1

A final version of this paper was published in Technological Forecasting & Social Change 80

(2013): 711-722. Please quote the published version.

Understanding normative foresight outcomes:

Scenario development and the „veil of ignorance‟ effect

Liviu Andreescu, Spiru Haret University

Radu Gheorghiu, Institute for World Economy

Marian Zulean, University of Bucharest

Adrian Curaj, Politehnica University, Bucharest

Abstract

The article approaches the question of the extent to and the ways in which the participatory

construction of normative narratives in system foresight influences the shape of the outcomes.

We discuss foresight as a system of inquiry into decision-making problems characterized by

three key features – distancing, holism, and participation-intensiveness. We put forward the

hypothesis that participative approaches to normative scenario development, which are

structurally similar to a Rawlsian “original position” setup, generate a concern with the

procedural arrangements governing the future world in the scenario, rather than simply with the

events or states in the story of the future. This concern with “constitutional basics” may be

regarded as an expression of participants‟ attempt to ensure that, in the future world, each party

will have a seat at the table and a voice in the conversation. As a result, the construction of

normative narratives may be interpreted in terms of an effort to smooth out tensions that are

inevitably embedded in scenarios. The hypothesis is illustrated, in the article‟s final section, with

a recent exercise on the future of higher education.

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Keywords: system foresight; normative scenario; participation; original position; consensus;

holism; deliberative democracy

1. Introduction

The question we asked ourselves as we approached the final stages of a large-scale, participatory,

vision-oriented process was: “What kind of normative narrative should one expect from a system

foresight exercise”? At the most basic level, the answer is, of course, plain: the picture of a

somewhat distant future which is recognized by the participants in the exercise as desirable and

as an appropriate guide for future policy action. But does this type of output have some structure-

or substance-related characteristics or features that are generic, i.e., which one would expect to

encounter in most normative scenarios in system foresight, or at least in those arrived at by

similar routes?

While the literature on scenario building and scenario planning has recently been enriched by

typologies and taxonomies [28,2,24], none of those we consulted adequately responded to this

question. Van Notten et al. [28], for example, distinguish between normative and what they

somewhat misleadingly refer to as descriptive scenarios, but do not systematically relate either of

them to other features within their three typological dimensions (project goal, process design,

and scenario content).1 Bishop et al. explicitly point out that, while they initially intended to

distinguish among scenario techniques in terms of a “descriptive” and a “normative” approach, it

“turned out that each technique could be adapted for one or the other...” [24, p. 21]. Borjeson et

al.‟s [2] discussion of normative scenarios is confusing (as we show presently), among others

because it appears to include in this class only so-called developmental or event-sequence

scenarios, but not also end-states or snapshot scenarios. Other taxonomies, though clearly

framing normative scenarios as a separate class, are hardly more specific in pinpointing any

distinguishing outcomes.

1 There is one exception, namely their claim that backcasting scenarios are normative “by nature” [28, p. 429]. We

discuss this question further down, in the subsection on normative scenarios.

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We therefore return to our question: does the added normative (as opposed to exploratory)

dimension of scenarios in system foresight exercises influence the shape of these narratives in

predictable or recognizable ways? The expectation that such scenarios have defining features

would not be far-fetched. It is a commonplace of post-positivist theories of science that the

structure of the system of inquiry partly determines the outcomes [17]. Our claim in this paper,

which we put forward as a hypothesis to be tested by future research, is that participatory system

foresight exercises yield normative narratives which tend to focus, explicitly or implicitly, on the

basic values and procedural arrangements governing the desired future world.

The article‟s first main section looks at system foresight as a system of inquiry, that is, as the

paradigm within which the type of scenario building we are interested in is undertaken. We

highlight those assumptions in foresight which, in our view, are conducive to the kinds of

outcomes described by our hypothesis. This also provides an appropriate context for clarifying

the meaning of the term “normative” as employed herein.

The hypothesis is properly fleshed out in the second section. To this end, we suggest an analogy

with a famous thought experiment in political philosophy – John Rawls‟s “original position” /

“veil of ignorance”. While appealing to such an analogy may seem surprising, we note that

scenarios themselves are thought experiments (“heuristic devices … for attempting to break

away from conventional thinking” [35, p. 149]). Indeed, as thought experiments the “original

position” and normative scenario building share several very significant structural features.

The third section spells out some implications of our hypothesis for the development of

normative narratives. We also suggest a less traditional perspective on working with scenarios,

specifically as a normative conversation on “fields of tensions”.

Finally, we provide an outline of a recent large-scale system foresight exercise in higher

education, focusing on its scenario development phase. This serves as a case study which lends

prima facie support to our hypothesis. However, we leave it to subsequent analyses of past and

future foresight endeavours to determine whether the hypothesis may be properly generalized at

all and, if so, to what extent.

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It must be emphasized that, while “foresight” is a concept which covers a wide array of

prospective practices, we are concerned here with one particular, albeit relatively broad, type.

Although, for the sake of convenience, we will employ below the phrase “system foresight”

without further qualifications, what we have in mind is a type of practice that (a) has, as its

object, large social institutions and the associated systems of organizations (such as education or

R&D&I); (b) entails a participatory process involving diverse categories of actors and

stakeholders; and (c) aims to deliver, among others, a shared normative narrative of the future

(often, a vision) as a guide to action. Furthermore, this normative narrative usually emerges as

the result of some form of consensus among participants and therefore claims for itself a degree

of representativeness (though not in the statistical sense) or, at least, of inter-subjective

agreement.

Each and every one of the features above is essential to our argument. Conversely, we do not

claim that the hypothesis put forward here holds with equal force beyond this qualified

understanding of system foresight, in foresight for small organizations, for example, or in

scenario-building efforts that do not allow the normative narratives to emerge through some

manner of agreement achieved in a mostly bottom-up process.

2. Foresight as a system of inquiry and the role of scenario building

To set the stage for this section‟s discussion, it is worth commencing with the observation that

the type of foresight alluded to above – large-scale, participation-intensive, systemic – is today

ripe for exploration, among others because of its substantial growth over the past few decades.

Miles et al. documented a rather remarkable accumulation of “national” foresight exercises

between the early 1990s and the middle of the last decade [14], while Slaughter found a few

years ago that government dominates “the world of FS/foresight work” [36, p. 9]. National

foresight is today complemented by regional endeavours, while the original S&T focus of system

foresight has also been broadening, as with the higher education foresight discussed in the final

section of this article. The national or regional – as opposed to organizational – dimension of

recent foresight has had an impact on specific practices, introduced new challenges, and, perhaps

most importantly, created new expectations [14]. Scenarios and visions for complex national or

regional institutional systems – and even continental ones, judging by foresight‟s “footprint in

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the further consolidation” of the European Research Area [37] – render questions such as the one

asked here quite timely.

This being said, it is difficult to do justice to foresight in terms of a brief characterization or a set

of features, particularly given the number of foresight schools and the wealth of foresight

practices currently in use, some of which do not even attach to themselves the “foresight” label

[14]. Although, in our discussion, we strive to capture several relevant core assumptions of

foresight in general, we are particularly concerned with the variety which is applied to large-

scale social institutions (to institutional systems or “organizational fields”) [38], relies on

participatory processes, and employs normative scenarios as a key method. This will be referred

to as “system foresight”. While this approach obviously restricts the range of foresight practices

tackled here, it covers a sufficiently wide gamut of exercises and experiences to lend a broader

interest to our argument.

2.1. Assumptions underlying foresight as a system of inquiry

For the purposes of this article, foresight as a system of inquiry – or paradigm, to use a broader

term – relies on, among others, three important assumptions:

in inquiring into the future, one must distance oneself sufficiently from the present [6,39]:

additional freedom from the latter leads to better anticipation of the former;

the future should be approached holistically [36], that is, systemically rather than in a

reductionist manner, with no part of the future system being considered as a priori more

important than any other [16, p. 31];

the processes whereby the future is explored should be participatory, ideally to the point

where “[e]veryone who will be impacted by the „plan‟ that results from a futures process

should be part” of the latter [32, p. 4].

As a paradigm, foresight doubtlessly relies on other fundamental assumptions, sometimes

deeper-level ontological and epistemic ones, such as several key claims about complexity and

uncertainty (from which, in fact, its holism derives) [4]. Nevertheless, foresight‟s future-oriented

distancing, its holism, and its participatory nature are essential and sufficient for our argument.

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They explain why the “scenario method” has been hailed as the “the tool par excellence of

futures studies” [30, p. 15] or as “the archetypical product of futures studies … [embodying its]

central principles” [24, p. 5].

Scenario development is a convenient method in system foresight because, firstly, it is well

suited to putting distance between participants and their present circumstances. By either

eschewing trend extrapolations (the “official” or “continued growth” view of the future [32]) or

employing them primarily as heuristic devices, scenario building allows, according to its

practitioners, for both temporal and epistemological distancing. The aim is to “look more widely,

more deeply, and longer into the future” [39, p. 102] rather than to be spot on. This arguably

enables participants to “see the present or future anew” [6, p. 78].

Secondly, the relatively substantial degree of freedom – implicit in the distancing effort – taken

in building scenarios renders holism particularly appropriate as a governing perspective. In this

sense, scenario development is a “systemic method” [36]. It typically presupposes long-range

futures in order to allow for “structural, and hence more profound” change [2]. Rather than

getting bogged down into details, many of which are inherently uncertain or based on

questionable assumptions, scenarios promise “deep understanding” and “the ability to ... spot

developments before they become trends, to see patterns before they fully emerge, and to grasp

the relevant features of social currents that are likely to shape the direction of future events.” [25,

p. 2] Furthermore, as a trend-breaking [22] or certainty-breaking tool, scenarios strive to keep

presentist reductionism at bay.

Thirdly, the distancing act naturally makes room for a participatory and activist approach to the

future. Whereas near, predictable futures are arguably sometimes best handled by experts, the

latter‟s role in the imagining and/or creation of futures appears less dependable. Furthermore,

since holism typically implies the recognition that systemic change depends on mutually

reinforcing transformations at both institutional and social level [27], a collective, participatory

learning-by-doing component appears attractive. Scenarios are especially convenient in this

context because several of their features enable broad participation: they often don‟t presuppose

advanced technical skills from most participants, can accommodate a variety of forms of input

into the process, are quite flexible as a technique and format, and can be convincingly interpreted

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as a process-oriented enterprise [3]. Thus, as Inayatullah noted, scenarios are about “the victory

of agency over structure” [6, p. 78], about the power to shape the future through the exercise of

collective will and imagination against the constraints imposed by present structures and mental

models. As a result, everyone is welcome at the table.

The synergy of distancing, holism and participation-intensiveness also renders normative

scenarios particularly attractive in foresight. Such narratives, whether packaged as sets of

desirable alternative futures or as singular visions of the future, rely on participation to a

qualitatively greater extent than exploratory scenarios, because they must not only deliver fresh

or original or heuristically useful insights, but also command the assent or the recognition of

participants (and often also of the communities whose voices they represent). Furthermore,

especially where the normative scenario is a single, “unifying” vision, it will tend to cover very

broad sections of the future system. Without guaranteeing a holistic perspective, this tends to

sustain it.

2.2. Normative scenarios in foresight

It is appropriate, at this point, to explain how we construe the term “normative” in this context.

We do not define normative scenarios in terms of “explicitly normative starting points …

[describing] future situations or objectives and how these could be realised” [2, p. 728], if by

“starting point” it is meant that such scenarios are built from pre-existing commitments to certain

goals or ends. According to this view, the “starting” goals or ends are not themselves the object

of normative inquiry, being predefined or preselected in some way. Rather, in our construal of

“normative”, the desirable future situations or the goals in the scenario-building exercise emerge

themselves as the result of a process with specific features. Typically, this process implies an

eventual consensus or agreement which, in view of its having been reached through the

involvement of the relevant actors and stakeholders, may claim a sufficient degree of

representativeness or inter-subjective assent, which is also a key source of normativeness. The

normative narrative(s) may then serve to guide future action aimed at achieving something

resembling the desirable image(s) of the future.

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Whether or not the normative scenarios are actually followed by strategic commitments or policy

action is less significant for their normative status. What is important is that they be offered for

such purposes. As a matter of fact, neither the desirability of a picture of the future, nor the fact

that it emerges as the product of agreement or consensus, nor both of these conditions together

are sufficient to lend a scenario its normative force. The latter becomes normative only if, in

addition, it is put forth as a goal for action (and sometimes also as a path to that goal).

While, in the system foresight context taken here as a reference, a normative scenario implies

desirability, consensus, and suitability for future action, there is also a weaker sense of

“normative” in the literature. It is encountered, for instance, in the observation that most

scenarios are informed by values. Thus, against the claim that alternative scenario sets “should

be conceived as value-neutral” [26, p. 114], it can be convincingly argued that all scenarios,

including early exploratory ones, are entrenched in norms and values [28] and are even

ideologically charged [22]. Sometimes this is acknowledged explicitly and, indeed, capitalized

on. In one of the approaches associated with the Manoa School, for example, the four archetypal

alternative futures are “cosmolog[icall]y, epistemolog[icall]y, and often deontolog[icall]y”

grounded [32, p. 7]. The same is true of techniques wherein scenarios are not fixed at the

beginning of the exercise. Frequently, scenario sets for organizations are developed based on

variables teased out during discussions on the organization‟s history, culture, its current goals,

etc. These starting points are clearly normative in the weaker sense discussed here, whether this

is recognized during scenario building or not. Yet this is not the meaning of “normative” we are

interested in, because virtually all scenarios are normatively embedded in this sense.

It is also worth distinguishing “normative” as deployed here from a stronger, more limited (and

limiting) meaning of the word: a scenario, usually embodying a set of strategic choices, which

commands the open, official commitment of the relevant decision-makers [7]. While such

commitment frequently constitutes one ideal of visioning, this strong version of normativeness is

not required for the purposes of our argument. Rather, we employ “normative” with reference to

a desirable story which is recognized as such by a diverse and, where possible, representative

community. The narrative‟s backing by decision-makers able and willing to take action is not a

necessary condition for normativity.

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3. The hypothesis unveiled: normative scenarios as “constitutional basics” of the future

world

Let us now return to the question which prompted the development of our hypothesis: does the

added normative (as opposed to exploratory) dimension of scenarios in system foresight alter the

shape of these narratives in predictable ways? We put forward that adding the constraint of

normativity on top of the three aforementioned features of scenario development – the distancing

act, the holistic perspective, and the participatory structure – will tend to generate narratives

which focus on the basic values and the key procedural arrangements that govern the desirable

future world. To put it differently: the consensus underlying the desirable picture of the future

will be the expression of an agreement not only on the “content of the future”, but – and

essentially – also on the foundational values and procedures enabling the residents of the future

world to negotiate their interests. Even though the desirable picture will, on its surface, depict

various future events or states of affairs, in practice it will frequently be the vehicle for a deep-

structure agreement on what we would venture to call the “constitutional basics” of the future

world.

The triad of distancing, holism, and participation-intensiveness plays a central role here.

Distancing, whatever its advantages as far as anticipation is concerned, increases epistemic

freedom as well as epistemic and psychological uncertainty about the future. Reflective

participants will soon understand that their role in the future world is not easy to predict. The

uncertainty is strengthened by the foresight ideal of participation-intensiveness: given the holistic

perspective and the systemic nature of the exercise, the actors and stakeholders involved will

typically belong to diverse groups. Presumably, each party to the scenario building effort will be

confronted with varied, often conflicting worldviews and with specific individual or group

agendas about the future. In response to epistemic uncertainty and ideological diversity,

participants will want to make sure that they will still have a say in the jointly constructed future.

They will set a baseline for their future bargaining power (a maximin strategy, in game-

theoretical terms). This should generate a concern, whether manifest or concealed, with

“constitutional basics” – the procedural arrangements governing the future world in question.

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An analogy with a familiar thought experiment in political theory may serve as an illustration.

John Rawls‟ “original position”, first widely publicized in his A Theory of Justice [20] and then

subject to various revisions [19,21], is sufficiently well-known beyond political philosophy and

political science circles for the brief presentation below to suffice. Before outlining it, it bears

pointing out that scenarios as currently practiced in futures studies are quintessential thought

experiments – heuristic devices whereby participants‟ current mental models are suspended in

order to stimulate new perspectives on the object of inquiry [35]. Seen in these terms, Rawls‟

approach to social justice is, much like vision-based foresight exercises, based on an imaginary

scenario which presupposes a leap of faith. It is also based on an intuition which, as noted

previously, plays a crucial role in scenario development as well: by putting some distance

between decision-makers and their present circumstances the scenario-building exercise will

enhance their imagination; act as an empathy-generating device [10] facilitating consensus; and,

partly as a result, yield a more objective (or inter-subjective) [19] outcome.

The goal of Rawls‟ “original position” thought experiment is to develop the principles of justice

underlying a well-ordered society. Following in the footsteps of social contract theories, the

American political thinker chose a deliberative procedure for his setup. Specifically, he asked the

participants in an “original position” to determine the appropriate basic principles of justice for

an imagined future society, without any of these founding parents knowing their actual social

position and their natural endowments therein – hence the “veil of ignorance”. Under the veil,

participants are unaware of their conceptions of the good in the hypothetical society, but are

supposed to choose rationally the principles that would enable each to adequately pursue their

vision of the good, whichever that may be. The purpose of the “veil” conceit is thus, much like in

scenario development, to enable the participants to achieve distance from their current interests

and viewpoints. By asking the prospective residents of the society to derive its governing

principles from a position in which each remains ignorant of his or her future condition, Rawls

hopes to trigger a suspension of those parts of participants‟ ethical models that are, in fact,

morally irrelevant, but which often affect, in practice, their moral worldviews.

As Rawls subsequently restated his argument, a key challenge which this thought experiment

tried to resolve is the “pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” [21, p.

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xvi], i.e., the irreducible plurality of legitimate worldviews held by the members of a complex

political community. The deliberating parties are, in effect, asked to define the principles of

justice for their future society by shedding their present-day footwear and imaginatively putting

themselves in the shoes of any conceivable dweller (or at least a number of substantially

different conceivable dwellers) of the future world. One of the frequent criticisms levelled

against the original position – but which need not concern us here – is that this act of imaginative

suspension may demand too much in practice [23].

In the case of normative scenario building in system foresight, a veil-of-ignorance effect is

achieved by requesting participants to construct and reflect on a desirable picture of a future that

is sufficiently distant to minimize perceived threats to actors‟ and stakeholders‟ present-day

circumstances and interests. Like the participants in the original position, the actors and

stakeholders in system foresight are recognized to have legitimate interests and views which may

be at odds with the views and interests of other participants. In reflecting normatively on higher

education in fifteen- or twenty-years‟ time, for example, foresight participants are invited to

think beyond their current social and professional coordinates: by that future time, the powerful

senior academics and administrators will probably have retired, younger ones will have secured a

comfortable position (or opted for another career), students will have long since graduated, their

parents will have stopped contributing to tuition, business leaders will have seen their ventures

develop in unpredictable ways, and so on. In other words, such an approach to normative

scenario building offers, by design, not merely the opportunity to think collectively, but also an

incentive to think beyond one‟s contextual interests in remaking the future. It enhances actors‟

and stakeholders‟ empathy not simply through participant diversity and a conversational process,

but by inviting them to explore the future from a position of relative freedom from current

concerns.

We hypothesize that this superior (though hardly absolute) degree of freedom plays a key role in

shaping normative scenarios in system foresight: like Rawls‟ founding parents deciding behind

the veil on the basic principles of their well-ordered society, foresight participants are stimulated

by the somewhat remote horizon of the scenarios, their bird‟s eye perspective, and their need to

come to an agreement, to reflect on “constitutional” arrangements ensuring access and voice in

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the future system. What emerges is, in Rawlsian terms, an “overlapping consensus” on value and

procedural basics which accommodates the variety of participants‟ “comprehensive worldviews”

(or views on the system that is the object of the system foresight inquiry). Just as the Rawlsian

ethical inquiry, “[r]ather than address all questions that might concern citizens … is confined to

what Rawls calls society‟s „basic structure‟” [11, p. 635], so the normative scenario generated in

the system foresight inquiry will tend to focus on the elementary conditions for participation in

the making of the future.

To sum up, the two setups compared by means of the analogy are remarkably alike in their

structural essentials. Both presuppose a deliberative format in which participants holding a

legitimate plurality of reasonable worldviews are invited to reach a normative agreement on the

basis of these worldviews. Both induce the participants, through trade-specific tricks such as the

veil of ignorance or distancing techniques, to set aside their present concerns in their

deliberations. True, the deliberating denizens of Rawls‟ future society are supposed, by the very

goals of their conversation, to discuss and agree on basic principles; whereas this is not

necessarily the case – at least not in terms of overt goals – with system foresight exercises. But

our point is precisely that Rawls‟s thought experiment is especially designed to be conducive to

such a debate about basic values and procedures, and that, on the other hand, normative scenario

development in system foresight closely resembles this design. If the features of the design, and

in particular the circumstances of the veil of ignorance, naturally move Rawls‟ deliberating

citizens towards an agreement on constitutional arrangements, then it should not be surprising

that system foresight exercises, which follow a relatively similar plan, tend to proceed along a

similar path toward a similar end-result.

4. Some implications for working with normative scenarios

If the hypothesis is correct, it has two kinds of implications on working with normative

narratives in system foresight. First, it tells us what we can legitimately expect to happen during

normative scenario building, and suggests that attention should be paid to particular dimensions

of this process. Secondly, the hypothesis points to some limitations of current work with

scenarios and to possible solutions for managing or circumventing them.

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4.1. Rethinking the relevant dimensions of scenario building

As to the first matter, if the representativeness of the normative scenario matters (if it is the way

in which the outcomes of the process are legitimized, for example), achieving consensus on

foundational values and procedures should not be considered an inadequate or insufficient

outcome. Not all normative scenarios will have a rich, lush story to tell about the future.

Sometimes participants do not fully agree on the shape of things to come, and the jointly created

story skimps on many issues – trends, events, circumstances – usually considered important.

(Outsiders will often notice that.) Nevertheless, even such a scanty narrative will almost always

contain significant deep-structure clues about how participants conceptualize their roles and

interaction in the future world. At a minimum, the story will provide the common terms on

which the participants are prepared to share the future with each other.

It may turn out to be comparatively more difficult to generate public policies or organizational

strategies based on a consensus barely going beyond value and procedural basics. By virtue of

their generality, the latter will be compatible with a wide spectrum of strategic or policy actions.

Nonetheless, such an agreement could still go a longer way towards engendering lasting

consensus compared with approaches which enrich the normative narratives by covertly forcing

consensus on more than the (uncoerced) participants would be prepared to accept.

This brings us to the issue of designing the “normative conversation” yielding the desirable

narrative(s). We have insisted above that the hypothesis advanced herein depends on distancing,

a holistic perspective, as well as on participation-intensiveness. It is high time to emphasize that

a genuinely participatory structure implies an authentic bottom-up approach to scenario building.

By this we mean something approximating, as far as possible, an “ideal deliberative procedure”

[29] which entails free dialogue, pluralism of views and aims, a recognition of each party‟s

deliberative capacities, a shared goal of reaching a reasoned agreement, and a collective

commitment to solving the issues at hand through the associative process under way (the

scenario building or visioning exercise and, after they are over, the conversation and community

they engendered).

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Not all narrative-building techniques are equally friendly to such a normative conversational

format. Many scenario techniques rely rather extensively, even though usually for heuristic

purposes, on models of the system to which the foresight inquiry is applied. Such models are

supposed to ensure a more disciplined exploration of the future, and are helpful in generating

intuitive scenarios that are related to each other in clear-cut ways. The double-variable approach

is a typical example. The Manoa School‟s archetypal alternative futures [32] and the “good, bad,

ugly” (GBU) or GBN approach also fit the profile. In these types of scenario work, the generated

or partly predetermined narratives are, properly speaking, alternatives, in the sense that one

scenario excludes the others, though they are not usually assigned probabilities (they are either

equiprobable, or their probability is not in question). In the normative stage of the exercise, one

scenario is then typically selected as the preferred narrative, or a preferred narrative is

constructed out of desirable features derived from the alternatives.

From the perspective advanced here, the problem with this approach is that, while the inquiry

into the future appears more disciplined, the “space of the possibles” is also comparatively

limited, sometimes in rather arbitrary fashion.2 (This is by no means to deny that such limiting

has its heuristic value.) The diversity of participant viewpoints is also restricted, because

whoever takes part in the exercise ultimately either has to buy into the whole conceptual model

on which the scenario development is based, or will be marginalized in the conversation. The

marginalization does not have to be personal – the participant who does not buy into the model

but accepts it as “the rules of the game” may be very active. But his or her original viewpoint

2 Let us discuss just one example from the literature, which is instructive precisely because the construction itself is

quite ingenious. In proposing a “hybrid strategic scenario method”, Miller suggests a scenario-based approach to the

future of electricity – as contemplated circa 1900. He also confronts head-on the complex issue of “select[ing]

specific scenarios from what is still a vast space of possibilities” [15]. His solution to meeting this complex

challenge is intuitive but, upon reflection, appears improvised and reductive: focus on the function and / or

organizational attributes (or other similar pairs) of the scenarios‟ subject. So Miller comes up with three values for

function (war, replacement for existing sources of energy, autonomous power for new products) and two values for

organization (centralized versus decentralized production), yielding six scenarios, which are then placed on a grid-

like map of the “pervasiveness” of energy, operationalized as “ease of use” and “range of uses”. This strategy is, in

fact, reductive many times over: first, in selecting pervasiveness as the issue (why not ethical concerns à la

Frankenstein [the book], especially in light of the War of Currents?!), then in positing a simple causal relationship

between the mode of production and ease-of-use (decentralization signifies overcoming technical barriers of

production, according to Miller, though in fact centralized production may well be conducive to general access as

well). This adhockery is, in fact, designed to generate a “rigorous” way to cope with the messiness of the field of

possibles. We suggest, instead, that the messiness be accepted as unavoidable and that one should rather strive to

provide an adequate medium to come to terms with it.

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will have been sidelined. Sometimes, sceptical participants accept to play the game, and they do

so actively and joyfully, but this should not be considered a sign that their initial scepticism has

dissolved. Their doubts as to the exercise‟s usefulness, and their consequent reluctance to

eventually act upon the results, may legitimately persist. To conclude, this type of scenario work

is perhaps more suitable for individual organizations, where the diversity of ideological mindsets

is not typically so high. It seems less appropriate in the case of institutional systems, which

involve a substantial diversity of actors and stakeholders and, by extension, of ideological

viewpoints.

4.2. Designing normative conversations on the future

We argue in favour of a more genuinely bottom-up approach which we see, in light of our

hypothesis, as better attuned to future-orientated inquiries into institutional systems. With the

exception of heuristic exploratory phases, this kind of system foresight relies not primarily on

models, but on the virtues and constraints of a normative dialogue. Given the nature of the

system inquired into, the numerous and diverse participants in the exercise, reflecting the

complex nature of the institutional system, will typically bring to the table their often

irreconcilable views of the latter. Strictly speaking, no participant or group truly sees “the

system”, because there is no single system for all the participants involved; each category of

participant has its own version(s) thereof.

Furthermore, participants‟ views are usually underpinned by complex and often unacknowledged

ideologies and will be, as a result, difficult if not downright impossible to change in substantial

fashion. This makes double-variable, archetypal or GBU/GBN approaches risky, because they

sometimes lure participants in with models or assumptions to which they, in fact, would not

subscribe on appropriate reflection. This is why the end-goal of the normative conversation

should be to facilitate consensus not only on the desirable picture of the future (often a simplified

sketch and a poor guide to tough future choices), but also on a “constitutional” framework of the

future. The latter will render difficult strategic or policy options and the trade-offs they involve

more manageable.

16

Let us illustrate this distinction between focus on the surface-level picture and, respectively, on

the deep-level “constitutional framework” with an example from the literature. Inayatullah [30]

describes Galtung‟s “transcend” technique [40] for the resolution of conflicts among visions by

referring to an exercise in which participants had to work with two appealing images of the

future of a city: a “green sustainable city” and a “far more exciting modern international

glamorous city” [30, p. 19]. The participants are said to have “transcended” the gap by relying on

innovation, which was considered implicit in or compatible with the modern facet of the

glamorous city, in order to ensure a sustainable dimension for the latter. Hence the appealing

picture of a sustainable glamorous metropolis.

But how far does this reconciliation of two desirable pictures of the future take us? What price

consensus? In the example above, consensus is attained, it seems to us, by assuming that two at

least superficially opposed worldviews are compatible “deep down”, at the – to use a term

employed by Inayatullah elsewhere [31] – mythological level. The unified vision for the city is

ideologically familiar from the catchphrase “sustainable development”. But to be content with

this level is to avoid a critical examination of the very notion of a sustainable glamorous

metropolis, and of sustainable development more generally. This vision, while tempting, gained

political momentum precisely on account of its vagueness and its ideological elasticity. As we

have been reminded, the “initial vagueness [of sustainable development] is no longer a basis for

consensus, but a breeding ground for a situation where whoever can pin his or her definition to

the term will automatically win a large political battle for influence over the future” [41, p. 1-2].

In other words, the sustainable glamorous metropolis seems an attractive idea partly because it

eludes, for the moment, many of the hard choices.

We doubt that, in the context of a scenario-based inquiry into institutional systems, the hard

choices of the future can be clearly mapped. Yet what can be achieved, and this may provide a

way out of the predicament outlined in the previous paragraph, is to lay out the values and the

procedural arrangements governing the conversations in the future. If the future is that of a city,

these basic values may turn out to be “an exciting life space” (of which glamour is just one

appealing, but neither sufficient, nor necessary, characteristic), “long-term sustainability” (for

which a green dimension may be important, but not absolutely essential), and so forth. Moreover,

17

how these values would be balanced in the many decisions on the future of the city, while hard to

specify in advance within the framework of the scenario-building exercise, can at least be tackled

in terms of the basic rules for the normative conversation that will extend into the future, long

after the system foresight is over. It could be established, for instance, that all factions will be

proportionally or equally represented in the decision-making process; that the roles of the experts

will be limited (or extensive) in some domains of decision but not in others; that one basic value

can be advanced only with minimal detrimental effects on others, or only if such effects are

offset within a specified time frame, etc. This, we put forward, should be a critical focus of the

normative conversation in successful system foresight exercises.

4.3. Normative scenarios as fields of tensions

This brings us to one final issue: the question of consistency in normative narratives. One

frequent assumption in scenario development is that the narratives generated are or should strive

to be internally consistent, that they (should) contain no significant inner tensions. This view is

almost explicit in the construction of double-variable narratives which neatly divide the field of

possibles into stories which, while they may partly overlap, certainly appear to be coherent,

homogeneous packages. As a matter of fact, the quest for internal consistency seems to be

widespread among scenario practitioners of many stripes. Thus, Rikkonen defines a scenario as

“an internally consistent story about the path from the present to the future.” [42, p. 208]

Bradfield et al. list internal consistency among “the common baseline criteria by which all

scenarios are evaluated regardless of developmental methodology” [3, p. 810]. Roubelat likens

scenarios to ideologies, which he defines as “consistent systems of ideas and beliefs” (a curious

assumption in postmodern times) [22, p. 519-520]. Checking scenarios for consistency is

explicitly recommended as a distinct, important stage of the scenario-building process [26,2].

Frequently, however, the assumption of or quest for internal consistency is either the result of a

problematic trade-off, or simply unwarranted. Consistency is sometimes achieved at the expense

of complexity, that is, by positing simple causal relations and ruling out specific combinations of

variables as impossible. Yet, as some authors have noted, “it is striking how often situations

occur that were simply … excluded as „logically impossible‟ or „inconsistent‟ during the process

of scenario building.” [18, p. 167] Scenarios often remain consistent by offering a bird‟s eye

18

view of the future: from “up there”, so little detail is seen that inconsistencies pass undetected

and are consequently presumed inexistent. On the other hand, when scenarios include tacit

contradictions or dilemmas, they are rendered at best useless and, at worst, misleading by being

(as they often are) swept under the rug.

We suggest that, if one looks at scenarios in the normative conversational frame proposed above,

inconsistencies are no longer necessarily a flaw. They should instead be welcome as a relief from

the causal limitations that are often introduced either surreptitiously or ad hoc in the construction

of narratives. As Postma and Liebl urged, a step “to increase the complexity of scenarios,

consists of allowing the exclusion of causality restrictions and the inclusion of inconsistency

effects, particularly paradoxical trend clusters [as in „glocalisation‟ or „Bourgeois

Bohemians‟…” [18, p. 169] As a matter of fact, in creating scenarios such inconsistencies or

tensions may often be involuntarily incorporated and even unavoidable. This seems obvious in,

for instance, the sustainable glamorous city in the example above. But it is likely the case also in

the seemingly more consistent pictures of the green city (Why bother? Why not make it a

countryside?) or of its glamorous international counterpart (Maybe glamour depends on

restrictions of access and thus on limited, jealously guarded internationalization? And where do

we hide “the other half”, those who sustain economically the international glamour?). And by the

way: can one imagine a myth without at least one major inner contradiction?

Tensions and potential inconsistencies should not be eliminated from scenarios by logical sleight

of hand or by feigning ignorance of complexity, but rather rendered manifest and then diligently

explored. Perhaps one should think of sets of multiple scenarios not so much as spaces of

possibles, but as spaces of tensions in which the inconsistencies are turned, through the creation

of alternative narratives and the eventual making of normative choices, into objects of

conversation and exploration. Exploring the tensions becomes then a principle guiding scenario

development, while the normative narratives are stories of potentially successful, albeit always

incomplete and fragile, negotiations of contradictions or dilemmas. A thorny and often glossed-

over issue in scenario development, the “select[ion of] specific scenarios from what is still a vast

space of possibilities” [15, p. 354], is thus resolved by being dissolved into the problem of

19

creating a space of negotiation in which the “fields of tensions” may be approached by the varied

participants.

5. The hypothesis illustrated: the future of higher education

The final section of the article is intended as an illustration, by way of a case study, of a system

foresight exercise which, upon reflection and with the benefit of hindsight, seems to fit the

profile described by our hypothesis. It should be emphasized that the exercise is not offered as a

test of the hypothesis. That would require a systematic analysis of a substantial number of past

and future exercises. If anything, the system foresight outlined below simply played a part in the

generation of the hypothesis. Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, the foresight project team

did not know what to expect from the normative outcome. Neither were we immediately aware,

after the generation of the vision on Romanian higher education in 2025 – the object of the

foresight in question –, what the results meant or how they could be interpreted. Our construal of

the visioning exercise in light of the hypothesis which it inspired took shape later, as we reflected

on our experience. This interpretation remains just one of the possible readings and alternative

analyses may doubtlessly be put forward. This being said, the reading proposed here seems

persuasive. Its chief value lies in suggesting a different angle on the meaning of normative

scenarios in system foresight.

The process3 outlined in this section was described in some detail elsewhere [1,5]. In what

follows, the analysis will be limited to the scenario building part, which is sufficient for this

article‟s goals. Nonetheless, a brief panoramic picture of the entire process will be provided in

order to set out the context of the scenario development exercise.

The idea of a system foresight exercise on Romanian higher education in 2025 emerged in the

context of a previously successful experience with “national” foresight for the R&D system.

Higher education seemed a good or better candidate because it has been the subject of incessant

reforms throughout its two-decade post-communist existence, yet these changes were judged

3 The process was part of the FSE-funded project Quality and Leadership for Romanian Higher Education, which

was carried out between 2009-2011 under the coordination of the (Romanian) Executive Agency for Higher

Education and Research Funding. For additional information, see http://www.edu2025.ro/ (an English version of the

website is also available).

20

unsuccessful. After twenty years of inconsistent reforming, education in Romania was assessed

quite bluntly as “ineffective, irrelevant, and of poor quality” [43, p. 1]. Furthermore, the system

has been in a state of flux, having witnessed a radical overall expansion, accompanied by a

(perceived) drastic reduction in scholastic standards and international competitiveness, as well as

by endless fretting over issues such as quality, homogeneity, fairness, disconnectedness from

social needs and aspirations, and indifference to market trends. Therefore, a vision on the future

of higher education and a subsequent set of policy lines were seen as potentially powerful reform

tools.

5.1. The structure of the scenario building and visioning process

The vision on Romanian higher education in 2025 was generated in the form of a normative

picture of the future derived from a set of four desirable future scenarios. By and large, the

system foresight followed a rather established model with several distinct stages, as described

by, for instance, Da Costa et al. [4]: diagnosis, followed by a participatory exploration process

relying primarily on scenario work, by strategic orientation (achieved, in this case, through the

visioning process), and by policy-making.

The scenario building combined a more analytical “from present to future” approach [12] with a

creative exploratory phase in which four desirable pictures of the future were developed by as

many groups of participants. Elements of the desirable scenarios were then used as a basis for the

generation of the vision. This was followed by a policy formulation stage (in a “from future to

present” backcasting approach [33,34]), ignored here as less relevant for our present purposes. In

a nutshell, the structure of the scenario building process was the following (Fig. 1):

Fig. 1. The structure of the scenario development process – an outline

[insert Figure 1 picture here]

The initial step was to identify potential matters of interest. This involved three activities:

o A computerized semantic scan of literature on higher education yielded a set of issues

and sub-issues of potential interest for the process. Some 600 titles were scanned and

analyzed, among others by means of combined Zoom and Tropes software.

21

o A series of brainstorming workshops mixing real-time interaction with carefully

managed anonymity – a combination made possible by the electronic platform iLab –

expanded the results of the literature review into a set of five broad themes (and

associated subthemes). The latter served as a general thematic framework for the

early phases of the scenario building.

o A heuristic system-view integration of the themes and subthemes.

Secondly, a large database of some 6,500 higher education stakeholders and experts was built

through a viral questionnaire and a nomination-conomination process. The identification of

stakeholder skill and will took the five themes and the subthemes into account. Based on

criteria such as stakeholders‟ previous activities or the number of nominations, around 600

experts were considered directly relevant for the project and either took part in its activities

or were invited to do so.

Five thematically-oriented expert panels, consisting of around 15 members each, elaborated

analyses of current issues in Romanian higher education, described relevant trends, identified

sets of future challenges, and mapped the stakeholders.

Based on the analyses and the charting of trends and future challenges, a group of some 100

panelists and invited stakeholders generated, during a three-day workshop facilitated by six

international experts, four desirable scenario drafts or frames. The scenario frames were

loosely related to the thematic areas, but were not required to – and in practice did not – stay

within their bounds. No unique set of techniques was employed, as each international

facilitator was free to use their preferred scenario toolkit.

The four scenario frames were fleshed out during a series of creative workshops involving

higher education actors and stakeholders (a substantial number of whom participated for the

first time in the process). The workshops lasted four days and involved around 200 persons in

total. While several established techniques (role-playing, card games, World Café) were

used, this exercise also relied on unstructured dialogue among the participants. A set of

metaphors describing the desirable future HE system were also generated to enrich each

22

scenario frame. Eventually, each scenario-developing group voted on the three best

metaphors and the scenario frames were consolidated into final narratives.

In the last phase of the scenario building process, a vision for Romanian higher education in

2025 was generated from the four desirable scenarios in the manner discussed below.

5.2. The substance of the vision on Romanian higher education

It is instructive to examine both the substance of the four scenarios and their dynamics in the

process through which the vision took shape. The scenario frames were developed within five

broad thematic areas: the development of human capital, knowledge generation, relationships

with business and the community, social values, and international competitiveness. Obviously,

these five broad themes overlap to a considerable extent. This was not considered a problem, as

participants in the scenario workshop were given room to expand their narratives in whatever

direction they saw fit. Consequently, the four desirable scenarios on the future of higher

education (Appendix figure) were not envisaged as alternatives, but as partial, overlapping

pictures of the future. They also conflicted with each other to a degree and, notably, harboured

significant internal tensions.

The four desirable narratives were designed to serve as the foundation stone for the final,

composite normative scenario – the vision on Romanian higher education in 2025. The process

relied primarily on negotiations among the members of a 15-person visioning group, consisting

of the leaders of the four scenario panels, alongside other prominent figures in Romanian higher

education and civil society. The project team and a few international advisers also assumed an

active role in the visioning, carrying out clustering and other sense-making exercises and

consolidating the results after each of the five rounds of debates, which brought about

substantial, sometimes drastic changes. After achieving agreement on the substance of the vision,

the resulting document was submitted to five focus groups consisting of stakeholders not

previously involved with the project. The goal of the focus groups was to test the presentation

rather than the substance of the vision.

The dynamics of the four desirable scenarios in the visioning negotiations (see Appendix) is

worth dwelling on. The image at the heart of the “Blue Ocean” scenario, a higher education

23

system with room for diverse academic organizations occupying a variety of academic market

niches, was soon accepted as an appealing description of the future. This scenario provided the

macro-level picture of the system, and instated the value of diversity as the first pillar of the

vision. At the same time, it generated a contentious proposition: the three institutional archetypes

projected in the same scenario encountered fierce resistance from several members of the

visioning group. They were perceived as a major source of tension, since, the reasoning of the

opponents went, a “true blue” Blue Ocean is one in which many types of organizational forms

are free to evolve, prosper and perish. Defining in advance a few standard organizational types

would be exceedingly limiting, as well as potentially harmful to the idea of diversity. Although

the notion of institutional archetypes had adamant supporters, it was abandoned eventually.

The second pillar of the vision was also a value: personalization, defined as highly customized

educational paths and experiences (primarily for students, but ultimately for all those involved in

higher education). The value responded to the core insight of the first scenario (“The University

of Life and Work”) and was judged to be consonant with institutional diversification. Several

key images in this narrative were retained (modular academic contents, widespread e-learning,

numerous non-traditional programs, non-academic practitioner involvement in curricular design).

The proposals not incorporated in the vision were considered too restrictive.

The third pillar, transparency, was devised as a procedural value. This choice had a prevalent

pragmatic dimension, since “transparency” was construed not primarily in its broad liberal sense,

but chiefly in terms of ensuring the conditions necessary for individuals, organizations, and

buffer institutions to negotiate their roles in a diverse and personalized higher education. Thus,

the vision described a higher education system in which there is general free access to a wide

range of publicly- and privately-maintained “transparency tools” – portals with comparative data

on programs and providers, alternative classifications and rankings of varied formats,

information and guidance services, etc.

The visioning negotiations ultimately sidelined most of the issues raised in the other two

scenarios – meritocracy, quality assurance, fundamental and/or applied research, the balance of

funding by state and private agencies, and so on. These were not selected as significant elements

of the vision, perhaps because they are currently hotly contested questions in Romanian higher

24

education which demand tough choices in the immediate future. Reaching an agreement on such

matters would have been an unlikely development, and the vision-building effort provided an

opportunity to eschew them in order to focus on the broader, deeper questions concerning the

future of the Romanian university.

5.3. The normative conversation in light of the hypothesis

Returning now to our hypothesis, we find several aspects of the visioning negotiations

particularly relevant.

The parties systematically and self-consciously avoided to be specific about the details of

the future system. The various organizational models advanced in the four desirable

scenarios represented a major bone of contention, and none were ultimately accepted as

appropriate for inclusion in the vision. Other questions touching on policy choices for the

here and now – such as the structure of the funding system, quality assurance procedures,

the balance between fundamental and applied research – were likewise eschewed. We

interpret this as a sign of the broadly shared feeling that the vision should be sufficiently

general and permissive to allow decisions on such matters to develop in time, naturally

and pragmatically.

Instead, it was the basic values governing higher education in 2025 that captured the

negotiating parties’ attention. The visioning group was hardly disinterested in funding,

quality assurance, governance, vocationalization, or the like. All or most participants had

strong beliefs in these respects, sometimes occasioning heated arguments. Partly as a

result, the visioning group concentrated their consensus-making efforts on the sphere of

values, and negotiated diversity, personalization, and transparency as the vision‟s three

pillars. We regard this as an indication that the object of the negotiating parties‟

consensus tends to shift towards the deep structure or the “constitutional framework” of

the future system.

The vision’s core values, selected from among the many proposed, signalled the parties’

preoccupation with ensuring that the future system remains open to them. The three

pillars were hardly the only values given pride of place in the four desirable scenarios.

25

The latter also highlighted accountability to the community, meritocracy, academic

freedom, professional ethics, employability, the nurturing of democratic citizenship, and

others. Yet none of these captured participants‟ interest in negotiating an inclusive

system, in which they would have a voice. Instead, diversity emerged relatively soon as

the appealing value, although it goes against traditional reflexes in Romanian higher

education policy (which emphasizes one-size-fits-all quality standards, identical

organizational structures, etc.) [44]. Personalization materialized as the flipside of

organizational diversity and was, to a large extent, conceptualized in terms of

programmatic diversification. Transparency was advanced as a procedural value, in order

to ensure that, faced with a potentially bewildering diversity, none of the parties to the

visioning negotiations and their constituencies are left out in the cold, deprived of the

means to make suitable choices.

A significant part of the discussions within the visioning group reflected on the tensions

in the four desirable scenarios, which the vision sought to transcend. Thus, for example,

the “University of Life and Work” scenario espoused an extreme personalization of

educational experiences and career paths, yet urged universities to organize their services

based on labour market forecasts. The “Knowledge Constellation” turned universities

into hubs in the global web of knowledge, while ignoring precisely the decentralizing

effects of the information revolution. The “Athenaeum” envisaged a universally esteemed

university, but tightly tied its core functions to market forces. Finally, the “Blue Ocean”

simultaneously supported diversity and sought to keep it under control through

predefined institutional archetypes. One can read the vision as an attempt to temporarily

transcend these tensions – by prioritizing among the desirable scenarios‟ values (e.g.,

diversity over tight coupling to market needs), by inventing new solutions (e.g.,

transparency as a tool in dealing with diversity and personalization), and, ultimately, by

selectively ignoring some of the tensions and thus postponing a resolution for later on in

the conversation.

In our interpretation of the vision on Romanian higher education in 2025, the negotiating parties‟

choices expressed an option not primarily for particular states of affairs in 2025, but rather for

26

what we referred to as “constitutional basics”. Dominant desirable narratives, such as the “Blue

Ocean”, were, in the process of being generally embraced, stripped down of specifics and of their

more constricting content. The message appeared to be that one should agree on the principles

governing the ocean – its major undercurrents –, but stop short of being prescriptive about its life

forms. It is not difficult to recognize here a sketch of deliberative democracy [8,9].

6. Conclusions

The hypothesis we put forward in this article is that normative scenarios in system foresight tend

to focus on “the frame of the future”, rather than merely on the picture inside the frame.

Although the interest of scenario practitioners is often captured by the surface picture, given its

overt preoccupation with future events and states of affairs, the deep structure of normative

narratives is equally significant. The latter is an expression not only of myths or latent ideologies

– which, to be sure, some scenario techniques do their best to explore –, but also of the

configuration of the normative conversation yielding the narrative.

In system foresight, this structure includes a distancing act in which a leap of faith is taken, away

from the present; a holistic perspective on “the system” whose future is inquired into; a

participatory process which invites a diversity of ideological commitments; and the eventual

making of some form of consensus. This combination generates, among participants, a concern

with the basic values and the procedural arrangements (the “constitutional basics”) governing the

future world. The participants‟ epistemic freedom allows them to be bolder, more imaginative,

and more empathetic; and their epistemic insecurity about their precise roles in the future world

provides them with a strong incentive to craft a place where they are all ensured appropriate

levels of participation and sufficient powers of negotiation.

So far, this hypothesis remains untested, and the exercise on the future of Romanian higher

education outlined above is offered merely as an illustration. To determine if and to what extent

the hypothesis may be generalized, systematic research on present and future foresight exercises

is necessary.

[insert Appendix here]

27

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