UNDERSTANDING RECENT ELECTION RESULTS IN VENEZUELA FRANCISCO J.
MONALDI HARVARD UNIVERSITY | IESA Wilson Center, January 2014
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THE CONTEXT A DYING PRESIDENT, A BOOM, AND AN ECONOMIC
CRISIS
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THE LARGEST WINDFALL IN HISTORY Source: IMF
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IN 2012 GROWTH INCREASED AND INFLATION FELL, IN 2013 THE
TENDENCIES REVERSED
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An electoral budget cycle on steroids...
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The public sector deficit in the year to the 2012 election at
historical high of close to 17% of GDP, with total public
expenditures also at a historical high of around 50% of GDP. This
when the price of oil is also at a historical peak. Source: BCV and
Barclays
Hugo Chvez Total votes8,136,964 Share of valid votes55.25%
Capriles Radonski Total votes6,499,575 Share of valid votes44.3%
Victory margin between HCR and HCF 10.90 percentage points Source:
CNE (99% ballots counted) CHVEZ EASILY WINS THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS
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Increasingly competitive elections It can be seen that
elections have become more competitive since 2007. There were four
elections between 2007 and 2010 and the opposition attained a
majority of the popular vote in two of them, while the vote margin
was close in all of them. In contrast, before 2007, the government
won all elections with a wide margin. Fuente: CNE The last five
electoral cycles have become much more competitive between the
government and the opposition
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Fuente: CNE clculos propios. Henrique Capriles Hugo Chvez 3
minutes (mandated by CNE) 10 minutes (mandated by Ley Resorte) 38
minutes (cadenas) 3 minutes (CNE) MEDIA ACCESS WAS HIGHLY UNEQUAL
Capriles Radonski had access to three minutes of advertising
mandate by Venezuelas electoral authority (CNE). As a candidate,
Hugo Chavez also had access to those three minutes. However, as
President, the Ley Resorte (Venezuelas law regulating mass media
which is enforced by the national government) allows him (the
government) 10 minutes of general broadcast per day and 38 minutes
of cadena per day publicizing government works. In sum, Capriles
messages were broadcasted through all national media airwaves for
three minutes a day, while Chavezs messages were broadcasted
through all national media for 51 minutes a day.
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THE 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION APRIL 13TH
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Very high turnout, although lower than 2012 14,854,477 votes
79.68% voter participation 2013 Presidential Election Source: CNE
(98,9% of ballots counted)
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Nicols Maduro Total votes7,545,338 Share of valid votes50.58%
Capriles Radonski Total votes7,270,383 Share of valid votes48.74%
Victory margin between NM and HCR 1.84 percentage points Source:
CNE (98,9% ballots counted) MADURO NARROWLY WINS THE HIGHLY
CONTESTED 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
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Fuente: CNE UNFAIR MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2013 ELECTIONS THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT ABUSE OF POWER IN THE HISTORY OF VENEZUELAN
ELECTIONS SIGNIFICANT INRREGULARITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTIONS
The two main channels in the country (Venevisin and Televen) had a
balanced coverage of both candidates in the news. While the
opposition-leaning channel showed preference for Capriles, only
surpassed by the bias showcased by the official state channel for
Maduro.
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WITH CHAVEZ AS INCUMBENT ELECTIONS WERE NOT COMPETITIVE, BUT HE
WON BY LESS THAN THE AVERAGE FOR INCUMBENTS IN THE REGION (27%)
MADURO WAS NOT AN INCUMBENT AND THE ECONOMY DID NOT FARE WELL
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2013 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS DECEMBER 16TH 2013 2,792 public office
positions were elected: 335 mayors. 2,435 municipal council members
686 chosen through PR 1,680 chosen by plurality
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Average turnout for local/regional elections 10,798,589
suffrages 58.92% voter participation 2013 Municipal Election
Source: CNE (98,9% of ballots counted)
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Victory margin between Gov and Opp 7.92 percentage points
Source: CNE (98,9% ballots counted) CHAVISMO BEATS THE OPPOSITION
BY A MARGIN SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Government Total votes5,265,930 Share of valid votes48.76%
Municipalities242 Opposition Total votes4,410,238 Share of valid
votes40.84% Municipalities75 Other Total votes1,122,421 Share of
valid votes10.39% Municipalities18 The victory margin rises to
10.62 percentage points if we account for
government-and-opposition-affiliated parties in the
comparison.
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OPPOSITION WON SIX OF THE TEN LARGEST MUNICIPALITIES IN THE
COUNTRY StateMunicipalityGovernmentOpposition Distrito
Metropolitano47,22%51,28% DTTO CAPITALLIBERTADOR54,55%43,34%
ZULIAMARACAIBO46,64%51,74% LARAIRIBARREN46,04%52,41%
CARABOBOVALENCIA44,28%54,24% BOLIVARCARONI51,21%43,52%
MIRANDASUCRE44,51%52,79% ARAGUAGIRARDOT51,55%43,64%
MONAGASMATURIN37,26%38,63% ZULIASAN FRANCISCO59,48%39,32%
ANZOATEGUIBOLIVAR52,65%44,78% * Ranking designed by N of
voters
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THE MUNICIPAL BALANCE OF POWER SHIFTED SLIGHTLY IN FAVOR OF THE
OPPOSITION Chavismo lost 23 mayorships, passing from 265 mayorships
to 242. They managed to maintain the Capital District (Libertador);
as well as some large cities like Maracay, Pto. Ordaz, Barcelona
and Pto. La Cruz. The government also held comfortable victory
margins in mid-sized cities like San Francisco, Los Teques, La
Victoria, Puerto Cabello, San Carlos, Coro and San Felipe. The
opposition obtained 76 mayors (from 54 it previously held). They
maintained the Caracas Metropolitan Mayor under their control, as
well as four out of the five municipalities of Caracas. They also
gained flagship municipalities like Barinas (capital of Chvez home
state), Valera, Valle de la Pascua and Maturn, all of these
traditionally chavista strongholds.
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HISTORICAL ELECTORAL RESULTS 2004-2013: THE OPPOSITION FARED
WORSE IN VOTES THAN IN 2008 BUT WON MORE POSITIONS BECAUSE IT RAN
UNITED
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Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Dakas organized looting). Polling
firm: Datanalisis. 2013 WAS A YEAR OF MOSTLY NEGATIVE VIEWS ON THE
COUNTRYS SITUATION WITH A SLIGHT RECOVERY TOWARDS THE END DAKA
effect
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THE DAKA EFFECT: ORGANIZED LOOTING? Economic situation is bad
Annualized Inflation surpasses 55% and Scarcity is around 20% of
basic-need products Chavismo manages to blame the retailers
President Maduro announces that retailers should reduce prices by
more tan 60% and calls for the people to re- claim these products
Controlled looting begins The public goes first to Daka, and later
to other retailers demanding the discounts Blow to private sector
in the country Retailers are left without stock and ask their
suppliers to redirect container to other ports Unclear perception
of looting episode In the aftermath of the looting, society was
polarized by those appalled by the events and those renergized by
the sense of justice and decisiveness of their leader.
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DAKA Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Dakas organized looting).
Polling firm: Datanalisis. Chavismo candidates experienced a boost
the month of Dakas looting
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DAKA Field dates: Nov 12-26 (post Dakas organized looting).
Polling firm: Datanalisis. Government evaluation became a good
proxy for the Municipal Election Results
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FINAL COMMENTS In October 2012 Chavez won by a smaller margin
than he should have. In April 2014 Maduro barely won (if he did).
The economy and the fact that he was not the incumbent led him to
lose 9 pp of the margin, despite all the blatant abuse of power and
electoral irregularities. The municipal elections of December 2013
were a significant victory for Maduro, given the terrible economic
situation. The opposition did significantly better than in 2008
largely as a result of running unified. Next elections: at the end
of 2015 for all seats in the National Assembly