United Nations Security Councilirc.princeton.edu/pmunc/docs/UNSC.pdf · The United Nations Security Council was formed in Chapters V and VII of the United Nations Charter in June

United Nations Security Council

Chair: Sarah Dinovelli Crisis Director: SuMin Park

Committee Name PMUNC 2016

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Contents

Letter from the Chair…….………………………...……………………...…..3

Topic A:…………………..…..………………….....……………..……..……4 Introduction…..………………………………….……………………….……………4

History of the Topic………………………..……………………….……….…………4

Current Status…………………………………….……………..…………...…………6

Country Policy…...…………………………………………….……………………….7

Keywords……………………………………....………………...…………….…..….12

Questions for Consideration………..…………….………………...…….……….…...15

Bibliography……….................……………………………..……………………...…...15

Topic B:…………………………....…………………..…………………….18 Introduction……..………………………...……………………………………..……18 History of the Topic.………………………….………………..………………...……18 Current Status………………………………………………………………………....20 Country Policy.….…………………...……………...…..……………………………..20 Keywords………………………………………………………………………….......25 Questions for Consideration...........…………….……………………..………………..28 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..30


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Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to PMUNC 2016’s Security Council! I am so excited to share this dynamic,

engaging weekend with you all! To introduce myself, my name is Sarah Dinovelli. I am a

rising junior in Princeton’s amazing History Department and am pursuing a certificate (read

as “minor”) in Statistics & Machine Learning. I started MUN in high school, but my

district’s program died within a year. I liked the two high school conferences I attended

though, so as a freshman in college I tried out for the Princeton MUN Team and somehow

got accepted. I also served as the Vice President and am currently as President of Princeton

Model UN’s sponsor organization, the Princeton International Relations Council. Honestly,

my favorite thing about MUN is chairing. I have chaired three times already, once at

PMUNC and twice for college conferences, and every time I made some amazing memories

with the delegates I moderated. I am sure this conference will be just as fun, if not even

more so!

This PMUNC, the Security Council will consider two ongoing sociopolitical situations in

order to debate issues of regional stability, intervention, and the role of the UNSC as a

peacekeeper. Our first topic, the Situation in Latin America, addresses a region with several

nations experiencing different types of instability economic crisis, corrupt governments

who abuse their people, and even armed conflict. The UNSC has the jurisdiction to

intervene in the case of armed conflict and when countries fail in their responsibility to

protect their citizens. Yet, the interpretation of these conditions have not been always been

consistent. This council will have to decide if these conditions for intervention apply to


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various states in Latin America, and if so, the best method of intervention. In our second

topic, the Western Saharan Conflict, the UN already runs a peacekeeping mission in the

region in order to promote a peaceful end to the conflict. However, over the course of its 25

year history, the mission has failed to organize a referendum to let the country choose

between integration with Morocco and independence.

Meanwhile, countless Sawhali families remain displaced and persecuted by Moroccans

because the peacekeeping mission, MINURSO, still is not mandated to monitor human

rights. Should the situation in the Western Sahara be considered severe enough that the

UNSC should act? These two cases present very different details, but overall they beg the

same question: when does the violation of human rights become a risk to international

security and to humanity?

As you all may have noticed, this committee will be run as a crisis simulation instead

of as a specialized committee. All delegates will still be acting as UN ambassadors though, so

portfolio powers will be quite limited. It will be up to you to figure out how to use your

domestic influence to shape policy in your home countries, while still negotiating a path

forward for the UNSC as a whole. Also keep in mind, as you are preparing for the

committee, what makes a great diplomat. Not only do successful ambassadors achieve their

end goals, but also do so while respecting and collaborating with their fellow ambassadors in

order to find the optimal solution for everyone. Also consider alternative ways to address

possible problems the Security Council may face. The world has been trying to address these

problems for years, without success. It may be time for the UNSC to bring new ideas to the

table.


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Best of luck preparing for this year’s PMUNC! Please feel free to email me at

[email protected] with any questions you may have, whether they are about the

topics, parliamentary procedure, or life at Princeton. See you all soon!

Best regards, Sarah Dinovelli


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Introduction

The United Nations Security Council was formed in Chapters V and VII of the United

Nations Charter in June 1945.1 Originally the Council consisted of five permanent members

and six rotating members, but a 1965 amendment added five more temporary members.2

Five states are permanent members of the Council and each have the power to veto any

UNSC vote: the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United

Kingdom, and the United States of America. The other ten members of the UNSC are

elected to two year terms by the UN General Assembly.3 The current non-permanent

members of the UNSC are Angola, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain,

Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.4 Together, these 15 nations are charged with the

“maintenance of international peace and security” and can “investigate any dispute, or any

situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.”5 6

The mandated role of the United Nations Security Council is vague, and so the scope of its

jurisdiction has changed over time. Throughout the Cold War the UNSC often could not

accomplish much, and focused on mediating conflicts between countries.7 8 After the Cold

War ended, the Security Council began to deal more with humanitarian crises, as the world

came to recognize the connection between human rights protection and international peace.9

1 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html 2 https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Security-Council 3 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/ 4 http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ 5 Ibid. 6 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vi/index.html 7 https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations-Security-Council 8 http://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/un-institutions/sc/overview/ 9 Ibid.


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In a 2016 Special Research Report the Council noted that in the past 25 years it has

expanded its scope of investigations to include human rights violations within countries, and

have now include human rights components in most of their mandates and peacekeeping

missions.

In our simulation of the UNSC, delegates will be tasked with blending together these two

facets of the UNSC – security and human rights protection – into comprehensive plans to

achieve peace.

Procedures

As you know, PMUNC’s Security Council will be run as a crisis committee, so the

rules and procedures will be slightly different than usual. There will be no Speaker’s List.

Instead, debate will open with a moderated caucus to decide the topic. Whenever a

discussion is exhausted we will return to a moderated caucus. Voting procedures will follow

the standards of Article 27 of the UN Charter. Procedural votes will require nine votes to

pass. All other measures will require nine votes, including the affirmative votes of all voting

permanent members.10 If a permanent member votes against a non-procedural measure, it

will count as a veto and the measure will fail. If a permanent member does not wish to vote

for a measure, but does not want to veto it, that member may abstain from voting and the

measure will pass as long as it receives the needed votes.11 Veto powers should be used

wisely and in accordance with the country’s policy. Unjustified vetoes will be greatly frowned

upon.

10 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html 11 http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml


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Crises & Portfolio Powers

Like in other crisis committees, crises will be introduced by the crisis team to spur

debate and to make delegates react to a new situation. However, all delegates will be acting

as their nation’s representatives to the UN, and so have very limited portfolio powers.

Generally, delegates will resolve crises by integrating them into existing resolutions. They can

relay information to their home governments and attempt to recommend policies, but please

keep in mind that you will not have the same power as a head of state. My Crisis Director

and I encourage you to think of creative ways to influence your state’s policy that will not

overstep your powers as a UN ambassador.

Peacekeeping Missions

Peacekeeping missions are one of the many tools the UNSC uses to ensure international

security and peace. They are established via UNSC Resolutions that must be passed with

nine affirmative votes without a veto from a permanent member.12 Each mission is unique to

the circumstances of the assigned country, but some of the most common peacekeeping

activities as:

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

Mine action

Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities

Protection and promotion of human rights

Electoral assistance

Support for the restoration and extension of State authority

12 http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/peace-operations-africa/p9333


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Promotion of social and economic recovery and development13

In addition to “Blue Helmets” (the traditional peacekeeping forces), UN Peacekeeping

Missions often also consist of military observers (who may or may not be armed, and are

usually tasked with monitoring the implementation and/or status of a ceasefire, peace treaty,

or other accord) and non-military civilian staff members (primarily working in civil affairs,

liaising with local authorities, and working on peacebuilding/other non-military affairs).

These do not include the myriad of other United Nations staff that may be deployed to

handle a situation, including support staff from the UNHCR (High Commission for

Refugees) as well as the UN Development Program and other more specialized bodies.

When planning these missions, the UNSC also follows three principles: consent of

the parties, impartiality, and the use of force exclusively for self-defense and for the defense

of the mandate14. However, the Council in Foreign Relations observes that some

peacekeeping missions are deployed without nations’ consent and have been used in

offensive measures before.15

13 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml 14 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml 15 http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/peace-operations-africa/p9333


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Topic A: The Situation in Western Sahara

In this session of the UNSC, council members will discuss the current state of the UN’s

mission to the Western Sahara. The Council will discuss how to improve the mission’s

functionality in terms of facilitating the completion of the referendum, lowering tensions

between the Polisario and the Moroccan government, and the refugee and human rights

issues in the region. The Council’s decisions will apply these recommendations when

MINURSO’s mandate expires in April 2017.

History of the Conflict

Moroccans believed that the Sahrawi people of the Western Sahara had long-ago pledged

allegiance to the Moroccan sultan, making them Moroccans.16 An October, 1975 opinion by

the International Court of Justice found that there were indeed tenuous ties between the

Sahrawi and Moroccans, although they were not strong enough to justify Morocco taking

over the Western Sahara. The King of Morocco, however, saw this decision as enough

justification to take the territory.17 In November about 350,000 Moroccans marched across

Western Sahara’s border in what became known as the Green March, effectively forcing

Spain to relinquish its claim to the Western Sahara to Morocco.18 19

As a result, the Polisario Front, a group of Sahrawi fighting for the Western Sahara’s

independence, used guerilla tactics to harass the Moroccans until 1991.20 At that time the two

sides agreed on a UN – organized settlement plan that established a ceasefire and would

16 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=323&p1=3&p2=4&case=61&p3=5 17 https://www.britannica.com/place/Western-Sahara 18 http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2014/11/143315/the-green-march-an-eternal-day-in-moroccans-memories/ 19 http://culturesofresistancefilms.com/ws-timeline 20 http://culturesofresistancefilms.com/ws-timeline


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decide via a referendum of the Sahrawi people if the Western Sahara would become

independent or would officially become part of Morocco. The settlement also allowed the

UN to establish the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

(MINURSO) to help organize the vote.21 However, twenty-five years have passed without a

referendum. Morocco has insisted on testing everyone in the territory to determine if they

are qualified to vote, while moving their own settlers into the region to possibly corrupt the

voting process.22 This led to a decade of debate about how to verify one’s identity as a

Sahrawi, and even when that process was agreed upon, the Moroccans and the Polisario still

could not decide on how to organize the appeals process.23

Current Situation

MINURSO (est. 1991)

MINURSO originally operated under several mandates, including the

implementation of the referendum and to facilitate the end of armed conflict between the

Polisario and Morocco.24 The mission only continues to monitor the ceasefire, to neutralize

leftover mines, and to try facilitate compromise between the two factions. All other

objectives, aside from the completion of the referendum, were successfully completed.25

During a March visit to a Sahrawi refugee camp, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon referred to the Western Saharan situation as an “occupation”. The Moroccans saw the

comment as biased and undiplomatic, and proceeded to force UN civilian volunteers out of

21 http://fletcher.tufts.edu/African-Peace-Missions/Research/Case-Studies/Western-Sahara 22 https://www.britannica.com/place/Western-Sahara 23 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/background.shtml 24 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/mandate.shtml 25 Ibid.


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the Western Sahara and asked the UN to close its military office there.26 After months of

dispute and high tensions between the UN and Morocco, the MINURSO mission was

restored with Security Council Resolution 2285 in April 2016. The resolution renewed the

MINURSO until April 2017 and authorized the deployment of 245 military personnel to the

region.27 As of June 30th, 2016 there are 215 military personnel and 241 civilian personnel

associated with the MINURSO in the Western Sahara.28

Current Operations Statistics, as of June 201629

Strength: 460 total, including:

Uniformed personnel: 215

o Troops: 24

o Military observers: 191

Civilian personnel: 241

o International civilians: 84

o Local civilians: 157

UN Volunteers: 4

As of July 26, 2016 the MINURSO still had not returned to full functionality.

Civilian staff are still being gradually phased back into the Western Saharan territory.30

The Polisario

Most of the The Polisario and its country, the SADR live in refugee camps in

western Algeria, but continue to fight for self-determination and for state recognition.31 In

July, newly elected SADR President Brahim Ghali stated that while SADR wishes for a

26 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/world/africa/morocco-asks-that-un-close-western-sahara-military-office.html?_r=0 27 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/facts.shtml 28 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml#MINUR 29 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml#MINUR 30 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/un-western-sahara-peacekeeping-not-fully-operational/2016/07/26/70a27c7c-5390-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html 31 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/the-37-year-old-refugee-situation-you-know-nothing-about/


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peaceful conclusion to the conflict, “...the Sahrawi people will relentlessly cling to defending

their rights by all means.”32

The Polisario also highly disapproves of the UN’s handling of Morocco’s expulsion

of UN volunteers. The Associated Press reported that in late July the Polisorio wrote an

open letter that accused the UNSC of allowing Morocco to undermine MINURSO, and that

urged the UN to be more aggressive in its efforts to complete the referendum.33

Human Rights Issues

Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reported human rights abuses

in the Western Sahara in 2015-2016. In its World Report for 2015, Human Rights Watch

noted that Morocco used large numbers of police to prevent “all public gatherings deemed

hostile to Morocco’s contested rule,” suppressed speech that questioned Morocco’s claim to

the Western Sahara, and the suspension of judicial rights in order to imprison Sahwari

activists.34 Amnesty International’s report echoes these observations and reported that the

Moroccan government was barring foreign journalists as well as domestic media from the

Western Sahara region.35 Meanwhile, more than 150,000 Sahwaris have been displaced from

their homes, 80% of whom are estimated to be women and children.36

Topic B: The Situation in Guatemala

32 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/western-sahara-polisario-congress-new-leader-unity.html 33 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/un-western-sahara-peacekeeping-not-fully-operational/2016/07/26/70a27c7c-5390-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html 34 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/morocco/western-sahara 35 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco/report-morocco/ 36 http://www.unicef.org/education/algeria_54061.html


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Guatemala’s plight dates back to mid-19th century Central America, when a series of

violent civil wars, collectively known as the Central American Crisis, befell the region.37

Owing to the legacy of violence and warfare left behind by these civil wars, the weakness of

social and political institutions in the country, and the proliferation of gangs, Guatemala has

become one of the poorest, most corrupt, and most violent countries in the world.38

The Central American Crisis

Guatemala’s own civil war traces its origins to 1954, when the country was being led

by a progressive politician named Jacob Arbenz.39 Arbenz instituted a massive program of

liberal reforms, nationalizing many foreign-owned corporations operating in Guatemala, and

massively redistributing wealth in the country.40

Troubled by these developments, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the

United States staged a military coup in the region, usurping Arbenz and replacing him with

conservative politician Carlos Castillo Ames.41 As a member of Guatemala’s staunchly

conservative military leadership, Ames rolled back the progressive policies of the Arbenz

administration and repressed his political enemies on the left.42 Under Ames, government

assistance for Guatemalan farmers, a significant and historically poor demographic,

dramatically decreased.43

In response to the repressive policies of the incumbent conservative government, the

Left, originally little more than a loose coalition of peasants and blue-collar workers, began

37 http://cja.org/where-we-work/guatemala/ 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 40 Ibid 41 Ibid 42 Ibid 43 Ibid


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an extensive program of militarization.44 Tensions between the two sides steadily increased

until 1960, when the political marginalization of the Left reached a breaking point and spilled

into all-out civil war.45 The war was brutal. Atrocities were committed on both sides, with

the insurgent left employing to guerilla tactics, and the right introducing so-called “dirty-

war” strategies to intimidate the enemy.46 Most notoriously, the government trained death-

squads of soldiers who were known to kidnap rebels, torture and kill them, before dropping

their bodies into the ocean.47

The situation dramatically worsened with the election of Fernando Lucas Garcia in

1980. Under his administration, extrajudicial killings (executions conducted without a fair

trial or due process) rose from 100 in 1978 to an estimated 100,000 in 1981.48 In addition,

the government began the use of scorched earth tactics, which involved the razing of entire

villages and buildings occupied by the rebels, rather than trying to capture them.49 The

brutality of this strategy led to an additional 70,000 deaths.50 When an UN-brokered peace

accord was finally signed in 1996, the final casualty count numbered over 200,000.51

The peace accord that was signed in 1996 established a UN truth commission, tasked

with investigating the atrocities committed by the Guatemalan government during the civil

war. At the conclusion of its investigation, the commission announced that it had found

“unequivocal” evidence that the Guatemalan government had perpetrated genocide against

44 Ibid 45 Ibid 46 Ibid 47 Ibid 48 Ibid 49 Ibid 50 Ibid 51 Ibid


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its citizens.52 However, those who have attempted to hold the Guatemalan government

accountable for these actions have found themselves the targets of unlawful detentions and

even murder.53

The Legacy of the Civil War

The aftermath of the Guatemalan Civil War manifested in the country in a variety of

political, economic, and social facets. For example, the scorched earth tactics employed by

the Guatemalan government burned over 400 towns, reducing the country’s agricultural

output by over 60%.54 The labor force also suffered as well: in proportion to its population,

Guatemala’s manpower losses in the civil war were incredibly high.55

Postwar political institutions became deficient as well. During nearly the entirety of

Guatemala’s civil war, the country had been ruled by a military dictatorship. The transition to

a democratically elected civilian government occurred relatively smoothly, but also revealed

serious flaws in the Guatemalan political system. For example, corruption and judicial

intimidation were exceedingly common. The most prominent example of this was the trial of

Efrain Rios Montt, who was one of the presiding military dictators during the Guatemalan

Civil War. In a landmark case, Montt was convicted of genocide and perpetrating crimes

against humanity by a Guatemalan judge. The case was celebrated as a shining example that

the Guatemalan government was finally being held accountable for its actions during the

civil war.56 However, not two weeks after the verdict was delivered, it was overturned with

no explanation by the Guatemalan Constitutional Court, which also removed the attorney

52 Ibid 53 http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/warpeace.pdf 54 Ibid 55 https://www.american.edu/cas/economics/ejournal/upload/Global_Majority_e_Journal_4_1_Bell.pdf 56 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42580.pdf


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general and the judge presiding over the case.57 This unexpected result reflects the serious

integrity issues that face Guatemala’s political institutions.

Efforts to transition former military and intelligence units into a new democratic

government were also unsuccessful, and resulted in their turning into massive illicit

enterprises.58 For example, at the conclusion of the civil war, the Guatemalan Intelligence

Agency no longer played a role in the day-to-day security operations of the government. In

response to this, members of the now-defunct agency began exploring less scrupulous job

opportunities, such as narcotics trafficking.59 Eventually, nearly all elements of the former

intelligence agency had been repurposed to facilitate illegal drug trafficking.60

A weak economy, deficient political institutions, and defunct post-war agencies, all

contributed to the deterioration of post-war Guatemala. With a lack of employment

opportunities, a jaded view of the government’s ability to improve their lives, and a lifelong

exposure to violence and strife, Guatemalan youth inevitably turned to the vices of crime

and gang violence.

Gang Violence

Gangs hold a lot of influence over the daily lives of Guatemalans. The two largest

and most influential gangs in Guatemala are Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio 18.

Each group claims 80% and 15% of the country’s 8000-14000 total gang population

respectively61. Barrio 18 and MS-13 historically do not have a hierarchical leadership

57 Ibid 58 http://www.insightcrime.org/guatemala-organized-crime-news/guatemala 59 Ibid 60 Ibid 61http://www.ghrc-usa.org/Publications/GangFactSheet.pdf


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structure. Rather, clikas, or cliques, of the gangs operate mostly independent of each other62.

However, experts have theorized that in the past few years MS-13 has begun to consolidate

leadership63.

Barrio 18 and MS-13 participate in a number of criminal activities, including drug

trafficking, murder for hire, and extortion64,65. Estimated profits appear to differ, but these

crimes have massive effects on ordinary Guatemalans. Extortion initially targets businesses,

but when business owners refuse to cooperate their employees are forced to pay in order to

avoid retribution by the gangs66. The public transportation sector is especially vulnerable to

extortion and extortion-related violence. Numbers released by Guatemalan authorities reflect

over 400 extortion-related murders of public bus drivers in 2014 alone67. Some businesses

use police officers to protect their employees, but some workers have reported that officers

use the opportunity to crack down on labor unions68.

Barrio 18 and MS-13 fight each other throughout Central America for dominance,

and Guatemala is no exception. In 2015, 91 people were killed per week, with body parts

often left in the street by gangs as warnings to others6970. Some of these murders are

62 Ibid. 63http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/report-highlights-increasing-sophistication-of-ms13-in-guatemala 64http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemala-profits-criminal-activity-may-not-amount-to-much 65 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf 66 http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/guate-mara-extortion-economy-guatemala 67 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/attacks-on-bus-drivers-in-guatemala-persist 68 http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/guate-mara-extortion-economy-guatemala 69http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3337589/Guns-gangs-murder-Shocking-photos-chart-bloody-

streets-Guatemala-scene-homicide-90-MINUTES.html 70 https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19279


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committed by children and teenagers, who are recruited or forced into gangs at a very young

age7172.

As a result of the increasing gang violence in the region, tens of thousands of youths

from Guatemala and other Central American countries are fleeing to the United States and

Mexico73. In response, the USA has cracked down on illegal child immigrants, which sends

children back into the violence they want to escape74.

Since these gangs are also prominent in El Salvador and Honduras, so much of the

gang activity seen in Guatemala has the potential to influence, and to be influenced by,

activity in the other two countries. Cliques of Barrio 18 and MS-13 can also be found in

Mexico, Canada and the United States7576

Government Corruption

Human Rights Watch reports that 95% of Guatemala’s murder cases never went to

trial in 201077. Meanwhile, in 2012 the Guatemalan government fired and arrested almost

200 police officers under corruption charges ranging from smuggling to kidnapping78.

Experts believe that the widespread corruption of law enforcement is caused by the lack of

the police training and equipment necessary to stand up to heavily-armed gang members79. A

report by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Central American Institute of Fiscal

71 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/country-lost-kids/ 72

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3337589/Guns-gangs-murder-Shocking-photos-chart-bloody-

streets-Guatemala-scene-homicide-90-MINUTES.html 73http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/gender_and_migration/2016/08/as_central_american_ga

ngs_target_younger_kids_more_minors_are_fleeing_to.html 74 http://www.newsweek.com/deported-central-american-teens-harrowing-choice-488485 75 http://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/mara-salvatrucha-ms-13-profile 76 http://www.insightcrime.org/honduras-organized-crime-news/barrio-18-honduras 77 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/guatemala 78 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/guatemala-police-reform-to-crack-down-in-2013 79https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/police-reform-guatemala-

obstacles-and-opportunities


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Studies (ICEFI) also reveals that police stations and courtrooms are severely understaffed.

According to the report, as of 2013 there were less than two officers for every 1000 citizens

and one judge for every 18,400 citizens80. Unfortunately, a lack of funding and the public’s

desperation to lower crime rates led to a reliance on the army to enforce order81.

Other reforms are also probably slowed by the rampant corruption in the

Guatemalan government. Human rights groups campaigned for reforms for years, which

eventually led to a partnership with the UN to form of the Commission Against Impunity in

Guatemala (CICIG) in 200782. According to the CICIG’s mandate, it assists the Guatemalan

government in the investigation of criminal groups that may have infiltrated the State83. This

represented a major step for the country, since its willingness to allow the CICIG served as

an implied recognition of its rampant corruption84. Yet, the sheer size of the scandals

uncovered by CICIG demonstrates that the country’s government is far from pure. Even the

President and Vice President are not above corruption accusations. In the infamous La Línea

scandal, both the executive and his vice president were arrested for accepting bribes in

exchange for not charging merchants import taxes85. It will be extremely difficult for

Guatemala to move forward as long as it cannot even trust its own president.

While studying this case country, delegates should carefully consider the UN’s

current efforts in Guatemala. At what point does a country’s domestic issues, like gang

80http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/guatemala-unicef-report-recommendations-security-impunity 81https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/police-reform-guatemala-

obstacles-and-opportunities 82https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Citizen%20Security/past/cicig_advocates_against_

impunity.pdf 83 http://www.cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate 84https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Citizen%20Security/past/cicig_advocates_against_

impunity.pdf 85 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/guatemala-la-linea-customs-scandal-explained


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violence and corruption, become an international problem? Is Guatemala a failing state, and

if so, how should the international community handle the situation?

Documents

United Nations Security Councilirc.princeton.edu/pmunc/docs/UNSC.pdf · The United Nations Security Council was formed in Chapters V and VII of the United Nations Charter in June