UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea

8/13/2019 UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea

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Human Rights CouncilTwenty-fifth session

Agenda item 4

Human rights situations that require the Councils attention

Report of the detailed findings of thecommission of inquiry on human rights in theDemocratic Peoples Republic of Korea

Summary

The present document contains the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on

human rights in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. The Commissions principal

findings and recommendations are proided in document A!"RC!#$!%&.

' ' The information contained in this document should be read in con(unction )ith the

report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

*A!"RC!#$!%&+.

,-.4/012

A!"RC!#$!CRP.

Distr.3 Restricted

2 ebruary #04

-nglish only


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[English only]

Contents

Paragraphs Page

5. 5ntroduction............................................................................................... .. ... ... ... .. .. 6$ $

55. 7andate and methodology of the commission of inquiry........................................ %/14 $

A. 8rigins of the mandate.................................................................................. .. . %/# $

9. 5nterpretation of the mandate................................................................... ... ... .. &/#0 %

C. :on/cooperation by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.................. #/#2 1

D. 7ethods of )or;.............................................................................................. #1/%# 0

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-. Crimes against humanity targeting persons )ho try to flee the country......... 0=1/4 &&$

. Btaration......................................................................................................... $/&2 &&=

,. Crimes against humanity targeting persons from other countries@

in particular through international abductions................................................. &1/$4 &4$

". A case of political genocide........................................................................... $$/$= &$0

5. Principal findings of the commission.............................................................. %0/%$ &$

5. -nsuring accountability@ in particular for crimes against humanity......................... %%/#0 &$#

A. 5nstitutional accountability.............................................................................. %2/=4 &$#

9. 5ndiidual criminal accountability................................................................... =$/#0& &$=

C. Responsibility of the international community................................................ #04/#0 &%&

55. Conclusions and recommendations.......................................................................... #/##4 &%$

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!cronyms

AC Action contre la aim *Action against "unger+

C-DA Conention on the -limination of All orms of Discrimination against omen

C-BCR Committee on -conomic@ Bocial and Cultural Rights

CRC Conention on the Rights of the Child

DPRK Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

A8 ood and Agriculture 8rganiEation of the Fnited :ations

"R:K Committee for "uman Rights in :orth Korea

"R "uman Rights atch

5CCPR 5nternational Coenant on Ciil and Political Rights

5C:K 5nternational Coalition to Btop Crimes against "umanity in :orth Korea5C-BCR 5nternational Coenant on -conomic@ Bocial@ and Cultural Rights

5CRC 5nternational Committee of the Red Cross

K9A Korean 9ar Association

KC:A Korean Central :e)s Agency of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

K5:F Korea 5nstitute for :ational Fnification

KPA Korean Peoples Army

KAF Korean ar Abductees amily Fnion

KAR5 Korean ar Abductees Research 5nstitute


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)% )ntroduction

. 8n # 7arch #0&@ at its ##nd session@ the Fnited :ations "uman Rights Councilestablished the Commission of 5nquiry on "uman Rights in the Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea *DPRK+. "uman Rights Council Resolution ##!& mandated the body to

inestigate the systematic@ )idespread and grae iolations of human rights in the DPRK@

)ith a ie) to ensuring full accountability@ in particular@ for iolations that may amount to

crimes against humanity.

#. Among the iolations to be inestigated )ere those pertaining to the right to food@

those associated )ith prison camps@ torture and inhuman treatment@ arbitrary detention@

discrimination@ freedom of e>pression@ the right to life@ freedom of moement@ and enforced

disappearances@ including in the form of abductions of nationals of other states.

&. 8n 2 7ay #0&@ the President of the "uman Rights Council announced the

appointment of 7ichael Kirby of Australia and Bon(a 9iser;o of Berbia@ )ho (oined7arEu;i Darusman of 5ndonesia@ the Bpecial Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in

the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea@ to sere as the members of the Commission of

5nquiry on "uman Rights in the DPRK. 7r Kirby )as designated to sere as Chair. The

Commissioners@ )ho sered in a non/remunerated@ independent@ e>pert capacity@ too; up

their )or; the follo)ing month. The Commission of 5nquiry )as supported by a Becretariat

of nine e>perienced human rights officials proided by the "igh Commissioner for "uman

Rights. 8nce appointed@ ho)eer@ the Becretariat )or;ed independently of the "igh

Commissioner for "uman Rights.

4. This report builds upon the oral updates )hich the Commission of 5nquiry proided

in accordance )ith Resolution ##!& to the "uman Rights Council in Beptember #0& and

to the Fnited :ations ,eneral Assembly in 8ctober #0&.

$. The Commission implemented the mandate entrusted by the 7ember Btates of the"uman Rights Council bearing in mind the Councils decision to transmit the reports of the

Commission to all releant bodies of the Fnited :ations and to the Fnited :ations

Becretary/,eneral for appropriate action.

))% *andate and methodology of the commission of inquiry

!% +rigins of the mandate

%. The adoption of Resolution ##!& mar;ed the first time that the "uman Rights

Council had established a commission of inquiry )ithout a ote. 5t follo)s resolutions

adopted in #0# )ithout a ote by the ,eneral Assembly and the "uman Rights Councilthat e>pressed deep concern about the persisting deterioration in the human rights situation

in the DPRK.#

2.


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Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK to the ##nd session of the "uman

Rights Council@ in particular@ identified the need for an international independent and

impartial inquiry mechanism )ith adequate resources to inestigate and more fully

document the grae@ systematic and )idespread iolations of human rights in the DPRK.

1. 5n ?anuary #0&@ the "igh Commissioner for "uman Rights@ :ai Pillay@ called for afully/fledged international inquiry into serious crimes that@ she said@ had been ta;ing place

in the DPRK for decades@ and stressed that the concern about the DPRKs possession of

nuclear )eapons should not oershado) the deplorable human rights situation in :orth

Korea.

=. The establishment of the Commission of 5nquiry must also be seen in light of the

DPRKs limited cooperation )ith the e>isting human rights mechanisms. The DPRK is a

Btate Party to the 5nternational Coenant on Ciil and Political Rights *5CCPR+@ the

5nternational Coenant on -conomic and Bocial Rights *5C-BCR+@ the Conention on the

Rights of the Child *CRC+ and the Conention on the -limination of All orms of

Discrimination against omen *C-DA+. Bince #00=@ the DPRK has not submitted any

state reports on the foregoing treaties@ although in #004@ the DPRK did ta;e the positie

step of initing a delegation of the Committee on the Rights of the Child to isit thecountry.

0. The DPRK under)ent its first cycle of the Fniersal Periodic Reie) *FPR+ in

#00= and )ill be sub(ect to the second cycle in #04. hile stating some generic

commitments to human rights obligations@ the DPRK failed to accept any of the %2

recommendations made by the FPR or;ing ,roup in #00=.&

. The Bpecial Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Peoples

Republic of Korea has not had access to the country since the inception of the mandate in

#004. The DPRK has re(ected the mandate@ deeming it as a hostile act@ and refuses to

cooperate )ith it. Bince the mission of the mandate of the Bpecial Rapporteur on iolence

against )omen@ its causes and consequences in ==$@4not a single mandate holder of the

"uman Rights Council has been inited@ or permitted@ to isit the DPRK.

#. 8n the basis of resolutions by the ,eneral Assembly and the "uman Rights Council@

the Becretary/,eneral and the "igh Commissioner for "uman Rights hae also issued

periodic reports detailing human rights iolations and related impunity in the DPRK. The

DPRK has not proided substantie input to these reports since it has re(ected the

underlying resolutions of the ,eneral Assembly and "uman Rights Council. Bince #00&@

the DPRK ,oernment has also re(ected all offers of technical assistance from the 8ffice of

the "igh Commissioner for "uman Rights *8"C"R+.

,% )nterpretation of the mandate

&. The mandate of the Commission of 5nquiry is essentially found in paragraph $ of

Resolution ##!& that ma;es specific reference to paragraph & of the #0& report of theBpecial Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Peoples Republic of

Korea.$Reading the t)o paragraphs together@ the Commission determined that it had been

mandated to inestigate the systematic@ )idespread and grae iolations of human rights in

the DPRK including@ in particular@ the follo)ing nine specific substantie areas3

/ iolations of the right to food@

/ the full range of iolations associated )ith prison camps@

& A!"RC!&!&4 -!C:.4!==%!$&!Add.$ A!"RC!##!$2.


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/ torture and inhuman treatment@

/ arbitrary arrest and detention@

/ discrimination@ in particular in the systemic denial and iolation of basic human rights and

fundamental freedoms@

/ iolations of the freedom of e>pression@

/ iolations of the right to life@

/ iolations of the freedom of indiidual moement@ and

/ enforced disappearances@ including in the form of abductions of nationals of other states.

4. These nine areas@ )hich are interlin;ing and oerlap@ therefore define the focus of

the Commissions inquiry. "o)eer@ this list of nine is not e>haustie@ and@ )here

appropriate@ the Commission has also inestigated iolations that are intrinsically lin;ed to

one of the nine areas.

$. The mandate further indicates that the inquiry should pursue three inter/lin;ed

ob(ecties3 *+ further inestigating and documenting human rights iolations@ *#+collecting and documenting ictim and perpetrator accounts@ and *&+ ensuring

accountability.

*a+ urther inestigation and documentation of human rights iolations3

Resolution ##!& as;s the Commission to inestigate the systematic@ )idespread and grae

iolations of human rights in the DPRK. amine the issues of institutional and personal accountability for grae@ systematic and

)idespread iolationsL@ in particular )here they amount to crimes against humanityJ.%. Considering the e>tent@ systematic nature and graity of the reported iolations@ the

Commission also considered the responsibility of the international community. 5t has

directed recommendations to)ards the international community as requested by

paragraph $ of Resolution ##!&@ read in con(unction )ith Paragraph & of the Bpecial

Rapporteurs report.

2. 5n accordance )ith paragraph 2 of "uman Rights Council Resolution #&!#$ %and in

line )ith best practices on the integration of gender in the e>ercise of mandates@ the

% Resolution on accelerating efforts to eliminate all forms of iolence against )omen3preenting and responding to rape and other forms of se>ual iolence *A!"RC!R-B!#&!#$+.

.


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Commission has deoted specific attention to gendered issues and impacts of iolations

during the course of its inestigations@ paying particular attention to iolence against

)omen and children. Ta;ing into account "uman Rights Council Resolution #&!#$@ the

Commission therefore paid specific attention to iolence against )omen and girls and

included the gender dimension of other iolations in its report. iolence against )omen@ in

particular se>ual iolence@ proed to be difficult to document o)ing to the stigma andshame that still attaches to the ictims. The Commission ta;es the ie) that its inquiry may

hae only partially captured the e>tent of releant iolations.

1. Compared to the mandates gien to other commissions of inquiry@2paragraph $ of

Resolution ##!& does not limit the temporal scope for the Commissions inquiry. The

Commission has focused on documenting iolations that are reflectie of the human rights

situation as it persists at present. ithin the limits of time@ resources and aailable

information at its disposal@ the Commission has also inquired into patterns of human rights

iolations that may hae commenced in the more distant past@ but are continuing and!or

hae serious repercussions to this day. "istorical eents that predate the establishment of

the DPRK are described )here they are crucial to understanding the human rights

iolations in the DPRK and their underlying political@ cultural and economic causes.

=. As to its geographic scope@ the Commission has interpreted its mandate to include

alleged iolations perpetrated by the DPRK against its nationals both )ithin and outside the

DPRK as )ell as those iolations that inole e>traterritorial action originating from the

DPRK@ such as the abductions of non/DPRK nationals.

#0. The Commission is of the ie) that iolations committed outside the DPRK that

causally enable or facilitate subsequent human rights iolations in the DPRK@ or are the

immediate consequence of human rights iolations that ta;e place in the DPRK@ are also

)ithin its mandate. 5n this respect@ the Commission also made findings regarding the e>tent

to )hich other states carry releant responsibility.1

C% /on-cooperation by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

#. Resolution ##!& urges the ,oernment of the DPRK to cooperate fully )ith the

Commissions inestigation@ to permit the Commissions members unrestricted access to

isit the country and to proide them )ith all information necessary to enable them to fulfil

their mandate. 5mmediately after its adoption@ the DPRK publicly stated that it )ould

Itotally re(ect and disregardJ the resolution@ )hich it considered to be a Iproduct of

political confrontation and conspiracyJ.=5n a letter dated 0 7ay #0&@ the DPRK directly

2 or instance@ "uman Rights Council Resolution B/2! mandated the Commission of

5nquiry on the Byrian Arab Republic to inestigate all alleged iolations of international human rights

la) since 7arch #0.1 The Commission of 5nquiry *C85+ on


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coneyed to the President of the "uman Rights Council that it Itotally and categorically

re(ects the Commission of 5nquiryJ. Regrettably@ this stance has remained unchanged@

despite numerous efforts by the Commission to engage the DPRK.

##. 5n a letter addressed to the Permanent 7ission of the DPRK in ,enea dated

1 ?une #0&@ the Commission requested a meeting. This )as follo)ed by another lettersent on $ ?uly #0&@ in )hich the Commission solicited the DPRK to e>tend cooperation

and support by facilitating access to the country. The Permanent 7ission of the DPRK in

,enea ac;no)ledged the receipt of the t)o letters to the Commissions Becretariat@ but

e>plicitly repeated the re(ection of the mandate of the Commission.

#&. The Commission reiterated its request to hae access to the territory of the DPRK in

a letter sent on % ?uly #0& to 7r Kim ?ong/un@ Bupreme


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#=. 5n carrying out its )or;@ and in assessing the testimony placed before it@ the

Commission )as guided by the principles of independence@ impartiality@ ob(ectiity@

transparency@ integrity and the principle of Ido no harmJ@ including in relation to

guarantees of confidentiality and the protection of ictims and )itnesses. 9est practices

)ere applied )ith regard to )itness protection@ outreach@ rules of procedure@ report )riting@

international inestigation standards@ and archiing.

&% Public hearings

&0. 5n the absence of access to )itnesses and sites inside the DPRK@ the Commission

decided to obtain first/hand testimony through public hearings that obsered transparency@

due process and the protection of ictims and )itnesses. ictims and )itnesses )ho had

departed the DPRK@ as )ell as e>perts@ testified in a transparent procedure that )as open to

the media@ other obserers and members of the general public. 7ore than 10 )itnesses and

e>perts testified publicly and proided information of great specificity@ detail and

releance@ sometimes in )ays that required a significant degree of courage.

&. Public hearings )ere conducted in Beoul *#0/#4 August #0&+@ To;yo *#=/&0

August #0&+@ tent that there )as a direct causallin; bet)een such abuses and the human rights situation in the DPRK.

&&. The Commission inited the authorities of the DPRK to attend and@ by leae@ to as;

questions and ma;e representations at the public hearings in Beoul@


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#% Confidential inter4iews

&4. 7any ictims and )itnesses )ho fled the DPRK )ere prepared to share releant

information@ but )ould not do so publicly as they feared reprisals against family members

)ho still remain in the DPRK. Persons )ho preiously sered in an official capacity in the

DPRK )ere often particularly reluctant to be seen to cooperate publicly )ith theCommission. Bome e>perts on the situation in the DPRK also preferred to be interie)ed

confidentially in order to presere space for their direct engagement )ith the DPRK.

&$. The Commission and its Becretariat conducted oer #40 confidential interie)s )ith

indiidual )itnesses. These interie)s )ere conducted during isits to Beoul@ To;yo@

9ang;o;@ cerpts from these interie)s are included in the report. 5n many instances@

information on the e>act place and time of iolations and other details that might identify

the )itness has been )ithheld due to protection concerns.

'% Call for submissions and re4iew of other written materials

&2. 5n ?uly #0&@ the Commission addressed a call for )ritten submissions to all Fnited

:ations 7ember Btates and releant sta;eholders. All interested states@ persons or

organiEations )ere inited to share releant information and documentation@ )hich could

be of assistance to the Commission in the discharge of its mandate. As of & :oember

#0&@ the deadline for sharing information and material )ith the Commission@ 10 such

submissions )ere recorded. ->ceptionally@ a small number of submissions receied after

the deadline )ere admitted. Additionally@ a ery large olume of correspondence )as

receied by the Commission and the Commissions members.

&1. The Commission obtained and reie)ed a )ealth of other reports and )ritten

materials prepared by the Fnited :ations@ non/goernmental organiEations@ goernments@

research institutes and academics. hile the findings in this report rely primarily on first/

hand testimony from ictims and )itnesses@ the )ritten record has proided inaluableconte>t and a source of corroboration. 7any reports and documents )ere tendered by

)itnesses at the public hearings. They )ere all recorded as e>hibits and are part of the

record of those hearings.

(% 5ngagement with other states

&=. The Commission isited the Republic of Korea from = to #2 August #0&. 5n

addition to the public hearing held in Beoul@ the Commission met the Prime 7inister of the

Republic of Korea@ goernment officials from arious ministries@ local and international

non/goernmental and ciil society organiEations@ the :ational "uman Rights Commission

of Korea and the Korea 5nstitute for :ational Fnification.

40. The Commission isited ?apan from #2 August to Beptember #0&. 5n addition tothe public hearing held in To;yo@ the Commission met the Prime 7inister of ?apan@

goernment officials from arious ministries@ and local and international non/goernmental

and ciil society organiEations.

4. The Commission isited Thailand from 1 to #0 Beptember #0&. During this isit@

the Commission met officials of the Royal Thai ,oernment including the 7inistry of

oreign Affairs@ the :ational "uman Rights Commission of Thailand@ representaties of

international agencies@ and local and international non/goernmental and ciil society

organiEations. The Commissioners conducted a confidential interie) )ith the family of a

suspected case of international abduction by the DPRK.

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4#. The Commission isited the Fnited Kingdom of ,reat 9ritain and :orthern 5reland

from #& to #$ 8ctober #0&. 5n addition to public hearing held in 55 .


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$% Cooperation of 6nited /ations entities and other organi7ations

42. Resolution ##!& encourages the Fnited :ations@ including its specialiEed agencies@

regional intergoernmental organiEations@ mandate holders@ interested institutions and

independent e>perts and non/goernmental organiEations@ to deelop regular dialogue and

cooperation )ith the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate.41. The Commission has engaged )ith a number of Fnited :ations entities and

humanitarian actors outside the Fnited :ations system to obtain releant information. A

small number of Fnited :ations entities )ere )ary of cooperating openly )ith the

Commission for fear of negatie repercussions on their operations in the DPRK. Bome

proided releant information@ )hile others did not. This report only attributes information

to specific organiEations )here such information is reflected in their public reports. The

citation of a public report is not necessarily an indication that an organiEation has

cooperated )ith the Commission.

4=. The Commission e>tends its gratitude to the 8ffice of the "igh Commissioner for

"uman Rights. Apart from its dedicated Becretariat@ the Commission also receied adice

and support from 8"C"Rs standing function to support commissions of inquiry@ fact/

finding missions and other human rights inestigatie missions. Buch support and

assistance )as afforded )ith proper respect to the independence and integrity of the

Commission@ its members and its Becretariat. The Commission also interacted )ith@ and

receied releant information from@ a number of mandate holders under the Bpecial

Procedures of the "uman Rights Council and human rights Treaty 9odies.

$0. The Commission benefitted from the inaluable support of a number of non/

goernmental organiEations that thoroughly document human rights iolations in the

DPRK. These organiEations sometimes suffer from inadequate financial resources.

:eertheless@ they )ent to great lengths to ensure that the Commission could gain the trust

of ictims and )itnesses )ho had departed the DPRK.

% Protection of witnesses and other in4estigati4e challenges

$. The Commission paid particular attention to the protection of ictims and )itnesses.

The initial protection assessment carried out by the Commission indicated that the

authorities of the DPRK routinely sub(ect persons )ho spea; out about the human rights

situation in the DPRK to summary e>ecutions@ enforced disappearances and other acts of

iolence. ,rae reprisals hae also been e>tended to the family members of such persons.

The Commission too; into account the policy of the Peoples Republic of China to forcibly

repatriate persons )ho depart the DPRK as )ell as ;no)n cases in )hich such persons

)ere abducted by DPRK authorities and forced to return to the DPRK.

$#. 9earing this conte>t in mind@ the Commission sought to e>ercise (udgement@ caution

and sensitiity in all interactions )ith ictims and )itnesses. Constant assessments )ere

made about the need to establish contact )ith persons )ho may be placed at ris; as a result

of that contact. Contacts )ere not attempted if the Commission determined that it )ouldnot be able to ensure the safety of a cooperating person@ if the ris; of harm )as assessed to

be too high or if the Commission did not hae sufficient information to ma;e an informed

determination on the leel of ris;. 5n particular@ the Commission did not pursue offers to

hae direct contact through mobile telephones )ith )itnesses still residing in the DPRK.

$&. 5n relation to the public hearings@ protection concerns )ere carefully assessed on a

case/by/case basis@ ta;ing into account all releant circumstances. 5n principle@ the

Commission only heard publicly from ictims and )itnesses )ho had no close family left

in the DPRK or )ere (udged not to be at ris; in the Peoples Republic of China. 5nformed

consent of the )itness to testify )as a necessary@ but not sufficient@ requirement to allo)

for the testimony to be heard. 5n some cases@ the Commission refused the offer of

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courageous )itnesses )ho offered to testify in public@ since reprisals against family )ere

(udged a real possibility. 5n other cases@ ictims and )itnesses )hose names and

e>periences )ere already sub(ect to e>tensie media coerage )ere allo)ed to testify@

unless there )ere reasonable grounds to beliee that additional public testimony might

result in further reprisals. The Commission also too; care to ensure that )itnesses

testimony and questioning )ould not refer to the personal details of persons )ho had note>pressed their consent to be identified in public and )ho could face protection concerns.

$4. The identity of all )itnesses )as established by the Commission prior to the

hearings. 7ost )itnesses )ere also prepared to reeal their identity during the public

hearings. or protection reasons@ ho)eer@ some )itnesses )ere permitted only to identify

themseles )ith a pseudonym *7s @ 7r Timothy etc.+ and to ta;e measures to conceal

their faces or adopt other identifiers. A small number of )itnesses )ore hats@ sunglasses or

other clothing that coered parts of their faces@ measures to preent the discoery of their

identity.

$$. -en these e>tensie protection measures may not preent reprisals. The

Commission requests that any information indicating that persons )ho cooperated )ith the

Commission or their family members faced reprisals be brought to the immediate attentionof the Becretary/,eneral@ through the "igh Commissioner for "uman Rights. The

Commission recalls that primary responsibility for protecting ictims@ )itnesses and other

persons cooperating )ith the Commission rests )ith their states of residence and nationality

and urges 7ember Btates to proide additional protection measures )here necessary.

$%. The lac; of physical access to )itnesses and sites in the DPRK@ coupled )ith the

stated protection concerns@ created a number of particular challenges for an effectie

inestigation.

$2. The pool of potential first/hand )itnesses is limited to no more than &0@000 citiEens

)ho hae left the DPRK@ the ast ma(ority of )hom reside today in the Republic of Korea.

7ost of these )itnesses are from proinces bordering China@ )hich means that the situation

in those proinces is relatiely better documented than the situation in other proinces of

the DPRK. 5n most cases@ a person )ho fled the DPRK requires considerable time to reach

a place of safety and to deelop the courage necessary to spea; about his or her e>perience.

,ien that the Commission applied a rigorous standard of proof based on first/hand

testimony@ it )as therefore not able to confirm many of the most recent instances of human

rights iolations alleged by non/goernmental organiEations and media reports.

$1. The most significant challenge faced by the Commission resulted from a fear of

reprisals. The ma(ority of potential )itnesses )ere afraid to spea; out een on a

confidential basis because they feared for the safety of their families and assumed that their

conduct )as still being clandestinely monitored by the DPRK authorities. The Commission

is therefore particularly grateful to those indiiduals )ho found the courage to brea; the

)all of silence by testifying publicly or confidentially to the Commission.

$=. ear of reprisals for their )or; and operations has also limited the )illingness ofmany aid )or;ers@ (ournalists@ diplomats and other foreign isitors to the DPRK to share

;no)ledge and information )ith the Commission. :eertheless@ foreigners usually hae

limited first/hand ;no)ledge about the human rights situation@ since they are denied

freedom of moement in the country and their contact )ith DPRK citiEens is closely

managed and monitored.

%0. The Commission found encouraging the amount of information that is seeping out of

the DPRK )ith the adent and )ider aailability of technology. The Commission )as able

to rely on commercially aailable satellite images to confirm the e>istence of four political

prison camps described in this report. Almost certainly@ higher resolution satellite imagery

produced by more technologically adanced states )ould hae proided further

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information. Fnfortunately@ despite requests@ these images )ere not made aailable to the

Commission.

%. The Commission also obtained clandestinely/recorded ideos and photographs

sho)ing releant sites@ documents and correspondence that elucidated alleged iolations of

human rights in the DPRK. The Commission relied on such material to the e>tent that itcould confirm its authenticity.

%#. The Commission is conscious of the fact that most ictims and )itnesses

cooperating )ith the Commission had an oerall unfaourable opinion of the DPRKs

authorities@ though usually not of the country itself or its people. Through its refusal to

cooperate )ith the Commission@ the DPRK depried itself of the opportunity to offer its

o)n perspecties on the human rights situation and to proide information on any adances

made in regard to the human rights of its population. The Commission has sought to

account for these challenges by carefully reie)ing information proided by the DPRK in

publicly aailable documents. 5n particular@ the Commission has reie)ed the DPRKs

state reports to the Fniersal Periodic Reie) and the Treaty 9odies as )ell as the publicly

aailable summaries of its responses to letters of allegations transmitted by the Bpecial

Procedures of the "uman Rights Council. igures and other releant claims of fact stated inthese documents are reflected in this report@ een if the Commission could not confirm their

basis or alidity.

5% 8egal framewor1 and standard of proof for reported 4iolations

%&. 5n assessing the human rights situation in the DPRK@ the Commission relied chiefly

on the binding legal obligations that the DPRK oluntarily assumed as a Btate Party to the

human rights treaties mentioned aboe. 8ther obligations e>pressed in customary

international la) also bind the DPRK.

%4. 5n relation to issues )ithin its mandate that har;en bac; to the period of the Korean

ar *=$0/$&+@ the Commission also too; into account those residual obligations ofinternational humanitarian la) that continue to be applicable in the relations bet)een the

DPRK and other parties to that conflict.

%$. The possible commission of crimes against humanity are assessed on the basis of

definitions set out by customary international criminal la)@ )hich to a large e>tent oerlap

)ith those later e>pressed in the Rome Btatute of the 5nternational Criminal Court.

%%. here appropriate@ the Commission has also considered releant obligations of

other states@ including the prohibition of refoulement under international refugee la) andinternational human rights la) as )ell as the rights and duties of states in e>tending

diplomatic protection to their nationals and permanent residents.

%2. Consistent )ith the practice of other Fnited :ations fact/finding bodies@ the

Commission employed a Ireasonable groundsJ standard of proof in ma;ing factualdeterminations on indiidual cases@ incidents and patterns of state conduct. These factual

determinations proided the basis for the legal qualification of incidents and patterns of

conduct as human rights iolations and@ )here appropriate@ crimes against humanity.

%1. There are Ireasonable groundsJ establishing that an incident or pattern of conduct

has occurred )hen the Commission is satisfied that it has obtained a reliable body of

information@ consistent )ith other material@ based on )hich a reasonable and ordinarily

prudent person has reason to beliee that such incident or pattern of conduct has occurred.

This standard of proof is lo)er than the standard required in criminal proceedings to sustain

an indictment@ but is sufficiently high to call for further inestigations into the incident or

pattern of conduct and@ )here aailable@ initiation of the consideration of a possible

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prosecution. The findings of the Commission appearing in this report must be understood as

being based on the Ireasonable groundsJ standard of proof@ een )hen the full e>pression

*Ireasonable grounds establishingJ+ is not necessarily e>pressed throughout the te>t of this

report.

%=. 5n line )ith the methodology of the Commission@ particular emphasis )as gien toinformation gathered during public hearings@ gien that the general public and e>perts can

directly scrutiniEe the Commissions assessment of the reliability and credibility of the

)itness and the alidity of the information proided.

20. 5ndiidual cases and incidents reflected in this report are generally based on at least

one credible source of first/hand information@ )hich )as independently corroborated by at

least one other credible source of information. To the e>tent that protection considerations

permit@ sources are identified. here the report describes patterns of conduct@ these are

based on seeral credible sources of first/hand information@ )hich are consistent )ith@ and

corroborated by@ the oerall body of credible information collected. 5n the fe) instances

)here this rigorous standard of proof could not be met@ but the Commission still considered

it appropriate to reflect the incident or pattern@ the underlying sources are identified.

2. The Commission considered the follo)ing to be sources of first/hand information3

*a+ testimony proided in public hearings and confidential interie)s by ictims@

eye)itnesses@ ictims close family members@ perpetrators or former DPRK officials )ith

direct ;no)ledge of the issues@ incidents and trends brought before the Commission@ )here

it )as assessed that the source )as credible and reliable and the information alidN

*b+ satellite imagery from reliable sources@ authenticated ideo and photo

material@ autobiographies@ and other documents containing first/hand information from a

reliable source. This category also includes a number of e>hibits receied during the public

hearingsN

*c+ publicly aailable admissions of releant facts by the DPRKN

*d+ la)s@ policies and directies of the DPRK as )ell as internal DPRKdocuments@ proided that they )ere receied from a credible and reliable source and their

authenticity could be confirmedN and

*e+ statistics@ sureys and other quantitatie information generated by the DPRK

or the Fnited :ations@ to the e>tent that the data is based on an apparently sound

methodology and the inputs underlying the data are considered alid and originating from a

credible and reliable source.

2#. The Commission relied on the follo)ing types of information for the purposes of

corroborating information based on first/hand sources and proiding the oerall conte>t to

iolations3

*a+ testimony proided in public hearings or confidential interie)s by )itnesses

)ho receied the information directly from a person ;no)n to them *and not as a rumour+@proided that the Commission assessed the source to be credible and reliable and the

information to be alidN

*b+ summaries of )itness testimony contained in publications or in submissions

by the Fnited :ations@ research institutes and human rights organiEations@ )here the

Commission assessed the source to be credible and reliable and the information to be alidN

and

*c+ summary descriptions of patterns of conduct contained in e>pert testimony@

public reports@ submissions@ boo;s@ documentaries and similar materials@ )here the

Commission assessed the source to be credible and reliable and the information to be alid.

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2&. The reliability and credibility of each source )as carefully assessed by the

Commission. The Commission considered )hether the source )as trust)orthy and )hether

the person )as telling )hat he or she belieed to be true. This assessment too; into

account@ amongst other considerations@ the follo)ing3

*a+ the )itnesss political and personal interests@ potential biases and past recordof reliability *if ;no)n+N

*b+ the )itnesss apparent capacity to correctly recall eents@ considering his or

her age@ trauma@ ho) far bac; the eents occurred@ etc.N

*c+ the position of the )itness in relation to the sub(ect of the informationN

*d+ )here and ho) the )itness obtained the informationN and

*e+ the reasons for )hich the )itness proided the information.

24. The Commission additionally considered that any piece of information had to be

assessed for its alidity by considering@ amongst other factors@ the informations releance

to the inquiry@ its internal consistency and coherence@ its logicality and its consistency )ith

and corroboration by other information.

2$. Assessments of the reliability and credibility of the source )ere separated from

assessments of the alidity of the information. The Commission did not assume that a

)itness@ (udged to be a credible and reliable source@ )ould necessarily proide accurate and

alid information.

2%. here information )as assessed to meet the Ireasonable groundsJ standard@ the

Commission could reach its conclusions and dra) inferences more comfortably because it

had repeatedly offered to the authorities of the DPRK the opportunity to attend the public

hearings@ to obtain leae to as; questions to the releant )itnesses@ and to address the

Commission on such information. 5n addition@ the Commission shared its findings )ith the

DPRK and inited comments and factual corrections. The authorities of the DPRK hae

failed to aail themseles of such facilities by their o)n decisions.

22. here the Commission refers in this report to a testimony of a )itness@ the

testimony as assessed and described is accepted by the Commission as truthful and releant

*e>cept to any degree e>pressly identified+.

21. Direct reference to specific testimony in the report does not indicate that such

testimony is the sole basis of (udgement by the Commission in relation to the issues under

analysis. here these direct references and citations are found in the report@ it is to be

understood that the Commission has decided to introduce them for the purpose of proiding

an e>ample or an illustration of broader human rights issues and!or patterns of conduct.

9% !rchi4ing and record-1eeping of testimony

2=. ith the assistance of releant 8"C"R sections@ a confidential electronic database

)as specially created from an 8"C"R standard model to enable the Commission to

securely record and store information pertaining to its mandate. Bpecifically@ the use of the

database enabled the Commission to3

*a+ safely manage@ follo)/up and archie informationN

*b+ ;eep information secure@ including through encryptionN

*c+ retriee and analyse informationN and

*d+ adhere to a sound human rights monitoring and reporting methodology.

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10. The database contains the summary records of all interie)s conducted )ith

)itnesses as )ell as electronic copies of releant materials gathered during the course of

the inquiry. As a fully searchable tool@ the database facilitated the logical organiEation and

retrieal of information for analysis@ establishing trends and patterns )hich assisted in the

)riting of this report.

1. The free@ informed and specific consent of interie)ees to use and!or share

information gathered )as recorded in the database@ as )as any additional assessment of the

Commission about possible protection ris;s of using and!or sharing the information

receied een )hen interie)ees freely consented to its use.

1#. The Commission of 5nquiry has requested the "igh Commissioner for "uman

Rights to safeguard the confidential database. The Commission has also informed the "igh

Commissioner of its )ish that the database remain a liing instrument that )ill continue to

be updated and e>panded. The database should therefore be made accessible in full to

8"C"R@ the Bpecial Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic

Peoples Republic of Korea and any future Fnited :ations mechanisms tas;ed to protect

human rights in the DPRK.

1&. urthermore@ the Commission has authoriEed the "igh Commissioner@ acting as the

residual Becretariat of the Commission@ to proide access to the e>isting materials

contained in the database to competent authorities that carry out credible inestigations for

the purposes of ensuring accountability for crimes and other iolations committed@

establishing the truth about iolations committed or implementing Fnited :ations/

mandated targeted sanctions against particular indiiduals or institutions. Access should

only be granted to the e>tent that )itnesses or other sources of information concerned hae

gien their informed consent and that any protection and operational concerns are duly

addressed. To ensure that the information gathered by the Commission is presered in its

integrity once the Commission has fulfilled its mandate@ the physical records of the

Commission )ill also be archied in accordance )ith Fnited :ations archiing practices.$

14. At this stage of the history of the Korean people@ the creation and maintenance of an

archie of the testimony of indiidual )itnesses on human rights abuses in the DPRK and

the )ritings of e>perts is an important contribution to human rights a)areness and eentual

accountability. Among the greatest affronts to the achieement and maintenance of

uniersal human rights for all peoples is the ris; that grae iolations ta;e place un;no)n@

in secret@ and are not recorded and analysed so that future generations can learn from@ and

resole to aoid@ shoc;ing departures from the uniersal alues recogniEed in international

la). This report describes many such shoc;ing departures.

)))% Historical and political conte:t to human rights

4iolations in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea

1$. The current human rights situation in the DPRK has been shaped by the historicale>periences of the Korean people. Confucian social structures and the oppression suffered

during the ?apanese colonial occupation hae informed the political structures and attitudes

preailing in the DPRK today. The imposed diision of the Korean peninsula@ the massie

destruction that occurred during the Korean ar and the impact of the Cold ar hae

engendered an isolationist mind/set and a deep aersion to outside po)ers. The particular

nature and the oerall scale of human rights iolations in the DPRK can be better

understood through an appreciation of the deelopment of the system of goernment in the

DPRK. The DPRK is a single/party state dominated by a family dynasty )hich controls the

$ Becretary/,enerals 9ulletin@Record-eeping and the management of !nited Nationsarchi"es@ # ebruary #002 *BT!B,9!#002!$+.

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party@ the state and the military. Rigid ideological tenets loosely based on socialist 7ar>ist/

tensie security apparatus sustain this regime.

1%. Any description of history and political structures ineitably reflects the sources and

ie)points of those )ho record it. The Commission endeaoured at different stages to

engage )ith the DPRK in order to receie directly its perspectie@ including on historicaleents. 5n the absence of any such engagement@ the Commission has nonetheless sought to

effect a balanced approach and to use the most reliable sources at its disposal to inform its

understanding of the historical and political conte>t to the human rights iolations in the

DPRK.

!% Pre-colonial history

12. The DPRK is often referred to as the I"ermit KingdomJ suggesting that the

insularity of the :orth has been characteristic since its beginnings. The largely self/

imposed relatie isolation of the DPRK today is not@ ho)eer@ an e>tension of the earlier

e>periences of pre/modern Korea. 5t is belieed that humans inhabited the Korean

peninsula since :eolithic times@ )ith the eentual emergence of settled communities basedon agricultural production that led to enough surplus for horses@ )eapons and armies to

sustain centuries of legends of epic battles among arious indigenous ;ingdoms and against

outside forces from modern/day China@ ?apan and 7ongolia.

11. 8er the course of pre/modern history@ Korea established a class/based system

)hereby a small aristocratic elite@ combining elements of a landed gentry and scholar/

officials@ eentually to be ;no)n as theyangban# ruled oer peasants and lo)er classes thatincluded merchants and labourers. Blaery and indentured seritude )ere also practised.

This class/based system is sometimes characteriEed as feudal and perhaps more accurately

as agrarian/bureaucratic. 5n theory@ this system conferred elite status on men )ho had

passed a rigorous ciil serice e>am and )ere a)arded high/leel bureaucratic positions@

some)hat analogous to the mandarin system in China. 8er time@ the yangbanbecame@ in

practice@ a hereditary institution through the family registry system that passed on elitestatus through the generations@ )ith its self/perpetuating priileges including the right to

participate in local councils.

1=. The yangbanclass system spea;s to the deep/rooted Confucian underpinnings ofKorean society. Confucianism is essentially an ethical and philosophical system that

regards adherence to strict hierarchies as important to social harmony and personal

fulfilment. ie ;ey relationships set out these hierarchies3 soereign and sub(ect@ husband

and )ife@ parent and child@ elder brother and younger brother@ and friend and friend. The

most important of those is the parent and child relationship. 5n fact@ respect for elders and

social hierarchy based on age remain ;ey features of Korean culture both in the :orth and

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,% ;apanese colonial occupation pand their spheres of influence in Asia. The Bino/?apanese ar *1=4/=$+ resulted in

?apan ending Koreas tributary relationship )ith China by formally declaring Korea to be

independent@ a status )hich allo)ed ?apan to increase its influence on the peninsula. The

Russo/?apanese ar *=04/0$+ sa) the ?apanese defeat the Russian fleet at Port Arthur *in

Dalian@ China+. This led to a peace treaty bro;ered by Fnited Btates President Theodore

Rooseelt in Portsmouth@ :e) "ampshire@ that recogniEed Korea as a protectorate of

?apan. 5n =0@ ?apan formally declared Korea to be a colony@ ending its monarchy and

requiring the allegiance of the Korean people to the -mperor of ?apan.

=. ?apan imposed arious moderniEing reforms@ including in matters of social@

administratie and economic organiEation. :eertheless@ Koreans hae oer)helmingly

ie)ed the colonial e>perience as negatie and brutal. Koreans )ere sub(ect to racial

discrimination la)s in their o)n country. They )ere prohibited from spea;ing the Korean

language and made to adopt ?apanese names. ?apan sent around 200@000 nationals to fill

roles in goernment serice as all top administratie positions )ere filled by ?apanese. 2

Transportation@ communications@ industry and een agriculture )ere e>panded for the

benefit of the colonial po)er rather than the Korean people. The results of ?apans

moderniEation drie on the peninsula )ere characteriEed by patterns of deelopment and

underdeelopment. The question of )hether ?apan ultimately assisted Korea in its

deelopment remains highly contested both politically and in academia.1

=#. The 7arch irst 5ndependence 7oement of == prompted protests by studentsand other Koreans against ?apanese rule in seeral Korean cities@ including Beoul and

Pyongyang. These non/iolent demonstrations spread oer the ensuing days to numerous

cities and to)ns. ?apanese authorities arrested thousands of Koreans@ many of )hom died

as a result of torture and inhumane conditions of detention.=

=&. ?apan instigated ma(or industrialiEation on the Korean peninsula as part of its

massie )ar effort. Bteel mills@ factories and hydroelectric plants )ere built@ mainly in the

:orth. 7uch of the Korean population )as uprooted from its agrarian base. Koreans@

including )omen and children@ )ere sent to labour in factories in the northern part of the

peninsula and in 7anchuria and to mines and other enterprises in ?apan. 7any of the

labourers )or;ed under terrible conditions@ and a large number of men and )omen )ere

2 Andrea 7atles Baada@ ed.@North Korea$ A Country Study# %ibrary of Congress@==&@ Aailable from http3!!countrystudies.us!north/;orea!#.htm.

1 or e>ample@ see Daqing Oang@ I?apanese Colonial 5nfrastructure in :ortheast AsiaJ@

inKorea at the Center$ &ynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia@ Charles K. Armstrong andothers@ eds. *:e) Oor;@ 7.-. Bharpe@ #00%+.

= Bee the -ncyclopaedia 9ritannica@ aailable from

http3!!))).britannica.com!-9chec;ed!topic!&%42&!7arch/irst/7oementN,lobal :oniolent

Action Database@ aailable from http3!!ndatabase.s)arthmore.edu!content!;oreans/protest/(apanese/

control/march/st/moement/==N and :ishi 7asayu;i@ I7arch and 7ay 4@ == in Korea@ China

and ?apan3 To)ard an 5nternational "istory of -ast Asian 5ndependence 7oements@JAsia-Pacific'ournal$ 'apan (ocus@ 8ctober &@ #002@ aailable fromhttp3!!(apanfocus.org!/nishi/masayu;i!#$%0Qsthash.#t=tgKt.dpuf.

#3
http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/12.htmhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/364173/March-First-Movementhttp://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/koreans-protest-japanese-control-march-1st-movement-1919http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/koreans-protest-japanese-control-march-1st-movement-1919http://japanfocus.org/-nishi-masayuki/2560#sthash.F2t9tgKt.dpufhttp://japanfocus.org/-nishi-masayuki/2560#sthash.F2t9tgKt.dpufhttp://japanfocus.org/-nishi-masayuki/2560#sthash.F2t9tgKt.dpufhttp://countrystudies.us/north-korea/12.htmhttp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/364173/March-First-Movementhttp://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/koreans-protest-japanese-control-march-1st-movement-1919http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/koreans-protest-japanese-control-march-1st-movement-1919http://japanfocus.org/-nishi-masayuki/2560#sthash.F2t9tgKt.dpufhttp://japanfocus.org/-nishi-masayuki/2560#sthash.F2t9tgKt.dpuf


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conscripted as forced labour.#0 9y =4$@ it is estimated that Koreans made up a large

percentage of the entire labour force in ?apan.#

=4. 5t is estimated that by =4$@ #0 per cent of all Koreans had been displaced from their

places of origin@ )ith per cent displaced outside Korea.##At the end of orld ar 55@

there )ere appro>imately #.4 million Koreans in ?apan@ # million in China and about#00@000 in the Boiet Fnion.#& After ?apans defeat in orld ar 55@ the colonial

administration collapsed. 7illions of displaced Koreans sought to return home )hile others

stayed behind in ?apan@ China and the Boiet Fnion. The legacy of this forced displacement

includes substantial minority populations of Koreans@ particularly in ?apan and northern

China.#4

C% Di4ision of the peninsula> the Korean ?ar and its legacy

=$. As the end of orld ar 55 approached@ the matter of the disposition of colonies

around the )orld became sub(ect to negotiation by the soon/to/be ictorious po)ers. The

Fnited Btates of America suggested a multi/lateral trusteeship for Korea in its general

preference for the establishment of gradual independence processes. 5n =4&@ inanticipation of ?apans defeat@ the Allied Po)ers at the Cairo Conference set out an

agreement for the independence of Korea Iin due courseJ. 5n =4$@ the Fnited Btates

decided on the &1thparallel to diide the Korean peninsula into t)o Eones of control@ one

under an American sphere of influence and the other under a Boiet one. The Fnited Btates

sent #$@000 troops to Bouth Korea in fulfilment of these arrangements. They )ere often met

)ith resentment and resistance. 5n August =4$@ the Boiet Fnion sent its #$ thArmy to

:orth Korea )here it set up the Boiet Ciil Administration.

=%. The ?apanese departure from the Korean peninsula )as abrupt. Belf/goernance

groups@ or peoples committees@ appeared throughout the peninsula to fill the acuum. The

Fnited Btates actiely suppressed these groups )hile the Boiet Fnion deeloped them into

core institutions of goernance. hen the Boiets arried in Pyongyang@ the leader of the

Korean nationalists@ Cho 7an/si;@ the most popular politician in :orth Korea@ hadestablished the Bouth Pyongan Committee for the Preparation for 5ndependence. Among

the Boiet troops )ho )ere dispatched to :orth Korea )ere IBoiet KoreansJ@ ethnic

Koreans )ho had been either been part of the substantial Korean minority population

follo)ing immigration into the Russian ar -ast in the late 1%0s or those more recent

arrials )ho had fled from 7anchuria under intensified ?apanese pressure against guerrilla

#0 5n 7ay #0#@ the Republic of Koreas Bupreme Court in a decision that reersed

preious lo)er court decisions and ruled that the right of former forced )or;ers and their families to

see; )ithheld )ages and compensation )as not inalidated by the =%$ treaty that normaliEed bi/

lateral ties. 5n ?uly #0&@ the Beoul "igh Court ruled in faour of four Korean men )ho )ere ta;en

into forced labour@ ordering :ippon Bteel M Bumitomo 7etal to pay them a total of 400 million )on.

The 9usan "igh Court@ on &0 ?uly #0&@ ordered 7itsubishi "eay 5ndustries to pay the same amount

in compensation to fie Koreans. 5n 8ctober #0&@ the ,)ang(u District Court ordered 7itsubishi"eay 5ndustries


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fighters there. These Boiet Koreans included the && year/old Korean guerrilla hero Kim 5l/

sung )ho )as a military officer )ith the ran; of captain in the Boiet Army.

=2. hen the Boiet Fnion decided against retaining Cho 7an/si; as the local leader@

Kim 5l/sung )as selected as an alternate candidate. 8n 4 8ctober =4$@ Kim 5l/sung spo;e

publicly for the first time to a mass rally in honour of the Boiet Army. "e )as introducedby Boiet ,eneral pression. ormer

Chairman of the Btanding Committee of the Bupreme Peoples Assembly ")ang ?ang/yope>plained3

The reason )hy Kim )as chosen from among the Koreans in the 11 th 5nfantry9rigade )as apparently because he )as young and had a good outloo;. "ise>periences )ere no match for the Chinese KoreanL leaders of the day@ though.->aggerated propaganda )as necessary in order to eleate a Russian army captain to

#$ The DPRKs official biography of Kim 5l/sung notes that@ IThrough the agrarian

reform@ a total of @000@$ hectares of land that had belonged to ?apanese imperialists@ pro/?apanese

elements@ traitors to the nation and landlords )ere confiscated and distributed to 2#4@$## peasant

households )hich had had little or no land.JKim 2l Sung$ Condensed 3iography*Pyongyang@ oreign


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the status of legendary :orth Korean hero@ but at that time Korea had (uste>perienced painful oppression under ?apanese rule. This presented a goodopportunity for e>aggerated propaganda.#%

0. 5n =4%@ there )as a consolidation of all political groups into the :orth Korean

or;ers Party. The :orth Korean armed forces )ere also organiEed and reinforced. They)ere trained and equipped by the Boiet military although initially they )ere disguised as

police and rail)ay defence units. 9y the time the DPRK )as established in Beptember

=41@ Kim 5l/sung )as firmly in position as the head of the Cabinet of 7inisters *or

Premier+. Boiet forces then )ithdre) in large numbers from the DPRK. 5n =4=@ the

DPRK instituted compulsory military serice@ bringing the total number of troops to

bet)een $0@000 and #00@000@ organiEed into ten infantry diisions@ one tan; diision and

one air force diision. This large military force )as equipped )ith Boiet )eapons@

including T/&4 tan;s and Oa; fighter planes. These forces )ere further bolstered by the

return of 4$@000 )ar/hardened Korean soldiers from China follo)ing the end of the ciil

)ar there.

0#. 9et)een =4$ and =41@ the &1thparallel turned into a heaily guarded border@ )hile

both sides of the diided peninsula contemplated the use of military force to achieereunification. Tensions and military proocations increased after the respectie departures

of Boiet and Fnited Btates forces in =41. 8n #$ ?une =$0@ Kim 5l/sung@ after finally

securing support from both ?oseph Btalin and 7ao Uedong@ #2 initiated the Korean ar by

sending up to =0@000 Korean Peoples Army troops oer the &1 thparallel in a multi/pronged

attac; that surprised both the R8K authorities and their Fnited Btates adisors.#1Kim 5l/

sung )as sta;ing his claim to the leadership of the entire peninsula based on the perceied

illegitimacy of the R8K leadership and e>pectations of insurgency in the Bouth. 5nitially@

the Korean Peoples Army easily oer)helmed the forces of the R8K@ )hich numbered

fe)er than 00@000 men. The capital Beoul fell in three days.

0&. Fnited Btates President "arry B. Truman interpreted the attac; by the DPRK on the

R8K as the first ma(or test of the Cold ar. "e quic;ly ordered the deployment of Fnited

Btates troops )hile see;ing endorsement of his actions from the Fnited :ations BecurityCouncil. The Becurity Council had initially adopted a Fnited Btates/led resolution calling

for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the )ithdra)al of :orth Korean forces to

beyond the &1thparallel )ith a ote of = to 0 )ith three abstentions.#=The Boiet Fnion )as

#% ")ang ?ang/yop )as the highest leel defector to the R8K. Bee4)ang 'ang-yop4oegoro*")ang ?ang/yops memoirs+ *Published in Korean by Ueitgeist@ #00%@ translated by Daily:K+. BF900%4.

#2 ?oseph Btalin bac;ed Kim 5l/sungs )ar by )ithdra)ing his earlier opposition to it@

minimiEing his o)n contribution and putting the onus of support on 7ao Uedongs ne) goernment

in China. The Boiet Fnion proided heay )eaponry to the DPRK but did not proide troops.

:eertheless@ Kim 5l/sungs top military adisors in the early phase of the )ar )ere Russian generals

)ho re/dre) :orth Korean inasion plans to their o)n specifications. 7ao pledged to send Chinese

troops if the Americans entered the )ar. Daid "alberstam@ *he Coldest ,inter$ America and theKorean ,ar*:e) Oor;@ "yperion@ #002+@ pp. 42/$=. Boiet archies also support this account@ inAndrei ample@ see ITop Becret Report on the 7ilitary Bituation in Bouth Korea from Bhty;o

to Comrade Ua;haroJ@ #% ?une =$0@ "istory and Public Policy Program Digital Archie@ Collection

of Boiet military documents obtained in ==4 by the 9ritish 9roadcasting Corporation for a 99C

Timeatch documentary titled IKorea@ Russias Becret arJ *?anuary ==%+. Aailable from

http3!!digitalarchie.)ilsoncentre.org!document!0%1%.#= 5n faour of Becurity Council Resolution 1# *=$0+ )ere theFnited Kingdom@

the Republic of China *Tai)an+@Cuba@-cuador@rance@:or)ay and theFnited Btates.

#'
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdomhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cubahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecuadorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwayhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stateshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdomhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Chinahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cubahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ecuadorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Francehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwayhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States


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not present to e>ercise its eto as a Permanent 7ember of the Becurity Council. The Boiet

Fnion had been refusing to participate in the Becurity Council since ?anuary =$0 oer the

issue of the accreditation of China. Chinas seat in the Fnited :ations )as still held by the

representatie of the Republic of China@ based in Tai)an@ despite the defeat of :ationalist

forces on the mainland.&08n #2 ?une =$0@ President Truman ordered Fnited Btates air and

naal forces to support the R8K. Becurity Council Resolution 1&@ adopted on the same day@determined that Ithe armed attac; upon the Republic of Korea by forces from :orth Korea

constitutes a breach of the peaceJ. 5t recommended that Fnited :ations members Ifurnish

such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attac; and

to restore international peace and security in the areaJ. 8n 2 ?uly =$0@ the Becurity

Council further recommended that all members proiding military forces and other

assistance do so under the unified command of the Fnited Btates and authoriEed Ithe

unified command at its discretion to use the Fnited :ations flag in the course of operations

against :orth Korean forces concurrently )ith the flags of the arious nations

participating.J&ifteen states@ in addition to the Fnited Btates@ contributed combat units to

fight in the Iinternational field forceJ under the Fnited :ations Command. 5n August =$0@

the Boiet Fnion returned to the Becurity Council and etoed all further resolutions

concerning the Korean ar. The debate on Korea then shifted to the Fnited :ations,eneral Assembly.

04. The ensuing months yielded a string of successes for the forces of the DPRK. 9y the

end of August =$0@ the DPRKs military controlled =0 per cent of the Korean peninsula.

"o)eer@ an amphibious landing of Fnited Btates troops under ,eneral Douglas

7acArthur in 5ncheon in Beptember =$0 turned the tide. ith the support of the Fnited

:ations no) behind them@ the R8K forces marched north)ard and recaptured Beoul.

,eneral 7acArthur pushed F:/bac;ed forces up to the Chinese border despite )arnings

from the Chinese. 9y :oember =$0@ the R8K supported by the Fnited :ations

Command controlled =0 per cent of the peninsula. The Peoples Republic of China then

sent hundreds of thousands of troops to bolster the Korean Peoples Army. They succeeded

in pushing Fnited :ations and R8K forces bac; beyond the &1 thparallel. The DPRK in its

subsequent accounts of the )ar has minimiEed the decisie role played by the Chinese

The Kingdom of -gypt@5ndia and the Bocialist ederal Republic of Ougoslaiaabstained.&0 The Boiet Fnion had assumed that the Becurity Council )ould not be able to

discharge its functions under article #2@ paragraph & of the Fnited :ations Charter3 IDecisions of the

Becurity Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmatie ote of nine members including

the concurring otes of the permanent membersJ. The other members of the Becurity Council decided

that a members absence could not preent the body from carrying out its functions.& Becurity Council Resolution 14. Those Btates contributing forces included3 Australia@

9elgium@ Canada@ Colombia@ -thiopia@ rance@ ,reece@ embourg@ the :etherlands@ :e) Uealand@

the Philippines@ Bouth Africa@ Thailand@ Tur;ey and the Fnited Kingdom. ie Btates contributed

medical support3 Denmar;@ 5ndia@ 5taly@ :or)ay and B)eden.

8n & :oember =$0@ the ,eneral Assembly adopted the IFniting for PeaceJResolution *&22 A+ stating3 Ithat if the Becurity Council@ because of lac; of unanimity of the

permanent members@ fails to e>ercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international

peace and security in any case )here there appears to be a threat to the peace@ breach of the peace@ or

act of aggression@ the ,eneral Assembly shall consider the matter immediately )ith a ie) to ma;ing

appropriate recommendations to 7embers for collectie measures@ including in the case of a breach

of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force )hen necessary@ to maintain or restore

international peace and security.J The resolution affirmed that the ,eneral Assembly may

recommend collectie action including the use of force@ despite the F: Charter )hich gies po)er to

the Becurity Council on all matters relating to international peace and security. 8n ebruary =$0@

the ,eneral Assembly adopted Resolution 4=1@ finding that the Peoples Republic of China )as

Iengaging in hostilities against Fnited :ations forcesJ in the DPRK and called on Iall Btates and

authorities to continue to lend eery assistance to the Fnited :ations action in KoreaJ.

#(
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IolunteersJ.&&:eertheless@ Chinese forces carried the main military burden for the rest of

the )ar.&4The DPRK has consistently do)nplayed the e>tent of outside assistance that it

receied not only during the )ar but in rebuilding after the )ar and then sustaining its post/

)ar economy. The counter/offensie by Fnited :ations forces reduced the gains made by

the Korean Peoples Army and caused massie destruction in the :orth. Thereafter@ t)o

years of bitter stalemate ensued. During this time@ more bombs )ere dropped on the DPRKthan had been deployed in the entire Pacific theatre during orld ar 55. &$The deastation

caused to all parts of the Korean peninsula )as enormous.&%

0$. The Korean ar ended in =$& in a ceasefire. 8n #2 ?uly =$&@ the Armistice

Agreement )as signed by


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Conference )as attended by the Republic of Korea@ the DPRK@ China@ the Boiet Fnion@

and % of the 2 states that had contributed forces under the Fnited :ations Command.

After t)o months@ these tal;s collapsed and hae not resumed. There has not been a

comprehensie peace treaty. 8n both sides of the border@ there remains fear of inasion and

infiltration. 5n the DPRK@ this fear has been instrumental in maintaining a state of

emergency ino;ed to (ustify harsh goernmental rule and its accompanying human rightsiolations. 5n this conte>t@ perceied political dissidents hae been branded as spies in the

serice of foreign po)ers. Bhortages in food and other essential means of surial hae

been blamed on a hostile outside )orld. The R8K li;e)ise e>periences the insecurities of

the unresoled )ar@ )hich the country addresses through general conscription and other

security measures. These security measures include restrictions that appear to infringe on

the human rights of its citiEens in particular respects such as the freedom of e>pression.4

02. The Fnited Btates by =$4 )as disassociating its forces from the Fnited :ations

Command and continued its engagement in the R8K through the Fnited Btates/R8K

7utual Defence Treaty. At the same time@ the other states that had committed troops to the

Fnited :ations Command )ithdre) most or all of their forces. The Fnited Btates maintains

a military presence in the R8K of about #1@$00 people.

01. Throughout the =%0s and =20s@ there )ere daily e>changes of fire along the

demilitariEed Eone ;illing some =00 soldiers and ciilians. 5n =%2@ the DPRK sought to

destabiliEe the R8K by utiliEing its secret serices. 5n =%1@ & men from Fnit #4 of the

DPRKs special forcesattempted to enter the 9lue "ouse in Beoul in an unsuccessful

attempt to assassinate President Par; Chung/hee. :eertheless@ in =2#@ follo)ing secret

negotiations bet)een Kim 5l/sungs brother Kim Oong/(u and the R8Ks chief intelligence

officer Oi "u/ra;@ the R8K and DPRK released a (oint statement on achieing reunification

peacefully )ithout the use of military force or e>ternal forces. Despite these deelopments@

the DPRK sponsored a number of terrorist acts against ciilian targets of the R8K. These

included3 the =1& attempted assassination of the R8K President Chun Doo/h)an in

Oangon through a bombing that ;illed # people including four 7yanmar nationalsN the

=1% ,impo Airport bombing that ;illed fie peopleN and the =12 Korean Airlines

bombing that ;illed $ people. These actions contributed to the increasing international

isolation of the DPRK.

0=. The )ounds inflicted by the Korean ar )ere deep and are still felt. The

Commission ac;no)ledges the suffering that has occurred on both sides of the border.

D% )mposition of the @upreme 8eader


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coneyed obligations on rulers to rule (ustly and fairly and for the benefit of all the people.

The Suryongsystem positioned Kim 5l/sung *and his heir apparent+ as unchallenged rulersdue to their proclaimed )isdom and beneolence under )hich the general population )ould

lie in a prosperous and righteous society. 5n this )ay@ the suryongsystem has facilitatedthe unchec;ed iolation of human rights in the DPRK.

. 5n =4=@ Kim 5l/sung secured his designation as Suryong@ Bupreme hibit 02+. Also aailable from http3!!))).hrn;.org!uploads!pdfs!"R:KWKen/,auseWeb.pdf.44 The official biography of Kim 5l/sung@ published by the DPRK@ notes the follo)ing3

I5n December =4$@ Kim 5l Bung conened the Third -nlarged ->ecutie Committee 7eeting of the

Central 8rganiEing Committee of the CP:K in order to crush the machinations of the factionalists

and local separatists )ho had been hindering the implementation of the Partys organiEational line@

and radically improe Party )or; X The meeting too; a historic measure to strengthen the Partyscentral leadership organ by acclaiming Kim 5l Bung as its head@ and meted out stern punishment to the

factionalists )ho had contraened the instructions of the Party Centre and iolated Party discipline.J

Kim 2l Sung$ Condensed 3iography@ pp. ##/#&.4$ According to the =$$ population and housing census conducted by the R8K Central

Btatistical 8ffice@ 2&$@$0 persons of the total population had come from the :orth *before and

during the Korean ar+. Korea 5nstitute for :ational Fnification *K5:F+@ ,hite Paper on 4umanRights in North Korea*#0&+@ p. $0=. During the Armistice negotiations@ the DPRK insisted that$00@000 Koreans )ho had been Ita;en a)ayJ from the :orth during the hostilities had to be returned.

Transcript of Proceedings of the Armistice :egotiations of @ & and # ?anuary =$#@ as reflected in

Korean ar Abduction Research 5nstitute@People of No Return$ Korean ,ar Abduction Pictorial4istory*Beoul@ #0#+@ pp. $%/$1. The Commission receied no information indicating that those )holeft the :orth during the )ar )ere forcibly abducted.

#.
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)ere Koreans )ho had left for China in the =#0s and =&0s@ initially basing themseles in

Bhanghai then moing )ith the Communists to their ciil )ar headquarters of Oanan. The

Boiet Korean action@ ethnic Koreans born or raised in the Boiet Fnion@ numbered

bet)een $0 and #00. Kim 5l/sung )as able to play one faction against another )hile

supporting his o)n ,uerrilla action@ those Koreans )ho fought against ?apanese forces in

7anchuria )ith him. 5n December =$#@ Kim 5l/sung denounced factions in a long speechto the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. 5n =$&@ rumours of an aborted coup

attempt by the Domestic action led to the arrest of their leaders. T)ele members of this

group@ leaders of the Bouth Korean or;ers Party responsible for organiEing guerrilla

actiities in the Bouth@ )ere charged )ith planning a coup and spying for the Fnited Btates.

8n the basis of trials that )ere highly orchestrated and heaily publiciEed@ ten )ere

conicted and sentenced to death )hile t)o )ere gien long prison sentences.4%

4. Kim 5l/sung continued to face pressure )ithin the leadership oer his increasingly

autocratic rule and emerging cult of personality as )ell as the direction of his economic

policies. After =$&@ the Boiet Fnion )as itself undergoing a campaign of Ide/

BtaliniEationJ that did not comport )ith Kim 5l/sungs efforts to consolidate his o)n rule.

5nstead@ the Boiet Fnion )as promoting collectie leadership@ peaceful co/e>istence and

an end to the e>cesses of the Btalin era.

$. 5n August =$%@ the members of the Oanan action openly criticiEed Kim 5l/sung

during the Partys Central Committee Plenum. According to a Boiet account@ one official

Iattac;ed Kim 5l/Bung for concentrating entire state and Party po)er in his handsJ .42 The

leaders of the Oanan faction )ho had tried to orchestrate the IAugust ConspiracyJ )ere

out/maneuered by Kim 5l/sung )ho isolated them before purging the ran; and file of the

faction members.41

%. 5n response to the criticism )ithin the Party against his rule@ Kim 5l/sung e>panded

the 7inistry of 5nternal Affairs to underta;e )hat became one of the DPRKs first large

scale purges. 8n &0 7ay =$2@ the Btanding Committee of the Central Committee of the

or;ers Party of Korea adopted the resolution I8n the Transformation of the Btruggle

)ith Counter/Reolutionary -lements into an All/people All/Party moementJ *7ay &0thResolution+ to ealuate the political bac;ground of eery adult in the DPRK. These

deelopments )ere to become a turning point for the DPRK. -arlier purges had differed in

that they had targeted specific groups of people@ such as landlords@ Christians and high/

ran;ing Party members )ho )ere potential rials to Kim 5l/sung.4=This purge@ lasting until

=%0@ resulted in thousands of e>ecutions@ often in public. Pang "a;/se@ the 7inister of

Public Becurity@ told a Boiet diplomat that 00@000 people )ere e>posed as Ihostile and

4% Andrei


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reactionary elementsJ bet)een =$1 and =$=.$0 5n =$=@ the Ambassador of the ,erman

Democratic Republic to the DPRK also reported to his capital that@ I5n recent times@ the

persecution of comrades )ho e>press a different opinion has been increased. They are

being sent to rural areas@ mines@ hydropo)er dams and also into prison camps.J$ 5n order to

sustain the large/scale purges of the late =$0s@ a system of secret political prison camps

)as set up@ )hich )as later e>panded.$#

2. The 7ay &0th Resolution effectiely launched the Songbun system. Songbuntranslates literally as IingredientJ but effectiely means bac;ground. 5t is a system through

)hich the state categoriEes citiEens of the DPRK into classes based on their perceied

political allegiance to the regime@ ascertained by reference to family bac;ground and

particular actions ta;en by family members. 9ased on this assessment@ citiEens fall into

three broad classes3 core@ )aering and hostile. $& Decisions about residency@ occupation@

access to food@ health care@ education and other serices are contingent onsongbun. hilethe official songbunstructure )as quite elaborate and changed oer time@ its main featurehas been the unchallengeable nature of the designation )hich is inherited mainly through

the paternal line.$4ollo)ing the 7ay &0th Resolution@ the Cabinet issued Decree :o. 4=

prohibiting members of the hostile class from residing near the DemilitariEed Uone or

coastal areas@ )ithin $0 ;m of Pyongyang or Kaesong@ or )ithin #0 ;m of any other large

city. 5n effect@ a large number of people )ere forcibly transferred to the rough mountainous

regions in the northern part of the country )here special settlements )ere created for these

e>iles.$$

1. After the Korean ar ended in =$&@ the DPRK goernment collectiiEed

agriculture and established a centrally/planned economy based largely on heay industry.

Those people )ho remained on farms )ere allo)ed to ;eep a small proportion of their

production )hile the rest )as ta;en by the state. The goernment assigned people to

compulsory employment.$% 5n =$2@ the DPRK instituted the Public Distribution Bystem to

proide food and to ration other goods. As the DPRK )as highly urbaniEed@ an estimated

%0 to 20 per cent of the population relied on the state for these food distributions. The

Public Distribution Bystem suppressed priate production and monopoliEed distribution of

food and household necessities. The entire economic frame)or; of the country@ and in

$0 Andrei ecutions became a customary practice in the DPRK in

the =$0s. "e cites Boiet archies for Pang "a;/ses conersation )ith Counsellor . 5. Pelishen;o.

IKim Ta;es Control3 The I,reat PurgeJ in :orth Korea@ =$%/=%0J@Korean Studies@ ol. #%@ :o. *#00#+@ pp. =1/0$.

$ Cited from a diplomatic cable sent in =$= by the Ambassador of ,erman Democratic

Republic *,DR+. 5n =$2@ the ,DR -mbassy already noted information according to )hich students

)ho had returned from Poland had been sent to prison camps in Pyongyang that )ere guarded by

soldiers. or a citation of the original ,erman te>ts@ )hich )ere found in ,DR archies after

reunification@ see J@ )hich includes both the )aering and hostile

classes.$4 Bee section 5.9.$$ Ken -. ,ause@ ICoercion@ Control@ Bureillance and PunishmentJ@ p. 0.$% 5n December #00&@ the Committee on -conomic@ Bocial and Cultural Rights in its

concluding obserations of the DPRKs initial report@ e>pressed concern Ithat the right to )or; may

not be fully assured in the present system of compulsory state/allocated employment@ )hich is

contrary to the right of the indiidual to freely choose his!her career or his!her )or;placeJ

*-!C.#!!Add.=$+.

#2


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particular the Public Distribution Bystem@ became an important means of social@ economic

and political control.$2

=. 9y the early =%0s@ Kim 5l/sung successfully suppressed public dissent. Any critical

remar; about the political or economic situation could@ and not infrequently did@ lead to

imprisonment and )orse. According to Russian obserers )ho )ere in the DPRK at thetime@ arrests and een e>ecutions )ere imposed for an attitude deemed to be e>cessiely

)arm to)ards the Boiet Fnion@ as )ell as any positie remar;s about the scientific@

technical@ or cultural achieements of other countries.$1

#0. hile the threat of these e>treme human rights iolations constituted a form of

terror deployed against the general population@ Kim 5l/sung continued periodically to

instigate purges )ithin the leadership of the party and military.$=or e>ample@ in =%4@ after

the resolution I8n urther Btrengthening the or; )ith arious ,roups and Btrata of the

PopulationJ )as adopted by the 1 thPlenum of the Partys Central Committee@ a ne)

campaign )as launched to further refine the Songbunsystem. 9et)een =%4 and =%=@ this)or; )as conducted by specially created groups. This e>ercise led to more people being

e>iled@ arrested and e>ecuted as enemies of the regime.%0

#. rom the early days of the DPRK@ Kim 5l/sung and the or;ers Party of Korea had

employed the la) and the (ustice system for purposes of maintaining the Partys supremacy

and suppressing political dissent. 5n his 7arch =$1 speech Ior the -laboration of the

?udicial Policy of our PartyJ@ Kim 5l/sung e>plained that the dictatorial functions of the

(udicial@ procuratorial and public security organs should be enhanced. "e said that Ithe

DPRKs la)s should sere as a )eapon to champion socialismJ and emphasiEed that Iall

the )or;ers of the (udicial organs should be true to the Partys leadership and intensify the

struggle against counter reolutionaries by firmly relying on the (udicial policy of the

PartyJ.%According to official DPRK sources@ Kim ?ong/il carried on )ith the approach of

ma;ing the (ustice system@ and (udges in particular@ sub(ect to the instructions of the

or;ers Party of Korea. According to official DPRK sources@ Kim ?ong/il Isa) to itL that

Party committees at all leels )ere strengthened and their functions and roles )ere

improed in order to intensify Party guidance oer X public security )or;@ and (udicialand procuratorial )or;.J%#

##. The political function of the la) and the (ustice system has also been entrenched in

the DPRKs criminal legislation@ starting )ith the =$0 Criminal Code@ )hich borro)ed

language from the Criminal Act of the Boiet Fnion that )as in force under ?oseph Btalin.

$2 Bee section 5.D.$1 Andrei press the smallest critique or to e>press doubts

regarding the correctness of this or that party directie from the party or the goernment. 5f one does

critique@ then along the lines of the formulations used in official speeches. 5.e.@ first one needs to pointto a large number of achieements and then criticiEe )hat is officially being criticiEed. 5f one does not

)ant to be depried of the means of support and of all perspecties for the future@ including remoal

from Pyongyang@ one must act this )ay only.J I:otes from a Conersation bet)een the st Becretary

of the PR< -mbassy in the DPRK )ith the Director of a Department in 8ne of the 7inistriesJ@ 0$

?anuary =$1@ "istory and Public Policy Program Digital Archie@ Polish oreign 7inistry Archie.

8btained by ?a;ub Poproc;i and translated by 7aya


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7any of the oert references to the function of criminal la) as a tool of political control

)ere remoed in subsequent reisions. "o)eer@ the present criminal la) of the DPRK still

requires the state to carefully identify friends and enemies of the state in its struggle against

Ianti/state and anti/people crimesJ@ and to subdue the small minority of enemies.%&

urthermore@ the state is tas;ed to rely on the po)er and )isdom of the masses in its

handling of criminal cases@%4 rather than to impartially apply the la). 7oreoer@ theCriminal Code currently in use defines ICrimes against the state or the peopleJ *called anti/

reolutionary crimes in the past+ in such br

Documents

UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea