, upon information and belief, the citizenship and green cardapplicationsofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensaredelayed indefinitelydue toan “FBInamecheck”andnotadjudicated, therebydenyingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensof therights the flow fromcitizenship, including theability totravel freely as a United States citizen and to sponsor for lawful permanent residencyimmediaterelativeslivingabroad.

51. Amongtheentitiesandindividualsthatthefederalgovernmentdisseminatesits federal watch list are state and local authorities, foreign governments, corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongothers.

52. Upon information and belief, because the names of Plaintiffs and similarlysituated American citizens are included on the federal watch list, their names weredisseminated to state and local authorities, foreign governments, corporations, privatecontractors,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.

53. Becausethefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttoforeigngovernments, listedpersons, includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,areoftennotallowedtoenterothernations.ThisisbecausetheUnitedStatesistellingother

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nations,withoutanymodicumofdueprocess,thatthousandsofitsowncitizensare“knownorsuspectedterrorists.”

54. Thefederalgovernmentdisseminatesitsfederalwatchlisttostateandlocalpoliceofficers,includingPlaintiffs,whichallowsthoseofficerstoquerythenamesofpersons,ifforexample,thelistedindividualispulledoverforroutinetrafficviolations.

55. DisseminatingthefederalwatchlisttostateandlocalpoliceofficerscreatesadangeroussituationinsofarasthefederalwatchlisteffectivelydirectsstateandlocalofficerstotreatthousandsofAmericans,includingPlaintiffs,chargedorconvictedwithnocrimeyetlistedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist”andasextremelydangerous.

56. Withtheadventanddeploymentofautomaticlicenseplatereadersbypolicedepartments across the country, local and state authorities have relied heavily upon adriver’s watch list status as the basis of a traffic stop, including Plaintiffs and similarlysituatedAmericancitizens.

57. Beingonthefederalwatchlistcanpreventlistedpersons,includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,frompurchasingagun.Forexample,NewJerseypassed a law in 2013 that banned persons on the federal watch list from owning guns.Additionally, Connecticut is in the process of setting up an institutional mechanism topreventindividualswhosenamesareincludedonthefederalwatchlist,suchasPlaintiffs,frombeingabletobuyaguninthestateofConnecticut.

58. Accordingly,PlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensareunabletopurchasegunsinstatesthatbanpersonsonthefederalwatchlistfromowningguns.

59. Because the federal government conducts a security risk assessment thatincludesqueryingthefederalwatchlistpriortoissuingalicensetocommercialdriversto

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transporthazardousmaterials,beingonthefederalwatchlistcanpreventlistedpersons,including Plaintiffs and similarly situatedAmerican citizens, from obtaining or renewingtheirHazmatlicense.

60. Being on the federal watch list can also prevent listed persons, includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,fromaccompanyingminorsorpassengerswithdisabilitiestotheirgate,fromworkingatanairport,orworkingforanairlineinsofaraslistedpersonsarenotallowedtoenterso‐called“sterileareas”ofairports.

61. BeingonthefederalwatchlistcanalsoresultinthedenialorrevocationofaFederalAviationAdministration(FAA)licenseofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens.

62. AlthoughTSA,CBP,andotheragenciesmayusetherecordsprovidedbytheTSC,itistheTSCthatmaintainsandcontrolsthedatabaseofsuspectedterrorists.

63. Two government entities, including the Unidentified FBI Agents andUnidentifiedTSCAgentsemployedbythosegovernmententities,areprimarilyresponsiblefor“nominating”individualsforinclusionintheterroristwatchlist—theNCTCandtheFBI.TheNCTC,whichismanagedbytheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,reliesoninformationfromotherfederaldepartmentsandagencieswhenincludingallegedknownorsuspectedinternationalterroristsinitsTerroristIdentitiesDatamartEnvironment(“TIDE”)database.TheNCTCreviewsTIDEentriesandrecommendsspecificentriestotheTSCforinclusioninthewatchlist.TIDEisthemainsourceofallinternationalterroristinformationincludedinthewatchlist.

64. TheFBI,includingtheUnidentifiedFBIAgents,inturn,nominatestothewatchlist individualswithwhat it characterizes as suspected ties to domestic terrorism. TSC,

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includingDefendantHealyandUnidentifiedTSCAgents,makesthefinaldecisiononwhetheranominatedindividualmeetstheminimumrequirementsforinclusionintothewatchlistasaknownorsuspectedterrorist.TSCalsodecideswhichscreeningsystemswillreceivetheinformationaboutthatindividual.

65. DefendantHealyhastestifiedthatinevaluatingwhetheranindividualmeetsthe criteria for inclusionon the consolidatedwatch list, theTSCdetermineswhether thenominated individual is “reasonably suspected” of having possible links to terrorism.AccordingtotheTSC,“reasonablesuspicionrequiresarticulablefactswhich,takentogetherwithrationalinferences,reasonablywarrantthedeterminationthatanindividualisknownorsuspectedtobeorhasbeenengagedinconductconstituting,inpreparationfor,inandoforrelatedtoterrorismandterroristactivities.”

66. DefendantshavenotstatedpubliclywhatstandardsorcriteriaareappliedtodeterminewhetheranAmericancitizenontheconsolidatedwatchlistwillbeplacedontheNo‐FlyList,SelecteeList(“SSSS”)orotherlistthatisdistributedtotheTSA,CBPorotherscreeningagencies.

67. The standards for watch list inclusion do not evince even internal logic.Defendantsdefinea“suspectedterrorist”asan“individualwhoisreasonablysuspectedtobe,orhavebeen,engagedinconductconstituting,inpreparationfor,inaidof,orrelatedtoterrorismandterroristactivitiesbasedonarticulableandreasonablesuspicion.”Inotherwords, Defendants place American citizens on the federal watch list based upon a“reasonable suspicion” that they are “reasonably suspected” of nefarious activities. This“reasonablesuspicion”basedona“reasonablesuspicion”standarddoesnotevencontaininternallogic.

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68. Thefederalgovernmentutilizesguilt‐by‐associationasabasisforwatchlistinclusion.Forexample,theimmediaterelativeoflistedpersonscanbelistedwithoutanyderogatory information—other than the bonds of family. Nonetheless, such designationsuggeststhattheimmediaterelativeishimorherselfengagedinnefariousactivities.

69. Being a known associate—a friend, colleague, fellow community member,etc.—ofalistedindividualcanalsoprovideabasisforwatchlistinclusion.

70. EvenifanAmericancitizenisacquittedofterrorismchargesorthosechargesareotherwisedismissed,thefederalgovernmentretainsforitselftheauthoritytocontinuetoincludetheminthewatchlist.

71. Forreasonsunknown,Defendantsalsoplacewhattheycall“non‐investigatorysubjects”onthefederalwatchlist,Americancitizensthattheyhavechosennottoinvestigate.

72. Under these practices and standards, the number of records in theconsolidatedwatchlisthasswelled.Over1.5millionnominationstothewatchlisthavebeensubmittedbyfederalagenciessincefiscal2009.

73. In2013,DefendantTSCaccepted98.96percentofallnominationsmade.74. Becauseoftheseloosestandardsandpractices,thefederalwatchlist’srateof

growthhasincreased.Infiscal2009,therewere227,932nominationstothewatchlist.Infiscal2013,therewere468,749nominations.

75. Uponinformationandbelief,in2001,therewere16peoplewhothefederalgovernmentsystematicallypreventedfromflying.In2013,thatnumberincreasedto47,000.

76. Once anAmerican citizenhasbeenplacedon thewatch list, the individualremainsonthelistuntiltheagencythatsuppliedtheinitial informationinsupportofthenominationdeterminestheindividualshouldberemoved.

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77. A2007GAOreportfoundthatTSCrejectsonlyapproximatelyonepercentofallnominationstothewatchlist.1Assuch,thewatchlistisgrowingatarateofapproximately20,000entriesperyear.

78. AtaMarch10,2010SenateHomelandSecurityCommitteehearing,RusselE.Travers,DeputyDirectoroftheNationalCounterterrorismCenter,statedthat“[t]heentirefederalgovernmentisleaningveryfarforwardonputtingpeopleonlist,”andthatthewatchlistis“gettingbigger,anditwillgetevenbigger.”

79. ThefederalwatchlistalsodisproportionatelytargetsAmericanMuslims.80. Defendantshaveutilizedthewatchlist,notasatooltoenhanceaviationand

bordersecurity,butasabludgeontocoerceAmericanMuslimsintobecominginformantsorforgoingtheexerciseoftheirrights,suchastherighttohaveanattorneypresentduringlawenforcementquestioning.

81. Public examplesof thisphenomenonabound. SeeLatifv.Holder,2014U.S.Dist.LEXIS85450,*19(D.Or.June24,2014)(anFBIagenttoldStevenWashburnthathe“wouldhelpremoveWashburn'snamefromtheNo‐FlyListifheagreedtospeaktotheFBI”);Id.at*21‐22(FBIagentstoldIbraheimMashalthat“hisnamewouldberemovedfromtheNo‐Fly List and he would receive compensation if he helped the FBI by serving as aninformant.”):Idat*22‐23(FBIagentsofferedAmirMeshal“theopportunitytoserveasagovernment informant in exchange for assistance in removinghisname from theNo‐FlyList.”). SeealsoFikrev.FBI,2014U.S.Dist. LEXIS73174 (D.Or.May29,2014) (EmiratiofficialstoldYonasFikrethathe“couldnottraveltotheUnitedStatesbyairbecauseheison

1 See United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters entitled Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List, GAO‐08‐110, October 2007, at 22.

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theNo‐FlyList”andanFBIagenttoldFikrethat“theFBIcouldtakestepstoremove[him]fromtheNo‐FlyListifheagreedtobeaninformant.”);Tanveerv.Holder,et.al.,No.13‐cv‐6951,Dkt.15(April22,2014)(NaveedShinwari “declinedtoactasan informant for theFederalBureauofInvestigationandtospyon[his]ownAmericanMuslimcommunitiesandotherinnocentpeople.”).

82. AlmostallpubliclyknowninstancesofAmericansbeingplacedonthewatchlistregardMuslimsorpersonswhocouldbemistakenforMuslims.

83. Additionally,governmentrecordsshowthatDearborn,Michigan—whichis40percentArab—isdisproportionatelyrepresentedonthefederalwatchlist.Infact,Dearbornisamongthetopfivecitiesinthecountry,alongsideChicago,Houston,NewYork,andSanDiego,representedonthefederalwatchlist.

84. Defendants’ 2013WatchlistingGuidancealso indicates that “[t]ravel fornoknownlawfulorlegitimatepurposetoalocusofterroristactivity”canbeabasisforbeinglisted.Whilea“locusofTerroristActivity”isnotdefinedbythedocument,uponinformationandbelief,itlikelyincludesanyplacewheremanyMuslimsreside.

85. Thefederalwatchlist’sinclusionstandardsaresopermissiveandpliableandthe selectee list's efficacy is at best fleetingly marginal that the inclusion standardsthemselvesviolatePlaintiffsproceduralandsubstantivedueprocess.

86. Thefederalwatchlistdiminishes,ratherthanenhances,ournationalsecuritybecausethenumberofinnocentAmericansonthelistisbecomingsovoluminousthatthepurposeofhavingalistissignificantlyunderminedasallarebeingtreatedasthesame.

87. Theconsequencesofbeingonthefederalwatchlistaremetedoutpublically.Membersofthepubliccanwitnesstheextrascreeningtowhichindividualsonthefederal

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watchlistaresubject,includingbeingpulledoutoftheircaratgunpoint,beingorderedtoleave one's vehiclewith one's hands held above his/her head, among other stigmatizingmeasures.

88. Inpractice,frontlinescreenersdisclosethestatusofindividualsonthefederalwatchlisttostateandlocalauthorities,aswellasairlineemployees.

89. Theoperationofthefederalwatchlistenlistsaircarrierstoassistthefederalgovernmentintrackingthepassengeronthefederalwatchlist.

90. DefendantsapplythefederalwatchlistagainstMuslimAmericansinamannerthatisdifferentfromhowitusesitslistagainstpeopleofotherfaithbackgrounds.

91. Defendantsuseimpermissibleandinaccuratereligiousprofilesincompilingthefederalwatchlist.

92. Defendants who contributed to the placement of Plaintiffs and similarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlistknewthattheiractionsviolatedclearlyestablishedfederallaw.

93. Defendants knew at the time they acted unlawfully that Supreme Courtprecedent required that,whenever a citizen is deprived of a liberty interest, the federalgovernmentmustatleastprovidethedeprivedwithsomeformofnoticethatadeprivationoccurred.

InadequacyoftheDHSTravelerRedressInquiryProgramProcess

94. The government entities and individuals involved in the creation,maintenance, support, modification and enforcement of the federal watch list, includingDefendants,havenotprovidedtravelers,includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmerican

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citizens,witha fairandeffectivemechanism throughwhich theycanchallenge theTSC’sdecisiontoplacethemontheterroristwatchlist.

95. An individual, including Plaintiffs and similarly situated American citizens,whohasbeenpreventedorhinderedfromtravelbybeingplacedonthefederalwatchlisthas no clear avenue for redress, because no single government entity is responsible forremovinganindividualfromthelist.TheTSC,whichisadministeredbytheFBI,doesnotacceptredressinquiriesfromthepublic,nordoesitdirectlyprovidefinaldispositionlettersto individuals on the selectee list, including Plaintiffs on the selectee list and similarlysituatedAmericancitizens,whohavesubmittedredressinquiries.TheNCTCwhichmanagestheTIDElistdoesnotacceptredressinquiriesfromthegeneralpublic.

96. Individualswhoseekredressafterhavingbeenincludedintheterroristwatchlist must submit an inquiry through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (“DHSTRIP”).DHSTRIPprovidesindividualswitha“RedressControlNumber.”

97. DHSTRIPistheonlyredress“process”availabletoindividualsincludedontheterroristwatchlist.

98. DHSTRIPsubmitstravelercomplaintstotheTSC,whichdetermineswhetheranyactionshouldbetaken. TheTSChasnotprovidedanypubliclyavailableinformationabouthowitmakesthatdecision. TheTSC is the finalarbiterofwhetheran individual’snameisretainedonorremovedfromthewatchlist,includingthoseofPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens.

99. TheTSCmakesadeterminationregardingaparticularindividual’sstatusonthewatchlist,includingPlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,andDHSinturnrespondstotheindividualwithastandardformletterthatneitherconfirmsnordeniesthe

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existenceofanyterroristwatchlistrecordsrelatingtotheindividual.Thelettersdonotsetforthanybasisforinclusioninaterroristwatchlist,donotstatewhetherthegovernmenthasresolvedthecomplaintatissue.

100. ThegovernmentdoesnotprovideanAmericancitizenwithanyopportunitytoconfront,ortorebut,thegroundsforhisorherpossibleinclusiononthewatchlist.Assuch,DHSTRIPoffersnomeaningfulreviewofthewatchlistdesignationandineffectshieldstheTSC’sactionswithrespecttotheindividualnominationsorclassesofnominationsfrommeaningfulreviewbyanyindependentauthority.

101. Moreover,thegovernment’sowninternalauditsofthesystempointtoseriousflaws.Forexample,aMarch2008DOJOfficeoftheInspectorGeneralreportentitledAuditoftheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeTerrorismWatchlistNominationProcessesfoundsignificantproblemswiththenominationandremovalprocess.

102. Thus,theonly“process”availabletosuchindividualsistosubmittheirnamesandotheridentifyinginformationtoagovernmententitythathasnoauthoritytoprovideredressandtohopethatanunspecifiedgovernmentagencycorrectsanerrororchangesitsmind.

103. Asallegedbelow,eachofthePlaintiffsandsimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensaredesignatedonthewatchlist.

PlaintiffAnasElhady

104. Mr.AnasElhadyisroutinelyreferredtosecondaryinspection,handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPat landbordercrossingswhenheattemptstore‐entertheUnitedStatesfromCanada.

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105. CBPofficersroutinelysubjecthimtoaprolongeddetentionandquestioningforapproximatelyfourtotwelvehourseachtime.

106. Moreover, he is routinely asked questions about his religious beliefs andpractices,whatsectofIslamhebelongsto,whatmosquehepraysin,amongotherthings.

107. Moreover,everytimeMr.Elhadytravelsbyair,hisboardingpassisstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

108. Mr.ElhadyfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.109. OnMay11,2015,Mr.Elhadyreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph99

aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.110. Shortly afterwards,Mr.Elhadywasagain referred to secondary inspection,

handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheAmbassadorBridgePortofEntryinDetroit,Michigan,forapproximatelysixhourswhenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

111. AftertheCBPofficersconfiscatedMr.Elhady’sjacketandshoes,theydetainedhiminasmall,freezingcoldholdingcellwithbrightlights.

112. Afterseveralhours,Mr.Elhadyknockedonthedoorrepeatedlyandbeggedforsomeonetohelphim.Hispleasforhelpwereignored.

113. Afterwards,hisbodybeganshakinguncontrollablyandhefellunconscious.114. CBPofficersfinallyopenedthedoorandwokehimup.115. Mr.Elhadyrepeatedlybeggedforanambulancetotakehimtothehospital,but

hispleaswereignored.

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116. Finally,Mr.Elhadywastakentoanambulance,onlytobehandcuffedtothebedinsidetheambulance.

117. Mr.Elhadywastakentoalocalhospital,wherehewashandcuffedtoachairinthewaitingroomofthehospital.

118. After being attended to by nurses and physicians, and prescribed themedicationthatheneeded,Mr.ElhadywasagainhandcuffedtoachairinsideavehicleandtransportedbacktotheAmbassadorBridge.

119. OnDecember2,2015,FBISpecialAgentJoshAllencontactedMr.ElhadyandinformedhimthathisphonewasbeingtappedandthatallhiscallswerebeinglistenedtobytheFBI.

120. Mr. Elhady’s boarding pass continues to be stamped with the “SSSS”designationwhen travels by air, indicating that he has been designated as a “known orsuspectedterrorist.”

121. Additionally,everytimeMr.Elhadytravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

122. AtnotimewasMr.Elhadygivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

123. Moreover, atno timewasMr.Elhadygivennoticeof thedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

124. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Elhadyremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

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125. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Elhady’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwas made based solely upon a hunch (based upon his race, ethnicity, national origin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffOsamaHusseinAhmed

126. On or about February orMarch, 2011,Mr. Osama Ahmed appeared at theDetroitMetropolitanAirport,uponreturninghomeonacommercialflightfromYemen.

127. Mr. Ahmed was escorted from the gate to an interrogation room andinterrogatedbyFBIagentsforapproximatelysixtosevenhours.

128. The FBI agents confiscated his USB drive that he hadwith him, and uponinformationandbelief,downloadedtheinformationfromhisUSBdrive.

129. Severaldayslater,FBIagents,includingSpecialAgentJoelKelso,appearedatMr.Ahmed’shome.

130. TheFBIagentstookhimtoanearbybd’sMongolianGrill,andattemptedtorecruitMr.AhmedintobecominganinformantinYemen.

131. TheFBIagentstriedtoenticeMr.Ahmed,whowasonly18yearsoldatthetime, intobecomingan informantbyoffering to teachhimhowtoskydive,amongotherthings.

132. SpecialAgentKelsoinformedMr.AhmedthathisnamewasontheNo‐FlyList,andthatifhecooperated,hisnamewouldberemovedfromthelist.

133. OnApril29,2011,Mr.AhmedfiledacomplaintthroughDHSTRIP.134. OnMay2,2011,Mr.Ahmed’sattorneyspokewithSpecialAgentKelsowho

informedheratthattimethattherewasnobasistoincludeMr.AhmedontheNo‐FlyList,andthathewouldmakearrangementstoremovehisnamefromthefederalwatchlist.

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135. OnMay10,2011,SpecialAgentKelsoinformedhisattorneythatMr.Ahmed’snamewasremovedfromtheNo‐FlyList.

136. AsaresultofbeingaddedtotheNo‐FlyList,Mr.AhmedwasunabletoapplyforemploymentattheairportwherehisbrotherwasemployedatthetimeuntilhisnamewasremovedfromtheNo‐FlyList.

137. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ahmed’snamewasaddedtotheNo‐FlyListinordertoleveragehisstatusonthefederalwatchlisttoputpressureonMr.AhmedtoactasaninformantinYemen.

138. Onorabout2015,Mr.Ahmed’sboardingpassesarenowstampedwith the“SSSS” designation, indicating that he has been once again designated as a “known orsuspectedterrorist.”

139. AtnotimewasMr.Ahmedgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

140. Moreover,atno timewasMr.Ahmedgivennoticeof thedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

141. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ahmedremainsonthefederalwatchlist.142. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ahmed’snominationtothefederalwatchlist

was made based solely upon a hunch (based upon his race, ethnicity, national origin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

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PlaintiffAhmadIbrahimAlHalabi

143. EverytimeMr.AhmadAlHalabitravelsbyair,since2004,hisboardingpassisstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

144. Moreover,Mr.AlHalabi is frequentlyunable toboardhis flightsuntilhe is“cleared”byDHStoboardtheflight,aprocessthatoftentimestakeshours.

145. Moreover, Mr. Al Halabi has missed his flights and incurred additionalexpenses on multiple occasions after having been subjected to prolonged searches andinterrogations.

146. On June 25, 2014, Mr. Al Halabi was surrounded by armed CBP officers,handcuffed in front of his children and detained in a freezing cold holding cell forapproximatelytwotothreehoursandinthewaitingareaforanotherthreetofourhoursattheAmbassadorBridgeportofentryinDetroit,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

147. CBPofficersconfiscatedhisphone,anduponinformationandbelief,theCBPofficersdownloadedthedatafromhisphone.

148. Mr.AlHalabino longer travelsbyairnordoeshe travel toCanadaby landunlessabsolutelynecessaryforbusinesspurposesinordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.

149. Mr.AlHalabifiledmultipleredressrequeststhroughDHSTRIP.150. Mr.AlHalabireceivedmultiplelettersasdescribedinparagraph99aboveand

wasassignedmultipleRedressControlNumbers.

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151. AtnotimewasMr.AlHalabigivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

152. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.AlHalabigivennoticeofthedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

153. Mr. Al Halabi’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”designationeverytimehetravelsbyair.

154. Additionally,everytimeMr.AlHalabitravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

155. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.AlHalabiremainsonthefederalwatchlist.156. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.AlHalabi’snominationtothefederalwatch

listwasmadebasedsolelyuponahunch(baseduponhis race,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffMichaelEdmundColeman

157. On or about May 2, 2015, Mr. Michael Edmund Coleman appeared at theDetroitMetropolitan Airport, in order to board a commercial flight for his trip to DohaInternationalAirport.

158. Mr. Coleman was unable to check in online or at a kiosk stationed at theairport.

159. Heapproachedanairlinerepresentativetobecheckedinmanually,andafterspeakingonthephonewithaDHSrepresentativetoobtainclearancebeforehecouldfly,hisboarding pass was stamped with the “SSSS” designation, indicating that he has beendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

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160. During Mr. Coleman’s flight connection at the Philadelphia InternationalAirport,Mr.Colemanwasunabletoboardhisnextflightuntilhewasonceagain“cleared”byDHStoboardtheflight.

161. Mr.ColemanfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.162. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.ColemanhasnotreceivedaresponsefromDHS,

norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.163. Mr. Coleman’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”

designationeverytimehetravelsbyair.164. Additionally,everytimeMr.Colemantravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondary

inspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearches,questioningandchemicaltesting.165. Mr.Colemanisfrequentlyinterrogatedabouthisreligiousactivities.166. AtnotimewasMr.Colemangivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement

onthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

167. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Colemangivennoticeofthedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

168. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Colemanremainsonthefederalwatchlist.169. Mr.ColemanlimitstravelsbyairandbylandtoCanadawhennecessaryfor

businesspurposesinordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.170. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Coleman’snominationtothefederalwatch


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PlaintiffWaelHakmeh

171. On or about April, 2014, Mr. Wael Hakmeh appeared at Chicago O’HareInternationalAirportuponreturningonaflightfromabusinesstripinTurkey.

172. He was referred to secondary screening and subjected to a prolongedinterrogation.

173. Additionally, tothebestofhisrecollection, in June,2014,hisboardingpasswasstampedwiththe“SSSS”designationforthefirsttime,indicatingthathewasdesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

174. OnoraboutOctober,2014,Mr.Hakmehappearedtohavebeenremovedfromthewatchlist,ashisboardingpassforhisflightwasnotstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation.

175. However,sinceapproximatelyJanuary,2016,Mr.Hakmeh’sboardingpassesarestampedwiththe“SSSS”designationeverytimehetravelsbyair.

176. Additionally,everytimeMr.Hakmehtravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

177. AtnotimewasMr.Hakmehgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

178. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Hakmehgivennoticeofthedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

179. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Hakmehremainsonthefederalwatchlist.180. Mr.HakmehnolongerconnectsthroughChicagoO’HareInternationalAirport

to DetroitMetropolitan Airportwhen returning home toMichigan from overseas travel.Rather,Mr.HakmehdrivesfromChicagoO’HareInternationalAirportforapproximatelyfive

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hourstohishomeinWayneCounty,Michiganeachtimeinordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatmentatmultipleairportsandriskarrivinglatetohisplaceofemployment.

181. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Hakmeh’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwasmadebasedsolelyuponahunch(baseduponhis race,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffMuratFrljuckic

182. Onor aboutOctober, 2012,Mr.Murat Frljuckicwas referred to secondaryinspection,handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheBlueWaterBridgePortofEntryinPortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

183. CBP officers subjected him to a prolonged detention and questioning forapproximatelythreetofourhours.

184. Similarly,onoraboutAugust,2014,Mr.Frljuckicwasreferredtosecondaryinspection,handcuffedanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheBlueWaterBridgePortofEntryinPortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinMontenegro.

185. Moreover,everytimeMr.Frljuckictravelsbyair,sinceapproximatelyMarchorApril,2012,hisboardingpassisstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

186. Mr.FrljuckicfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.187. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.FrljuckichasnotreceivedaresponsefromDHS,

norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.

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188. Mr. Frljuckic’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”designationeverytimehetravelsbyair.

189. Additionally,everytimeMr.Frljuckictravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

190. AtnotimewasMr.Frljuckicgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

191. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Frljuckicgivennoticeofthedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

192. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Frljuckicremainsonthefederalwatchlist.193. Mr.FrljuckicnolongertravelsbyairnordoeshetraveltoCanadabylandin

ordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.194. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Frljuckic’snominationtothefederalwatch


PlaintiffAdnanKhalilShaout

195. EverytimeMr.AdnanShaouttravelsbyair,since2004,hisboardingpassisstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

196. Mr.Shaoutisfrequentlyinterrogatedabouthisreligiousbeliefsandaffiliationwithreligiousgroupsduringsecondaryinspections.

197. Moreover, Mr. Shaout is frequently unable to board his flights until he is“cleared”byDHStoboardtheflight,aprocessthatoftentimestakeshours.

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198. Moreover,TSAagentsoftenconfiscatehislaptop,anduponinformationandbelief,downloadinformationfromhislaptop.

199. Onorabout,June23,2011,whileMr.Shaoutwassittingintheplanewaitingfor take‐off, despite having been thoroughly screened by TSA, TSA agents removed Mr.Shaoutfromtheplaneandconductedanotherextensivepatdownandsearchofhispersonalbelongings.

200. TheentireflightwasdelayeduntiltheTSAagentscompletedthissearch.201. Mr.ShaoutnolongertravelsbyairintheUnitedStatesinordertoavoidbeing

subjectedtotheabovetreatment.202. Mr.ShaoutfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.203. OnNovember5,2015,Mr.Shaoutreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph

99aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.204. Mr. Shaout’s boarding pass continues to be stamped with the “SSSS”

designationwhen travels by air, indicating that he has been designated as a “known orsuspectedterrorist.”

205. Additionally,everytimeMr.Shaouttravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

206. AtnotimewasMr.Shaoutgivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

207. Moreover, atno timewasMr. Shaoutgivennoticeof thedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

208. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Shaoutremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

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209. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Shaout’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwas made based solely upon a hunch (based upon his race, ethnicity, national origin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

210. Mr.Shaoutno longertravelsbyair inordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.

PlaintiffSaleemAli

211. On or about October, 2012, Mr. Saleem Ali was referred to secondaryinspection and detained by CBP at the border stop at the Ambassador Bridge, Detroit,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabriefvacationinCanada.

212. CBPofficersconfiscatedhistwophones,askedhimforhispasswordstoaccessthetwophones,anduponinformationandbelief,theCBPofficersdownloadedthedatafromhisphones.

213. CBPofficerskepthisphonesanddidnotreturnthemuntilthefollowingday.214. Moreover,everytimeMr.Alitravelsbyair,hisboardingpassisstampedwith

the “SSSS”designation, indicating thathehasbeendesignatedas a “knownor suspectedterrorist.”

215. Additionally, every timeMr. Ali travels by air, he is referred to secondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

216. Mr.AlifiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.217. Mr.Alireceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph99aboveandwasassigned

aRedressControlNumber.

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218. AtnotimewasMr.Aligivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatch list,andatno timewasheofferedameaningfulopportunity tocontesthisdesignation.

219. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.Aligivennoticeofthedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

220. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Aliremainsonthefederalwatchlist.221. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Ali’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwas

madebasedsolelyuponahunch(baseduponhisrace,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religiousaffiliation,familialstatusorFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffShahirAnwar

222. Mr.ShahirAnwaristhebrotherofPlaintiffMr.SamirAnwar.223. EverytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,since2014,hisboardingpassisstamped

withthe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

224. Additionally,everytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

225. Mr.AnwarfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.226. OnMarch23,2015,Mr.Anwarreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph99

aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.227. Mr. Anwar’s boarding passes continue to be stamped with the “SSSS”

designationeverytimehetravelsbyair.

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228. AtnotimewasMr.Anwargivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

229. Moreover, at no timewasMr.Anwar givennotice of thedeprivationof hislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

230. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwarremainsonthefederalwatchlist.231. Mr.Anwarno longer travelsbyairnordoeshe travel toCanadaby land in

ordertoavoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatmentorthetreatmentexperiencedbyhisbrother,PlaintiffSamirAnwar,describedbelow.

232. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwar’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwas made based solely upon a hunch (based upon his race, ethnicity, national origin,religiousaffiliation,familialorFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffSamirAnwar

233. Mr.SamirAnwaristhebrotherofPlaintiffMr.ShahirAnwar.234. EverytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,hisboardingpass isstampedwiththe

“SSSS” designation, indicating that he has been designated as a “known or suspectedterrorist.”

235. Mr.AnwarfiledaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.236. OnAugust7,2014,Mr.Anwarreceivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph99

aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.237. On or about February 22, 2015, Mr. Anwar was referred to secondary

inspectionanddetainedbyCBPattheborderstopattheBlueWaterBridgePortofEntryin

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PortHuron,Michigan,whenheattemptedtore‐entertheUnitedStatesafterabrieftriptoCanada.

238. Mr.AnwarhandedaCBPofficertheletterfromDHS,howevertheCBPofficerresponded that the letter does notmean anything and does not have any impact on thesituation.

239. CBPofficersconfiscatedhisphone,askedhimforhispasswordtoaccessthephone, and upon information and belief, the CBP officers downloaded the data from hisphone.

240. Moreover, Mr. Anwar was interrogated about his religious beliefs andreligiousaffiliations.

241. Mr. Anwar’s boarding pass continues to be stamped with the “SSSS”designationwhen travels by air, indicating that he has been designated as a “known orsuspectedterrorist.”

242. Additionally,everytimeMr.Anwartravelsbyair,heisreferredtosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

243. AtnotimewasMr.Anwargivennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.

244. Moreover, at no timewasMr.Anwar givennotice of thedeprivationof hislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

245. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwarremainsonthefederalwatchlist.

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246. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Anwar’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwas made based solely upon a hunch (based upon his race, ethnicity, national origin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).

PlaintiffJohnDoeNo.1

247. OnoraboutJanuary,2015,Mr.JohnDoeNo.1’sboardingpassisstampedwiththe “SSSS”designation, indicating thathehasbeendesignatedas a “knownor suspectedterrorist.”

248. Additionally, every time Mr. Doe No. 1 returns to the United States frominternationaltravel,Mr.Doeissubjectedtoprolongeddetentionandquestioning.

249. Suddenly,shortlyafterMr.DoeNo.1wasdesignatedonthefederalwatchlist,many of his individual and business bank accounts were closed without notice or anexplanationofthereasonswhytheywerebeingclosed,includingbankaccountsatJPMorganChaseBank,TCFBankandPNCBank.

250. Upon information and belief, Unidentified TSC Agents disseminated thestigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorist”attachedtoMr.DoeNo.1toJPMorganChaseBank,TCFBankandPNCBank,andasaresult,hisbankaccountswereclosedwithoutnotice.

251. Mr.DoeNo.1filedaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.252. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.DoeNo.1hasnotreceivedaresponsefrom

DHS,norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.253. AtnotimewasMr.DoeNo.1givennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement


39

254. Moreover,atnotimewasMr.DoeNo.1givennoticeofthedeprivationofhislibertyinterestsorviolationofhisconstitutionalrights.

255. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.1remainsonthefederalwatchlist.256. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.Doe’sNo.1nominationtothefederalwatch



257. On or about May, 2010, Mr. John Doe No. 2 appeared at the DetroitMetropolitanAirportuponreturningonaflightfromatriptoTurkey.

258. He was referred to secondary screening and subjected to a prolongedinterrogation.

259. Duringhisinterrogation,CBPofficersbeganlookingthroughpicturesonMr.DoeNo.2’slaptopandaskedhimquestionsabouthisplaceofworship,thereligiousleaderathismosque,whetherMr.DoeNo.2knewanyonewhowasinvolvedinterroristactivities,andwhetherhehadinformationaboutothercongregantsathisplaceofworship.

260. EverytimeMr.DoeNo.2travelsbyair,sincehisMay,2010trip,hisboardingpass is stampedwith the “SSSS”designation, indicating thathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

261. Additionally, every time Mr. Doe No. 2 travels by air, he is referred tosecondaryinspectionandsubjectedtoprolongedsearchesandquestioning.

262. Mr.DoeNo.2filedaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.263. OnJanuary19,2016,Mr.DoeNo.2receivedaletterasdescribedinparagraph

99aboveandwasassignedaRedressControlNumber.

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264. AtnotimewasMr.DoeNo.2givennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacementonthefederalwatchlist,andatnotimewasheofferedameaningfulopportunitytocontesthisdesignation.


266. Asofthedateofthisfiling,itisunclearwhetherMr.DoeNo.2remainsonthefederalwatchlist.

267. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.2’snominationtothefederalwatchlistwasmadebasedsolelyuponahunch(baseduponhis race,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities).


268. EverytimeMr.JohnDoeNo.3travelsbyair,since2002,hisboardingpassisstampedwiththe“SSSS”designation,indicatingthathehasbeendesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

269. Infact,in2002,uponreturningfromaninternationalflight,Mr.DoeNo.3wasescortedoffoftheplanebyFBIagents,beforehewasinterrogatedandthreatenedbyagentsfromdifferentgovernmentagencies.

270. Mr.DoeNo.3isfrequentlyunabletoboardhisflightsuntilheis“cleared”byDHStoboardtheflight,aprocessthatcantakehours.

271. Moreover,Mr.DoeNo. 3 is frequently called over the loud speakers at theairportafterhehasalreadyreachedthegatepriortotakeofftogobacktosecurity,onlytobedetainedandsubjectedtofurtherprolongedinterrogationsandsearches.

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272. Additionally,TSAagentsconfiscatedhisphones,requestedhispasswords,anduponinformationandbelief,downloadedinformationfromthem.

273. Onorabout2006,Mr.DoeNo.3’sJPMorganChaseBankwassuddenlycloseda fewdaysafterheopeneditwithoutnoticeoranexplanationofthereasonswhyitwasbeingclosed.

274. Upon information and belief, Unidentified TSC Agents disseminated thestigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorist”attachedtoMr.DoeNo.3toJPMorganChaseBank,andasaresult,hisbankaccountwasclosedwithoutnotice.

275. Mr.DoeNo. 3 lost lucrative employmentopportunities as a result of beingdesignatedasa“knownorsuspectedterrorist.”

276. Mr.DoeNo.3filedaredressrequestthroughDHSTRIP.277. Asofthedateofthisfiling,Mr.DoeNo.3hasnotreceivedaresponsefrom

DHS,norhashebeenassignedaRedressControlNumber.278. AtnotimewasMr.DoeNo.3givennoticeofthefactualbasisforhisplacement



280. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.3remainsonthefederalwatchlist.281. Uponinformationandbelief,Mr.DoeNo.3’snominationtothefederalwatch


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282. Mr.DoeNo. 3 limits travels by airwhennecessary in order to avoidbeingsubjectedtotheabovetreatment.

COUNTIFAILURETOPROVIDEPOST‐DEPRIVATIONNOTICEANDHEARINGINVIOLATIONOF

THEFIFTHAMENDMENTRIGHTTOPROCEDURALDUEPROCESS(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

283. Theforegoingallegationsarereallegedandincorporatedherein.284. EachofthePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenslearned

thatheorshewasplacedonthefederalwatchlistsubsequenttobeingaddedonthefederalwatchlistandsoughttochallengesuchplacement.

285. Defendants’actionsasdescribedabove inrefusingtoprovidePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswithanynoticeatallof theirplacementwhichdeprived Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens of constitutionallyprotectedlibertyinterests.

286. Defendants’ actions in nominating Plaintiffs and other similarly situatedAmerican citizens to the federal watch list blatantly violate the requirement that“’nominations’ must not be solely based on race, ethnicity, national origin, religiousaffiliation,orFirstAmendmentprotectedactivities.”49U.S.C.§114(h)(3).

287. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenshavealibertyinterestintravelingfreefromunreasonableburdensthatarenotreasonablytailoredwithin,to,andfromtheUnitedStates,throughlandbordercrossingsandoverU.S.airspace.

288. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenshavearighttobefreefromfalsegovernmentstigmatizationas individualswhoare“knownorsuspectedtobe”terrorists,orwhoareotherwiseassociatedwithterroristactivity,whensuchharmarisesin

43

conjunctionwiththeadditionalconsequencesthat followfrombeing listedaswellasthedeprivation of their right to travel on the same terms as other travelers and/or thedeprivation of their liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment in travel free fromunreasonableburdens.

289. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenshavealibertyinterestinnonattainder (ie: the interestagainstbeingsingledout forpunishmentwithout trial).Defendants’actionshavesingledoutPlaintiffsandotherssimilarlysituatedforpunishmentsthatinclude,butarenotlimitedto,inabilitytotravelbyairandunreasonableburdensplacedupontravelingbyairtoandfromtheUnitedStates,overU.S.airspaceandatlandbordercrossings,andfalseassociationwithalistofindividualssuspectedofterrorism.

290. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens, having beenburdenedorpreventedfromboardingoncommercialflightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesatlandbordercrossings,havinghadtheirbankaccountsclosed,havingbeenpreventedfrommaking wire transfers at financial institutions, having had their citizenship applicationsdelayed indefinitely due to an “FBI name check,” having lost lucrative economicopportunities and suffering from other forms of financial harm, and having sought tochallenge their placement on the federal watch list, are entitled to a constitutionallyadequate legal mechanism that affords them notice of the reasons and bases for theirplacementonthefederalwatchlistandameaningfulopportunitytocontesttheircontinuedinclusiononthefederalwatchlist.Defendantshaveevenfailedtoprovidethemostbasicingredientofdueprocess,whichisnoticethatthegovernmenthasdeprivedapersonoftheirprotectedrights.

44

291. Moreover,DefendantshaveofficiallyimposedonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensthestigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”withoutaconstitutionallyadequatelegalmechanism.

292. Further,DefendantsdisseminatedthestigmatizinglabelattachedtoPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”tostateandlocalauthorities,foreigngovernments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficialandprivateentitiesandindividuals.

293. ByimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensthestigmatizinglabelof“knownorsuspectedterrorists”andbyfailingtoprovidePlaintiffsandotherssimilarlysituatedwithaconstitutionallyadequatelegalmechanism,DefendantshavedeprivedPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensoftheirprotectedlibertyinterests,includingbutnotlimitedtotheirlibertyinterestsintraveling,freedomfromfalsestigmatization,andnonattainder,andthusviolatedtheconstitutionalrightsofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswithoutaffordingthemdueprocessof lawandwill continue to do so into the future if Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Americancitizensarenotaffordedthereliefdemandedbelow.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory andinjunctivereliefintheformdescribedinthePrayerforReliefbelow,plusallsuchotherreliefthisCourtdeemsjustandproperincludingcostsandattorneys’feesincurredinthisaction.

COUNTIIDEPRIVATIONOFPROTECTEDLIBERTIESINVIOLATIONOFFIFTHAMENDMENT

RIGHTTOSUBSTANTIVEDUEPROCESS(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

294. Theforegoingallegationsarereallegedandincorporatedherein.

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295. BecausePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswerelistedby Defendants in a manner not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, Defendants’actions as described above in including Plaintiffs and other similarly situated Americancitizens on a watch list that unreasonably burdens or prevents them from boardingcommercialflightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesatlandbordercrossings,arearbitraryandcapricious,lackevenarationalrelationshiptoanylegitimategovernmentinterest,andhaveunduly deprived Plaintiffs of constitutionally protected rights, including their libertyinterestsintravel,freedomfromfalsestigmatization,andnonattainder.


297. By placing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens on thefederalwatchlist,Defendantshaveplacedanundueburdenontheirfundamentalrightofmovement.

298. By placing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens on thefederalwatchlist,DefendantshavetreatedPlaintiffslikesecond‐classcitizens.

299. Defendants’watchlistlacksacompellinginterestinsofarastheirtruepurposeis to provide law enforcement with a tool to coerce American Muslims into becominginformants.

300. Defendants’watch list are alsonotnarrowly tailored insofar as the federalwatchlistareentirelyanddemonstrablyineffectualandobviousalternativesexist.

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301. Defendants’actionsinplacingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlist,officiallyimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican citizens the stigmatizing label of “known or suspected terrorists,” anddisseminating the stigmatizing label to state and local authorities, foreign governments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficial and private entities and individuals, without a constitutionally adequate legalmechanism, are arbitrary and capricious, shock the conscience, violate the decencies ofcivilized conduct and are so brutal and offensive that they do not comport with thetraditionalideasoffairplayanddecency.

302. Because Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens have notbeen charged with any crimes and are United States Citizens, Plaintiffs challenge theirplacementandtheplacementofotherssimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlistonabroad,as‐appliedbasis.

303. Plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge is also facial, as there are nocircumstanceswheretheirplacementortheplacementofotherssimilarlysituatedonthefederalwatchlistisnarrowlytailoredtoachieveanycompellinggovernmentinterest.

304. Defendants have thus violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and theconstitutional rightsofothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswithoutaffording themdueprocessoflawandwillcontinuetodosointothefutureifPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensarenotaffordedthereliefdemandedbelow.


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COUNTIIIUNLAWFULAGENCYACTIONINVIOLATIONOFTHEADMINISTRATIVEPROCEDURE

ACT,5U.S.C.§§702,706(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)

305. Theforegoingallegationsarereallegedandincorporatedherein.306. Defendants’actionsinplacingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican

citizensonthefederalwatchlist,officiallyimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican citizens the stigmatizing label of “known or suspected terrorists,” anddisseminating the stigmatizing label to state and local authorities, foreign governments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficial and private entities and individuals, without a constitutionally adequate legalmechanism,were and are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, otherwise not inaccordancewithlaw,andcontrarytoconstitutionalrights,power,privilege,orimmunity,andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.


308. Defendants’failuretoprovidePlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens,whohadbeenunreasonablyburdenedordeniedboardingoncommercialflightsorenteringtheUnitedStatesacrosstheborderandsoughttochallengetheirplacementonthefederalwatchlist,withaconstitutionallyadequatemechanismthataffordsthemnoticeofthe reasons and bases for their placement on the federal watch list and a meaningfulopportunity to contest their continued inclusion on the federal watch list is arbitrary,

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capricious,anabuseofdiscretion,otherwisenot inaccordancewith law,andcontrary toconstitutional rights, power, privilege, or immunity, and should be set aside as unlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.

309. Because Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens do notpresentasecuritythreattocommercialaviation,Defendants’actionsasdescribedaboveinincludingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlistthatunreasonablyburdensorpreventsthemfromboardingcommercialflightsorenteringthe United States across the border, are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,otherwisenotinaccordancewithlaw,andcontrarytoconstitutionalrights,power,privilege,orimmunity,andshouldbesetasideasunlawfulpursuantto5U.S.C.§706.

310. PlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensarenotrequiredtoexhausttheDHSTRIPprocess,undertheholdinginDarbyv.Cisneros,509U.S.137(1993).SeeUnitedStatesDistrictCourt,EasternDistrictofVirginia,CaseNo.11‐cv‐00050(2011);Dkt.70at22;attachedasMemorandumOpinion(Exhibit4).


COUNTIVVIOLATIONOFTHEFIFTHAMENDMENTTOTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION

(Jurisdictionunder28U.S.C.§1331and5U.S.C.§702)(EqualProtection)

311. Theforegoingallegationsarereallegedandincorporatedherein.

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312. Defendants’actionsinplacingPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensonthefederalwatchlist,officiallyimposingonPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmerican citizens the stigmatizing label of “known or suspected terrorists,” anddisseminating the stigmatizing label to state and local authorities, foreign governments,corporations,privatecontractors,gunsellers,thecaptainsofsea‐faringvessels,amongotherofficial and private entities and individuals, without a constitutionally adequate legalmechanismarediscriminatoryandconstituteanaction that targets religiousconduct fordistinctivetreatment.


314. By placing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens on thefederalwatchlist,DefendantshavetreatedPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenslikesecond‐classcitizens.

315. Defendants’above‐describedactionsweremotivatedbythereligiousstatusofPlaintiffs and other similarly situated American citizens and on the basis of theconstitutionally‐protectedfreeexerciseofreligionofPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizens.

316. Defendants’ above‐describedactionshavehadadiscriminatoryeffectuponandhavedisparatelyimpactedPlaintiffsandothersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizenswhoareMuslimAmericantravelers,andnottravelersofotherfaiths.

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317. Defendants’above‐describedactions,policies,courseofconduct,orpatternofpractice that mandate or permit the above‐described treatment of Plaintiffs and othersimilarlysituatedAmericancitizensdoesnotserveacompellingstateinterestoralegitimateorpublicpurpose,noraretheytheleastrestrictivemeansornarrowlytailoredtoachieveanysuchinterest.


COUNTVVIOLATIONOFTHEUNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTION

(Non‐Delegation)

318. Theforegoingallegationsarereallegedandincorporatedherein.319. CongresshasnotprovidedtheExecutiveBranchwith intelligibleprinciples

fromwhichtheExecutivecanimplementitswatchlistschemesregardingcivilaviationandnationalsecurity.

320. The Executive branch’s assignment of the watch listing function to TSCviolatesCongress’directivethatTSAdeterminewhobelongsonfederalwatchlistsandtheconsequencesthatflowfrombeingonthoselists.

321. CongresshasnotdelegatedtoTSAtheauthoritytocreateaprocessthatcanculminateintheremovalofindividualsfromtheTSDB.

322. Inthealternative,Congress’sdelegationtoTSAtocreatearedressprocessisdefectivebecausetheExecutiveBranchhasallocatedwatchlistauthorityinamannerthatpreventsTSAfromcreatingaredressprocess.

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323. Asaresult,Defendantshaveillegallyactedbeyondtheirauthority.WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant declaratory and

injunctivereliefintheformdescribedinthePrayerforReliefbelow,plusallsuchotherreliefthisCourtdeemsjustandproperincludingcostsandattorneys’feesincurredinthisaction.

PrayerforRelief

WHEREFORE,Plaintiffsrespectfullyrequest:

1. AdeclaratoryjudgmentthatDefendants’policies,practices,andcustomsviolatetheFifthAmendment to theUnited StatesConstitutionand theAdministrativeProcedureAct;

2. Aninjunctionthat:a. requiresDefendantstoremedytheconstitutionalandstatutoryviolations

identifiedabove,includingtheremovalofPlaintiffsfromanywatchlistordatabasethatburdensorpreventsthemfromflyingorenteringtheUnitedStatesacrosstheborder;and,

b. requires Defendants to provide individuals designated on the federalwatchlistwithalegalmechanismthataffordsthemnoticeofthereasonsandbasesfortheirplacementonthefederalwatchlistandameaningfulopportunitytocontesttheircontinuedinclusiononthefederalwatchlist;

3. Atrialbyjury;4. Anawardofattorneys’fees,costs,andexpensesofalllitigation,pursuantto28

U.S.C.§2412;and,5. SuchotherandfurtherreliefastheCourtmaydeemjustandproper.

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JURYDEMAND

NOWCOMEPlaintiffs,byandthroughtheirundersignedcounsel,andherebydemandtrialbyjuryoftheabove‐referencedcausesofaction.

Respectfullysubmitted,

THELAWOFFICEOFGADEIRABBASBY:/s/GadeirAbbasGADEIRI.ABBASAttorneyforPlaintiffs1155FStreetNW,Suite1050Washington,D.C.20004Telephone:(720)251‐0425Fax:(720)251‐0425Email:[email protected],notinD.C.PracticelimitedtofederalmattersCOUNCILONAMERICAN‐ISLAMICRELATIONS,MICHIGANBY: /s/LenaMasriLENAF.MASRI(P73461)AttorneyforPlaintiffsLegalDirector30201OrchardLakeRd.,Suite260FarmingtonHills,MI48334Phone:(248)559‐2247AKEEL&VALENTINE,PLLCBY: /s/ShereefAkeelSHEREEFH.AKEEL(P54345)AttorneyforPlaintiffs888W.BigBeaverRd.,Ste.910Troy,MI48084Phone:(248)269‐[email protected]

Dated:April5,2016

Documents

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT COMPLAINT FOR …files.courthousenews.com/2016/04/05/cairinj.pdfApr 05, 2016 · States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 11‐cv‐00050