UNIT 6Community Fishing Rights vs. Community

Fisheries Management: Forming and implementing a beneficial fisheries

management regime within the community

Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08, Apia, Samoa

Secretariat of the Pacific Community

• Session objectives: To show and reinforce the point that community

fishing rights do not constitute a fisheries management system

To demonstrate that outcomes of a community fisheries management depends on the dynamics of community group

Outcome:• Participants should appreciate that inclusion of

individual needs within a community is important in achieving consensus in fisheries management decisions

Distinguish between Community Fishing Rights and Community

Fisheries Management

• Community fishing rights constitute a subset of the class of management systems referred to as “property rights”. – harvesting rights, TURFs– authority to the group– rights do not take away role of individuals

Community fisheries management

• Community fisheries management refers to the set of management rules adopted by the community to achieve their collective goals and objectives– consists of operational rules: formal and informal

• Rules determine how the fisheries management regime will function– influenced by the political, legal and social

circumstance in which the community fisheries right has developed.

Community Fisheries Management as a Bargaining Game

• Conceptualise the rules of the fisheries management regime to that of a game where the players decide on what rules to adopt and the process of adopting those rules to achieve their goals and objectives (Arnason, 2007)

• Rules - within the existing set of formal and informal rules

• outcome of the game is dependent on the group dynamics

• Level of cohesion

• Influenced by several complex sociological, political, cultural and economic factors

• Organised groups - social and political institutions, cohesion is high, division of labour , adherence to rules, distribution of benefits, behaviour and decisions of the group could be predictable

• Different preferences and expectations- outcome of decisions is less predictable

• If community is highly motivated towards a common goal of a good and decent livelihood with a longer time horizon: – more concern over the status of the resources

– rules of compliance likely to be based on the threat of social, economic, physical, supernatural punishment and in-kind penalties

Right holders - through direct participation in the fishery draw upon their individual and collective knowledge on the location and abundance of fishery resources, observation of catches and catch rate, seasonal and annual changes, technological changes, economic returns and other information (Willmann, 2000).

• Community members may have differences on how the fishery should be managed or on the optimal fishery policy

• Group dynamics plays a key role

• Group members play a bargaining game (Arnason, 2007).

• If each member's pay-off increases with the aggregate pay-off, his or her optimal strategy will work towards the maximisation of aggregate benefits (Arnason, 2007).

• Rules of the game apply to the management regime as well as management measures

“Kaldor-Hicks: Criteria”• Implication of policy change – restrictions

on effort/ and or catch• Person A ($20), Person B ($200)

– With policy change – A to cut back on effort and has $40

– B has $190– A can pay B between $10 and $20 since B is

now worse off.– Pareto optimality : maximum gainers pay >

minimum losers are willing to accept

• Community members must be clear in what they want and how best to achieve such goals and aspirations– homogeneous group– small in number– institutions with implicit arrangement for

sharing, redistribution– voluntary compliance

Large groups - internalisation of externalities diminishes

Characteristics of the community influencing the nature of operational rules

Eligibility criteria of group membership – merit, kinship, skills

Rules on transferability of rights – sale, lease, marriage, bequest

Existence of secondary or temporary rights – non-group members in exchange of fee or gifts

Gear and equipment rules – what technology and methods are permitted

Species rules – size limits, quotasConservation rules - area closures, MPAs, taboo areas

Sharing rules – distribution of income, catch

Forming and Implementing a Beneficial Fisheries Management Regime

• The context of some elements of the key items:– Political support - recognition by governments

and public on -CBFMs, decentralisation of management,

– Traditional and formal local institutions in place

• Legislation -broad powers through legislative means - Fisheries Act, Constitution, by-laws

• Information - traditional knowledge and experience– Lack of information on external factors-

market, prices, innovations– Role of fisheries extension officers

• Technical Guidance -limited capital, access to appropriate resources, education– individuals- private gains– government advisory role, research

information, oversee MCS– NGOs, researchers, scientists and other groups– Donors

• Decision making framework - a traditional hierarchical structure such as the chiefly system that makes decisions – Modern administrative systems– purpose, functions and responsibilities must be

clearly defined, complementary– Inclusive consultations– transparent decision

• Use decision tools - Cost/Benefit analysis, project management, resource accounting

• Rights to veto - transboundary nature of resources– conflicts– Security issues

• Access to expertise/funding - facilitated by fisheries department, NGOs, SPC– Skills in writing project proposal, project

management, evaluation and reporting, stock assessment, biological surveys, resource economists, sociologist, etc

Implementation Plan

• Fisheries Management Plan – to implement Policy

• List of objectives that can be achieved• Means to achieve the objectives – strategies• What is needed to operationalise ?–

resources- (financial, technical, infrastructural) institutional framework, information