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Understanding Child Support Guidelines
Presentation to the Arizona Child Support Guideline Committee
June 27, 2008
© 2008Ira and Tara Ellman
2
Overview: Four Parts
What do our current guidelines really do? A look at the numbers they produce
What should the guidelines do? Some possible principles What principles are favored by Arizona citizens? How do they compare to current reality?
Why do the current guidelines do what they do? Examining the theory of current guidelines, and why it necessarily produces these results
What is the alternative? How could we do them differently?
3
Part I: A look at current guidelines
The Classic Choice: Income Shares v. POOI Wisconsin: Gross Income POOI State
Support equals flat percent of Dad’s Income 17% for one child, 25% for two, 29% for 3 34% for 5 or more
Mom’s income not considered Income Shares: Mom’s income considered
But does it matter? Let’s find out.
4
POOI v. Income Shares
Assume Dad earns 1000, Mom earns 500 Assume POOI and Income Shares states both
set support at 17% for one child, as does Wisconsin
POOI: 17% of $1000 = $170 in support Income Shares: longer route to same place
Total Parental Obligation = 17% of $1500 17% of $1500 = $255 Dad pays 2/3 (1000/1500) of $255 Which is $170
5
POOI v. Income Shares, continued
So why does the choice of POOI v. Incomes shares matter?
Answer: it’s the rate structure, not the fact that we look at both incomes
POOI: flat rats Income Shares: declining rates
Example: Arizona
6
Support Obligation as a Proportion of Combined Income
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000
Combined Monthly Gross Income
Pro
po
rtio
n o
f C
om
bin
ed
In
co
me
1 2 6Children
Rates start high, fall steeply
Plummet at $4200
Low and slowly falling above $8100
Arizona Support Rates, 2005 Guidelines
7
Arizona & Wisconsin Rates, 1 Child
Support Obligation as a Proportion of IncomeFor One Child
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000
Monthly Gross Income
Pro
port
ion
of In
com
e
AZ wisc. average rate
8
Arizona & Wisconsin Rates, 2 Children
Support Obligation as a Proportion of IncomeFor Two Children
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000
Monthly Gross Income
Pro
port
ion
of In
com
e
AZ wisc average rate
9
Arizona & Wisconsin Rates, 5 Children
Support Obligation as a Proportion of IncomeFor Five Children
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
$0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 $8,000 $10,000 $12,000 $14,000
Monthly Gross Income
Pro
port
ion
of In
com
e
AZ Wisc. Average Rate
10
One Effect of AZ’s Falling Rates
Dads with the same income pay different rates. Mom’s rising income
lowers Dad’s rate, not just his share of joint obligation.
Might seem fair to some, unfair to others.
SUPPORT RATE FOR ONE CHILD
$500 $1,000 $3,000 $7,000Custodial Income
$0 n.a. 0.23 0.20 0.13$500 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.12
$1,000 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.12$2,000 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.11$3,000 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.11$4,000 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.11$5,000 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10$6,000 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10
Non-Custodial Parent's Income
Compare Two Dads Who Both Earn $3000 1. Mom earns nothing: Dad pays 20% or $600 2. Mom earns $3000: Dad pays 14% or $420
11
Second Effect of AZ’s Falling Rates
Poor Mom realizes limited benefit from Dad’s rising income. Dad’s rising income
lowers his rate Reduces the impact of
his rising share of their joint obligation
SUPPORT RATE FOR ONE CHILD
$500 $1,000 $3,000 $7,000Custodial Income
$0 n.a. 0.23 0.20 0.13$500 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.12
$1,000 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.12$2,000 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.11$3,000 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.11$4,000 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.11$5,000 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10$6,000 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10
Non-Custodial Parent's Income
Compare Two Moms Who Both Earn $500 1. Dad earns 1000: pays 22% or $220 2. Dad earns 7000: pays 12% or $840
What is the impact of this result?
12
Gauging Impact of Support Amounts
How does the support amount affect each of the two households?
Gauging that is not easy. You must compare Households of different composition Which therefore need different amounts of
money to achieve the same living standard. But for lower income households, the official
poverty threshold is one common measure Simple to understand Often used and therefore “standard”
13
Understanding Poverty Threshold
Developed in 1963 by Mollie Orshansky, a statistician in the Social Security Administration (formerly a Research Clerk with FDR’s Children’s Bureau
It’s basically the cost of minimal grocery market basket times 3.
“Updated” annually by Census Bureau for price of the market basket
Actual poverty judgments range from 125% to 180% of the “poverty threshold”
But “poverty threshold” still a standard benchmark
14
Some Monthly Income Benchmarks
Poverty level 2002 2007 2-adult, 1-child household: $1,207 $1,391
“200 % Poverty” $ 2,414 $ 2,782 Single person $ 780 $ 899
Median income for all US households: $3,550
80th Percentile income For all US households: $7,001
95th percentile income for all US households: $12,500
15
CHART 3 INTRO MIDDLE INCOME
RANGE OF CUSTODIAL HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES EXAMPLE OF ONE-CHILD FAMILY WITH $3550 COMBINED INCOME
(MEASURED AS PERCENT OF POVERTY LEVELS)
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
500%
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Custodial Parent's Share of Combined Income
Perc
en
t o
f P
overt
y L
evel
Custodial HH before pmts
Custodial HH after pmts
Intact HH
100 pct of poverty level
Mom’s Income Share
Situation: Middle Income Household with One Child
Intact family was at 300% of poverty level
Possible outcomes for Mom and Child BEFORE
payments.
Outcomes AFTER payments
16
CHART 5 LOW INCOME MOMRANGE OF CUSTODIAL HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES
EXAMPLE OF ONE-CHILD FAMILY WITH $3550 COMBINED INCOME(MEASURED AS PERCENT OF POVERTY LEVELS)
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
500%
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Custodial Parent's Share of Combined Income
Perc
en
t o
f P
overt
y L
evel
Custodial HH before pmts
Custodial HH after pmts
Intact HH
100 pct of poverty level
Mom earns 30% of combined income, or
$1065, near poverty level.
After $468 payment, Mom and Child at 150% of poverty
Payment helps, but not nearly enough to restore
old living standard.
Situation: Low income Mom from a middle-income intact household.
17
Three Moms with 1 Child Each Earns $1000
NON-CUST INCOME $
SUPPORT RATE
SUPPORT PAYMENT
$
CUST. PCT POVERTY
NON-CUST. PCT
POVERTY
LOW INCOME
Combined $1500 500 22% 110 107% 50%
MIDDLE INCOME
Combined $3500 2500 19% 471 142% 260%
HIGH INCOME
Combined $7000 6000 13% 781 173% 668%
Why Doesn’t Higher Income Dad Help More? Answer: Rates Fall as Dad’s Income Rises
Low Income
Dad
High Income
Dad
18
HCART 4 TWO CHILDREN RANGE OF CUSTODIAL HOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES EXAMPLE OF ONE-CHILD FAMILY WITH $3550 COMBINED INCOME
(MEASURED AS PERCENT OF POVERTY LEVELS)
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
500%
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Custodial Parent's Share of Combined Income
Perc
en
t o
f P
overt
y L
evel
Custodial HH before pmts
Custodial HH after pmts
Intact HH
100 pct of poverty level
Keeps middle class life style with high earning
Mom .
Falls near poverty with low earning Mom.
How two middle- class children can have very
different outcomes:
Conclusion: Where noncustodial parent earns the majority of income,our guidelines do not protect children from large declines in living standard when their parents separate.
19
Overview: Four Parts
What do our current guidelines really do? A look at the numbers they produce
What should current guidelines do Some possible principles What principles are favored by Arizona citizens How do they compare to current reality?
Why do the current guidelines do what they do? Examining the theory of current guidelines, and Why it necessarily produces these results
What is the alternative? What is the alternative?
How could we do them differently?
20
Goals of Support Guidelines
Protect Child Well-Being Especially important for low-income CP’s
Recognize Dual Parental Support Obligation Explains why we require support even when
CP has adequate income for child Avoid Gross Disparities in Living Standard
Explains why we go beyond basics Balance above against Earner’s Priority
Principle
21
1. Measurable Child Well-Being
A
B
The solid or the dashed line?
22
Well-Being, continued
Empirical literature suggests the solid line--but
•Value judgments cannot be avoided•` What counts as well-being?• Long v. Short term? • How to measure and aggregate?
23
Possible Working Assumptions Curve steep to Point A, the “minimum decent living
standard”—perhaps 150% of poverty threshold Curve begins to flatten at Point B
Perhaps 60th to 80th Percentile of household income As well-being returns decline, so does the child well
being rationale for any support claim on obligor.
Well-Being, continued
24
Possible Well-Being Principle
First Purpose of Child Support is to Ensure Child Well-Being
The lower is the custodial household income, the more well-being a support dollar buys And therefore the stronger is justification for
requiring support from the obligor Summary: The lower the CP income, the
more we should ask of the obligor
25
Dual Obligation Principle
Explains why we require support even when CP has more money than NCP CP has lots of money
Multiple reasons for Dual Obligation Moral claims Fairness to CP Maintain obligor’s authenticity as parent
Dual Obligation says little about how much Fair share of the well-being amount Nominal may be enough when WB not at
issue
26
Gross Disparity Principle
Fairness claim for child, not Well-Being claim Shield innocent victim of break-up from
disproportionate living standard loss Fairness argument more powerful if child
Had enjoyed higher standard for some time Sees Obligor’s new family enjoying high
standard Problem: Windfall benefit to CP Compromise: Avoid “Gross” Disparity
27
Gross Disparity, continued
Version One: where family was intact Child’s living standard should not decline too
much more than Dad’s Version Two: where there was no long-term
intact family Child’s living standard should not be grossly
inferior to Dad’s When Relevant? When there is
A high-income obligor, and We are at flatter end of the Well-Being curve
Two Possible Gross Disparity Principles
28
Earner’s Priority Principle
Everyone keeps what they have unless there’s a very good reason to take it from them. Especially the poor.
For poor obligors: Self-support reserve trumps even child well-being
For higher income obligors Gross Disparity a less powerful counterweight to
EPP than child well-being: Hence we allow some disparity Validates objection to “hidden alimony”
But Child Well-Being is “a very good reason”
29
Possible EPP Principles
For low-income obligor: Award only nominal amounts from
impoverished obligors Never reduce obligor income below poverty
levels. For higher income obligor
The award should preserve a living standard advantage over CP household, if child well-being not at risk:
child has a “decent minimum” or Something more than decent minimum
EPP continued
30
Overview: Four Parts
What do our current guidelines really do? A look at the numbers they produce
What should current guidelines do Some possible principles What principles are favored by Arizona citizens How do they compare to current reality?
Why do the current guidelines do what they do? Examining the theory of current guidelines, and Why it necessarily produces these results
What is the alternative? How could we do them differently?
31
What Do Arizona Citizens Believe?
How Do You Ask? Attitudes or support amounts?
We asked about both Their relationship provides insights But ultimately, amounts matter most
Do not anchor If you want to know what people think, do
not first tell them what others think
32
Who We Asked
Members of Pima County jury pool 65% to 70% response rate to long forms This data based on N of 407, of whom:
55% were women 62% were married, 35% were divorced 69% had children 12% had paid support, 18% had received it 97% graduated high school, 25% had B.A. 5.6% earned less than $15,000 46% earned more than $60,000
33
Of the 30% who have been in the child support system, nearly all the Obligors were men, and nearly all the Custodial Parents were women
34
What We Ask: Support Amounts
One child (9 year old boy) Mom is CP, Dad is support obligor Son “lives mostly with Mom, but Dad sees him
often” Dad earns $6000, $4000, or $2000 a month in
“take-home pay”. Mom: $5,000, $3,000, or $1,000 Everyone asked about all nine income
combinations Rs either Name or Choose a support amount
35
The Exact Question
We want to know the amount of child support, if any, that you think Dad should be required to pay Mom every month all things considered. What will change from story to story is how much Mom earns, and how much Dad earns. There is no right or wrong answer; just tell us what you think is right. Try to imagine yourself as the judge in each of the following cases. Picture yourself sitting on the bench in a courtroom needing to decide about what should be done about ordering child support in the case and trying to decide correctly. To do so, you might try putting yourself in the shoes of Mom or of Dad or both, or imagine a loved one in that position.
36
Low income mom
High Income mom
1. Three lines, not 1—Mom’s income matters and POOI implicitly rejected
2. Rates on Dad’s income higher when Mom’s income lower
Respondents’ Average Support Function
37
Lesson One
Respondents agree that as Mom’s $ ↓ Dad should pay more in dollars, and The rate applied to Dad’s income should
go up This is not POOI.
Is it Income Shares? Do they believe Dad’s rate should go down
as his income goes up? No. See next chart
38
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2 4 6Dad's Income in Thousands
SurveyMeans
ArizonaGuidelines
Support Payment as Percent of Dad’s Income Mom’s Income is $1,000 monthly
39
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2 4 6Dad's Income in Thousands
Survey Means
ArizonaGuidelines
Support Payment as Percent of Dad’s Income Mom’s Income is $3,000 monthly
40
Support Payments As Percent of Dad's Income: CP Income is $5000
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
2 4 6
Dad's Income in Thousands
SurveyMeansArizonaGuidelines
Support Payment as Percent of Dad’s Income Mom’s Income is $5,000 monthly
41
Rate Rules
Method As Mom’s Income Rises
As Dad’s Income Rises
POOI Unchanged Unchanged
Income Shares Go Down Go Down
Pima County Citizens
Go Down Unchanged
42
Key Points on Rates
Pima County citizens reject both POOI & Income Shares
They believe in a “flat tax” for child support Income Shares Guidelines have a regressive
rate structure They believe the flat rate on Dad should be
higher when Mom’s income is lower This is not POOI either
This view about rate structure shared by men and women: no difference between them
But how does this translate to support $ ?
43
Child Support PaymentsCP Income $1,000
100
300
500
700
900
1100
1300
0 2 4 6 8
Non Custodial Parent Income
Su
pp
ort
Paym
en
t
surveymedian
Guidelines
Survey25thPercenttile
44
Child Support Payments:CP Income $3000
100
300
500
700
900
1100
1300
0 2 4 6 8
Non Custodial Parent Income
Su
pp
ort
P
aym
en
t
surveymedian
guidelines
Survey 25thPercentile
45
Child Support Payments:CP Income $5000
100
300
500
700
900
1100
1300
0 2 4 6 8
Non Custodial Parent Income ($000)
Mo
nth
ly S
up
po
rt P
aym
en
t ($
)
surveymedian
guidelines
Survey 25thPercentile
46
What About Other Income Share States?
• Which one to pick?
• Studies by Jane Venohr found that– There are 12 net income, income share states– Of these, Iowa had the median child support
amounts
• So, how do our respondents mean support amounts compare to the support levels required in Iowa?
47
Iowa Support Amounts Compared to Respondents’ Preferred Amounts
CP Income
↓
NCP Income
→
2000 4000 6000
Survey 1000
Iowa
461
456
956
804
1451
1122
Survey 3000
Iowa
379
404
748
748
1117
966
Survey 5000
Iowa
298
374
541
668
784
954
•Middle Cell: Identical•Top Row (Poor Moms): Public wants higher amounts•Bottom Row (Comfortable Moms) Public wants lower amounts
48
Key Points on Amounts• Respondents generally favor amounts
higher than Arizona guidelines• Compared to Iowa they want
– Higher amounts for low-income CPs– Lower amounts for high-income CPs– This follows from Well-Being and EPP
principles, consistent with Dual Obligation– We must ask about higher NCP to find out
about Gross Disparity
• Men and Women agree on this rate structure– But do they agree about amounts?
49
Child support by gender of respondent
$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
$1,800
2,000 4,000 6,000
Dad's Income
Ch
ild
Su
pp
ort
cp 5,000 males cp 5,000 females cp 3,000 males cp 3,000 females cp 1,000 males cp 1,000 females
Mom has $5000Mom has $3000
Mom has $1000
50
Further Data On the Way
Two children, higher incomes for NCP Gender reversals Attitudes about support principles and how they
relate to support amounts Are amounts affected by whether the parents were
married, or the length of their relationship Impact of visitation arrangements on amounts Impact of visitation frustration on support amounts Anchoring Effects: a possible way to tame gender
differences Impact of Showing subjects the parties’ post-transfer
incomes
51
Overview: Four Parts
What do our current guidelines really do? A look at the numbers they produce
What should current guidelines do Some possible principles What principles are favored by Arizona citizens How do they compare to current reality?
Why do the current guidelines do what they do? Examining the theory of current guidelines, and Why it necessarily produces these results
What is the alternative? How could we do them differently?
52
What Current Guidelines Are Notor, Guideline Myths
Not estimates of the cost of raising a child Can’t be, because what a child costs depends on
the living standard you want to buy for him or her
Not estimates of what it takes to provide a child with the marital living standard That’s not often practical or possible
Not based on estimates of what custodial households need, or what it’s fair to expect noncustodial parents to pay
So then—where do they come from?
53
Where the Guideline Numbers Do Come From
From a very complicated theory that starts from a simple idea
The Simple Idea: Base Guidelines on What Parents Spend on children in Intact Families
The Complicated Theory arises because: How do you decide what counts as a child
expenditure? How do you measure the expenditures you want
to count? The Devil—and the Policy—is in these details
54
The Two Key Questions
1. How are child expenditures defined? what is consultant trying to measure? This is a matter of Concept
2. How are expenditures, so defined, measured? Is our measure any good? This is a question of Implementation
55
The Concept: Which Expenditures?
Why do we care what parents in intact families spend on their children?
We might think it tells us how much money the CP needs to provide the
child with the living standard enjoyed by the intact family
If that purpose, we should measure all parental expenditures that confer a benefit
on the child Question: What did PSI measure?
56
What PSI measured
The numbers in the current support grid are based on a measure of what The average intact family With the same parental incomes as the
parents And the same household composition Spends
But which expenditures of that family? Answer: the marginal child expenditures
Which expenditures?, continued
57
HOW ARE CHILD OUTLAYS DEFINED?From PSI Report, Pg. 6
58
What Are the Marginal Expenditures?*
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Couple 1 child 2 children 3 children
Food
Toys, Clothes
Utilties
Rent
Cars
Total
*Illustrative (not actual data)
59
Effect of Marginal Expenditure Measure: Two Examples
Assume family earns and spends $3000 monthly, two parents and one child
Assume the marginal expenditures on the child are $500—the extra amount they spend on account of the child. This is 17%, the Wisconsin figure For Income Shares, it would become the
“basic support obligation” Example 1: Dad and Mom both earn $1500 Example 2: Dad earns $2500, Mom $500
60
Marginal Expenditure Examples
Example 1: Mom and Dad each earn half, each responsible for half the $500, or $250
After support payment Mom and child have $1500 + $250 = $1750 Dad has $1500 - $250 = $1250 Both worse off, but probably about equally worse off
Example 2: Mom earns $500, and Dad earns $2500 Dad pays Mom 25/30 or 5/6 or $417 So after payment
Mom and child have $500 + $417 = $917 Dad has $2500 - $417 = $2083 Dad is doing fine, Mom and child in deep DD
61
Why Marginal Expenditure Yields This Result Allocating marginal expenditures works when
both parents have the base income If parent’s incomes are very disparate, the
low-income CP Mom lacks the base Support pays for the extra bedroom, but she can’t
buy the rest of the apartment Dad retains all of his contribution to intact family’s
base expenditures—and continues to enjoy it If Dad’s income is much lower, even his share
of the marginal expenditures may be very high burden
62
How Are Marginal Expenditures Estimated? This is the implementation issue Is there an established way to estimate
marginal expenditures? No
How did PSI do it?
63
From PSI Report, Pg. 6
64
Source of Equivalence Table
Two equivalence scales used Engel: families are equivalent when the
same percent of their outlays go to groceries
Rothbarth: Adults equivalent when spending same amount on adult items
The two estimators yield different results, and there is no way to test either. We use Rothbarth
65
How Does Rothbarth Work?
Assume we have a couple who spend $50,000 a year. We want to know their marginal expenditures on their child
We find that the average couple, with one child who spend $50,000 a year, spend $1,000 on adult goods.
We find the average childless couple that spends $1000 on adult goods Assumption: their living standard is equivalent
If that childless couple’s total expenditures are $40,000, then the first couple’s marginal expenditures on child are $10,000 (50,000 less 40,000)
66
Rothbarth Problems
Only data is CES (more on that later) No data on “adult expenditures” except for
expenditures on alcohol, tobacco, and adult clothes
Alcohol and tobacco self-reporting off, and potentially odd
Adult clothing cost about $1400 for households with income of $65,000 (2 %).
Slight errors in the report have big effect here
67
More on CES Data
Estimators require data linking income, expenditures, and family composition
Only such data is the CES Data collected from panels interviewed every
three months Do panel members accurately report their
income and outlays? No Both Underreporting and over-reporting
68
Income Underreporting
Problem well-known among economists Affects lower incomes especially
Lower half report expenditures in excess of income
PSI recognizes this but has no solution
Likely effect: increase child outlay estimates at lower income levels
69
Expenditure Underreporting
Particular problems in higher incomes Indicator: implied savings rate implausible Households from $70 to $90,000 gross:
66,12155,240
10,900 Average NetIncomeAll Expenditures*
Implied Savings
*Expenditures include pension plan contributions
70
Expenditure underreporting, cont
Likely Effect: lowers estimate of child expenditures at upper income levels
To 21 % of net income, from 38% at lower income levels,
Conclusion: Data Problems yield regressive child support schedule Cast doubt on Rothbarth measures
71
Why the recent decline in Expenditure Estimates at High Incomes? Change in parental values? Upper
income parents spending less on their children?
Costs of children’s goods gone up more than the goods in general?
Or an artifact of the data problems (E.g., increase in high income underreporting?)
72
Summary
Current guidelines have rapidly declining rates This rates structure produces problematic results
when parents have disparate incomes Seem inconsistent with likely goal of protecting
child well-being Seem wrong to Pima County respondents
We get these rates arise from a method that Inexplicably assumes support should be based on
marginal expenditures in intact families Necessarily relies on problematic data to estimate
marginal rates Conclusion: we ought to use a different method
73
Summary, continued
Our real task is not to estimate marginal expenditures on children in intact families that no longer exist or never existed
It is rather to set support rates that properly balance the competing policy concerns Child well-being Avoid gross disparities Fairly allocate Support Burden Between
Parents Avoid impoverishing obligor
74
Overview: Four Parts
What do our current guidelines really do? A look at the numbers they produce
What should the guidelines do? Some possible principles What principles are favored by Arizona citizens How do they compare to current reality?
Why do the current guidelines do what they do? Examining the theory of current guidelines, and why it necessarily produces these results
What is the alternative? How could we do them differently?